S/PV.400 Security Council

The rem[l.Tks of members of the Security Council will be interpreted COnsecutively; those of all others will be interpreted simultaneously, in accordance with the usual custom of the Council. At the conclnsion of the 398th meeting of the COllncil it was agreed, for thc convenience of members and to permit adjournment at a reasonable hour. to defer to the present meeting the French interpretation of the address which was made by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I now caU upon the interpreter to proceed with this interpretation. CONSElt DE SECURITE PROCES.VERBAUX OFFICIELS QUATRlEME ANNEE No 4 QUATRE.CENTIEME SEANCE Temte cl; Lake Success, New-York, le vendredi 14 janvier 1949, a 15 heures. Pnhident: Le general McNAUGHTON (Canada). Presents: Les representants des pays suivants: Argentine, Canada, Chine, Cuba, Egypte, France, Norvege, Republique socialiste soviMique d'Ukraine, Union des RepubIique.~ socialistes sovietiques, Royaume~Uni, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. I. Ordre du jour provisoire (SIAgenda 400) 1. Adoption de I'ordre on jour. 2. Question indonesienne. 2. Adoption de l'ordre du jour 3~ Suite de la discussion sur la question indonesienne Sur l'iwl!itation d1~ President, M. Hood, repre- srmtol1t de t'Australie; M. Nisot, representant de la Belgique; M. So Nyun, represmtant de la Birmanie; Sir Benegal Rama Rau, representant de f'lnde; M. 'Van Roijen, representant des Pays- Bas; M. IHgtes, representant des Phiri1ppines, at M. Palar, representant de la Repftblique d'In- dQnesie, prennent place ala table du Conseil. Le PRESIDENT (traduit dal'm~glais): Les dis~ cours des membres du ConseiL de secmit6 feront l'objet cl'une interpretation consecutive, Ies antres interventions, d'une interpretation sim111tanee, selon la pratique suivie jusqt1'ici. A la fin de la J98eme seance dl' Conseil, nOllS avions decide, pour notre commodite et pour pou- voir nous' separer a 'tme heure raisennabIe, de remettre jusqu'a la presente seance l'interpr~ta­ tion en fran~ais de la uec1<1mtion du representant de l'Union des Rep11bIiques sociaIistes sovie- tiques. Nons allens donc entendre l'interpretation en fran<;ais de cette dec1aratiorl. Mr. N1S0T (Belgium) (translated from French) : If, as a representative invited by the Council, I may be allowed to insist, I would ask the President to call for an interpretatIon into Fr,ench of the remarks of the USSR representa- tive, Mr. PAll-OPl (France) (translatd from French): At the end of the last meeting on the Indonesian cuestion (398t1~ mutlngJ, it was de- cided that the French translation of this speech would be given at the opening of the present meeting. I therefore a~k the President to pro- ceed in accord.ance with that decision.

Under the circumstances, I would ask the interpreter to proceed. At th-s POi1Ll, the interpreiati~m into Frmcn 'was gi7JIln of the remarks made by Mr. lffaUk, represenlal'FJe of Ihe Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, at the 398th meeting of the Security Cou,ecil.

I would draw the Secudy Council's attention to the two reports which have been received from the C()mmittee of Good Offices this morning from Batavia and which have just been circulated by 6e Secretariat as documents S/1211 and 5/1212. 1 propose 'that the general discussion on the Indonesian questiun be continued. It is my hope that in the course of this afternoon's meeting the general debate may be comple.ted and that thus the ground may he traversed which should be covered before proceeding to consideration of specific proposals. A n~mber of represeutatives have intimated that the.y wished to make general statements today, aVG I am also informed that the representativeof the Netherlands wi~het> to make a statement on behalf of his Government. If the representative of the Netherlands is prepared to speak now, I shall call upon him first. Mr. VAN ROlJEN' (Netherlands): 'With the President's permissiun, I shall not limit myself to the statement of my Government, but I should like first of all to answer several of the speakers who have spoken on previous 0eeasions. The Secmity Council will not expect me to enter into nU the remarks which have be/'.:l made in this debate, but a number of them, particularly on the part of tbe non-members, have give:! proof of SUC3 obvious bias and unfairness that I cannot let them pass without comment. It seems to me that the meaSllie in which the Seem'Lt)' Council's resolutions [5/1150> S/1164, $)1165] have, ill fact, been carried out by tlS should have ent:tled my country's attitude to a more balanced and fair appraisal than it has received, I shall try to demonstrate this with regard to each of the specific items contained in the Council's resolutions, These items were: first, the termination of hos~ tilities; secondly, the release of political leaders, M. NlSOT (Belgique): Si, en tant que representant invite par le Conseil, je puis insister sur ce point, je demanderai au President de bien vouloir iaire proceder a une interpretation en franc;ais du discours du representant de l'URSS. M. PARODI (France): A la fin de la derniere seance consacree a la question indonesienne (398eme seance] il avait e.te entendu que t'in· terpretation en fraw;ais de ce discours aurait lieu au debut de la presente seance. Je vous demande. Monsieur le President, de hien vouloir y faire proceder aiusi que cela avait et~ d~ciJe. Le PRtSIDENT (traduit de 1'111tgla-is); Dans ces conditions l'intcrpretation va avnir lieu. La declaration prononcee d la 398eme seana du Conseil de .~ewrite par M. Ma.lik, reprisal!- ta1tt de fUnion des Rcpubiiquc.s .'Iocit;lli.ste.s somA· tiques, est interprf:tee en friJlI~ais. Le PRESIDENT (lrad1,it de 1'1l1;glais) : ]'attire l'atlention du Conseil de securite sur les deux rappc,rts de la Commission' de bans offices, arrives ce matin de Batavia, et qui ont ele llistribuC3 par le SecTetarkt 5011S les cotes 5/1211 et 5)1212. Je propose que nous poursuivions la discussion geru~ralt: de la question indonesienne. J'espere que nOllS pourrons J'achever au cours de la seanre de cet apres~midi; nous atlrOllS alOl-S franc1\i l'etap€' preliminaire a l'exanten des propositions concretes. Un certain llomore de representants ont indj· que qu'ils voudraient prononcer aujourd'hui des declamtions de caractere general: j'apprends egallOntent que le representant des Pays-Bas desire faire Ime declaration au nDm de son GllUvernement. Si le representant des Pays-Bas est pret a prendre la parole maintenant, je In. lui donnerai volontiers. M. VAN ROfJEN (Pays-Bas) (traduit de J'onglais); Avec la permission du President, je ne vais pas me homer a presenter la'declaration de mon Gouvernement, car je voudrais repondre d'abord it. pltHieurs orateurs qui ont parU~ au .cours de seances precedentes. Le Conseil de securite n'attend certainement pas de mo.i que je commente toutes les observations qui ant ete formulees au COUts de ce dil'bat. 11 en est, toutefois, un certain nombre, emanant notamrnent de representants d'Etats non membres du COIlseil, qui sont si injustes et temoignent d'Ull tel parti pris que je dc-is les relever. Etant donne la mesure dans laquelle nous avons effectivement applique 1€5 resolutions DU COllseil de securite [5/1150,' S/1164, Sj116.5j, mon pays Hait, jl me semble, en droit d'attendre qu'on ju~eit son attitude avel: plus de ponderation et d'equite. Je vais m'attacher it en fain: la prellvc en reprenant chactltl des points partieuliers des resolutions. Ces points etaient les suiyants: premierement, la cessation des hostilites; deuxiemement, la libe- Although the Netherlands Government strongly holds the opinion that the Security Council is not competent to deal with the Indancsi~n ques· tion, it has, in view of the great interest taken in this question by the Security Council, kept it fully informed of the way in which in fact its wishes were being satisfied. On 7 January [397th meeting], I explained to the Counci! that the three points of its resolutions were either fulfilled or in the course of being fulfilled. Yet that statement met with sharp criticism from a number of representatives. I shall deal with this criticism point by point. The representative of the Republic of Indo· nesia has stated that the Netherlands: "has officially ordered the cessation of hostilities while simultaneously ordering its army to fire on the units of the enemy forces which have remained among the Dutch units in accordance with their defence tactics." I am sorry to say that this gives an e.'1tirely distorted picture of the actual situation. The only action which is still allowed to the Netherlands troops is action against disturbing elements who - either individually or collectively - endanger public security or interfere with or prevent the supply of food and other essential commodities to the population. Such measures are a normal conse.quence of the responsibility of any State towards its population, and in this connexion I may remind the Council of article I of the additional Renville principles [Sj649, Appendix V111] in which the Republic of Indonesia agreed that sovereigllty i:1 the whole of Indonesia was and would remain with the Netherlands Govcrnhlent until the establishment of the United States of Indonesia. Mr. Palar also declared at the 397th meeting that the Republican forces are completely intact in Java and in Sumatra.· If it is Mr. Palar's intention to emphasize that on the Republican side, too, there is only a very low number of victims to deplore, I can entirely agree with his statement. But Mr. Palar tried also to make the Council believe that fightinK is still going on and that there still exists a Reptiblic.an Anny which is offerjng resistance. It is perhaps not entirely superfluous for me to say that this is completely at variance with the facts. It will, however, be more convincing to some representatives if I quote from the report of one of the nrst neutral foreign eye-witnesses to visit Jogjakarta. From a dispatch of a special correspondent of The Times of London in Jogjakarta dated 5 January, I quote the following: "It was understandable that Jogjakarta, until recently the capital of a Republic claiming 20 million subjects, should be completely occupied by the Dutch in seven hours; ... It is harder to understand the amazingly peaceful conditions now prevailing in the city, where for three years '! " J' I , ;' J'extrais ce qui suit d'une ~epeche d'un corre:;· pondJ.nt p<lrticulier du Times de Londres aDjokjakarta, en date du S janvier: "On peut comprend~e que Djokj~kart~. cncOl;e tout recemment la capltale d'une Repllbhque pretendant compter vingt millions de sujets, ait pt! avoir ete completement orcnpee par lcs Hol1an~ dais en l'espace de sept hel1res j .•. Il est plu~ difficile de comprendre le calme surprenant qUI, "The brigade that occupied Jogjakarta had less than one fatai casualty a day. There is still some sniping on the olltskirts at night, and several nights ago an arme.d band filtered into the centre of the city. Convoys are running on all main roads without interference. Indonesians have had plenty of time to regroup their forces, but so far there are absolutely no signs of the guerritla offensive threatened in their propaganda, "The quality and temper of the Republican Army-the Army was the main stumbling-block in negotiations between the Dutch and the Hatta Government-is shown by the fact that during the past few days 304 of its officers have sur. rendered, Every morning the Dutch have sent out a truck with a loudspeaker to tour the city ~nd the outskirts giving rende/JVous for surrender. Many of those who have surrendered have been staff officers, and a high proportion have come. in with their arms. They included two majorgenerals and one coloneL , . , Some of these officers have been detained; tile rest have been released and told to report to the police twice a week. It seems that they had become thoroughly disgusted with conditions in the Republican army," This is the end of the quotation from The Ti'mes of London of 6 January, The facts are, as is proven by the amazingly low numhe.r of casualties, that the much vaunted Republican Army cf 300,000 to 400,000 men has practically put up no fig.bt, that instead of the mass resistance on the part of the people which the Republic claimed would ensue, there ha~ been no resistance or enmity from the populatton at al~. There has not even been any largescale guernlla warfare, nor is it to be expected, On the contrary, the number of murders kid~ nappings and other acts of terror whieh f~r the !astnine mO,nths before the purge, had e~nstantly been mountmg, has already noticeably declined. Altogether, ~hre,e weeks after the beginning et the purge, hfe IS nearly back to normal in the former Republican areas. ,S,eyeral repre.scllt,atives h~ve also violently cntlclzed our actlOn m connexlOn with the release of the political leaders. In the faee of the amount of demagogy which has been poured forth over the Council in this respect, I tmst the Council wLll base itself on the facts and keep a sense of proportion, Vihat are the actual facts in this respect? O-f the prominent political leaders Upon whom enforced residence has been imposed all but a few enjoy full freedom of movement.' For these few, freedom of movement for the time being is limited to a specified area, At t~e Council's meeting [397thJ on last Friday, I mformed the Council that ihis area was the island of Bangka. This indeed, was the in- "Le5 pertes subies par la brigade qui a occupe Djokjakarta sont de moins d'une vie humaine par jour. On entend encore, la nuit, des coups de feu isoles aux abords de la ville, IL y a 'quelv ques nuits, une bande armee qui s'est glissee jusqu'au centre de la ville. Les convois parcoU~ rent toutes [es grandes routes sans ette inquietes. Les Indonesiens ont e'u tout le temps de. regrouper letir forces, O1ais, jusqu'a present, on n'observe aucun indice de l'offensive de guerillas dont avait parle la propagande indonesienne. "On peut jl1ger de la qualite et du moral de l'armee republicaine - l'armec eLait la pierre d'achoppement principa1e da.fJ.s les negociations entre les Hollandais et le Gouvernemel1t Eatta - d'apres le fait que, en quelques jOllrs, 304 offi~ tiers de cette armee se sont rendus, Tous les matins, les Hollandais font circuler, dans la ville et dans ses environs immMiats, un camion muni d'un haut-parleur qui indique Ies points Olt sont acceptees les redditions, Beaucoup de ceux qui se sont rendus sont des officiers d'etat-major, dont la plupart etaient en armes. On compte notamment deux generaux de division et Un colonel ... Certains de ees oIficiers ont cti~ prives de leur liberte; les autres ont ete relaches et ant ete pries de se presenter .i la police deux "fois par semaine. It semble qu'ils soient devenus profonuement d<~gotites des conditions qui regnaient dans l'armee repl\blicaine," Je terminc lci cette citation du Times de Londres du 6 janvier. Ce qui est vrai, comme le prouve le nombre derisoire des victimes, c'est que cette annee republicaine si prance, de 300.000 a 400.000 hommes, n'a pratique1nent oppose attcune resistance, D'autre part, au lieu de la levee en masse du peuple qui devait se produire, (lUX dires de la Republique, il n'y a eu absolument aucune resis~ tance, ni meme auettne hostiiite de la part de la population c:ivile, I1 n'y a meme pas eu d'action importante de guerillas, et il n'y a pas lieu d'en attendre. Au contraire, le nombre des meur~ tres, enle-vements et autres aetes de terret1f qui etait alle croissant clansles neld mois rrece'dant l'epuration, a deja sensiblement diminue. Dans l'ensemble, trois semaines apres le debut de l'epuration, la situation est redevenue presque normale dans les regions precedemment sous autorite republicaine. Plusie.u.rs representants ant egal;ment violem~ ment cnhquf. notl'e conduite quant .i la remise en liberte des chefs politiques, Malgre les flots d'eloquence demagogique dont le Conseil a ete sature a ce propos, j'cspere que le Conseil s'en tienclra aux faits et gardera le sens des proportions. Quels sont done les faits en la matiere? Tous les princ.ipaux dirigeants politiques acteellement en reSidence forcee jouissent d'tme entiere liberte de mOl1vement, a l'exception de que1ques-uns qui n'ont pour le moment la \iberte de se dCplacer que dans une zone determin~e. ,A la ~,e~n:e de ,vendredi demier [397emr. ~Ca~l(e], J;;U ~nforme ,!e Conseil que cette zone etalt constltuee par 111e de Banka. Telle 61ait Having said this about the actual facts, I must add a few remarks in this connexion. In the first place I should remind the Council that from the beginning I announced that the Republican leaders would be relea~ed tlpon the understanding that the persons concerned would refrain from activities endangering public security. Therefore if those leaders whose release might at this moment still endanger public security are still restricted to a certain area, it is consistent with that statement, In the second plate I submit that the Council has embarked on a very dang,erous COUrse, and I urge every member of this Council to weigh carefully what the consequences will be if the Cotmcil starts meddling in the question whether any Member State has, with or without good grounds, taken certain measures to safeguard its internal security, Not we, but the Council, is thus undermining the whole stnlcture of the l!nited Nat.ions hy breaking away one of its main pIllars, whICh is that the United Nations shall refrain from interference in the internal affairs of 1fember States. The result of sueh a course would be disastrous, not only for the United Nations but also for the seClldty of its Members. I must point out one more aspect of this matter. Th'2 fact that during the hostilities we have imposed enforced residence upOn certain political leaders is in perfect harmony with international law and practice. It is completely normal, not only in the case of international wars, but still more in the case of internal disturbances or of action against a group or faction whose de facto authority had been recognized over a certain area within a State, that if the leaders of sl1ch a group or faction fall into the hands of the oth~r party, they are temporarily deprived of thelr freedom of movement. This is not o;'\ly normal; it is also sanctioned by intern<ltionallaw. To prove this, let me quote one of the most authoritative works in this field. In Oppenheim's International Law, sixth edition, we read on page 279 of part II, in the paragraph dealing with the position of the head of an enemy State and officials in important posts: "... they 3re so important to the enemy States, and they may be so useful to the enemy and so dangerous to the invading; forces, that they may In the present case, there was, of course! n.o question of war between, t,:"o State~, bU~ 1, IS evident that the same pnncIple applies With al1 the more force in the case of internal strife within aState, There are plenty of examples in recent history to confirm this practice. How many leaders of a political opposition are allowed to retain their freedom, even in times of peace, in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics? And what, may I ask, has become of the Nizam of Hyderabad? The same has been done many times with leaders of revolutions or CQUPS (j'~t(Jt in many countries. All that I have said goes to show, in our opinion, first, that the Security Council is cverstepping its authority under the Charter by interfering in the measures taken by a Membe.r State for its internal security; secondly, that, in so doing, the Security Council is embarking upon a course extremely dangerous to the security of the Members; thirdly, that the imposition of restricudns of movement in a case like the present one was in accordance with international law and practice; and, fourthly, that this restriction has in fact now been lifted for all but a few le2ders, the remooning on.es having freedom of movement in a specified area. 1 may add thilt I have jllst received some additkmal information which may interest the Security Council. On 13 January in Bandung the Assembly for Federal Consultation, which is the gathering of the leaders of the federal areas, adopted a resolution which stressed tha~ the formation of a national federal Governmert for the w~ole of Indonesia, on the basis of the decree conce:ning the administration of Indonesia durR ing the transit:on period, is necessary for the transition to the free and sovereig,n United States of Indonesia. The resolution added that, before the fonnation of that Government, it wOl1td be necessary to con.sult prominent persons from the territories which have been under Republican control. In response to this resolution, the Netherlands authorities have promised all possible co-operation in order to bring about the desired contact between the Federalist leaders and stlch other prominent persons mentioned in the resoluR tion [5/1150] as they may wish. This contrad will be entirely free and will take place w:thout the presence of .any Netherlands authorities. I now come to the rr.atter of facilities given to the Committee of Good Offices, the Consular Commission and the military observers to carry out the hsk entrusted to them by the Se:urity Caund. The Security Council has been informed by the Commttee of Good Offices, in the Committee's report of 8 January 1949 [5/1193] that "... arrangements have been approved for the Dans le ca~ actuel, iI ne s'agit eYidem;ncnt pas d'une guerre entre deux Etats, mais il va de soi que le meme principe s'appliqLlc avec t:ne force plus grallde encore dans le cas d'une 1utte intes~ tine a I'interieur d'un Etat. L'histoire contemporaine nous fourott de nombreux exem?tes de cette pratique. Ccmbicn ) a-t.i1 de dirigeants d'me opposition politique qu soient autorises a conserver leur libcrte, memc er temps de palx, dans l'Union des Republiquc: socialistes sovietiques? Qu'on me dise ce qu'i est advenu du Nizam d'Haide:-abad? Les insti gateurs de revolutions ou de coups d'Etat dan~ de nombreux pays ant eu bien souvent le memt sort. Tout ce que je "iens de dire prouve, d'abo~d que le Conseil de securite outrepassc l'atltorll que 1ui confere la Cbarte en intervenant dan des mesures prises par un £tat Mcmbrc pour s securite interleure. Cela prouve at1ssi que, C faisant, le Conseil ele securitc s'engage sur un voie extremement dangcreuse pour la securit des Membres. Cela prouve encore qce le fa: d';mposer des restrictions a la liberte de mouve ment dans un cas comme celul-ci est conform at: droit intern<ltiona1 et a la pratique i:lternatic m.le. Cela prouve enfin que ces restrictions or ete effectiverncnt levees en fait pOHr tons 11" d:efs politiques, sauf quelques-uns qui jouisser cependant cle lem Iiberte de mouvement dans ur zone determinee. Je viens du reste de rf'ccvoir de nOllvcau renseignements qui pourraient il1tl~resser - Conseil de sectlrite. Le 13 janvier, I'A!'>;cmblC cOllsultative federale de n:mdceng, c'cst-a-dil la reunion des chefs des regions feder<;,l~s, adopte une resolution soulignant qu'it est necc: saire de former un gOtlyernement national Cederpour l'ensemble de l'Indonesie sur la base C decret sur l'administration de l'Indonesic J>el dunt la periode de transition, pour effcctller transition qui aboutira a la creation des Etat Unis libres et souverains d'InelOl1csie. La reS' lution ajoute que, ,want de former cc gO\1ve nement, il faudra consulter 1es princiralcs perso' nalites des territoires qui ant tte SOttS le contra republicain. A la s,jte de cWe reso:ution. ) :l.utorites neerlandaises ont promis toutc' la Ct> peration possible pour realiser les contacts you!' ent:~ 1es chefs. fedel}listes et les autres pcrso nailtes en questIOn qu 11s pourraicnt vouloir conSl ter. Ce~ contacts seront absolumcnt li!]rc~ aUfOnt hen saus la presence des atttorites nccrla daises. J'arrive :naintenant a la qt1estion des facilit accordees a la Commission ele bans o;ncL'$ a C?mmission conSll1aire et <lUX obscrvatcnr!l' mi t;C.1res pom 1eur peImettre de.' s'acqttittcr de t5c.he que le Conseil de secltrite If'_l1r a C'onfi, Le Conseil de securite a ete informe P'lf'" ~mm~ssion de bons offices, 1,allS son rap{lo~·t _ 8ymvler 1~9 [-?,(1193J.que ." . ont 6te apprc; vees des dISPOSitIons vlsant l envoi des obs~ On 9 January, ten teams of military observers returne<i to the field in all areas which have been ur,der Repllb:ican control to resume their activities, and up to the present time these military observers seem to be completing fleir task to theil- ::;atisfaclioil and to that of the Committee of Good Offices a::ld the Consular Commission. It is true that in the beginning there was some delay. It must he pointed out, however, that this was a result of the confusion which existed con~ concerning the interrl'lation of the tasks of th~ two bodies I have just mentioned. In this connexion, I may quote from the' report of the Committee of Good Offices of 7 January [S/1189]. "If the Committee of Good Offices is to continue to func:ion, it is requested that the Security Council define the respective func:ions of the Committee and of the Consul<lr Commission under the resolutions of 24 [5/1150J and 23 [S/1164 and S/1165] December 1948. Inability to deter-mine whether the fm:ctions of one are at this point exclusive cf the other or are cor.- current, and the problem as to whom the military observers are primarily responsible, h<'..ve already created some difficulty ..." Likewise, it is said in the report of the Con~ sular Commission of 6 January [S/1190]. "Practical reasons make clarification of respcctive positions of Committee and Commission urgently necessary, especially concerning disposal of military observers." This shows tha: the accusation of the representative of the United States was entirely unjustified when he said [398th mectittg] that "... the Netherlar.ds <luthorities too:C upon them· selves the authority to question whether the military observers were reporting tu tiJe Consular Commission or to the Committee of Goe,d Offices." It also appears from the report of the Consnlar Commi!':!':ion [S/1190j that Gn 3 January both toe Co:nmittee of Good Offiees and the Consnlar Commission l'eceived a letter from the head of the Netherlanus Far Eastern Office promisir.g facilities for botl: bodies and for the military observers, but that subsequently some confusion arose between the two bodies. Furthermore, in its report of 7 January [5/1189] the Committee of Good Offices me:lfans only the meeting of its military observers A cctte fm, ;e commandant en chef needandais a danne, le 8 janvier, 0. tous les ccmmandants territoriaux de Java et de Sumatra l'ordre d'appo:-ter al1x o~servate1!rs militaires toute I'aide compatible avec Jeur role et let:rs responsabilites militaires, et avec les besoins de la se.curite. 11 a rappele.. d'ailleurs, que ce sont les observatetlfS qui assument taus les risques, car it ne sera pas possible d'affecter toujours a leur protection des detachements speciaux de gardes. Le 9 janvier, dix equipes d'observatellrs militaires sont reparties en campagne dans toutes les regions qui, jt:.squ'i present, ant ete sous le contr6le repub1icain, pour y reprendre 1ellr activite. 11 semble, jusqu'~ present, que ces ohserva~elml militairl's ~oient satisfaits de la maniere dont its s'acquittent de leur tache et que leur satisfaction soit partagee par la Coomission de bans offices et la Commission consu1aire. 11 est vrai qu'il y eut au debut un certain retard: cela. et~it du, it faut le dire, au flottement qui existait clans les esprits gtlant aux taches respectives des d~ux organismes q,:e je viens de mentionner. A cet egard, qu'il me soit pennis de citer un passage du rapport de la Commission de bans offices en date ju 7 janvier [S/1189J: "Si la Commission de ballS Jffices doit rester en fonction, le Conseil de securitc devra Mfinir les attributions respectives de la Commission et cdes de la Commission const:laire aux termes des resolutions des 24 [S/1150] et 28 [S/1164 et 5/1165] decembre 1948. :"e fait qu'il est in:possible de savoir si les fonctions de ces deux ccmmissions sont au stade present incompatibles, si elles peuvent coexister, et le ptobU:me de savcir devant laqllelle des commissions les observateurs militaires sont re~ponsables, Il. deja cree certaines difficultes .•." De meme, il est dit da!1s le ra.pport de la Commlssion consulaire en date du6 janvier [S/1190]: "Des motifs d'ordre pratique exigent que soit precisee d'urlYence la position respective de la Commission de boes offices et de la Commission cons111aire, notamment en ce qui concerne l'utilisation des observateurs militaires." Cela montre tj ue le representant des Etats- Unis a prononce une accusation inj:.lstinee lorslllt'il a dit [398bne sear_ccJ: "... les <llltorites neerlandaises ant pris sur elles de poser la question de savoir si les observateurs rni;itaires faisaient rapport a la Commission r.onsulaire ou .a la Commission de bons affices". Il ressort egalement du rapport de la Commissbn consulaire [5/1190] que, le 3 janvier, la. Commission de Lam; officcs et la Commission consulaire ont ret;u une !ettre au chef du Bureau c1es Pays-Bas pall: l'Extreme--OTient, leur prorr.ettant des fac:ilit~.s a toutes deux ainsi qu'aux observatellrs militaires, mais que, par la suite, tlnc ce:iaine confusion 'l'P~t ?rorluite cn~re ces de.ux organes. De plus, dans son rapport en date du 7 janvier [S/1189j, b Commission. de bons offices parle settlement des conversations qui ont ell lieu le "T:lese officers are not the military observers of the Committee of Good Offi:es and the information they obtained lS not available to the Committee, even if their tour was of the type of field investigation and observation required by the functions of the Committee." Shce the military observers were dispatched to the field on 9 January, this whole question is now settled. But it seems ne:essary to draw attention to the unfair assertion m<lde bv the Com:uittee of GO'Jd Offices, as though no attempt had been made from ou side to procure for the ohservers the facilities we h2.ve promised. In conclusion, I may again state that the three objectives aimed at by the Security Council have been realized as. far as possible. Certainly, in no other case before be Secnrity Conncil-be it the question of Greece or of Korea or of Palestine or 0: Kash;nir or of Hyderabad-has this been done within so short a time and to such a deg,ee. As I explained elaborately on 22 DI~eember [38.0~h meetingJ at the Otltset of the discussions on this subject, ,:ny Government emphatically denies, for three reasons, the ccmpetence of the Security Council with regard to the Indonesian Question. In the first pJ;o,ce, the Charter of the United Nations is applicable only between States, and therefore does not apply to the Indonesian question; in the second place, 6is is a qu es:ion within the domestc jurisdiction of the Netherlands in the sense of Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter; and, in the third place, it does not threaten imernaticnal peace and security. V'le rema:n prepared to submit the question of the Secu:-ity Council's competence to the International Court of Jl1stice, which obviously is the only way of determining in an ir:tparti~l manner whefher or not the Council 1135 jurisdiction over this case. n~L1nis auparav2nt, le 3 janvier, a 8 h. 30, et que le commandant en chef neer1andais etait present. Le commandan: en chef a propose alors que les attaches militaires visitent, methodiquement, leg differentes regions republicaines afin de rennir des donr.ees pour 1ellr rappo:i. Tous les attaches militaires presents, a savoir les repn~sentants des Etats-Unis, du Roya'Jrne-U:ti et de la France, ont approuve sans reserve les propositions neerlandaises, mais ont cemaride de remettre toute decision jt1squ'a ce qll'ils aient re<;u de nouvelles instructions. A la suite de cette reunion, !e cornrrandant en chef neerlandais, pot:r mOr:trer sa bonne volonte, a, 1es 5 et 6 janvier, emmene en tournee a t:tre officieux qllelques officiers de liaison dans les regions precedemment occl1pees par la Repl1uliql1e. Ce fait est mentionne dans la conclusion dll ~apport de la Commission de bans offices [5/1189], mais il nOlls a simplement 'lalu Lffi paragraphe de.sobtgeant de la part de la Commission, qui ecrit dans ce rapport: "Ces officiers ne sont pas des observateurs militaires de kt Com:nission de ballS offices, qui ne peut connaitre le resultat ::le leurs observations, meme si la visite qu'ils ant hite c:onstitue le type d'enqllete et d'oLserl'atiom Sllr ?lace qu'cxige l'execution des fonctions de 1:3. Commission." Pl1iscue des observateurs militaires ont ete envoyes s~r leg Iieux le 9 janvier, toute cette Question se trouve regJee. this .:e crois devoir attirer ]'attention dn Conse'l sur l'assertion injuste de la Commission de bons offices, qui flemh~<,: croire que nous n'avons rien fait pOUr accorder au:<: observateurs les facilites promises, Pour conclure, je repete que Ies trois hilts vises par le Conseil de securite ant He atteints dans la mesme du possible. L est certain que dans atlcur,e autre affaire dont le Comeil a ete saisi,qu'll s'agisse de la Grece, de la Coree, de la falestine, du Cachemire, d'Haiderabac, cela ne s'est produit aussi vite ni dans une mesure aessi grande. Comme je [Iai explique en detail le 22 d~cero­ bre [389hlte seance], au debt1t des debats s\.:r cette question, man Gouvernement nie categori~ quement la competence du Conseil de securite ,n cc qui concerne la question indonesienne, ~l tela pO'.tr trois raisons. La premiere, c'en que:a Charte des Nations Unies ne gouverne que les relations entre Etats et ne s'app:ique donI:: pas a la ql1estion indonesienne; la seconde, t'est que cette qnestioll est de la competence nationale des Pays-Bas au sem de l'Arlicle 2, paragl'aphe 7, de la Charte; la troisieme, c'est rue la situation en Tndonesie ne menace pa~ la pa{x et la seCUrte in,ternationales. Nons somrnes t01.1jlou,s pr&s it soumettre la question de la competence cli Conseil de secllrite a la Cour internationale de Justice, ce Qui serait evidemment le seul moy(n de determiner de fa~on impartia1e si I~ CCJllscil est competent en la matiere. sov~reign and independent United States of InclonesJa. Finally, as I have already said, the Security Council's objectives h<tve been realized to the extent which has been possible. For this reason we have the feeling that, in response, we m.1Y at least expect from the side of the Conncil a more impartial appraisal of the efforts which we made to meet the desires of the Council, notwithstand~ ing our conviction that this matter is our own domestic affair. I hope that some members of the SeC!lrity Council will realize that it is an inadequate way to encourage comrliance with its wishes if every act on our part of meeting those wishes is either ignored or minimized ar met with new requests from the Council. This is a1l the more so as the "impettlOsity" on the part of the COl1ndl-<Is with good reason it has been called by one of its members with regard to the Indonesian case-is in marked contrast with an extreme leniency shown in certain other disputes before the Council. My cotmtry cannot fail to notice this striking contrast, and would find it difficult in the long run to submit passively to what it righlly considers as measuring with two weights ..nd measures, My country likewise cannot fail to notice that some of the most violent attacks upon uS have been made by representatives of Governments the record of which in the field of compliance with the Security Council's resolutions is anything but impeccable, Let me mention a few examples to prove this point. In Paris, the representative of Syria, who stated that he spoke on behalf of the Arab League complained of a lack of compliance on the pa:t of the Netherlands with t.he ?ecurity Council's resolutions. In this cannex!on It seems lIseful to recall that between March and June 1948 the Security Council had, in no ,Ies~ than seven resolutions, called upon the part;es m the Palestine dispnte to cease all acts of ViOlence or of armed force These resolutions were adopted on 5 March [Sj691J, 1 April [5/714/1J, 17 April [S/723], 23 Ap'-;! [5/727], 18 May [5;753], 22 May [S/773] and 29 thy [S/801] , In those ,resolutions of 18 May and 22 l'!ay the Sec~1rl!Y Council even called for a cease-l1re order wlthlll thirty-six hours, Yet it took until 11 June, more than three months after the nrst cease~fire reso~ lution of the Council for a truce to become effective' and we kno"; to what degree this truce was obs~rved afterwards. I do not want to criticize any particlll2.r party for the non-:o~­ pli::mce with these resolutions, but contranw:se we certainly had not expected a rep~esent~tl~e of Syria to cl'iticize os for net complymg wlthm less than one week. De me-me, mon pays ne PCtlt s'empecher de remarqtler que eertaines des attaques les plus violentes dirig-ees contre lui proviennent de repn~sentants de GOllvernements dont la conduite 1Jassee, en ce qui concerne le respect des resolutions du Conseil de securite, est loin d'etre exemplilire. Je citerai quelques exemples a I'applli de mes dires. Le representant de la Syrie, qui ~'est de.c1ar~ le porte-parole de la Ligue arabe, s est plamt a Paris que les Pays~Bas n.e Be c~nfo:~alent p~ aux resolutions du Consel! de secunte. Je erots bon de rappeler, a ce prop?s, ~~e, entr~ t;Jars ~~ juin 1948, le Conseil de secllnte, a vote Jusqt.-t a sept resolutions invitant 1es partJe~ en Palestm~ a cesser tout acte de violence et tont recours a la force armee. Ces resolutions ont ete adoptees le 5 mars [S/691] , le le~ avril [5/714/1j, l~ 17 avril [S'723] le 23 ~vnl [S/727], le 18 mal [5/753], le/n m~i [Sj773] et le 29 rnai [S/8ql]. Dans 1es ~esolutions de 18 mai et du 22 mal, le Conseil d~ securite a meme invite les parties a cesser le feu dans les trente-six heures. Pourtan~, ce n'est que le 11 juin, c'est-a-d~~e plus de t;01S mois apres l'adoption de la premiere de, ces reso~ lutions, que la treve est devellue f'jfectlVe, N~us savons d'ailleurs dans quelle mesl1re cette treve a ete observee par la suite. Je ne vellX reprocher a quiconque de n'avair pas observe les. termes, de cette resolution, mais. pour ma part, Je ne m a~­ tendais guere a ce qu'un repre:,enta~.t :Ie la Syne nous reprochit de n~ pas avo,r Ob~l a Ull ordre dans un delai de moms d'llne semame. dea~ly stated by its deleg~tion ..." On 3 June 1948 [312th meeting] the Security Council adopted another resolution [5/819] on the India-Pakistan dispute. Again India refused to wmply with certa:n points of the Council's decision, and I quote from a lettcr of the representative of India to the President of the Security COllncil, dated 5 June 1948 (5/825J. "... there can be r.o question 0 f the Commission. proceeding to implement the r~s01ution on Kashmir until objections raised by the Government of India have heen satisfactorily met." Again, we find it difficult to accept criticism on the part of the same country which took thi.c; att~tl.lde with regard to the Security Council's resolullOllS. This be<omes all the more difficult when we realize that fourteen months' time was necessary to reach a truce in Kashmir, Another country which in Paris vehemently accused the Netherlands of non-compliance with the Sect:rity Council's decision and of a lack of respect for the United Nations, :s the USSR. I sha!l not go into all the accusations launched by the representative of the USSR, but simply look at the record of the USSR itself and of the countries which it constantly defends. On 21 October 1947 the General Assembly. by 4') votes to 6 with 11 abstentions, adopted resolution 109 (II) concerning the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece, in which it called upon Albania, Bulgaria and y.Jgos:avia to do nothing which would furnish aid and assistance to the guerrillas fighting against the Greek. Government. It also in~tjtl1ted a Special CommIttee on the Balkans on which the USSR was to be represented. What is the record or cotnplinnce with this resolution by the USSR and its satellites, v,·hich today 21'e accusing the Netherknds of a Lack of respect fOr United Nations decisions? ' These are the facts, Greece's northern 'neighbotHs, with the active support and protection of the USSR, continued to furnish aid and assistance to the guerrillas in Greece, as has been reporled by tbe United Kations Special Cor.lmittee on the Balkans. The USSR and Poland refused to take their seats on the Committee. Greece's northern neighbours, again with the full support and protection of the USSR, refused all co-operation and facilities to the Committee instittlted by the General Assembly's resolution, and even denied it access to their territory. aG~usations. -'ai devant noi le texte d'une 1ettre adressee au ~ President du Conseil de securite par le representant de l'Il1de et dat&: du 5 mai 1948 [Sj734]. Otte rettre a trait a la resolution adoptee pllr le Conseil le 21 avril sur la question du Cachemire et contient le passage suivant: "Le GOt1Vernement de l'Inde regrette de ne pas etre en mesure de mettre a execution les rarties de la resolution a l'egard desquelles ses objec-' tiOllS ont ete dairement exposees par sa delegation .•. H Le 3 juin 1948 (312eme seance], le Conseil de seenrite a adopte une resolution :S/819] sur' le dlffere.nd lnde-Pakistan. U. encore, l'lnde a refuse de se conformer, Sur certains points, a 11;. uecision uu Conscil et jc cite le passage s"ivant d'une lettre adressee, le S jUin 1948, 3.t! President du Conseil de secllrite' par le rep;'esentant de l'Inde [5/825], "... iI ne peut etre q:.lestion pour la CommissiOl1 d'entreprendr~ nu de faire appliqucr la resobtion sur le Cachemire tant que les objections soulevees par le Gouvernement de l'lnde nJauront pas ret;u tl:1{, reponse satisf,:;isante." 11 110US est difficile, je le repete, d'admettre la critique de la part d'un pays qui a pris cette attitude a l'.egard des resolutions dtl Conieil de secul'ite, Cela nottS est enCOre plus cifficile q1,1and nous songcons ql':"il a :allu ql1atorze mo:s pour about:r a tme tn~ve dans le Cachernire. Un autre pays qui, a Paris, a accLtse 1es Pays- Bas avec velU~mtllCe de lIe pas se conformer a la decision du Conseil cc sect:rite e: de manquer de respect al'egard des Nations Unies, est ['Union des Republiques sociajstes sovietiques. .le ne m'etendrai pas sr.r toutes les accusations lancees par le representant de l'URSS, mais je me borllerai a rappeler les actes passes de son Gouvernement et des pays dont i1 prelld constammen: la defenSe. Le 21 octebre 1947, l'Assemblee generale a adopte par 40 voix contre 6, avec 11 abstentions, la resolution 109 (II) relative a l'illdepcndunc~ politique tt l'integrite territvriale de la Grcke, par laquelle clle invitait l'A1banie, la Bu~garie et la Yougoslavie it s'abstenir de fou:rnir aide et assistance aux guerillc.s 111ttant contre le Couvert"lement grec. L'Assemb1ee generale a egalemenl insti:ue une Commission speeia1e des Nations Unies pOUt les Balkans, a laquelle l'URSS devait etre representee. Qtulle sUlte l'URSS (( ses satellites, qu: accusent alljourd'hui les Payl- Bas de ne pas respecter 1es decisions des Naliors Unic~, ont-ils donncc it ccttc d~8olution? Tels sont 1es faits: Les voisins dll nord de b. Grece, activement soutenus et proteges p;;r l'URSS, ont continue it fournir aice et assistan<e aux guerillas de Greee, comme en a rendu com~e la Commission specia1e des Nations Unies po~r les Balka:ls. L'URSS et la Pologne ant refu!e de sieger a la Commission. Les vOIsins dlt .no~ de la Grece, toujours avec la prote<tion et l'appn entiers de l'URSS, ont refuse a [a Cemmissit11 creee par la resolution de I'A'ssemblee generale " tout~ cooperatioIJ et totttes facili:<~s, allant jll;' qu'a lui interdire -d'entrer Sur leur territoire, i. i-',, r. id- "It is extremely characteristic: that statements about the necessity to maintain the prestige and authority of the Security Council eman::lte mainly from the representatives of those countries whic.h, as expel-ience has shown, have least regard for the prestige and <luthority of the Security Council ::lnd, more often than not ignore it. Evidently words are one thing and deeds ore another. In these circumstances talk 0 f prestige and the phrases which are often used in the course of our oebntes regarding the Security Council's prestig-e lose their meaning and become banal, empty phrases." These words were spoken on 17 July 1947 by nonE othEr th,m the representative of the USSR, Mr_ Gromyko. For once, I entirely agree. All these examples show an application of two weights and two measures which my nation, like any self-respecting nation, finds it very hard to accept. A marked lack of impartiality and of fair apprais::l1 of facts also characterized, to our gre::lt regret, the statement made on Tuesday [398th meeting] in the Security Council by the representative of the United $t::ltes. Let me mention ::l few points to prove this contention. I trust that the American Press will deal with these remarks with its usual fairness. Mr. Jessllp said that the Netherlands failed to comply with the Security Council's demands. Yet I ch::lllenge anyone, including the representative of the United States, to mention any C<lse before the Security Council involving armed clashes in which the Council's demands have been fulfilled so soon and to such an extent. In connexion with the Palestine question for instance, the Security Council p::lssed no less than thirteen resolutions in the course of 1948 calling for a cease-fire, but fighting is 'still continuing, Yet the United States re[lresentative never thought it necessary to pronounce such a blistering judg~ mellt on either part}' in that case. As late ::lS Z9 Decembel· [396th me~l;ngL ten months after the first ce::lse·fire resolution concerning P<llestine, the United States representative even abstained on the Security Council's resolution "C'est un fait caracteristiqtle qtle les declarations sur la necessite de rn::lintenir le prestige et l'autorite dl1 Conseil de sectlrite eman€llt 5urtoat des representants des pays qlli, l'ex[Jerience l'a prouve, montrent le moins de respect pour le prestige et l'autorite du Conseil de securile et tiennent le mains compte de son existence. Evidem111ent, les actes sont une chose, les paroles en sont Hne autre. Dans ces conditions, ces al1usions all prestige de ces phrases, si frequentes au cours de nos debats au sujet du prestig-,e du Conseil de securite, perdent leur signification et deviennent hanales, vides de sens." Ct's parotes ant ete prononcees le 17 juillet 1947 par le representant de I'URSS, M. Gromyko lui-meme. POllr L10e fois, je suis entierement d'accord. Taus ces exemples montrent qu'i1 y a dCllX paids et detlX mesures, ce qne mon pays, comme le femit tOllt pays qui se respecte, a hien du mal a admettre. NOllS sommes egalemc:nt pcines de constater l'absence d'impartialite et la meconnaissance des faits qui caracterisent la declaration faite marcli [398hne seance] au Conseil de securite par le representant des Etats-Unis. J'en citerai qlte1ques exempIes, avec I'espoir que ]a presse americaine fera etat de ces observations, avec son esprit de justice habitue!' M. Jessup a declare que les Pays-Bas ne se sont pas conformes aux injonctions du Canseil de sectlrite. POL1rtant, je defie n'importe qui, et notaml11ent le representant des Etats-Unis, de citer line affaire portee devant le Conseil de sectlrit~ et <Iyant donne lieu a des engagements armes, dans laquelle les ordres du Conseil aient ete exe~ cutes <l.llssi vite et aussi bien. Ainsi, dans le cas de la Palestine, le Conseil de securite a adopte, en 1948, jl1squ'a treize resoltttions invitant les parties a cesser le feu, et I'on se bat encore. Pourtant, le representant des Etats-Unis n'a jam<lis CHl devoir cen;:;ttrer d'une maniere aussi dnglante que dans tlotre cas la conduite des parties en cause. Tout recemment, le 29 decembre [396erne seCUlceJ, dix mois apres la premiere resolution invitant a cesser le feu ell Palestine, le representont des Etats-Unis s'est merne abstenll Mr. Jessup also accused the Netherlands of violating the Charter, but never refuted our contention that the Ch:lrter is not applicable in this case. He criticized us because we did not end hostilities in Java in less than one week and in Sumatre in less than twelve days after the Council's resolution [5/1150], but he did not say a word about .statements and proclamations issued by the other party containing a categorical refusal to cease hostilities. The United States representative likewise accused the Netherland, of having followed a policy of weakening the Republic, but he did not say a word about tIle consistent policy of violence, murder and terror followed by intiltrating members of the Republican forces. He accused us of presenting the Republic with a prefabricated in~ terim administration, bt:t failed to mention the fact that this it1terim administration was drawn up along with the Federalists who represented two-thirds of Indonesia, and that the Republic was several times offertd an opportunity to take part on the basis of equality in this process of "fabrication". The mo"t unfair statement of all, 11Owcver, is that-according to Mr. Jessl1p-the Netherlands has failed to enter into ~on(I, fide negotiations since -:May of last year. Mr. Jessl1p forgot to mention that, at that moment, i, was announced that, in flagraut violation of th Re/tvill£ principles [5/649, appmdicas XIII MLd VJI!], the Republic had concluded an agrccment with the USSR for the exchatLge of consular officials. He also incidentally failed to mention that negotiations under the al1.'>p:ces of the Committ~ of Good Offices were finally broken off, not by the Netherlands bUfby the Republic, in a meeting of the Steering Committtee on 23 July 1948, as is evidenced by document S,I918. He totally ignorec the fact tJJat two strong Netherlands delegations were sent to Indonesia In November for a last sL1preme eti'ort to reach an agreement. Really, tookingback on several of the speeches I have melltio:led, such a one-sided presentation of facts is certainly not calculated to strengthen our faith in the impartiality of certain members of the Security Council. For~unately, such an attitude is not characteristic of all the membcrs of the Sc.curity Counci~. In this connexion I should particularly like to express my appreciation for the speedl made by the representative of China [3.98th meeting]. Although I am sure he will not expect me to agree with everytlling or even most of what he said, I highly value the balanced character of llis statement, frce from any bias, which was made in the high spirit of impartial detachment in which a problem like the Indonesian question should be OU M. Je~Sltp ~e montre r.t>pendant le plus injuste, c'est lorsqu'i! reproche aux Pays-Bas de n'avoir pas franchement engage de pourparlers dcpuis le O1ois de nlai de l'annee derniere. M. }essllp a oublie de dire qu'on a appris a cette epoque que la Repnbligue avait conc1u un accor:i avec l'URSS pour re-change de representants consdaires, Cc qui constitl,ait unE' violation flagrante des principes du Renville [5/649, atJ,nBstS XIll et VIII]. D'aiIleurs, il a dn reste omis egalement de mentionner que les negodatbns entreprises sous les auspL:es de la Commission de bans offices ont finalement ete rompues, non pas par les Pays-Bas mais pa, :a Repu'Jli'lue, au cours d'une reunion nu Com;1"e. rlirectellr tenue Ie 23 juitlet 1948, COlIlme it est dit dans le document S/918. It a totalemct1t oubJie que, en nove:l1bre, nous avor.s fait un supreme effort pour arriver Et un accord en envoyant en Indonesie deux irnportantes deleg<ltions. Vraiment, si l'on se reporte a tel au tel des discours que j'ai cites, on comprendra qu'un<; interpretation des faits auss: teintee de partl pris ne contribue certainement pas a renforcer notre foi en l'impartialite de certaim membres du Conseit de secutite. Telle n'a pas He, heureusement, l'attitude de taus les membre<; d11 Causei! de securite. A ::e propos, je vQudrais dire a quel point j'apprede le discours du representant de la Chine [398~tlle seance}. Il ne s'attend certes pas a ce que je souscrive a tout ce qu'il a dit, ou meme a la majeure partie de ses observations, ma.is j'apprecie hautement l'espr:t de O1esure et d'absence de tout prejuge qui animait sa decl:!.r~tion, bel exeJnple de l'impartialite et de la serenite qui doivent inspirer un debat sur un probleme tel Several representatives have urged the Security Council to order the withdrawal of the Nether· lands military forces to the former status quo line. In a previous [392nd] meeting of the Security Council in Paris I have already explained why the Netherlands would not be able to acquiesce in such a proposal. I shall once more try to do So. After the Japanese capitulation, the Indonesian population, especially in Java and Sumatra, was left behind in a miserable coudition, morally, physically and economically. For more than three years these people were the victims of the incompetent regime oE the Jogjakarta Republic, built on war propaganda, corruption, disorder and terrOr. In the beginning the moderates in the Republic tried to hold in check the aggressive youth movements, the revolutionary leadel-s and the army, but it very soon became appal'ent that they were :1Ot strong enough to resist the continuous pressure from the extremists. This is one of the reasons why the moderate Republican leaders never succeeded in making the agreements concluded with the Dutch acceptable to the extremist military and political elements in the Republic. Therefore the moderates gradually had to give in more and more to these undisciplined groups, so that they became mere tools and a fa(jade for the OLltside world, de,void of any real power. In order to fight the MussocommunIsts, Ml-. Hatt,1 had to call on Tan Malakka-also a foreign-trained communist 1eadel"-for assistance. Thtls Tan Ma1akka's authority was re-established and before the purge his influence was rapidly extending. For instance, in Tapanl1li and Asahan, two important provinces of Sllmatra, a communist regime W<lS established, which was accepted and officially recognized by the Jogjakal'ta Government. Communists and other extremists had full OPPolitmity to fight and abstract every effort to solve the Netherlands- Indo~es!an dispute in a peaceful way and further negotIatlOns were consequently doomed to failure. Today many former Republican officials are cooperating with the Netherlands to restore law and order; the Chinese minority which sllffered so llla?y greviot1s losses, both in Jives and property, IS now finally freed from the fear and terror under which it hac! lived for several years. In Asahan and Labuan-Batu in eastern 511- matra, for instance, 245 chiefs and prominent Indonesian leaders arrived at Medan, the capital of Federal Eastern Sumatra, on 6 January demanding the immediate re-unification of tlleir territory with Federal EasternSumatra. Their spokesman, Mr. Bahaudin Subakti, declared that the peoples of Asah<.n and Labuan-Batu-more P1usieurs repn~sentants insistent pour que le Conseil de securite ordonne a'ux forces Olilitaires neerIandaises de se retirer sur Ies positions qu'elles occupaient avant la reprise des hostilites. J'ai deja explique a Paris [392eme seal,re], et je vais redire ici, pourquoi les Pays-Bas ne pourraient accepter de le fa1re. Apres la capitulation japonaise, la population· indonesienne, sllrtout a Java et it SU01atra, a ete laissee a elle-meme dans une situation deplorable aux points de vue moral, physique et eco~ nomique. Pendant plus de trois nnnees, cette population a ete la victime de !'incompetence dtt regime de la Repttblique de Djokjakarta, fonde sur la propagande de guerre, la corruption, le desordre et la terreur. Au debut, les elements moderes de la Repnblique ont essaye de contenir les mouvements agressifs de jeunesse, Ies chefs revolutionnaires et l'armee, mais il est apparu tres vite que ces moderes n'etaiellt pas asse~ forts pour resister a la pression constante des extrbnistes. . C'est en partie pour cette raison que les chefs republicains moderes n'ont jamais reussi a faire admettre aux aements extremistes republicains, tant militaires que politiques, les accords condus avec les Pays-Bas. Les moderes ont dOlle ete amenes a ceder de plus en plus de terrain aces groupes indisciplines, jusqu'll en devenir le jouet et it ne plus etre, pour le reste du monde, qu'un simulacre de gouvernement, sans fo:'''::c ui pouvoir, M. Hatta a du, pour combattre les commu~ nistes de Musso, appeler a la rescousse Tan Malakka lui-meme, chef communiste de formation etrangere. Cela a permis a Tan Malakka de retablir son autorite, de ttll~ Sorte qu'avant l'epuTation, son influence s'etendait rapidement. Ainsl, clans le TapannJi et l'Asahan, qui sont deux importantes provinces de Sumatra, un regime communiste s'est ~tabli, qui a ete accepte et offieiellement rec.onl1U par le Gouvernement de Djokjakarta. Les comntlwistes et d'autres extremistes ont etl tOL1te latitude (Jour combattre et contrecarrer les efforts entrepris pour l'esolldre pacifiquement le differtl1d entre les Pays-Bas et l'Indonesie et, par suite,les negociations ulteriemes etaient vouees a['echec. Beaucoup d'anciens fOllC~ tionnait-es republicains cooperent al1jol1rd'hui avec les Pay,;;-Bas pour retab1ir l'ordre pl1blic; la minorite chinoise, qui a eprouve de si lourdes peltes, tant humaines que materielles, est enon Jiberee de la crainte et de la terrcllr clans lesquehes elle vivait depllis plussieurs annees. Ai'lsl, 245 chefs et personnnlites indonesiennc$ de i'Asahan et du Labuan~Battt1 - provinces de l'est de Sllmatra - se S011t rendns a Medan, capitaJe de I'Etat federal du $umatra oriental et ont demande que 1eurs territoires fussent imme· diatement reunis a l'Etat federal du Sumatra oriental. Leur parte-parole, M. Bahaudin Subakti,a declare <jue les populations de l'Asahan forc~s, all these co-operat}ve groups would fall prey to reprisals and retalIatory measures on the part of the extremist g,angs which would; t?en again take over power. The number of Vlctl:tJS of such "retaliation, I can assure the Secufl!Y Council, would have to be computed not m hundreds but in thousands, and would even surpass that of the terror which was exercised before the purge. In this connexion, I hope the Preside~t will allow me to read to the Security Councll one of the numerous telegrams which I recently received, a telegram fron; the "Association of Padang", in another regIOn of Sumatra. "Please inform Security Cotlncil that w; are grateful that we are now freed from the Irresponsible elements of the Republic. If Netherlands armed forces should be withdrawn, this would have the most serious consequences for the Illdonesian population. As this matter ~on­ cerns the Indonesians only and not thesubjects of any other count~y, the Security C?u1!cil sh01;ld listen to the objectIOns of our AssociatIOn, whIch is an Indonesian Association. We may point out that the Russian proposal as to this withdrawal has no other objective than to cause 'fratricide'." I have now dealt with most of the points raised in the debate, and I have done so fairly elaborately because my Government, as I said, wants to keep the Security Council informed as fully as possible and does not want to dodge any of the questions raised. One point remains, however, which, both in the view of the Council and in that of the Netherlands Government, is the most important: our ,concrete plans for the speediest possible creation of settled and stable conditions in Indonesia, through the achievement of a solution freely accepted by all interested parties, and particularly by the population of all areas of Indonesia. The Netherlands Prime Minister, Mr. Drees, arrived in Indonesia on 6 January, and started conversations at once. These are progressing satisfactorily, but it is obviously too early to announce any concrete results as yet. Some representatives have proposed that the Security Council should draw up a precise timetable for the programme I mentioned. My Gov~ ernment considers that such action on the part of the Council would, on the one hand, constitute still further unacceptable interference in our domestic affairs, and, on the other, would be superfluous in view of our OWn plans which are now rapidly taking shape. For my Government, too, wants to formulate this programme as precisely as possible, including the indication of Si les Pays·Bas retiraient leurs farces armees, tous ces g,roupes animes de l'esprit de cooperation seraient en butte aux represailles des cliques d'extremistes qui repl'endraient le pouvoir. Je peux assurer le Conseil de securite que c'est par milliers et non par centaines qu'il faudrait compteI' les victimes et que lenr nombre clepasserait tout ce qu'on a vu pendant la terreUr qui a pre~ cede l'epuration. A ce propos, j'espere que le President voudra bien me permettre de porter a la connaissance du Conseil un des nombreux telegrammes que j'ai re~us recemment. Il emane de 1"'Association de Padang" - qui se trOtlve dans une autre region de $umatra - et est ainsi con;u: "Nous VOllS prions de faire savoir au Conseil de securite que nous sommes hettreux d'etre liberes du joug des elements irresponsables de la Republique. Le retrait des forces ncerlandaises aurait les consequences les pins graves pour la population indonesienne. Puisque cc.tte question concerne seulement les Indonesiens et non pas des citoyens d'autres pays, le Conseil devrait entendre les objections de notre Association, qui est une organisation indonesienne. Nous tenons 11 souligner que la proposition de I'URSS tcndant a faire retirer les troupes neerIandaises n'avait pas d'autre objct que de pravoqucr une lutte fratricide." J'ai ainsi traitc la plupart des qncstions qui ont ete soulevees au cours du d6bat. Si je l'ai fait en detail, c'est parce que mon Gouvernement tient, comme je I'ai deja dit, it ce que le Conseil de securite soit aussi bien renseigne que possible et parce qu'il ne peut eluder allcune des questions dont on a fait etat id. I1 reste cependant un point, qui est le pIns important aux yel1x du Conseil et atlssi du Gouvernement des Pays~nas: je vettx [JarIer de nos plans concrets pOur faire regner cn Indone;;ie, aussi vite que possible, le calme et la stabilite, en aboutissant a une solution librement acceptee par toutes les parties en cause et notamment par la population de toutes les regions du territoire indonesien. M. Drees, Premier Ministre des Pays~Bas, est arrive en Indonesie le 6 j anvier et a immediatement entame des conversations. Bien qlle ces pourparlers progressent de fa~on satisfaisante, il est encore trap t6t pour annoncer des resultats concrets. Certains representants ant propOse au Conseil de securite de fixer nne serie de dates en ce qui concerne les plans en question. Mon GOl1Vernement estime qu'une telle decision du Conseil constituerait une nouvelle ingerence inacceptable dans Ics affaires intt~rieures des Pays~Bas et qu'eHe serait par surcroit inutile, etant danne que nos propres plans se cristalisc.nt rapidement. En effet, mon Gouvernement dent, lui aussi, a forrnuler ces plans avec auwnt de precision que possible, en indiquant notamment des dates limitcs As I have declared several times before in the Security Council, the unalterable aim of the N et3erlands Government remains the immediate creation of an all-Indonesian federal interim Gov~ ernment, followed as soon as possible by free elections for a representative body with a view to the establishment of a Netherlands-Indonesian union and tr:e creaticl:l of the United States of Indonesia, to which sovereignty will l:;e transferred. The Netherlands Government has given due considf'nl.tion tn the question of a time-table tD be adopted fDr the execution of its programme, and has come to the following conclusion: The Netherlands Government trusts that a federal interim Government will be instituted within one month from the present date. This federal interim Gcvernment wit: at once start preparations for the holding or free general elections. It is the intention of the Netherlands Government to invite Un:ted Nations observer::; to these eJections, In view of the fact that com w plete peace and order have not yet returned to all areas, and in view of the necessary administrative and tec:hnica: preparations, It will be ma~erial1y impossible to hold these electiDns within six mon6s. My Government will, however, exert all possible efforts in order that the elections may take place in the third quarter of this year. TI,:S period, by thc way, is in accord::.nce with the fomth addit'onal R(Jr-ville prir.ciple [S/649, Appendix VIII], which mentions a period between six months and one year. The elected representative body wiil then draw up a constit~ttior. for the United States of Indonesia. This constitution will thereupon be submitted to the participant States, for their assent The interim Govern:nent will abo IR~lM.n: the administrative organizaticn of the new St;;.te. Finally, a rotmd-tc.ble conference will be held between the representati....es of th~ Netherlands alld of Indonesia, in order to discuss a draft statute for th~ ~etherlands-Indonesianunion. Whe:1 this phase has been completed, nothing wU stwd in the way of the transier of sovereignty to the Unite.': States of Indonesia. The Netherlands Government would like to see this transfer effected on 1 January 1950. However, fa: the moment, it seems unlikely that it will be possible in practice to execute the whole programme witllin so short a time. Therefore, my G<Jvernment is of the opinion that, taking a realistic view, it can do no more tban declare that it will do all within it5 power to aeLieve the transfer of sovereign:y in the course of the year 1950. This is tl:e end of my Government's statement, which r hope wit! convince tIle Security Council that the Netherlands Government is doir:g, its ut:nost to arrh'e at a speedy and satisf.,ctory solution uf the Indonesian question. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : I would not attempt to conceal the fact that my Government was seriously concerned that the Comme je l'ai dit plusieurs fois au Conseil de securite, le but que recherchera toujours 1(( GoUvernement des Pays-Bas est la creation iin':' m€:d.iate d'ulI Gouyc:nCmcnt federal provisoire pour toute l'Indo:H~sie, suh·ie aussitot que possible dc libres elections pour le choix: d'une assemblee de representants, en vue de creer ur.e Union neerlando-indonesienne et des Etats-Unis d'Indonesie auxquels sera tr<lnsferee la souverainete. Le Gouvernenent des Pays-Bas, ayant bien ett.:die la guestion deE dates a. :1xer pour l'execution de son programme, eEt arrive a la conclusion suivante: It a le ferme espoir qu'un Gouverncment federal provisoire pourra etre cree dans un delai d'un mois a CUlllvtt:~ c1'al1jourcl'huL Ce Gouvemement provisoire comme:1cera immediatement it preparer des elections generales libres. Le Gotlvernement des Pays-Bas a d'ail~ .!eurs I'intention d'inviter des observateurs de l'Orgar.isation des Nations Unies <l etre presents a ees elections, Comme certaines reg,ions n'ont pas encore retrouve la paix et I'ordre et qu'il est necessaire de prendre un certain nombre de mesures d'ordre technic;ue et administratiI, il sera materiellement impossible de proceder a de telles elections d'ici six mois. Toutefois, mor. GOllvernement fera tout cc qu'il pourra pour qu'elles :l.ient lieu dans le troisieme trilTIcstre de l'annee cotlrante. Cela est d'ailleurs conforme au quatrieme pnncipe compleme:Itaire incorpore a l'Accord du Renvi!le [5/619> anneu VIII], qui prevoit une periode de six mois a un an. L'Assemblec de representants ainsi elue etablira nne constitution df's Etats~Unis d'Indonesie. Le texte en sera soumis a l'approbaticn de tou.:; les Etats participants. Le Gouvernement proviscire prep:.:rera de son CGte la structure aclmirdstrative du :J.ouvel Etat. Entin, le~ representants des Pays-Bas et de l':ndonesie se :-euniront en :onference afln d~ rediger un projet de statat pour l'Union neerlan., do-inc1onesienne. Lorsque cette etape aura ete franchie, rien ne s'opposern plus au tram£crt de la souverainete aux Etats-Unis d'Indon~sie. Le GOllvernement des Pays-Has vDttdrait ~u'il ait lieu le ler janvier 1950. Toutefois, il n'est guere probable, pour le moment, ql\'On pllisse e......ecLlter l'ensemble de ce programme dans un del<\i allssi brei. Mon GOl1vl'rnement, Qui tient a se m:lntrer realiste, estime dor:c qu'il doit Sf borner a promettre de faire ~out son possible pour nialiser le transfert de la souverabete aux Eta~s-UlJjs d'Indom:sie dans le courant de l'annee 1950. TeLe est la declaration Clue mon G01~verm:mt:nt m'a charge de f:tire. J'espere qu'ellc convaincra le Conseil de secllrite que les Pays-Bas font tout Cl" qu'ils penvent pour aboutir a une solution rapide et s.1tisfais;J.nte de la question indonesienne, Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume·Unj) (traduit de [,anglais): le ne chercherai pas a cacher que man Gouvernement etait fort inquiet The concern felt by my Government was due not only to the fact that, in its view, the attitu1e and action of the Netherlands Government In these last few weeks has been of a kind to render much more difficult the reaching of a solution based on that agreement without which it cannot be of a lasting nature. It was due ev~n mare t? the fact that resolutions of the Secunty CouncIl appeared to have been ignored or treated with less than: the respect due to them. T?at was a very serious challenge to the authon~y of the United Nations. I need hardly say that 1t affected very markedly the attitude of this Council towards the Netherlands Government itself. It is < true, of course, that the competence of the Security Council in this matter has been challenged and that, -at the outset of the discussiOns on this question, my own delegation made express reservations on that point. But much has happened since tllen, and we have a situation in which the Security Council has felt compel1ed to make recommendationS with which the Netherlands Government has, moreover, at one time or <Inother, undertaken to comply. While my Government welcomed the recent statements of Her Majesty, the Queen of the Netherlands [397th meeting], and of the Netherland3 Prime Minister on the creation of the United Sutes of Indonesia and the transfer of power, the world awaited proof that the responsible Netherlands authorities were taking practical steps to implement those undertakings or to carry out the Secnrity CoundJ's resolution of 24 December. I think that tile Netherlands Government will not have failed to mark this trend of thought from the speeches that have been made in the Security Councit, both in Paris and here at Lake Success. In regard to past events and to the existing situation as we know it, there are, therefore, certain points on which the Council will, I thing -and rightly-wish to have complete aSSt1rance. The first is the release, and the ttnconditional release, of the political prisoners. That is required, not least, in the interest of further steps for the ultimate peaceful settlement. It is perhaps unfortu nate that we should have to inSist on this publicly, but that has been forced on us by the events of the [last few weeks, The second regt\irement 1S that the local agencies of the United Nations must be given every possible facility within reason to report on the development of events. I would suggest that the Council might invite the Committee of Good Offices or the Consnlar Commission to furnish reports, on the basis of the investigations now Si man Gouvernemcnt etait inquiet, cc n'etait p.as se111ement pane que, depuis qltelques semaines, l'attitude et les actes du Gouvernement' des Pays-Bas e.taient de nature il rendre bien plus difficile d'aboutir a une solution fondee sm une entente sans 1aquel1e it ne saurait y avoir de solution durable. C'cst encore plus parce qu'il apparaissait que 1es resolutions du Conseil de securite etaient meconnues DU n'etaient pas accueillies avec le respect qui Jellr etait duo C'etait la un cJefi tres grave a l'alltorite de l'O'rganisation des Nations Unies. Inutilc de dire qlte ce senti· ment a e.te pour quelque chose dans l'attitude du Conseil a I'egard dlt Gvuvernement des Pays-Bas. Il est exact evidemment qu'au debut de Cl" debat, la competence du Conseil en cette matiere a ete mise en question et que ma propre delegation a fait des reserves a ce sujet. 1'1ais il s'est passe bien des chases depuis 10rs et nous nous sommes trouves en presence d'nne situation devant laquelle le Consei!. s'est juge tenu de formuJer certaines recommandations que le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas s'est, du reste, engage, a tel DU tel moment, a executer. Si mon Gouvernement accueillait avec satisfaction les declaratioll5 faites recemrnent par Sa Majeste la Reine des Pays-Bas et par le Premier Ministre de Cl" pays all sujet de la creation des Etats-Unis d'Indonesie et du transfcrt des pouvoirs, le monde attendait la prenve que les antorltes responsables des Pays-Bas prenaient des mesures pratiques en vue d'executer ces engagements et de donner effet a la resollttion du Conseil de secuTite en date du 24 decembre. Le Gouverncment des Pays-Bas n'aura pas manque de remarqner qLIC cette meme i(Jee tenrlait a·se manifester clans les discours prononces alt Consei! de securite, tant a· Paris ql1'ici meme. Eu egarrJ a ce qui s'est passe et a la situation actuelle telle que nous la connaissons, le Comeil tiendra certainement, et a juste ti.tre, a recevoir des assurances compl?~tes sur c.ertains points. 11 y a tout d'abord1a question de la mise en liherte, et cela sans condition, des prisonnier~ politiques. C'est une des conditions - et non des moindres - dont la realisation aidera a franchir de nOllvelles etapes sur la voie du reglement pacifique defiititif. 11 est peut-etre flicheux d'avoir a insister pttbliquement sur ce point, mais noltS y sommes forces par les evenements de ccs der· nleres semaines. Il £attt, en second lieu, que 1'00 ac.corde allX organismes des Nations Unies operant sur place toutes facilites raisonnables pOUT qu'ils puissent ·rendre compte de l'evolution des evenernents. L~ Conseil pourrait inviter la Commission de bons offices et la Commission consu1aire a. Itti fournir des rapports, fandes sur les enquetes menees en The question of the withdrawal of Netherlands troops has been raised. This is a very natural demand, and it could not be expected that the uJUncil should set its seal of approval on the results of the so-called police action. It cannot give such approval, I think there have been sufficient statements made at this table to show that the action of the Netherlands Government in this matter has given rise to considerable resentment. But, even under the stress of resentment, the Council must try to be realistic, and I think most members will realize that, in the actual circl1mstances, it would be unwise--or worse-to demand a simple reversal of the situation with which it has been unhappily confronted. A complete and immediate withdrawal of the Netherlands forces would leave a very dangerous vacuum. 'Nhat force for the maintenance of law and order could immediately take their place? I know of none, and I think that only a little reflection will show to what terrible dangers an immediate withdrawal might give rise. But that is not to sav that nothing shO\1ld be done. One day Netherlands forces will have to be with~ drawn, and provision will have to be made to fill the gap. It seems to me that it is not too early to explore the possibility of providing for that time, and it might be that, on the advice perhaps of local United Nations agencies, a beginning might be made in the building up of law and order in regions where the services of troops might be dispensed with without undue danget-. I have mentioned the possibility of the Council's relying in this matter on local United Nations agencies. I do not wish at this stage to go into the question whether there should be any change in the composition or terms of reference of those bodies. I should be glad to hear any arguments that may be advanced on this point, but, until I am convinced to the contrary, I should be inclined to suggest that the Council should continue to work through the agencies which it has on the spot, which are acquainted with all the local conditions and which have certainly proved their worth. Sg much for past events and the existing situation. Those, as I have said, must be remedied to the utmost consonant with security, not only in order that the Council may maintain its authority, but in order that it may have confidence that its further recommendations may command respect. 'What" is, of course, much more important is that the way should be cleared for an ultimate On a souleve egalement la question du retrait des troupes neerlandaises. Il s'agit d'une exigence bien natureJI.. et all ne saurait attendre du Conseil qu'il enterine purement et simplement les resultats de cc qu'on a appele l'oIJe.ration de police. It ne sauJait le faire .. Les declarations failes ici suffisent a demontrer que, sur ce point, les agissements du Gouvemement des Pays-Bas ant provoque t11l prefond mecontentement. Mais, meme sous l'empire du mecontentement, le Conseil doit s'efforcer de garder le sentiment des realites. La plupart des representants se ren M cirant compte qU'il serait [Jeu sage, potlr ne pas dire plus, d'exiger, dans les circonstances actuelles, le retottr pur et simple a la situation anterienre, comme solution du probleme epinellx devant lequel nous nous trouvons. Le retrait camplet et immediat des troupes neerlandaises laisserait un vide tres dangeretlX_ QueUes :forces pourraient les remplacer pour maintenir l'ordre public? le n'en connnis vraiment pas, I1 suffit de reflechir un peu pour se renure compte des terribles dangers qtte pourrait entraine. le retrait iuunCdiat des troupes neerlandaises. Cela ne signifie nullement qu'il ne faille rien faire. n faudra bien qu'un jour les Pays-Bas retirent leurs trou~ pes et que l'on prenlle les mesures necessaires pour combler cc vide. Il ne me s~mbl e pas premature d'ellvisag,cr des maintenant ce que I'on pourrait faire en Cl'. 5ms; peut-etre Y <Lurait-il lieu, en s'inspirant des avis des organismes des Nations Unies operant sur place, de commencer a ramener peu a peu l'ordre public dans les regions d'oit Yon pourrait sans trap de danger retirer les troupes neerlandaises. J'ai parle de la passibilite que le Conseil s'en remette en cette matiere aux organismes des Nations Unies qui se trouvent sur place. I1 ne s'agit pag d'exarniner maintenant s'il conviendrait de modilier la composition ou le mandat de ces organismes. Je serais heureux d'entemlre les arguments qu'on pourrait presenter pour ou contre. Quant a moi, je suis persuade, jusqu'a preuve du contraire, que le Conseil devrait conti~ nuel' i agir par l'intermediaire des orgnnismes dont i! dispose sur place, car ils connaissent bien la situation locale et ont certes deja fait leurs preuves, J'en ai fini avec la situation passee et la situation actuelle. II f<lut, comme je l'ai dit, y porter remMe dans toute la mesure compatible avec la securite, non sculement pour sauve~rder l'autorite du Conseil, mais aussi pour tui donner le ferme espoir que les reeommandations qu'it pourr.."it forrm.ller seront desormais respeetees. Ce qui importc bien plus, evidemment, c'est de preparer la voie vers un reglement p:leifique That is the goal which we ail wish to attain. If a satisfactory ending can be reached, many of the obstructions on the way will be forgotten. When the Netherlands Government furnishes the Council with clear evidetlCe that it is, in fact, taking steps to implement the underta\~ings t:ontained in the statements of Her Majesty, the Queen of the Netherlands, and of the Netherlands Prime Minister, its path will be smoothed; an atmosphere will be created favourable to the negotiations which will be necessary for an agreed and lasting solution; and we may hope for a final and satisfactory settlement of this unhappy and complicated question. Mr. ALVAREZ (Cuba) (translated from Spanish) : The delegation of Cuba had intended not to take part in the discussion of the Indonesian question, but to confine its action to casting its vote whenever che Council is ready to take a decision. As a new member of the Council, it seemed to ,us more prudent o·ot to intervene in a discussion which has absorbed the attention of the Council for so long a time, and which has had a history as extensive in documentation as it has been barren of solution. The most practical course, without doubt, was to leave the task of finding a just and feasible solution to 'the nations responsible for, or directly interested in, the existing situation. My. Government hold;; the view, however, that the United Nations has not been set up merely to seek the practical settlement of disputes between States, but that the Member nations have united their forces so as to fulfil the aims and principles of the San Francisco Charter, with a view to practicing tolerance and living together in peace as good neighbours, uniting their strength to maintain international peace and security, and ensuring, by the acceptance of principles and the adoption of suitable methods, that armed force shall not be used save in the ~ommon interest and that international machinery is employed for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples. Tel est l'objectif que DOllS cherchons tous a atteindre; si nOlls aboutissons heureusement au terme de nos efforts, nous oublierons beaucoup des obstacles qui nous ant arretes sur le chemin. La route sera moins dure lorsque le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas aura fourni au Conseil la preuve decisive qu'il prcnd vraiment des mesurcs pour executer les engagements contenus dans les declarations de Sa Majeste la Reine et du Premier Ministre des Pays~Bas, En effet, On aura eree ainsi une atmosphere favorable aux negociations necessaires a une solution durable et fonclee sur un accord mllcueL On pourra alors espe:. rer tm reglement satisfaisant et definitif des difficultes regrettables et d'un probleme epineux. M. ALVAREZ (Cuba) (trad-uit de l'espagnol): La delegation de Cuba avait l'intention de ne pas intervenir dans la discussion de la question indom!sienne et de se borner a prendre part au scrutin lorsque le Conseil estimerait que le moment serait venu de prendre une decision, Mon pays est devenu membre du Consei1 de securite tout recemment et il nous paraissait pllJs prudent de ne pas intervenir dans une discussion qui occupe ]'attention de ce Conseil depuis si longtemps et dont l'histoire est si riche en documents et si pauvre en salutions. L'llttitude la plus pratique pour nous etait suns doute de laisser le soin de trouver Hne issue juste et pmtique aux nations responsables de la situation qui s'est creee ou aux nations directement inte· ressees. Neanmoins, mon Gouvernement estime que l'Organisation des Nations Unies n'a pas et'; ereee uniquement pour chercher des solutions ni:alistes aux differends entre les Etats; ses Memo bres· ant uni leurs efforts pour atteindre les buts et pour appliquer les principes de la Charte de San-Francisco en pratiquant la tolerance, en vivant d,ms un esprit de ban vOisinage, en unissant leurs efforts pour maintenir la paix et la. secllrite internationales et s'assurer, par l'adoption de principes et de methodes appropries que I'on n'aura point recours a la force, si ee n'est clan; l'interet commun, que le jeu des organisme; internationaux se poursuivra de maniere a assurer le progres economique et social de tOilS i~l peuples. The Republic of Indonesia is an established fact which has, in documents of broad juridkat scope, been accepted with certain limitations by the Government of the Netherlands itself. But even were this not so, the Members of the United NatiDns whkh have Or which assume responsibility for the administration of territories the peoples of whic.h have not yet attained a full measure 0'£ self-government, have recognized, in Article 73 of the Charter, the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of those territories are paramount, anu have accepted as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost their political, sDcial and ec.onomic well-being. And our avowed principles take us still farther: In setting up the international Trusteeship SySM tern, we have set out in Article 76 of the Charter the bask aims of that system as required by Article 1 of the same dDcument, and these include, inter alia, the promotion of the political, economic, sDcial and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the Trust Territories and their progre,ssive development toward se1f~government or independence, as may be appropriate to the particular. circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of these peoples. , Consequently, the question which faces us is a test of the sincerity of those countries which have subscribed tD th'e Charter, and of the faith of all the peoples of the world in this great experiment in international communal life under the aegis Df peace and justice. We shall not embark upon an analysis of the facts or study of the arguments. Above both sets of arguments towers a great truth: The people Df the Republic of Indonesia have earned their right to independence, The Queen of the Netherlands herself acknowledg,ed, in her address of 6 January, the right of the peoples of Indonesia to peace, happiness and prosperity under a sovereign Government of their own; we therefore declare candidly that we cannot understand why those fine words have nDt been transformed into reality. The colonial era has passed into history. To attempt to re-establish it in the times in which we live would be an error entailing such grave consequences that we cannot imagine its being On est aUe meme plus loin en matiere de prindpes, en etablissant le Regime international de tutelle. On a, confonnement i l'Article premier de la Charte, fixe dans l'Article 76 les fms essentielles de cc regime, qui sOnt, entre autres, de favoriser le progres poJitique, economique et sodal des populations des Territoires sous tutelle, et leur evolution progressive vers la capacite it s'administrer elles-memcs, ou l'independance, compte te.ntl des conditions particulieres i chaque territoire et a ses populations et des aspirations Ebrement exprimees des .popu1ations interessees. Nous nous trouvons done en presence d'un cas qui constitue une epreuve de la sincerite des pays qui Dnt adhere ala. Charte et de la confian~e des peuples de la terre dans cette gran~e experience de vie intemationale, sous les slgnes de la paix et de la justice. Nous n'allons pas entreprendre une analyse des faits ou 11n examen des arguments. Au-dessus des deux theses plane une grande verite: le peuM pie de la Republique d'Indonesie a gagne son droit a l'independance. Si la Reine des Pays-Bas elle-meme a reconnu, dans Son discours du 6 janvier le droit des petlples de l'Indonesie a la , , , , . , paix, au bonheur et a la prospente, so?s ur:e forme de gO"l1vernement souverain qui ltll seralt propre, nous declarons avec ingenuite que nous ne comprenons pas ponrquoi d'aussi belles paroles' ne se sont pas traduites par des faits. L'ere du co1oniaIisme est du domaine de l'his· toire. Vouloir la ressusciter cl. l'heure actuelle serait une erreur si grave que nOllS ne pOUVOllS cancevoir qu'elle puisse etre commise par ce 3. That before 1 July 1949 free elections should be held under the supervision of the Committee of Good Offices so that the people of the Indo:lesian RepUblic may establish a sovereign constituent assembly, which will enact ordinary legislation, draft and put into force the Constitution of the Republic, and determine the bases for the country's participation in the United States of Indonesia, ns stipulated in the Linggadjati Agreement of 25 March 1947.1 4. That the armed forces of the Netherlands should begin their withdrawal from the territory of the Indonesian Republl( on the day that announcement of the forthcoming elections is made, and that withdrawal should be completed fifteen days before the elections take place. The occupation of t11e other territories of the United States of Indonesia should be terminated on the day of entry into office of a duly elected Government, which should be before 24 December 1949. 'Sce Political Events in the Republic of Indonesia, Netherlands Information Bureau, New York, page 34. inten~ts particuliers des nations. I1 ne suffit pas pourtant, a notre avis, de simpies declarations platoniques_ Tout en respectant pleinement les opinions des autres, la d6legation de Cuba estime necessaire que le Conseil de securite adopte tine resolution prevoyant que: l. Les forces armees des Pays-Bas se r~ti­ reront immediatement sur les positions etablies par la convention de treve du 17 janvie! 1943 connue sous le nom d'''Accord d1.l Renville" [Sj649, annexe XI], a l'exception des endroits ou, de ]'avis de la Commission de bans offices, il sera necessaire de les maintenir pour preserver la loi et l'ordre, sous la surveillance des obse,- vatel11"S militaires de cette Commission, 2. Le President de la Repuh1ique d'Indonesle et les autres prisonniers politiques seront mis en liberte et seront reconnus de nOtlvellU comme representants officiels de leur nation. Ils auront pleine liberte de motlvement et cl'action, aJin de diriger les destinees de cette nation. 3. Sous la surveillance de la Commission de bans offices, et le 1er juillet 1949 au plus tard, des elections libres anront lieu dans le 11ut de permettre au peuple de la Republique d'Indonesie d'etnblir une Assemblee constituante souveraine ql1i preparera la legislation counnte, redigel'a et mettra en vigucur la constitution de la Republique et preparera les bases pour l'entree de cellc-ci dans 1es Etats-Unis d'Ind~· nesie, seIon les dispositions de l'Accord de Linggadjati du 2S mars 19471 4. Les forces annces des Pays-Bas commenceront a se retirer du territoire de la Republique d'Indonesie le jour ou Iz date des elections sera annoncee, et le retrait de ces troupes sera termine. quinze jours au plus tard avant la dare des elections. L'occupation des autres territoire; des Etats-Unis d'Indonesie devra prendre cmnpletement fin le jour ou un gouvernement dCl1n~nt elu assumera le potlvoir. ce qui devra se produire le 24 decembre 1949 all plus tard. 'Voir Political Events in the Republic of [nd()"tnl, Bureau d'information del Pays-BaB, page 34. We hope. that our remarks will be received by the members of the Secur.ity COlJncil in the same spirit of impartiality and witr the same high pt:rpose and sincere desire to succeed which has inspired the Cuban delegation in formulating them, in the hope of con:ributing toward a happy solt.ltion of the problem whi::h r.oncerns us. Mr. So NYUN (3urma): On behalf of the GClvernrnent of the Union of Burma I w:sh to thank the Presirl",nt and th(O members of the Sectrity Council for penritting Bunna to plrticipate :n this discussion, We consider i: a happy augury for a success:'ul settlement of this question that, ::tlm()~t imnJ('dia.telv after Burma had been granted permission to 'participate [398th meetil1qJ, an atrr.osphere of hope was created by a most impressive, finn and realistic speech made by tht> representative of the: United States, Tie iuprcssial1 created by this spee.ch was further strengthened by the speeches s'Jbsequent1y made the same afterr,oor; by the repl'esentatives of China and Norway. But this hope and this impression have just been almost dashed to the grOL:nd by ~he speech 'we have just heard harT. the representative of the Netherla:1ds. However, I shall deal with tais speech later after I have examined the substance Of some of the previous speeches of other representatives, notably those of the representatives of China. and Norway, with 1l111c:r of whose statements I nnd myself in agreement. It is taped that the very strong plea pnt forward by the rE'pr~sent:l.tive of ehb-a [398th meeting] for more positive action by the United Nations, for solid guarantees of a free plebisde, for strorg gllarantees of peace and· order in Inrlonesia, and for a constructh'e and definitive solution of the problem, will command be ~tipport d h:s collec,gl.le,. Everyone must also have been im?rcs;,ed by the very judicious speech ma~e by the re'preser.ta~ ti've of Norway [398th mMtmg] wherem he ex- 'pressed his unwillingness to condone the $0- tailed p:Jlice action of the Nctherlunds and c::>~­ demned its violation of the (barter both lI1 letter and spirit, and wherein he observed that the Netherlands had cone a great d:sscrvice to the cause of the Ur:itcd Nations, Without goiEg further into the details at :his ;tage, I Bhoulc like to say that the3e speeches carried with them the assu:'ance to the world chat the Security Council was not only competent to act in this mat:er, but that it was determined to act, to act at once, and to act firmly. It is fully expected that this assurance will be followec. by concrele proposals for the settlement of this question. SlIch an assurance must surely ]'espere que les mer.lbres du Conseil de seeurite accueL1leront nos paroles avec la [argeur de vues, le se:1timent d'impartialite et 'Ie desir sincere d'arnver .i tU1 resublt qui ont ponsse la delegation de Cuba a s'efforcer de trouver lJne solution heureuse au probleOle qui nous preoccupe en ce moment. M. So NY"ClN (Birmar.ie) (trllduit de l'(J,n~ glais): Au nom du Gouvernement de I'Union birmalle, je voudrais remercier le President, ainsi gue les merr.bres dt: Conseil de securite, d'avoir perrnis a la 3innanie de participer cl cette discussion. Nous considerons comme de ban augure pour l'heurenx reglement de Cl'. probleme que, presqtlC aussitOt apres que la Birmanie eut ete autorisee a participer a cette discussion [398eme seance]; le discolrrs remarquaole, ferme et realiste du representant des Etats~Unis art cree ',me atmosphere d'espo·1f. Cette impr~ssjon a grandi encore zpre:s les interventions bites a la meme seance par les representants de la Chine et de la Korvege. Mais cet espoir et cet:t:e impression v:ennent d'Hre presque oet:l1its pa~ le discoll.rs que vient de proooneer le represen:ant des Pays-Bas. Je reviendrai Sllr ce disc()llfs apres avoir analyse l'esscntiel des declarations de certaim al1:res repn~sentant3, notamment des representants de la Chine et de la l\'orv~ge, en m'associant a une grande partir. OFce qLl'ils onl dit J'espere que le~ paroles si eloquantes par lesqt:elle;; le representant de la Chine /398eme s~an"·c] a clemande une acLioll lJILls positive de la pali de l'Orga:::Jisa:ioll des Nations Unies, de solides gar.anties ::I'un libre plebiscite, de fortes garanties en ::e qui COncerne I'ordre pllblic ~ll Inc10nesie et une sulutillll constructive et definitive du probleme, rallieront l'appui de ses collegnes. D'Hlllrp. part, tout le monde a dit etre frappe par le di5cours :ort pertinent elll ~epresentatl:­ de la Norvege [398eme sf,mcc] , dans 1equel ce111i~ci a declare qu'il se refusait it ellterioei le.:; pretendllCs meStlres de police ctltreprises pa: les Neerland<.is, a condamne lellr violation de la lettre e: de i'esprit de 1.1 Charte et a fait observer que les Pays-Bas <.l.vaie:lt grandement desservi la cause de l'Organi,ation des Nations l."nies. SaIlS e:ltrer a :'heure actuel1e clans les details, je vClldrais dire que ces discou~s assllraient au mOllee que le Consc31 de secllrite etait non se11- lement competent pour agir en la matii"re, mU:s qu'il etai: resolu d'agir sans retard e! avec fermete. 0:1 s'attend certainement a ce que ces a~suri1nces ~oient st1ivi~s ce proposition:; concn~tes en vu~ clu reglement de cette question. De te:l1es assurances doivent certai:Jcment encoura~ th~ Prime Minister of India. M:-. Nehru, to con.- vene a conference oC all countries opposed to the Dutch aggression with ·a view to considering whot steps should je taken aga:nst this manifesta.tion of aggressive: imperiaJ:sm. It is ahnost needless ~o show that, in addition to being moved py motives and considerations which are shared by all Member States, such as the humanitarian desire to prevent further bloodshed and a solicitude for the maintenance of international peace and security, my Government is vitally interested in all meast1re~ calculated to :"estore security in the partic.ular part of the wor~d :n which we arc sitlated, and c.onsequently, In ail measures which would mbioize the repercussions that would inevitably result from a failure to :heck tbe present trends in the Indonesian situation. We feel ~trongly, in spite of what the representative of the Netherlands has jl\3t said, that the Indonesiar: situation, if not checked, will disturb not only the peace of :::ioub East Asia but also the peace of the world. Jt must therefore continue (o'Je a matter of inter_ national. concern. To continue to assert, as the representative of thf>. Netherlands has asserted, that it is purely a dome;;tic matter, would only show that the D~teh are t:itl".er incurably stub~ born, or that their ways of thinking are lamentably outmoded, or tha, they bve grossly ,.tnderc~timated the collective intellig-ence of the Members of the United Nations. We can fully appredate the righteous indig~ n:ltion of the Uritfn States in this matter. I am reminded at the present rr.oment of tbat diett:m so commendable for i:s brtvity and wisdom, that was used by H. G. We:ls-"The path to helt is paved with good intentions". The suffering millions of Europe ;md not least amongst them tl:e Dutch, ,have bene5ted and are still benefiting from the generosity, magnanamity, and good will of tile United States. The picture of a dying man restored to such strength as to be able to strike and overpower MnJf>.One weaker than himself n:ust sllrely ma;'e the na:1d that fed the dying man and that saved hm from a collapse, trerr.ble at the thought that the well-inteutiouecl generosi't)' had been abused. It is a matter now fer mora: speculation whether thi~ generosity wiJI contirme. The Netherlands is a member of the Western Vnion~an association botmd together by reasons of security, and an association which is aiming to Mon Gouvt:rnement a deja, eCl termt:s tres uet~, eXFose 30n attitude. La nouvene de l'attaque injustifiee lancee par lcs forces neN:andaises centre la Republique d'Indonesie ainsi que de l'aTrestation du President Sockarno, dll PnSsj· der,t du Conseil Hatta et d'autres dirigeants ;:lOlitiques, a susdte ['horreur et !'ind:g;nation de :non Gouvewemcnt. Le President du CDnseil de mon :Jays a aceueilli favorablentent la deI:larche de M. Nehru, Premier Ministre de I'Inde, qui proposait de reunir ur,e conference de tous Its pays opposes al'agression neerlandaise a5.n d'exa~ miner les mesures qu'it y aurait lieu de prenrl.:"e contre cette manifestation d'jmperiaJisme agressif. Il est presque 5Uptrflu cc montrer que l'atti~ tl1de de mon Gouvernement 1ui est d:ctee non seu[e:nent par res motifs et les considerations qui sont ceux de tOllS les alltres Etats Membres, tel le souci d'empe:her toute nouvelle effusion de sang et de maintenir la paix et la securite in:emationales, mais aussi par l'interEt tout pll.T~ ticulier qtle presentent pour lu: toutes les 1:1esures destinees a restaurer la stkurite de cette partie du monde, a bquelle nous appartenons et, en ccnsequence, toutes les meSl1res pouvant diminuer [es repercussions qui ne sauraient manquer de se prodt!il'e si )'nn nt' n~U5sissait pas a enravcr la erise qui se developpe en Indone.sie. En d~pit des dedarations que vient de faire le represen~ tant des Pays-Bas, nous somrnes convai:ncus que la erise d'Indonesie, s'] n'y est pas mis fin, ne rnanquera. pas rle troubler la paix non settlement de !'ASle slld-or:entale, mais rr.erne du mor.de entier. C'est pourquoi cette question doi! demeurer sur le plan international. S'ils cO:lti. lltla:ent a affirmer, comme l'a fait le representant des Pays-Bls, ql1'il s'2git lk d'une question d'ordre purement interieur, les Neerlandais montreraient tOllt simpletnent que lcur entett":~ ment est incurable ou que [cur maniefe de pCllser est lamentablement surannee, ou encore qu'ils ont par trap sotls-eslime l'intelligt'nce caflective des Membres de l'O,ganisation des Nafons Unies. Nous pouvons parfaiten:ent comprendre la juste indignation dt":s Etats-Dnis a. ee propos. Je me sO!1viens en ce mom~nt de la for-mule, si :er.J.arquable en sa sagesse et t":n sa concision, qu'a reprise M. H. G. Wells: "L'~nf~r e;:t pa,'e. de bonnes intentions." Les millions d'etres qui 30uffrent en Europe - et parmi eux les Hollanda:s ne sont pas les de:niel"s - ont benUicU et bene.fic!e~t encore de la gen~rosit6, de la magnanmllte et de la bonne volonte df>.;': Rtats- Unis, La vue d'uD fJomme mourant qui retrouve de3 forces suffisantes pour attaquer et terr<lsser un homme encore plus faible que lui doit assurement faire tre.mbler la main de, cdui qui .a sauve eet homme et qui \'0 arrnche a la mort le faire trembler a la pensee qu'on a abuse de'i3 generosite et de ses bonnes intentions. C'est sur le plan moral <iu'il iaut se demander maintenant s'il y a lieu de continuer ce geste gen6reux. Les Pays-Bas font pa:tie de l'Union de l'Eu. rope pccidentale, c'est-';'-dire d'une association clont 1€9 membres sont unis pour des raisons de In any case, what does it avail the Netherlands if it has conquered all the lands of the Indonesians when it has not conquered tr.eir hearts? Bigger and more powerful nations than the Net1:erhnd5 have, in their wisdom, realized that to conquer a country by force is one thing and to administer that country after the conquest is quite ,mother. No people in this t\....entieth century can hope :0 rule another people against its will; and the representative of the United State~ struck the right note. if r may say EO, wl;en he observed, in effect, in the very able and firm speech he made, that in the settlement of this question, Indonesian nationalism must be fully recognized l398th meeting]. An English poet once sang to the effect that as long as the Coliseum stood, Rome would stand; and that if the Coliseum fell, Rome would fall. That is true of the United Nations in the sense that the United Nations, in which my Government and my people have the ceepest faith and for which they have the most prC£ound loyalty at:d respect, is the only hope of this dis· tressful world; and if it falls, the world wiII fall with it. The impression that has been gaining ground that tr.e United Nations is an impotent body when faced w:th the task of enforc:ng its decisions, is a mischievous one, and has already done gre2t danage to the prestige of t~is augnst Organiz3,tion; and all right~minded natIOns have for long felt a very strong n~ed for an ar~ed international fOlce for en!Ol·clng the Orgamzation's decisions wheneve~ they are flouted as they have undoubtedly been in the present case, It is !".oped that the suggestions contained in the speeches of the representatives o,f the United States, of China and of Norway WIll be elaborated and dobed in mo~e concrete form. Togeber they represent, in what is essential" a 'Workable basis for negotiations towards a' satlsfactory solution. The unconCitional release of Dans cette question, nous aVOns depuis longtemps depasse le stade de l'instruction, car les faits ne soot plus contestes. Aucune personne sensee ne saurait tro',TVer de .ill~tification a l'agression neerlandaise au a la non-obS€rvation pnr leg Pays-Bas des Q,dres du CDosei! de securite de cesser le feu et de Telacher les prisonniers poE~ tiques. Les Pa:ys-Bas ant defie le Conseil de secu~ rite et ont viole la chartt c'une 0!"iian:sation internationale dont its font partie. Mon Gouvernement constate avec satisfaction que, s'jl faut en croire certains indices, le Conseil de secu~ite n'acceptera pas en I'occurrence le fait a:compli, ne recon~ nai:ra pas les reSJ:ltats obtenus grace. a des sueces militaires rernportes au mepris des ardres du Conseil de seC\.1riu~ et en viola.tion de la Charte des Nations Unies. En tout etat de c<.-use, i quoi st:rt-il all." Pays- Bas d'avoir conquis tout le territoire indonesien alors qu'ils n'ont pas conquis le cceur des Indo· nesiensr Des :Jations plus grandes et pIu, puis· santes Cj~e les Pays-Bas oe sont rendus compte, dans leur sagesse, que conquerir un pays par la force est une chose et administrer ce pays apn~s la conquete en est une a'ltre. Aucun peuple, au vir:;gtieme siecle, ne saurait esperer gouverner un autre pellple coutre sa volonte:. Lp. representar.t des Etats·Unis a, si je puis di~e, trouve ,la note juste lorsque, dans son energique et rema~­ quable disc:ours, il a dec1aTl~ que, dans le reglement de cette question, il devait etre pleinement tenu coopte c-n Ilationatisllle indoncsicn [398emc sJance]. Un poete <l..gIais a dit un jour qu~, aussi long· temps que le .colisee tier.drait, Rome tiendrait et que lorsque le Colisee s'effrmdrerltir, Rome s'effO:lclrerait. Cela s'applique egalernent i ['Organisation des )Jations Unies er. ce sens que ce:te organis2..tion, en laquelle mon Gouvernement et man peuple ant la plus grande foi et envers laqueUe ils professeut le plus grand devoucment et le plus grand respect, cons~itue le seuI espoir du monde en detresse; si elle s'ecroule, le monde s'ecrouiera avec elle, L'impr~ssion de plus en plus rc?andue que l'Organisation des Nations Unies est atteinte d'impuissa:Jce lorsqu'il s'.a.git de faire appliquer ses deci510ns est un~ notion pernideuse qui a deja cause le plus ,grand ,tort all prestige de ceUe grande Organisatiol1, Dep'jis ]ongtemps, tonte" le., natiOns soucieuses de justice comprennent l'imperieuse mkessite qu'il y a pour l'Organisafon des Nations Unies de dis· poser d'lme force armee internationale pour assurer la mise en ceuvre de ses deci"ions lorsqu'on la Ilargue, <:ommc c::'cst cvidemment le cas, dans les ciroonstances presemes. II faut esperer que 1-e:s suggestions cnntenues dans Ies discours des representants des Etats~Unis, de la Chin/" pt de la Norvege serunt et~ldiees et recevront une for:ne plus concrete. Elles representent, en effet, du point de vue de tout ce qui est essentiel, une base pratique de negociations en vue d'ttn reglement satisfaisant. La mise en ,ea~or.able na~ions are in. agreement. The posItIon :herefore is that the disea3e has been diagnosed and the :-f'medy is Dbviotls to all; but as this remecy e.'ltars a major surgica! operation, time is of the essence of the cure. Tne world expects the United Nations to act firmly and toaet itnmediatdy, and to appoint proper agencies 'to cary out aH necessary act!on so as ~c:: ensure that everythillg is dOl1e undet" t.'" superV1Slon and aus~ p:ces of f.le United Natiom, whose au6.ority must be pal'iUllount in a matter of such grave international concern. The plea has been repeatedly put forward tha: the worl:! sl:ould no: condone the. many atrocic,us acts 0: the NetherJan::ls, whe:1 in fact the world has by its delayt:c.l action alre:tdy !'.(mnoned many Sldl acts. We would rather plet.d that there be :10 further condonation. Lct those of lIS in the United Nations who have been placed in the false position of <'.-ccessor;es l,eforc the crime :lot ~t\lmble into the further [osifon of accessories after the crime. . This is no time for qtlibnling with words, and tero.s, and phrases, and for importing interpretations suited only to one's own interests but tot;;.llv u:nelated to reality. Vv"hat a mockery, what' a defiance of tr.e orders of the Security Council, and what <lll ins'Jlt to our inte1lif!fnte: for the Netherlands to have suggested, in effec~, th<lt hostilities would cease a. its cwn sweet will ;md plelS\lre, that is, only after ~l1e bloody deed bad been com?leted and the mililary objectives acr.ieved! And what a travesty of justice and truth to say that all this has been done In the name of peace, in the nal'1e of hllmanity, in tile name of the satvation of H:e In<Jonesian people. 'V:1ich CJU11try :md whi:h nation would not pray to be saved and freed from such saviours a:lc friends? I shat now deal with the speech of the representative of lhe Neberl::Lnds in grelt,er detail. Ever: at this late hour d:e repre3entative of the Netherlands questi<Jlls the ::ompetence of the Security Council to deal with this question and virtually tells us that if the Nctherbnds ha3 furnished this Council with information it has done se under protest, howevel- \;oltrteously worced that protest TIlay have been. The representative of the Netherlands has attributed Lias and un f.<ii:"ness to r:lOst cf the sj'leeches made in criticism of s{lch action. It wotlld be more nattlral to expect bias ;:md lmfairness from a co'.1r.try which is directly intere~ed in defending itself be:o,e l~lis bat" of Y,>Qrld 09i:liol1 against charges which can tlO longer be in dispute. The Security Council would, I am sure, have no hesitation ~n preferring to believe tee reports of the Committee of Good Offices, whose :ntegt"ity ar.d impartiality cannot be challenged or called into question. s;o~tdes propositions deja anciennes etablies ala sUIte d'llne ana1yse minutieuse de'la situation 3n.uyse qui a l'npprohatiol": de tous Ies homme~ raisonnables qui font partie de nations raisonnablcs. La posit:on est n.one la suivante: la maladie est diagr,ostiquee et le remMe est evider.t aux yeux de tOllS; mais comme la cure exige une grave Dperaticn chirurgicale, la quest:oo de temps prend tine importance vitale. Le r.Jonde s'attend a ce que l'Organisation des Natio1.s VOles agisse avee fennet'; et sans retard, r:u'elle designe les organes necessaires po~r prendre les mesures qui s'imposent afin d'a~surer que tOl1t se fera sous le controle et ;es auspices de l'Organisation, dont l'autorite demeure supre.me dans une question intemationale au,si importante. On a demande a rna:n:cS rcpriG€s qlle le monde ne donne pas son approba:ion aux atrocites commises par ies Pays-Eas "Jurs que, en fait, il a deja, en tarda:It d'intervenir, approuve no:nbre d'entre eHes. Ce que non:; demanuedons plutot, c'est que l'on ne recom:nence pas. Qlle ceux cl'entre les Membres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies ql1i se sont rois dans la faltsse position de celui. qui. aide un criminel a preparer sm crime, ne se laissent pas entrainel' a aider le crimine] a commettre soi', forfait. Le mQme::tt n'cst pas opportun pour jouer avec les mats, les phrases, les ex:p~ess:o:1s et pour avancer des interpretations conformes a des ill,,~rets parti::ulieT5, maLo; sans aucun rapports avec la realite. Quelle deri3ion, que! defi aux ordres du Consetl de securite, qtle'.!c ~n:ure a nctre intel;igenc:e que d'avoir ?reti:'ndl1, en hit, que les hos:ilites r,e cesseraient qu'a lellr heure, c'est~a-dire quand la besugne sanglante <Iura ete :,;onsommee et leg. objectifs millt;;.ires attdnts. Ql1elle ?arcdie de la jLlstice et de la verite de dire que tout ceJa s'est fait all nDm de la paix, de l'lmmanite et pOllr le sabt du ~euple im;o"esier.. Qllel pays, que]le naticn ne pt"iet"uit pas pour etre sauves et liberes de tels sauveurs et de tels arnis'? J'examinerai maintCllant plus en detail le dis- CO'Jrs dLt representant des Pays~Ba5. Meme au st<:.de actllel le represelllant des Pays~:Bzs me: en doute la competence du Conseij de seeurite a examiner ceHe c1Uestion et nOL:!> laisse cntcndre qtlE', si les Pays-B·as cnt foumi des renseignement3 at: Comeil, Ls ne 1'on: fait qu'en vrotesLant, enc.ore que r:ette protestation ait ete formuUe en termes potis. Le rep:,e3entant des Pays-Bas " accuse 1~ plupart nell orateurs qui ant critique cette attitude d'avoir fait preuve de partialite et de parti Fis. 11 "erait plus nature! ele s'attendre it ee que la pari.alite et le parti pds viennent dl1 pays qcti a i se cefendre dcvant le tribunal de I'opinion pubJiql:e mO:1.diale co~tre des accusations dont le jien-fonde n'e:sl plu5 contestable. Le Conseil de securite prefel'era, j 'en suis certain, ajol1ter foi aux rapports de 1.1. Commissioll de bons cffices, dont l'integrite et l'irnpartialite ne sauraient etre mises en dDute. Dealing with the political prisoners, the representative of the Netherlands by hlS own admission, testified to the "limited"-that is the actnal word he used: "limited"-freedom that is to be granted to a few of the politic.al leaders. He went on to say that the politica11eaders would be released. But on what terms? On terms and under conditions that would render such a release, a mere mockery of freedom. The representative of the Netherlands, finCing himself briefed for a weak case, has referred to equally serjous delinquencies (m the part of India, Syria and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, forgetling for the moment that the multipli_ cafon Ot such delinquencies, even if true, would not improve his case, which must stand 011 its own merits and not on the demerits of other cases totally unconnected with his. In spite of the disappointing speech to which we have listened from the representative of the Netherlands, we would end on a friendly basis. We would appeal to the Netherlands to be fair, to be reasonable, and not to blacken a picture that is already dClrk. The Dutch can take legitimate pride in the recorded history of their own culture and their own civilizatioIl. And, in the history of the world, they also can point to.events and epochs which would indicate that their love for peace has been no less strong than that of any other nation in the world. Vlhy then this sudden and tmcontl'ollab1c exhibition of unreason and belllcose passions? We fully ttndentand that the Netherlands may feel that everything is slip. ping aW<lY from it, and that without its far-flung possessions it would lOSe its sources of economic and poEtical strength. But, surely, the remedy it has been applying is even worse than the disease itself, and tlle path it has been following is suicidal. The his tcry 0 f greater nations than the Netherlands has amply shown that it is the path of greater wisdom to give with good grace and in good time, and to give magnanimollsly, rather than to have things wre~ted away irom unwi~ling hands. In the observatLons r have made at the first possible opportunity afforded me after beingpermitted to pnrticipate in this discussion, my only desire and pt:rpose has been to indicate the reactions and general attitude of my Government ill tlit: lllalter; a'ld to show how vitally interested my Government is in a speedy, just and horlOurab!e sohltion of this \'ery grave problem. At later stages, when the suggestions and ideas which have been put forward by several members of the Security Council will have taken concrete form, I hope once more to avail myself of the permission to participate in this discussion pllis~t: eta:. Lt: rapport de la Commission de bOJ;!s, offices, qui vient de noUs' etre presente et qui est ~.dresse au President du Conseil de sectlrite, presente un tablean de destl"llctions impicoyables et incessantes. Qtlant aux prisonniers poJitiques, le representant des Pays-Bas a admis qu'une Hbcrte "Jimitee" - ('est le terme qu'iI a employe - al1ait etr€; conferee a quelques-uns des dirigeants republieains. 11 a ajoute que ces dirigeants seraient liberes. Mats sous queUes conditions? Ils seront liberes dans des conditions et avec des reserves qui ieront de cette lih~ration un simple simulacre de mise en liberte. Le representant des Pays-Bas, qui a re~u des instructions pour de£endre une cause extrememen! faible, a parle de fodnits tout aussi ~2lYeS qui auraient ete commis par plnde, la Syne et l'Union de.~ Re_pllbliques soeialistes sOYietiques, en ol1bliant que, meme si d'aulreS se sont rendus cOLlpables de crimes analogues cela n'ameJioreuit en rien son cas, qui doH etre juge en tenant compte des circonstanees dont il s'accompagne et nOIl des circonstances qui accompagnent des crimes qui n'ont aueun rapport ayec le sien. Malgre le discollTS ctecevant qui a ete prononee par le representant des Pays-Bas> nOllS vou1ons tel'miner sur une note amicale. NoDS demandons aux Pays~Bas d'etre equitables et raisonnables et de ne pas noircir encore un tableau deja sombre suffisamment. Les Hollandais peuvent a bOil droit etre tiers de Jellr culture et de lc\1r civilisation. 11s peuvent citer des evenements, rappeler' des epoqnes eLtieres qui viendront prouver qu'its sont, tout autant que ;es aLltres, atta,:hes au maintien de la paix. Pourquoi done cette mani~ festation sourlaine et impetlleuse de passions deraisonnabJes t"t beliiqut"uses? Nons comprenons parfaitemenl c,ne les Pays~Bas puissent craindre que tout ne lenT echappe et qu'avec leurs possessionsloinfaines i1s perdent lenr force economiqlle et politique. Mais le remede auque1 ils ont recours est certainement pire que le mal lui~meme et Ill. voie dans laqueIle ils se sont engages mene au SUicide. L'histoire de nations ~ltlS grandes que 1es Pays-Bas prouve qu'il est plus sage de ceder de bonne grace et au moment opportun, de donner genereusement ph,tot que de se voir arr~cher ce qu'on detient. Si j'ai fait <:es observations ala pre.miere occasion qui S'est offerte apres que j'aie ~te autorise it. prendre part it. ces d€:bats, mon seul clesir et mon setTI but Dnt ete (J'indiquer les reactions et I'attitude gener<J.le de tr.on Gouvernement en la matihe de montrer que mon GotlVernE'ment est interesse cl'lIne faltOn vitale a trOl1ver une solution rapide, equitable et honorabie pour ce grave problt::me. Plus tard, lorsque les suggestions et les idees presentees par certains membres du Conseil de securite amont pris UIle forme concrete, j'espere profiter une fois de plus de la permission que le Conseil de sccurite e'est gene';' Mr. HOOD (Atlstralia): May I say at the beginning how muw some of us we:come the broad and far-sighted statements which have just been made to the Security Council by the representatives of Cuba and Burma. If those statements assist the Security Council in facing and discharging its clea, obligations in this matter, those representatives will have rendered no sman service. I do n<lt wish to prolong the general debate uonecessarily, still less to repeat observationt; which have already been made on behalf of the Australian delegation. But I think that some useful purpose can be served at this stage by the presentation of three or fOUr remarks which will be brid aau, I llope, clear, and which will, in my view, contribute to a proper appraisal by the Security Council of what, in the light of its clear duty, its next step should be in this discussion. I would refer, first, to the staterneul which we heard this afternoon from the representative of the Netherlands a:ld to which some attention has just been paid by the representative of Burma. I think that not " few members of the Council will regret the terms and nature of the 'statement made by the representative of the Netherlands. It is, in fact, a disappointing state· ment. After all that has gone before-not only in the last three weeks but in the last six or seven months-what do we find the Netherlands Government prepared to do in the face of the very clear and expli.cit CO:1Sensu.s now prevalent among the members of t1:e Council? I have analyzed this statement-and I hav!" done so cursorily, in view of the time which has been at our disposal to look at it-and I :find nothing new of any nature in it, except a:t indication-and a vague indicatian-{)f certain stages of the procedure for the assumption of final sovereignty by a Ur.ited States of Indonesia. h no respect does the statement really attempt to meet the implicit wishes of the Security Council, which I trust will, in due course and at a very early point, be translated into explicit requirements by the Council. Furthermore, the statement, I regret to saJ'- and I hope Mr. van Roi:en will forgive me for saying thi~is also a misleading statement. His, indeed, so misleading as to be rash. I take one passage in relation to the present situatior. in the Republican areas. Mr. van Roijen saic, as a summing up of his description of present conditions in the occupied areas: "Altogether, three weeks after the begimting of the purge, life is nearly back to normal in the former Repnblican areas." It is a coincidence-and the representative of Burma bas drawn atte:ltion to this-that we also have today a report from a group of military oo!ervers of the Committee of GUl)U Officc.s it:;;e1f, dated as recently as 9 January [S/1212J. This report covers the area around Surabaya, which is the only area on which We have so far ~eceived a report. In this report, we read the following: Tout d'aLord, je voudrai,:: dire. que[ques mats au sujet de la declaration que le representant des Pays-Bas a faite cet apres-midi et au sujet de laquelle le representant dela I3irmanie viem de fOrm.1ler quelques observations. A mon avis, plus d"I'J membre du Conseil regre~tera les termes et [a nature de la declaration faitc par le representant des Pays·Bas. C'etait en fait Une declaration bien decevante. Apd:s tout cc qui s'est passe non seu1ement au cours des trois dernieres semaines, rnais au cours des six DU sept derniers mois, a quoi le Gouvernement des Pays- B<ts se declare+il pret, en presenc.e des opinions tres netres qt;i prevalent maintenant au .sein ti'J Conseil? J'ai analyse cette declaration - je l'ai hit rapidement car nous n'avions que peu de tem~> cl notre disposition - et je n'y ni r:cn trouve de nouveau si ce n'est une indication bien vague, at; sujet de certaines etapes de l'evolution devanl abolltir a J'exercice des drob, de sou'ierRinete par les Etats-Unis d'lndJnesie. CeUe declarati(nl ne cherche aucunement a satisfaire les desiTs que le Conseil de securite a dWl exprimes implicitement et qui, je ['espere, seront biemot for· mules en termes precis. De plus, je regrette de devoir dire - et j'esptle que M. van Roijen me le pardonnera - que cette declaration est deroutante et meme temt. raire. Je releve un passage qui a trait a la situJ· tiOll actue1le clans les regions reptblicaines. En resumant sa description ces conditions qui regnc~t dans les regions occupees, M. van Roijen a de· c:are: "Dam l'ensemble, trotS semaines apres le dibut de l'epurat:on, la situation est presqlie redevenue normale dans les regions precedem· ment mus lltltorite repl1blicaine." Le representant de la Birmanie a attire no~ attention sur le fait que nOlls avons, pa:- coin(j· denee, re~u aujourd'hui un rapport emana'.l d'un groupe d'obscrvatCL\rs militaires de la Corn' nission de bans offices, rapport qui ne date q~e du 9 janvier [Sj1212]. Ce rapport a trait ala region 3utOtr de Sourabaya qui est la sel/le ltI sujet. de laquelle nous avons jusqu'ici re~u dei ren!ielgnf'ment~. Nous l:sons d"ns ..e documer,!: "The towns of Lamongan and Bodjonegoro are reported to be badly damaged by fire and demo~ lition ..." Finally, and significantly, we read the following in the report: "TIle number of Netherlands troops in the newly occupied areas is insufficient"-and this is a statement by a group of military observers- "to prevent roving bands of guerrillas from moving freely and from performing acts of sabotage, such as destruction of newly repaired bridges. Netherlands troops are also insufficient to main~ tain law and order in towns, and many Chinese merchants have suffered severely fmm looting." This; I repeat, applies only to one small section of the occupied territory. Is it a picture com_ patible with the pattern which Mc van Roijen has attempted to place before the Council? May I be permitted to add somewhat to this analysis by quoting information which I have received today from my own Government relating' to present conditions in the occupied areas of Indonesia. This information is from unimpeachable sources. The following is contained in that information: "Guerrilla activity in East Java is embarrassing the Dutch considerably. The Republican radio station in East Java continues to report guerrilla activities, which iOlPpear to be most intensive in West and Central Java. Considerable guerrilla activity contint1eS around Jogjakarta, Madioen and Solo. It is :also reported that the Dutch are taking strong reprisal action, including the burning of complete villages, and, in the Solo area, are using artillery fire against anything which resembles a concentration. This is causing numerous civilian casualties." Furthermore, as an additional element in this picture of "almost normal relations," I have received this information: "Very little co-operation is being obtained from the people of Jogjakarta. Only ISO of the 10,000 civil servants ordinarily em]?loyed are now "\vorking for the Dutch. In centra! J:ava the food sit'lation is critical, rice and textiles are bein.g distributed only to those working for the Dutch." I could quote further, but these are some of the cardinal points in a summ:ary survey of present conditions in the Republican areas. Do they concord with the picture which Mr. van Roije-..n has attempted to put before the Security COllhCil? Taking the statements of the Netherlands representative as a whole, and taking in particular 11 est significatif aussi de trouver le passage sUlvant: "Le nombre des troupes neerlandaises se trouvant dans les zones nouvellement occupees est insuffisant." Et voila ce que dit le groupe d'observateuTS militaires: "Pour ernpecher des bandes de guerilleros errants de se deplacer librement et de se livrer a des actes de sabotage, tels que la destruction de ponts recemment repares. Les troupes neerlandaises sont egalement in5uffisantes pOUT maintenir l'ordre public dans les villes et de nombreux marchands chinois ont subi de graves pertes du fait de pillages." Je le repete, ces renseignements ne se rapportent qu'a une petite partie du territoire occupe. Ce tableau ressemble-t-il a celui qtle M. van Roijen a tente de presenter au Conseil? Ptlis-je me permettre de citer quelques renseignements que j'ai re~us aujourd'hui de man Gouvernement all sujet des conditions qui r~gnen! dans les regions occupes d'Indonesie? Ces renselgnements proviennent d'une source tres sure. Voici ce qu'ils disent notamment: "L'activite des guerillas dans la partie orientale de Java gene considerablement les Ho1landais. La radio republicaine du Java oriental continue a signaler des operations de guerillas qui semblent ctre partieulierement intenses dans les parties orientale et centra1e d~ l'ile. Les guerillas continuent a deployer une activite considerable autour de Djokjakarta, de Madioen et de Solo. On signale egalement que les Hollan~ dais prennent des mesures severt~s de represailles,· dont certaines consistent a incendier les villages entiers. Dans la region de Solo ils font usage de l'artillerie contre tout ce qui ressemble a lme concentration. Ces mesures font de nombreuses vktimes panni les civils." POllr completer cette description d'une "situation presque normale", j'ai re(ju L'jnforination suivante: "La plupart des habitants de bjokjakarta ne cooperent que fort peu avec les HoHandais. Des 10.000 fonctionnaires normalement employes, 150 seulement travaillent pour e11X. Dans la partie centrale de Java, la situation alimentaire est critique, le riz et les textiles ne sont distribues qu'a ceux qui trOlvaillent pour les Hollandais." Je pourrais citer cl'autTes renseignements, mais ce sont la les points les plus importants d'une etude sommaire sur les conditions actuelle:3 qui regnent dans les regions republicaines. Cette description concorde-t-elle avec le tableau que M. van Roijen a essaye de presenter au ConseD de seeurite? Si 1'on considere les declaratlons faites par le representant des Pays-Bas et, en particulie~ sa In the setond part of his statement, the Council was informed of a broad programme of constitutional development in Indonesia whieh admittedly is in line with the previously declared inte:ltion of the Netherlands Government and which for our inform:l.tion today, admittedly did con~ain a certain tent~tive d<i.te fc. its completion, We look again in vain in the programme for referer:ce to or acknowledgement of the Republic. WJ-.at :'1\S beCQme of the Repllhlic of Indonesi2.? In the protracted di3cussions which the Council ha$ had for eighteen months in this Council chamber, the Council has taken alL cOl,nizance cf, and given full recognition to, the status and existence of the Republic of Indonesia as an equal -partne:: in what has been happening in Indo:J.esia. Is it now the desire of the Council-this is a rhetorical question, because obvio'.1s1y it is notto proceed as if the Republic had ceased to exist? But that is what the representative of the Netherlands apparently would wish the Council [0 do. By all its action since 1947, the COllncil is committed irrevccabJy to the reeogndon uf the Republic as an equal partner in all the processes le!'.ding to the final. settlement of the Indonesian question. I was very llappy to note that the representative of the United Kingdom stated earlier this afternoon that the restoration of the Repllb~ lit to a positior: in wl1ich it could ~unction :md could be recognizee as an e.qual partner in negotiatiws is a primary, indeed the primary, objective immediately before H;e Sf>curity Cmlncil. ' In order to e.stablish or to re-estab1i3h the position which ougbt never have heen shaken or 6sturbed, the Council must now face certain obligations which are not, perhaps, eas), to accept, but which mmt be discharged, and adequately discharged. The Counc:l roilst insist on two essentia~s, The first is release of and restoration of complete personal, official and political freedom to tr,e IndoI1csian leaders who have been a:td who <.re under detentiulI. T1Jis is axiomatic. Secor.d1y, the Council mltst insist on a withdrawal of the trOO?S and occupying forces in the Republican areas, V{hat is rr>ally the use of restoring the poHticd freedom of the Inconesian leaders, and even restoring the status of the Republic as a political entity free to participate on an equal basis a.s a political entity with the Netherlands authorities? What is the use merely of ::Ioing that? The Republic must be restored not or.ly in the political sense, not oniy on paper, but also in a territorial sense so far as that proves to be necessary. The Dans la ?euxieme p~rt.ie de sa ~eclaration, M. van ROl;en a porte a la connalssance du Co:tseit un programme etendu au sujet de l'e'lO~ lution constitutionnelle de l'lndonesie, progra:mme qui serait confor:ne aux intentions precedemment enollcees par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas; it' {'st egalement vrai que M, van Roijen a indique, pour notre information,la date a laquelle ce progr<i.mm~ devrait etre realise, La encore nons ne trot1vcns aucune allusion a la Republique. Qu'est devenue la RepubLique d'lnclone~ie? Dans :es discussions prolongees qui se sont deroulees dans cettc Sll.\Ie au cot.:rs ~les dix-huit den.iers mois. le Conseil a pleinement reconnu le statut et l'existence de'la Rep'lblique d'Indonesie, a admis que cctte dernihe jUl,ait son role dans les evenements d'Indonesie sur tm ?ied d'egalitc avec les Pays-Bas. Le Conseij clCsire-t-i.l maintenant faire comme si la R~pub1iquc :lVait cesse cl.'exister? C'est I<i une question pt:renent theonque, car de toute evidence il ne le desire p::.s. Ylais te1le est, stmblt~t-il, l'a:titude que le representant des Pays-Bas desire voir adopter au Conseil. Par toutes les mesures qu'il a prj~es apres 1947, le COllseil s'est irrcvo,~[\blementengage a reconnaitre des droits egat:x a la Repll· blique au caul'S de tot:tes les negodations devant aboutir au reglemcnt final de la qnegtion indollesie:me. J'ai ete tres he'.1reux de constater que, clans la declaration qtt'il a faite cet apres-midi, l~ representant du Royaume-Uni R sollligne que l'uo des objectifs principat1X du Conseil, son objectif principal meme, devait etre de permcttrc a la Republigue de fonctionner et de ltli assurer des d~oits egaux au cours des ncgcdations. En vue d'etablir OLl c.e retablir Unc :;ituatio.1. qui n'aurait jamais do Hre mise cn danger Otl modifiee, le Conseil doit maintenant faire face a certaincs obligatiom, qui :le sont pcut-etre pns iaci:es a accepter, mais dont il doit s'acquilter et s'acquitter comme it convient. Le Conseil dait :nsister sur d~ux points C$sentiels: le premier est la liberation des chefs indonesiens qui ont ete arretes et qui son: er:cOre detenus; i1s doive:it rctrauvcr :me co;nplete liherte pen~nnndlf'_, 06- cielle et politique. Ce:a va de sol. Deuxiememer.t, le Conseil dOlt insister sur le retrait des troup::s et des forces d'ocCt1?ation q11i se trotlvenf dans les regions republicaines. A qtlOi ser\'irait le retab!issement de la :ibcrle poEtique des chefs i:tdcnesiens et me-me le Itlablissement du statnt de la Re.publiquc en tJut qu'entite politique lihre de partidper sur me baoe d'egalill: avec Its <;luloritt:s llt:t:lhll~d;}iscs aux negociati::ms? A qcoi cela servirait-i1 si'l'on I sJarn~tait la? LE Repllbliqne deit etre retaUie non seulelTIcnt tU poiut de vue -pDlitiquc 110n set:1ement er. theorie, mc.is il faut egal~mtllt The Council, now having gone so tar, cannot escape the responsibility of bt:iug in some way-'- and the more closely the better-associated with the actual contents, at any rate in their basic character, of what the nnal settlement may ·)e. It might be that the Council CQtl1d refer in some resdutioll in due cours~ to wh:l.t :tppears to be a suitable basis for negot;ations. It could go even further and could recommend not only the basis, but even some of the details or the contents of an eventual settlement. I shall not ex.pand on that point. T11ere will, I hope, be an opportunity within the not-tco-distant futme of stating the views of tT.y Government on the nature of the final settlement. I1 nc faut pus nous hisser indLtire en erTf'tlr par le dernier passage de la declaration de M. van Roijen. Tons les objectifs qui }' sont enumeres auraient pu etre atteints en 1947 et meme avant, si le Gouvernement des ?ays-Bas s'eta:t montre sit1cerf'mf>rt pret a considerer Clue la Republique devait prendre part am:: n~goci~ti.on~ sur un pied d'egalite. Mais c'est precisernent le refus clu GOllvernement des Pays-3a.5 d'accepter cette egalite, chaqllc fois que la question s'es~ posee, qui a mene a l'echec des negociations, ecllec que, tout a fait a tort. M, van Roijen a attribue, all cours de son intervention de cet apres.midi, a la Republique. Le probleme expose par le representant des Pllys-Bas au su.iet de I'organisation des elections devant aboutir a la constitution d'un parlement representatit et au transfert des droits de SDllverainete, ne signifie qu\.ne chose, a savoir que l'on se propose d'imposer ces mesures d'une tat;on unilateraIe au peuple indor.esier.. Let us not be misled by the final pass<'.ge of Mr. van Roijen's statement. It is a fact that all the objectives which are there outlined could have been attained during the course of 1947, and even earlier if the Netherlands Government had been prepared sincerely to ad~it the Republic to an equal status cS a negotiating par:ner, but it was the very fact that the Netherlands Government reft:sed to give such stllttlS to the Republic, when it came to every practical testing point which led to the breakdown of the negotiations which Mr. van Roijen, quite wrongly, attributed this afternoon to the Republic. The programme outlined by the Netherbnds representativ<: for the halding of elections to establish a represe:ltative pa,liament and fol' the trans~ fer of sovereignty, merely means the unJateral imposition of those stages and processes by the Netherlands Government on the people of Indonesia. Let the Security Council realize that be Netherlands is incapable of making such a tmilateria1 imposition, an:! that if it is allowed to try-if the Council permits it to try-it will lead to lhe 'worst consequences both in Indone3ia and thl'OUghDtlt the whole of South East Asia. The PRESlDENT: To the other representatives wl:o wisl1ed to speak at this meeting, I propc·se that the Co-.mcil should now adjuurn, la meet again on the Indonesian questio:l on Monday, 17 ]anuar,Y. at 3 p.m. The melJtiny rose at 5.55 p.m. 11 faut que le Conseil de securite comprenne que 1es Pays~Bas ne peuvent imposer leurs decisions ullilaterales et que, s'lls etaient autorises i le faire, si le Conseil leur donnait cette permission, les p:res conseqltenCes en resulte:aiet.It pour l'Indonesie et pour l'ensemble de :'ASle sud-orientale. Le PRESIDENT (trcuiuit de l'anglais): Je pro~ pose aux. autres representants qui ont expri~e le desir de prendre la rarole an cours de la presente reuClion, que nous levions la seance et que nous reprenions la discussion de la question indonesienne le [u:ld'i 17 janvier, i 15 heures. La seance est levee d 17 h. 55.