S/PV.401 Security Council

I draw the attention of the members of the Security Council to the fact that this is the third anniversary of the first meeting of the Security Council. It will be recalled that the first Lneeti~g was held in London. 3. Continuation of the discussion on the Indonesian question

In accordance with the tlsllal custom of the Council, the· remarks of Council members will be interpreted conscwtively; all others, sin1l11tanfol1s1y. I call the attentioll of the representatives to document 5/1213 dated 17 January 1949, which QUATRE.CENT-UNIEME SEANCE Tenlle aLake Success, New-York, le fundi 17 janvier 1949, a15 heures. President' Le general McNi\1JGFlTON (Canada). Presents: Les represent,-mts des pays suivants' Argentine, Canada, Chine, Cub". Egypte, France, Norvege, Repub1iquc sOclali"ie sDvietique d'Ukraine, Union des Republiqnes socialistes sovi€tigues, Royaume·Uni, mats-Unis d'AmcriCjuc. I. Ordre du jonr provisoire (S/Agenda 4,01) 1. Adoption de \'orc1rc du jour. 2. La qlle3f:iOl1 indonesienne. 2. Adoption <le rordre du jour Le PUESlDENT (tTaduit de l'anglais): Je. rap- pclle aux membres du Consel! que c'est aUjoUl'- d'hlli le troisU:mc allniversaire de la premien: seance dn Conseil de securite. CeUe premiere seance, on s'en sotlvient, s'est tellu~ a Ldndres. 3. Suite de la discussion Bur la question indoncsienne Sur l'invitMi01~ du PfesirJr:mt, lVI. Hood, reprc- Slmiant de l'Anstralie; M, Nisol, rf!pr~sentan,t de la Beloh]?le; Si!- Benegal Rama Ran, repl'heu- tant de l'lnde; M. van Roijcn, 1-epreSetltant des Pays-Bas; M. Ingles, rcpn5smtant des Philip- pines, et M. Palar, reprCsflttant de la Republique d'Indonesie, prenncnt plar~ Cl la table dll C01l.seil. Le PRl:SIDENT (iradltil de l'anglais) . Slliv<lnt la coutumc, les interventions des membres dll Consci1 fe.ront l'objct d'une interpretation conse- cntive et tOlltes les antrcs d'une interpretation simultanee J'attirc l'attention des representants sur le document 5/1213, en date du 17 janvier 1949; Mr, PALA:t (Rc:public of Indonesia): In his statement before the Security Council on 14 January [400tJ1 meetingl, the representative of the Netherlands tried to explain to the Cocncil the "measure in which the Security Coundl's resolution has in fact ::,een carried out", and he has <lone w by dealing at le:1gth with three spe- cific points: the termi\latio:1 of hostilities, the release of political leaders, and the granting of :acilitie<; to the Committee of Good Offices and the Consular Commission. I will not take up these ?oints again, since it would surely be a seriOtlS lmderestimation OT the intelligence of the Security Council and of every- one, for that !Ulltter, to assume that arguments of the Netherlands repre~elltative have in any way COnvinced the Council of the fact that the Netherlands Government has complied with the Securify Council's resolution. None of the argUtnents put forw~rrl hy the representative of the Netherlands can star:cl up against the overwhelming evidence produced by the Committee of Good Offices in Indonesia. The facts as reported to the SeClwity Council by the Committee of Good Office!; are clear and un- Rmbigl1otlS, There has beer. no compli,mce by the Netherlands with the cease-fire order. The political leaders have not been released, and at the time the Netherlands reiJresentative an· nounced that facilitic9 had been g-,mnted :0 the military observers in the field, the fact was that no such facilities had lceengranted. I shall there- fore not elaborate on these points. In his statement, however, the Netherlands representative has raised several points which are a complete misrepresentation of fact and which I cannot allow to pass withOltt comment. The Securh Council will remember that I hai"e pointed otlt several times that it is the con- sistent Nf'therlands policy to build up the im- pression in the world that the fight:ng in Illdo- nesia is over, that an is peacefttl and quiet and that, in fact, no outside country need interfere in an affair that has alreli.dy been settled. It was in order to achieve this aim that the Netherl<l.nds Government, from the very beginning of the miU- tary attack, has imposed dOtlb;e censorsh:p, bo:h political and t.1ilitary, on all otltc.oming news from Indonesia. Dt1riCg the 400th meeting of the Secttrity Council, Mr. van Roijen again tried to give a picture of perfect onler, tranq11illity and peace in Indonesia. In :'act, he said: "... there has been no res-is:ance or enmity from the popul:4.tion at all. There has not even been any large-scale guerilla warfare nur is it tu be expected". To support his point Mr. van Roijen quoted a lengthy newspaper report. I will not indulge in reading to the Council the rerwrts I have :-eceived £rem my Government about the mi:itary situation, nOT will I quote any new~paper reports, althol1gh such reports of continued f.Lnd e'ven ir.creas:ng M. PAL'\R (Republique d'Indonesie) (tradllit de l''Jnglais): Dans la declaration qu'il a :aite devant le Conser de securite le 14 janvier [40G~me seanceL le rep~esentant des Pays-Bas a teute cl'exposer au Couseil "dans quel1e mesure la resolution dtl Conseil de seeurite a effet:ti'lernent fie appliqJee"; il a, POl1f ce faire, longuemenl devdoppe trois points particuHers: la cessation des hostilites, la mise en 1iberte des dirigeants poJitiql1es el les facilites accordees a la Corr.mis- sion de bUll ufflCe~ et it la Commission c.ansuJiire. Je ne vais pas revenir Sur ces differents points, car ce serait vraiment som-estimer l'intelli5"ence des meI11bres dtl Conseil - et celle de tOllt le monde - que de sUpposer que ces argUl:lents dl1 representant des Pays-Bas aient en quoi que ce soit n::l1ssi i convaincre le Comeil que le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas a mis a eXeClltiOn ta nfsolution du Consei1 de securite. AUCl111 des arguments a'lances par re repre- sentant des Pays-Bas ne pcut tenir devant les prcuves ecrasa:ltes gu'a fournies. la Commission de bans duces en Indonesie. Les faits, tels que la C01l1mis,~:on de bons offices lcosa exposes au Conseil de securite, ne laissent subsister a.ucun doute: les Hol1alldais ne se sont pas confannes a l'ordre de ceSSer le feu. Les dirigeants poli- tiglles n'ont pas ete relaches, et, all moment ou le representant des Pays-Bus annom;ait que l'on avait accorde des faciHtes dUX observatelll'S militaires envDyes sur If'~ lieux, ces facilires n'avaient point ete accordees. Je ne m'atfarderai done pas davantage sur ces points. D'autre part, le representant des Pays-Bas a formute un ce~tain nombre d'observations qni de- natl1l'ent completeUlent 1e3 fnits et que je ne peux lai3ser sans commentaires. A diverses reprises, le Conseil de secllrite s'en souvienl, j'ai falt observel' qt:e la politiql1£> des Pays-Bas cherche sysh~matiquement l creer dans le monde l'jrnpression que les cOll1bats o~t pris fin en Indonesie, gue la paix et la tl'3nqUll- lite y regned pattout et qt1l'., en somme, le;; autres pays n'ont pas a intervenir dans cette affaire,1111i est deja regUe. C'est pOLlr cn~er cC,tt.e iJnpres_~ian qu~, des le derlllt ces 0p~1"atiQ!lS mJl~­ taires, le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas a soltmlS toutes les nouvel1es d'lndonesie a une double censure, politique et militaire. A la 400eme seance du Conseil de secl1ritt\ M_ vac Roijen a ue nouveau essayc de ~rosser 1111 tableau de l'orcre parfait, de la paix et de .l~ tranquillite profondes q:li regnent et'! Indoncste En fait, il a dit: ".. , it n'y a €u absolument aUCl1ne resistance ni mC-me al:Cl1l1e hostilite de 1l: raft c1~ la pcpulntion civile. I1 Ilf' s'est manifest.! al1ctll1e activite. de partisans et i1 ne s'en mal1l' festera vraisemblablement pas". A l'a?pui de ~a thc~, M. van Roijen a cite un long article d~ Journal. Je ne vais pas lire au Conseil les ren· scignements que i 'ai re<;us de mon Gouvernemed sur la sittlation militaire en Indonesie, et jene This report gives an entirely different picttlre of the situation than that reported by the Nether- lands represe:ltative. In fact, the impression created by tillS report is one of an occupying army completely unable to control the areas it invaded and even unable to maintain law and order in the towns it claims to have occupied. I quote: "Destruction of roads, bridges and property has ken and still is h'1.king place ona much greater scale than was anticipated by the Netherlands military allthorities. Hundreds of bridges have been destroyed, including many importalit ones. All railroads are completely blocked owing to the. destmction of bridges and railroad property. •• & The number of Netherlands troops in the newly-occupied areas is insufficient to prevent roving bands of guerillas from moving freely and from redorming aets of sabotage such as destruction of newly-repaired bridges." It is really to be regretted that the presence of a group of nel1tr::l1 observers in Indonesi::l seems to spoil the sincere efforts of the Netherlands to create the impression that the Netherlands Army has succeeded in bringing peace, ordet· and tranquillity to Indonesia. Embarking ltpOn Cl discussior, of the attitude of the Security Council, Mr. van Roijen has tried to minimize his Govel'nment's defiance of the Security Council's order by pointing to the in" sllfficieneies of others. Surely this is a stnmge procedure, to say the least. I will not elaborate on this point, but J feel compelled to dwell at some length 011 several other points the Netller- lands representative made in his reply to the statements of several members of the Council; they are such a complete misrepresentation of the facts that I feel I must correct some of the most flagrant ones in order that the Council may base its decisions on an objective knowledge of the facts involved. It is amazing that the Netherlands Government could furnish its spokesm::ln with such bad information. The Netherlands representative bases the rigbt of his Governmel1t to start its colonial war in Indonesia-if indeed there is any such right-on the Netherlands sovereignty over these areas, and he reminded the Council of article I of the Additional Renvil/e Principles [S/649, Appen- di.t: VIII]. What, however, is the feal position of tbis Netherlands sovereignty? Article I of the Additional Renville Principles was one of the articles which both the Nether- lands and the Republic agreed to embody in a futttre political ::lgreeme.nt between the Nether- lands and the Reptiblic of Indonesia. Aboard the Relwil/e, we signed a truce agreement _[5/649, borner~l .a me reporter au dernier rapport de la ~011lm1SS10ll d~ bons offices [5/1212], qui con- tlent des renselgnements recueillis par les obser- vatcurs cnvoyes sur les lieux. Cc rappott donne de la Situation un tableau entierement different de cclui qu'en fait le repre~ sentant des Pays-Bas. 11 donne en effet l'impl'es- s.ion qu'il y a en Indonesic une <lrmee d'occupa- hon absolument incapable de tenir sous son contr61e les regions qtt'elle a envahies incapable meme d'assurer I'ordre public dans' 1es villes qu'elle se VCl.nte d'avoir occupees. Je cite: "Les destmctions de routes ponts et biens ont eu lieu et se produisent enc~re sur une echelle beaucoup plus gnr.de que les autorites neerlan~ daises ne l'avaient pr~vll. Des centaincs de ponts ont ete detrttits, dont de nombreux ponts impor- t:tnts. Le trafic ferroviaire est entierement para- lyse en raison de la destruction des ponts, du materie! et (les installations . . . Le nombre des trotlpe~ neerlancbises se trouvallt clans les zones nouvellement occupees est insuffisant pour empe- cher des bandes de guerilleros errants de .sc de.pla- cer librement et de se livrer ades actes de sabo- tage, tels que la destruction de pants recemrnent repares." N'est-il pas vr::liment regrettable que la pre- sence en Indonesie d'un grOltpe d'observate'Jl's neutres parnisse compt'omettre les sl1cces des efforts sinceres qlle deploient les Hollandais pour donner l'impression que I'armee des Pays- Bas a reussi a apporter la paix, I'ordre et la tranquillite a l'Indonesie? Se lano;ant dans ltne discussion de I'attitude du Consei1 de securite, M. vnn Roijen a essaye d'attenuer la gravite du geste de deft par 1eque1 son Gouvernement a repondu aux ordres du Con- seil de securite, en arguant des defaillances d'au- trui. Voila certainement un procede pour le mains etrange. Je ne m'etendrai pas sur ce point, mais je me sens tout de meme oblige de m'arreter quelque peu a un certain nombre d'autres asser~ tions que le representant des Pays~Bas a emises flOur repondre aux declarations de plusieurs mem- bres du Conseil; ces assertions denatl1rent a td point les faits, que je me vois dans l'obligation de I·edi.fier certaines des erreur.s les plus fla- grantes afin que le Consei1 pl1isse se fonder, dans ses decisions, sur une conn::lissance objective des faits. nest stupefiant que le Gouvernement neerlandn.is ait si mal renseigne son porte Mparo1e, Le representant dl':S Pays-Bas, en soutenant que son Gouverntment avait le droit - comme si l'on pouv::lit parlH de droit dans un te1 cas - d'entreprenclre cette guerre c.oloniale en 1ndo- nesie s'appuie sur le principl': de la souverainete des Pays~Bas clans ces .tert'itoires: il.a rappele a,u Consei1 l'article premle:r des pt'll1C1peS comple· mentaires un Renville [5/649 ll/t1Icxe VI11]. Mais qu'en est-il exactement de cede llouver:al- nete neerlandaise? L'artic1e premier des principes complementair~s du Renvl71e est I'ull de ceUK que les Bollandats et les representants de la Republique etaient convenus d'introduire dans un futtlf accord poli- tique imtre-les Pays-Bas et la Repl1bliqlle d'Indo- nesie. A bard du Rcnville, nous avons signe un Furthermore, the following will prove that the picture [ have just given is not just a subjective interpre:ation of the Re1tville Truce Agreement 3:J.d its Addit:ontll Princ:iples. It was stated by the Committee of Good Offices that their ir.ter- pretation was that this Rem>ille Agreement would not in any way change the position on either side, and in denling with the Netherlands we were and are acting on the basis of our Proclamation· of Indeper.dence. It was on this basis that the RepuJJlk of Indonesia CO:J.tinued to maintain its relations with fr:endly countries and to establish new ones. It felt that whenever it established these new relatiors it was with the sole purpose of not rendering negotiations with :he Netherlands (;ove111ment any more difficult. It is the Netherlands which has violatec. the agreement. It has tried to weaken and exhaust the Repllblic by maintaining a tight blockade even against the express prcvisions of tlte Truce Agreenent. ft has violated the Renville Agree- ment ey setting up States in areas under displtte, the position of which was to be determined through negotiations under the auspices of the Committee of Good Offices and by lining up such States witn other St:l.tes created by the Nether~ lands on territories ocwpied by it. It has pre- sented us w:th a prefabricated interim adminis- tration set up without consultation with the Committee of Good Offices through whose instrll- tnenta:ity such interim govern:ne.nt should have Ltell ~realed. In replying to the points raised by the United States delegation, Mr. van Roijen pointed 01.:t that this interim administration had been drawn up with the Federalists, who represented two-thirds (If TnConesia. This interim government, however, is not the one envisaged in the Renville Agree- ment. It is not one arrived at throtlgb negotia~ tions with the Republic of Ir.donesia under the auspices of the Co:nmittee of Good Of-fices but it is one arrived at in defiance of the Renville Agreement and by by-pElssing tnl" Commtltee; it has been established after discussions with repre- sentatives who came from arens under Nether- hinds control and by representatives mainly con- sisting of Netherlands puppets placed at the head of States and so-called autonomous areas by the machinations of the Dutc:h politic:al rna~hitJe ill thOH' areas. I will not try to elaborate any further on the misrepresentations tn Mr. nn Roijcn's statements at the last meeting of the Security Council. Cest ainsi que la Repub!ique d'Indonesi(' a maintenu ses relations avec des pays amis et qu'elle en a etabli de nOl1velles. Chaqlle fois qu'elle a et.1bli de telles rela:iQns, die s'est att,> chee a ne pas rendre plus difficiles les negocia- tions avec les Pays-Bas. Ce 50nt les Hollandais qui ont viole l'accord. Jis ont essaye d'af-fai'hlir et d'eplliser la Repu- blique en maintenant un bloc1.ts etrojt, en doirit des c1al1ses expresses de l'ac.cord de treve. Us ont vio1e l'Accord du Renville en crcnnt ces Etats dans des regions contestees, dont le sort dev"it etre fixe par voie de negoeiations, sous les aus- pices de la Commission de bans offices, et en groupant res n01.:veallX Etats avec d'autres Etnts crees par les Hollandais sur les territoires qu'ils occupent. Ils nor.s ont fait don d't1ne administra- tion interhlaire prefabriquce, etablie sans qu'ait ete consul:ee la Commission de vons offices qui aurait dll Hre ['instrument de sa creation. Re[londant aux remarques dlt represe:Jtant des Etats-Unis, M. van Roijen a fait observer que cette administration interimaire avait ete institu:e aver le CC:lcour~ des federations qui representtnt les deux: tiers de l'Indonesie. Cependant, ce gou- vernement interimaire n'est pas celui qui etait envisage dans l'Accord du RcmJiHe: ce n'est pas un gouverne11lmt etabli par des negotiations avec \<1 Republique d'Indonesie SOltS les auspk.cs de la Cot:1ll1is.~ion de bons offices i c'est un gDll' vernement cn~e en violation de I'Accord du RCllville et sans passer par la Comm:ssion. Ce gOL:vernement est issu de discu3sions aver ies represcnt:mts vellant de territoires SO\1;; contro1e des Pays-Bas e: est l'ceuvre de represe:rtants qui etaient pour la l;lupart des homme;; de pc.i11e pl~cts a la tete d'EtalS et de tcrritoircs dits :;J.l.1tOIlomes par les nan~lIvres de l'apparei1 politique neer- landais. Je n'essayerai pas de rn'etendre davantage sur les inexactitudes que contient la declaration faite par M. van Roijen a la dcrnihe seance DU Conseil. As no political solution as envisaged in the Truce Agreement materialized, cl.ashes between the population arid the Netherlands Army took place. It would be a misjudgment of the situa- tion to US$ume that these clashes between the population and the Netherlands Army were cuusedintentionally by Repuulican troops which had been left behind, since there were no such troops. The records of tIle Committee of Good Offices will prove that the provisions of the Truce Agreement have been fully carried out by the Repllblic of Indonesia. These incidents cannot be constrt:ed as instigated by infiltrations into Netherlands occupied territory from the Repub- lican side of the demarcation line. J have already pointed out in one of my previous statements [389ih meeting] that the matter of inliltration was not political or military, but purely the social rroblem of people wanting to join tlleir families again aftel' their forced separation. The incidents to which the Netherlands con- tinue to refer as infiltrations have nothing at an to do with nttempts on the part of the Repub- lic to stir 11l1rest in the ter,'jtol'jes occupied by the Netherlands. These incidents are acts of resistance by the population against the Nether- lands military forces and their political machinery. I do not intend to state that there were no shortcomings in the implementation of the Truce Agreement on our part. The terrible economic conditions brought upon us by the continuous Netherlands blockade and the continuous tllreat of <t military attack, a threat which became more and more acute, did llot facilitate the task of my Government in the discharge of its obligations, nor have the freqtlent violations of the 1·ruce Agreement by the Netherl.mds-for instance, the setting up of states in disputed areas-helped my Government. But surely, if there were any sub- stantial reasons for the Netherlands charg-es of violations or even of deficiencies on the part of the Republic with regard to the impl~mentation of the Renville Agreement, there should have been reCQ'.lrse to the Committee of Good Offices, Instead of acting in that way, howevel', the Neth~ erlands has done its utmost in every possible way to misuse any difficulties and differences of opinion for its psychological war preparations, without making any sincere effort to reccncile differences through the instrumentality of the Committee of Good Offices. Je ne vais pas pretendre que nons avons appH- ql1e I'accord de treve sans aucune defaillance, L'execution par man Gouvernement de ses obli- gations ne lui a certes ete facilitee, ni pal" la situation economique desastrel1se que DOUS a value le maintien du blocus neerlandais, ni par la menace de plus en plus imrninente d'uTIe atta- que a main armee qui etait sl1spendue sur nos tetes, ni par les violations de la treve qu'ont frequemment commises les Hollandais et dont la creation de nouveaux Etats dans les territoires contestes olIre un ban exemple. Mais, si les Pays- Bas avaient des raisons valables d'accuser la Republique d'avoir a maintes reprises viole ou meme, pillS sirnplement, de ne pas avoir integra- lement execute les dispositions de l'Accord du Rcnville, ils atlraient dii s'adresser a la Commis- sion de bans offices. Loin d'agir aimi, les Hol- landais ont essaye d'exploiter toutes les diffi- ctllh~s, tOlltes les divergences d'opinion. pour assurer la preparation psychologique de la guerre et n'ont fait auclln effort pour arriver a tine solution par l'entremise de la Commission de: bons offices. Dl\ fait que la solution politique envi5~gee dans l'accord de trevc ne se realisait pas, il s'est prodtlit des bettrts entre la population et les troupes des Pays-Bas. Ce serait nlal juger la. situation que d'y voir tine intervention preme- ditee de troepes I'epublicaines laissees dans ces regions, car aUCllll de nos detachements ne s'y trouvait pIns. Les rapports de la Commission de bans offices demontrent que les dispositions de l'accord de treve ont ete integmiement appliguees par la Republique d'bdonesie. On ne peut con3i- derer les incidents dont j'ai parle comme l'ceuvre d'elements republicains qui se seraient infiltres, en passant la ligne de demarcation, dans le terri- toire occt1pe par les HolIandais. J'ai deja fait observer [389~J1Ie seance] que cette question des infiltrations n'est pas un probleme politique oU militaire, mais UIl probleme pllrement social j i1 s'agit, ell effet, de gem qni v0111aient rejoindre lenrs families apres l1l1e seraration forcee. Les incidents que les Hollandais contint1ent n ollalifler d'inflltrations n'ont rien a voir avec les tentatives des Republicains pour provoquer de l'agitation dans les territoires occupes par les Pays-Bas. Ces incidents s'Ont des actes de resis- tance de la part de la population contre les forces militaires et l'admir.istration neerlandaises. What is the significance of this programm:,? Is this a new plan for the futm"e of IndoneSia, generously granted to us by the Netherlands G?V- ernment? By no means. An all-~ndoneslan federal interim government, t~e establIshment. of the United States of Indonesla and the holdmg of free elections were tlle aims agreed upon by both the Netherlands and the Republic of Indo- nesia since the Linggadjati Agreement.1 The interim government and the United States of IndOllesia were to be brought about however, by b01W fide negoti;ctians betwern the Netherlands Government Rnd the Government of the Repub- lic of IndoneSia under the ausriees of the Com- mittee of·Good Offices, and oot created unilater- ally by the Netherlands Government and imposed on the Indonesian people. The creation of such an interim government and s~lch a United States of Indonesia as are now envisaged by the Nether~ lands Government will not by any means consti- tute a soltltion of the Indonesian problem, since the establishment of such an interim government and such a United States of Indonesia will not be considered by the Inclonesia people as in accordance wilh our agreements with the Nether- lands. To them it would mean the consolidation of the Netherlands war of aggression and the gains acquired through that aggression. To them the imposition of such a government would mean the continuation and consolidation of that aggres- sion, in the face of which they would feel com- pelled to continue their political and military resistance. Again, if it were the Netherlands plan to set up an- interim government and establish a United States of Indonesia through democratic and legal processes, then why did the Netherlands refuse even to consider the plan provided by the Aus- tralian and United States members of the Com- mittee of Good Offices in July 1948-that plan wh:ch isknowl1 as the Cl'itchley-Du Bois plan IS/11i7/Add.1, AppelldLt· VI] and which pro- vided for elections for the establishment of all interim government and the creation of the United Slates of Indonesia? Moreover, why did the :t-,fether1ands at a later date avoid the discus~ sion of the Cochran plan by diverting the issue to direct talks between the Netherlands Minister and Premier Hatta? These talks were not, as described by the representative of the N elher- lands. a supreme effort to come to an agree~ ment, but a call-aud now I quote the description of these talks given by the United States member of the Committee of Good Offices. "..• for a non-· negotiated blanket assent which would preclude 1 See Political E~,"'!ts il~ thE Rep11blic of Indollesia, Netherlands Infoflr.a.tlOll Bureau, New York. Que signifie ce programme? Est-ce 18, un nou- veau plan pour l'avellir de l'Indonesie? Nllllemenl. Un gouvernement federal provisoire. eiltierement indonesien, I'etablissement des Etats- Unis d'Indonesie et des e.1ections libres sent pre- cisement 1es buts sur lesq\lels l'entente etait faite entre les' Pays-Bas et la Republiq1.1e d'lndonesie depuis l'Accord de Linggadjati1 • Mais c'est a la suite de negotiations de bonne foi entre le Gou- vernement des Pays-Bas et celui de la Republique d'Indonesie et sous les auspices de la Commission. de bons offices que devaient etre instaUI'es le gOl1vemement provisoire et 1es Etats-Unis d'lndo· nesie. 11s ne devaient pas etre etablis unilare- ralement par le Gotlvernement des Pays-Bas et imposes au peL1ple d'Indonesie. Leur creation, telle qu'elle est maintenant envisagee par le GOLlvernement neerlandais, ne constitue en an· wne fa~on Ime solution elll probleme indonesien, car le peuple indonesier. refusera d'admettre que c'est bien la le genre de gOllvernement provisoire 'et d'Etats-Unis d'Indonesie qui etaient prevus d<ll1S nos accords avec les Pays-Bas. A ses yeux, l'e~8,l>lissement de ce gotlvernement et de ces Etats-Unis serait comme une consecration de la guerre d'agression neerlandaise et l1ue consolida- tion des gains acquis par cctte agl'ession. Devant eet Rcte arbitraire qui signifierait pour lui la conti- nuation de l'agression, notre peuple se sentirait oblige de pOllfsuivre sa resistance politique et militaire. D'autre part, s'il est clans l'intention des Pays- Ras d'etab1ir un gouvernement provisoire et des. Etats-Unis d'Tndonesic par des procedes legauY et democratiques, pomquoi ant-Hs ete jusqu'a refuser d"~xaminer le plan propose ell juillet 1948 par 1es representants de I'Australle et des Etats-Uois a la Commission de bons offices, COl1nu SOltS le nom de plan Critchley-Du Bois [Sjl117/Add,1, anHt.\"C VI] qui prevoyait des elections en vue d'etablir un gouvernement pro" visoire et de consHuer les Etilts-Unis d'Indo· nesie? Et plus tard, pourquoi les Pays-Bas ont~ils elllde ]a discl1ssion du pbn Cochrnn par une mancettvre oblique qui devait aboutir il. des con· versations directes entre le Ministre des Pays- Bas et M. Hatta, Premier lV.l;inistre? Ces conversations n'ont pas ete, COmm.e. l'a pretendl1 le representant des Pays-Bas, un supreme effort pour parvenir a un accord, mais, et je cite maln· tenant l'appnkiation qu'en a donne le represen· tant des Etilts-Unis .?l la Commission de OOtlS offices, une tentative pour obtenir: ". . sans 'Voir The Political Evmls in the Republic Df I,.,~o" MS'ia, 'Publie par l~ ·BureaU d'information de. Payl" Bas i New-York, page 34. These are the reasons why I contend that these renewed Netherlands pledges, with time-table and evel-ything, constitute the final sanction of the Netherlands war of aggression rather than a basis for the solution of the Indonesian problem. Another point mentioned by the Netherlands representative is the provision that free elections would be held. Free elections were provided for 'in both the Critchley-Du Bois and the Cochran plans, but the Netherlands did not want elections held under the supervision of the Committee of Good Offices. It wanted its own brand of free elections-the same type of free elections it held in setting lip its prefabricated States in West Java, East Java, Madura and other areas in Su- matra in violation of the Renville Trtlce Agree- ment. With regard to West Java, East Java and Madura, I want to remind the Security Council of the fact that the establishment of sl1ch States succeeded only on the third attempt, after having twice met with failure, and that even then the desired result could be achieved only by the arrest of several of the delegates who, the Neth- erlands feared, were too much inclined toward the Republic, and by the machinations of the Netherlands civil administration during the con- ferences. The reports of the Committee of Good Offices on this subject bear witness to this fact. In our opinion, free elections can be held only if conducted and supervised by a United Nations agency without the presence of Netherlands occu- pying forces and free from the machinations of the Netherlands civil administration. Great emphasis is laid by the Netherlands representative on the transfer of sovereignty by the Netherlands Government to the United States of Indonesia. The meaning of this transfer, however, would be, in the first place, a transfer of sovereignty to a govemment'al body established not as an expression of the will of the people, bllt unilateral1y by the Netherlands in such a way that Netherlands domination would be secure, Furthermore, the so-cal1ed sovereignty to be handed over by the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia would not be sovereignty in the generally accepted sense of the word, but only what is left of sovereignty when the basic essentials of sovereignty have been subtrt\(.:ted and secured by the Netherlands in an Indonesian 'union which would not be, as envisaged in the R?t~1/jfle Agreement, an instrument of joint co- operation on an equal basis between the Nether- lands Government and the United States of Indo- nesia, but a super-State, constituting an additional lever of control for the Netherlands. Our nego- tiations with the Netherlands have made it very Telles sont les raisons pour lesql1elles j'estime qlle les promesses que nous renouvellent main- tenant les Pays-Bas, rneme augmentees d'un emploi dl1 temps et de tout le reste, constituent la consolidation defmitive des restlltats de l'agres- sion neerlandaise plut6t que les bases d'une SOII1- tion du probH:me indonesien. Le representant des Pays-Bas a egalement annonce qU'il y aurait des elections libres. Le plan Critchley-Du Bois atlssi bien que le plan Cochran prevoyaient des elections ]ibres, mats les Hollandais ne vOlllaient pas qu'elles aient eu lieu SOilS la surveillance de la Commission de bons offices. lls voulaient des eJections libres a leur maniere, c'est~a-dire ,des elections libres du genre de celles qu'ils ont organisees Iorsqu'ils ont cons- titue, en violation de l'Accord de treve du Ren- villc, leurs Etats pretabriques dans les territoires occidental et oriental de Java, a Madoura, ainsi que dans certains atttres territoires a Sumatra. En ce qui cOllcerne le territoire occidental de Java, le territoire oriental de Java et Madoura, je desire ruppeller au Conseil de secllrite que l'etablissement de tels Etats n'a reussi ql1'au troisieme essai, apres avoir echOlle. deux fois, et que, meme alors, le resultat desire n'a ptt etre attcint que grace a l'arrestation de plusieurs dele- gues dont les Hollandais craignaient les ten- dances repubHcaines trop marquees et gni.ce aux intrigues menees par I'administration civile des Pays-Bus pendant que se deroulaient les conver- sations. Les rapports de la Commission de bons offices a. cc sujet temoignent de ce fait. A notre avis, des elections liLJres ne peuvent avoir lieu que si eUes sont organisees et surveillees par un organe des Nations Unie.s, hors la presence de troupes d'occupatiol1 neerlandaises et a l'abri des manceuvres de l'administration civile des Pays- B",. Le representant des Pays-Bas insiste beau- coup sur le transfert de la souverainete par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas aux Etats-Unis d'Indonesie. Mais ce transfert signifierait tout d'a.bord la remise de la sOllverainete a ttn orga- nisme gouvernemental iSSll, non pas de la volonte du peuple, mais d'un acte unilateral des Pays- Bas, clont le seul but est d'assurer leu!" supre- m<ltie. De plus, la pretendue souvcrainete ainsi transferee par les Pays-Bas nux Etats-Unis d'Indonesie ne serait pas une souve.rainete, au sens generalement donne a Cl". terme, mais uni- quement ce qui resterait de la souverainete apres que les Hollandais l'auraient clepouillee de ses elements essentiels pour s'en asS'urer le controle au sein d'une union indonesienne qui ne serait pas, comme il est prevtl dans l'Accord dn Ren- ville, un organe de cooperation mutuelle sur le pied d'egalite entre le Gouvernement neerlandais et les Etats-Unis d'Indonesie, rnais un super~Etat constituant un moyen supplementaire de domi- nation pour les Pays-Bas. Nos negociations avec The Security Council is now l~nishing its general debate on the Indonesia guestion in order to begin its consideration. of any proposals ~or a possible solution of thIs case. I should hke to make some observation which, in the opinion of my delegation, will have to be taken into account by the Council in its discussion of any possible draft or solution. To the Indonesian people the issue is simple and clear-cut. A war of aggression has deprived them of their leaders and diminished their terri- tory. Their defence against this aggression has been successful and wilt be even more success- ful. In these circumstances, it -will be impossible, both psychologically and politically,. fo: our people to consider any proposal Whlcll !S not based on the fullest restoration, both political and territorial, of the Republic of Indonesia. Only then will a basis be established upon which fruit- ful negotiations with the Netherlands cOl1ld take place. The restoration of the Republican Government as political body only, w1th some. territory, would leave our Government completely at the mercy of the Netherlands and their peculiar conceptions of bona fide negotiations. Under such conditions, the Republican Government would not be in a position to maintain the. status of the Repllblic of Indonesia as a State with its own political machinery to reflect the desires of the people and with its own economic machinery to provide for the needs of its people, or to maintain the financial autonomy necessary to meet its obligations as a State. Under such conditions, also, there would be no possibility whatsoever of conducting bona fid~ negotiations free from coercion, both military and economic, and free from the continlled threat of a renewed military attack. In fact, under such conditions nothing would hnve been done to meet the difficulties already described by the Committee of Good Offices in ~ts report of 26 December [S/1156] , in which the view is offered tnat: "((l) Negotiations presuppose two parties, each Ul1coerced by the armed force of the other and cach prepared to move toward the reasonable viewpoint of the other," and "(b) Politically, the people of one party, without whose support any agreement, even if achieved, may well be unenforceable, will be re- luctant 10 accept as bona fide any negotiations in which <lgain tlley start with an area 11llder their control dimil\i~hed as a result of the resort to armed force by the other." We have stressed time and agaia the view that any solution in Indonesia and any governmental structure or elections should be under the auspices cf. the Security Council since, in our opinion, thIS would be the only glHlfantee of arriving at a stable and peaceful settlement with the Nether- lands. I will not elaborate this point any further. I want o~Jy to stress the necessity of larger powers beJ~g granted to a Security Council body In Indonesl.3.. Even if wider and decisive powers "b) Du point de vue politiClue, la popul:Ltion de l'une des parties, dont le consentement risque fort d'etr7 indispens~ble a I'execution, sinon a la cOnc1USlOl1 de to!;t accord, ne sera gtlll:re dis- p.os~e a consiclerer comme veritable toute nego. Clatlon all cours de 1aqueUe e1le s,'es! trouvee ampu~ee d'ulle region p1acee sous son alltante, dl1 fall que l';\,ltI'C partie a recotlru a la fo~ce." Nous avons souligne n diverses reprises que tOllte solullOn dll problcme indonesien aillsi que tOllte OJ'ganisation du gottvernement o~ des elec- tions, c!ev~aient etre entreprises sous les auspices du. Consell de securite, car ce serait hi, a notre aVIS, la seule garantie d'abol1tir it un reglement definitif et pacifique dn differer.d qui nails oppose all~ Pays-Bas.)e ne m'attarderai pas davantage Slll ceUe qtteshon. Je me bornerai a insister sur la necessite d'accorder des pouvoirs plus etendus In the event of new negotiat~ons being opened l>etween the Netherlands and us, under the aus- pices ef the Security Cotmdl, the Ceundl will understand that the same problems and the same issues will again arise in those negotiations. It is thcrefere our opiniell that such guarantees should be embodied in any such resolution. It is only such guarantees which would be able to alleviate the feeling of insecurity with regard to the future position of our people. J know that sevel'al delegations are being led in their consideration of a possible draft resolu- tion by a calculation of the possibilities of ha,'ing a certain resolution accepted by the Security Council. Stlch calculations inevitably tend towards compromise on some basic issues. I sincerely !Jope that these calculations will not lead the Council to adopt a resolution -which is insufficient to cope with the situation in Indo w nesia. Tht adoption ef such a resolution would definitely not lead to peace and stability, but would only make the sitnation in Indonesia more complicated. Mr, VAN ROljEN' (Nethtrlands): I shall not at the present moment reply to the different points in the speech of the representative of the Re- public of Indonesia, but will, with permission, reservc my answer to Mr. Palar for later. I only wish to make a brief declaration in COll- nexion with the reports which have been received concerning the circumstances under which certain Republican leaders are being held on the island of Bangka, I have been authedzed to say that my Gov- ernment has taken nete with deep regret of the housing couditions and restrictions under which, apparently, the Republican leaders in Bangka were still being held. Further information re- ceived by my Government shows that those con~ ditions were imposed upon them in direct opposi- tion to the instructions given by the Netherlands Government. Severe lneasllres will be taken against the responsiblE'! authorities Two high- ranking Netherlands officials are already on their way to Bangka in ordJr to report fully on the situation and to see to it that the instructions given will be stlictly carried out. In this connexion I should like to add that Mf. Sjahrir, who is one of tIle political prisoners being held on Sumatra, has accepted an invita- tion to confer with the Netherlands Prime Minis- ter, Mr. Drees, at Batavia. Mr. Sjahrir is arriv- ing in Batavia tomorrow, Sir Benega1 Rama RAu (India): I wish to intervene in the debate at this stage to make et t~eiglle a ohserver dans ses travaux un emploi du temps bien arrete, de manierea dejouer les tactiques dilatoires ct 1es mesures de retardement auxq'Jelles 1es Pays-Bas ponrraient recour!r. Les comptes rendus de la Commission de bons offices rnontrer.t abondamment comlJien, jusqu'ici, cette tactique a reussi aux Hollandais. C'est ponrquoi ma deJegatien considefe que la resolution qui fixel'a les bases d'un reglement doit contenir un programme de travail con<;lt sous cette forme. Le Conseil comprendra que, s'il s'ouvre, sous ses auspices, de nOl1velles negociations entre les Pays-Bas C':t nOLlS, les memes prob1emc:s et les memes questions se peserorit une fois de plus. Nous estitrtons, par consequent, que cette garan- tie doit etre inscrite dans la resolution elle-meme, car eUe est la seule qui puisse attenucr 1es inquie- tudes qu'inspire l'avellir de notre peuple. le sais que, en examinant Ull tcl projet de resolution, certaines delegations se preoccupent surtOl1t des chances qu'il aura d'etre accepte par le Conseil. De tc1s calc:uls ne peuvent manquer de condujl'~ a un compromis sttr certains points fondamentaux. J'espere sincerement que ces ca1- culs n'amcneront pas le ConS'eil a adopter une resolution im[Jarfaite ne permettant pas de faire face i la situation en Indonesie. L'acloptiell d'une: pareille resolution ne pourrait assurer ni la paix, ni la stabilite; elle ne ferait que compliql1er la situation actnellc. . M. YAN ROI]EN (Pays-Bas) (trad1dt de 1'(Jt1- glais); Je n'aborderai pas maintenant les diffe- rentes questions quc le representant de la Repu- blique d'lndonesie a sou1evees dans son discours: qu'iJ me soit pennis de reserver a plus tard ma reponse a M. Palar. le desire me borner a faire une breve declaration atl sujct des rapports sur les circonstances d<ll;s lesquelles ccrtains diri- geants republicains se trouvent dans l'ile de Bangka. J e suis alitorise a dire que men Gouvernement deplore vivement les nouvelles qui lui ont etl: communiquees toucbant les conditions de loge- ment et les restrictions apparemment imposees aux dirigeants re[)ublicains clans I'Be de Bangka. Il resulte des informations c()mpli~ll1entaires rectleillies par mon Gouvernement que ces condi- tions leur ont ete imposees en opposition directe avec les instrllctions donnees par le GOLlverne- rnent des Pays-Bas. Des mcsures seve.res seront prises contre 1es autorites l'esponsabJes_ Deux fonctionnaires superieurs ncerlandais sont deja en route pour Banka avec mission de faire un rapport detaille sur la situation et de veiller a Cl" que les instructions donnees 'soient executecs strictement. A ce propos, jevoudrais ajottter que M. Sjah- rir, l'un des dirigeants politiques cIetenus f Sumatra, a accepte. l'invitation de conferer a Batavia avec 1·:1. Drees, Premier Ministre des Pays-Bns. M. Sjahrir arrivera a Ratavia demain. Sir Benegal Rama RAU (Inde) (traduit de l'anglais): le desire intervenir dans la disct1ssion, We have always been frank in regard to these natters. In the course of negotiation, when we fOllnd th<.t we could not carry out the recommen- dations of the Security Council we frankly stated that we cOllld not do so, and we gave t~e reasons for our action. If only the representatIve of t.he Netherlands Government had told the Secunty Council that his GOvernment hac not complied and could not comply with the resolution! I c~r~ tainly would have Some respect for the slncenty and goor.! faith of his Govermncr.t. thollgh p:r- naps not for its statesmanship. Wh<lt r.e did, however, was to say that his Goyernment com~ plied with the res:Jlution in regard to the ,release of prisoners, and then he told us that the pr:soners were confined to an island. I was not aware vi -he dimensions of that island, but the representa- tive of the Philippines disclosed that this freedom was very much like that of Napoleon's on Sl. Helena. And even t11at statement has proved, as the representative of the Netherlands has just now admitted, to be completely bacclll"<lte. With the perrr.ission of the President, J shall read tI. shOrt extract from ine repoti of the Com- mittee of Good Offices [S/1213] which has just been circulated. "The ministers and officials, brought to the island by 31 December, are detained in a large building. They have Que doorless bedroom, 6 metres Jy 6 metres, in which are loca~ed six beds. In audition, they were origina.lly allowed an area of 4 metres by 10 metres wired 01" fmm a large receptior. roam. Since 12 January, tl1is wire has been removed ;lnd the entire reception room, 19 metl"es by 16 metres, is open to their use. They are pe~mitted limited access to the roof under g~ard. All windows are enclosed by wire n~ttillg as i~ the area around the door. Gttards ~re on duty in sentry boxes immediately Olltside. They are not permitted to leave the wire area. Up to two days before the visit oi the Committee. when some additional furniture was installed, there were only chairs a:ld two tables." This :s what they mean by :~eedom on the island. T wish to emIlhasize today the importance of passing, before the 20th vf this r:1.onth, a resolll- tion embodying tile views of the Security Council 00 the Netherlands military action in Indonesia, and ,the specific proposals for dealing with the situation which has deVl>loped. As all members He1E~ne. Et meme cette declaration du representant des Pays-Bas, it vient cl'en convenir, s'est averee compU~:elllent inexacte. Si le President le pennet, je vais donner lec- ture d'nn bref passage du rapport de la Commis- siOn de bons offices [S/1213J, fjui vient d'etre distribue: ;(Les Ministres et hauts fonctionnaires amenes dans I'ile le 31 dCcembre 1948 sont detenus dans un grand b.itiment. 11s ont une chambre a cou~ cher sans parte, de 6 metres sur 6 metres dam laquelle se trOllYCnt si't lits. Dc [Jlus, ils nvaient, a l'origiT)e, a l'intc.~riel1~ d'l1ne gl'ande piece de reception, unc superfieic de 4 metres sur 10 me- tres entouree de nl de :er. Depuis le 12 janvier, ce Jil de fel' est retire, et ils ant acces :i la piece enW:re, qui a 19 met!'es sur 16 metres. Tls ont Ult droit Iimite d'acces au toit, sous escorte. 11 y a du grillage a tOllies les felletres ainsi qu'autour de la parte. Des sentinelles monteot la garde dallS des guerites situees immediatement it. l'exterieur de, la naisoll. Les intenles ne sont pas autorises a sorti:' de I'endos. Avant que du mobilier sup" p!ementaire ait ete installe. deux jours av.ant hi vlsi~e de lfl C3mmission, il n'y avait; que d~s chalses et dell.... tabl~s." Voila ce qtt'on entend par liberte de mOllvement clans cdte lie. .Te desire souligner aujourd'hui combien il est important d'adopter avant le 20 de ee mois une resolution traduisant :'opinion du Conseil de secl,rite sur I'action militaire entreprise pnr 1e5 ~~ys-Bas ,e~ It:donesie., et comportant des propo' sltlOns preClses quant a la maniere de mettre ban In my preliminal·y statement on 7 January [397th 11leeti~lg], I explained that the comeners of this Conference have no intention of going outside the fno.mework of the United Nations. The Government of India has always been a strong supporter of the United Nations, and it would not do anything which would weaken this Organization. The object of the Conference is to explore the possibilities of a peaceful solution, and to strengthen the hand of the Secmity Council. It is very important, however, fol' the representa- tives to this Conference to know beforehand the views of the Security Council on the Indonesittn developments and what it proposes to do in order to reach the objective by peaceful methods. The time factor, as I explained in my last speech, is extremely important, and I do hope that there will be no fllrther deJay in regard to the passage of a resoJntion by the Setnrity Council. iiTIport~ que les membres de la conference con- naissent d'avance l'opinion du Conseil de secu~ rite S\lr 1es evenements d'Indonesie et sachent ce qt1'll se propose ele faire pour atteindre le but fiJlal par des moyens paeifiques. Le facteur temps est d'une extreme importance, ainsi que je I'ai indique dans mon demier discours [397eme srJullre;, et j'espere que l'1lc1option d'une resolu· tioll par le Conseil de securite ne sera pas retardee davantage. All cours de tua dernier~ intervention, j'ai declare que je ne desirais faire actnellement aucltne suggestion concrete concerntLnt le ;sens dans \~que1 une sc']ution devrait etre recherchee, parce que, dans des cas de ce genre, il importe d'aboutir 11 un accord aussi large que. possible avant de presenter formellemcnt Lln projet de resolution au Conseil de secnrite. rai eu de nombreuses discussions avec plusieurs membres du GltlSeil ainsi qu'avec la delegation d'Indo- nesie, et, si le President m'y autorise, je voudrais indiquer, dans leurs grandes ligpes, quels sont, a mon avis, les elements essentiels 5I\lr lesquels i1 y a lieu d'insister. D'aLurJ - l'accunl est quasi unanime sur ce point - il est indispensable que les dirigeants emprisonnes scient immediatement liheres et re- connns en tant qu'autorite avec laqllelle les nego- tiations ulterieures pourront etre conduites. Tant que ces dirigeants seront en prison, tautes les wEgotiations seront vaines, car l'immense majorite de la population, qui leur est fidele, rejetterait tout arrangement resultant de telles negociations. Sans la cooperation et la bonne vOlonte reci~ proques, aucun arrangement, si parfait soit-il sur le papier, n'a la moindre chance de succes. C'est pourquoi i1 est tssentiel ue creer l'atmosphere appropriee a des negotiations fecondes et effi- caces. En deuxieme lieu, comme le repres.entant de la Chine l'a si clairement fait remarquer [398eme seonce1) les circonstances exigent actuellement que le Conseil de securite participe plus active- ment a la mise i execution de toute resolution et de toutes mesures qu'il pourrait adopter. Nous disposons deja de la Commission de bons offices qui a fonctionne en Indonesie pendant les dix~ huit derniers mois en depit de difficultes cOl1si~ d<§,rabJes et qui est parfaitement au courant de la situation dans ce pays. Si cet organe po,lVait etre transforme en une commission dtl Conseil de securite, par le h'uchement de Jaquelle les resolu- tions et decisions du Conseil sc.raient mises en cetlvre, j'estime qu'on toucherait plus rapidement au but Qu'en appliquant la procedure suivie jllS;- qu'a present. In my last speech [397tll meeting] I stated that at that stage I would not like to make any concrete suggestions concf'rning the lines nn which a sollltioll should be songht, because in a matter of that sort it was very important to readl as great a measure of agreement as possible before the formal introduction of a resolntion in the Security Council. I have had numerous discus- sions with m.any members of the Security Council and with the Indonesian delegation, and, with the permission of the President, I should like to indicate in very rough outline, the essential points which i~ my o"pinion should be stressed. First, as is almost univcrsally rccognized, it is imperative th.at the imprisoned leaders should be released immediately and established as an au- thority with which the further negotiations could be conducted. vVith these leaders in prison, no negotiations can be effective, for any scheme tha.t emerges from such negotiations would not be accepted by the vast majority of the population, which follows the imprisoned leaders. The most perfect scheme on pilper cannot be successful withol1t the co-operation and good will of both sides. It is therefore essential that the proper atmosphert :;hould be created for successful and etfective negotiations. Secondly, as the representative of China so ably pointed ont [398th meeting], the stage has been reached at which the Security CO\\I1ei! should take a more active part in the implementation of any resolution or scheme that is passed by it. We have already had the Committee of Good Offices, which has been fLlnctioning in Indonesia in spite of formidable d.iffic~llties, for the. last eighteen months, and whlch IS fully acquaJnt~d with all the conditiojls in that country. If this body could be reconstituted as a commission of the Security Council and could be made the agency througl1 w~i.ch the Secu.rity Council's resolutions and deCiSIOns are earned out, I feel that the objective would be reached more expe- ditiously than under the procedure which has hitherto been followed. Fourthly, as has heen emphasized by the reple- sentative Ct Indonesia, definite dates should Le fixed for the plebiscite and for the tran.'ifer of completc scvereignty of the United State~ oL Indonesia. I attach very great importance la the fixing of tllese dates, btcatlSe there would be greater willingness to co-operate on both sides if both sides realized that the objective would l'ave to be reached by 11 certain date. If we did not prescribe those dates, diffintlties would be magni- fied and there woulrl be a tendency to regard difficulties as a justification for wrecking the scheme; instead of a sincere effort to QVerCClllle difficulties, which I feel can be accomplished by good-will, there would be a tendency to allow matters to drift in the hope that ultimetely nothing would be done. As was also emphasJ!ed by the representative of Indonesia, the COmmis- sion should also be responsible for the eitective supervision of the arrangements for a piebiscite which, all agree, should be held ir. a free atmos~ phere. Finally, it is essential that any H..e[1tlbliean government that is set np during the transition period 'should have the necessary financial and other resources for discharging effectively the normal functions of government, It should not be dependent on the Netherlands for the pro- vision of these resources. It follows that apart from olher measures, the eC0110mie blockade which has. had suc~ a strangling effect On th~ et;:onomy ct IndoneSia, should be lifted. I have deliberately not gone into details, for they could no doubt be dealt with by the corn. mission if there is an agreement 0n the general principles upon which further action ~hOllld be based. Once again, 1 only wish to appeal to the Securit)' Council to take up the matter immedi- ately and to indicate at once, und clearly, how it pT?pOSeS to deal with the Indonesian situation. Guerrilla activity, us the report of the Commit- tee of Good <?ffices shows. has. con~iderab1y in- creased, and 1f we anow the situatIOn to drift there will be widespread disorder and chaos' and there will be vel')' little chance of reaching EI1 qnatriemc lieu, comme l'a sonligne le repre~ sent.mt de l'IndOlH~sie, i1 faudrait fixer des dates determinees paUl' le plebiscite et pour le trans- fert de la sonverainete complete aux Etats-Unis d'Inclollesie. J'attache infinimellt d'importance a la fixation dc ees dates, parce que les deux parties feraient pl'ctlve d'ul1e volontc de coope- ration accrue si elles se rendaient compte que le but doit etre atteint a Hne date determinee. Si 110US n'imposio:1S pas ces dates, les difficultes ne feraient que croitre et pourraient servir de pre- texte au torpi11age des plans ctablis; au lieu de tentcr sincerement de surmOnter 1es obstacleS' - ce qni pelit etre realises, je crois. avec de la bonne volonte - on serait amene a laisser aller les chases duns l'espoir que tina1ement rien ne serait accompli. Commc I'n cgalement indique le repre- Sentant de l'Indonesie, It\. cOll1mission devmit etre chargee, en outn:-, de S11fveillcr les dispositions prises ponr I'organisation CLI plebiscite, qui, de l'avis general, devrait se derouler dans llne atmo- sphere de libc1te. Enfin, i1 est 3bsolnment essel"tiel que le gou~ vernement republicain cOJ'Jstitue pendant la pe- riode de transition, quel Cju'il soit, dispose des ressources financieres et autres qui sont indis- pensables a l'exercice efficClC{' des fonctions nor- males d'un gouverncmenL 11 ne devrait pas etre triblltaire des Pays-Bas pOnr se procurer Cl'S ressources. Par consequent, au nombre des mesu- res aprendre acet effet, figure la levee du hlacus qui a si durement touche l'economie de l'Indo- nesie. ]'ai eWiberement evite de m'engager dans des details qui pou1'l'ont indubitablement etre regles par la commission si l'accord se fait sur les prin- cipes generaux devant servir de base a toutes 1es dispositiollS ulterieures. ]e me bornerai a £a~re appet, tme fois de pIns, au Conseil de secunte pour qu'il s'attaque immediatement au probleme et qu'il indiqu<'., sans plus tarder et clairement, comment i1 a I'intention de venir a bout de la Situation en lndonesie. Le rapport de la Commission de bons offices rnontre qlle les operations de gnerilla ont consi- derablement allgmente d'intensite; si nottS per- mettons Clue les choses aillent a la derive, le desordre et le chaos s'<'.tendront, et il reslera Mr. JESSUP (Ul11ted States of America): I share the desire that the Secllrity Council should proceed as soon as possible to consider the text of a resolution which would deal with this ques- tion of Indonesia that we now have bc:!ore us. The st<l.tements which have been made around this Cotmeil table in the course of these debates do show, T believe, a very large measure of agree- ment on basic points, as the representative of India has just said. It seems to me that it would be very unfortu- nate if that large and gratifying measure of a~ree­ ment on principle and on many basic points ';rere to be diluted by disagreement on any points of detail. I also agree with tl1e statement made this afternoon by the representative of the Re- public of Indonesia thnt it WOllld be most un- fortunate if the Security Council were to adopt an insufficient resolution. I think that the 2tate- ments which have heen made Gy the rcpre.~enta­ tives of the parties concerned, by the members of the Security Council and by the representa- tives of those non-member States who have been invited to p,uticipate in our deliberations on this question, have all contributed to the eventual formulation of a Secllrity COI~neil position. T hope tl1at this position will soon be translated into the definite form of a resolution which could be adopted, voted for by most, if not <:111, the members of the Secllrity Council which would contribute to a gentlille solution of this problem. The representative of India has also referred to the meeting which is to be convened in his country on the 20th of this month, The United States notes, with sympathetic i<lterest, the initia- tive taken by the Government of India in con- voking a conference of the States which are geographically neighbours of Indonesia, and hopes that the consultations of the representa- tives <1.t that Conference will contribute added support to the efforts of the Security Council to bring about a satisfactory and a viable peace in Indonesia.

As T entered this Council chamber, I was handed a communication by the representative of the Indonesian delegation. This commtlnieation has now been distributed to tIle Security Council as document S/1214. I shall ask the Assistant Secretary-General to rend it Mr. SOBOLEV' (Assistant Secretary-Gelleral in charge of the Department of Security Council AHairs): The letter is dated 1i January 1949 addressed to the President of the Security Council hy the representative of Indonesia. It reads as follows: "The Indonesian delegation presents its compliments and has the honour to submit the following: Owing to the rupture of communications between the Indonesian delegation at Lake Suc- M. JESSUP (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (trad1li! de l'anglais): Je partage le desir de voir le Conseil de secl1rite entreprendre le plus t6t possible l'examen d'un texte de resolution traitant de la question indonesienne, dont nous discutons actuellement. Je cmis que les declarations prou· vent, comme vient de le dil'e le representant de l'Inde, que certains points fondamentallx font l'objet d'ul1 accord assez general. I1 me semble CJu'il serait tres ,regrettable qu'un accord de principe et qu'une identite de Vl1es sur t111 g-rand nombre de questions fondamentales, realises da11s nne rneSllre aussi large et aussi ;;atisfaisante, soient neutralises par des divergences sur des questions de detail. Approllvant egalement la declaration faite cet apres-midi pRr le l'epn~sentant de la Republique d'Indonesie, j'estime qu'il serait eminemment fachenx que le COllseil de secl1l'ite acloptnt une resolution qui ne serait qll'une dcmi-mesLlre. Je pense que les de.c1<lrations faites par les representants des par~ ties inleresse-es, par les membres du Conseil de sewrite et par les representants des Etats non membres dn Conseil qni sont invites a participer a nos deliberations sur cette question 011t tOlltes facilite line prise de position par le Conseil. J'espere qu'il va bient6t preciseI' SOl1 attitude SOilS la forme d'une resolution qui puisse etre adoptee sinon par tOLLS les membres du Conseil de securite, dl1 moins pal" la plnpalt d'entre enx, et qui soit de natnre a contrib;.tel' a une verit<lb1e solu~ bon de ce probleme. Le representant oe I'Tnde a fait mention ega· Jement de la conference qui dait s'ouvrir clans Son pays le 20 de ce fiois. Les Etats-Unis prenllent note avec interet et sympathie de I'initiative prise par son Gouvernement de convoquer une conference des Etats geographiquement voisins de l'Indonesie, et ils esperent que les deliberations de cette conference contribueront a soutenir les efforts Mployes par le Conseil de secuI"ite en vue de I'etablisse.ment d'une paix satisfaisunte et durable en Indonesie. Le PRESIDENT (tradtlit de l'anglais): Lorsque je suis entre dans l<l salle du Comei1, le representant de l'Indonesie m'a remis une note Cjui vient d'etre distribuee au Conseil de secllrile sous la forme du docllment Sj1214. .Te prie Monsieur le Secretaire general adjoint d'en donner lecture. M. SOBOLEV (Secn~taire general adjoint charge du Departement des affaires du Conseil de securit~) (traduit de l'anglais): La lettre est datee d\; 17 janviel" 1949 et est adressee an President Oll COllseil de secllrite par le representant de J'Indonesie. Elle est l'edigee comrne sllit: "La delegation indonesienne presente ses com· pliments et a l'honneur de soumettre les observations suivantes: En raison de l'intenllption des communic.ations entre la delegation de l'Indonesie