S/PV.416 Security Council

Since the agenda [S/Agenda/416] was circulated, a supplementary report has bet'n received from the United Nations Commission CONSEIL DE SECURITE QUATHE CEI\T SEIZIEME SEANCE Te/lltea Lake Success, New-York, le j~udi 10 1f~ews 1949, a 15 hcuYes. President: M. A. Ar.VAREZ (Cuba). 1. Ordre du jour provisoire (S/Agenda 416/Corr.l) a) Rapport, en elate du ler mars 1949, adre~se au Conseil de securite par la CDmmission des N atiom Unies Dour l'Indonesie conforlllement a la cesotution du Conseil de secmite en date da 28 janvier 1949 (5/1270 SjI270jCorr.l). b) Lettre. en date du 2 mars 1949, adre3see au President du Conseil de securitc par le representan~ des Pays·Bas, coucernant la re,olution dtt Con.seil en date du28 janvier 1949 reJati\'e a la question lndonesienne (5/1274). , c) Rapport supplementaire, en date du 7 mars 194-9, adre.'isc au Cor.seil de securite par la Commission des Nations Uni,~s pour :'Indonesie conformement a la resolution du Conseil de securite en date C:u 28 jar.vier 1949 (S/1270/Add.l et 5jI270/Add.l/ Corr.1 ). 2. Ordre du jour provisoire If there are no objections, we shall follow that procedllre. 3. Continuation of the di8cu8sion on the Indonesian question 1'epresentativ~ of Aw;tra{i.a>· Mr. vat! Longenho,,'c, repreuntati7.1e of IJelgium; U Bo },;faung, re-pre~ sentativc of B1Jrma; Sir Rnnegol Ramo Ra1~, n,presantative of India,' Mr. Vlln Roijen, repre- sentative of the Netherlands; Gmeral Romulo, rapresenlati7ie oj the Philipthlc.s; and Mr. Palar., represenfati71e of the Republic of lndotlcsia, took their pIous at the Security Council table. The PRESlDE:>IT (translated from Spanish): The established practice will be :ollowed f!)r spee~bcs, that is, there will be consecutive inter~ pretation for speeches by members of the Council and simulta:Jeot:s interp'ebtinn for speeches by representatives invited 10 participate in the ctis" cl1ss:on. Befot"e we begin to consider the items on the agenda, I s,.ould like to bring to the Council's notice a letter from the representative of the Republic of Indonesia, dated 7 March 1949, ask~ ing the Preddent for facilities and a safe conduct for a member of that delegation to go to Indonesia for interviews with the Republican leaders in CllStody nn the islar.d oi Bangka. The :etter will be read for the Council's bfonnation. Mr. Hoo (ASfistnnt Se~re.tary-General in charge of the Departm~nt of Trusteesb(:l) : The letter reads as follows: "The- Tndonesian delegation presents its com- pliments ar,d has tlle honot1r to refer to its letter of 17 Jamary 1949, addressed to the President of the Sec'Jrity Council. "In said letter, it as subcnitted that due to the rupture of communications between the Inclo- ne~ian delegation to the United Nations at Lake Success ami the Republican Government of Jog- jakarta, the Indonesian representatives ilnci them- selves severely handicapped le the discharge of their dttties. "At that time, it was rellt1ested on the part of the Inclone3ian cleler-ation to make E.vailable trans- port facilities and safe conduc~ to officials desi~­ nated by the Republican Government in Indonesia to j}roceed 10 ::"ake Success to acqllairl: the dele- gation here with the latest developments in Indo- nesia as well as with he feelinJ!5 of the Republi~ caD Government and its people. "RecallSi': of the subseqLlent course of events, said request c:lUld not be fulfilled. The present situation still ma.kes i, advisa')le, if not impera- tive, for the Indonesian delegatior. at Lake SlJC~ cess to have a thuruugh and [lfsl-hand knowledge of the developments on the spot in Indonesia. "It is in this light thnt the Indones:an delega- tion now submits to you as President of the Security COllr:eH that one of the memJers of the 3. Suite de la discussion sur la question indoncsienne Sur l'illVitatioh du President, M, Hood, repre- sentant de l'Austrnlie; J.f. vatl La1'.genftOVe, tl'pre- srmtant dl' la Belgique,' U. Ba Mating, representant de la Birmanie; Sir Bmegal Ram<!. Rau, rcprhen- tant de l'htde; M. ,,'an Roijen, represetltant des Pa'jJs-B(IS,' le geJ1erai Rcmulo1 representant des Philipfrines; et M. PaliLY, rapreser.tant de la Rcpltbliquo d'Indonesia, prettnent place d la table d1t Cmseil. Le FRES;DENT (tradttit dl: l'espagnoJ): Suivant l'tlsagc ctabli, if y au~ interpretation consecutive pour les discotlrs des membres du Conseil et interpretation simultanee pour les declarations des representants invites a participer ala discussion. Avant d'aborder l'exarnen des ;lOints de I'ordre du jour, je desire faire savoir au Conscil que j'ai TeI;U une lettre du representant de la Repub1ique d'Inconesie. en date du 7 mars ]949, deman1ant qu'un sauf-conduit et tOlltes fadlites soient accor- des a un membre de sa delegation pour se re1dre en Indonesic afm d'avoir une entrevuc avec les chefs republicair.s deten'Js dans l'ile de Banka. Lecture de ceHe lettre va etre donnte au COllseil de secur:te. M. Hoo (Secretaire general adjoint charge du Departeoent de la tute1le) (tnuluit de l'angli.l); Cette lettre se lit comme sai:: "La delegation de l'Indonesie vous presente ses compliments et a l'honneur de se re£erer a sa lettre en date du 17 janyi~r 1949, adressee au Pre- sident du Conseil de secllrite. "Cette lettre faisait connaitrc au Conseil que la n:pture des communications entre la delegation de I'Indonesic aupres ele l'Organisa:ion des Nations Unies aLake Success et le Gouvernement de la Republique a Djokjakarta, ge:1ait serieuse- ment les representants de I'Indonesie dans l'accomp1issemer.t de leur mission. "A cette epoque, la delegation de l':ndonesie avait de:nande que des moyens c.e transport et un sauf-conduit fussent donnes aex fonclionnaires designes par le Cot.:verncment de la RepllbliqllP: en Indo:Jesie, afin qu'ils pussent se rendre a. Lake S"uc.:ess pour mettre la delegation au courant des demiers eVfnements dIndDllcsie ainsi que du sentime:J.t dl1 Gouvernemenf de la Republioue et de la population. - "Les evenements qui se son: produits depttis lors ont ell1peche de donner suite ~ cett~ demandc. En raison de la situation actuellc, i1 est encore plus souhaitable, sinon indispensable, que la delegation cle l'Indonesie aL:l.ke Sucre!l!, r~oh'e directement d~s renseigne.ments com;Jlets sur le cours de.s eve- nements en lnd:mesie. "C'e~ a. cause de (CS considerations que la delegation de l'Indonesie vous dernande atljour- d'b1.1i, en votre qualite de Pre5ident du Cons~il "Tlte Inconesian delegation therefore :espect- fully bllt urgently requests you, as President of the Security Council, to make available facilities for the safe conduct of Mr. Suc.arpo Sastrosa- tomo, Press Attache and member of the Indo- nesian delegation at Lake Succes5, to proceed to Indonesia to contact the leaders of the RepubEcan Government now under Dutch custody on tlle island of Bangka. - "In view of the prevailing circumstances, it is also respectfully but urgently requested that facilities be made available for Mr. Sudarpo Sastrosatomo':; return lo the U:Jited States of America und that his departure from Indor.esia be safeguarded after the fulfi.1men: of his mission. "In view of the foregoing, the Indonesian dele- gation re~pectflllly but urgently requests the United Natior.s Security COllae:! to is~ue Mr, Sudarpo Sastrosatomo a lilissez passer as a guarantee that he will not be ~.illdered in any way from contacting our leaders on the island of Bangka in the shortest poss:ble time nor :rom departing from Jndones;:t for the purpose of return:ng to Lake Success as soon as he has completed his mission."

On this point I have pleasl1re in informing the Ccuneil that yesterday morning in a telephone cO:1Versation which I had with the Ne:herlands representative, and which I confirmed by letter yesterday. I passed on the Indonesian representative's request. The Netherlands representative told me he would immediatdy submit the reque5t to his Government for consideration. I am glad to inform the Council that at noon toc1av the Netherlands rerresentative t:lld me his Governmen had instructed him that there was :10 objection to tbe Indonesian request. Before we pruceeu witb our work, T should like to wekome the new represer.tative of France, Mr. Jcan Chauvel, on behalf of the Counci:, and express the hope that }le will find his work with us pleasant. Mr. CIHUVRL (Fnmcl') (ira7!slaled from Fret!ch) : I thank the President for his kind worus oi welcome. I am very haI:PY to be taking pllrt in today's meeting of the: Council, and hope that I shall be able to make a useful contribution towards the achievements of our common goal. Mr. van ROIJEN (Ketherlands): Today we are meeting once: again in the hope of fina:!}' a::hieving, by discussion, the aims shared by my coun:ry and this Ccunci1: :he establishment, by an orderly democratic process, of independence for Indo:tesia, There is no difference between the expressed aims of the Netherlands Govrnment and tllose of t11is Council regardmg Indonesia. \Ve both Egree that freedom is the goal. The only issue betwecn llS :5 the rne<lTlS of opening the door to this freedom, My Gover:lment has proposed, a~tache de presse et membre de la deh~gation de l'Indonesie a Lake Success, afin qu'il puisse se rendre ell Indonesie pour en:rer ell rapports avee les dirigeants du Gouvernement de la Repl1blique, actuellement cletenus par :es Hollandais clans l'ile de Banka. "Etant donne les conditio:1s actuelles, nOllS clemandons egalement respcctueusemcnt mais instamment, qcc toutes facililes soie;,t donnees a M. Sud3.rpo Sastros;;.tomo pc!!r· rNltrer <lmcEtats- Dnis d'Ame:ique et que la possibilite de G.uitter. l'Indonesie a. tel moment qu'il choisira, une fais sa mission remp:i.e, lui salt garantie. "En raison des faits que naus Venons d'exposer, la delegation de l'-Indonesie prle, respectueusement mais in5tamme'nt, le Conseil tie securitc des Nations Unies de fa~re C:e1ivrer a. M. Sl1darpo Sastrosatomo un laissez-passer garantissant qu'il ne sera nullement etnpeehe, ni d'entrer en rapports, le plus tot possible, avec nos cl.irigeants dans 1'ile de Bar.ka, ni de quitter I'Indonesie pour revenir it Like Success des qc'il aura accompli sa mlssir:m." Le PRl:::SIDE~T (tradtdt de l'espagtIOJ): A eet egard, j'ai pIaisir ainforr.lcr le Conseil que j'ai eu, hier matin, un entretien' teJephonique avec le repreSt:lltant dcs P:l.ys-Bas, ent1"eti~n que je lui ai connrme bier, par t.:ne lettre IUI translllettant la demande du representant de l'Indonesie. Le representant des Pays-Bas m'a inforrne qu'i! soumettrait immediatement celte demandc a son Gouvernement. Je suis heureux d'informer le Consei1 que, .&ujourJ'hui a. midi, le representant des. Pays-Bas 111'a fait savoir qu'il avait re<;u des instructions de son GOI1Vemer:lent selon lesquelles la demc.nde formulee ?ar I'Indonesie ne soulevait pas ,d'objection. Av:mt d',.hotder nos travaux, je des:re, au nom des membres da Conseil de seeurite, £ouhaite: la bienvenue it M. Jean ChrtUve1, nOll,eau representant de la France aupres du Consei1, en esperant qu':11ui sera agreable de col1aborer a nos travaux. M. CHAUVEL (Fran~e) : Je remercie le President de ses a:mab1es paroles de bienvcnuc. Je suis particulierement ncweux dl;; prendre [lart aujourd'hui it la seance du Couseil, et j'espe~e collaborer ·Jtilement a la tache que nOllS poursU\- vons teus ici. M. VAN ROlJEN (Fays-Bas) (tmo1lit de Fang/ais): No~[s voici de nouveau recnis aujourd'bu: dans l'espoir d'atteindre enfin. en discutant ensemble, le but poursuivi, ~ant pat mon pays que par le Conseil de sccurite, a savoir: donner dans I'ordre, par des metnode£ de:nocl"atiques, l'independance a l'lndollcsit. 11 r:'existe aucune diyergence entre les huts proclames par le Gouvernemen: des PaY5-Bas et ceux du Conseil de securite en ee qui concerne l'Indonesie. KOl1s estimons I'un et l'autre que I'objectif a atteindre est ;a liberte. Le seul point sur 1eque1 nous ne soyor.s pas d'accord, c'est le The people of the Netherlands are firmly convinced that lasting freedom and peace for Indonesia cannot be achieved by oUr ItnglteSt10ning application of the Council's resolution [S/1234j and that there are certain elements in the method proposed which can lead only to disaster, I can asusre the COlmcil, however, that any suggestions which its members may make in con~ nexion witl1 our proposal will receive OIl[ most careht1 attention and study. Jt is our hope that the members of the Council will likewise consider our aq;uments with an open mind, so that we may achieve our commou'goaL In this spirit I shall refrain for the moment from discussingthe report of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia dated 1 March [S/1270]. There are, no doubt, a number of remarks we should like to make on that score, but we believe that in the interests of Indonesia the debate in the Security COl1nci! should now be fOCtlSed on finding a constructive solution to break the dearl!ock which occurred after the resolution of 28 January was adopted. .That resolution confronted the Netherlands Government with a grave dilemma. As a Member of the United Nations and a traditional supporter of its principles, my cmmtry was naturally inclined to carry out fully any resolution adopted hy the Security Council. However, as the country which, until the transfer of sovereignty, still benrs sole respollsibility for Indonesia, it was unwilling to take certain steps recommended by the COllrlcil's resolution because it was convinced those steps would lead only to disaster and chaos. My Government noted with satisfaction that its own frequently expressed aims regarding Indonesian independence were and are identical with the aims of the Security Council, as stated in the resolution. We were hif'lly gratified to find that the Councl1 had adopted, as an aid to the achievement of those aims, our own time-table which I outlined to the Council on 14 January [400t!t meeting]. On the other hand, the method recommended in the' resolution contained certain measures to which I had to formulate fundamental objections On 28 January [406thmeefl'Jtg], and, after tbe most serious consideration, my Government felt obliged to maintain thos'e objections. Before the Security Cmlndl adopteQ the resolution, I stressed that thus duplicating the Netherlands programme for i11cJependence by a United Nations programme which aimed at the same goal though by somewhat different methods would complicate the situation in I:ldonesia, create confusion in many minds, encourage the Le peuple neerlandais est fermement convaincu que l'application sans reserve de la resolution du Consei1 [5/1234J ne permettrait pas de faire regner de fa~on dLlrable la paix et la Iiberte en Indonesie et que la methode proposee comporte des elements qui ne peuvent mener qU'au Msastre. Neanmoins, je puis assurer les mcmbres du Conseil que toutes les suggestions qu'ils presenteraient au sujet de notre proposition feront 1'9bjet de notre attention et de notre examen le plus serieux. Nous esperons que, de leer cote, 1es mefilbres du Conseil examineront nos arguments sans parH pris, ann que nOllS puissions. atteindre notre but cOmmt111. Dans eet esprit, je m'abstiendrai, pour le mo- ,ment, de discuter le rapport de la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Indonesie en date du ler mars [5/1270]. Sans doute y a-t-i1 toute une seric d'observations que nous voudriOlls presenter a cesujet, mais i1 nous semble que l'interet de l'Itldonesic exige que le debat devant le Conseil de securite se concentre, a l'heure 3ctue11e, sur 1es moyens d'abolltir a une solution constructive qui pennette de sortir de l'impasse dans laqueUe nous nous trouvons depuis l'adoption de la resolution du 28 janvier. Cette resolution a place le Gouverne111ent neer- ,Iandais devant un grave dilemme. En tant que Membrc de l'Organisation des Nations Dnies, et fidele partisan de l'application de ses principes, mon pays est naturellement parte .it executer a la leitre toute resolution adoptee par le Conseil de securite. Toutefois, en tant que pays qui, jusqu'au transfert de la souverainete, continue d'assumer seul la responsabilite en ce qui concernc l'Indonesie, it n'a pas consenti .a prendre eertaines mesures preconisees par la resolution du Conscil, parce qU'il etait convaincu que ces mesures ne pourraient mener qu'au desastre et au chaos. Mon Gouyemement a remarque avec satisfaction que les bUts qu'i1 a maintes fois proclames concernant l'independancc de l'Indonesie etaient et demellrent identiques a ceux qui sont enonces dans la resolution du Consei[ de securite. Nous sommes extremement satisfaits de voir que le Conseil de securite a adopte, ponr aider a la realisation de ses objectifs, 1es dates que nous uvions nous memes prevues et dont j'ai donne connalssance au Conseil le 14 janvier [400Jl1te ser1/!cl!]. Ceei dit, la methode preconisee par la resolution comportait l'application de certaincs mesures contre lesqttelles j'ai du formuler des objections fondamentales le 28 jnnvicr [406~nlC' seance), Apres avoir examine tres sel'ieusemcnt la question, mon Gouvernement s'est vu oblige de maintenir ces objections. Avant que le Conseil de securite n'adopte sa resohttion, j'ai fait valoir que, si an superposa.it au programme du Gouvernement neerlandais pOur donner I'independance al'Indonesie le programme elabore par l'Organisation des Nations Unies, dont le but est identique mais qui comporte des methodes partiellement differentes, on compHque- All these predictions have unfortunately come true. Immediately the question Was raised~ will the Netherlands Government maintain its own programme, or will it take over, entirely or in p;lrt, t.he prog;amme. of the Security Council resolut!on? ThlS question created tmcertainty and confUSIOn throughout Indonesia, Progress to. warns the f".<;lablishml'.nt of a feder;ll interim governme,nt, which was well on its way, came to ~ standstill. 0;ne of the three principal Repubhcan leaders, t;le former Prime Minister Sjahrir, wbo had come to Batavia in Januarv at the request of our Prime Minister during-his visit there, :lod who l;:lu agreed with him to co-operate towards a solt:t1on, became reluctant as soon as he learned of the contents of the draft resolution, Soon after that draft was pn\lishpd another leader wI:o was invited for discussions Mr. Hatta declined the invitation to take part in ~ d;scussion: Thus .the Seclrity Council resolution eat~f'd a deadlock at a moment when speed towards a solution was the wish of all the parties including the Security Council itself. ' Tl'e same insoluble problem arc>se when it came to the execution of the various paragraphs of the resolution. Leaving aside for the moment the obligations under paragraph 1, to which I shall return later, the initial steps to be taken by the Netherlands under paragraphs 2 and 3 of the resolutioll were the following: First, to n::~tore unconditional liberty to thClSe Reptlblican leaders whose freedom of movement was still restricted; Secondly, to reinstate the Repubican Government in its functions in Jogjakarta and its immedirite environs; Th:rdly, to give the Republican Government facilities for communication and consultation with all persons in IlI(lullesia; and Fourthly, to undertake negotiations with the Rf'pllblir.ar. Government. With regard to the first point. the Netherlands Government had repeatedly made it clEar that it hat! nu intention of restricting the liherty of movement of tl:e Republican leaders a.'1y further or any longer than was strictly necessary in the interests of public security, I therefore promised in the Security Council that the I"cstr:ctions imposed upon them would be lifted after police actio:1, on cOTlI..Etion that this would not endanger PLlblk order. I also anr.ounced, as early as 21 December [393rd meeting]. that the -Republican leaders would be invited to participate lrl n~go· tiations concerning the future of Indonesia and that they would be allowed to do so m complete freedom, The Netl1erJands Government, after cor.sultation with the authorities ir. Indonesia, ca.-ne to the concll1sion that the return to orderly conditiohs in many parts of Java and Sumatra had progressed sufficiently to e:lable it to carry out TOll~e~ ces predictions Se Son! malheul'emcrncnt montrees ('x;,.ctes. On ~'e,~t all~~i:ot demanclf si !e Gouvernement des Pays-Das s'cn tiendrait a so:,. propre prowal1lme~ ou s'il adopterait, en total}te 01: r;n p;;.rh~, cel1Jl qui p_tait pnonce dans I:; reso1utlOr; du ~.o1lSeil. de securite, CtHe queshon a cause de I Incertitude et de la confusion clans toute l,!,~()nesie, L'etAhlissemel,t d'un [OUve~nement ,federal provisoire qni etait en bonne vo:e a ce~se de progresser. L'un des trois principa~~ dll'lg~ants repllblicains, I'ancien Pretniet !"f:m,stre Sphrir, ~ui s'etait rendu a Eatavia en la~vll~r, comme I'iwait demancte notre Premier M~rJi~tr~ ]ofsqu'il se trouvait dar:s cette vi1le, et gUl etalt d accord avec 1ui pour cooperer 11 la ~echerche d'u~e so:ution, s'est r;lOntre peu dispose a col1ahore~ des qll :1 a cu COllnalssanCC du contenu du ~roj;t de resobtion, Peu de temps apres la p~bl~cation de ct'. texte, un autre dirigeant republlC:tlr;, ,M" Halta, fl; .declipe l'invitation qui lui avalt ete falte de pa~tll'lper a une discllss:on. Ainsi, la resolution du Comei1 de securite a conduit a m:e impasse au mcment ou le des!r de to:ltes les parties, y compris le Cnnseil de securite lui-meme etait d'acce1erer la solution. ' Le meme prob1eme insoluble s'est pose lorsqu'il s'est agi de I'executio:l des dispositi(lllS des differents paragraphs de la resoiution. AbSlraction faik, pour le Il!on:ent, de la question des obligations prevues at paragra?he plemier, question sur laquelle .ie reviendrai, les premieres mesures qui devaient Hre prises par le.s Pnys-13::s aux teflnes des ?aragraphes 2 et 3 'etaient les suivantes: Premierement: Rendl'e sans condition la liberte aux dirigeants :'"epublicains dont les deplacements etaient encore sou:nis acertaines restrictions; Deu,;ciememe:lt: Retablir le Gnuv/'rnement republkain dar.s ses fanctions it Djokjakarta et dans les environs immediats de ceHe ville; Troisiemement: Donnfr au Gouvernono~nt repubEcain toutes facilites pour comr:lUniquer et se concerter ave£: quiconque en Inda.nesie; Quatriemement: Reprendre des negociations avec: le Gouvernement republicain. En ee qui conceme le prEmier [Joint, le GOI1- ver:)ement neerlandais a declare d'une maniere ties claire, i plusieurs reprises, qu'it n'avait l'inteniion de restreindre la libertc de Illouvcment des dirjgeant~ republica~ns .. ni dans Ulle pIns large mesun~, ni plus lcngtemps qu'il n'etait sHde:nenl necessaire dans l'interet de la secllri:e publiQue, J'avais donc pro:nis au Cor:scil ele sec:Jrire que les restrictions imposees a ees dirigeants seraient supprimees apr-es notre ,actkltJ cc po!ice, a cDlldi· lion que leur suppreSSIOn ne cor.stttue pas une menace pour I'ordre public. rai egalement annonce des le 27 decembn: (393~me saanca), que , , . , ' ... ' les dirigeants repubheall1s seralent mvl!fs a partl~ dper a des r.egodations ccncernant l'avenir de l'lndonesie et qt.:'ils pourraiellt le fairc en toute Jiberte. Le GouverneMer.t des Pays-Bas, apres avoir cO:1sL::lte les <'.utarites en lndon:esie, est arrive ala cone:us:on que le retab1issell1ent de j'ordre &tait assez avanrc clans de nombreuscs regions de Java et de Sumatra pour lui permettre de tenir ~tl'exige le paragraplle 2 ce la resolution et que le Conseil nous a presses plusieurs fois de prcn~ ure, a s<lvoir la mise en liberte ron:; condition .des dirigeants de la Republique, a maintenant ete prise. Ell re flt1i r:once11le le troisieme point, h liberte de se ~oncerter, toutes faci:ites or.t c.eja ete donnees, ces dernieres selllaines, aux. membres de la Commission des Nati:ms Uo'ies pour l'Iodo- With regarL to the third point, freedom of r:Dn~t1ltation, full opportttnity has already, within the p~st few weeks, been g:ven to the U:1ited Nations Commission for Indonesia, to other Republican leaders, and to repre~entiltives of the Federalists to visit the Republican leaders in Bangka and to talk Witll them in con:plete freedom. IH~sic, nux ::'I.t1tres ilirigeants repuhlicains et <lUX: represcntants des fec'eralistes pour se rendre <J.upres des dirigeants de la Republiqlte it Banka et s'entretenir avec eux e:l toute liberte. En re qui cor.cerne le quatrieme point, la reprise des negociations avee le Gouvernelllent repl!~ blicain, j'ai deja. dit qlle des pourparJers ,waient pte eneage.o: avec les dirigeant3 de la Republique, a titre individuel, en vue de constitl1el"un gOtlvernWlent federal provisoire, et que ces pDurpar1ers evolua:ent de manie:e satisfaisante au moment Dt~ la r:1if{~H;in:l rIu tex:te de la resolution du Conseil viut y cO·.1per court. Les Pays-Ba~, pour tenter de renot:.~r ces pOLUp~rlers, firent snvoir qu'ils etaient disposes a negocier avec le Gouvernemcnt r.~pLlblicair:, et, en hit, ils reprirent des pourparlers, it titre cf£icieux, par l'intermejiaire de rcpresentants Gu'ils enVDyerent it diverses reprises a Banka. De plus, les Pays-Bas ont depuis lors /5/1274, allnexe IlJ inv;te le President de la Republiq:le a envDyer une delegation cl 1<1 conference de In. table rcnde, dont je reparlerai tout a l'heure. Nous estimcns done qt:.e, de notre cote, nous aVOllS fait tout l1otl-e possible pour cons:ituer un gouvernement federal provisoire auquel participeraient les dirigeants de la Republique et pO.tr Ilegocier avec le Gouvernement republicain, Nons regrettons profondement que, jusqll'a present, l.a Re?ublique l1C se soit guefe mont:ree disposee it partidper it un gouvern"':11ent pmvisoire ou a des :legocia:ions, With regard to the fourth point, he reopening Df negotiations wi:h f1e Republican Government, t oentioned before that discussion,; had already been 1>tarteu "Iith tl1e Republican leaders. indi· vidually, for tl~e estilblishrnent of il federal interim government a:1d were progressing 5atisfac:orily whn the draft fDr the Council's resobtion bec.arre knJwn, w:lich eu: :;hurL these discussions. The Netherlands, in an effort to restllT.e tietrl. announced its willingness to negotiete with the Republican Government, ancl actually did resttme informal talles through representatives which it repeatedly dispatched to Bang.lGl. In addition it has now invited [S/lZ74, app(!}ldix Il] the ?resident of the Republic to send a delegation :0 fhe rOllnd table conference, ,;;bout wh.ich I shalllJa'/e something more :0 say presently. We cotlsider, therebre, that we have, on onr side, done Ollr ?tmos~ to create a federal interim government mc1udmg the Republican leaders, and to enter in:o negotiations with the Republican Government. We deeply regret thatthe Refublic has llF to .now ..shO\~n little inclination to take part e!ther In an lOterm governtnent or ir. negotiatiDns. . This re:1J(:tanc:e on the part of the Republic, as We Imow, h.lOges on trre remaining point, namely, the restoratIOn of the Republican Government to its fUllCtiOt'lS in the city of Jogjakarta and immediate environs. I s:'lall try to make clear the Si la Republique ll1anifeste si peu d'empressement, c'est, nous le sayons, Z cause du dellxlemepoint, a sa'Voir lr.. remise en fouctions d1.1 GOt1- vernemeni n~pt1b!icain cans la villi: d~ Djol~"­ jakarta et dans 5es envi:om immediats. Je vais m'e!fotcer de pre:::iser les m:sons pour lesquelleS netts avons de serieuses objections CO:1tre cettC l11esure. Etant dcnne gue les l-'ays·B<ls ant pr,s- SC:lte llne nouveUe prolXlsihon tendant it hate" le transfert de la souverair.ete, il serait cert<ti"- r~a~ons f,::r Ollr serious objections tD this pro- VISIOn, vtewed ag~io.st the hackgrnllnn. of the new Neth~rlands propos~1 for an early transier of sOverelgn:y, restoratIOn of the Republican GJvernment to its ftmctions at Jcgjakarta now WDtllC inevitably give rise to the fea:- that the Republic might become the. dominating, power nem~nt it cr.aindre que la remise en [onctiol15 immediate dll Gouvernement repubHcain it l)jol~­ jalcatia ne pen-nette it la Replloliqlle <':e ceveJ1~-(' la force qtli dorninf tonte l'Indonesie, contr~J·­ remer.t allX pri,~cipe_~ de rAccord dt: Ren'!;illit [S/649, annexes XIII et VlIIl. Les reperCttssial1-~ d'un pareil fait seraient considerables 'et dcs~:9­ treuses. Beaucot1p de federalistes, qui ant entiele - ov~r .the whole of IndoneSia, cOlltrary to the pnnclpl.es of. the Renville Agree:nent [S/649, appen.diCEs z.l!l and FIllj, The repercllssions of snch <.n even: would be tremendous and disa~~rou.s. Many Feder~lists, who have Pllt all t11eir falth to 11S, wOllld, nghtly or wrongly, consider public~,n areas who have welcomed the rettlrn of our troops and our administration, and upon thousands of Republican civil :;ervants who have continued to function and who have co-operated with '1S. Moreover, such an action would be the signa.l for an all-out fight between the different factions withir. their own ranks in the Repl1blic. It would mean a frightful domination in which the pnpu'atLon would have to pay a terrible toll. The maintenance of law and order, one of the statecl objectives of the Council's resolution. would become a practical impossibility. How would it be possible for t.he Republican leaders, uncertain of their present standing arnoug their followers, to grasp at once the reins o~ goverrul1ent and to assert their authority witliout detailed preparations and effective guarantees having been made for their return? Who will bear the ultimate responsibility for all the implications of a restoration now of tht;: Republic at Jogjakarta? I seriomly beg the Cou:1cil to look at these realities and not to cling to a rigid fomlLlla bearing no relation to thf>c f"c1s of the situation, a formula which was adopted by the Council before the new Netherlands proposals were known. It is an illusion to think that the United Nations Commission, with a handful of men spread out over a population of millions, wuuld be able to prevent such reprisals. This is a physical impossibility. Ho\v could G. commission wh;ch, befure !9 December, waC not able tn r'heck t'he infiltration 0: .11 ,000 armed Republican troops through the status q'UO line, be able to (orestaU the swift kidnapping in the niRht, the slashed t11rm.t, the stab in the back, the ambush on a lonely road, and mutilated body in a r~verbed, which we recognize on:y too well as the performance of certain armed Repuolican bands, and which breed on lIS that military action of 19 December? This is all the more urgent since the restoration of the Republican Government at Jogjakarta would, if I nnderstanct the Republican standpoint correctly, necessarily imply the reconsth11tion of the TN1,1 the Republlcan army, in that territory, This would entail the restoration of the influence of pretisely the same militarist and extremist elements as have for three years bten the main stnmbliug-block in negotiations with the Repub:ie anel the reason why the Republican Government was not able or willing to put an end to terrorisr.-J.::tnd violf':!lce. Moreo,'er, such <l decision could be a god-send to Tan )falakka and his commllnist followers and thty would redouble their activity. I believe recent developments in SOllthern Asia -in fac.t, ir1 the whole of Asia-amply justify 'Tellgara ltatJtJtICI bldtJnesia. Comment les dirigeants de la RepubJique pourraient-ils, ne sachant pas jusqu'a yue1 point ils sont sui-vis actudlement, saisir d'un ccup Ies renes du gouver:lemcnt et affirmer teur autorite, san~ qu(O des dispositions mil1utieuses et des g:mmties effeetives aient ete prises en vue de leur retour? Qui, en fin de compte, endossera la responsabilite clf'. toutes [es consequences cl'un retablissement immediat de la Rep,tblique aDjokjakarta? Je prie instamment le Conseil de tenir compte de ces faits et de ne pas s'attac:her a une formule rigide qui n'a auc:un ralJport avc(: la realite et qu'il avait adop:ee avant Cjue I~ llotlVellt proposition des Pays-Bas ne hit connue. C'est 1me illusion de croi~e que la Commission des Nations Ur:ies, avec U;1e poignee d'hommes disperses clan!; :me population de plusienrs millions 5e1·ait capable de preventr les represailles auxq'ue:Ies je viens de faire allusion. C'est .m~te­ rieHement impossible. Ccmmer.t une ConU:l1sslOn, qui, ,want le 19 ch~cetnbre, n'a pu empcchcr ;11.00? homme5 arn:es appartenant aux forces repltblrcaines de s'infiltrer it travers la Iigne du statu quo, serait-dle en lncsnre aujoltH:'h1.!i de pdvenir les atrueites ou nOilS ne reconnatssons que trop bien l'ceuvre de cer:aines b~nd~s arn,lees republic:aine~ e.t qui nous ant contramt a proceder a l'operation militaire du 19 decembre: enlevements nocturne3, gorges tranchees, coups de poi~ gnard dans le des, embuscades Sllr Ies ~outes c1esertcs, corps mutjll~s je6s d"ns!cs rivle~~? Le danger est d'<'.utant pbs pressant, quc" St. Je comprellds bien le point de vue des R,epllb~tc~m~, le retablis:;elllent du gouverl1E'ment repubbcalO a Djokj~l{arta entrainerai,t n.ecessaire~;el1\la ~econ~~ titutiou, dans ce terntoue, du .) NI , 1armee republicaine On assisterait en me!Ue temps a un renOUyeau de l'influer.ce des memes elements militaristes et extremistes qui, depuis Irois nns, constituent la principale pier.re d'achopp~ment des negociation.: avec la Repuhhque c.t 1~ ra1sofl, pou~ :aquelle le Gotlvernement repUbhcaln n·a et.e nt capable, ni desircllJ( de mett,n:: ~n au t~rrom:me et a la v:olencc. Une telIe decl~lon serm: de plus lUll" aubaine pJt1f Tan MalaIck.a et ses partisans communistes, qui ne manqueratent pas de ~edou­ bier d'aetivitc. Je suis cOl\vaincu cue les evenements q11i se SOllt produits Clos det:niers temps dans le sud A for~t::l..~t~ of W:lat could be expected if the Republican GOvernment were restored to iB functions at Jogjakarta can be fOllnd in the gl1idance and sLlppcrt recently given to terrorist activity by certain Cabinet Ministers of the 3.e· publican Government w"io, after the action of 19 December were not restricted in their freecom of movement and were allowed to remai:1. in log~ jakatta. Dning recent investigations a document was found, for instance, in which one of them gnve. instructions, not ody to continue :he guer~ rilla warfare, but also to "eliminate" certain prominent civil servants becattse they had con· tinued to serve with the Dtltch. Reconstitution at this moment of the Republic as a territorial entity. how<ever small, w{luH furlherrl.lore render ne"essary the drawing up of a new truce a.greement a.r.d the dema.rcation of new status quo lines; it wotTld mean again making arrangements about the traffic of goods and persons across the lines; it would again entail endless n::crimbations abont violations of tr.e truce which woulc inevitably ensue. In brief, it we-uM give rise all over again to the endless daily difficulties and friction which we have known for nea.rly three years now, This in turn would certainly poison tIle atmosphere for future nl'gotiations. It is very easy to ta1k at this table about creating a new line of demarcation, but only tllose who have been through all theSe experiences know what that word implies, and :t cannot be ex.pected thal these s,nue persons would willingly ('t(>ate this whole Slate of affairs once more. Whi~e my Government was still trying to find a satisfactory solution to these problems, its effo:ts were suddenly rendered purposes1ess through. :he stand ~aken by certain RepubIico:n allthodties. The so~called Rep:.lhlican Emergency Government. which functions in SUn1atra 011 the basis 0 f full powers given to it by Mr. Soekarno just prior to 19 December, and which c1a;Ols COl1- t~ol over those oands wllich still cat'ry on f:'uerrilla warfare, broadcast on 6 and 10 February a nessage saying, among other thing's: urn order to dispel any possihle doubt. it is necessary to dedaft': that the Emergency Govem~ ment cannot accept the resolution of the Security Council, which does not go nearly as fe:r as thc New Delhi resolution"; aild further: "It is better to continue the fight now t1~til the Dutch will have 10 give in to our demands." This statement was made 011 6 and 10 February, and it is a fact that the second week of FeJDlary saw a b,ief ±lare~up of the guerrilla fighting. TJlis Reptlblican attitude was confitr.'le<! by a report from New Delhi published in the New ¥or!r Times of 20 Febntary 1949, stating :hatin 11 Press no:e the Rep;.lblican Emergency Government annonnced its intention of continuing the fight unless the DLtte+. accepted certain conditions, Les conseils et le soutien que les terroristes ant re~us dernierement ue r;ertains lJ1il1istrcs du Gou~ vernement rcpublicain qui, apres l'operation du 19 di-cembre, avaient garde leur liberre de mouvement et la faeulte de rester a Djokjakarta, O:1t donne un avant-gout de ce qui se passerait, vraisemblablement, si le Gouvernement :'epOh:icain etait retabli clans ses fonctions a Djokjakarta. C'est atnsi qae de: rece:l.tes enquetes ant mis a jeur un do::ument clans lequell'un de ces minlstres donnait comme instructions aux terroristes non seulement de pOllrsuivre les operalio!:~ de guerilla, l11ais aussi d"'eliminer" certains fonctionnaiTes en vue parce qu'ils etaient ff';stes it. leur poste seus J'administration neerlandaise. En outre, si :a Republir}1lf' Hait retablie maintenant en tant qu'entite territoriale, si petite ffrteUe, il faudrait elaborer un nouvel .accord de treve et tracer de nouvellcs lignes de slut," q-uo ~ i1 f.a.uclrait prendre de nouveau des dis?mitions pour permettre nux pe:"sonnes et aux marchan~ dises de franchir ces !ignes, ce qui entrainerait encore d'innombrab1es recriminatiom ~. propos des violations de la treve qui ne manqul;:raient pas de se produiTe. Bref, on ftrait renaitre les innombra'Jles difficultes et causes de fTietions quotidiennes que nous ccnnaissons depuis bientDt trois 'ms. Tout cela ne manquerait pas de cr<~er une ambiance peu favorab:e aux negociatiollS futures. nest tres facile, autour de cette table, ue parler de l'etablissement d'cne nouvt'lle ligne de demarcation, mais seu1s Ceux qui ont participe ii celte operation savent ce qu'impliquent les mots "ligne de demarcation"; on ne peut demander a. ces metnes personnes de ereer de nouveau, volon- :airemenf, le JrJell1e etat de choses. Au moment DU mon Gouvememe:1t s'e:lor<;ait encore de trouvel unc sohition satisfais:l.nte aces problemes, j'attitude adoptee par certaines autoritps rp_pllblicaines est venue brusquement renclre Cl'S efforts inutiles. Le pretendu Gou'vernement republicain de salut public, qui ronctiC'nne aSumatra grace aux pleins pouvoirs que :ui a dnnnes M. Soekarrio i:nmediatement avant le 19 deaernbre et qui pretend exercer son contraIl" sur les bandes qu: continuent a mener des operations de guerilla, a :adiociiffuse, les 6 et 10 fevrier. un message dans leque: i1 proclamait notnmment: "Pour dissiper to'Jte espece de doute, il :mporte de declarer que le Gouvernelll<:nt de salut public ne peut pas accepter la resolution ell Conseil de :;teurite, Iaqu!!lle n'est pas abeaueoup pres si radica:e que la resolution de N ew~Delhi"; i1 ajoutait: "Mieux v"ut poursuivre la lutte jusqu'a Cl" que les Hollar.dais soient obliges de ceder a nos exigences". Cette deda,ation fut bite ll;: G et le 10 £evrier, et il est a remarquer que, pendant la deuxieme senw.ine de fevrier, 1es operations de guerilla con~ nure~t un bref renouveau d'intl'nsite. Dne information provenant de ~ew~Delhi et publiee dans le N;:zlJ York Times du 20 fevrier 1949 confirme cette att:tude de la Republique; d'apres cette lnformation, le Gouverne:nent repu. blicain de salut )uhlic a annonce, par un communique a la presse, SOIl intention de poursuivre la It is surprising, by the way, that the report of the United Nations Commission made absoluteiy no mention of this Repttblican attitude, which nevertheless was directly ~('mtrary to paragraph 1 of the resolution and which was one of the reasons why our troops were forced to continue staving off attacks by guerrilla bands. What then was, in brief, the sitttation shortly aft(:r the adoption of the Council's resolution? On the Republican side cert.ain statements claiming official authority had openly rejected the resolution and instructed its followers to continue fight~ ing, The Netherlands Government earned out certain important provisions of the resolution hut found it incompatible with its responsibility at that moment to restore the Republican Govern~ ment to its function in Jogjakarta. Under the influence of that resolution, the talks with the Republican leaders about the formation of an interim government came to a standstill. Feeling strerlgthened by the rf'solution, the Republican leaders now put forward, as a preliminary condition, that they should be restored, to power at Jogjakarta. Thus, the impasse was complete. ';{et everyone agreed that a speedy soltltion was essential; f've'yone agreed on the aim that an independent United States of Indo~ nesb should soon come into being under stable twd peaceful conditions, It was, and is, a matter of vital importance to break this tragic deadlock which has arisen because of lack of agreement on a method to achieve a common aim, and only a completely new approach seems capable of doing 50. In these circumstances, thf' Netherlands Gov· ernment has searched for a solution which would lead to the same goal as that envisaged in the Security Cotlncil's resolution, while avoiding that part of its method which caused the deadlock. The only way to achie,'e this seem~d to b~ to speed up considerably the transfer of so.vere~g,nty, t~us reducing to insignificance the mtenm penod whith in the pas~ has pro.ved ~o be. t~e greatest stumbling-block It was In thiS spmt th~t t?e Netherlands Government, in consultation With Its High Representative in Ind?nesia:, d,rew up a revolutionary new scheme whIch will, If adopted, lead to statehood for Indonesia within a very few months. The elements of this offer have bee~ bronght to the knDwledg,e of the ,SeLUrity C~u~Cll in the report of the Untted NatlOns Com!TIlsslOn for Indonesia of 1 March [S/1270] , and 1ll more coherent iorm, if I may say so, by, the ~et~erlands representative to the United NatIOns In hiS letter of 2 March 1949 [S/1274], I c~n, the~efore, refrain from explaining thf' plan I~ detail and limit myself to an 0l1t1ine of its main charclcter~ istics. The main characetristics of our new propo~al are that a ronnd table conference of all l:?artles in the Indonesian question should be held Imme· Comment en sommc, la situation se presentait~ elle., pr.1l ::lflreS l'adoption de la resolution du Conseil? Du cote republicain, par certaines declarations dont les auteurs proclamaient le caractere officiel, on a ouvertement rejete la rcsohttion et enjoint aux partisans de la Repttblique de poursuivre la lutte. De son cote, le GOUVf'rnement des Pays~Bas a execute certaines dispositions impor~ tantes de la resolution, mais il a eslillle que Tcta~ blir le GOU\'f'rnernent rerublicain clans ses {onc· tions a Djokjakarta, a l'heure actuelle, etait in· compatible avec ses proprcs responsabilites. A cause de cette resolution, les pourparlers eng~ges avec les dirigeants de la Republique en vue de constituer un gotlverneme:nt. provisoire tomberent au point mort. Se sentant aflermis> clans lellr pDSitton par la resolution du Conseil, les dirigeants de la Republique exigent maintenant, a titre de ~on~itio~ preHminaire, que lellr Gouvernement SOlt, ret~bh dans ses fQnctions it Djokjakarta, La sltuatton est donc sans issue. Cependant, tout le monde est d'accord pour penser qu'il est indispensable d'apporter r<lpidemf'nt U~f' soh~tion, t?ut le !!lDnde est d'accord sur le but a attemdre, :J. ~avOtr que les Etats~Unis independants d'Indonesie se con~. tituent au plus tot d'une maniere s.table et pa!- sible. Il etait et il clelnt~Ure esscnhel de £ortl~ de cette impasse tragique, ou l'on s'est e~gage faute d'unc methode commune pO,ur attem.dre un objectii commun; i1 semble que Ion ne pU1~se sortir de ['impasse qu'en abordant la questIon d'une maniece entierf'ment nouvelle, Ainsi, le Gouvernement ut:<; Pays:~BtlS a, re;:he~­ che une solution qui permette d'attel,nclre 1~bJ~t1,f prevu par la resolution du Co~sell de ~eeunte, tOtlt en evitant d'emp10yer la metho,dc qm a con~ duit a l'impasse actuel1e. It sen;b1att qu~ le seul moyen d')' parvenir etait d'accelerer ,sen.sJ1J.le~en~ le trall,',fcrt de la sOHver::linete;, ?n red~lral~ a\ll~l all minimum la periode de tra~sltlon.qu! -le.x:pe~ rif'llCf' I'a montre _ collS.titu~lt la p~mclpale plerrf' d'~choppemf'nt. C'est dans cet esprIt que le Gou~ vernement des Pays~Bas, d'accol'd av~c son I-I~ut Representant en Indonesie, a etabb I:n proJ~t nCluveau et revolutionnaiu dont l'ad~p,tlOn feral! de l'Indonesie un veritable Ela~, d lCl 9-~elques mois. L'f'ssentiel de cette ,pro~~sltlOn a ete com- . • u Con5eil de secunte dans le rapport mumque a .' 1'1 d _ de la Commission des NatIOns Ullles pour n Q •. n '"te du ler mars [5/1270] et, sous ttr~C nesle e Lld .' d· 1 p" forme plus coherente, si Je pIllS Ire, par ere. - sent,mt des Pays~Bas a l'Organisation des _Nations Unies dans sa lettre du 2 mars 1949 [Sjl274j.]e l:l donc m'abstenir d'exposer ce proJet dans.le ~~ta~l, et me homer a en degager les traits principaux. , Notre nouvelle proposition prevoit princlpal<:~ , ' . 'd· t ,'L- H,y' (on avatt ment la reullIon nnme 13 e,'" , tout d'abDrd prevu la date du 12 mars), dune Thf' Conference of heads of Federal States accepted the invitation unanimotlsly on 1 ~lard:. It is to be regretted that up :0 the present the 1{epuJ/ican Government 11as Dot seen; its way dc.u also to accept the invitation. Much now will deJend on the reply of the United States Con:- mission for lndonesia. In connexion with ~he invitations to the con~ f~:"ence, I ahould like to give a clarification on a paint wbich has apparently given rise to some m:su71derstanding. On 4 March, a report was pt:.blished in sevem1 New York r.cwspapers creating the impression tha1: the Netherlands Government had re~0gnized a new group to represent recently occupied Republican territory <1t the proposed round table conference. It was quite understandable b<'lt the unfortunate hllpression created by this report dis:urbec. several delegatiol1s. I SbOlllo, therefo:-e, like to confirm in the Security Council tile reply we gave :0 those delegations which asked us about it; namdy, that fIe inference of this report is complete:v incorrect and misleading. A Provisional Representative Council was recently recognized in a part of Central Java. but it represents exclusively the population of territory which Prlo[," to 19 Dece:nber 1948 was alreadv under Netherlands contTol, and the preparations to establish this body on a democratic basis bad been prugre%ing since: September 1948. Returniny, to the new Netherlands pla:l, I may say the following concerning the time it would reqllire for its realization. It is hopec. that if a s:tpretne concerted effort is made by all parties it shol.J1d be possible for such a conference to reach an agreement in about six weeks on the main principles for the scbjects ] mentioned '.:Jefore. After that, another six weeks will probably be needed, as far as the Netherlands is concerned, for thp, ratification of the ag:eernentsJ afte.r which the transfer of sovereignty could take place. From that m:Jment onward, responsibility for the affairs of Iodane~ia would rest with the Indonesians; they would be responsible for the elections, for the mainten<lnce of law and order, etc. Wc shall be prepared to contin·.le to render them assistance for a short while, but only if ex?ressly requested to do SQ. • If this offer is accepted and carried out, it will present two enDrmous advantages over f1e scheme laid down in the Security Council resolution: tint, the aim of the Coun<.;il's resolution, lIamely, s'effec~ue clans un deJai de quelques mois, pour que l'union neerlanclc-indonesi"'nfl<': soit ~t'1hl"" all meme moment, pour que 1'on e1abore les accords relatifs it cette .union et que I'on constitue un gouve:"nement U:deral repre&ematif poUr l'ensemble de l']ndmes:e; la conference p:'endra~t egalemerlt au be.soin des dispositions en vue d'ur:e tres courte periode ee transition. Les invitatior.s :\. fette f.onfere:lce de la table ronde ont ete adressees le 26 fevrier anx p<'.rties en cause, en premier lien a la Republique d'Indonesie. a l'Asse6blee consultative Hd6:ale (c'est-l~dire allX fedetalistes) et a la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Indo:1esie.' La Conference des chefs des Etats fecieraux a acceptl: l'invitalion a l'·..l.nznim;te, le: ler mars. Il est regrettable que, jusqu'a present, le Got1vernement repllblicain n'ait pu se decider aussi a accepter cette invitation. De la reponse de la CommiS3ion des Nations Unies pour j'Indanesie va depe:tdre malntenant. POUl beaucollf, le sort de la conference. A propas des invitations a la Confe:·encc, jc voudrais preciser un point qui semble avoir donne lieu a. un malcntendu. Le 4 maTS, p1ufiieurs jourml.Ux de New~York ant publie une inforr.;afon lai~sa.nt croire que le Gouvernemen: des Pays- Bas avait reCon:IU un nauveau groupe de persaunes pour representer, ala conference env:'sagee, la zone recemment m::cupee &.:1 tcrrito:re nf:mb:icain. 11 est tOllt 11 hit c:ompn\hms:b1e que certaines delegations i>e: soient emues de la facheuse impression creee par cette nouvelle. Je tiens done aconfirmer devant le Cor.seil la r~onse que nous avor.s hite a:1X delegatio:Is qui s'daitut enqu~scs aupres de naus; l'infor:nation en question est eutien:ment incxa.cte et propre ainrlttire en erreur. Un Conseil :epresentatif p:ovisoire vient d'etre rrronnn clans une region de la partie cent,ale de Java, mais il repn~~ente uniquement la populatloil d'ul] territoire qui etait aux mains des Hollandais avant le ]9 decembn: 1948; on prepara.it depuis le mois de septembre 1948 I'institution de ce Conseil se10n des princi?es democratiques. POll:- en revenir all projet des Pays-Bas, je puis donner des indications quant au temps qa'il faudra pour l'exectter. On espere que, si les parties s'unissent dims un supreme effort, :a conference pourr"" en six. semaines enviroo, aboutir a un acconl SL:r les principes fondunentaux apropos des questions ~t1e j'fl.i mentionnecs. Znsuite, il faudrll enmre }:robab1emcnt six semaines au Gouvernemer:t des Pays-B<'.s, tout au moins, pour ratifier ces accords, apres quoi le t:-ansf~rt de la souverair.ete pourra ~'ef[ectu<,;r. A p<lrhr de ce moment, la direcfon des affaires d'Indonesie in~ cor::tbera aux lndrmesiens; ils auront la charge de proceder aux ele::tions, de maintenir l'ordre public, etc. Nous resterons disposes, pendant qltclque temps, a leur preter assi5tanc~, mais nOI.l$ ne le ferons que si on nc-us le demande formellement. Si ceite proposition est acceptee et mise en ecuvre, elle presentera. deux avantages l'onsine_ rables par rapport au programme prevu dans la resolution do r:onseil de securite; premierement, 1. trust tha~ the Security COU:J.cil will fun realIZe ,that th1S off~r constitutes a great and reIJ concessiOn and sacnfice on the part of the Netherla~ds, My Government has felt elllitled to make thls offer only becacse it is deeply convinced of the urgent n,ec,:ssity of fir:~ing a way out of the pr.esent dead.oc.::, a way whlc.h can be found on1y Wlt~ a ~ew, ~old appr-oac~, such as the one emM bodied m. thlS offer. I must, therefore appeal UIl<.:e agalll ,to the Security Council to' render pas,s\ble, on 1tS pact, the execution of this scheme whl~h, I must again emphasize, will lead to th~ ac111cvemcnt of. the Security Council's own ::tim at a much earher date, The en1)' difference bet:we~n Our proposal and the Couf1.cil's resolution ll~s m the m:thod, notably on 0111' p:<.r':inda: point: the :estorat~on of the Republican Government in JogJakarta Defore the ccming rotlnd table confo::renc,:. The Se~ttri~ C.rnmc.il will not faH to app:ecJate that thIS ramt IS of secondary import- 3tlee as compared to tne broader issue which is th.e =:tchiellernent of ir,dependence for'Irdonesia wlthl1l the sh0rtest possible time; it is a rr.atter o.f m~thorl wh:cn is not essential to the 111t:mate s:tllatlOn to be created. At the same time, in the view of tbe Net"lerlands Go'Vernment it would ;ltJ I stated Jefore, Create an unbearable s:tltation: For several reJ50nS, the question of the immedia:e rcstl)ra1ion ol the Republican Government loscs mnch of its intere5t if the new proposal is can'ied into effect. In the fi~Sl [Jlace, the interim period r:receding the trilnsfer of sovereignty wodd be shortened t~ a matter 0: weeks or nlonths after the beg.in- :l1.1.lg Df the round t::J.ble Confl'rl'nce. In the sec:md IJla;:c, the Repl\bli~an leaders WOL1ld, upon the eSl.<l.blishment oi the Feder:d Government, imm~di2.tely ta1<e part in the Government of the wl10le of Indonesia. includi:lg the fonner Rep\lblio::arl territories. rn the third place, it would, after the transfer of sovereil{l1ty, be up to the Indonesians themselves to determine the internal organization of their new S':ltte which would enal::1e them, if they w \\'isr.ed, to restore the Re{:ublic in its original, Or in any other for;n. WhClt better guarantee cail the Security Council desire than the assurance that the Republic wi:l, :f it is really desired, ultirr.ately be restored it: it:s original form at the moment when its re:StaratLor: will no longer have the harmful consequences it would ha'Ve now? I must point Ollt that the reason why the Netherlands GoverD11lent-althot:gh still convinced that a longer period 0 f transition wou1d have been more to the interest of Indonesia itself -cn.n now make this far-reaching concession resides in the fact bat the actior. oE 19 Decem· ber has, for t':te mOment, eliminated those disemq~memf',nt, 1~ periorle rll': trami:ion, aver: tdutc; 1:5 d1flic~ltes <;:u'elle comporte, Sera reduite a p. esque nen. J'espere fe:rnement que le Conseil dt: :>ec,lTite se rendra .plemetnent compte de l'importance de Iff conces~lOn et du sacrifice \"eritables que cetti'. o re represente ,de la parl (les Pays-Das. Si mon Gol,ver,ne:ne::l.~ s est Cu en droit de faire une telle affre, c est ,unlc:uement parce qu'il est profondeM mt:Jll tDllYalllCU ~e la (leCCs5ite urge"tc de trouver le moye~ de sc:rt1r de l'impasse actuelle; ce moyen l~e pe~t etre de~,ouvert qu'en s'attaqllant ala ques~ bon ~ ',:mc man1<~re nouyclle et nardie, Cc.mMe 110l:S !e falsons clans notre o!tn:, Je delllanderai done l~s:nmment, une fois enCOre, au Cousei] Cl' .oecuntc de r~ndre ,p<;Jssible, pOllr S-'I. pHrt, l'excclCtion d~ ce ~roJe! qUl, Je le r~pete, p~tmet!ra d'attei:1dre ble~ p.u.s ~ot le but meme que vise le Consei!. La s;u.e ~:hfferf'n('e ~ntrf" notre rroposition et la rese!utlOu du Cousei1 de ~ecurite reside dar.s la ~elh~de a mh're, notamment sur un point: le re~abl.lssemelt du Gouvememer.t republieain a DJllkJa.brta avant la reunion de la conference de la tab:e ronde. Le Conseil ::le secttrite ne manquera pas de reconnaitl'e que Cl' point est seconM da~re par CDmFaraison a"ec la question plus vaste 1~1I e? de donn~r" dans l~ 'pIu: bref.delai possible, 1mdepen::lar.ce a IIndonesle; 11 S'Jgtt d'une affai-e de methode qd fl.'a pas U:lC importance cavilale pour la situation a creer en denniliYe. De pltlS, le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas considere ainsi que je "ai deja declare, que le retahli.s;cl11cnt du Gouverncmen: republicain crecrait unc situation intolerable. Pour divel'seS r<lisons, la question dll ret8.bl:s· sement ~mmediat du Gouverne:nc:1t l'epub:icain <lura :X:tlUCOUP mains rl'imeret si la nouvdle propositiDn est mise aexecution. TO'lt d'aJord, la periode de t~ansition qui doit precedeI' le transfe1t de la sOU\'erainete sl'ra ra· rnenee aqt:elc:ues semaines eu aquelques 111.0is a compter de l'OllVerture de la confercn.ce de la table rO:lUe. En second lieu, des l'i:1stitution du gouyer:lCment federal, 1es dirigcants rept:blicains pa~ti. ci:;>eront au gouvernement de l'ensemble de l'Indonesie, y ccmpris les anciens territoires de la Republique. Enfin, une fois le transfert de la sOllverair.ete effectue, i: appartiendm. aux Indonesiens Cl1.Xmemes de decider de I'Clrganisatian interne de leur nouvel Etat; ils pourront ainsi, s'ils le desirnltJ rctablir la RCpubliquc sous ~a forme primitive ou sous unP: nouvelle fonne. QueUe meil1eure gara:ltie le Conseil de securite peut·il des;rer q:Je l'assuranee que la Republique sera finalerlent retablie sous sa forme pl·e."t1.iere, si te1 est 'Vcritab[ement k. desir ces interesses, a utI mol!ttnt ou cette resu.l1.ration l1'aura plus les consequences nuisib1es qu'elIe aumit actuellement' Je dais faire observer qlle, si, tOllt rn rest,l1lt conYaincu qu'une plus longue periode de transiticn cut ete prefh:l.ble pour l'Il1.donesie, le Gou· vernement ces Pays-Bas peut f<lire maintenant cette immense conces3ion, c'es: parce que les me- 9un~s pri~es 1(> 19 de:embre ant mOlnentJnement sLlpprime les perturb<.tion ci\leS 2,'JX menets Ol-ga- It is one of Ihe advantages of the scheme, as proposed by the Netherlands Governm~nt, that it avoids thlS one controversial issue of immediate restoration of the Republican Government at Jogjnknrta. Tha.t would mean. it is true, a deviation, on that particular point, from the text of the Security Council's resolution. But may J respectfully remind the Council that in the case both of Palestine and of Kashmir, the Sectlrity Council allowed its representatives on the spot tD deviate from its reso]t1tions, wben it was found that some other method seemed better calculated to If':ld to the aim the Council had in v·iew. The United Nations Acting 'Mediator on Palestine and the United Nations Commmissiol1 for India and Pakistan were well ndyised tD dn S0, ;'Inn the Council to allow them to follow this Wllrse, for in both cases the desired end was obtained without adhering strictly to the provisions of the Cotlncil resolution. That is what I wot1ld ask the Council to do in this case as welL We merely request it to anow the United Nations Commission ior Indonesia to take part in the rotlnd table conference and to {\trther it." S11(Tess. L'un des avantages de la solution que propose le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas est d'eluder la.- question controversee ciu retablisselllellt iIrlmediat du Gouvernement re.publicain,a Djokjakarta. Sur r.e point particulier. la proposition des Pays-Bas s'ecarte, it est vrai, du texte de la resolution du Conseil de sectlri-te. Toutefois, je; me pemiets de rappcler :l,U Conseil que, dans: le r..A.~ de la Pales~ tine et dans ce!l1i dl1 Cachemire, le Conseil de stkurite a autorise ses representants sur place a . s'ecarter des dispus:tiollS <:ontelllH':S dans ses reso-- lutions lorsqu'il a He constate q1.:l':me autre methode sembtait mieux convenir pour atteindre les buts vises par le ConseiI. Le Mediateur par Interim des Nations Unies en Palestine et la CDmmission des Nations Unies POllT l'lnde et le Pakistan ont eu tout a fait raison d'agir ainsi, et le Conseil a egalement eu raison de le leur permettre, ear~ d,ans ks dCl:X cas, le but vise a. ete atteint sans que l'on ait strictement observe toutes les dispositions contenues dans les resolutions du Conseil. C'est pour cette raison que je derrmmle au Consdl de serurite d'agir de la meme manicre dans le cas pr"sent, c'eM-a.-dire de perrnettre ala Commission des Nations Unies pour l'lndonesie de prendre part ala conference de la table TOndc et de contribue. it son sueCes. I should like to conclude by observing that it would, after all, be only human (or the Council to prefer that its resolution be foIlowed in all provisions. I cannot believe, however, that the members of the Council will be unwilling to gh'e the most serious consideration to my Government's proposal, which, in Ollr opinion. goes much furt;her than the Council's resolution and wil1lead more ropidly and with less difficulties to the result uesired both by my Government and by the Council. What must concern 11S most 1ll this matter is not that the Council's resolution be carried out to the letter, but that its aim be reached as so<m as possible. Surely this is not too much for the world to expect of us here. And I hardly think there is one among u." who will say that the text of the resolution is more important than the fate of Indonesia. I trust to the ~tatesmanship and the realism of the members of the Security C01.1ncil to join us in opening up this new and direct road to the independence of Indonesia. Gem:ral ROMULO (Philippines): The facts 01 the matter now before the Sec:udty Council are few and clear. All the pertinent documents, by no means voluminous, have been in our hands several days previous to this meeting. It is hard to imagine any political situation or dispute before the Council on which there can be less disagree- Pour terminer, je dirai qu'il ~erait parfaitement nature!, apres tont, que le Conseil prefere que toutes les dispositions de Sa resolution soient observees. Je ne puis croire, neanmoins, que les membres du COllseil se refuscront a examiner la proposition de men Gouvernement avec la pl1.:ls serieuse attention; elle 11a, selon nous, beaucoup plus loin que la resolution du Conseil, et permettrait d'obtenir plus rapidement et plus aisement les resultats que souhaitent it la fois mOll Gou~ vernement et le CQnseiJ. Dans cettl' affaire. nous ne devol1s pas tant nous preoccttper de I'application stricte des dispositions de la resolution que de pi;H·vetlir, le plus tot possible, au but qu'clle vise. Asstui~ment, le monee ne detnande pas trap en attendant cela de noUs. J'ai peine a imaginer que l'un d'entr-e nous puisse considerer que le tell-le d'un<: resolution a plus d'importance que le sort de l'Indone.<;ie. J'espere ferrnernent que les membres du Conseil de S~M.lrite;, guides par leur sc:ence du gouvernement et leur sens des realites. se joindront a nous pour ouvrir cette nouvellc voie qui menera. tout droit it j'indcpendance de l'Innonesie. Le general ROMULO (Philippines) (tra-du-it de 1'4ttglai.r) : Les faits se rapportant i I.. q uestiun dont le Conseil est actuellement.sais,i sont c1airs et p:'U nomhreux. Tous Ies documents re1atifs a la question sont peu volumineux, et Us nous ont tite communiques plusieurs jours avant la prtsente seance. 11 est diffieile d'imaginer une The resolution of 28 January 1949 i=lfovided, among other things, for the foHewing: first, the immediate discontinl1a~ce of all wili:ary Opl!:'3- tiO:::tS by the Netherlands Geverr.ment <lod of guerrilla warfare by the ac1hereot~ of the. Republic of Indonesia; sewndly, the immediate and unconditional release by the Netherlands Government of all political priseners arrestee. by them since 17 :Cecember 1948 1:1 the Republic of Indor:esia; thirdly, he immediate relurn of the cffi,~ials: of the Re~mblic of Indonesia to Jogjakarla in order th<lt they may diicharge their respons:bi:ities in co:mexion with the cessation of hostilities and exer,:ise :'heir appropriate functions in full free~ dem, and fourthly, negotiations uelween rcprcse:ltatives of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indom~~ju, under the auspices of ,the United NatioT:s Commission for Indonesia, leading to the esmhlishment of an interim federal govern~ ment not later than 15 March 1949, elections for an Incor.esia:l constituent assembly not later than 1 October 1949, and the transfer of sovereignty over bdonesia by the Govemme~tof 11e Netherlanes to t:'Je United Statl's of Indonesia at the earEest poss:b1e date, and in any case not later thin I july 1950, How the parties to the dispute have acted on this :-esolution is clear frem the: documents, especirtlIy the report of 1 March of the United Nations CommissiOll' for Indonesia [S)1270]. With regard to the cessation of hostilities, tbe Dutch authorjti~s rJin isme a belated cease-fire crder to their troops, but thenpromp:].y nttllified i: Ly stating that it would be subject to th need ior SOl:1e milibry action in c'der to mai:ttain -peace anc: order. Obviottsly, the Government of the Republic cOl1ld not <,.sgut:1e responsibility for halting the guerrilla warfare waged by its ad~ herer.ts unless and until the RepUblican authorities are actllal1y returned to t:1e:r capita: and, whaL :s :nore important, given the opportttnity to exer~ cise the power of goveclment and th~ net:ess:l.ry facilities to carry out thei, task in full freedom, as proviC:eci in the resolution. lleerlandai3~Sont dcnne t~r(1ivementit lellrs t:"O\1- pes I'crdre de cesser le feu, ntais e1les l'ont pro!uptf'ment rencu inefflcace en en sllcordoncta:lt l'cxecLltior. a la necessite d'entrep~endl'e cut."1.ine action militalre en vue dumaintien de la paix et de l'ordre. De tOLlte evidetlce, ~e Gouvemement de la Republique ne pouyait pas aSSUOlet la respOl~sabi:ite de fa:re Cf'.<;ser les o?erations de gUl!- rilla mcnees par SfS partisans taut que les aLlto~ rites repl.lblicaines ne seraient pas effeetivcmentreinstal'ees clans Iettr capitate et, C~ql1: e:>l.ct:corc. , plus :mportan:, tar.t qu'elles n'nuraient pa.s eu la " IlO~si)ilite C:'e-",erccr leur pQuvoir de gnuvcrner et qu'el1es n'auraient pas les ~<'lci:ites necfs&Ures pour s'acquitter librement de leur tache, comme le prevait la resolution. Quant a. :a mist: ell liberte des prisoTItliers po1i~ tiques, IfS membres du Ci:mseil savent par qt:els . moycns detournes l'Drdre que le Coriseil a reirere ; Dar trois fois a ete elude jusqu'a pre3ent. n y a plus de six semaines 1397eme secl-nee), no1.lS avons taus pu entendre id le n:pn£scntnr..t dl;3 Pays-Bas au·Comei: de sccuri:e dODner, au nom . de son Gouverncmcnt, l'assurar1(~e. formelle cue les ddgeants reptlblic:ains avaient 6te mis er: (uerte. Les memb~f'8 du Conseil s'en souvienn~nt fort bien. La Commission des Nations l.;nies pour l'Indonesie a consta.te que cette affirmation etait· inexacte. et en a infortnl~ le Conscil. Dans sa : leltre du 2 mars [5/1274). le meme representant With regard to the release of political prisoners, the memDe~s know by what devious methods their thrice-re7)cated order to this effect has lJere:ofore been i~n·orecl. More than six ·weeks ago 1397th nleetingJ the representative of lhe Netherlands in 6is body-and we all heard him here-gave. sulemn assurance, on behaI:: of his GDvernment, tht t:i.e Republican leaderi had been released. The members will remember that very well. The Cnited Nations Commission found thzt that was incorrec:, and so reported it ·to this body. In his lette:- of 2 :vIan:h .[5/1274], the same Nether~ lznds representative once again assures this body that "the Netherland" Goverr.ment has lifted the La resolution cu COl1i~i1 de securi:e du 28 janvier 1949 p~evoit, entre autres chases, pre:nie,;, rement, que If' G01;ven:ement des Pays-B<ls dOlt faire cesser immediatemel'lt toutes operations militaires et que le GOlH'ernement de la Repcblique doH ordonner en meme temps a St:5 panis<t.l1s de rl1e!tre fin a'1X ope:"ations de gu£rilla; deuxierr:ellJent, que le Gouvenc·ll1ent desPay::-Bns doh l'emett\,e en lib~rte, immediatemen: et sans condition,:ol1s le,., .PtiSOnl1icrs potitiques arretes par lui dar.s la Reptiblique d'ln<:onesie clepuis le 17 de~ cembre 1948, et, troi~ilbmment, qu'il doit bc::liter le re:our immcdat a Djokjakarta des foaclion~ naires eu Gouvernemer.t de la Republi1ue d'lndolIesic ufin 'lu'ih puissent s'aC'qtlitter, en :Ollte liberte, des taches qui leur incombent en ce qui concerr.e la cessation des hostilites, et exe.rcer lib:"ement les fonctions qui leur sent impartie5; quatril~mem!";nt, que les representants du Gouvernement ces Pays~Bas et ceux de la Rep~b1ique rl'InLonesie ouv.rent des. nigodations J:lVtc le concours de la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Indonesie,afi:l d'iboutir it la constitution dtl gouvemement 'feceral provisoire, avant le 15 mars 1949 a11 pillS tare, et de faire pro:eder it des elections en vue de la creation d'unc AssembIee ccnstitltaute J'Indonesie, a.vant le ler oeto_ bre t949, et .mn d'assuret" le plus tot possible et, en tout cas, ~VU1t lp ler juillet 1950, le transfert aux Etats~Unisd'fnclonesie, par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, de la souverainete s:.tr I'lndonesil:. Les documents, notamment le rapport de la Commi.'ision des ~a.tions Unies pour l'Ir.donesie er. date du 1er rr:ars [5/1270 I~ indiquen: daire~ nlent les IT.esures que les parties au differel'.d ant prises a la suite de cetle resolution. En ce qui Concerne la ccssat1cn des hostilites, les "utorites We have just heard a report that the Republkan officials are now allowed freedom of move~ ment. As a result of previous experience with a similar report, we mllst sUI wait and !'iee whether or not it is true, and if it is true, to what extent this belated move on the part of the Netherlands autho~ities constitutes compliance with the Council's resolution; for freedo:n of mOVement, on the part of the Republican leaders, wO\lld have no practical meaning unless they have full liberty of mO'/ement and action, complete freedom to exercise the powers of government, unrestricted capacity to discharge their responsibilities under th\": resolution of 28 January, and, above all, the right to comider their return to th<': capital as signalling th<,: restoration of the Gov\":rnment of the R<,:public of Indonesia to full authority. The Dutch attit11de tnward3 th<': other provisions of the resolution has be\":n charact<':nzed by j us: such double talk or outrigllt defianct';. Sine\": August 1947, the Security Council has recognized the Republic of Indonesia, and its resol~t:on of 28 In.nuary 1949 provides for its rt';storation to full authority. Un the other hand, the Dutch authorities hav\": glvt":n the Republic a backhanded recognition which, in effect, is no recognition at all. In the imritation of the Assembly for Federal Consllltation to the Republican leaders, the high represclltative of the Crown is quoted as saying that the Republican leaders "art'; allthorities of a republic, the status and form of which will be :1etern;ined by the will of the people in observance of the principle of equal member States within the framework of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia", In other words, aiter two years of negotiation with officials of the Republi:, whose existence they officially recognized ir. the Linggadjati2 and ReuviUe Agreeme:lts, the Dutch authorities now state that the form and status of the Hepublic are still to be determined. Tht'; Dutch au60rities have refused to relinquish the Jogjakarta area to the Rt';rtlhlic, They claim, and it' was so repeated here again this afternoon, that peace and order would be difficult to maintain in the area if tl:js were done, and "stabs in the back" and so forth have been mentionec. here. They state that the Republic would be at the mercy of uncontrollable extremists. The facts prove the contrary. Last year the Republic put down an insurrection by \":xtremists without any help from the Dutch, We all know that. More recent events ha\'e shown that it is tlie very p~~em.:e of Dutch troops in the Jogjakarta ar\":a which invi~es trouble and disrupts • Se~ The Political Events in tiu Republic of Indonesia published 'by the Netherl<1n:ls Information Bureau, NeV: YoOrk, P&&e 3-4. 'Voir The Political Events in lAc Republic; of Indonesia, pllblie par le Bureau d'infonnation des Pays'- Bn a NeW-Yt:lrk, p:.lge 34. i~ aciTievingthei:: ptlrpose in this stronghold of l{epltblican influence they woeld be able to gain <:omplete mastery over tIle Whole of ]a\'a. That is the real reason, and. no double talk can hide it. The Dut:h alltl1ori~ies have consistently igllOn:J be many ::~quests of the Commission far assistance in the disc:-l<lrge of its duties. Its milit:r.ry observers :,ave been reduced to the category of news correspondents, find like the lGtter have not been aIIcwed to see what is really going 0:1.. The Security CoundJ'~ proposals for the esroJlis1.ment of a federal, independent and sovereign United Stales of Indonesia hIve been completely :gnored. Indeed, the Netherlands have tried to proceed unilaterally to suhstitute for those pro~ posals their QW:1 plar. of holding a round til.?:e wn feren6'. rit The Hag-ue atter.ded by partles invited by the Dt1tc~ for the pLlrpose, ostensibly, of "expeditiro.g" the formation of the United States of Indonesia, Much is belng made 0 f the Dutch intention to transfer sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia one whole year in advance of the target date set b)' :h~ Security Council, "-nd we heard the representative of the Netherlands und.erscore that again here tr.is afternuon. Dut the invitation i~, af; usual trans.parent and betrays t!1e real intentions of the 1\etherlands Government. 'The invitation reads in part: "The Necherlands GOyemr:lent is prepared to examine .. en its merits every proposed solction ... and to examine to what extent these proposed so:utions tire compatible with its re:;por.sibiHty." In other words tIle round table conference at The Hag\le woul~ :lot be free to consider any and all proposnls that may be advar.ced by tbe parties. but only such proposals as wOll.Id be agreeable to tile Netberta~ds Goverument In the first place. Th!:; means, In effec:, that the conference W011lc serve merely as a rubber stamp ':0 .p':!ve ''.n aspect of legality to the fi:tished scherr.e of the Netherlands. This alternate procedure or counter-proposal b('comes all the :nore SlIspect when it is consider:ed in connexicn with the amendmenl~ recently 1ncorporatecl into the Constitution of the Netherlands. Tlle:;e a:nendell1enh dearly set forth the statns, rights and powers of 6e Netherl.a:lds- Indonesian "Cnion that has }'et to he estabhshed. ln the Re1wille and Linggad~ati Agreements, and in the rewll1tion of 2S January, the status of the proposed -CnlOn <:nd the rights an~ powe:s of the Republic of Indonesia as par~ ~f t.1.e Unlon we~: to be determined by negotlatlOns betwe~n tl Netherl:J1Hls ar.d the' Republic of Tndonesla. 3y amer.dillg their constitution in advance,,?f an): satifdactorv neg-o:iations, the Dutc~. l:ave Jumpec Les aut(Jrih~s neerlanclaises n'ont jamr..is tenll le moir.dre compte des nombrctlses d~mandes que la. Con:mission leur a a<lressees din qll!dle.~ rOl.~ sis:ent dans l'accornp:issement de ses foneticns. Les o1Eerv~tetlrs militaire3 ce la Col1lmiS5ion ont ete reJegtles dans la ca:tegorie des correspondanls de presse, ~t, tau:' cOffime ces derders, n'ont pas ete autorises .i suivre les evenements de pres. Il n'a ete tenll ::l:.lr·m r.ompte des propositior.s du Conseil de ,ecllTitk tenchmt aeeer des Etats- {Jnis d'Indonesie, dent le Gouvern~ment sernit federal, :nde.pendant et s-cuverain. En realite, les autoriles needandaises o:tt tente d'agir de maniere unilatcrale en sub3tituant <i ees proposifolls leur [-rojet de reunior. d'tme cO.1terence ,le la table ronde a La Haye; ceHe conference, clout les paticlpants seniient invites par les Pays-Bas, aur<'.it pour but aVQue de "hate:" la mnst.itution des Eta:s-Unis d':ndonesie. 0:1 fait g~and C,15 de l'intention que rranifes".ent les Pays-Ba, de transferer leur souvera:nete a:Jx Etats-Unis d'lndon~f;ie, Imf anne.e wtiere avant la date ]il11ite fix-ee par le Conseil de securite, et n0113 VC:lons d'entencre de nDtlveaU, eet aptes-midi, le rcpn~­ !en:ant des Pivs-Bas fa:re valDir cette illtenticlll ayec insi3tance. Tcutefais, la falion dont est redigee l'invitatian i cetle wnfa-euee est, eon1rne d'or<tnaire, revelatrice e: tra:lit les veritables ;ntentions eu Gouvernement des Pa)'s.Bas. 11 y est dit: "Le GDU'lernen1ent des Pays-Bas est dispose a e.xaminer, ... en fonction cc leurs merites prvpres, toutes propo3itlons de soltltio1, .' et a Jeter:11in<'t (Ians quelle mesure Les propos:llOn3 sont cOLn?atibles avec se~ responsabiHtes." Er. i!'auln:s :ennes, h eonfkrencr (Ir la tahle rondc qui (loit se rfunir a La Ha~e. ne sem pas libre d'examiner tolttes les prOposItIons, queUes qu'elles soient, que pourront presen~er les ~i'lerses parties, mai.~ 3ir:lplement les 5tlggestlOl1s qUI sel'Ont ~drn:.ses par le GOt:vcrnemc:Jt_ cles P~ys-Bas. En rid, cee: revie:l.t a clire que la confer('nc~ aUra 3imple:nent pour objet d'entcrin~r It prOJet des Pays-Bas sous sa f:Jrme finale (lfin de 111: GOIJner l'apparence de la legali(~. Cette proredtlre DU contre-prop()sitiol~ d~sti.nee a se sllbstituer a la resolution tilt Cousell CCV1C;-rt de pIts en plt.:s stlspecte lorsqu'~:Jn la ra?~r?c.1e des amendements recemmen~s 11\COrpores a l,a Constitution des PaY3-Ba3. Ces am~rlclements deflnissent nettement le s:1ltut,. les d~~lts et les PCt,I~ voirs de l'union ne.erl~ndo-mdoneslenl1e, qUl n a as encore eLe constItuee. A,ne termes des,Accv:cls ~u Ren'1!iUe et de ~i:1ggadjati, et .de I.a ~esobt1or. d 28 ·anvie.r c'est par voie de negoClatlor.s entre U J ' .' d'l d " les Pays-Bas et la Rep:.lbhqu~ n one3lf q.ue d 'vent elre determines les drolts et les pouv~lrs dOll R' bl',que (.'Indonesie en !ant que [Jletn)re cfl-epu ~ .. t cl I,' En ,n'endant leur LonstltutlO.:l avan e tmlOn. ~ . P B t toute negociatioll satisfaisanlt, les aysas on , , Thf: (actl; I have reCcllllted show beyond doubt how· the decisions and recommendations of the Secu;ity Council are being circumvented, ignored ~~. VIOlated by smooth double talk, outrigl:t deh,mL:e.' ~r Lhe all too :amiliar tact:c of the fm·f accomph. ~e record shows just as emphatically how sc,uptllous the Repllbljl'; has been in its respect for and observance of the resolutions of the Security Council, despite what has h!"f'n said here this afternoon. The Republic. has at all :imes willingly st;bmitted ,to the authority of the Co:.meil. AI. though it has not always reeeh-ed full support for its views i:1 -this horly, it has accepted iT. gocd faith all the Council's decisions and reeomrnen· d.Qtions, The Republic of Indonesia is not a Member of the United Kations, I am sorry to say, and it." C'rmdtlct in this respect serves as an object lesson for :hose who are, Is it realized that even .in the extremely difficult position in which, they found the:nselves as virtual prisoners of the Dutch, the leaders of the Repuhlk showed a disposition to :::ome to terms with the Netherlands which was exemplary? On Qand 7 February in Bangka, their prison Islam!. they received a11d conferred with representatives of tile Feder.al Assembly for Consultation, and ~n 4 Mareh they dec1arcc. that they could agree in prineiple with the purpose of the proposed conference at The Hague-I repeat, that· they could agree in principle with the purpose of the proposed confere:1ce at The Hague. On both occasions, however, the officials aml n:prescntatiYes of the Republic we~e careful to sta:e d-,at ':ormaJ conversations could be l:eld on11' with the eognizance of the United Nations Commission, that eventual participation of the Republic in tile round table conference should not prejudice the position of the Commission, and that a speedy and satisfactory solution of the dis,?ute cCllld be reached if both partie:; c1ear!y declared their acceptance of the resolution of 28 Jan:lary In the face of these facts the United Nations Commission for Indonesia stated in paragraph 6 of its r-eporl of I March (Sj1270J that, "despite. the additional time providen for the Government of tbe Nethe:lands to ad:ust itself politically and otherwise to the requirements of the resolution, not only have the parties reached no agreement on n.n interim f(,c'era) government, but there have "Jeen no negotiations l1nder the resolu:ion". And, what is very important, :he report went on to say, "The Commission finds that the Netherlands Government has not complied with the basic prerequisites of further action under the resolution," That is tbe report of your Commission. In paragraph 25 of the same document, embodying Les decisior.s et leg reeommand::ltiom: dn Conlleil de secmite - les faits Que j';'\i rapportes ne 12issent. a~lc,un d,mte it ee sujet - sont toumees, considerees comme lettre inorte ou violees; en effet, on a recours a des paroles conriliantr.ll it double sens, on brave ouvertelUent les decisions ou on elT.ploic' la tactique tmp familiere du fait accompli, L'etude des evenements montre tout auss; nettement la maniere scrupuleuse dont la Republique a - malgre ce qu'on en a dit au Conseil cet n.pres-midi - respecte et observe les resolutions du Conseil de securite. L<t Republique s'est toujonrs soumise de son plein gre a l'autorite do Conseil. Bien que son paint de vue n'ait pas toujours relju l'appui de ce~ organe. la Repnblique a loyalement accepte tout~s ses decisions et recommandations. La Republiqne d'Indonesie n'est pas Membre de l'Organisa~ion des Nations Unies; je regretle de le constater; neanmoins, son attitude a cet egard pourrait servir de leljon a eeux qui font partie de l'Organisati'm. Se rend-on compte que, dam la situation extre.- mcn:cnt difficile ou ils se trouvl'nt, le." i1irigeants republicains, qui SOl1t, en fa:t, prisonniers des autorites nee,:lanC:aises, manifestellt pourtar.t I'intention meri:oirc de s'entendre avec les Pays- Bas? Apres a.voir re~u a :3anka, I'ile tInt est leur ;prison, les representants de lJAssembtee consul- , tatiYe les 6 et 7 fevrier e; s'etre entre:enus avec ,eux, ils Ont declare, le 4 mars, pouvo:r accepter 'en principc J'objectif de la conf~["("n('e que l'on praposait de tenir a La Haye - je dis bien: qu'ils pouvaient accepter en prineipe l'oJjectif de la ecnference que 1'0:1 pmpasait de tenir a La Haye, TO'.1tefois, les fonctionnaires et lefl repre-. sent<lnts de la Repllblique {mt tenu apreciser, dans ces deux dreonstances, que des entretiens officie1s ne pouvaient avoir lieu que si la Comnission des Nations Unic5 en ettl.it informee, que la participation eventuelle de la Republique ala conference de la table rande ne devait p2S prejuger la position de la Commission et qu'il etmt possible de parvcnir rapidetT.ent a l1ne solution satisfaisar.te du differend si Ies deux parties declaraient nettement qu'dles ac:eep:aient ·la resolution du 28 janvier. Devant cette situation, la Commission des Natior.g Unies pour l'IndOnl~sie a declare, dans le paragraphe 6 de son rapp)rt du ler mars rS/12701, que, "en depit du nouveau delai ainsi acc:orde au Gouvl"mement des PaY3-Bas po'.!r qu'i1 prenne :es meSU,es, pOlit:ques et autres, requises. par la resolution, non seulement les· parties n'avaier.t pas realise l'accord sur un gO;1verneml"nt federal pmvisoire, mais dIes n'avaien: mbne !>as ent:-epris de negociatio:1s conformemcr:t aux: termes de la resolution". 'Et Cl" rapport ajoute, chose extrenement importarite, que "la Commission conslate que le Gouvernement neerlandais n'a pas rel11pli les conditions prealables essentielles aune nouvelle action· aux termes de la resolution". Voila ce que dit le rapport de la Commission des Nations Unies. Au paragraphe 25 dt: meme. "The Commission is ob:iged to report that as of I Man;h, tl,l\:re has ?CC:1 failure of the parties to tl:e Indon~sl;\n questlOn to reach ar. agreement on th~~ estabhshment of an interim federal government. I wish to draw special attention to what follows: "Th:s situation reml:s :rom the failure of the NetherJ<lflds CJ.!>vernment ~o accept the procedures of the res?lutlon of 28 . anuary, and 'not from .a mere dIffereuce of viewpoint On details of governmental strllcture and functions." That <-o.mes frot;"! the report of the imparti,al men to this ~Conllcil-a unanimous report signed by them. These are the facts of 6e situatiQI1 anu lhese the conclusions wr.ich have been draw~ , therefrom by the Council's own agents on the spot. . There may be. SOtne who arc inclined to con- Sl?er ,the so-cal1ed Dutch counter-proposal as constItutmg a new fador in t!le siLtation. Indeed,' th; representative of tne Netherlands only a few al1nutes ,lgO and in his letter of 2 Mar::h lS/1274j, !l<1S affirmed tl-:at "there exists comjJlete identity oetween the anus of the Security Council .a~d those of the Netherlands Government with regard to Indonesia:", and th~.t "there can be onl)' differences of opinIOn about the procedure which is best suited to le~d to the desired re~u1tlJ. This stateme:1t, obviously intended to allay all apprehensions, is di~l1ieting and should Pllt LlS On our guard. For flis is a case where aims ca:mot be entirely disassociated from procedure, where the means and the end are bound to condition each other. Tr.e Dutch propo:>al to hold a round table conference involved much more than a simple change of venue :rO:11 Java to The Hague. The who:e basis of tllf'; negotiations is to be changed, ar.d so are the positions of the parties in relation to each otl:er. The Dutch :l.uthorities a:e giving llO as.'wranCe of the immediate discontint.:ance of their military operations nor of the restoration to full authority of the Rep\tblic of Indonesia. In fact, they have said tl~at they w:ll not restore Jogjakarta. The Republican leaders, it is to be remembered, are to attend the conference not i", their capacity as o:fici<ll~ of the Reoublic of Indonesia but as mere representati\·es at a re:Jublic whOse status is to be determined later. 10:ost important of all as far as the Security Council is cO:tcerned is the attempt to subslitltte eXclusive Dutch auspices for those of the 'United Kations Commission, which would be reduced to a vague advisory role in the regotiations instead of the positive one which is contemplated in the resolution of 28 January, The entire pattern of me<:.ns at:d end, of procedlue and aims, which is set forth in the Council's resolution i:l order to ensure just and, fre'e agreement between tr.e ~arties, is completely alte:ed in the Dvtch pr<lposal so as to ta~ethc questl~n out or the hands of tile Council and leave it m the hands of the Netherlands Government to "La Commission se voit dans l'obligafon' de Ten~Te compte (jt:e, it la dat~ du ler nlars· les J?art~es. au differend indonesien n'ont pasr{J!;s"i a reahser :m aC;:ord sur la constitution d'1m Gouverllement feeeral provisoire." J'a~ire tout p.arti~~ierement l'attentioil, dV Consel] sur ce qUI S:llt: "Cette situation est due au fait lJllC le Gotlver. nemen! de.s ~ays-Bas n'a pas accepteles 'Proce, dures m~htl1ees .par la .~esolution d"-l 28 janvid, et f10r: a ttue ~ltt.tple (.!Vergence d'opinions 'Sur des pomts de detail concer:tallt la structure et les attriblltions'du Gouvernemen:." :t' , Cc:s cons:atati~ns sont !i~ees dl1 rapportq~:Q,~t etabL .-e:l tOllte_ Impar1:altte des membres dece Consell et ql1'ils ont tOts signe' apres l'avoJt accepte a l'ur:animite. Te1s liDnt les elements cie la situation et l~s concbsions qU'en Oot u;-ees Ics pro~res agent~ du Conseil qui etaien! sur place. , Certans or.t peu:~etre tendanee a cor.side;c'r .ce qu'on a appete la contre-proposition des PaY!i~ Bas comme un nOtlve1 elel71ent de la situation. De fait, le -representant des Pays-Ba.s, dar.s sa lettr~ du 2 mars [Sj12i1J, et i1 ya qtlclqllCS :'nstanls a peine, a affirme "l'identite complete, en ce qd concerne l'Indonesie, des, objedifs du Go:.lverne- IT.ent des Pays-Bas el de ceux. du Consel! de securite". Et ij a ajoute qtl' "il ne ptut donc s"~~le­ ver de divergences d'opinions qu'au sujet des rneiJ:eu~es mHhodes a employer pour arriver au resultat souhaile". CeHe affirmation, evidemment destinee a apaiser toutes :es craintes, est inquie:ante et devrait nO\1S mettre sur nos gm'des, car, Jars la question q:li r.ous cccupe, il est impossible de dissc·r:ier les objectiis vises ces methodes de realisation, et la fin I't les moyer_s sont etroitement so:id3ires, La proposition faite par les Pa)'s~Bas de reuni;- unc con~erence de la table roncle a bim d'autres conseq:lences qt:'ur. simple renvoi de l'affaire de :ava a La Earl'. TOllte 1n base- !les negotiations et les positions resrectives des parties elles~l1len:es vont·se troUver mooifiees. Les all:orites neerlll11- daises ne s'engagent, ni a cesser les operations militaire.s qu'elles ont E..'1tl"tprises, ni a l-etablir integralement l'autorite cc la Republique d'Indonesle. En fait, e1Ies ant declare quJelles ne rendraient pas Djokjakartu. Les dirigefLnts republicains, il ne fa:tt ['oubtier, do:vent assi;;ter a la conference, non a titre d'envoyes officiels de la. Re:JUbliqlle d'Indcmesie, mais comme s~mples represerttants d'uue republique dOnt le s:atut sera fixe ulteriet:renent. Rn outre - et c'est cequi, du po~nt de Vue du Conseil de sec-.1rite, est le plus imoortant - on ~'efforcc de pla:er les negociations exclu~iveme:1t ;;ous les auspices des Pays- Bas et de reGuire la Commission des Nations Unies a jouer un vague role cor.sultatif, au lieu du roie actif prevu par la resolution du 28 janvier. L'ensemble (cs moyens e: des fins,des metltodes et dC3 huts qt1e le Conseil avait enonces dans sa resolution wr" de garantir la conclusion d'un accord equ:table et librement conse:lti de pa:t et d'a.utre 5e trouve compU:tement modifie dar.s la proposition des ?ays-Das j en effet, on retire la question a'J Conseil pour la remettre e:'!tre les The leaders of the RC'public have seen 6is lates': tactic of the Dutch authorities for wl-.at it is, and have wisely rejet.:ted tb~ invit.ation. I am confident th.:.( the Security CClund1 will nO': permit itself to be drawn into t11:s plan and that it will on no <:lccount authorize the Unite'c Nations Commission for Indonesia to participate in the proposed confererlce at The Hague. I submit that the so-called Netherlands counterprop05al m115t bt considered in this light if it is to be considered a': all as a factor in :he situa- :ttion. Jt h a new g<l.mbit, but the object of the Netherlands is the same; namely, to challenge the competence of the Security Council, to defy (ts authority, ta by-pass its decisions and, ulti- Illately, to impose its will on the Indonesians by persuasion if possible or, if necessary, by :orce. The Unit~d Kations Commission in [ts report of 1 March [/1270: warns the Council both of "the progressive deterioration of the situation in Indonesia" and of "the aUJ!;mented tang!:!" tu world stability which must result". These were wise and prophetic words. The Netherlands :luthOI·iti!"s 1tave built a wall d s]ence arour:d the military situation in Indonesia. However, the Security Cotmci1 is not unaware of the changing military pictme in Indonesia as a res:.tlt of the increased activity of the Indonesian gl1f"rrillas. The time may soon came ..·-<len the terms of the prese:lt resoldion, which make no mention of troop withdrawal or delimitation of territory, no lon~er reRect the actual military lJu:::;itiun or stre:1gth of the Republic. Unless the Council chooses the easy path of letting events take tl,eir course and qllestions resolve tl~emselves, it must reinforce fbe clecisi:::ms it has already taken and compel observance of sllcb decisions though the appropriate meaSL1res providerl for in t11e Charter. The Commission's report speaks of the "augmented rla~ger to world stability w~ich must reS:.llt" from the failure to solve the Indonesian problem. I represent 'here a collntr~r whose interests are specially affected by the continuar.ce of this dispute. It was my privilege to atte:ld the Ne.'.v Delhi CorJference on Indonesia. I must rf'po'rt 7.0 the Security Council the grave concern which all the delegates to tllat Conference of nineteen Asian cO\lntr.es felt on this question, over arc! beyond the restrained manner in which they eondllctcd their deliberations, ;i\1ln the measured terms in which their recommendations to the Cotmtil were couched. I express a sentiment shared by tll tbe members of the Confere:J.ce whe:J. I say that. we appreciate the consideratiDn that was given to our modest contribution toward a just a11C satisfactory solution of the Indonesian problem. TtI'. Security Council is well aware of the request cO::ltained in the New Delhi resdution of 23 January that "in the event of either party to the dispute not complying with the recommencations of the Secnrity CounCil, the Security Council shall take Les di~ige2.nts de la Reptlblique d'Indonesie ont juge la derr:iere taeique des autorites neer:an~ daises a sa ;uste valeur et out sagement refuse l'invitation qui lenr avait eM adressee, T'ai la conviction que le Conseil de secur:te ne se laissera pas gagner i te projet et qu'il n'autorisera sous .LUc\.:n prctexte la Commission des Nations lJ::lies ?our l'Indonesie a participer a la conference qui doit se tenir a La Eaye. ],estime qu'il taut examiner la prete:ldue (ontreproposition des Pays-Bas en ter:ant compte des cDl1siderations que je viens d'exposer, si tant est qu'on puisse la regarder comme un eJement de la situation. C'est une nouvelle manceuvre, mais l'objeeti: des Pays-Bas reste le meme; ils cherchent, en eiIet, acon:ester la competence du Conseil de securite, abraver son autorite, il toumf'.r ses decisions et, en fin de compte, a imposer leur volonte au peup1e imlonesien par la persuasion si possible et, s'il le fallt par la force. La Commission des Nations Unies, dans son rapport du ler mars [S/1270L a averti le Consei1 de "I'aggravation progressive de la situation en InulJnesie" et l'a 111:S en garde en merr,e temps contre "le danger croissant qui en resulte necessairement pour la paix' mondia1e". Ce sont des paroles sages et prophetigues. Les autorites neerlandaises ont fa~t planer le silence sur les evellements mi1itaires d'hdonesie. Toutefois, le Consei! de securite n'ignore pas que la situation militaire en Indrmr"~ie s'est modifiee a la suite d't111e recrudescence cl'activite des partisans indonesiens. L'benre n'est peut-etre pas etoignee ou 1es dispositions de la reso:ution actuel1e, dans tesquelles il n'e:;l question ni de retrait eles troupes, ni de delimitat:on de tenitoire, ne corresponaront plus a :a si~tlation militairc veritable ot1 a la force de la RepubJique. A moins que le Conseil ne f)re£ere prendre le parti iacile de laisser les evenements suivre lettr cours et les problemes se resoudre d'eux-memes, illui faut renforcer les decisions deji\. prises et :es iaire respecter au moyen de mesures appropriees prevues par la Charte. Le rapPort de la Commission fait allusion au "danger troissJ.nt pour la paix mondiale qui n~sulte neeessairement" du fait que le problerr:e indonesien n'a pu elre l'esolu. Je represente :ci un pays dont lcs intth€::s sont particulierl'ment atteints par la prolongation du differend. rai. eu le privilege d'assister a la Conference sur l'Indonesie qui s'est tenue a New-Delhi. J'ai le cevoir de signa1er au Conseil de secLllite les graves preoccupations que cette question inspire it totts les represc:Jtants des dix-neuf pays d'Asie ainsi. <1lte ..-If'. la moderatian dont ces pays ont fait preuve au tours de leurs debats et dans la redaction des retornmandations qu'iIs ont ad~essees au Ccnsei:. ]'exprirne le sentiment de tous les memb:'es !le la Conferencc en declarant que HOUS 2pprecions a sa juste valeur I'attention accorclee a la mocleste contribution que. nous avians apportee i une so'ution ec;uitable et satisfaisar-te de la question indanesienne. Le Consei! de .securite se rend certainement compte du sens de la requete coriten"Je dans la rc~olt:.tion de New-Delhi. el"l date du 23 janvier, ou i1 est ~ecommande que, "au cas Oll l'une des parties au conflit ne se conformerait May I conclude my remarks with the re:ninder that there is still time-althotlf.h the time is getti:1g very short-to salvage peace ar.d freedom iu A~ia and to create between the democr?cies of western Europe and the emerging democracies of Asia a fund of common f"itlt and common purpose instead of the heritage of anger, violence and hate which is {.~rtai[l to be the aftermath of the forcible reimposition of colonialism in our part of the world. Mr. PALAR (Republic of Indonesia): The pre..eent state of the Iooonesian question, as illtlstrated in the documents before us, can be characferized brietly as follows: the NetlJerlands Governt:1en1 maintains its att:ttlde 0:' non-compliance with the Council's resolution of 28 January. Instead of complying, the Netherlands Government has presented a plan wnich says that sovereignt)' will be transferred to the United States of Indonesia a year earlier fllan is provided for by the terms of the 28 Ja:mary resolution. I~ we could forget-indeed, if we were allowed to forget-the sad exper:ence 0; our previous dea~ings with the Dutch, we might overlook the fact that we ;;re dealing with the Netherlands ()n an internat:onal level under the atlspices of the Serllrity Council, and we would sigh with relief and rejoice over the fact that the Nether~ lands will trar.sfer complete sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia this coming- Jnly. Thus, a free, soverei~, indepf"-orlent LJnited States of Indonesia wauld be established only six months later tl:an 1 January 1949, the crigi:ml date set for:h in previous agreements we hz.d with the Du:ch. To " world which is losing its patience with thf'm, to the Security Council, and to us, the Dutch present their plan :n be following te:npting forcn: they tell us that the aim of the Sectlrity Council ar:d of the Netherlands Government is precisely :he same; nam~ly, [1e tear.sfer of so\ereignt)' to the United States of Indor:esia. The Security Council wants a procedure in line with its resohdon of 28 Jant1<lry; but the n.1tch, in a s'.lrprising rc.vcT3Zl1 of the stand to which they have adhered all along, now ::onsidcr the Se~urity COl\r:dl procedure too slow, and they ha're therefore come fo:ward witl: their own plan for a speedier pruc~dure. The. Dutch present their plan as :f it CDt1ld bring about tbe desired results approximately one year earlier. The m"nner ir: which the D>Jtch preser.t their plan would make it seem the greatest J.lot;t;ible error on the pa:"t of the Security Council and of the Republic not to accept this Dutch plan with open ar.1JS. [ndeed, we would ur.doubtedly accept these Dutch proposals ,,,·haleheartedly if we could for- M. PA:.......R (rndon~sie) (trrultit de l'allgfais): Les documents dont nous sommes saisis pennet· tent de resumer corr.me suit l'etJt de la question indoncsiennc: le Gouvernement des Pay,~-Ras continue a. ne tenir <J.ncun compte de la. reso:ution d:! Conseil de securite en date du 28 janvicr. Au lieu de s'y conformer, le Gouverner:lent neerlan· dais a presente un projet aux termcs duqucl il transfererait la souverainele aux Etats-Unis d'Indanesie un an avant la date pn~vue dans ladite resolution. Si nous pcuYions oub:ier, ou plut5t si on nous ]E.issait oublier la triste experience que nOLlS avons acquise dans nos tractations aYec :es P3ys-Bfts, nous potrrions negLger le fait qtle )lOllS traito:ts en ce moment avec ellX sur le plan international, sous les auspices dt: Consei! de securite, et nous pour,ions pousser un soupir d~ .sOLllagemcnt et nous rejouir de cc que les Pays-Bas proposent de t~ansferer, an mois de juitlet, la totalite des droit.s sol1verains a·.1X Etats-Unis d'Indonesie. Ainsi, des Etats-Unis d'Indonesie :ibres, sQUyer<1ills t:t illuependants seraient crees six mois seulement apres le 1er janvier 1949, date qui :wait ete primitiveffient fixce dans nos accords anterieurs avec les Hollandais. A un lnonde auquel i1s commencent a hire perdre patience, all Conse;l de sectdte et anous· merr.es, les Hollam':ais pnesentt":l1-t cc projet sous une forme tentante. Ils affi:ment, en effet, que le but qu'ils cherc:tent :i atteindre est exactement le meme que celui du Conseil de securite, a savoir le trangfert de la souverainete anx Etats-Unis d'Indonesie. Le Coose] de securite vcut qu'ils suivent it eet egard la methode prevlle dans Sa resolution du 28 janvier; quam aux Hol1andais, ~envel-sant d'une r:1aniere surprer.ante ['attit'.lde qui Hait la leur pendant toute cette afbire, iis dec1arent maintenant cue :a rnethJde preconisee par le Conseil est (rop- Jente et mcitent en ;;n-ant leur propre projet qui comporte une pr(lcedure plus ra?idc, lis af:lrment que leur projet pour~ rait avancer de pres d'un an la realisauon des )-esullats desires. A en juger d'<lr-n~·" 1:1 maniere dont les Hollandais presente:lt leu, projet, le Comei} de securite et la Repub1iq'Lle commettraient une erreur des plus gr<lves s'ils ne I'accueiJlaient pas avec empresst":ment, Or, iI VG. sans dire que nous accepterions les propositioll3 des Pays·Bas de grand ceellr si nous We are not trying to be unkind. We really feel no need to be unkind, and certainly not to Mr, van Roijen, who defends t!le Netherlands case excellently and b:n.vely. \Ve aTC only establishing the harsh trutl:s of the matter. We know that, at this ioport<;nt time i:1. history, the Netherlands, notwithstanding its pretensions of still having the situation under (ontr.o\ is tortned by a bad colonial conscience ;t:1.d i.~ tom by fearful doubts ·abcut the soundness of ar.y step which it has to 'take regarding Indonesia, Thus, the DJtch arc trying to shield themselves befurd:and from any eventual mistakes which might result from these steps. When 6e High Representative of the Crown, Mr, Beel, in his memorandum to the United Nations Commission for Indonesia, in the Commission's report of 1 Marc:l, says that "the Netherlands Government is convinced that all parties conr.erned should first of all endeavour to resutne discussions on tlle basis of mutual appreciation nnd confidence", then I a~ inclined to think of my cuunlry today, of our bllfT1ed villages, of our women and children who have hecome tr.e victims of the Dutch military action, of our brave gu~rriJIa fighters, who are being tortured in such a bestial manner by Dutch soldiers thal, in nc.wspapers in the Nether;ands and in the Netherlands Parliament itself, it has bef'n called shameftll. J accuse the Netherlands anuy before this world forum of using nazi methods in Indonesia, Let me quote from some letters of Du:ch so:diers in Indonesia whit:1 were printed recently in Dutch newspapers; ", .. and on the other side, there are no more wounded men beca use they are killed .. the.re is no more pardon. We have been giving them pardon for two years already and the situation has not :mproved ' , , and that now belongs to the past. Anyone who makes a wrong step is shot down . . . we took several prisoners and they had sworn by the Koran not to say <;,.nything'.. Also not to say where they had hidden their weapons, Yet, what must you tlo in such n situation? Plainly try to beat it ot:t of them, Dut I take my hat off to these gentlemen. As hard as metal.· They said notr.ing. But finally, after they have heen beaten unconscious so many times, something comes out of them." In ;l seccnd letter, we reau about the trentmellt accorded a man suspected Gf being a solder in the TNl, th.e Inconesian National Anny: "That evel1ing and on the iollowing evening he W:l.S treated brutally, was kicked m.::.ny times in the back which I saw with my own eye~; 9-u~,la seule attitude que ,nous puis3ions adopter a ! egard des Pays-Bas, c est de nOlls demander: queUe interpretation les Hollandais eL1x-me:nes donnent-irs a leurs paroles si ,eduisantes, et qu'y a..j:-il derriere ces paroles? ·~ous ne no".1S appliquons pas cl. etre tnalveiI. larots. NL:uS ll'aYUllS vmintent paslieu d'etre mal- \'e~na~ts, surtout a regard de M,' van Roijen, qUl defend avec tant de talent et de courage la cat:se cles.Pays~Bas. NOllS ne faisons qu'etablir id la dure verite. Nous savom que,:i ce tournant important de l'histoire, les Pays-Bus, tout en pretendant qu'ils ont encore la situation ell main SO:1t tourmentes parce qu'ils ant conscience d'avoi; applique une mauvaise :nethode co1onia.le, et sont en proie a des doutes atroces quant cl. la sagesse de toute mCSLlre qu'ils doivent prendre. I'll 111<"10- nesie, Aussi les Ho11andais cherchent-ils a, se proteger d'avance contre les effets de toute erreur qt:i pourrait resulter de ces mesures. Lorsque le Hau'! Representant de la Couronne~ M. Heel, declare, dans son uH~Iliorandum n la Commis3ion des Nations Un:es pour l'Indonesie; lequel figure dans le rapport de cette CommissioJ:!- er: date du ler mars, que "le Gouyernemen~ des Pays-Bas est convaincu que toutes les parties interessees deivent, en premier lieu, s'~fforcer de reprendre les discussions sur la base d'une cnnsicieration et d'une confiance mutuel1es-", je ne puis m'empecher de penser n mall pays '::el qu'il est aujcurd'hui, de penser a nos villages. incer.dies, ;j, nos femmes et it nos enhnts tomhes victimes des mesures militaires entreprises rar les HoLandais, a nos braves par.tisans, tortures. par :es soldats neerlandais d'une maniere si bestiale, que, meme dans les jotlma:!" neerlandais et au Pallemcnt des Pays-Bas, on a dO reconnaitre que c'etait une hante, t>evant cc forl1m mond:a1, j'accuse l'annee' neerlandaise de recourir en Indol"Jesie a des methodes nazies. Permeltez-moi de citer quelqlles lettres de soldats neerlalldais en Illdoncsie q·Ji ont ete imprirnees recemment dans les journa\1x des Pays-Bas ~ ", , . Et, du cote oprose, il n'y a plus de blesses~ car on les tue . ' . 11 n'y a plus de merci. N omi; leur avons fait grace pendant deux ans et la situation ne s'est pas amelioree .. , Tout ccla appartient de:;onrM.is au passe. Quiconque faitun faux pasest abattu , .. Nous avons fait plusieLlrs prisonniers; or, i1s avaient jure sur le eoran de ne' rien di~e. Ils avaient aussi fait le se:rment de ne·. pas .eVeleT l'endroit ou ils avaient Cache leur!J. armcs, Que faire en pareH cas? 11 est clair Qu'ili faut Ies battre jusqu'a ce qct'ils 8.l'ouent, mais Jedoi5 mettre chapeau bas devant ces gentfemen. lIs son~ durs comm~ fer; Us n'ont rien Jit. Toutcfois, !orsqu'on les .a batttls plusieurs fois jl1squ'a ce qu'ils en perdent c.onnaissance. on finit par en, tirer quelque chose." Une ~utrl' lettre de:rit la fac;on dont fut trait& un homrr,e qu'on soup~ont:ait d'appartenir a. la. rN!, ('est-a-dire al':rrmee l'ationale indonesienne~ "Ce s(Jjr~l:i., ainsi que It soil' suivant, on l'a traite avec brutalite, en lui dot:!flant a ma-ir.:ttes reprises des eoups de pied dan.s. le dos. Et yoici> toget~er with three other men whose names he mentIOned. and wh.o stayed behind as spies. The next mornIng he trIed to snatch a marine's weapon b!lt l;e was overpowered by three mell who tied hIm m such. Cl: way that he couldn't move a linger. In tha! pOSltlon ~ lay on the ground the whole day wIthout recelvmg food or water, and I have even ,seen how a marine kicked him in the back o~ hiS head. Yesterday morning at about six o clock he was shot to death by a secret service man somewhere in the woods." Finally, from a third letter I quote: "There was an article in the Vrij Nederland ~bout the maltreatment of native prisoners. That Indeed happens qU;ite often. Dump them l1nder a stream; £lit .thelr stomachs with water; and m~ny other thtnr;s. ,-;- What do you think of a pT1~one: . who didn t know anything and kept mamtalllIng' that fact but who, after h::lving been hung by his toes for some time confessed where all kinds of papers were an'cl when a meeting of the chiefs of the bands would be held ?" The Dutch are using nazi methods in Java today, and I fear for our people there, not only be;catlse of these testimonies by Dutch soldiers themse1v<"s, but also because I know what the Netherlands Army did to my people in South Celebes not so very long ago. I desire an investigation, by noy international organ having the necessary comptence, of the methods now being employed by the Netherlands Army in Java, S1.1rnatra and Madura. I want this mvestigation because I know what happened in South Ce1ebes. There is an official Netherlands report about South Celebes which the Netherlands Governmer.t dared to show only in strictest confidence to the members of the Netherlands Parliament, but which they did not permit to be published. Everyone in South Ce1ebes knows that two years :Lgo the Dutch shot or tortured. to death 40,000 people there-men, women and children. Dutch circles have claimed that there were no more than 5,000 people mtlrdered that waYI but let the Nether1:Lnds Government publish its own official report on those happenings in South Ce1ebes, that report which they are so afraid to let the world See 1 -When Mr, Beet speaks of "mutual appreciation and confidence", I think of the reports I have received telling of the systematiC IIlurderby ess~y~ dc s·empa;e; de l'arme d'un fasitieNnarin, n;als I1 fut maltme par trois hOf)1mes qui le Egoterent de tel~e maniere qu'il ne pouvait plus remtte,r un dOlgt. Dans cette position, il est re~re ~ouc~e su.r .Ie sol tol1te la journee, sans avoir ni a bo1re m a manger. J'ai me-me vu un fusiliermadn le trapper'du pied sur la nuque. Hier mlitin vers six heures, il a ete execute dans les boi~ par un homme du service de renseignements." Voici enfin une troisieme lettre OU il est dit· "Le journal Vnj Nederland a pUblie un arti~le sur 1es mauvais traitements qu'on inflige aux prisonniers indigenes. En effet, cela arrive fort souvent. On les jette a I'eau, on remplit leur estomac d'eau et on leur fait subir bien d'autres chos~s encore ... Que penseriez-vous d'un prisonmer qui ne Cesse d'affirmer qu'it ne sait rien, mais qui, apn~s avoir passe quelque temps suspendu par 1es orteils, £lnit par indiquer ou se trouvent toutes sortes de documents, ainsi que la date et le lieu ou se tiendra une reunion des chefs de bar.desr" A Java, les Hollandais appliquent aujomd'hui les mHhodes nazies et j'ai peur pour notre pcuple la-bas, non seulement a cause des temoignages fournis par les soldats neerlandais eux-mcmes, 'mais aussi parce que je sais comment l'armee des Pays-Bas a traite, il n'y a pas longtcmps, mes compatriotes clans le sud de l'ile de Ulebes. Je demande qu'un organe international, dote . des pouvoirs necessaires, fasse une enquet!'. sur les methodes que I'arm~e neerlandaise emploie actuellement a Java, a Sumatra ct aMadoura. Jc tiens a ce que cette enquete soit faite parce que je sais ce qui s'est produit dans le sud de File de Celebes. 11 existe un rapport officiel, pub1ie par les autorites neerlandaises, sur la purtie sud de rile de Celebes, mais ce fl.'est qu'a titre strictement confidentiel que le Gouvernement des Pays-Eas a ose montrer ce rapport aux membres du Par1e~ ment neerlandais, et i1 en a interdit la publication. Tous leshabitants du sud de cette lie s"vent que, il y a deux aDS, les Hollandais ont execute ou torture amort 40.000 hommes, femmes et enfants dans cette partie de rile. Dans les milieux neer- 1andais, on a prHendu qu'il n'y avait pas eu plus de 5.000 personnes assassinees de cette maniere mais que le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas pUbli~ done son propre rapport ofl1eiel sur les evenements qui se sont produits clans le sud de l'ile de Cele:bes, Cl'. rapport qu'il a tellemcnt peu:r que le monde voie! Lorsque M. Beel parte "d'une cor,sideration et d'une confiance mutuelle", je ne peux m'empecher de penser aux renseignements que fa; re~uS et It does not befit the Dutch to expect us to resume negoti.ations "on a basis of mutual appreciation and confidence". We have no confidence in the Netherlands, and the reports of the Committee of Good Offices fully justify Otlr mistrust \Ve desire the resumption of negotiations, but negoti<ltions under the auspices of the Secmit} Council. We desire the resumption of neg"Jtiations, bllt not Orl the basis of "mutual appreciation and confidence". We desire thi'; resumption of negotiatioDli' on the basis on which they have always rested: the basis of hard facts, the ba."lis of the balance of powe~ in my country, in S0I1th East Asia, and in the world. Tttis is the reality, a reality which the Dutch should not try to camouflage with beautiful words which strike a ratIJex forced note after two Dutch military attacks on the Rept:blic of Indonesia. It is on the basis of our harsh expel'iences that my delegation has considered, in all its aspects, the quc:~tion of the Netherhlluk pr()posal b accelerate the transfer of sovereignty. ~ think it is fairly obvious that this announced ac;:e1eratio:I is the bait held Ollt to make the Security Council and the Reptlblic of IndoneSia accept tbe Netberlands plan. This annOltnced acceleration has ta screen the fact that the Dtttch, in rc.a~ity, have not complied wi6 a single rlf'ln:lTlo of the Security Council after the launching of their second mil:- ~ary attack. The Netherlands binds the speedy transfer of sovereignty to the simultaneous establishment of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union. In an official Dutch elucidation of the plan, it is stated that "the Contents of those sections of the (Nether~ lands) constitution which embody the results of previol1s consultations will be the only limitations for the Netherlainds". The sections referred to are in the recent amemimf'nt to t'1e Netherlands constitution which concerns the new relationship between the parts of the former Kingdom of the Net1'.erlands- Holland, Indonesia, Sudnam and Cllf;u;;ao---and deals especially with the formation of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union. In this offici<.ll ducidation, it is statd that the contents of these sections of the Netherlands constitution embody the results of previous consultations among the parties concerned. This is a deliberate prevarication, and I challenge the Netherlands Government to deny this. The truth is that the draft amendment to the Consti:utioll was sul)lrJitted to the Nctherlnnds Pa.r1iame~t without prior consultation with the governmental administratiOn> of the so-cal1ed overseas territOries; tile Indies, Surinam and Cura~ao. In fact, the Dutch determined for themselves the main outlines of the formation of the Netherlands~Indonesian Union by acce?ting this amendment at the very time tl~at the :'-1ethcrlands r:.nd Indonesian de.!e~ gations in Indonesia were still occupied w:th negotiations abollt the formation of the Union. 11 ne siecl point aux Hollandais de compter que nous consentions a 'reprendre des negoeiations "sur la base d'une consideration et d'une confillnce mutuelles". Nous n'::tvons pas tonfmnr:e dans les Pays-Bas, et 1es rnpports de 1<1 Commission de bons offices justifient pleinemcnt notre attitude. Nous souhaitons la reprise des negociation5, mais seulement sous les auspices du Conseil de secur;te. Nous desirons cctte reprise, mais non sur :a base "d'une consideration et d'une confiance mutuelles". Naus desirons que les m~go-­ eiaticns reprennent sur la base qu'elles Dnt toujours eue, c'est-a·dire en partant des faits Jlositifs et de la notion de l'equilibre des, forces dans mon pays, en Asie du Sud-Est et dans 1e rnonde entier. Te11e est la n~alite, et 1es Pays·Bas ne devraient pas chercher a la camoufler suus des paroles seduisantes, qui sonnent plutot faux apres les deux offensives militaires lancees par les Hollandais contre [a Republique d'Indonesie. C'est en se fondant sur cette dure experience que ma delegation a examine, sous tous ses aspects, la proposition des Pays-Bas d'acce[erer le transfert de la souverainete. 1l est assez clair, it. mon avis, que cette proposition n'est qu'une amo:"ce qui doit nmener le Conseil de securite et la RepubEqtle d'lmlonesie a accepter le projet des Pays"Bas. En pr<Jmettant d'accelerer ce transfert, le!> HolLanclais cherchent adissi:nuler le fait que, depuis qu'ils ont lance leur se::onde offensive, i1s ne se sont pas confOrmes a tlOe seule uemande du Conseil de securite. Les Hollandais tiennent a ce que ce tran3fert rapide de la souverainete soit synchronise avec la crea~ion de l'union neerlando-indonesienne. Nous lisor:s clans un commentaire officid du projet publie par les Hollandais que "les dispositions des articles de la Constitution (des Pays·Bas) enon~ant les resultats des consultations anterieures seront les senles limitations qui existeront pou:" les Pays~Bas". Or, les dispositions en question font l'abjet d'un amendement apporte recemment a la Constitution des Pays-Bas. Cet amendemeIlt precise les nouveJIes rebtions entre les dlfferentes parties de l'ancien Royaume des Pays-Bas, a savoir: la Hollande, l'lndonesie, le SuriIlam et le Cura<;ao, et traite notamment de la creation d'une union neer1ando-indom~sienne. Dans ce comment;\ire officiel, j] e~t dit que les dispositions de ces articles de la Constitution neerlandaise consignent les resultats des consultations anthieures entre les parties interessees. C'est la unc contre-vel"ite flagrante, et je mets le Gonvernernent des Pays-Bas au den. de dire le contraire. La verite, c'est que le projet d'amenclement ala Con.~tit·Jtiona ete presente au Parlement nee,landais sans consultation prealable avec Les administrations j?,'ouvernelllentales des territoires dits d'outre~mer: lndes orienta1es neerlandaises, Surinam et Cura~ao. En fait, les Hollandais ant determine seuls les grandes lignes de la ftlUre union neerlando-indonesienne en acceptant cet am...nrlemf>nt au moment meme ou' les dete-- gations nee:landaisl2 et indonesienne en Indonesie~ poursuivaient des negoeiations en vue de lacrea-.. What does the amendment to the Netherlands Constitution provide? In section 208 sub-sections 3 and ~' it is stated that the Unicn, r.eaded by the Sov('relgn of the Netherlands, will guarantee tl".e juridical warrants and a good governme:1t in Indonesia. We do not place a very h:gh value on the: privilege of sharir.g sovereig:1ty with the Netherlands, and cert<lin1y not if it is to be the Union wl:ich is to guarantee the juridical warrants and good government for Indonesia. If the Un:on exercises those h~!>ic. functions of sovereignty, what kir.d cf sovereignty will Indo~ nes:a then have? That is why we have nev~r accepted a:1d will never accept the Union as outlined b the N etherland~ Constitution. That is why, in our opinion, the rO',md table c~nferen:e at which the Netherlancs will be l:mited by t!1e terms of its ConstitutiGn will never lead to a solutio:'! of the problem. The proposed dcceleratiuJl 0; the transfer of sovereignty, as presented by the Dutch in their proposals. of 26 February, to bE' carried out simultaneously with the estah1ishmer:t of the Netherlands~Indonesian Union within the limits of the Netherlands Constitution, c<r.nnot possibly take place; there is not even a guarantee of a Tell1 transfer of sovereignty, mllch less an a:celer~ ation. The only guarantee of 2. transfer of sovereignty lies in a statement of the Netherlar.ds Gover:lment, and the Re{)orts of tlle Corrmitcee of Good Offices m!lke it abundantly clear how one has to evaluate a guarantee contained in a statement of :hc Ne:herlands Government. Mr. Koets, the Director of Cabinet of the High Representative of t:1e Crown in Indonesia, has informed our leaders on Bangka that t:le purpose of the roun!:! table col1fl'rencE' is the advanced tnnsfer of sovereignty, real, corrplete and un~ conditionaL How can the Netherlands reconcile th:s transfer of real and complete sovereignty with sect~on 208, sllb-sections 3 and 4 of their Constituton? Is the representative of the Netherlands prepared to clarify this point? I ask for this clarification hecause without it I expect that the Dutcl:, masters in unilateral interprctatiofl, intefld to create a new interpretation for the word "sovereignty", one which will fit into the scheme of their Constitutional limitations. But 1f they should do so, 1 reaUy think that this lime, at least, the Dutch will not be able to convince anyone but themselves that what they will then pre:se:lt to the world as sovereignty has anything to do with real sovereigpty. How are these assurances compatible WiUl a statement made to a British co~res:}Ondent by Mr, Giehen, who handed over the ijvitation to attend thp round table confe~ence to Mr. Soekarno? In :'eply. to the question "Mat do you mean by sovereignty?" Mr. Gieben remarked: ~n p~esence d'u:J. fait aceomi'li, mais nOllS n'nVD!lS Jamals acccpte cette conception unilat~rale que les Pays-Bas ~e font cl'une union, Que prevoit l'amendemE'nt i la Constitution ~eerlandaise? Aux paragraphes 3 et 4 de l'artide 208, il est dit que l'union, ala rete de laqueJIe se trouvera le Souverain des Pays-Bas, f\SSUrera tou:es garantie3 juridiques et Cln ban gOl1verne~ ment a l'Ind03esie. Nous n'attachons pas u:J.e tn~s grande vdeur au privilege qui consiste. a partager la sOl:verainete avec les Pays-Bas Sllr- ~ou~ ~i c'es~ l'uniot: qui doit assurer les gar~nties Jlmdlq'JeS et un oon gouvernement au peuple indonesicn. Si c'est l'e.nion qni t'.xeree ees attributions essentielles de la souverainete, de que! ger.re de souverainete jouira done l'J:ndonesie? Voila pourquoi nous n'avons pas accepte et n'accepleroJl.5 jamais une l.;nion du genre de ce\le <jui est prevue dans la Constitution neerlandaise, Voila pourquoi, a notre avis, cette coderence de la table ronde, a laquelle les Pays-Bas seront tenus de rester dans les Iimites fixees par les dispositions de leur propre Cons:itut:on, n'aboutira pas a une solution du probleme. Ha/er le tr:msfert de l~ !lQltvNainete, wmme l'ont suggere les Pays-Bas dans leurs propositions du 26 feY,ler, ee transfert devant interyenir en meme temps que semit etablie l'union neerlandoimJollesiell:le clans le cadre fixe par la Con!ltitutio:l neerlandaise, est absolUlIlent impossiUe; on n'a meme pas la garantie que ce transfert de souverainete sera reellement effeCltlc, e:Jcore bien mains qU':l aura :ieu plus rapidcment. La seule garantie d'un transfert de sotlverainete reside dans une declaration du GouvcllIement neerlandais; or, les rapports de la Commission de bons offices ne montrent que trap clairemcnt quc11e valeur it faut acco:deratine garantie donnee dans une declaration de ce GQuvernement. M, KQets did de cabinet de la Commi!lsion de la Couronn~ neerlandaise pour l'Indonesie, a informe nos dirigeanls .i Banka que la conference de la table ronde aurait pour but de hiter le transfert de souv~rainete sw l'Indonesic de faljOll reelle, conp1ete e':. incond!t,ionnelle. Comment les Pays~Bas peuvent-lls conc:her ce transf~rt d~ ~ou~ vt'rairete reelle et cc:npJete avec les dIspOSItions des paragraphes 3 et 4 ce l'Astidc 208 dc :cu.r Constitution? Le represent<1nt cles Pays-Bas, eS~·ll pret it elucider ce point? ~e de?landc c:! eclalrcissernent. car, sans ce1a, J~ m attends a ce .que les Pays~Bas, qui sont p~sses maitres en matiere d'interpretation unila:era1e, don~ent,,;ne not.l"e11e ir:terpre.tation au mo: "sotlverametc '. u.ne lflte;-- prc:tation qui s'acconie avec les restncllOns pr~ VtlcS par leur Consti1ution..Mais, clans ce.cas, Je c~ois vra:ment que <::.ette £015, tout a'J moms, les Pays-Bas ne convaincront personne, sauf eu)Cmemes, que cc qu'ils presentent ~ll monde sO'JS le om de souverainete a que!q11e chose de commlln n . , avcc la. veritable sot:veramete. Comment ee-s ~.ssurances peuvent-elles se conci~ lier <,-vec I.:l. declarAtion f,aite a.un corresponda~t de presse britanni9-U!: p~r M: GlclJen;,qUl a remlS , lX. SoekafflO j'lOvltahon a la c:on:erence de la ~ble ruutie? /I la question : "Qu'entendez.vo,us par souverainete.?", M. Gieben a donn~ la. repanse suivante: Why has the ~etherlands come forwarc wit]l th~s plan in such aI: attractive ciisguise? It IS not because it is so arxious to hand over to Indo~ ll,esia real, cO!Tlplete and ttnconditional sovereignty, nor because i: has suddenly decided that the Ir.donesian people have become ripe for independence, but only because the Netherlands wants to avoid implementation <.If the Security Council resolution, avoid the withdrawal of their troops, avoid the release of the Republit:a, leaders and the restoration of t!1e RepUblic, and avoid. the resumption of negotiations between two equal parties under be auspices of the Security Council. having considered what tht: Dutch aims really are it wit be useful to examine how the Dlttch pla~, to reach their goal. To 'carry out their aims, the Netherlands waneS to invite what it considers to je "all parties con:::.erned" tu a round ta.hle conference to be held at The Hague, to discuss "the earliest possible transfer of sovereignty and the simul:aneous establish:nent of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union" and so on. This round table tonference will be hel::! under the chairmanship of the Netherlands Minister for OverseaS 'l'erri:ories and, I qJote from the Commission's R~?ort : ."The Netherlar.ds Govern:llent is prepared to consider toge:her witl: the parties concerned the merits of any 'Proposed solution put forward at the conference by any oi the par.ies, and ..."- I want to stress this Fart of the stc:tcmcnt-"and to examine in how far it is compatible with its :;esponsibility". May I draw the atte:ltion of the members of ·.lie Council to the tone as well :;s to the content of this quat<ltion? T]le :-ietherlands, wl:ose inter- :lation2.l prestige has never bef\O ns loIV as it is now; the Netherlands which is currently facing: a threateni:lg political crisis ir. its own country; :he Netherlar.ds v/hid: in Indonesia can no longer Cb:.l11t OIl t;l(': continuing support of its federalist friends wd which daily 5nds i:sel£ in a worse military position ns a' resll1t of our guerrilla forces, bis same Netherlands, :n the statement quoted above, adopts the attitude of self-confident, se~f-righteous, paternal friend who, without any di:p.culty wh..tsoever, can reduce a world problem like that of Indonesia, which h<:.s been on the international level for more than 0. year and a half, to a simple domest:c matter and, simultaneously, usurps for itself any unal decision on this problem bv an a:lnouncement that it is prepared "to examine i::i. how far it is compatible with its responsibilit)'''• d'Indone~ie aSsurneraient ['elt:ere sOl1\'erail1et§ . , . . , IDalS avcc ccrtamcs reS,nctlons au debut. Pr-r excmple, la detense, les aff&ires etrangeres les fiUilllces et deu:x ou trois autres scrvieca de' peu d'import~nce seraiel':t dirige~ par :-JO:.lS pendant un c~r:alll temps. Je :le petlX'. pas dire pendant COmDle:l de tenl?s, Puis, au momen: du transfert d,cS pouvoirs ~n ces n:atieres, se posera la que,,;- hon des relatlOns des Pays-Bas ant les ::>rillces indigenes, qui SCll1t touj ours n~gies par ur. traite speciaL" Pourquoi done les Pa.ys-Bas naus offrent-ils un projet ptes€nre sous une forme aussi attrayante? Ce n'cst pas parce q~I'i1s sont n!ellemcnt desireux de transferer R l'Indonesie une souverainere reelle, con:plete et sans condition, 11l parcc qu'ils ont decide subitemf'.nt f]t:l': le peuple il1dcnesien emit mur pour l'independance; ce qui [cs poussc, c'est simplement le desir d'rvitf'r la n;ise en ceuvre de la resolutlon du Consen de securite, le rC£rnit de le~r3 troupes, la liberation des dirigeants republicains et le ret<J.blissement de la RepubJ:que et, cnnn, d'evite!" la reprise des negoeiations entre les de11X parties sur un pied d·'egalite ~t sous le~ au~pices du Consei: de seCllr:te. Apres ,avoir l'x:amine ce .que sont en reali~e les buts des Pays~Bas, il est utile d'e:udier la manle.re dont les Eollandais !:e pmposent d'::.tteir:dre c:es .buts. PO:.tr arrive:, alett:'s fins, les Pays-Bas veulent inviter tous ceux qn'ih <'.Onsiderent conime "les parties i:lteressees" a. partieipf';r it une conference de la table ronde qu: se tiendra aLa Haye, afin de discuter les dispositions a ")rendre "en vue de bate!" le plus possible le tn>.nifert de souverainete sur l'Indonesie, et de constit..ter en :neme temps l'un:on ncerlundo-indonesienne", etc. Cette conference de la tab:e ronde se tiendra S011S la presidellce du Minist:rc des Pays-Bas ponr les territoires cl'outre-mer et, j e cite des extra:.ts du rappo:"t de la Cmnmi.ss:on; "Le Gou-vern('ment des Pays-Bas est pret a examiner, de cO:J.cert avec les autres parties et en fonC;lio~s de leurs merites propres, tot1tes solutions qui seraient presentees a la conference par l'une quelconque c:t>s parties. et" - je tiens a souligner ce passage de la o§c1aratioll :-- "et a determiner clans queJ:e m~.''llre ceS solutions sont compatibles avec ses respcnsa:i::ilites." Puis-je attirer I'attention ces menl.bres du· C6nseil sur le ton a-.tssibi-en (lue sur la teneur de cette citation? Les Pays-Bas· n'ont jc.mais vu Jeu:'" prest:ge panni 1es ndions du monde tomber aussi has que main:enant. Ils sont sans cesse'· r.le:1aces d\me crise politique a l'i.nterieur meme du pays. En Indonesie, ils ne peuvent plus comptei' sur l'appui constant de lcurs arnis fedhalistes; et· leur situati-on rr,ilitaire empire chaque jour par suite ties opera:ions <le nos partisans. Or, ils prennent, d"ns la de.claration citee c.i-dessus, I'atti,- tude d'un ami sur de lui-meme, vertueux et pater w nel, qui, sans la moindre difficulte, peut ramener un probleme mondial comme c.elui de l'Indonesie, qui depuis plus d'un an et demi revet un ca:-a.ctere international, ~ :me sinple question d'ordre intedeur. En meme temps, iLs s'arrogent le droit de decider en cernier ressort en la matiere, en annon- 'iant qu'ils sont prets a "determiner clans queUe mcsure" les solntions proposets "sont cotnpatibles avec [leurs) responsabilites". co~operate with the United Nations Commission fQr Indonesia in the: same manner as it has cn~ operated with the Committee of Good Offices to promote disc7ssio.ns to attain as quickly as possible the goal which IS common to all pa:,ties." If this were not s'lch a seriol1s matter, I should suspect the Netherlancs Government of jestir.g. It was the Committee of Good Offices itself which re?orted that during the greater part of !ts existence i.t was unable to carry Dut Its ftmctlon as a commntee of good offices because of Dutch manoeuvring, and that, in addition, the Dutch left no stone unturned in their efforts to keep the Committee of Good Offices outside the negotiafons. I want to remind the Council of the Committee of Good Offices' report [S/~1561 stating th:1.t there were still too many pOSSible avenues open for negotia:ions ur.der its al1~pices to )t1stify a second Nether!ands military action. It l~ clear that the ComC11ttee or Good Offices belf felt injured by the manner ir: which the Dutch dealt with it. And now the Netherlands declare, unJlushinglr. that it is willing to cooperate with the Umted Nations Commission for Indonesia in the same manner. T~e Security Council decided to enlarge the ;lDwers of be CommWee of Good Offices because they considered th:$ ttecessary for bringing about a solution in Indonesia, but it is clear1v the Dutch intention, :;Lll eernonstrated hy their' statement, cited above, about co-operation with the Commission, to reduce tl1e powers of the Corr.mission to the mere functions of good offices. Indeed, accorrlil\B" to the terms of the proposed round table conference, these powers will be even further reduced, since the Commission's role at the round table conference will not be one of giving assistance, but one of attending a conference under Dutch auspices at which the Netherlands will have the final say. That the Netherlands intends; to keep the final decision in its own hands is clear froIr. the Netherlands statement which reads that at the round tab~e conference, the Netherlands "is prepared to examine in how far any proposed solution is compatible with its responsibility", When wc Indonesians hear the Dt:tch talk about their responsibility, we becOlT.e bitter. At the time when the Netherlands was committed to solemn agreement with the Republic to submit to arbitration any differences of opinion about the Linggadjati Agreement, the Netherlands fou.nd it compatible with its responsibility to break that Agreement by starting a military action. The Dt:tch also found it compatible with their responsibility to violate the Renville Agreement of 18 December 1948, by starting their second mili~ tary actio:l, when according; to the Committee of Good Offices itself, the possibilities for negotia~ ~es po~rparl:rE pennettant d'atteindre le plus rapi~ emen.. pOSSIble les objectlfll communs a :Olltes les partIes." .. S'i1ne s'agis~ait pas d'une question aussi grave, Je so~p~on,!eralS le Gouvemement neerlandais <le vOlllor:- plalsanter. C'est la Commission dc bons offices [5;1156J elle-meme qui a fait tonnaitreque, pendant :a plus grande partie de son exj5~ t;nce,. elle s'est trouyee dans l'inpossibilite de s acqUlt;ter des foncbons qui lui incombent en sa qu"lJte de' Com'1tisslon de bons offices a cause des m~nceuvr~s des !lol1ar.d~is.; elle a aj~llte ql1C C<;l1X-Cl navalent nen neglige pout" la tenir it , I'eeart. des negocil'.tions. Je voudrl'.is rappel(!r tu Consell le rapport de la Commission de bons offices [S(1156] qui affinnait que les possibilites de poursU!vre les negociations sous les auspices de la Commission Haient trop nOl11brenses pour qu'une .de\lxib:ne i.ntervention :I?ilitaire des Pays- B~s p:11Sse se Justfier. I1 est eVident qUt: la ColI1~ lTIlSS10n de bODS offices elle-meme a ete blessce par la fa<;on dont :es Hollandais I'ont traitee. Et mabte~~nt, les ~aYs-Bas ~eclarellt sans vergogrte qu lis SOll! prets i coop~r~(" de semblab1c millliere avec la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'ln~ donesie. Le Cor.sei1 de securite a cecide d'e1argir l~s pouvoirs de la Commission de bons oGce;;, car il a est:me qu'j[ etait necessaire de le :airc si on voulait arriver aune solution en Indonesie; mais les Pays-Bas ont bien !'intention, comme le mcntre c1airement la dedaration citee plus haut ccncemant la cooper<l.tion des Pa)'s-Bas a,,·ec la Co:nmis"ion, de reduire ceHe-::i au simple role d't:ne Commission de bans offices. En fait, selon les termes mt:llles du projet de conferenre rlP.:fL table ronde, les pouvoirs de la Conmission serDnt et1~ core plus reduits, pui;ql1e celle-ei ne serai,: meme pas appelee apreter SOlI a~de, mais simplement a assistcr it une conference tentte sous :es auspices eU Gouvernement neerlandais et a Iaquelle les Pays-Bas auraied le dernier ~not. Que les Hollanclais entendent rester maitres de la decision finale, c'est ce qUl re~S;(lrt dairement de la declaration du Gouvern~ment des Pays-Bas se1or. laquelle ala Conference de la table ronde, le Gouvernen'ent des Pays-Bas determinem "clans quene mcsure les so:utions [qui se:-aient presentees a la Conference] sont compatJbles avec ses responsabiIites.', Lcrsqlle muS, Indonesiens, nous e~~~n~om les Bollandais parkr de kurs responsaJlhtes. r.ous. devenons amers. Au temps ou les Pays-Bas eta,ient tenus par un engagement soJ~rmel ,n'ee la R.epublique ce soumettre a I'arbttrage t~lUtes dlvergenees d'opinior,~ a~ SU:,~t ~e .l"Acccrd ~e Linggadjati, ils ont Juge qu 11 et-ut con:pahble avec leurs responsabilites de violer eet accord en engageant des operations militaires. I1s o~~ ~galem:nt juge compatible avec leers responsabllttes de VIO· ler :'Accord du Renvillf'. le 18 decembre 1948, en entreprenan: leur deuxieme action militairc, alors. 'que, selon la Commission de bons offices elle- Let liS lock at who is being invited to this round table conference. The Netherlar.ds has invited even Surmam a!ld the Dutch Antilles, "::mt, unfortunately for the Netherlands, Surinam apparently has a better understanding of its position thar. the Dutch give it credit for, and it has already reje~ted participation in the round table conference. Surinam has decided to send only observers. It would be much more in line with the spirit of the Arnerk:an l,:ountries, and it wOl1:d seem far more natllla:, if Surinam and CuraJ;ao were to participate in a confej·ence of free American nations, tban ill a round table conference of part.~ of a crumbling Netherlands empire. Les Hollandais ant egalement invite a ceUe conference les Etats, cunstilues dam les parties du territoire qu'ils occnpent, qui sont representes al'Assemblee consu1ta:ive fede.rale designee sous le nom de EF03, Etats qui sont egalement connus sous le nom de federalistes. Je me demande si les Hol1andais ne commencent pas a avoir des cr.aintes au sujet de cette invitatiu:l auressee nux f6dernlistes, surtout depuis le derttier rapport de la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Indone.sie [S(12!OjA.id.l] ou iI est dit: "•.. La converS<ltion ientre les chefs republicains a BMk:l. et] le Comite de liaison du SPO a amene cc dernier a considerer que la restau~ ration de In Republique et de son Gouvernement etait n~eessairf", conformelhent a la resolution du Conseil de secnrite, comme condition sine qmJ, non pour qu'un GOI:VCrnely.ent republicair. agissant ice titre pl,isse prendre des decisions valables au sujet de La participation it la conference de l~ table ronde." Ceci est entiere:.llent c.liffercnd de ce qt1e les memiJresdu Conseil de sccu:-ite OOl entendu (lU debut de la sennce lorsQue le represe!'.tant des Pays-Bas a declan~ ~ue rctablir muintenant :a Repub1i:Jue serait, a tort Ott it raison, interprete ::Jar nombre de feder-ali.'\tes cili ont mis dans le Conseil toute lem :onfiancc, ~om111c une trah;scn de leur cause. Or, d'apres le rapport de la Cam- :nissian, ce5 memes federalistes est:ment que le Th~. Dutch have also inv:ted to this conference the States set up in Netherla.nds~occupied territory which are represented in the so-called BP03 or Fe:ien.1 Assembly for Consultation, also known as the Fecler:diHs. r wonder if the Dutch are not growing nervous about this invitation to the fi'edf'nlis:s, es[lecially since, in the l",test re;:JOrt from the United Natio:ls Commission for Indonesia (5/1270/~dd.lJ, it is stated: ". . the conversation [between the Republican l.eade:s in Baugkal with the contact com=ittee of the EFO has resulted in the l1r.derstanding of the EFO of :he nec{:ssity of restoration of the Repub~ lie aC)rl its guvernment in accordance Witl1 the Security CoLtncil resolution, as a condition .sine f]lW 11011 for takir,g cOl11?etent decisions as a Repdlican government with rega~d to partidp:ttian in the round table cO:lference". This is an entirely different story from dlt: one heard by the members of the Secl1:'ity Council earlier today when the represel~tative of the Netherlands told the Council that to restur~ the Republic now· would mean tha: many Federa:ists, who hac put all of their faith in the Council, would rightly or wrongly consider it as u betrayal of their C<lllse. NOli'>', the same FecIcraEsts, accord~ ing to the report of the Commission, consider the restoration of the RepubUc as the cD:ldition .sine qlta iton for their own participation in the round table conference, together with the Republic. This atti~ude of the BFO mu~t IJa,e come as quitc a surprise to tl'te Dutch, consicering that the Crown Commissioner in Indor.esia, Mr. Bee1, has exerted a tremendous ammlnt of pressure on the Federalists in an effort to avcid just such a development. However, despite this unanimity of opinion on the part of the Pederalists and the Rept:blic, which in the Dutch v:ew would certainb represent the whole of Indonesia, the Nethef"iand's has still rdllseJ to restore the Republic. ~onferencede la table ronce anx cotes de la Republique. Cette aUitude cll1 nra a du etre, pour les Holtandais, une reelle surprise, si 1'011 canside:-c que le Commissaire de I,. Cot1ronne de la Couronne en Indone~ie, 1L Dt':el, a excTcc une pression enorme sur les Hderalistes, precisement ann d'eviter une telIe evolution. Ce;:>endant, malg:e cette ur.animite d'opinioIl Jes federalistcs et de la Re[Jublique - qui, aux: ye·.lx des Hollandais, representent certa:nement l'ensemble de l'Indonesie - les Pay~-nas .ie .refusent toujOUI'S i re.tlblir la Republique. Voyons maintenant qui est invite aeette confe~ rence de Ja table ronde. Les Pays-Bas ant i:wite meme le Surinam et les Antilles neerlandaises, mais, malheureusement pour eux, le Su,inam comprend apparemmer.t miellx sa situation que les Hollandais ne l'en ont eru capable, et n deja refuse I'offre de pGrtidper a la conference de la table rande. Le Su:-inarn a decide d'envoyer selllement des obserV2teu::,s. 11 serait beat1caup plus conforr.le a l'esprit des pays d'Amerique, et il sp.mblerait beaucoup plus naturel, que le Surinam et Cura~ao palt:cipe:nt a une conference des nafons arr.ericaines libres plutot qu'a tlr:e confer-('r:c/, ne la table ronde des parties d'un empire neerlandais qui s'ecroule. r<~tablissement de la Republiquc est la. condition sine qU1J, non de :et1t propre participation a la In any event, now that it is clear that the ~ethetlands is facing a united Indonesian fron:, It seen13 proper to me at this point to refute a N~therlar.ds ;Jropaganda slogan wbich has not hllled to make an impression in sever<J.l parts of t.he world. Tle Ketherlands has always, and de~ llberatel)', tried to create the im'Jression that H:e Republic Was supported by only· one-third of tbe Indonesian pOpLllation, and that the other two- thirds of the population, re?resented hy the 50- called Federalists, were siding with :he Dutch aga.inst the Repcblic. At one of the previous m~etings f389th: C?f the Security Cour.cil, I pOlOted out :hat thls propE.ganda line is a de- liberate misrepresentation of the t~uth. :,\Jaw we have th proof before us, in this report from the United N a:ions Commission for Inc.onesia The Netherlands has also invited :0 this round table confere:lce representatives of the Provisional Felleral Gcvcl'r.mcllt of Indonesia, the .<;8.me Pro- visiollfll Federal Government which was set up in contravention of the Renviile Agreement. Wllal part of Indonesia is represented by this Provisional Federal Goverr.mer:t? CertairJy not the areas or the population of the so-caUed Federal lerrilol-jes, even less so the territory or the people of the Republic of Indonesia. Neither territo~i6l1y nor politically C<tn those people be cOH;;iJered rcprescnbtives 0: IndnoeRi;t at all. But, in a formal, legalistic sense, they do repre~ sent something; they, along witl] be Crown C07l- missiOJler, represent the Nethf'r:ands in Indo- nesia. And finally, tr.e Dutch invited the President o~ tl-.e Rep,lblic of Indcnesia to afpoint a delegation to participate in lhi... conference. The :;.;Jethi'r- lands refuses to restore be RepuuEc 0: Indo- nesia. It refuses to re-establish the Presiden:- and the Cabinet uf tbe Republic of In::lcnesia :0 its lawful functions, catlSing disrurtion cf normal contact between our President and people, the democratic cuntat:t which is tr.e basi;, the juMi- fication a.nd the gU<lrnntee of his presider:cy. Nevertheless, the Dutch invite tbis Pres:dent to appoi:lt a cekgatiol: to participate in the round tab:e con !'erence. The Netherlands does not ccnsider it "COlY- patible" w:th. its responsibility to allow our President <:nd the other political leaders to be Le,; Pays-Bas ne col\siderent pas q:J'il soit "corrpatible" avec leurs res.oonsabjJjte~ d~ laisser retablir dans lenr situation legale a Djokjakarta notfl: President et :lOS autres cllefs polit:qtlcs; ils ~l1eguent, entre ~1Utres, que la ~i~ua[!o: a Djokjakarta est encore telle, que leur secuntc ne p(ll1n,d pas etr'e assuree. A-t-or; jamais dOllne pretexte plus ridiCllle et plus mince pour C<l!11011- fler ses vraies intentions? L'attitude adoptee en res~ored :0 their lawful positior:s in Jogjakarta, among other reasons because it claims :hat the situation ir. Jogjakarta is still such that the;r safety could not be guaranteed. Has anyone ever produced a more transparent and :idiclllom pre~ text :0 camOUflage his real in:etltions? The real attitl1de of the Netberlanus Gov~l'nrncnt is muth more eviJ.ent f:-om a statement mace by a higb Netherlands ofEcial a week ago when he said that restoring the RepublicaTl Goverl1n:er.t was :l.S imposs:ble as reconstrncting an egg from an reaJi~e par ie Gou'{ernement des Pays·J3a5 reS50rt beaucotlp plus clairemen: d'une dec:aratioll faite, il ya 1uit jours, pa: un haut fonctionnaire neer- lanrJa;$ qui a clit que retablir le Gouvernement republicain etait chose aus.si impossihle qm ~c refaire un ,)'.t:f en partant d'[ltle omelette, En fait, ce son: le Commissaire de la Cou:·onne des Pays- Bas et le Cabin~t neerlandais dO:lt la securite omel~t. It is, in fact, the Dutth CommissioE!,..er of the Crown and the Dutch Cabinet whose safety would be enda~gered if they were to appear in En tot~t cas, rnainte:m:lt qu'il est clair que les Pays-Has sont en presence d'un front llnkuc en. Indonesie, il me pa~ait opportlln de re:uter un slogan ~e la PYOP.agande neerlandaise, qui n'a pas manque de falre Impress;on <fans diverses -parties du monde. Les Pays-B<.S ont toujouro, et adessein. essaye de c:eer l'impression qu'un tiers smlement ?e la p.opul.~tiotl de :'Inaclllesie t!Ortnait son appui a la Repub.lque et que les deux autres ti~rs de la population, representes par les federalistcs, comme on les appelle, se range<lient du dte des FoJlau. d?is, con:re la Republiqu~. A :'une des preCedentes seances 3891:11le seance J du Couseil de securite j'ai fait remarquer que ce genre de prop"gand~ denature intentionnellerr.er:t la verite. La :lreuve en e:;t maintenant sous nos yeux, dans ce rapport de la Commission des NatlOns UnitS POUI" l'InGonesie. Les Pavs-Bas ont egaLement invite a cette conference" de la table ronde des representants du Gouvememerit federal provisGire d'rndon~sje, de ce :neme Gcuvemement federal provisoire qui fut etab:i en vio:ation de l'Accord du Renvitle. Quelle p<lrtie de l'Indonesie represente ce Gou- vernement federf.] prov:soire? Ccrtainement pas les territoires dits federaux DU :eur popda:ion, et encore moills :e territoire DU la population de la Republique j'Indonesie. Ce Gouvemement llC petit nutle:nent etn consi&~re corr,nte repro~scn­ hmt l'Indonesie, :li dt point de vue terr:torial, ni du po:nt de vue ?oHtique. 'l'outelcis, uu point ue Vlle formd et rigour':llserr.ent juridiqtte .i I'e:<ces, i1 repr~er.te q·.lelque chose: avec le Commissaire de la Couronne, il represente les Fays-3as en Indonesie, Entin, les Hollandzis ont invite le :?resiJenl dc la Republique d'Inaollesie a designer une dele- gation pour -prendre part a cette conference. Les Pays-Bas refuse:J.t de retabEr la Republique J'fw dDnesie, lIs refnsent de retabEr le President et le Cahinet de la Republique d'Indonesie dans le~rs fonctio:Is h~gaJes, rampant aillsi les rapports rlor- rnaux entre notre President et le peup1e, ces rap- ports democratiques qui sont a la base de sa ha.ute foncfon et en sont a la fOls la justification et la garant:e. NeanmQ:us, les Hollandais invitent ce Pr~siden~ adesigner une delegation poUr parti- ciper it la conference de la table ronde, There is a very obvious endeavotlr b)' the Netherlands to separate Ollr President, our Cabi- net and our political leaders from out' gallant troops and guerrillas who have staked their lives for the defence of our freedom, freedom as we see it. They are fighting, and we along- with them. ag-ainst the D\.Ttch brand of p:-efabricated and con- ditional freedom. These guerrillas are the new element ill the. situation and, I venture to say, at present, the decisive element in the Netherlands- Indonsian issue. The reports which came through from Indonesia have already established beyonc doubt the precarious military position of the Dutch in Indonesia, and it is because of the pre- cariousness of their situation that they have now embarked Upon the most vicious, inr.uman anG ruthless campaign of brutal reprisals against the population in an effort to terrorize it sufficiently to keep it from supporting our troops. The larger towns <lre in the hands of the Dutch but the countryside is ours, militarily and ,dministra- tive1y. This holds true, not only for those parts of Java and Sumatra which were under our con- trol before 18 December, but also for those areas which were occupied by the Dutch before they started their second military attack As this sitl1atio::l will inevitably have an important bear- ing- on any solution of the Indonesian issue, I request the Security Council to order its military observers to report on this situation. I would like, at this point, to remind the Council of the fact that, according to the Com~ mission's report, the military observers have not, up tin now, rcccived the necessary co-operation from the Dutch in the diSCharge of their duties, and that their repeated requests for situation maps and maps indicating the deployment 0: troops were flatly refused; but the United Nations Commission for Indonesia reports relating to that subject speak for theltlSelves. The actual military situation is sufficiently indi- cated by our troo:>s' recent attacks on Jogjakarta which was temporarily occupied by our troop~ at the end of February. Our guerrilla tactics do llOt envisage any per~ne.nt occllpation of cities, as that would only subject us to heavy armoured attacks by the enemy. Therefore, after our troops ha.d achieved their political objective it- launching thiS attack on Jogjakarta, they withdrew again. B.ut if the Dut.clJ con~imle their so-called tnop- pmg·up operations With the support of their warships and bombers, then I can very well visualize a situation where other cities like Soeta· baya and Batavia will be subjected to guerrilla penetration. These are all indications of the com~ plete rea.diness or. the part of our troops to fight 1t out WIth the Dutch on the battlefield. It is this, new aort. dec:sivl" element in the struggle, the victorious guerrillas, which the Dutch are trying to elimirulte militarily. Failing that, they are now trying to manoeuvre our President into such a position that he would be responsible for their elimina:ion. What the. Dutch En meme temps, ils s'efforcent de faire ~epren­ dre aux- Federalistes ~ qui avaient :utte pour ne plus etre de simples fantoc:hes - le role-auquel les Hollandais tes avaient rfleglles a l'origine, Daus le rapport supplementaire de la Commission de.. Nations Unies po:.!r J'Indonesie datee dll 7 mars 1949 [S/12JOjAdd.1j, il est dit que le BFO regarde le retablissement de la Repllblique et son Gouvernement conior:nemer.t a la reso· Mion du Conseil de securite cornme la condition .rine q4G liCIt de la vali&tl!, de 111. decision dl1 Gouverl1etnent republicain COrlcemant la parti- cipation a la conference de la tab:e roude. De plus, it est entmdu pour le BFO que la partici- elation eventuelle de la Republique d'Indones~e l la conference ce la table ronde ne prejugera nullement la position de la Com:nission des N a.~ tkms "Ullics pout" ['lr.do:lesie, preVUf par 1:1. reso- lution du Conseil de securi:e. Or, que s'est-it passe apres que le BFO eut 2.dopte a l'unanin~jte une resolution exprimant cet:e manihe de vOlr? Quelques heures plus tard, des membrcs du SPO ont rflOu la visite du Commissaire de la Couronne neerlandaise qui. leur ,l dit que le Gouvemement des Pays~Bas ne pouvait pas accepter leur reso- lution, car elle impJiqee qu'il se confor:ne a la resolution du Conseil de securite. M. Bed a done At the same time, the Dutch are trying to force the Federalists, who have struggled tD f:ee themselves from the status of puppets, back to that role which U~e Dutch had originally relfgatcd to them. In the additional report fron: the United Nations Commission fa: Indonesia, dated 7 Mardl 194() [S/1270IAdd.J], mentiDn is made of the understancing bv the BFO of the necessity of the restoration of the Republic and its govern- ment in accordance with the Sec:.lrity Cwnril's re-1lo1ution, as a condition sine qua non for laking a competent decision as a Rept1blican government with regard to uartieipation in the round table confcrer.ce. It \\.:3S also IlOdl'r!'ltood that eventual participation by the Republic of Indonesia in the round table conference should not prejudice the position of the United ~.ations Con:mission for Indonesia in accordance with the St!curity Cou;1cil resolution. But what happened after the BFO had unanimously adopted a resolution embody- ing this understanding? A few hours later some members of the BFO were visited by the Dt:tch Commissioner of the Crown who to:d the:n that their resolution was unacceptable to the Nether- lands Government because it would mean- Dutch compliance with the Secu:ity Council's resolution. Mr. BeeI therefore proposed tl:at the BFO with- draw their reSOltltion" A.", a consequence of Mr. Beel's action, the BFQ session failed to achieve anything- because nine oct of the fo.uneen rn:m- bers opposed the withdrawal of theIr resolutlOn. This has been the n,ost recent attelllpt by the Dutch to try to force a split in the Indonesian ranks. ~t1ggere au BFQ de retirer sa resolution. Par suite de l'jhtervention de M. Beel, la session du BFO n'a pas abouti a un resultat, f"euf de ses quatorze Olembres s'opposa:J.t au retra~t de la resolution. C'e~t la te.ntativc la plus recente qu'aient bite les Hollandais pour essayer de provoquer une scission dans Ies rang~ indonesicns. Les Hollanuais nCllS prescntel1t la conference de la. table ronde comme un Doyen d'accelerer le transfert de la souverainete. Ce Qu'ils se propo-· sent n~ellement en reunissant cete conference, c'est, tout d'abord, c'ecarter la resoluti~ du Conseil de secur~te du 28 janvier, de rMulre les. pouvoirs de ~ Commission des ?'J"arions Unies pour l'Il1donesi.~, ai:lsi que (I'~vite: le rctrait oes troupes neerlandaises et le retabllsseme,nt de la Republique; c'est, en second lieu,. de fair.e passer le prDbl~me indonesien du ?lan mternatlOnal all plan national, sUr Iequel .la dec:sio~ hn~l,e .appar~ tiendra amt Pays-Bas: c"es!, ellsUlte, d"evlter de traiter avec la Republique ell t~nt qu'au,re partie au differend, qualite qui lui a etc reconnue par le Conseil de securite; c'es:, enfin, de rabaisser nos vaillar.tes troupes au rang ele rebelles. Avec toute l'energie clont nous disposons, nous refusons <le faire notres les oJ:jectifs vise~ par le:> Pays- Bas. The roend ta;le c.onference is being presenteu to us by the Dutch as a means to accelerate the transfe: of so-...ereignty. What the Dutch are actually aiming at with this conference is, in the first place, to put aside the Security Cou?-cil resolution of 28 January, demote the Umted Nat:ons Commission for Indonesia and avoid the withdrawal of Netherlands trooos and the res- tor-ation of the Republic; seco~dfy, :0 reduce the Indonesian' problem fro:n its international :evel tu a domestic onc where tile N ethe1'land~ will have final discretion j 6irdly, to avoid dealing with 6e Republic as the other party in the dispute, as recogn:zed by the Security Council, and fourthly, to degrade our gallant troops to the statllS of rebels. With all the emphasis at our disposal we reject the Netherlancs aims. In these conditions our Government, function- ing in Jogjakarta as a Government of the Republic of Indonesia-which Republic is to be retored (starting from Jogjakartai under the supervision of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia-will decide in full Cabinet session about possible participation in a round table conference with the Dutch. At that Cabinet session our Government will then forml1late its views on the structure and composition of a round table conference in which it would partici- pate. Such a decision, taken in fuli Cabinet session, will not only be the sole lawful Govern- ment decision but will also guarantee that such a decision will be based on the actual situation in IndQnesia and that such a decision could be enforced since the members taking part in such a Cabinet session would include not on1v those of our leaders who are imprisoned at present but also those Cabinet members now 1eacling our Emergency Government, and the other five Cabinet ministers who are leading our troops in their tigbt against the Dutch. But the first and predominant question with which the Security Council is now faced is not ,the consideration of any Netherlands plan, but the fact that the Netherlands has not yd imple- mented the Security Council resolution. The proposal to hold a round table conference is based on the negation of the primary conditions laid down in the Security Council resolution. The report of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia establishes this fact clearly. It is clear that the implementation of the Security CotlOcil resolution is and remains the paramount question before lIS, and the Security Council knows that our Government has not yet had the possibility of taking- a decision on this question because the Netherlands has not g-iven it the possibility of discharging its responsibilities. 1 should also like to stress the fact that the task of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia does not end with the theoretical transfer of sovereignty but continues up to the moment when a free, sovereign and unoccupied Dl1ited States of Indonesia has been achieved. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): 1 should like to s1ate that the United States Gov- ernment continues to believe that the Security Council's resolution of 28 January represents a ~ant ses fonctions a Djokjakarta en tant que Gou- vernement de la RepuLlique d'Indonesie -- Repu- biique qui doit etre retablie (a Djokjakal'ta pour commencer) sous le contr61e de la Commis~ion des Nations Dnies pour l'Indonesie - decidera, en seance pJeniere du Conseil des Ministres, s'il participera a la conference de la table ronde avec 1es Hollandais. A cette seance, notre Gou- vernement precisera Cl" que doivent etre I'organi~ sation et la composition de la conference pour ljtl'il y participe, NOIl seulement une decision prise ainsi en seance pUiniel'e du Consei1 des Ministres sera la seule decision du Gouvernement qui ait une va1ettr lega1e, mais on aura 13, garantie qu'elte se fondera sur la situation de fait en Indonesie et qu'elle pouna etre executee: en dIet, cUe sera prise, non seulement avec la.parti;ipatio.n de nos dirigeants actuellement empnsonnes, roam auss! avec celle de ceux de nos Ministres qui sont a la tete de notrc Gouvernement de salut public et celle des cinq Ministres qui conduisent nos troupes dans leur 1utte contre les Hollandais. Toutefois, la question primordia1e en presence de 1aquelle se trouve le Conseil de securite n'est pas le projet des Pays-Bas; c'est le fait que les Pays-Bas n'ont pas encore execute 1es dispositions cle la resolution du' Conscil. La proposition de reu- nir ttne conference de la table roude implique la negation des conditions fOlldamentales enoncees dans la resolution du Consell de secnrite. Cela ressort dairement du rapport de la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Indonesie. I1 est evident que la mise en reuvre de la reso- lution du Conseil de securite demeure la question capitale, et le Conseil de secmite sait que notre Gouvemement n'a pas encore pu prendre une decision a Cl" sujet parce que 1es Hollandais ne lui ant pas donne la possibilite de s'acquitter de scs fonctions. Je voudrais aussi insister sur le fait que la tache de la Commission des Nations Unics po'l.r I'Indo- nesie ne prendra pas nn 10rs du transfert theo~ rique de la souverainete; la Commission devra poursuivre son ccuvre jusqu'a ce que des Etats· Uuis d'Indoncsie lihres, souverains et indepen- dants aient ete constitues. M. AUSTIN (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (rraduit de l'anglais): Je tiens a declarer que le GOtlverne- nement des Etats-Unis est toujours convaincu que la resolution du Consei! de securite En date du Five weeks have passed shce the Security ·COtlncil Oldopted this resolution. Duril:g those five weeks, it must be admitted, little progress has been made in the implementatior. of the provisions ·of the CottlH'.iI'E resolution. There has been neither actual nor comr1ete cessation of hostiltties in Indonesia. and act:ve warfare, both gt1crrilla .,mclorg;tni%ecl, is continuing to a variable ex:ent in differ(:nt areas. Tl]is has been reported to t1S by the United ::-.Taticlls Commission's Military Executive Board in the Commission's report of l' ],Iarch. It is :rlle that the Netherlands has decided to lift the restrictions on the freedom of movement of :hc I~aden> of the Republic of Indonesia and that the Netherlands has stated that tr.e lifting of these restriction:; is not dcpendent on the Republican leaders' participation in the ?roposed conference tlt The Hague. We have yet to see, however, the practical results 01 this decision and the leaders of the Repttblic are, as far as is known, stir in residence at Bangka and Prapa1. In the Netherhnds' Memorandum III contained in Appendix E of the Commiss.ion's report of 1 Marc:l it is stated that the Republica;] leaders will be sul.Jject to the same re~rictions as every- body el3e, or, in other words, that they will be permitted the same freedom as other civilians enjoy in the areas lmder Nether:ands control. It does 110t appear, however, that they are free to visit their own territory ttncler Republican control or to have contact with their adl-.eren:s in d\{Jse areas. It IS apparent that the DctclJ have not o.ffered the unconditional f,eec1om which was contemplated in the Council resolution, For in- shll1ce, the Repllb1ican leaders are :1ot allowed to return :0 Jogjakarta. Furthermore, the Netherlands has indicated that it is not prep;rrec1 to restore t1'.e Government of the HepLtblic to its capltal at ]ogj.:.karta, as provided in the Councils' resolution of 28 January, We are ~tnable to understand the attitllce of the Government of the Netherlands on this question, for two reasonS: first, the provisions of the Semrity Council resolt1tion in this r~spect are intrinsically sound and reasonable: secondly, the proposed accelerated transfer et sovereignty would give the Republic the power to restore tbe ear-ita[ at Jogj<tkarta, ,"le have Iisetnecl today to what the representa· tive of the Neberlands had to say, and, among of1cr things, he said the following: "It is liop,eel that by a sup:re:ne concerted effort of all parties it shonld be possible for such a conferen~e to reach an agreement in "bOllt six weeks o~ the main principle ~or the subjects I have menttoned before, After that, another six weeks will prob- at,ly Le lJeeded, !IS far as the Ketherlands are ccncerned, for :he ratification of the agreements, after which the transfer of sovereignty cOllld take place. From that moment onward, respon~ibility fc,r the affairs of Indonesia would rest wlth the Indonesians; they would be responsible for the Cing semaines se sont eCQulecs depuis {Jue le Consei1 a adopte cette resolt:tion, On doit reCOll- mitre que l'excctttian de la resolution a fait tres peu de progres pendant ces cinq semaines. La cessation des hostilites en Indonesie :t'a b~, ni effe:tive, ni complete, et Ies combats conti:tuent avec une intensite variable dans plusieurs regions, soit sous forne d'operations de guerilla ou sous celle d'opcmtions militnires en regle. Le Comite executif rnilitaire de la Commission des Nations Unies r.ous I'a signale da:!s le rapport de la Commission en date du ler m<'.fs. It est vt'ai 'lt1e les Pays-Bas ont decide de level' les restrictions in:posees a la libcrte de mouve~ ment des dirio;eants de la Repl1blique d'Indcnesie, et iJ est egaJement vrai qu'ils ont declare que cette meSllre n'etait pas sllbordOIl'lel" .it la participation des dirigeants republie<tins a la conference que l'an pro?osc de rcunir aLa Haye, Cependmt, iJ hudra yoir quels scront 1es resultats pratiqucs de ceUe de:isior.; pour le moment, autant que I'on sac:he. les dir:geants republicains S011t tonjours en res:dencc forcee a Banka et a Prapat. Dam Jeur memora~dun; IH, reproduit a L'annexe E du rap- port de la Commission en date du le~ mars, les Hollandais exposent que ks dirig-eants rcpubli. eains seront sOl1rr:is at.x restrictions qui s'appli- quen! a tout le monde; autrement dit, its bCnefi- cieront de la meme liberte que les rtlltres civils se trOl1vant dans 1es regions soumises ~ l'autorite des Pays-Bas, Tcutefois, il ne semble pas qu'ils soient autorises a se l'endre clans le territoire qui est aux:. mabs des Rcpublicains, ni cl'entrer en contact avcc leurs partisans politiques de ces re- gions. Il est clair que les Hollandais :1e le,lr ont pas offcrt b liberte incor.ditiulllldle L:ll'iisag6c dans la resohLtion dL: Consei!. C'est aimi que I'on ne permet pas aux:. dirigeants republicaills de reto'.trner a Djolrjakart<., De p:us, les Pays-Bas or.t fait connaitre qu'ils l1'ctaient pas disposes il rc!ablir le Gou,ver.llcment republicain dans sa capltale de Djokpkarta, comme le prevoyait la resolution du Corneil en date du 28 janvier. Nom ne parve:tons pas acomprendre I'attitnde du Gouvernemen: des Pays-Bas, et cela pou' deux:. raisons: premierement, I;; d!s?o~itiom ,de la reso- lution dL! Conse] de securtte a eet egmd s~~t esscnttellcment justes et raiswnahl~s; de.llX1~­ memeut le transfert accelere de la souve:alt:ete, tel qu'ii est envisage, donner,ait i,la ~ep'J.bhquc le pOl.l\'oir de retablir sa capltale a DJo1'lakartrt. Nous ,uvo:ts entendll auj ollrd'luti 'les declaration:; du represental~t des Pays-Bas;~: a ~it ?ota1l1me~t eeci: "On espere que <.l 1es partIes s umsse:tt da~ls un supreme e.ffo~t, la Ca.n~~t'ence pour,ea, en SIX semaines enVlron, aboubr a un accotd sur. les principes fondar::tentaux a ~rop?S des C]uesbons que j'ai mcntlQl:nees .EnsUlte, tt fa~dl'a. enc:c,rc probablemcnt six semames au G~t1vel nen.ent des Pays-Bas, tout au mO~ns, pour rabfier.ces ,accords, apres <luoi le tr<ll1sfert de l!l souvcn!lncte.poIJ,rn s'effectuer. A partir de cc moment, b. dlrectlo.n des af.aires d'Indonesie incomb7ra aux,Indone- siens' jls a'Jront la c:large de falre proceder aux e.Iecti~ns, de maintenir I'crdre publiC, et:, Nous Je me perrnets maintenant de poser aux mern- tres du Consei: la question suivante: si on estitne "ue les Republicains seront en mesure de main- tenir l'ordre public dans douze semaines, sont-ils manifcstcmcnt incapnbles de le faire maintenant? Est-il certain que le retablissement de la sOUVe_ rainete de L-t Republique d'lndonesie conduirait al'anarchie que l'on nous a decrite tout a l'heure s'il etait effectue maintenar:t au lieu de l'etre c.ouze semaines plus tard? La resolution du Ccnseil de secur:te en date du , 28 janvier prevoit t'llle If' transfert de la souvc- rainete devra s'effectuer le plus tot ?ossible, ITlais elIe ne fiXl; la date timite qu'au 1er juillet 1950$ c'est-a.-dire un an plus tard que la date a laquelle le transfert acceIere est proevu. On est done en droit de se demander seriemement si les dangers dont 011 nous a parle ici et dont l'Indonesie serait menacee a la suite QU retablissement de la Repu- blique clans ses pouvoirs et dans sa capitale, Dj ok- jakarta, sont des dangers reels. En d'autres termes, ne ressort-il pas de la declaration que nous venons d'entendre que ces dangers sont puretncnt imaginaires? QueUes sont les raisons qui ont amene le Conseil de seeurite a ordonner le retablissen"lent t.lu Gouverll<:u:ent de la Rcpublique a1.\ siege ou eIle avait precedemment exerce son autorite? A u moment de l'adoption de cette resolution, :tnon Gouvernement estim<:tit - et il estime touj ours - qU'OIl ne peut admettre que l'une des parties en presence desqueIles se trouvait le Conse.il soit eliminee du fait d'une action militaire. Nous esti- mons toujours qu'on ne peut pas s'attendre a. ce que le Gouvernement n~publicain assume les rcs- ponsabilites inherentes a la conduite de negocia- tions devant aboucir aun regiernent politique. juste et durable, tant qu'il n'aura pas pu aSSUfner de nouveSl1 Ies responsabilites gouverneme~tales a. Djokjakarta, Pour que les dirigean:s republicains prennent part a des negociations serieuses. ne faut-il pas qu'ils aient la possibilite de reconsti_ ttler leur G01wernement sur leur propre territoire et de reprendre contact avec les membres du Gou_ vernement qui ont ere disperses a la suite des operations militaires, de maniere a pouvoir repre_ scnter fidelement les aspirations de leurs partisans politiques? The Security Council resolution of 28 Jamlary considl:rs the earliest practicable date for that transfer of sovereignty, but it puts the deadline off until 1 July 1950; that is to say, admittedly a year later, a year after that accelerated deadline. T;'1erefore, the serious question arises whether the dangers spoken or here as probable aftermaths of the restoration of the Republic to power at itscapital in Jogjakarta, are real. In other words, does not this address to whid. we have listened. admit that they are not, that they are merely fancied dangers? Wh2,t were the reasons which led tie Security Council to order the restoration of the Govern- ment of the Republic to its fanner seat of authority? My Government b~lieved at the, time of the adoption of the resohltlOn, and contmues to believe now, that military action cannot be permitted to eliminate one of the parties before the Cotlocil, We continue to believe that until the Republican Government can resume govern~ n~ental responsibility at Jogjakarta, it cannot be expected to assume the responsibil:ties which negotiation for a just and lasting, political settle- ment reiuite and entail. For the Republican leaders to take part in any negotations which are rp.eaningful, must they not have the opportunity to assemble as a government in their own terri- tory, to re-establish the contact of that govern- r:Jent with its members who a:e dispersed by the military action, and to be able to represent accurately the wishes of political adherents? This is not a qLtestion of form or rhf'toric; it is a vital question. We have always understood, as has the Ne6erlands, that any agreement for a settlelnent of the political fLtture of Indonesia would have to be reached with the Government of the Republic. The Ling~djati and Renville Agreements amply bear out this point r am glad also to :late that the Netherlands has confirmed i:s point of view in this respect in connex.ion with the proposed conference at The Hague. There would be little of pennanent value in any plan which would fail to take this central fact into account Ce n'est p:\s l10e ql:estion de forme ni de rhcto_ riql\e; c'esl uoe question fondamentale, Nous avons toujours pense, comme les Pays-Bas d'ail_ leurs, que tout accord reg~ant le sort politique de 1'Indonesie doit elre conclu nvec le Gouvcrne_ ment de la Republique. Les Accords de Linggad_ jati et du Renville le prouvent formcllement. J e constate aussi avec plaisir que les Pays~Bas ant confirme leur point ue vue acd egard al'occasi.0l1 du projet de conference aLa Haye. Je crois qu'Utl, projet qui ne tiendrait pas compte dc ceUe condi_ tion primordiale n'aurait aucune valeur durable. In order to negotiate an agreement with the Government of the Republic, there must be responsible he:r.ds of an organized Republican Government with whom to deal. An agreement resulting from negotiations 'mdertaken without reference ta such reql;iremems seems necessarily Pour negocler un accord avec le GOUVCI'llCn1Cnt de la Republique, il faut pOllvoir traiter avec des dirige;mts responsables d'ur: Gouvernement rep\l_ blicain organise. Un accord resultant d~ negoci a _ trons entreprises dans cl'autres conditions ~s.t condamne a rester lettre morte. C'est pour cette, Dans le second memorandum qu'i! a s::mmis a la Commission, le Gouvernetnent des Pays-Eas pretend que, si on permettait au Gouvernement de: retnurner a Djokjakarta, on devrait renoneer a tOtlt espoir de realiser un transfert rapide de scu· verainete, eorume l"envislgent les Pays~Bas, ear, une fois le Gouvernell1ent republicain retabli a Djokjakarta, les ~IolIandais ne poulTont plUS maintenir ['ordre public. Toutefois, le Gouven;e- ment neerlandais declare en me-me temps que l'07dre public pO'jrrait etre mainteou dotlze semaines plus tard, en accelerant, c(]mme il le propose, le transfe7t de la sOllverainete. In the second memorandum submi:ted by the Netherlands to the Comm'ssion the Netherlands maintains that to allow the return of the Repub- lican Government to Jogjakarta would be :anta- mount to precluding the possibility of ach:eving the speedy trar.sfer vf sovereignty as envisaged by tne Netherlmds beCallf;t' with the Republican Government restored to Jogjakarta, the mainten- ance of law and order by the Netherlands would he impossible. But they also say here that it would Re possible within twelve weeks after this accelerated transfer of sovereig:lty. C'est adopter, 'semb1e-t-il, une ;Itti:!1rle ,'raiment extreme. ]'estime qu'il ressort des documents prescntes 1'an demier par la Commission de bens offices qlte l'instabilite qui existe en Indonesie ne provient pas de la presence dn Gouvernement republicain a Djokjakarta; elIe est direetem~nt imputable au fait que les negoeiatiotls engagees en vue d'un reglement politiqlle n'ont eu aucun This seems to he a very extreme position. I believe that the records of the Committee of Good Offices during the past year indicate that unstable conditions in Indonesia were not the res'.1lt of the Repl1blican Government's existence at Jogja- karta, but were direc:t1y attribtltable to the fact that the negotiations tor a politica: settlement faikd to produce any concrete results. n~sultat positif. L'intense activite de guerilla qui e:x:iste ach:el- lement en Indonesie est la consequence du fait que les Pays·Bas ant aoandonne les neg:JCiations pour p<lsser a l'actioll militaire. Est-illogique de proposer, comme le font 1es Pays~Bas, de tr~ns­ ferer la souvcroinete clans trni.~ rJU quatre mOlS a The extensive gLerrilla warfare now being carried on in Indonesia is the direct consequence of the Netherlands' abandonme:lt of negotiations in favDt1r of military action. Is it entirely con~ sistent to propose, as the Netherlands proposes, the transfer of sovereignty three or fonr months hence to an Indonesian Government which will inclllde the Republic as a member State while at the same time mai:ltaini:1g that the immediate restoration of the RepUblic in be limited area of Jogjakarta wO~lld result in c:haos? U11 gouvernemellt indonesien dont la Republique indonesienne fera partie en qualite d'Etat membre, tout cn pretendant que le retablisscment :mmediat de la Republiqlledans la region T"estreinte de Djokjakarta creeraitle chaos? Man Gou',ernement estime que, si l'inderen- dance doit e~re rapidement dOlluee a. l'Indonesie, comme le pn::voit le projet des Pays~Bas, il faut commencer des maintenant par retab1ir la Repu- bliqtle. Depuis la demiere seanc:e que le Con~eil de sectlrite a ccnsilcree a l'examen de 1:;. questIOn indonesienne [410bne seance], le GOl1vernement des Pays-Bas a propose de convoqucr une co:t.fe- n::ncc qui aurait ponr rn.che cl'examiner (Lans quelles condltions e.t par que1s tnoyens on pour- rait effectt1er le p1ns rapidement possible le trans- fert de souverainete; le projet des Pays-Bas pre- VDlt la creation simult"nee d'lme union entre les It seens to my Government that if Indonesia is to receive early independence. as envisaged by the Netherlands plan, a l;eginn:ng must be made now by the re-establish:nent of the Republic. Since the Security Council last considered this m:der [410th meetin-g] , the Nl'therlands Govern- me:1t has made a new prcposal that a round table 'cor.feren~e be held at The Hague to discass the cor.ditior.s for and the means by which the earliest possible transfer of sovereignty could be effec- tuated, wi'th simnltaneotlS establishment of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and arrangerI1ents ·for the transition period, including b.e setting up of a federal interim gove~nment, these provisions being considered in their relation to the accelerated transfer of sovereignty. Fays~r;as ct l'Indonesie, ains! que l'elabo1'2tion des dispositions a prendre pendant la periocle de transition, notamment la creation d'un gotlver- nemenc federal provisoire; cc:; di:opositions .sont destinees a faciliter un rapide transfert de sou~ verainete. We are also informed by the supplementary report of the Commission [S/1270jAdd.1] that the President of the Republic, Mr. Soekarno, has indica.ted to the Netherland$ authorities that he is not at pres~nt in a position to accept the invi- tation. He h<ll>, 'however, stated thnt he could ag;ree in principle with the purpose of such a conference, and that if certain prior conditions were fulfilled his GOvernment might be prepared to send a delegation. The principal condition is the restoration 0 f the Republican Government at ]ogjakarta in accordance with the provisions of the Security Council's resolution. There is an indication in the second ;Ippendix to the Com~ mission's supplementary report [Sj1270jAdd.1] that the non~Republican Indonesian leaders repre- sented in the Federal Assembly for Consultation are in agreement with the President 0 f the Re- public on the necessity for the restoration of the Republican Government at Jogjakarta in accord- ance with the Security Council's resolution. • The second prerequisite for the acceptance by the Republican Government of the invitation to attend the conference at The Hague is that the position of the United Nations Commission as provided in the resolution of 28 Jantlary should not be prejudiced thereby. It is our understand- ing that the Netherlands has invited the partici- pation of the Commission in accordance with the terms of the Conncil's resoll1tion, and there would, therefore, appear to be no difficulty on this point. It would be unfortunate, in otlr view, if agree- ment COttld not be reached by the parties con- cerned on the preliminary step, the restoration of the: Government of the Republic to ]ogjakarta in accordance with the provisions of the Security Council's resolution. in order to remove an obstacle to further free negotiations between the parties. If the parties came to such an agreement on the terms and conditions for holding the proposed conference at The Hague, we believe that neg-o- tiations between them at such a conference would be consistent with the basic purposes and objec- tives of the Coullcil's r~solution of 28 January which, of course, WDtl1d rem<lin in full force and effect. We believe that it would he appropriate for the Security Council's Commission to consult with tbe representatives of the Netherlands, the Government of the Republic and the leaders of the Federal Assembly for Consultation, and to assist them in reaching such agreement. If agree- Nous avons appris par le rapport supph~men­ taire de la Commission [Sj1270jAdd.1j que le President de )a Republiglte, :M. Soekarno, a fait connaitre aux autorites neerlandaises qu'il ne POtl~ yait pas, .i l'heure actuelle, accepter cette invi- tation, Toutefois, i1 a declare qu'il pourrait approuver, en principe, l'objet de cette conference et que, si certaincs conditions prealab1es etaient remplies, son GOl1vernement serait peut-etre dis- pose a renvoyer line cter6gation. La principale condition est le retablissement du Gouvernement republicain aDjokjakarta, confonn~mentaux dis- positions de la resolution du Conseil de securite. La seconde annexe au rapport supplementaire de la Commission contierlt un passage qui indique que -les dirigeants indonesiens qui ne sont pas republicains et sont representes a l'Assemble~ consnltative federale sont d'accord avec le Presi- dent de la Republiql1e quant a la: necessite de retablir le Gouvernement republicain de Djokja- karta, conformement a la resolution du Conseil de securite. La seconde condition que le Gouvernement repu- b1icain met a son acceptation de participer a la conferer.ce de La I-Iaye est qu'elle ne prejugera nullement la position de la Commission des Nations Uoies, telle qu'elle est definie dans la resolution du 28 janyier. Nons estimcns que les Pays-Bas ont invite la Commission a participer a la Conference ccmformement aux termes de la resolution du Conseil; il semble done 1U'il n'y <lit pas de difficulte sur ce point. I1 serait regret- table, i notre avis, gu'une accord ne puisse etre realise entre les parties interessees all sujet de la mesme preliminaire que constitue le retablis- sement du Gouvernement de la Republique a Djokjakarta conform~mellt aux dispositions de la resolutlol1 du Conseil de securite; il ne faut pas oublier qlle, si I'accord etait realise sllr ce point, un obstaCle a la reprise (le negociations libres entre les parties scrait ecarte. Si 1es paliies interessees parvenaient a se mettre d'accord sur les conditions dans 1eqllelles la con fe- rence que 1'0n propose de tenir a. La Haye pour- rait avoir lieu, nom; avons la conviction fIllC des negociations clans le cadre de cette conference seraient compatibles avec les buts essentiels de Ja resolution que le Consei1 a adoptee le 28 jnn- vier et qui, bien entendu, resterait en yigucur. Nous estimons que la Commission du Conseil de securite devr",,-it entrer en consultation avec les represcn!..Jnts des Pays-Bus et avec le Gouverne~ ment de la Republigue, de nH~me qll'avec les diri- geants de I'Assemblee consultative federale, et Le PRESIDENT (fraduit de l'espagnol) : En raisor: de l'heure tardive et du nornbre des orateurs inscrits, je propose de susper.dre la seanCe et de poursuivre nOS :ravaux demain. Sachant que plusieut's membres du Conseil Dnt des engagements pour l'aptes-rnidi, .ie proposerai au Consei} de teni, seance demain matin, a 10 h. 30. The PU:SlDFN'!' (t,aM/a/ed trcm Sf;a.ni.sh) : As it is getting late and I have a number 0: speakers on the list, I propose to adjourn the meeting and continue tomorrow, I know some representatives have engagements curing the a[:ernoon, so I shuuld suggest that thl" meeting be held tomorrow morning at 10,30, M. TA)l.ASSENKO (Republique socialiste sovie- tique d'Uktaine) (traduit clu msse) : Ne vz.udrait· il pas rniWJIt se rellnlr demain a 11 heures? Mr. TARASE:fKO (Uk:ainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (t1'allS1aled from Rus.riu.n): Wou~d it not be better to meet tomorrow morning at 11 a.m.? Le PRESIDENT OrOO"il d~ l'espagnoJ): T'estime qu'il n'y a pas d'inconvenier.t a suivre la suggestion dlI represettant de I'Ukra:n~. La seance commenceraa 11 heures, le premier orateur inscrit etant le representant de l'lnde. The PRESID£NT (translated from Spanish): I see no obj~ction to the procedure proposed by the represer.tative of the Ukrainia.n SSR. The meeting will Ixgin at 11 a.m. The first speaker will be tJ.e representative of India. La seCllltC€ est levee G18 "eures. The muting rase al 6 p.tn.