S/PV.409 Security Council

The provisional agenda is before the Security Cour:cil in. daeum.ent S/Agenda 409jRev.1. Unles~ the~e IS an obJec~ tion, the agenda will be conSIdered as adopted. CONSEIL DE SECURITE PROCES·VERBAUX OFFICIELS QUATRIEME ANNEE No 12 QUATRE CENT NEUWEME SEANCE Tcnue d Lake Success, NtW-Yol'k, le mal'di 15 fevrier 1949, a,15 lte!l1'e.r. President: M, T. F. TSIANG (Chine). Presents: Les representanls des pays suivanls; Argentine, Canada, Chine, Cuba, Egyp.!e, France Norvege, Republique socia'iste sovletique d"Ukraine, Union des.Republique;;. soci~1ist~s sDviHiques, Royat1l11e,UnI, Elats-Ums cl Amerique. I. Ordre du jour provisoire (S/Agenda 409/Rev.1) 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour. 2. Lettre, en date clu 19 janvier 1~4-[?,. adres~ee all Secretaire general r;ar, l.e 1" InJstre , cs Affaires etrangeres ra~ lll~el'lm de la Re,publique Of' Cnn~e et relatlVc a la demance d a~­ mission de la Republique de Coree ~ l'Ol'galHsaticn des Nations Unies, et dec1arltlOn porl~n! aeceptntion des obli.gation, de la Charte (5/1238). 3. Lettre, en dale dUCl1 f~j"d;er ~94u?.'tfdpr;~~~ au President du ~ll1sel e,sec ;1" "._ presen'ant de l'Unlon des Rcpl1bhques SOGa ri~tes so~ietiqt1es et re[ati\c a la. dcmnn.de d'acmission al'Organisati?11 de~ Nallon.s Dill; de la Repttblique populmre democrahquc e Coree (5/1256). Designation d'l1n Gouvernettr dlt Terr}t~~re 4. rore de Tric5te; Lettre, en date, du.8 fev;lcr 11949 adressee au President du C?nsetl de s~cu­ rite par le rcpresentan.t, ~c ['Umon cl?s Repu· bliqucs socinlistes SDVletlqt:CS all sUTJet ?te. la . . d' GOt\veI11~ur::\n ern Olre designation nTI libre de Trieste (5/1251). 2. Adoption de l'ordre du jOlll' Le PREsIDENT (tl'adait d.e, l'anglais ): Les . . C .. de stkunte ont devant €llX membres ot1 onseL d 409/Rev 1] l'ordre du jour prod;i<s?ir,'t,.o[Sns/Agj.:nl~a consider~rai Yi! n'y a pas OOJf' , .. eonune adopte. The regime estalJlished in SOl1th Korea was imposed by foreign occupation forces, and in the presence of foreig,n occupation neither the country, nor the people, nor the government set up in that country can be regarded as free ar.d independent. The USSR delegation therefore sees no reason for tlle Security Council to consider this question,

I should like to say that the <lgenda, in accordance with ottr f'Jles' of [Jro~ c:edure, and particularly with rule 7, was prepared by the Secretary-General and approved by the President of the Security Coltndl. The representative of the USSR went into the merits of the question. Tl1at <lspect of the matter will be dis.cussed later. I wish to say that, in accordance with our rnles of procedure, the present agenda is properly dr<lwn I1p. I think that the objection raised by the representative of the USSR is not well founned. Mr. MALlK (UnLon of Soviet Socialist RepUblics) U,·al1sla{r;d fnJm Russian): I do not dispute the Presinent's rig-ht to draw up the agenda and to approve it in consultation with tbe Secretary- General. nor do I dispnte rule 7. My action is bilsed on rUle 9 of the n1les of procedure, which provides that "the first item of the provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council sl"lall be the adoption of the agenda". This rule entitles me to move that this question, which was included on the provi~iollal ag-enda, shall not be considered, I am legally entitled to do this and in taking stlch action in con~ formity with rule 9 of the rules of procedllre, I am infringing neither the prerogatives of the President nor those of the Secretary-General.

I ask the representative of the USSR whether he wishes to have his objection put to the vote. Mr. MAUK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): Yes.

The representative of the USSR objects to the inclusion of item 2 in the provisional agenda. We shall now vote on the objection. ~'URSS ne p'Ctlt accepter l'exa'men de ccUe demande, qui em<lne d'un gouvernement fantochc, d'un gouvemement illegal, dont l'etablissetnent ne fait que con~oLider la division de la Coree. L'histoire de l'h111l1anite montre que chaquc peuple choisit la forme de gouvernement qu'il juge <lcceptable. Le .celebre President des Etats- Unis Jefferson a declare: "Chaql1('. pays doit pou~ voir choisir la forme de gonvernemen! qui lui conviellt et la modifier selon ses propres desirs", Le regime etabli en Coree du Sud a. ete impose au pays par les forces d'OcCllpation etrangeres. Or, on ne saurait consiclerer camme libres et independants un pays, un peuple et un gouvernement soumis a une occtlpation etrangere, Par consequent, la delegation de l'URSS ne voit pas de raison cl'examiner cette question au COl1seil de securite. Le PRESlDENT (i1·adHit de l'allglais) : Conformement au regleml:'nt interieur et, en partlculier, a l'article 7 de ce reglement, l'ordre dn jour n ete etabli par le Secretariat et approllve par le President dl! Conseil de securite. Le represent.ant de I'URSS" a aborde le fond de la question. Cet aspect du probleme sera examine plus tard. Conformement it notre n~~glement interieur, eet ordre uu joU!' a ete etabli en banne et due forme, J'estime que l'objection du representant de l'URSS n'est pas fondee. lL MAUK (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiq\te) (traduit du russe): Je ne conteste pas le droit du President d'etablir 1'0rdre du ~ottr, e! de ~'approuver en cooperation avec le Secreta!re general. Te ne conteste pas non rillS les dispositions de L'article 7, mais j'agis cOl1fonnement aI'article 9 da reglement interieltr. DU it est dit que "le premier point de l'ordre du jour provisoire de chaque seance du Conseil de: securite est l'adoption de 1'o1'dre du J0ltr" Aux termes de cet article, j'ui le droit de proposer qu'une question figurant a l'ordre d!-l JOl~r pt"Ovisoire ne soit pas examinee. C'est mon dro! t legitime, et c.'est conformement a l'articJe 9 du reglement inhhieur que j'agis, sans enhe~ndre ell. quoi que ce soit les prerogatives du PreSident Oll celles du Secretaire general. Le Pld~SIDENT (traduit de l'an!J!ais): J e dem<tnde au representant de l'URSS s'i[ desire que sa proposition soit mise aux voix M. MALIK (Union des RerJubliques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit de l'altglais) : Dui, Le PRESIDENT (tradHit d,' l'anglais): Le representant de l'URSS pro[Jose de supprimer le point 2 de l'ordre du jour provisoire. Nons allons voter sur cette proposition. 3. Application of the Repu.blic of Korea for membership in the United Natiollll Tb.e P.RESIDE)iT' According to the usual pro- cedure of tllf Secllri:y Council, such an app!ic<'-- tion is referred to the Committee on the Admis- sion of New Members. If there is no objection to folbwing the usual prClcednre, it wU: be hancled in that manner. Mr. MAUIC (Dc-dun of Soviet Socialist Repub~ lics) (translated front RussiQ1t); The USSR dele- gation ob:ec:ed to the inclusion of :his question it: the Security Cound's agenda ar.d objects to its being re1er:ed to be Committee for further stitdy. Wh~.t is this "government", which s:yles itself the Government of the Re:)llblit of Korea and makes en~ire1y ul1fonndect ciaims to represer.t the interests of the Korean people? The question of the e1:itablishmenl of a South Korean puppet regime was disc:ussed at length at the recel:t session of the General Asse:nl::Iy in Paris. It is quite obvious from the document;; of the Uni:ed Natior.s Temporary Commission on Korea :hat this so·called government came into existence as a :eS'JIt of both secre: and open links between the American military ad- minislratior. and a snml1 grau? of SrJ1lth Korean :eactionaries, headed by the arch-ret.ctionary Sy:Jgman Rhee. This group is composec for the greater part of former Qdslings and colhbora~ :ionists, who co-operated in the past with the Japanese mili:ar.sts and are at prese:lt fuJilling the fltnction of chief support for the fut-eign oc:c11pation authorities in Sou:h Korea. We 31sc know that tlee emergence of this "governme:lt" was preceded by enforced and falsified elections crganized by tlle United States military authori:ies b S011th Korea, to the ac- companiment o~· f_arsh police :errorisr.1 on the lir.es of the Nn7-i plebiscite in the Saar, as was admitted by the American General Weckerling in at: illterview w:th representatives of the Uniterl Natiun;; Temporary COr.'lmission. These elections were held ~alnst the will and desire of tl:e Korean people. The {a,:ts and data ~uoted "t the General Assembly session, and snpported by the docu- IT.ents of the United Nations Temporary COl:I- mission, are still fresh in our memor\,. Those facts show tha: all ;he political parties-ir. Sot1th and North Ko:'ea from be left wir.g to the ex~ t:eroe right, with the exception of the small clique of Syngman Rhee, were 0p;Josed to the r_olding of separate elections in South Korea, be- C:'ll1~~ the.y w01l1d inevitably result in di.viding the country to the advantage of the foreign monopolists and of the foreign strategists who are attempting to transform it into a military and strategic base. Fifty-six political parties and pub- lic organizations in South and North Korea, with Co](~e clu Sud, eledions qui rloivent fatalement aboutir a la division de ce pays pO'Jr le plus grand profit des monopoles et des strateges etran- I gers qui cherc:hent a transformer ce pays en tme base mi:itaire. Cinqunnt~-?ifC pa:tis et organisa,- 3. Demande ({'admission de la Repu. blique de Coree a rOrgaui!latioll dC8 Nations Unies Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais); Confor- mement a la proceuure lnbituelle dll CODseil de securile, cette dcmar:de c1ait etre renvoyee devant le Comite j'admissioll des r:ouvea[1x Mem- bres. S'il n'y a pas d'abjecfons, cete prceedure sera adoptee. M. MAt.IK (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du rus.s-e): La deJegetion de l'URSS s'est opposee a ce (Jue eette question f,j,t inscrite a l'ordre 011 jour du COf.seil de seCt· rite, et elle s'oppose egaleme:lt 11 ce que le Co:nite en soit saisi en vue d'Lln nouvel exam~n. Que represente cc "gouvernement" qui s'intl~ lule Gotlvernement de la Repu;"Hque de Coree et qui pretend, sans ~urnl'le rnison vala'.lle, dHendre les inten~ts d'..! peuple coreen? La creation d'un regirr.e fantoche en Coree du Sud a fait l'objet d'une discussion dHaillee a- la derniere sessior. C:e l'Assemhlee genhale a Paris, 11 ressort dainm~nt des documents de la Commission tetr.porai~e ::les l'ations Doies pour la Coree que ee pre:tendu gouvernement a ete constitu~ a la suite de trac:atiom secretes et ouvertes entre I'administration miiit<1lre amerl- caine et un petit groupe de reactionnaires c.e Coree du Sud dont le chef est I'ardli-reactionnaire Syrg- man Rhee. Cette clique cotrprend smtou: des anciens quisling-s et des col:aboratecrs qui avaient coopere nvee les :nilitaristes ja90nais et llui, a. l'heure actuelle, constibe1".t le orincipal soutlen des :lutorites d'occuJlafon etrangeres en Co~ee du Sud. On sait eg-ale:ne:lt que ee "go\1ve~nement" a ete constitce ala Sltite d'elections forcees d trtlquCC5 qui nvaient ete organisees par les autorites tr.ili· taires americain~~ en Coree dl1 Sud dans des conditions de terrenr poJicihe v:oJente, 5\1! le modele du plebiscite hitlerien dz.us la Sane. Cela a etf reconnu par le gener.al americ.1in Wecker· ling au conrs d'un entret:en Cll1'J1 a eu avec le5 representants de la Commission :emporaire des Nations Unies. Ces elections ant et~ org~nisees en depit de la volonte et contrairement aux desirs dn peuple cureen. ']'';ous avons tOtlS pres~nts a la me:noire les faits et les renseignements qui ant ete cites au Cours de la derniere ~ession de l'Assemblee gene- rale et qui sont tr.entionnes dans les dOC'..lments de la Commissio:I temporaire des Nations Unies; Ces renseig!1ements indiquent que, a l'exccption de la petite clique de Syngman Rhee, taus les partis palitiques de la Coree d'..l Sue et dl1 Nord, depuis la gauche jusqu'a l'extreme-droite, s'etaient eleves centre I'organisation d'e~ections separees en \Ve also find in the Commission's documents statements by such prominent South Korean poli- ticians as the President of the Supreme Court of South Korea, who admitted before the United Nations Commission that there was no personal' freedom in South Korea, which had been trans- formed into a police St<lte and a police torlme chamber, and declared Ihat the police in South Korea, who were under the control of the Ameri- can military authorities, were able arbitrarily to deprive thousands of people of their freedom' without trial or inquiry. - We have seen also among the United Nations Con;mission's documents the statement by the Chatrr.nan of the Commission, the Indian repre- sentatIVe, Mr, Menon, WllO said: "I seriously doubt whether the government to be created as 'a res:llt of the elections will be genuinely nntion<Jl ; I senonsly doubt whether the elections will lead to the uuincation of Korea." We are also aware of the statement made by the Canadian representative on the United Na· tions Coml11is~ion, who described the intervention (If the Interim Committee in the Korean elections as "unwise and unconstitutional". The documents of ,the United Nations Com- missiop also include. a statement by the repre- sentalive of Austraha, who admitted that the elections would be boycotted by all parties in Korea except the extreme right grollp. His state- ment was later fully confirmed. We' also ~cnow that the question whether separate e1ectlOllS should or should not be held in South Korea was decided by four ,votes only of m~m,bers of .the United Nations Temporary Com- n-IlSSI0n, WhlCh, as we know, has nine members. Or the four members of the CommissiO!1 who yoted, without any legal justification whatsoever, In favour of holding separate elections tbree .r~presented countries whose ruling circles are directly dependent upon the United States of America, They were the representatives of tbe Philippines, El Salvador and China. The represen- tative of India, who was the fourth member to vote for sep~rate elections, e..'Cpressed doubts as to tl:e expedtency and wisclom of holding t11ese electlOns, as I have pointed out above. Tlms, the fate of half the country with its population of m.an;.: ,?illions, was decid~d by four votes/ ~'l.,<;;t by indIViduals who, in the majority NlJUS connaissons egalement la declaration dtl representant du Canada a ladite Commission qui a qualifie l'ingerence de la Commission intc- rimaire de I'Assemblee genem1e dans les elec- tions coreennes d'acte "deraisonnable et anti- constitutionnel" . Nous avons pu lire, dans les documents de la Commission des Nations Unies, la dedaration du representant de l'Australie qui a reconnu que les ~lections seraient boycottees par tous les partis coreens, a l'exceptioT). des partis de I'cxtreme-droite, Cl' qui a ete entiercment cOllfiTme par la suite. On sait egalement ql.1C la question de Sa.VOil' s'il £aUait ou' non proceder a des elections sepan~cs en Coree du Slid a ete tranchee rar un vote favo- rable de quatl'e representants de la Commission tcmporaire des Nations Unies qui, pOl1rt,mt, com- prenait neuf membres. 11 fallt sOl1Jigner que, sur les qllatre membres de la Commission qui ont vote, sails aucune raison valable, en favctlt d'elec- tions separees, trois etaient des representants de pays dontles milieux dirigeants SOllt tributaires des Etats-Unis cl'Amo§rique. 11 s'<Jgit des repre- sentants des Philippines, du Salvador et de. la Chine. Qtlant au representant de l'Inde, qui s'etf!-it associe EL eux, il a declare qu'il doutait de l'oppOl-- tunite et de la h~galit6 de ces elections, ainsi que je l'ai deja mentionne. Ainsi donc, la destinee de la moiti6 d'un pays, dont 1<1 population s'elh'e a plusieurs millions. a ete detenninec par qU.:l.lrc persoilOes 'doDt la majo' • The doctlments of the United NatLOlls Comn-.is- SIOI1 al~o reeor? t~a.t "the ;najority of democratiR cally dlsposed tndlvlduals In Southern Korea a at ~resellt either under arrest or in prison or re subject to restrictlons on tleir freedom of mo~~= ment", ~~hy in SllCh CirCllm5trmces were these no- torlOl1S elections heM <Lt all? The explanation is that the United Swtes occupation allthorities were stcving o.t all costs te, cre<lte in South Korea n. ~uppet regl11le convel1lent to themselves a r~.c:lme composed of re'nctionaries of tl1C ext~~nle right and ,former Jap~~es~ collaborationists. They thereby J.lmed to leglttmtze the al"bitrary action coercion ,md terror PT:lcti!'>~d by the SmIth Korea~ rea~tionaries ag<linst democratic organizations and thelr members ul:der the protection of the fo~eign occupation ~llthorities. T:le Commission's docu- ments C~n(;lm ~II extremely valllable admi~si(ln hy the r?pres~.ntatLveof Aust:"alia, \yho stated d;lring ~hejtSCLlsSlOn of the questtori ef separate elections Ifi :xiutlt Korea in the United Nations Con-mis- SiOll that "sLlchelectians wou:d he C:01]trolJ~d by one party only, the right-wing party, and this party wOL1ld make it im')ossible for democ.ratic elements to mnI,e their voice heard". He al"o <lc!{lecl that "the pOlicy of the Government of t~e Udted States of America and of tile Cornmand~r of tne occupation forces, General Hodge, was ?llned at creating an extremely right-wing party 111 Sou:hern Korea". It -becomes qttite clear to every objeclive and impartial individual that this was precise:y the aim of the UI1~ted States military command in South Korea when it deliherately sabotaged t:,e work of the United States-Soviet Joint Com- mission for KOTea in order to prevent the adoption of tlte USSR delegation's proposal. That cclega· tiol1 had urged that, in· confoTmity wit!, 6e de- cision of t\e Moscow session of the Coundl of Foreif'n Ministers on KOTea, the Joint Ccmrnis- sion should consult all Korean democratic parties and {J"blic oq;anizations before lh-awlng up its proposals for the creation of a provisional demo- cratic Korean government. Many large democratic organizations such as the All Korean Federation of Labour, the All Korean Barmen;' Union, t:'le 1{OTe"n National Revolutionary Party, the All Koreal1 YOllth Alliance and others Were barred from the consul~ tLtions by the United States military .'luthori:ies or r<t:heT by the delega:ion of the United States command on the United States-Soviet Jairt Com- mission tar Korea. In the light of sl1bsequent events, it became ohviol1s tbat the United States command had not been relying-nor is it relying now-on a democratic Korea. It is rel)'ing rather on a Korea tr,1I1sfonr:en. il1to a colony of the Uniteu States, which tnalntains all the police rules and reg"ulations of the Japanese colonial Tegime as well <.S rebining all former officials of the Japanese police service in leading positions of the South Korea Police. Nous avons cgale~lent ?u lire, dens les docu- men.ts de l~ Ccmmlssion de I'Organisation des NatIons U111;5, que !a plupart ces personnalites f.. tendances demo::rat!cues se trOl1v·'...,t eo Co.' dSd" ..•. ,'" .ec ~ u etalent, OU blen arretce~, ou bien limitcc:; ns leur liberte de mouvement. . Paurq1.;oi. ces fall11'.ltses e.tections ont-clles eu h~u en dePlt de.~ drcon~tat1r.es que ie viens d'in~ d,ll"}tH;J'? ~'est pnrce que ks autorites americaines d gecupatlon se sont efforcees de creer a toul pnx, en. Co~ee ?u SiJd, un gouvernement fan_ toclle qllZ ~Ul.Vr.'..lt dccilctr.cnt hurs ordres et qui se C?Jnp?Seralt de reaetior.naires d'extrerne-droite e., d a nClellS ~ollaborateu rs des Japo:mis; L. cren¥ t;on .de.ce regir;ce devait pe.rmettre de legatisl'r 1arbl~ral~e, la. \'Iolcnce et la lerreur exertcs par les reaCb?nn~lres d,e la Cc:rce du Snd 1, regard des orgamsatlOl:s democratlques et de lenrs diri. ~eants" avec l'appui des autorites d'occupation etrangeres. Dans les dOC'lmcnts de la Commis- sio~, on peu~ lire till aveu extremement signifi- cattf du repl"~scntant de Y~l1stralie qui a declare, au moment 011 1" CommissIon des Nations Uni~~ exa!!Jinait la question des elections sepOLrccs ell Coree du Slid. que "de pareillcs elections ne sel"aient contr8:ees que par \:n patti: cdui de ~h~oite, et cc parti ferait tout pour empecher les elements democratiques d'exprimer :cur opinion". 11 a egalement ajoute que "le Gouverncmcnt des Etals-Unis et le Commandant en chef des force.~ cl'occupation, k geueral IIodgc, cherchent it orga- niser, en Caree uu Sud, un parti cxtrenlistc de droite", Touk pl'r.sonne objective et itnpartiale se rend ::ompte que tel etait precisemcnt le but pOll[".';\1ivi par le Conunandant militaire americain en Corec du Sud, lorsqc'iJ a deliMrement fait eC!lOuer les travzux cc la Commission rr:ixte sovietico-amc- rioaine poUr In Con~e, af.n d'evitcr I'adoption des propsiticns de la d€Mfi<ltion de l'URSS; en diet, la clel\~ga~ion de I'URSS avait insist(\ cOllfor~ mement aux d(;ci~ions adoptkes a Moscou par le Conseil des N:inistres des atTaires etrilngeTcs i1ll sujet de la Coree, pour que la Cot":'l1nission mixtc entrit en cOllSultafon avec toU!:; les partis demo- cratiques coreens et ave;,; tout~s le:> orgalli"atir1ll5 civiques en vue d'eJaborer des propositions COltccr- nant la c~eaticn d'Ul gOi1vernemert uemocratiqlle prnvisoire en Coree. Le Haut Cammandement amer:cain, ou plut6t la delegatioll du Haut-Comn:andemcnt amc:icain a la Con".mission mixte sovietico-americaine -pnu T la Con~c, a ecartc toute utle srrie d'organisations democra~iql1cs importal:~es, comme pa,. c~em~lc, la Confederation p:mcoreenlle d;.t Tr~vall, ll!nlOn paysanne par:corecnne, le Partl natIonal revolll- tionnaire coreen, ['Union de la jel1TIf'SSe fJanco- reenne etc. Les evenements nltericurs ont 11100- tre qt~e le Hallt COll1mandcment ~l11er!cain a taujollTs mise, non pas sur lme Coree, demQcra- tigue, mais sur l;ne Coree lla1l5forrn~ "'1 l.l!1C colonic des Etats-Unis, en y conservant, non seu; lement les reglements de police qui y av~icllt e~e introduits par le regime colonial japor:'l.ls, matS en j,{arc,mt, clans les rangs de la pu1Jce. de. la Coree du Sucl et ii. ses postes de com~landeIl1en,t, tous les anciens fonctionnaires de pobcc nommes par les Japo:Iais. The Anglo·American bloc at that AssemblY imposed the creation of the notorious United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, which acted as a rubber stamp for the United States military authorities and by four votes out of nine approved the holding of forced and falsiped elections in South Korea and the creation of a puppet regime there. A new resolution on the Korean question [195(11I)] was imposed upon the ~neral Assembly and mechanically adopted rhtrin,e: the Paris session for the s'.me rmrpose, The real aims of the United States cleleg:ttion in rnisin~ the Korean CJuestion at the General As- semhly have been revealed by none other than the Ilea-cl of that delegation, Mr. Dul1e~, who rlem~nried in his statement to the Assemblv that the United Nations should "affix tIle seal of Ie<;ality" tl"l ;>11 that han been nOlle in SOllth Kor~a. Th:\t ~mountec1 to asking" that the United N'atlons shol1ld le~:tH7.e il1effality. . The ~(orefl.n (Jllestion has pmvic1erl the r]f':1re~t Illt,stratln!l nf the tennency of the United St<ttes to tlse .the Unilen ,Nations for its own pnre!v sc.llish Interests, whIch Imve nothinrr, in common \~lth the purposes and princinles of the Or~aniza­ tlon. ~lle resolution, which tIle United' States ddegatlOn submitted to the Paris session of the General Assembly and imposed upon that Assem- bly, .had two. ?asic aims: first, at all costs to obtalTI. reCOffTIltlon of the illegal puppet govern- :nent In. South Korea; and, secondly, to create an Internatlo.n,al screen for the further prolongation of the military occupation of that region. Being loath. to le~~e foreign territory, the United States and Its mJlitary authorities in South Korea are trying under various pretexts to retain their troo~s tllere. as long as possible, instead of im- mec1llltely Withdrawing them as did th S . 1) . h . e ~OVlet ]lIon wen. 11; answer to the wishes of the Korean people, It completely evacuated its troops from North Korea at the beginning of December last. Those are the usual tactics of the United State.s Government; tbat is the policy it carries out.1ll Sout~ Korea. It is also the policy it carnes .Otlt m Japan, where it is delaying the conclus!.on Df a pface treaty so as to retai1;1 its occupation trDops there as long as possible. It is Le bloc ang10-americain a ensuite impose .. I'Assemblee la creation de la fameuse Commission temporaire des Nations Unies pour la Cor6e qtli, som la dictee des autorltes militaires americaines, a approllve par quatre voix sur neuf, l'organisation u'elections forcees et truquees en Coree dll Sud et la creation d'un regime fantoche dans Ce pays. C'est ega1ement a cette fin qu'une nouvelle reso- lution [195 (Ill)] ayant trait a la question coreenne a ete imposee a l'AssembJee generale qui l'a adoptee pal- tlTI vote automatique; Les buts que poursuivait la delegation des Etats-Unis en SOI1- mettant la question de la Coree a l'Assemblee generale ont ete exposes par M. Dulles en per- sonne, en sa q1.1alite de chef de cette delegation. It a exige, au caUl's de 5011 intervention, que l'Orga- nisation des Nations Unies "appose le sceau de la Legalite" sur tont ce qui a ete fait en Coree du Sud. Ce~ equivalait a exiger que l'Organisation des Nations Vnies legalise !'i1!eg3lite meme. L'exemple de la Coree met en lumiere d'une fa!1on particulierement nette les efforts d~ploy~~ par les Etats-Unis afin d'utiliser l'Or1(anisation des Nations Unies dans lel1rs propres interets egoistes, interets qt1i n'ont den a voir avec l~.o; buts et les devoirs de ceUe Organisation. En sou- mettant !eur resolution a la derniere se~sion de l'AssembUe generale ~t en l'imposant aceBe-d, les Etats-Unis cherchaient a atteindre deux objeclifs fondamentaux: premierement, jls voulaient obtenir a tout prix la reconnaissance du gOllvernement fantoche qui avait ~te cree illegalement en Coree du Sud, et, cleuxiemement, ils cherchaient adon- ner une justification, sur le plan international, au maintien de leur ocel1pation militaire dans eette partie du pays. Au lieu de retir~r immMiatement leurs troupes de la Coree _ comme l'avait fait 1'Union sovietique, CJui s'est efforcee de satisfa~re 1es desirs du petlple coreen en evacuant la totahte de ses troupes au debut de clecembre de I'annee derniere - les Etats-Unis et leur Ihut Comman- dement en eoree du Sud essaient, sous les pre- textes les pLllS divers, d'y maintenir leurs troupes le plus longtemps pos~ible, car ils ne tiennent pas a abandonner un territoire etranger. C'est la la tactique habittlelle des Etats-Unis: its l'appliquent en Coree du Sud; ils I'appliquent au Japon, ou ils !hus, ~ilitary occupation and cruel police t~1 ror presided over the cre..tion of the South I.....orea!l puppet government; a puppet govern~ ment ~t ha~ been ~p to now "nd a puppet govern_ ment It wIll r~mam s~ lOOK as dIe occupation of So~th Korea :Jy foreIgn troops conti:lUes, The Unlte~ States ~litar'y authcri:ies and the re[JTf!- sentatlves of big Umted States monopolies have already hastened to impose a serie~ of degrading alld unequal treaties and agreements on that brand-new "government". The nature of these ?green:ents can. be iudged by the fact that even m the ?llppet :\fational Assembly of SOllth Korea o,nly 78 members out of 200 voted for the ratifica~ tlOI1 of tbe agreement cor.cluded by Syngman Rhee nod the Commander~in-Chiefof tbe United States occupation fones in South Korea in Sep- t~tn1Jet la.st; 28 members lef: the meeting as a sign of protest against the r:Itincation of ';;11c:h .1 degr?c!ing awe~ent. On 21 September last, they pubhshed a JOint dec:1araticll stating: "Wc have never. se:f"n such a one~sided agreement, Many deputies have spoken against it. The immense ~llajori.t~ of the people do no'". support the agree~ ment eIther. We want the United States of America to complete the trall.'lfercm:c of pcwer so t1J<lt w~ can govern the country freely ,lOd in our own mterests." The entire policy of the Uniteu States, how- ever, from ±:le f,rst d:J.y of occupation of South Korea in autumn 1945, shows beyond any doubt thuL it does not intend to allow the Korean pevple to create its own national and independent gov- ernment freely atld withllut any foreign inteT- fp.:r~llce and pressnre, The creation of such a government does not entl'r into the calculations of eithe:, the brge mOllClpolies or the military tluthorities of the Uni:ed States, Both are trying to strengthen their position in South :Korea and to utilize the territory and its natural resources for their own selfish interests, to the detriment of the Korean people. l'he so-called South Koreall government has been created for that very purpose, It has no grOl.;nds for c:.oosider~ itself represer.tntive of the Korean people, By its nature, its origin and its virtaal position ag a branch of the United States occupation forces, it can carry cut only the will and orders of those whu created it and who direct and guide it. Having been set up by foreign occupation forces against the will an::\ national interest of the Korean people, it represents nothing but a puppet reg:me resting on Alllericar: bayonets, It is afraid of being l~ft fac.e to face wit:1 the Korean people. TllOse who created th<lt government .are also afraid to leave it witllO~lt tIle protection of foreign occupation troops. History teaches us that no government of ~ny country which is created by foreign occl1pah<;n allLhoritics while foreoign occupation troops are 10 the country can be free alldindependent or ,repre- sent the interests uf the people. The e.xample of th~ Pl~tab Governmen:, and of varIOus other gcvl':rnmeats: established by h;rdg'1 occuptitirm "C'cst so:.Js ~n, regime d'occupatiQn milita:re et ~L.ns. des condltlCns cc terz·ellf polieiere qU'a ete etabb le gouvernement f<1I:to:::he de Coree du SiIU. Ce gOllverllernell~ reslera un gouvernC"lltnt f'lll- teche tant q~e la ~oree del Sud sera o~cupee ;,ar des troupes etrar:geres, Lcs autorit:es mili:aircs et les rerrl's;.,t?tn~t~ de~,gr.ands lllonopoles all;eric~im se sont deja Jl<lt~~ d lmP?S,er a'cc "gouvernemenf' nOllvel.lclncnt ere;: ~mc senc de trnitcs et cl'accords asservlssal1ts et 1llplstes. Pour se rendre compte de la n~ture de c~s a~co~ds, it su~1 de se ra~peler que:, ttlenIe a.u ~eJr: ce 1assemhlce fantoche de la COlee du Sl,:d, I accord en septembre -:femier entre ~yn%.'TI.a~ ~~ec I't 1~ Comm:lmlarlt en chd a:l1c- T1Calr. ~ a ete ,approuve que par 78 :11tmbre" sur 2~., Vlllgt-llUlt l1l~mb~cs de ]'A,scl1lb1C.e ont pro~ tes,e centre 1<1 ratification de cet accord Ilsservis- sar.t en qU1:t;ant I,~ saLe des seances. Le 21 sep- tembre dermer, 1.5 on t publie tne declaration 011 il est di:; "Nous n'avam ja:nais "u un accord =touss; injllSte. De nombre:lx deI:ute, .!'y s?nt opp~ses. La majorite ecrasante du peup:e 5 Oppo~e ega1eu:er.t a cet accord. No;,js vtlulons qu~ les~Etats- Unis cffe_ctt;cnt Iln transfert des pou- VOrTS a~n g·je nOUg ptlI::SIOns gO:-1Verner le pays ~n tOllte hberte et coniormernent a. nos propres il1!t~rets." .;. " , , Il ressort eep"'f1d::tnt ce la politiqlle mer.ee par les Etats-Unis des les premiers joun de ]'OCC1l- p<i.tiOll de l2. Cor~c Sud, c'est-i·dire des: 1'2ll- tomme 1945, glt'ils ne sont nullement (:iSOOSe5 n permettre at:. peuple CUfttll de crCel" son-propre gouvernernent national el independant, e:1 toute liGe:'te et sar,s aUCU:le ingere:lce fli prtssion (tnl)- gl::rc. La creation d"Jn le1 gouvernement ne corre~­ pond pas aux plans des grands monopoles et de! autol"jte~ llli:ilaires des Eto.ts-Unis. Lt'" uns et les aut:,es s'efforcent de cO:1solider !eurs positicns en Con~e du Sue: et d'utilistr ~JJl krritoire d se~ ric1te~ses naturelles d.lns lel.lTS rro;m:-s interets ego'istes, au delrllnen: des in:erct> du JX"up1e corCen. C'est pl-hisrcment a cette fin qu'a ele cree le pre:endu gouvernelllent de la Carte du Sud. 11 n'a aUCUl1e raison valable de se considerer comme le representan: du peuple COreer), Etant dOilne sa natt.;re, son Ol-j/iine et sn situation ven- to.ble, ~e gollvernement n'est qu'une filiale dts au~orites americaines d'occupation. et il ne peut executer que 10. volonte et leg directives de ceux qui !'ont eee et qui !e diriger.t. Ayant ele tree par des autorites, d'oceup,ati?n. etrar:gercs, ("n depit de la volon:e et dl's l11tere:s nallOn<l\1X du peufle toreen ce gO'Jverncment n'es: qu'un regime fill1toche qui's'apPl:ie sllr les baionnettes ;Imeri- caines. Il <; peur de r.ester face 3. ~a~ avec: !~ peuple corecn, De ne~e. cellX ql1l ont c:~ee craignent de id t'e:irer l'appui de:: trollptS d'oc- Cllp.ation etrange:·e~. L'h:stoire nous app~cnd qu'rllw:m gouve~nelllellt cree par des autorites d'~CC:Upat:!!D etranger<.': et en presence de t;oup~s ? OCCUpatlOfl OC' ~l1t ,e~re libre. et jnd~pendallt nJ repJ'esenter les tnte:'et~ , ' hi" )' ' du peuple. Nons 11 avaIlS pa~ e~cop; ou le, expe. r'ence du Gouverlwment Petam, 1:1 celle d au:re~ g~uvernements crees p<:.f [e~ reg'mi::s d'occup;doll 111 lts communication to the United Nations (Sj1238], that government declares that it is "the direct resl1lt of the mandate of the General Assembly of the United Nations", although it is well known and quite obvious that the General Assembly and the United Nations had not and have not any right to intedere in the Korea!1 question and to empower anyone to create any government there. That would be a violation of the Charter, and particularly of Article 107. The General Assembly bas never given any such mandate. It is common knowledge that even the meLnbers of the United Nations Tem- porary Commission admitted that the Commission had no right to l101d separate elections in South Korea and to establish a government there. That was the reason why they appealed to the Interim Committee, which had been illegally formed, under United States pressure; being an illegal organ itself, it gave the Commission illegal orders to hold separate elections in South Korea. However, even after the Interim Committee had given that instruction, the Canadian repre- sentative on the Commission, as I have already stated, pointed out the illegal and unconstitutional character of the Interim Committee's decision. Various otber members of the Commission also expressed doubts about the Commission's right to hold separate elections in South Korea. Only those members who acted under direct orders from the United States occupation authorities felt no doubts on that score. I am referring primarily to the representatives· of the Philippines and of El Salvador. Thus, the SOl1th Korean puppet governmel1t's assertion that it is the result of a mandate given by the General Assembly does not correspond to the facts and has ne legal basis whatever. That government was set up on orders from the United States occupation authorities and is a puppet of tl,ose authorities. In its communication to the United Nations, that government diel not dare to state that it had been created by the will of the Korean people, since it is well known that the Korean people never set up that Government. Examination of the application of such a "gov- ernment" by the Security Council is an insult to the Korean people and the Council has no legal grounds for taking the application seriOlls1y. In view of the above-mentioned considerations, the USSR delegation objects to LOl1sideration of the question by the Security CotmciI and}s against referring the communication to the Committee on the Admission of New Members. The Govern- ment of the Democratic People's Republic of COrl~e un gouvernement quelconqtlt', car cela aurait ete incompatible avec la Chartc de l'Organisation 'des Nations Unies et, en partiClllier, avec l'Ar~ tide 107. Du reste, l'Assemblee generale n'a jamais con- fen~ -un pareil mandat. On sait que ies rnembres de la Commission temporaire ·des Nations Unies pnur la Coree Ollt eux-memes admis que la Com- miSsion n'avait attcnn droit d'organiscr des tlec- tiOlls separees en Coree du Sud,ni d'y creer un gouvernement. C'est pn~dsement pour cette raison que les membres de la Comniission se sont 8.dres~ ses a In Commission interimaire de l'AssembUe gcnerale qui avait ete illegalement creee sous la pl'cssion des Etats-Unis et qui, etant elle-memc un organe illegal, a donne a la Commission l'onlre illegal d'organiser des elections seprrl'ces en Coree du Sud. Mnis, meme aprcs que cet ordre illegal eut ete dOllne, le representant du Canada a la Commis-:- sion temporairc a dec1nn~, comme je l'ai- deja mentioune, que cette me.sure de la Commission illterimaire de l'Assen;.blee generale etait ille-ga1e et antieonstitl1tionnelle. D',mtres membres de la Commission temporaire ont ega1ement mis en doutc le droit de la Commission d'organisel' des elections separees en Coree <tu Sud. Seuls Ies me111- bres qui avaient agi sous la dictee des autorites americnincs d'occupalion 11'ont eu aucun douk ace st!jet. Je veux parter avant tont des represen- t<lnts des Philippines et du Salvador. Par consequent. I'affirmation du gouvernement f"ll1toche de la Con~e (111 Sud selon laquelle il doit Jirectel11ent son existence aux decisions de I'As- semblee generale, ne correspond pas a la realitc t:t est absolument sans fon'dcment. Cc gOl1veIne- I11cnt a ete cOllstitue conformement a la decision des autorites al11ericaines d'occupation et sur leur ordrc, et il n'est qu'une marionnette entre les mains de ces autorites. Dans b demande Cju'il a adrcssce a l'Organisation des Nations Unies, ~e gOllvenlement n'ose pas pl-etendrc qu'il a et6 cree par la \'olonte du peupie coreen. On sai~, e,n I effet, que cc n'est pas le peuple toreen qUI 1a ~f(~e. Le fait meme que le Conseii de securite E'.xamine In ca.ndidature de ce "gouvernemcnt" constitue une offense pour le pcuple de la Con§e. Le Consei1 de securite n'a aucune raison valahle de prendre cette dcmande en consideration. Cest pourquoi la deU~gation de l'URSS s'op_ p'ose a ce que le ConseiL de securire examine cette. de111andc et a cc qu'il la trallsmette an Comite d'admission des nouveaL1X Mcmbres. Le seul representant veritable dll peup1e coreen est le Gouvernernent de la .Republique populaire d6mo- The PKESlDENT: Since objection has of'en raised to the adoption of the usual procedure, which is to refer the matter to the Committee on the Admission of New Members, I shall have to put the que5tioo to the vote after the completion of the debate. Mr, AUSTJN (United States of America): This is the first time that I have listenl:U to this ghastly tale of tyrannical coercion in the election in South Korea, stated with the fluency which familiarity with such matters allows. I am informed, how- ever, that others at this table have heard this same story be[ure, It must hilve been rath",r gr1le- some for them ~o listen to it the second time. If it is true that this group of charges was m<..de during tile cOIl~ideraliol1 of this questlon in Paris, the whole matter has been sUlllmed up in the resolution of the Genera! Assembly, since the General Assembly considered these charge;; and also considere.d the facts regarding the elcc~ tion ill South Kore.'l.. As a resn1t, the General Assembly passed a resolution 1195 (Ill)] which recommends our action here. Paragraph 9 of this resolution, which also appears in document A/788, reads: "Rerom!nends thn.t Member States and other nations, in establishing their relations with the Government .of the ReplIblic of Korea, take into consideration the facts set out in paragraph 2 of the present re.>olution," Now that same paragraph 2 is a complete answer to this story that we !lave listened to today and which others have listened to before. Paragraph 2 reads: "Deciares ttat there has been estaUished a law- ful Government, (the Government of the Repllb- lk of Korea) having effective control and jtlds~ rlk.t'ion over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commissfon was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside: that thi!> Government is. based on elections which were a valid expres- sion of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Tem- porary Commission; and that this is the only BllCh Gllvemment ill Korea," There is much Illore in this resolution all of which bears upon the fact that these charge~ made herlO tochy [lncl made in Prrris at th:lt :ime were completely refuted, and resulted in a reso- hltian which disptltes everything that was sa-id tuday. " Is that important? Is it credible as against the statemcnh repeated here? I think that when we Le Pl'-ESlDENT (!raduit de ranglair); Etant donne que des objections ont the sotllevees contre ]'adoptiol1 de la procedure babitl1elle, qtli consiste a remoyel' b. question dev:tnt le Comite d'admis- sion des nouveaux Mernbres, je devrai mettre cette question aux voix: it la fin du debat. M. AUSTlN" (Etats·Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais): J~ 'liens d'entendrc pour la pre- miere fe-is l'eHrayant recit de la tyranilie qui aurait ete exercee lors des elections en Coree du Sll<l, fecit (Fl~ nOllS a ete fait a.vcc lme nisancc qui' montre que I'orateul" connait fort bien ce genre de nH~thode. Toute£ols, on me dit qw~ d'al.ltres membl'eS du Conseil ont deja ente:ldu ce re-cit; LIs ont da etre terrifies en l'entendant pour la scconde fois. nest vrai que ces accusations ont ete fonnulees )nrsque cette question a ete etudiee a Paris, mais la conclusion des debats a ete une resolution de j'AssemoJee ~IH~rale. En ce qui conccrne les elections en Coree du Sttd, l'A;l.~r-mblee a, en effet examine et ces accusations et les faltS; 1'AsSCOl- blee a aclopte en consequence t11le resolution [195 elIf)] j le paragra)Jhe 9 de ectte rcsoiL\tion qui figure egalernent au document A/788, se lit r.omme suit: "Rec::mlJ11{mde aux Etats Membres et aux autres nations de tenir compte des faits cuonces all paragraphe 2 de la presente resolution dans I'tftablissement de relations avec le Gouvernement de la Republique de COrl~e." Or, ee paragt~phe 2 constitue la repanse a tOLltes les accusattons que nOllS a'lons cnlenducs aujourd'hui et que d'autres or.t eCltendl1es aupa~ r~...ant; i[ est redige comme s'Jit: "Declwl' qu'il a ete etabli tm Gouvernement I~gitime (ie Gouvernement de la Republique de Coree) qui e~erce effectivement son aulorile I':t sa juridiction sur la partie de la COrl~e oil la Commission tentporaire a ete en meEllTe de pro- ceder a des observations et a dcs conclusions et dans Iaquelle reside la grande majorltC de la population de l'enselllu1e de la Corer;: que ce Gouvernement est m~ J'e.leetions qui ont ete l'ex- prf'ssion "alable de la libre volonre du corps elec- toral de cette partie de l~ Caret et qui olll ele observees par la Commission temporaire; et que lcdit GOUVCl11ement est 11' sw1 qui, en Caree, pOEsede ceUe qualite." Cette n~~olllti011 contlent bien d'alltres ele~ 1nents encore qui, cn fait, re£ute:lt cornplelement les acctlsations forl11tllees aujoard'hui et au cours des debats qui ont eu lieu a Paris; cette resolution constitue un dementi a tout Cl'. que nous venons d'entendre. N'est-ce pas ia cl'. qui importe? N'est~ce pilS a celte re:solution qu'i1 faut ajouter foi, et non aux The United States understands that the s1tt1a~ tion is just as the President stated it to be: the President has suggested under rule 59 of our rules of procedure that the application of the Republic of Korea should be referred to the Com~ mittee on the Admission of New Members. We agree that that should be done. I assume that these charges will be reviewed again there. This is probably not the last time that these charges will be made. The Committee is a tribunal that can patiently sit and "take it" another time. Who knows whether, even then-after three times-we shall get to the end of that story. As is stated in the application itself [Sj1238], the Republic of Korea was set up as the direct result of the mandate of the General Assembly, alld its general election was observed and approved by the United Nations Temporary Com~ mission on Korea. Is it not clear that this State has a particularly dose rel.ationship to the United Nations, whose Commission has observed the cir~ cumstances of its birth? If we undertake to apply to any State tile Charter of the United Nations, which provides the ql,lalifications for admission, we must admit that here is a State about which we know something; here is a State that has already been considered by the organ of the United Nations that finally :passes all the admis~ sion of any applicant to its membership. It is the General Assembly that admits a State. To be sure, we, the Security Council, have a function, which is to recommend to the General Assembly whether a State shall be admitted or not; it is the General Assembly, however, that has the final word. In deciding that question of admission, the ability and willingness of the appli~ cant to carry out the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations is the test. This State does 110t come before us in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations. This State comes here with an .enclor~ement already given by that great body whIch wll1 have the final word if we make the reconmlemlalion. They have sent us all that is necessary to answer tile charges that have been m~'de against them. We shall Sllpport the President in his mHng'. AIr. TARASENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated froll1 Russia,!): The ! 1 rll.;ni:!1] delegation belie\'es th:lI tl,(' i",l\1sirr~ ,"'/-- ;,"'f' 1;1 of t'-e e:'~":l'i" t;II" n' ~ 11' "1 :i "r,' !I".', .•:" ....!1!c<1 'er (. 'S~!" 01Jici(l1 ",,.cord,, of 1,1,.' third ."·.'.'·W" n) G.'>Jeral Ass~mbly, Part I. '187th plenary mec-ting. Les Etats~Unis estirnent que la situation est bicn celle que le President a definie: le President a propose de renvoyer la demande d'admission de la Republique de Coree au Comite d'admission des nouveux Membres, conformement a I'ar- ticle 59 de notre l'eglement interieur. Nous som~ roes d'accord avee ceUe proposition. Je presume que ces accusations se.tont formulees a nouveau au sein de ce Comite, e.t ce ne sera probalement pas pour la demiere fois. Mais le Comite est un tribunal qui peut sieger p<ltietnment et entendre une fois de plus ces accusations. Et qui peut savoir si, meme apres que. ees accusations auront ete repetees trois fois, nous en auron5 fini avec cette histoire. Comme il est clit dans la demande d'admission [S/1238j, la Republique de Coree doit directe- ment son existence aux decisions de l'Assemblee generale, et les elections generales y ont ete obser- vees et approuvees par la Commission temporaire des Nations Unies pour la Coree. N'est-il pas evident que la Coree Q des liens particulierement etroits avec l'Organisation des Nations Unies qui a charge une commission de eonstater la nais- sallee de eet Etat. Si nous avons l'intention d'in- voquer les dispositions de la Charte des Nations Unies qui determine les conditions d'admission des Etats, nOllS e1evons admettre qu'il s'agit hI. d\m Etat que nous connaissons bieIl; il a deja fait l'objet d'une enquete cle la part de l'organe des Nations Unies qui statue en demier ressort sur toutes les delOO.ndes d'admission. C'est l'Assemblee generale qui se prononce sur l'admission d'un Etat. Certes, le Conseil de secu- rite est charge de faire cles reeommandations a l'AssembIee generate a cet egard. Cependant, c'est l'Assemhlee qui decide en demier ressort. Afin de pouvoir statuer sur la clemancle d'admis- sion d'Ull Etat, il rant determiner s'il est capable de remplir les obligations de la Charte des Nations Unies et s'il est dispose a le iaire. Or, l'Etat clont il s'agit n'a pas contrevenu aux dispositions de la Charte cIes Nations Unies. Cet Etat se pre~ sente a nous apres avoir re<;u l'approbation de cclte Assemblee generale qui devra stattler en dernier ressort a la suite ele notre recommanda~ tion. Cet Etiit nous a communique tOllS les eJe~ mcnts necessaires pour repondre aux accusations qui ant ete formulees contre lui. Nous nous declarons en fuvclIr de la decision uu President. . M. TARASSENKO (Republique socialiste SOVle- t:que d'Uki'aine) (traduit dtt rus:;l'): La dele- '-:,1 on d~' la RSS d'Ukraine estime que le Conseil ':gi c1'une fa<;on arbitraire et illegale en inscri~ 11 '''(he du jour t'examen de la demande 'Voir le, DOC1I.1!ll'Jlt. otlic,jcls dc la troi.;ir1flf se.uiOK .I" I'Asumblce gencra/e, premiere partie 187eme seallce pleniere. ' Mr. Austin reminded the Council that the resolution approved the elections and the govern- mellt formed in South Korea. But that is not enough. It is not enough that the so-called gov- ernment of South Korea has been recognized by the pro-American majority in the General Assem- bly. It is not enough that it represents the will of the United States. It would have beer. more important if it had been recognized by the people of Korea and if it had been an expression of their will. The circumstances in whic1\ the manipulated elections were held in Sou~h Korea, the estab~ lislunent of the so-called government there, and the present situation in South Korea, show that the Korean people had not and have not any- thillg in common with that government. It is evident from the facts that the Korean people despise and hate that government. The United States delegation stated that all the USSR charges against the so-called South Korean government were rejected in the General Assembly resolution. VVhat is important is not that the obedient Anglo-American majority re- jected those and other facts mentioned in the USSR. charges, but that the Korean people agree with the charges. Subsequent evenlS in Korea confirm that the overwhelming majority, the tremendous mass, of the Korean people agrees with the accusations which the delegations of tbe USSR and other cOllntries have brought forward in the General Assembly and in other places, and that the majority of the Korean people is opposed to the illegal establishment of the $ot1th Korean Government. The Korean people confirms these accusations. In view of the above considerations, the l.Jkrainian delegation voted against the inclusion, on the Security Council's agenda, of the so-called South Korean government's application for at!- SOil peuple. Ils ne pourraient former qu'un gou- vernement fantoche controle par 1es autorites americaines d'occupatioll. Or, le Conseil de secu- rite est precisement en train d'examiner la de- mande d'admission presentee par ce gouvernement fantoche. Cette attitude du Conseil de securite ne [ln~s:J.ge rien de bon; elle ne peut que porter pre- judice all peuple eoreen. M. Austin vient de rappeler que l'Assemblee generale a approuve par sa resolution les elections gui ont eu lieu en Con~e du Sud et le gouverne- mcnt qui ya ele constitue. Mais cela importe peu; il ne stlilit pas que le pretendu gouvernement de la Coree du Snd ait the reconnu par la majorite pro-americaine de l'Assemblee generale. Le hit que Ce gouvernement se conforme a la volonte ues Etats-Unis ne suffit pas non plus. I1 allrait ete plus importnot que le pel1pie coreen reconnut Ct gOl1vernement; i1 aurait ete pillS important que ce dernier exprimat la voloute du peuple coreen. Or, les circonstances qui Ont preside a l'orga- nisation d'elections frauduleuses en Coree du Sud I.:t it la constitution de CC pretendu gouvernement, ainsi qt1e la situation qui existe acttlellement en Con~e dll Sud, prol1vent que le peupie coreen n'a jamais rien eu de commun avec ee gonvernement. Les faits montrent que le peuple coreen meprise et deteste ee gouvernement. La delegation des Etat~-Ullis a declare que les acctlsations portees par l'Union sovietique contre le pretendu gouvernement de la Coree du Sud avaient He rejetees par la resolation de l'Assern- blee g'enerale. lIhis il importe peu que la majorite de I'Assemblee generale qui suit docilement les Etats-Ullis et le ROyO-I1me-Uni, ait rejete ces accu- sations jnstiMes de l'L'nion sovietique; ce qui est important, c'est (jue le peuple coreen les a reprises pour son propre compte. Les evenements qui se sont produits depuis en Coree confirment que l'imrnense majorite du petlple coreen a fait siellnes tbutes ]es accusations que les deh~gations de l'URSS et d'autres pays encore avaicnt fonTIulees a l'Assemblee generale et aineurs; ces evenements prouvent egalement que la majorite de la popu~ !ation est opposee au gouvernement de la Con~e dl! Sud, en raison de la maniere illegale dont il a ete constitue. Le peuple de la Con~e confirme donc les accusations qui ont etp. fades. Four ces raisotls, la delegation de l'Ukrainc a vole contre l'inscription .it ]'ordre du jour du Conseil de securite de la demande cl'admission presentee par le pretendu gouvernement de la General McNAUGllTON (Canada): At this time I wish merely to say that the Canadian delegation supports the procedure which the President has indicated in reference to tl1e second item on the agenda-that is to say, that the appli- cation of the Republic of Korea for membership in the United, Nations, which is contained in docu- ment 5/1238, should be referrtd to our Com- mittee on the Admission of New Members, where We shall be better able to give it the detailed consideration which is required and on the basis of which we shall be able to reach appropriate conclusions.

As there are no further speal{ers on this item, I shall put to the vote the proposal to refer the application of the Republic of Korea to the Committee on the Admission of New Members.

The Security Council will now lake up item 3 of the agenda, which is a letter dated 11 Febmary 1949 to the President of the Security Council concerning the application of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for admission to membership in the United Nations. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): I raise a point of order, to wit, that this item is not an application for membership within the meaning of the Charter. Let us examine that question for a moment. D?cument S/1247, dated 10 February 1949, contams two documents, one a note by the Secretary- General and the other a telegram pmporting to be signed "Pale Heun Yung, Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Democratic People's Republic of Korea", We are informed of the matter by the note of the Secretary-General, which is couched in rather startling language; it is the first time I have ever seen such language in a document laid before us. The Secretary-General's note says: "In view of the General Assembly resolution of 12 De~em~er 19~8, paragraph~, the Secretary- General 1S 'clrculatmg the followmg communication for the convenience of the memhers of the Security Council which may desire to be informed of it and not in the application of rule 6 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council." Every word contained in that brief note is a warning to us. It apprises us of the chal'acter of this document, In the first place, members of the Le general McNAUGHTON (Canada) (trad'uit dc' l'a'lglais): Je voudrais dire simplemcnt que la delegation du Canada approuve la procedure proposee par le President quant au secoad point de l'ordre du jom: la demande d'admission de la Republique de Coro~e qui fait l'objet du document 5/1238 doit €Ire renvoyee devant notre Comite d'admissiOI1 des nDtlVeaUX Membres ou nous pourrons examiner cette demande avec tout le sain qu'el1e merite et prendre une decision appropriee. Le PRESIDENT (tradtttt do? l'anglais) : Aucun autre membre ne desirant prendre la parole sur ce point, je mets aux voix la proposition tenclant a renvoyer la demande d'admission de la Coree dewmt le Comite d'admission des nOUYeallX Membres, It est proc~d~ au vote amain levee, Par 9 voix contre 2, la pmpositio1J est adoptee. 4. Denmnde d'admissioll it l'Organisation des Nations Unies de la Repuhli(JUe populaire democratique de Corce Le PutSIDENT (trad~tit de l'aJtglais): Le Conseil de securite va maintenant aborder le point 3 de l'ordre dll jour; c'est une lettre, en date du 11 fevrier 1949, adressee au President du Conseil de sewrite et concemant la demande d'admissibn cl 1',Organisation des Nations Unies de la Republique populaire democratique de COf\~e. M. AUSTIN (Etats-Unis d'Ameriql1e) (tradtt'it de l'anglwM): Je presente nnt motion d'ordre: ce point de l'ordre du jour ne constittle pas une demande d'admission au sens ou ['entend la Charte. Examinons un instant la question. Le document 5/1247, date du 10 £evrier 1949, contient deux documents; I'un est une note du Secre:taire general et l'autre un telegramme qui nous est prescnte C0J11111e etant signe: "Fak Heun Yung, 1Iinistre des affaires etrangeres, Republique populaire d6nocratique de Coree". Nous sommes saisis de la question par une note du Secretaire gelu".ral redigee ell des terl11es assez surprenants; c'est la premiere fois qtle je vois employer, dans un document qui nous est soumis, des tennes de ce genre. La note dlt Secretaire general est ainsi conc;ue: "Etant donllt le paragraphe 2 de la resolution de l'Assemblee genera1e en date du 12 ctecembre 1948, le Secretaire general adresse la communication suivanle .lUX membres du Conseil de securite qui uesireraient en prendre connai"ssance, a titre d'information, et non pas en application de l'artic1e 6 du n~.glernent interieur provisoire du Conseil de securite," Chacun des mots, dans cette Callrte note, contient un avertissement pour nons. On nOlls indique le caractere de ce document. En premier But fmt is not all there is to it. The Secretary- Gellenll circulates "the following communication" not "the follcwing application". He is very careful not to characterize this as an arplkafon fo~ membership, and h~ does not even say that it is n cOllunttnkation from anybody. He does not pass 011 the authenticity at what purports to be Pak Benn Yung's signature. He :s circulating "the following comrnunication"-what for? Is it for action by the Security Council u:1der rules 58 and 59? No, he does not say any such tl:ing, he does not refer to that at all. It is only i::I order that we may be informed of it-and he then goes to the length of saying that it is n<;·t all applici'..- tion of rule. 6. Rule 6 says: "The Secretary-General shall immediately bring to the attention of all representatives on the S~­ C1.lrity Council all commtlnications from States, organs of the United Nations, or the Secreslary- Gcncrd cOllcernin"- any matter fol' :he consideration of the Security Council in accordance with the pl':>Visions of the Chatter." The Secret<lry-General does not .submit tUs document for the cons:deration of the Secmity COltllcil he does not submit it as Cl corr.municatio11 frO~1 a State or from any other of tl:e bodies comprehended in rllle 6, and he does not l1nd:r- :ake to say that it i::; a matter that the SecurIty Council should "be informed of". There is a little background to this which affects tbis kind of commllnication to us from tne Secet.1ry-Genernl. This is the logical and natural res'J1t of the resolution of the General Assembly to which he rders. I have already rderred to that resolution in connexion with the previous itC111. I now wish ~l,<;o to refer to another vote taken on this matter, Document Aj788 of 9 December reads, in snb-paragrapb 9(b): "A draft resolution proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [AjC.1{427/Co~.11 which, inter alia, resolved that the Unlte~ NatlOnS Temporary Commissi::m on Korea s:1ould be abolished." We find that the First Committee ~f the General Assembly, 'voting on that resollltl0?-. of the USSR, rejected i~ by 4-2 votes to 6 Wlt:1 3 abstentions.1 Thus we :lave l~a,:,e not only the res0ci. lotion to which I have prevlOusly refe;red an 11 with which the members of the Cou?cll are a familiar, but we have also the actIOn of the • Sec Official \Rl'cods of tM third ses.~OIt Oi23tf:J, Gfftwral A.:sl'mbly, Part I, Pirst ComIDlttee, meeting. qu~ l'a sig-ne ? Ce n'est pa!> ID. une procMur~ qui plllsse co:wel1lr pour adresser une demande cl'admission <lux termes de la errarte. Mais cela n'est pas tOll!. Lc Secretaire general adresse aux memhres dl.l Consetl "la commur.ication suivante" - r.on pas" la dcmande d'ad~ mission suivan:e". n prcnd bien soin de ne pas 'qualifier ce texte de demande d'admission, ct il ne dit meme p.as ele qui provient :tttc communication. 11 s'abstient de tOllte menti:m qui pourrait confirmer l'au6enticite de ce que l'ull llOUS pre~ sente comme etant la signature de P2k Heun Ytmg. 11 adresse aux repl'esentants du Conscil de secl.1l'ite "la conuounicatian suivanlc". A que]e fin? Est-ce por.r que le COnscil de sccurite pren:1e des mesurcs cr. vcrtu des articletl 58 ct 59 de son reglement? Nco, il ne c1it rien de tel, il nc fait aucune allusion a cela. I1 vent simplement que le Conseil soit inforll1e, et il va meme jusqu'a dire qlie cc n'est pas er: application de l'article 6, L'articJe 6 dl1 regleme.nt ir.terieur provisoire tlu Conseil de securite clit: "Le ::ecrtha:re general parte imilledia:emcnt a la connaissance de taus les ~cpresentanls emanant cl'Etats, d'organes des Nations Unies ou CU Sccretaire general CDl1cernanl une ljW':Sl'OIl a cxanllncr par le Conseil de securite conformement a;ue dispositions de la Charte." Le Secretairl' general ne soumel pas cc doculTJent au Conseil de securite pour fju'il l'cxaminc; il ne lc soumet pas cbmme UTIC communicCltion emanant el'un Etat ou de quelquc autre orgtne vise a J'artic1e 6, et il n'c:ltend pa~ dire gue ,c~ ~oit la une question qUC le Cor.sCl1 de sccunte cJoive ~xamil:er: c'est ur: poin: sur lctp.H:l le Conseil c10it Hre informe. Cette sorte de comml1nicati~? CJ,ue nou,s fait.le Secretaire general se tro~ve hee a c;r:ames ~lr­ constances: c'est une conseC]\.I~nc.. lO~lqU~ e,t natu; rellc de la resolution de :'Assemblee general~ a 1aque1le il se rHere. 1'.ai dej~ pa'le de c~tte reso~ Illtion i;. propClS du pomt precedent de I ordre du jour. _-e dema~derai nJ~:ntenar.t nux mc;nl:res du Conseil de bll'n voulolr .se r~pDrter,au rest:,I~t cl'un antre vote qui a ell lIeu a cc SU]et. A I al;- nea 9 ~1) du ~ocume~t A/788, en date du 9 decembre 1948, 11 est dlt: "Un projet de resol~tioll pre:~~te pnr l'Union d Republiques soeialtstes SOvletlques lAjC.1j 4~7jCorr.1] qui tendait notamm:nt a dl.sso:ldr~ , Commission tcmporaire des NatlOns Umes poUl .a la Coree." Nots voyons quc la ~re;11ierc Com.mission .~e l'Asscmblec gel1era-le a reJet;. pa:-,42 VdIXl;U~SSl' avec 3 abstelltiom, cette. resolutton lee t't' ~ Ainsi uous avons, nOli seulement a r so u 10 dont ]'ai pade precedeml1lel~tet dont l:s mcmbr~s du Consril conn<lisScnt ..b~e~ lesj teL,~es, ~~~~ nO\1S a vons aussi la ceC1SlOIl <. e SSCr.I - t if"iel. de la Iroi,iel'lI! .e..iOH • Voir Jes J?OC~I1:e,~/ °pce~ihe p.artie, PreJl1j~re Comde l'Aui!mblN gllJf:,-a e, - missioll, 263eme seance. I wish the Security Council to consider the fact that this is a declaration by the General Assembly in a field where the General Assembly makes decisions, The General Assembly was acting in a capacity that was complete. It was not acting in one of those capacities in which it is limited to nothing but recommendations. To be sure, it made a recommend.atian, but it also made a declaration and a decision. It had the power, and there is really no appeal from that decision. So far as the United Nations. is con~ cernec1, that is the decision of the United Nations made by the proper organ having jurisdiction over the subject matter. When paragraph 2 is read in that light, it has greater weight than when it is considered as a recommendation. TIle General Assembly recommended: ". . . that Member States and other nations, in establishing their relations with the Government of tIle Republic of Korea, take into consideration the facts set out in paragraph 2 of the present resolution". That is for our guidance as individual Members of the United Nations. What is it that we are to take into acount? One of the things t1lat we are to take into account, which is of the hir..he!;t degree of importance, is that the Government of Southern Korea: "... is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission: and that this is the only such Government in Korea". It seems to me that, as a Member of the United Nations, my country is bound by that. That is effectual. It was within the power as well as the jurisdiction of the General Asesmbly to make that finding, and it made it. It is a decision, and it stands in an entirely different way from the way in which a mere recommendation would stand. It has two effects. One is to give status to the Government of Sotltbern Korea, and the other is to give no status to the so-called signer of this telegram, Pak Heun Yung, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Security Council will notice that it is not even signed by a Government or a purported Government. It is signed by a man who sends the Security Council a telegram and desc.ribl"s himself. No organization or regime that claims tQ have the power to certify a man as the representative of that regime has said anything to thl" Security Council or authorized anybody to say anything to the Security Council, unless you can take this letter from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which appears in document 5/1256, as a letter from somebody who really has authority ill that field, The letter says; Ceci doit servir pour notre gouverne en tant que Membres individuels de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. De quoi devons-nous tenir compte? L'un des faits dont nous devons tenir compte, et qui est de la plus hante impOltance, c'est que le Gouvernement de la Coree du Sud: " . est ne d'elections qui ont ete l'expression valab1e de la libl'e volonte du corps electoral de cette partie cle la Con~e et qui ont ete observees par la Commission tel11poraire; et que ledit Gottvernement est le seu1 qui, ",n Coree, possede cette qualite." 11 me semble que, en tant que Membre de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, mon pays est lie par cette resolution, laque11e est valide. L'Assemblee generale etait competente, elle avait les pouvoirs necessaires pour enoncer cette conclusion: elle ]'a enoncee. C'est une decision, et sa portee est tOllte autre que ceUe d'une simple recommandation. Cette decision a deux effets: I'un est de donner statut legal all GOllVernement de la Con~e du 5ud ; l'autre, de lie dOlmer allcun statut au pretendu signataire de ce teIegramme, Pak Heun Yung, Ministre des <J.ffaires etrangeres de la Republiqtle populaire democratique de Coree. Le Conseil notera que ce telegramme n'est meme pas signe par un Gouvernement ou un pretendu Gouvernement. I1 est signe par un homme qui envoie au Conseil de securite un tele~ gramme et se qualifie lui-meme. Aucune orga· nisatiot1, aucun regime, qui pnhende avail' qualite [lour attester que cct homme est lJien le representant de ce regime, n'a dit quoi que ce soit au Conseil de securite n'a delegue pouvoira quieonque pour dire quoi que ce soit au Conseil de securite; a moins que les membres du Conseil ne corisiderent la lettre du representant de l'Union des Republiques social.istes sovietiques qui figure au document 5/1256 comme la lettre de quelqu'un ayant vraiment autorite en ce domaine. Cette 1ettre dit: "(Signed) J. MALIK" \Vill Mr. Malik admit that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has set up a regime in North Korea in defiance of the decision of the Gener:ll A<;sf'.mbly? Will he admit that no other regime has any atlthority there and that its aut1lority is maintained only by sheer force? Anc if be did fldmit that, what should we do in the presence ef s{lch a request, as a Security Council which stands before the judg-ment of all the worM .and which is limited and governed in its conduct of parlimentary mallets by rules and by a Charte~ of princJples and a Charter of conduct? What should we do in such a situation as that? ShOlllct we dignify it by sel1ding it to a subsidiary comA mittee of the Security Council and give it a statl1s similar to the statns of the <lfplicaticn of South Korea, the aDplication of the Government of the Republic of Korea, which the General A.'isemblv says is the only Government in Korea? Well for our part, flS cne member of the Secnritv Council; we cannot do that. There is another side to this matter which goes beyond the indiyic1ual State and its representative. beyond t!le SeC11rity Council, ~nr1 which comprehends the Security Council <IS an ergan of the United Nations, This side of the matter has its influence upon the United Kations as a whole. because it reveals that somefling COl1ld be done here which would throw this voltmtflrv Organization into a perfect -r.1ess. Ii the General Assembly, which had the power and jurisdictio!l to m[\kc that decision, made a decision that the only such l2:0vernment in Korea is this Government of the Renllhlic of Korea. :lnd we. who h~vl" onlv the fl1~cti()n of 1l1<1ldngo a reco:11mend"tion to the !'cne'ral Assembly with respe~t to tl1e application of St~tf'<; for membership when we are eonsider~ ing this sl1biect of membership, undertook to rass an entirely different decision-one opposingthe decision of the General Assembly of the Uniterl Nations-what would become of the United Nations? ....ve shotlld then have onc organ-some think it is the greatest organ of all-tl1e General AS5trnbly, holding one view, and the Secmity Cotlnci], ap.other organ which some people consider the primary organ of the United Nations. holding another and entirely opposite view. I say that our regard for the supremacy of the Charter. our fidelity to the law of that volun~ tar)' association which nas matured into a convention and a treaty between us, really commands us in a situation like that to adhere to and fa.ith_ fully to support the declaration made by the General Assembly. This is strong enough, in my opinion, to crea'te a parl;~mentary bar to the consideration of a telegram sent here, no matter whether it is proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist .Republics or not. In my jt:dgment, it M. MaHk est-il dispose a admettre que c'est l'Union des Republiques socialistes sovit~tiq\1es qui a cree un regime en Core du Non\, au mepris de ia decision de l'Assemb~ee generale? Est-it pret a ndmettre qu'aucun aulre regime n'~xeree son autorite dans cette region et que l'autoritt. de celui-ci ne se maintient que par la force? Si M. Malik est pret !l. admettre ceh, fJ1H';l1e attitude devons-notlS prendre al'eg"ard d'u:1e tdle demande, nous, membres du Conseil de securite, qui sommes sournis au jugement de l'opinion mondiale et dont les travaux parlementaires sont definis et regis par un reglement il1terieUr et pa, une Charte qui contient des prindpes et des regles cl'application? Comment devons-nous agir en pareillc cil'constance? Devons-nous faire a cette demande l'hon~ neur de la transmettre aun eomite subsidiaire du Cun:;eil de sccuritc et lui dormer 1", m':me rang qu'a la dema~de d'admission form\11ee par le Gollvernement de la Con~e du Sud, lequel, de l'avis de l'A::;semblee generale, est le seul Gouvemement en Coree? Pour nOIlS, en tant <J.ue membre dn Comeil de securite, nons nous y refusons. 11 y a, d'ai11eurs, un autreaspect de la quest:on qui va au dela. de la position prise par notre delegation en tant que membre dl1 Conseil de securite, atl dela du Conseil de securite lui-mcme, et qui concerne le Conseil de securite en tant <:jtl'organe des Nations Unies, Cet aspect de la question a une influence sur l'Organisation des Nations Unies prises dans son ensemble; nous pourdons en agissant inconsiderement. creer la ronft;sion totale all sein de cette Organisation a laqLtelle nous avons librernent adhere. Si l'Assemblee generale, dans le plein exerciee de ses pouvoirs jurididonnels, decide qu'en Coree un seul Gmwernelnent exisle, celui de la Repttblique de Con~e et si nous, Conseil de sccurite,dont les foncti~ns en matihe de demande d'admission 5e limitent it faire des rpeomma11(lations a. l'Assemblee generale, prcnions nne decision completement differente, une decision opposee i celle de l'Assemblee generale des Nations Unies, qu'ad· viendra+il de rOrganisation? :'ious auric-ns abrs l'Assemblee generale, organe que eertains s'accordent a considerer comme J'organe principal des J\'ations Unies, qui adopterait un point de vue, et le Conseil de securite, qlle d'autres considerent comme l'organe essentiel des Nations Unies, qui se rangcrnit a un point ne vue diffel-ent et .1bsclument oppose. le declare que, par respect pour la sllprcma~ie de la Charte, par fi.n~lite aux bis de eette aSSOClation libre qui a ete cimentee par un accor;:I ~t un traiU mutuel, nous sommes absolument obhges, en presence cl'une teIle situation, d'adherer et d'ap~ porter notee appni fideLe a. la dedaratiulI faite par l'Assemhlee gtner~le. Cet nrgument est .asse.z fort, a mOn avis, pour faire obstacle, du pomt de vue de la procedure par1ementaire, a ]'l'x.;lmen d'un simple telegr.amme, m~e si. cet exan:e~ est propose par ]'Unlon des Republlques socJahstes Le PREsrm;:NT (tradH}~t de l'anglais): Bien que le representant des Etats~Unis ait pose une question de procedure parlementaire, je prefere ne pas me prononcer des maintenant, en tant que Pj(~sident, pour des raisons dont I'expose exigerait un temps trop long et qui, je pense, n'oot pas besoin d'etre exposees. ]'interprhe la decJa~ ration du representant des Etats~Unis d'Ameriqt1e COll1Lne constitl1ant un argument contre le renvoi de la demande dont il s'agit at'. Comite d'admis~ sion des nouveaux Membres. Puisque cette objection a ete soulevee, je la mettrai aux voix lorsque le debat aura pris fin.

Although the representative of the United States has raised a question of parliamentary procedure, I prefer not to give a rt1ling, for reasons which wot11d take up too much time to state and which I think need not be stated. I construe the statement of the representative of the United States of America as an argtlment against referrin~ this item to the Committee on the Admission of New Members. Since that 'objection has been raised, I shall pnt that qltestion to the vote after the completion of the debate. M. MAUl{ (Union des Repl1bliques socialistes so....ietiques) (tradltit du russl'): rai deja eu l'occasion d'indiquer, lors de l'examen du point 2 de l'ordre uu jour, qt1e le Gouvernement de ]a Republique [Jopulaire democratique de Coree representait veritab1ement le peuple coreen; ce Gouvernement a eM constitne ala suite des elections pO[Julaires qui ant eu Hell en aout 1948 dans I'ensemble de la Coree, tant dans le nord que dans le sud de ce pays, pOUf former une Assemb1ee nation<l.le corcenne. Ces elections ont eu lieu contre la voJonte des elements reactionnaires du Slid et des atltorites americaines d'occupation; elles etaient, en revanche, conformes i la volonte et aux desirs du peuple coreen tout entier, tant dans le nord que dans le sud du pays. Ces elections ont montre avec tme extreme viguetlr la fa~on dont l'ensemble du peuplecoreen a reagi contre les elections truquees dl1 10 mai 1948 que les autoritcs americaines d'occupation avaient suscitees et imposees sous le convert de la commission connue sous le nom de Commission temporaire des Nations Unies pour la Coree. Les elections i l'Assemblee nationale coreenne ont ete dirigees par les pnrtis politiqtlcS et les orgar,isations civiques -- de gauche, de droite, ou appartenant aux milieux moderes __ qnl, apres avoir boycotte les elections forcees en C6ree du Sud, avaient decide de proceCler a des elections libres de toute entrnve et, notamment, de toute ingerence etrangeres, et de former nn gonvernement national tmine et deinocratique de la Coree. On sait qu'en Cor&: du Nord ces electioT!s se sont deTOnlees dans des conditions norll1ales, au scrutin tmiversel direct, egal et secret. Dans le suc!, les elections ont ete tenues en secret, au sCl'utin a deux echelons; tout d'abord, il a ete procede a I'election des represcntants de la population de la Con~e du Sud, puis ceux-ci ont tenu till congres et ont flu des representants pour {'Assemblee nationale de toute la Coree. Ces elections ont permis au peuple coreen de manifester sa volonte en toute libei1:e. Au congres des Mr. MAl.JJ{ (Union of Soviet Socialist Rermblits) (translafed from Russian): I have already [Jointed out, in the statement which I made previously when we were discussing the second item on the ng-enrla. that the tme representative of the Korean people is the Government of the Democratic People's RepnhIic of Korea, which WaS establisned as a restllt of all-Korean elections for representatives to the Supreme PeoDle's Assembly of Korea. Those eiectirms were held in A l1g-ust 1948 in both North and Sotlth Korea, a~ajnst the wishes of both the re<lctionary elements in the South and the Americ<ln occupation authorities. bnt in accordance with the will and desire of all the Korean people, in both North and South. Those elections were a powerful replv by all the J:Corean people to the forced and n,anipulaten electlOns of 10 May 1948. inspired by tl1e American occllpation authorities under cover of the so~cal1ed United Nations Temporary Commission, The elections to the Supreme People's Assembly of Korea were held under the direction of the political parties and public organizations-left centre and rigl1t-which boycotted the forced ejections in South Korea and announced their intention of holding free and unrestricted elections withotlt foreign interference anr~ of establishing a sin~le democratic people's Korean government. As we know, the elections were carried out in North Korea in normal circurnstantes on the basis of general, equal and direct suffrage by secret. ballot. In the South they were carried Ollt in secret and in two stages. First of all, representatives of the South Korean people were elected, they then met and elected representatives to the all-I~orean Supreme People's Assembly. These e1ectlOns were a free expression of the Korean people's will. One thousand and eightv South I~orean delegates were chosen to attend the meeting of the people's respresentatives but o.oly 1,002 delegates attende~, the rest h~ving either been arrested by the UUltecl States military authorities or even put to death on the way. In North Korea 99.97 per cent of all electors and in South Korea 77.52 per cent of the eJectors took part in the elections to the Supreme People's Assembly of Korea. reprt~~mtants ont ete Hus 1.080 representants de la Con~e du Stld, mais 1.002 settlement y ont pris part; les {lUtres ont ele arn~tes par les autorites ltIilitaires americaines ou ont ete tues en cours d~ route. En Coree du Nord, 99,97 pour cent du nombre totaL d'electeurs et, en Coree dll Sud, 77,52 pour cent de l'ensemble des electeurs ont participe aux elections des repre~ntants a l'AssembJee nationa1e coreenne. pupp~t assembly and the puppet "government" in Seanl, As is known, an attempt was made in the Ad Hoc political Committee of the General Assembly in Paris, by tbe United Kingdom representative for example, to JellY that the:;e declions had been held i:l SOllth Korea. In the end, however, the United Kingdom representative 'Jtllled out of a portfolio a few voting papers issued during the elections and tried to show that they had not been properly fillen up., Thus he contradicted himse:f. At the first session of the Supreme People's Assembly in Au,e;ust 1948 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was proclaimed, a democratic: constitution was unanimollsty ::Irlopte,rl ann a Govertullent of the Republic was formed. Such is the central Korean Governmen~ establisher'! by the Kore,m people as the result of really free elections and it is the only leg-al national Government in Korea. It is a true expression of the interests of the Korean people, since it was est"l.b~ished in accordance with :ho::: peoples' will withCltt any compulsion or foreign intervention. As tIle newspapers have stated, the second session of :he Supreme Peoples' Assembly of Koren. was held at the end of January and :he begirnil1R or Febf'.tary this year. The work of that session and all the activitie~ of the Govemment of the Derr:ocratic People's Republic of Korea arc cnrrierl on in conditiom in which the Sll[lreme le~islative organ of the Republic End the 1epl1blkan Government re?resent the free, independent .and sovereign authority which !{OvernE; the cotlntry withotlt any foreign intervention and withou: the presence of foreigr occupation forces. n.,tYing :he session, the Supreme People's Assembly of Korea discussed the draft of a law on <J. two-year plan far the post-war reconstruction and development of the national econo:ny, ~11d tmanimOtlsly arrroved the Government's intended measures f<lr strenp;t.her.ing the country's ecol~omy, for educational advancement and for the revival of national culture. The Assembly adopted a law on tl:e natiom.( economic plan for the year 1949-50 and heard a report from the Minister for Foreig:l Affairs, Mr. Pak Heun Yung, on the foreign policy of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 1:1 their speeches the delegates to the A?sembly p<linted Ollt the significant advances WhlCh had bee:1 mane in the democ,atizatbn of the country, eC010mte development and the revival Of tl~e nalional ct!rtme. A finn political ann econOZ1l1C foundation for the building of an indeP7ndent State has been created and is 'Jeing cOIlsohdated. The industries of North Korea, whier, were comple~ety destroyed by the Japanese tni~.itaris~s, are heing rebuilt. In the years after the h?eratLcn of Nofth Ka,ea fro:n the Japanese colonJal yoke by thc Sovjc~ forces, 7.,079,000 Ot1t of 2,300,000 illiterate persons have become literate. ~he '1laterial and cultural conditions of the workmg On sait qu'a Pa,is le repn~_sehtant <1u Royaume· Dni a essaye, atl canrs d'une sewce de la Commission politique speciale ue l'Ass{,ll1bk~e generllk, de contester qu'il y 8.it ell de telles elections en Coree du Sucl. Mais it a fini par sortir de sa serviette ql1e1ques bulletins electo:'8.l1x, pour pl'OUver qu'ils amaient €le remplis de fao;;on dHectueuse. Ce faisant, il s'est confondu lui-neme. A sa premiere session, knue en aout 1948, l'As~ sembJee mtionalc corecncte tl proclarne la Repu· blique populaire democratiql1e de Con~e, napprouve a I'uanimite une constitution demacratique et a cre~un Gouvernel11cnt. C'e1lt la le veritable Gouve:rnement central de la Coree que le peJple coreen a constitt11~ a. la Sllite cl'electlo1l6 tenlles en toute liberte; c'est done le sent Gouvernement national legitime de la ,Coree. 11 repr~­ SC:lte incontest::tblenlent 1e~ interets (11, penple coreen, car c'est celui-ci qui ['a constitue, en dehors de taute contrainte 011 d'inlerventiO!l el,angere, D'apres Ies remeignernents panls dallS la presse, la deuxielilc session de l'Assemb1ee nationa1e ccreenne a eu lieu cette annec ala fin de janvier et au commencement de fi~vrier. Les trav<tm;: de cette session et l'activite. tout entiere <iu G:Jtwernement de la Republique populaire democmtique de Coree prouvent ql1e cet org-ane legis- 1<itif st1[lreme de la RepubliCiuc et le GOllVCrnl'- ment decelle-ci constituent le pCl1voir libre, independant et sotwerain qui gouverne le pays; celui~ ci ne stlb:t, ni l'ingerence ctrangcre, ni 1::. presen~e de troupes d'oceupation etrangereE;. "Au cO:.Jrs de cette session, I'Assemblee natiooak coreenne a etudie :m projet de loi re/atii a un plan ce deu~ ans poyr le .relevemen! et le ueve~ loppement ?e, l'econ0J.lll~ ?abOnale apreS'la .guc;re et a ado:>te a l'unal1lmlte ·les mesures envlsagees par le c"ollvernement en vue d'assain,i.r la 5il~a­ tiOll economique du pa~s, de propag~J' I n1struct100 pllblique et de favorlser la :e~aJs5ance ~e la culture nationa.l/';. Cette Assen1:>l~~ n lld~ptc u.ne loi relative a un programme sur I economIc natlo- 1la1e pour '1949-1950 et a e-nlendu un. rapport prescnte par M, Pak Eeun Yung at! ~uJct cl; la [loIitique etra~gere du Gou~'erl1cment c~.la Republiqtle popub.lre democ.rattgue de CClee. Les representan!~ qui ant p:'l_rticip~ at1:, deba~s de l'AsscmhlCe ;Jilt fait r02SE;ortl~ ks prcg:re,; conSIderables qtli avaient ete realises en ce.quI callcerne la democratisation du pays, son cleveloppe11ll;nt economiqlle et la renaiss:tllce ce sa culture natl9- :\alc. L'evolution cl,; l'Etat indepen1~nt de C~ree ~epose desormais sur des bascs po-llllques et ec,o- :lomiques stables qui ne c~sscn~ d~ s; l'affermlr. Les entr'eprises indl1strjellc~ de la. Coree ~t1 Nord, que les militaristes j apon<J.ls ~Valel1t. enth~rement ::1etmites sont en cours de reco:tstruct10n. Pennant la period'e qui s'est ecoutee depuis que les tronpes de I'DRSS ont l;llen~ la Coree du Nord du JQug colonial du Japan,' 2.079.000 persormes, sur un Gove~nme:\tof the Republic has established di?lomatic relations with a number of countries, including the Soviet Unio:1. The Governmen: is carrying on a peaceful policy of extending and strengthening dose and friendly relations with :he countries which have established diplomatic relations with the Republic. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has applied to the United Natic.ns for membership. Its application [5'/1247] reads as :ollows: "The Government of the Democatic People's Republic of Korea representing the will of the Korean people is willingto co-operate with other peace~loving States in the work of maintainingpeace and international security. The Korean Republic :ullv upholds the principles and purposes of the United Nations Organization and is I'cady to accept the uLligation ~o co-operate with .111 the countries, Members of the Ur:ited Nations. in effecting these principles and purposes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. "The Government of the Democratic Peor!e's Repu)1ic. of Korea is hereby requesting to admit the Republic to ~embershi!J in the Ur.ited )J'ations. "Please accept, Sir, the ;:LSSl1rartccs of :lly highest conside:-ation. "(Siqned) Pak HUEN YtJNt "Minister d Foreign Affnirs "T~e Democratic People's Republic of Korea." The application is addressed to the Se:reta:-y- General of th~. United Nations. The Se::retary- Geneal, acted :rre,g'Ularly in not distributing, as an o1iclal document, that le.e:itimate ap-plication setting forth the reqtlcst of the Governmer.t of the Democratic People's Repu)lic of Korea for adrdssion ~o tne United Nations. anu in issuinO" it for the consideration of the members of tne Sewrity Council, ::lS h.:ls been indicated here The Secretarv-General hl'ld no re:lson to do tlJis bUI nevertheless he did it. ' Tn order to redress the b;11ance nf justice, the trSS:;: delel!"ation transmitted an official letter to the President of the Security C01mci! containing a reO'.lest that the question should be included on the Council's ag-enda. As a result cf that move the ~uestioll and the application are beinl! duly conSIdered by the Security CO'lncil in ful1 conformitv with its rules of proceclure. There is abs.olntely no founllrltion for all the attempts Whld, have beer: made to question, bv reference to the rules of procedure, the Council's competence to examine this question. Of course, Mr. Austin can reject the application by a mechanical vote, but no 'Vote and none r;f ~r. Austin'~ speeches in ~he Security COlmcll w1l1 sllcceed m concealingthe flOct tl:at the Republic e>:ist". that its Government wai) established in accordance with the will of all the Le Gouvernement de la Republique populaire democratique de Con~e a adresse a I'Organisation des Nations Unies l1DC dcma:-tde au suiet de l'admission 1e '" Republique comme Membre de l'Organisation, En voici le texte [5/1247]: Le Gottvernement de la RepubIique popuhire democrat!qt1e de COTl~e, exprimant la volonte du peuple coreen, se declare pret a collaborer avec les autres Etats pacifiques au mainti.en de la paix et de la securite bternationales. La Republique de Corec s'as50cie p1ebeme:1t aux but~ et am: pl'ineipes de l'Organisation <les Nations Unies et die est prcte a accepter l'oLlig'<ttiol1 de coUaLorer .avec tOllS les pays Membres des Nations :.rnies a la rea1.isatiw. de ces principes et de ces bllts, conformement ala Charte des Nations Unies. "Le Gouver:J.ement de la Republique populaire democratique de Coree sollidte par la presente son admi~siorI comme Membre de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. "Veuillez agrecr, Monsieur le Secl-etaLrc gelle- Tal, l'assurance de ma tres ;,aute consideration. (Signe) Pak HWN YUNG "Ministre des affaires CtratlJeres, "Republiq~le popHlaire democratique de Cf)rh". Cette communic.ation est adressee au Secn~taire general de l'O~gani3ation des Nations Dnies. Le Secretaire general a eu tort de ne pas faire distribuer, S0115 forme de document officiel, le texte de cette demande It~gitinu;: du Gouvernement de la Repl:blique populaire democratiqt1e de Coree relative a. t'admission de la Republiquc a l'Organisation des Nations Unies; en etIet, COF.1me it est indique dans cette communication, le Secretaire gener:'ll l'a adressee ;lUX mcmbres du Conseil de securite a titre d'infor:naticn. Bien que cette attitude du Secretaire general ne fut pas justifiee, il ne ren a pas moins adoptee. La delegation de l'URSS, desiret1se de rcparer l'injustice cODlIllise, a adresse au Pre.."ident du Conseil de secmite noe letlre officielte demandant que cette question fut inscrite a I'ordre du jour du Consei~; c'est pa~ suite de cette demarche que le Conseil de securite est en train d'examinel" cette qlle~H(ln et cette demandej cela est enti~rcmo::n~ legitime e: confoffilc aux: dispositions du reglement interieur. Totltes les tentatives visttnt i1. contester, en se fondant s·J.r le reglement interieur, ~e droit que le Conseil a d'examiner cette question, sont entie,rf'mpnt injustifJees. Bien en::endu, M. Austin peut avoir recours f.- un vote "automatiqlle" pour faire rejeter cette demande. Mais aucun vote ni aucune intervention tumuhteuse de M. Austin au Conse:! de securite ne $alraie:tt changl;';r qUOl que ce soit aux faits; la Republique existe, son Gouvergernent a Mr. Austin referred to the General Assembly resolution and claimed that it recognized tl1e puppet regime in South Korea as tIle Government of all Korea. I have already pointed out in my earlier statement-and the l...lSSR delegation to the Assembly also made a statement to that effect -that that resoltltion was illegally adopted by the General Assembly under pressure from the Allglo-American bloc. The same resolution mentions the characteristics of that "government". Paragraph 2 of the resolution states that the Government has "effective control and jurisdiction" over only part of the country, hut goes on to say that it is "the only such Government". What sort of government is referred to? A government which was ttnlawfnlly established by the United States armed forces and w11ich has "control" over only part of the territory of Korea; the Centml Govemment of the Korean Democratic People's Republic, established in accordance with the will of tile whole Korean people, exercises control over the whole territory of Korea. That is the difference between the puppet Government established by the United States in Seoul nnd the ceJltral national Government in Pyong-- yang'. established in accordnnce with the people's will <ll1d which the people of both North and Sml~h Korea elected wilhout any foreign intervent!<m. That Government has jurisdiction and cont:01 over t1~e country without foreign interventlon and wlthotlt the presence of occupyingforces. Therein lies the real and fl1ndamental difference between the puppet regime in Seoll1 and the lawful centl'a1 Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 1\1r. Austin drew attention to the resolution, but. be was only interested in paragraph 2, to WhlCh he referred and which he interpreter! ill his own way; he tl'ied to drag the puppet government into the United Nations and to present it as the lawful Government of Korea. Rut Mr. Austin did not mention paragraph 3 of the resolution. If the resolution l'S to be implemented, paragraph 3 rntlst also be implemented. In that paragraph of the resolution, the General AssembLy recor;1Oiends th~t the occupying Powers sbou1d wlthdraw theIr occupation forces from Korea as early as practicable. Everybody knows, however, that notwithstanding a similar recomme?1dation in a previous General Assembly reso- 1nttol1 of November 1947 [112(IIJ] on tIle with~ M. Austin a npf.lele I'attention du Conseil sur la resolution de l'Assel11blee generale, mais il ne s'interesse qu'au paragraphe 2; il le cite et l'illterprete a sa fa~on pour tenter d'il1trocl~ireen .fra~lde le gouvernement fantoc11c clans 1OrgamsatlOn des Nations Unies et le hire passer pour le Gouvernement legitime de la Cork Mais M. Allstin ne mcntionne pas le paragraphe 3 de la resolution. Si t<l'lt est que l'on doive appliquer la reso1uticn, il faut ega1ement donnel' suile 03.1.1 paragraphe 3. Or, ce paragraphe de la resolution de J'Assem~ blee generale invite les Ptlissanccs occupantes a retirer 1el1l's troupes de la Coree clans le plus brei delai possible. On sait toutefois qu~., en depit d'unc recOl1ll1landation analogue qui figure dans la resolution de I'AssembIee genera1e adoptee en I\.f. Allstin s'est refere a la resolution de l'Assemblee generale qui amnit reconnu le regime fantoche de la Coree du Sud en tant que GOll- VCI'l1ell1cnt de toute la Con~e. Au Calli'S de mall intervention IJrecedentc, rai deja. indique - et la delegation de I'URSS I'a egalement uec1are au cours de la session de l'Assemblee -- que l'Assemblee generale avait adopte cette resolution i1Jegalement, sous I'influence du bloc anglo-ame~ ricain. Ce "gouvernement" se trotlve de-crit d(lns le corps meme de cette resolution. Au paragraplle 2, il est dit que ce Gouvernemcnt, n"'exerce effectivement son autorite et sa juridiction" que Sllr une partie du pays; cependant, il est dit qlll": "ledit Gotlvernement est le selll qui, en Coree, possede cette qualite". Que1 est cc gouvernement? C'est precisement le gouvernement qui a ete eree illega1ement par 1es llutorites militaires des Etat~~ Vnis et qui exerce son "autorite" sur une partle seulement du territoire de la Coree; au contraire, le Gouvernement central de la Repub1ique popu~ laire democratique de COl"l~e a lite constltue COI1- formelllent a la volonte du peuple coreen tout entier et exerce son autorite sur I'ensemble de la Coree. C'est la la difference qui existe entre le regime fantoche que 1es Etats-Unis ant et<lbli a Seoul et le GOllvernement national centtal de la Coree w~e conformement ala volonte popt11aircaPyongyang, a. la suite d'e1ections auxquelles a pris part le peuple coreen tout entier, dans le nord du pays aussl bien que dans le sucl, et ce1a en l'absencc de toute ingerence etmngere. Ce Gotlver~ nement exerce sa juridiction et son contro1e Stir le pays sails ingerence Hrangere et sans la presence de troupes d·OCCllpation. C'est en cela que reside la difference capitale et essentielle entl'e le regime fantoche de Seoul et le Gouvemement central legitime de la Republiq'lc populaire democratique de Coree. That is tIle meaning of the United States [Jolicy with regard to Korea, but no mechanical vote, no reference to the rt,les of procedllre, will make it possible in any way to deny the inclis- TJutable fact that a legal Korean Government has been created and is ir, existence, Ilnd that the Democratic People's Repuhlic of Korea was established in accordance with the people's wishes and will continne to exist.

Before the French interpretation is given, I should like to ask whether any other members wish to speak? If there are no objections, I propose that the French interpretation of the statement of the rep~es~ntative of the USSR be given at the begmnl1lg of our next meeting. 1L TARASSENIW (Repl1blique sociuliste SQvie.- tique d'Ukraine) (tl'ildltit dtt nlsse): Je voudrais, moi aussi, prendre la parole. Mc. .TARASIi'NKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist RepubliC) (translated from Russian): I also inten cl to speak. The PnEsIDENT: I propose that we adjourn until 3 p.m. tomorrow. Le PREsJDENT (traduit de l'anglais): ]e pro~ pose de Je"el' la seance et de no us l'eunir demain apres-midi a 15 heures. Mr. nr;; LA T0U.RNELLE (France) (translated from. French): Could we not meet tomorrow morlllng and hold two meetings tomorrow? M, DE LA TOURNELLE (France) : Ne pourrionso nous pas nous ret1l1ir demain matin et tenir deu:h sennces dans 1:1 jonmee de demain? ,The PRESIDENT: If the members of the Council WIsh, I am prepared to have two meetings tomorrow. However, I know that some members prefer to have a meeting in the afternoon only. Le PRESIDENT (trad1{it de I'anglais): Si les membres du Conseil le desirent, je suis pret a tenir deux sewces demain. Mais je sais qtle cel'~ hins membres pl'cferent que nous ne tenioll~ qu'une se.mce, l'apres-midi. Mr. DE I"A TOURNELLIT (France) (translated from French) : I am not pressing for two meet~ rngs to. be 11eld tomorrow if We comple>e our agenda III the morning. • M, DE LA TOURNELLE (France): Je n'insiste pas pour qu'il y ait deux reuniDns dCl11ain, si notre ordre du jour est epuise a la fm de la lnatinee. The PRESlDENT: Do the memllers of the Council prefer to meet tOmorrow at 10.30 a.m. or 3 p.m.? Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anqlais) : Les mel11- bres prHerent-i1s Se rettni,. demain a 10 h. 30 ou it IS heures? . Mr. MALTlC (Union of Soviet Socialist Repub- Ires) (translated from Russiatt) ' I I' f 3 b 0 • woue. pre er p.m., ~t tf there is a strong desire to meet in the mornmg, I shall not rais'" " b' t' '- any 0 Jec IOn. M. MAUK (Union des Republiques socialistes sovictiq'Jes) (tradltit du russe): Je prefererais que la sennce ait lieu it. 15 henres, mais, si un grand nombrc de represcntants desirent que le Conseil se rerJllisse dans la matinee, je ne m'y opposerai pas.

As tllcre is no strong preference, tIle CotmciJ will meet tomorrow at 3 p.m. Le PREsIDENT (traduit de l'allqlais): En l'absence d'une preference tn~s marquee le Conseil se reunira demain a 1S henres. ' The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m. Void en qnoi consiste la politique qae les Etats- Unis poursl1ivent a l'egard de la Coree. Mais <luetln vote "autotnatique", atlcune mention dll reglement interieur ne saurait permeHre aqni que ce soit de nier I'evidence: le Gouvernement legi~ time de In. COl'ee a He constitue, it existe; la Repub1iqllc popnlaire democratique de Coree :1 ete c:reee par la volonte du peuple coreen, tt elle contimlcra d'exister. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de I'onglais) : Avant que I'interpretation en fram;ais ne soit donnee, je voudrais s.woir si d'autres membres du Conseil desirent prendre la parole. S'il n'}' a [laS d'objections, je propose que 1'interpretation en fran~ais de la. declaration durepresentallt de l'URSS soit clonnee au debut de notre prochaine seance. La seance est levee a18 h. 35.