S/PV.417 Security Council

The provisional agenda of today's meeting appears CONSEIL DE SECURITE PROCES·VERBArx OFFICIELS QUATRIEME ANNEE No 20 QUATRE CENT DIX·SEPTIEME SEANCE "j'enue It Lake Success, NnCI-Yurk, le vendredi 11 mars 1949, a 11 hrures, PrUidmt: M, A, ALVAREZ (Cuht). Presents: Les representants des pays 51l1vmts: Argentine, C<lnac1a, Cl:inc, Cd:¥l, Egypte, France, ~orvege, Republique socialiste sov1(hiqlle d'Ukrainc, Unio:l des Republiques sodalistes s?vietiqlJes, l~oyaume-Unl, Et.'l.!s-Unis d'Ame~ nque. 2. Adoption de l'ordre du jour (S/Agend.417) 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour. 2. La question indonesienne: (1') RappoJrt, f11 date du let' mars 19-49, acrc.sse au Conseil de securite par :a Comtn:sslO11 des Nations Unies pour l'Indo:1esie con~ fonnement a la r~~o!ution du Cons-::il de securite en date du 28 janvier 1949 (5/1270 et Corr.l). b) Lettre en date du 2 mars 1949, adrcssee au ?resid~nt du Conseil de securite par le reprhenliJ.nt des Pars-Ba-so concernan.t la ~esobtior. (iu Consell en date du 28 jan- .,ier 1949 relative a la question indonesienre (5/1274), c) Rapport 'iUpp:eme[ltair~,en d~te d.uJ mars 1949 adresse au Consell de secuntf" par la Com;nission des Nations Ur.ies pour :'Ind3- ne-sie cO:lforrnemcnt a la resolution du Conseil de securite en date du 28 janvier 1949 (S/127OjAdd.l et CJrT.1), d) Deuxieme raClpor: sUpph::lJlentairc., en date du :0 mars ·1949, adresse au Conseil de securite par la ~on;l1~ission des ,Nation~ Unies pour l'Inconesle,. confcr~len!e?t a la resolution du Consell de sw:mte en date du 28 janvier 1949 (S/1270jAdd,2), 1. Ordrc du jour provisoire Le PRESID'lNT (traduit de l'espag~ol): L'ordrc du jour provisoire de la seance d'auJour- 3. Continuation of the discussion on the Indonesian question The PREswENT(translated from Spanish): Before beginning to discuss the question on the agenda, I should like to report to the Council that a letter was received last night from the repre- sentative of Pakistan to the United Nations, ask- ing, at the request of his Government, to take part in the discussion of the Indonesian question, in accordance with the provisions of Article 31 of the Ch<Jrter and artide 37 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council. The Assistant Secretary-General will read the letter. Mr. Hoo (Assistant Secretary-General in charge of the Department of Trusteeship): The letter [S/1283J reads as follows: "I have been instructed by my Government to request that, under Article 31 of the Charter of the United Nations, read with mle 37 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, Pakistan may be permitted to participate in discussions of the Indonesian question, when discnssion of the question will be resumed by the COImeil." The PRr;:SlDENT (translated from Spanish): If toe members of the Council have no objection, the request of the representative of Pakistan will be granted. At the invtitaliotl of the President, Mr. Hood, representative of Australia>' Mr. van Langenhove, representative of Belgui-In; U Ba Ma~tng, repre- sentati.vl! of Burma; Sir Benegal Rama Rau, representative of india,' Mr. van Roijen, repre- sentative of the Netherlands; Mr. Chanco, representative of fhe P'~ilippinfS; and Mr. Palar representafive of the Republic of Indonesia, took their places at the Security CoutJtil table.

As usual, there will be consecutive interpretation of speeches made by members of the Council and simultaneous interpretation of those made by representatives invited to sit at the Council tahle. Sir Benegal Rama RAU (bulw): The representatives of the Philippines and of Indonesia have dwelt at great length on tJ1e record of the Netherlands Government in connexion with its neg"otiations with the Indonesian Reptlblic, for it is in the light of this record that its sincerity and good faith regarding its latest scheme for a confen;nce at The Hague Shotlld be judged. I am anx.lOUS that I sbould Say nothing that might vitiate the atmosphere for a satisfactory sett1e- 3. Suile de la discussion sur la question indonesienne Le l1l.tSIDti:NT (traduit de l'espagnol) : Avant d'aborder l'examen de la question inscrite a notre ordre du jour, je Hens a faire savoir au Conseil que nous avons ret<u, hier soir, une lettre du representant du Pakistan aupres de l'Orga- nisation des Nations Unies, clans laque1le it de- mande, a la requete de son Gouvernement, de prendre part <lUX debats sur la question indo- nesienne, conformernent ~ux dispositions de I'Article 31 de la Charte et de I'article 37 du reglement interieur provisoire du Conseil. Le Secretaire general adjoint va donner lecture de cette lettre. M. Hoo (Secretaire general adjoint charge du Departement de la tutelle) (traduit de l'anglais): Voici le texte de la leUre [5/1283]: "le suis charge par mon Gouvernement de de· mander, confonnement a l'Article 31 de la Charte des Nations Unies et a l'article 37 du reglement interieur provisoire du Conseil de sccurite, que le Pakistan soit autorise apartieiper a la discussion do.: la question indonesienne lorsque le Conseil reprendra la discussion de cette question." Le PR EsIDENT (trad~tit de l'espagtlol) : S'il r.'y a pas d'objections de la part des membres du Conseil, je propose que I'on donne satisfaction au representant du Pakistan. Sur l'invitatiotl dlt Pt#,dent, M. Hood, repre- swtanl de I'Australie; M. van Langenhovc, repre- sentant de la Belgique; U Ba Maung, representant de la BiN/laffie; Sir BiJniJgal Rama Ratt, represe1Y- tant de fIndc; M. 'l!atl Roijen, represetltant des Pays~Bas; M. Chan(o, representant des Philip· pines et M. Palar, repl'helltlltlt de la Repu&lique d'indonesie, prelJ11ent place d: la taMe d~t Conseil. Le PRESIDENT (trMJ/lt de l'espagno-l): Comme d'habitude, l'interpretation consecutive sera utilisee pour les discours des membres du Conseil et l'interpretation silllultanee pour les discours des representants invites a sieger a la table du Conseil. Sir Benega1 Rama RAu (Inde) (traduit de l'anglais) : Les representants des PJ1ilippines et de l'Indonesie ont longuement parle de la maniere dont le Gouvernement neerlandais a agi au camS de ses negociations avec la Repub1iqtle ll'Indo- nesie, car c'est d'apres cette maniere d'agir qu'it faut juger de la sincerite et de la bonne foj des Pays-Bas en ce qui concerne leur dernier pro,iet de conference a La Haye. Je tiens a ne rien dire qui puisse troubler une atmosphere propice a un ~ctl.on 10 talnng at least the [lrst essential pre- hnllm~ry, steps necessnty for the tesu1l1ptio~ of negot1~tlOns, which are, of course, ahsobtety essential to a peaceful solution 0: the problem. In view of the broken agreements and dis- honoured pro~nises of the N~therla:1~s in the past, further promJses and assertions of Its good faith can, hardly be accepted as a substitute for positive actIOn.. Far_ from giving any indication of co- Opf'ratlOll WIth the Security Council, the Nether- lands. Gov~rnment ren-,ains adamant on the questlOl~ ot ~he. competence of the Council to deal WIth thiS ISSt1e and states that it is not prepared to c:c:rry out the Council's resolution [5/1234J, except to the extent that it is con- sistent with its responsibility for t'le maintenance of rea: freedom and order in Indonesia. In SIlP~ port of its attitude, the Netherlands Goverr.ment poi.nts_out that its nation has for three centuries gUldec. the fate of Indonesia and must continue to hear that responsibility until sovereigr.ty is transferred to the United States of Indonesia. It wattId perhaps not be irrelevant to remind the Netherlands Government in this connexion that, for a few years during the last war, :1 had completely lost control over those possessior.s and that, if the British and Indian forces under Britis11 control had not, under the authority dele- gated by the Allies in the South East Asia Com- man?,. tab;n over the responsibility for the admtrastratlOn of this area after the Japanese surrender, it would probably not have been possible fot the Netherlands Government to re- occuW these islands. This is worth remembering, especmlly n~ the ~etherlandsGovernmentth:-ough- out these diSCUSSions has strongly resented what it regards as an interference by the Security Council in a domestic issue. For a proper appreciation of the situation that has developed since the Security Council passed its resolution on.28 January [5/1234], I must emphasize some of the salient fe-'ltnres of that resohttion. T1,e earlier resohltions of the Security Council, passed on 24 [5/1150] and 28 December 1948 [5/1164 and S/1165] , had not been carried out, and the reports of the Committee of Good Offices had dearly bdieated that the responsibility for the failure to impleme:lt those resolutions rested primarily, if not entirely, on the Netherlands Government. In view of these circulTIstances and of its primary respons:bility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council decided to play a more direct part in the implemer.tation af its resolutions and reCO'n~ satisfa~tI01?- ~ux Indonesiens et retab1isse la paix: et l~ set:tlnt~ dans ceUe region de I'Asie. Je VOIl~ drals pDuvoH,croire en la sinceri:e du Gouvcrne- ment des, P~ys~Bas lcrsqu'il fait cette nouvelle offre, .ma,IS test allx,Pays-Bas de prouver qu'ils S?~t SJllteres en caoperant avec le Conseil de secll· rlt~ et. en prenant all mains les premieres mesmes essentlelle~ !Jul. s~nt necessaires pour ({ue r~pLcn­ n;:1t des negocmtIons sa.ns 1esque:les on ne saurait resoudre le probleme par des moyens paciftques, Etant donnt~ que dans le passe les Pays-TIn., ont TOmpt1 des accords et n'ont pas tent1 lems pro~1esses, de natlvelles prall1esses et des aAlr- ma~lO~s de '~onne fo! ne sauraient, de leu:- part, temr hell de mesures positives. Le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, loin de manifester la volonte de cooperer avec le Conseil de secunle demeure . . ' llltranslge~m: sur la question de la competence d~ Consell quant au prob1erne dont il s'agit, et declare qu'il n'est dispose aappliquer la resolutio11 du Conseil [5/1234] que dans la mcsure Oll elle est compatble avec la responsabilite qui lui in- ccmbe de faire regner une liberte verit.;ble et l'ordre en Indonesie. Le Gouvemement neerlan- dais fait valoir, pour justifier son attituce, que le3 Pays-Bas ont, depuis trois sicdcs, guide les destinees de l'Indonesie et qu'ils doivent continuer d'assumer ceUe responsabilite jusqu'a ce que la souverainete soit transferee nux Etats·Unis d'Indonesie. A ce sujet, je ne crois pas m'ecarter de la question en rappelant au GOl1vernement neer\an· dais que, au cours de la derniere guerre, il a, pen~ dant quelques annees, perdu completement le contr6le sur ses possessions d'IudulIe5ie et que, s: 1es forces armees britanniques et indiennes SOI.1S commandel:1ent britannique n'avnient pas, usant de l.'autorite qui avail ete conferee par les Allies au Commandcment militaire du sud-est de l'Asie, assure l'administration de ceUe region apres la capitulatior. du Japan, le Gouvernel1lent des Pays- Bas n'aurait probablement pas pu occuper de nouveau I'archipel. C'est la un point qui medtc cc ne p;;.s etn: oublie, d'autant pins I]UI" If. Gou- vemement des Pays-Bas s'est vivcment eleve, au wurs' de ces debats, contre Cl" qu'il considere comme une ingerence du Conseil de secUlite dans tlne affaire d'ordre interieur.. Pour que 1'0n comprenne bien les evenements qui se 50nt derou1es depuis que :e Conseil a adopte sa resolution du 28 janvier [S/1234], je voudrais meUre en evidence les pril1cipaux points· de cette resolution. Les resJlutions a:lterieures du Conseil, celles du 24 de.cembre 1948 r5/1150] et du 28 decembre 1948 [5/1164 et 5J1165], n'ont pas ete appH- quees, et le rapport de la Commission de bons offices a nettement indique qce, si elles ne l'ant pas ete, c'est le Go\.:vernement des Pays-Bas qui en est le principal, sinon le seul responsa-Jle, Dans ces conditions, et etaut donne la responsabilite supreme qui 1ul incombe en ce qui L:onccrnc le ma-intien ce la paix et de la securite internatLonales, le Conseil de securite a decide d'cntreprendre une action pIes direete en vue de hire appiiquer ses The Security Council called upon the Govern· ment of the Netherlands to release immediately and unconditionally all political prisoners arrested by it since 17 December 1948 in the Republic of Indonesia and to facilitate the return of offieials of tIle Republican Government to Djokjahrta, in order to enable them to exercise their appro- priate functions in fIll! freedom as a Government. The Netherlands Government was also directed to afford to the Republican Government adequate facilities for its effective functioning in the Dj ok- jakarta area ::1nd for consultation and communi- cation with all persons in Indonesia. These were to be the :first steps that were absolutely essential for the initiation by the Commission of negotia. tions between the representatives of the Nether- lands Government and the Indonesian Republic, on the basis of the prillciples Set forth in the Lir.ggadjatil and Renvillc Agreements [Sj649, ApPendices XIIl and VIII]. The Netherlands Government stRtes that it has lifted the remaining restrictions on the liberty of movement of the Republican leaders, sobject only to the general regulations applicable to everyone in the matter of travel and residence, which for military reasons are enforced in certain parts of Indonesia. The Netherlands Government explains that the restoration of their freedom is not de- pendent upon their acceptance of the invitation to the conference at The Hagpe. <lUX voyages et a la residence qui s'applique a tous les individus et est irnposee, pour des rmsons d'ordre militaire, dans certaines parties de l'Indo- nesie. Le GOllvernement <..Ies Pays-Bas ajoute que la liberte a ete rendue aces dirigeants, sans qu'illeur soit impose comme condition cl'accepter , I'ilwitation qui lellr avait ete faite de se rendre a la Conference de La Haye. As the representative of the United States of America has clearly shown in his speech yester. day [4161h meeting], what the Netherlands has offered is not the unconditional freedom which was contemplated in the Security Council's resolution. The leaders are apparently not free to visit their own territory under Republican (Ontrol or to contact their followers in those areas. What the Security Council has demanded w,ts political freedom, not merely facilities for enjoying fresh air. The Netherlands Government has made it quite clear that it is not prepared to restore the Repub- lican Government in Djokjakarta. It bases its refusal primarily all the ground that any snch restoration would mean widespread disorder and reprisals on a horrifying scale. As the representa- tive of the United States of America has pointed out, such disorders as there have been are according to the report of the Committee of Good Offices, directly attributable to the failure of the political negotiations to produce any con~ crete results, and not to the existence of the Republican Government in Djokjakarta. At this stage I should like to read a telegram which hus just been received fmm Batavia: '~ee Th.c Political Evenl. in the Re./>l.blic of l,wo_ tuna. publlshcd by the Netherlands Inform.:r.tion Bureau, New York, fI'lIoge 34. Le Conseil de securite a invite le Gonvernement des Pays-Bas a mettre en liberte, immediatement et sans conditions, tous les prisonniers politiques arretes depuis le 17 decembre 1948 clans la Repu- blique d'Indonesie et a permettre le retour a Djokjakarta des membres du Gouyemement repu- blicain, afin que ce Gouvernement puisse exercer ses fonctions en toute liberte. Le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas a ete egalcment Invite a donner au Gouvernement republicain toutes les facilites ne- cessatres pour qu'il puisse administrer effective- ment la region de Djokjakarta et puisse communi- quer avec toute personne residant en Indonesie et la consulter. ees mesures devaient etre les premieres dispositions qu'i1 etait indispensable de prendre pour que la Commission puisse amor- cer des pourparlers entre les repre.sentants du Gouverntment des Pays-Bas et ceux de la Repu- blique d'Indonesie sur la base des principes enon- ces dans les Accords de Linggadjati1 et du Ren- viile [ Sj649, annexes XIII et VIII]. Le Gouvernernent des Pays-Bas declare qu'iI a leve les dcrnieres restrictions ql1i etaient encore imposees a la liberte de mOllvement des dirigeants de la Repllblique et que cettx-ci ne sont plus soumis ql1'a la reglementation generale re~tive Cornme le representant des Etats·Unis 1'a c1ai- rement indique dans son intervention e]'flier [416eme seance], la liberte qui 13. etei:lccordee par les Hollandais n'est pas cette I1berte S;lns condi- tion que prevoyait la resolntion du Conseil de securite. Les dirigeants republicains ne semblent pas libres de se deplacer et de se mettre en rapport avec leurs partisans i l'interieur du territoire sou- mis a l'autorite de leur propre Gouvernement. Ce que le Conseil avait demande, c'etait la Iiberre politique, et non pas sculement la possibilite de jouir du grand air. Le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas a fait nette- ment comprendre qu'il n'etait nullement dispose a retablir a Djokjakarta le Gouvernement de la Republique, Ce refus est essentiellement fonde sur l'argument selon [equel une telle restauration entrainerait une epouvanbble serie de desordres et de represailles, Le representant des Etats-Unis l'a signale: lorsque de tels desordres se sont pro- duits, leur cause directe a ete, d'apres le rapport de la Commi5sion de- bons offices, le fait que les negotiations politiques n'ont pas donne de resul~ fats CDncrets, et non l'existence d'tm Gouverne- ment republkain a Djokjakarta. Je voudrais maintenant donner lecture du tel~­ gramme que nOllS venom de recevoir cle Batavia: ~Voir The- Political Evtnu in the Rtpublk of /ndQ- ne.ria, pubHe par le Bureau d'inform.:r.tion des Pay,s- Bas ill New-Yurk. page 34. repri~al of reCent attack of the Rep:lbl~can Army" "Member of Vlorking Committee Mangt1nsar- koro; Member of Parliament, Suwirjo; Mayor of Diaknrtn, Sudarsollo, .<lnrl ~x·Governor of Molu- cas, Latuharhary, maltre.1.ted. Approximately sixty stndents killed by e1ec:rocution ill the dectrical power station, D;okJak~rt-.fL. Djokja- karta bas been thoroughly boted by Dutch troops." That shows by whom the reprisals are likely to be committed. T1:e recent repOrt of the UniLed Nations Com- mission for Indonesia LS/1270J does :lOt mention any such difficulties in the way of the restoration of the Republic. The Commission l:as been on t]".c s.po: and it wOltld certainly have drawn the attention of the Security Council to any such poss:biUy, especiaJ:y ::IS tIle COl1J:cil had placed upon the Commission the responsibility for mak· ing recommenJa:ions for the progressive transfer of aclministratiOl1 to the Republican Government, with due regard to the reqcirernents of la'....· and order. The Net:-JerlHnrls Government has invited the Republican leaders [S/12N] :0 a conference at The Hague as individuals anc. not as repre- sentativcs of the re-established RE'pthli:::a1'. Gov- ernment. In other words, so far as it is concerned, no Rer,:ubiic exists. The restoration of the Republic pfovices the test of sincerity oi the ~etherlar.ds Gcvernmem i:l regard to the new offer. The refusal of the Netherlands to facilitate tl:e re-esta')lishment 0: the Rept1blie cf Djokjakarta and to negotiate with the Republican Governn:ent is, in effect, a repttdiation of the Linggadjati and Renville Agrccments, The proposed tonference at The Hague, if held tmder the terms ad conditions conveyed in the invitation, would meal: the com- ?lete wi')lllg out of all the car.lmitlllents, polititd anc moral, of the Netherlands Government, since the o~h.e:- party to thes~ agreements, nameIy, the Repl1blican Gove:-lll1lellL has been l!liminatecl. This is a very important I-J0:nl which I cannot emphasize too strongly at H.is stage. Now how can the Nethp.rl;\nc1s Government expec: us to betie\'e in its sincerity and good faith, if :t proposes to begi:l this llew phase in the nego- t[mioCls by dishonouring past :tgreel'l.ent" with the Republican Governmer:t signed by it? If the Dutch reaIly meant :0 transfer con:plete and un- restricted sovereignty lle£ure .Tn}y next, one wOllld have expected therr., as practical statesmen, to create the necessary atmosphere uy adopting <1 eoncdatory attitude towarJs :lIe Rtpu"olican Gov er~ment. Is it practical to t:-ansfer complete sovereignty in the chaos and confusion of guer~ rilla warf<lr.e. wlich can be stopced only by a re-es:ab1islled Republican Gcvenunnt? What doe!; tht Netherlands GO'lemnle:nt offer in the place of the very comprehensive and de~ a~taque de l'armee H~pllblicail1e. "Fnrent nmlt:aites: Manguns..'l.rkoro, m~!llllt"e dl1 Coniite de tr"Vu] ~ Suwirjo, membre du Parle- ment; St:ldar30flO, Maire de Djakutru, et LaUl- harhary, ancien Gouverncllr des Mohtques. Soixante etlldiants environ tues par electrocution cftns la station e1ectrique de Djokjakarta. Forces r.eerlandaises ont entierement pille DjokjakartL." Voila qui montre biel: ue laqudle des partie3 pellyent venir le:; repr~sail1es. Le demier r.lpfJort ill" la Corrnnission des Nations Unies pour l'Indom~sie [Sj1270] ne p'e w voit aucun incii.ent de ce genr~ lorsqll'(ln rcst3.11~ rera la R~pllblique. La Commission !;'c>t fl':ndue sur p12ce, et, si des incidents de ee genre etaient acraindre, eUe aurait certaincmer.t signale le :ait at! CO:1~ell de ~ccllrite, car le Conseil a charge la Commission de hire des recor.1mancations en cc qui conceme le transfe:lt proglessif de l'a(h1\- :1istration an Gouver:telClent republicmn, compte tenu d~ la neccssite de rnaintenir I'ordre puBic.. Le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas 2. ir.vite les diri- geants de la Republi'1ue [S/1274; a plell[]~e part 11 l:ne conference a La Haye, a titre indivic:ucl et non er. qualite de represenl:cLnts. du GOl:v~rne­ m~nt n~publicai:1 retabli En (j"mt:-es temle::, T-JOtll le GOLlvernement des Pays-Bas la Republique n'ex:iste pas. La res:aurat:on de la Republiql1e permettra de juger si le GOllVernement des Pays-Bas est sin- cere quand il fait cette nouvelle offn'. Le re£us, de la part des Pays~Bas, de faeiliter le rCt3.blisse- ment d!t GOl1vernement repnblica.;n aDjoI(j<1karta et de negoder avec ee Guuvernemcnt const'ttle, en fait, une repudiation des Accords de Linggad- .iati et du Renv111e. Si la conference que l'on envisage de te11lr a La Baye a litll dallo ks condi:ions prevues par !'invitation, cela at1ra c():nme consequence l'anllu1ation complete de tOl:S les engagements, aussi bim politiques que momux, pris par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, car I'autre partie 3. ces accords, c'est-a-dil"e le Gou- vernement republica:n. aura ete diminee. ['e5t un point d'Ltlle extreme imporhmce et $1"! leqllel je n<.; sa\ll-ais t1"Op insister au stade oil. :lOUS ell sc.mrnes, Comment le G::JU\·crnel11en~ des Pays-Bas pel:t~ il pen"e:" qae llQlIS croyions a ~a sinccrit~ ct a sa bonne foi> alors qu'il s'apprete it entrcprendre 1e nouvelles negotiations. en r~pudiant des accords passes signes aver: le vouve:'neme;1t repllblicai:l? Si les' Hollandais aV2.ient reellel11cnt lJintention d'opher, avant le mcis de juille~ prochain, 1.111 transfert (:e souverainete total et sam conditio:l:;, on aurait [Xl penser que, en hOUlmes d'Etat 3- l'esprit pratique. ijs creeraient line atmosphere favorable ell adoptallf l1ne attituce con:iliantt a l'egard du Gouvernement republicain. Est·ce faire pret:.ve d'esp-:it pI<ltiqJ<': que d~ transferer en:ie- rement la souverainete, alors que les c.perations ce gnerilb. -ere.ent des trou·Jlcs et des MSOfcres auxql1els scu~ le retablissl'.ll1(':nt <h". Gouytu,eIT.ent republicain pOllrra metlre fm"i OU'Qffr.: dOllC le Gouvememer,t ces Pays~Bas po~· remplacer le progra"l1IT'.e conpkt que le The Netherlands also offers a transfer of sover- eignty, the nature of which has not been defined. According to Mr. Koets' explanation, the transfer was to be "real, complete and llnconditionaJ". This explanation has now been declared by the Neth€rlands Government to be not official. On the other hand, according to the interpretation of Mr. Gieben, quoted by Mc Pa1ar yesterday [416t11 mr:r.fl:Hgj, "defence, foreign affairs, nnance, and one or two other little things" would con~ tintie to be managed by the Netherlands Govern- ment for an indefinite period. Of course, although defence, foreign affairs :tnd finance are so des~ cribed as "little things", they are in fad very real matters. Nor is it clear whether such a c:om[Jlete tr:tnsfer is legally possible under the recently amended Netherlands Constitution, I am astonished that the Netherlands Government could think that the proposal in its present form would be generally acceptable as an adequate substitute for the Security CGuncil plan. Under these circumstances the action to be taken on the Commission's report is perEectly clear. The Security Council must stand firmly by its resolution of 28 January [S/1234]. It should insist on the unconditional return of the Republican leaders to Djokjakarta with full free- dom, and oh their re-establishment as a govern- mental authority. As regards the Netherlands invitation to attend a conf.erence at The Hague, I do not think the COl111Cll should consider it until and unless the initial steps I have just mentioned have been taken. Obviously the Coullcil cannot act on the tentative and personal views of the President. The Republicans cannot be eX[Jected to give their co?si~ered opinion tmtil they have retllrned to DJogJalcarta and begun to function there as a government. It is very important that the Council should fully safeguard the position of the United Nations . . I presume tlint this will be the last op'portunity gl:ven to the Net,herlands Government to comply With the resolutIOn It has de"ecl th, 1 " N .' II ee reso tt- tlOns. ow lt has suggested a procedure for a con.ference at The Hague, which is carefully d.eslgned to by-pass the Security COl1llcil resolu- tIOn. If. no definite steps have been taken for the restoration at an early date of the Repl1blican G9Y{'rnment ~n pjo!cjakarta, I hope that there Wilt be no ~esltatlOn In regard to the consideration of the .actlOn that should be taken to make the resolutlOr; of !he ~ecurity Council effective. Any fur.ther mactlO!l m regard to the matter will s~rtou~ly damage the prestige of the Secnrity CotlOC1!, and ~ggravate the Indonesian as wen as the Il1ternatlOnal, situation in the Ea;t. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated from French): Among the speakers who have preceded me, I thought several seemed inclined to ex~g!;{erate the difficulties with which the Conncll lS codronted. I shaH try, for my part, t? assess them as accurately as possible in the lIght of the date at our disposal. In t~.t report which it addressed to tl1e SeCtlrity C;0llOCll [5/1270], the United Nations Commis- sion for In~ol1esia notes the recommendatl0ns of the t"csolutlOn of 28 J<Jnuary 15/1234] which h;J.ve r;ot been c0I?-plied with. In informing the CO~1t1CI~ about thlS matter, the Commission is :\ctmg 111 accordance with its terms of reference and in conformity with the manner in which othe; organs of the Council have proceeded in the past when placed in similar circumstances. It is now for the Conncil to decide what atti~ tu~e it will take and what instructions it wiil give to Its Commission. The decisions which it is thus called l1pon to take are delicate ones. The Council wonld therefore be wise to gttide itself by the experience it has acquired in the course of these last months not only in dealing with the Indonesian Cjuestbn, but also in connexion with other matters with which it has had to deal. \Vhat lessons can be learned from this experi- ence? I have already had the opportunity, in the course of an earlier speech [40Sth "Heeling], to recall how much the Connci! had been justified in congratl1lating itself on the discretion which its Commission had shown in the Kashmir qlles- tion. I should like to refer today to a more recent example taken from the Palestine situation. After the Acting Mediator had reported seriolls breaches of the truce in the Negeb, the SeC\1rity Council on 4 November last adopted a resolution (5/1070] under the terms of which the partles were called upon to withdraw their forces behind provisional lines which the Acting Mediator was to determine. ma~de que des negociations soient entrepriscs enl1e les de~1};:. Gouvemements sous les <ltlspices de [a C0l11m15S10n. Voila, me semble-t-i1, la clerniere occasion qui sera offerte au Gouvernement neerlandais de se conf?rme.r a, la resolution. Cc GOl.lvernetnent a bray: trOIs reso~utions. It propose maintenant unc prOCt;dtlre COl1Slstallt a rennir a La Haye une conf.~ren~e qui a ete soigneuscment conc;ue de mamere a t011liler la resolution du Consei!. Si des meSl1res concretes ne sont [Jas prises en vue d'une restal1ration prochainc du Gouvcrnement republicain a Djokjakenta, j'cspere qu'on n'hesi~ te~a pas aenvisager l'action qui devra etre entre~ pnse pour assurer l'execution de la resolutiOn du ~.onse~1. Si nOI1S d:lneurions plus. longtemps dans 11IlactlOll, le prestige dn COl1seil de securite en souffrimit grandement, et la Sltuation de ['Indo- nesie, ;wssl bien que la situation internationale en Orient s'en trotlverait aggravce. IlL VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgique): Parmi ItS orateurs qui m'ont precede, plusieurs m'ont p",rl1 enclins a grossir les difficultes devant Icsql1l'lles le Conseil est place. Je m'efforcerai, pour ma part, de les mesurer aussi exactement ql1e. pos- sible cl'apres les elements qui sont a notH; dis- position. Dans le rapport qu'elle a adresse all COllsei[ de securite [5/1270], la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Indonesie releve les points sur les- Cjl1els la resolution dtl 28 ji"lnvier dernier [5/12341 n'a pas eteexecutee, En renseignant le Conseil a ce sujet, la Commission agit conformement att mandat qui 1ui a ete dOnlle, conformemcnt allssi a la maniere dont ant procede precedemment d'autre organeS du Conseil places dans des condi~ tions analognes. Il appartient rnaintenant du Conseil de deter~ miner I'attitude qll'i[ acloptera et les instructions qu'il donnern a sa Commission. Les decisions qu'il est ainsi appele a prendre sont delicates. Aussi agirait-il sagement en s'inspirant de l'expe- rience qll'il a acquise au cours de ces clernier:s roois, non seulement dans l'affaire d'Illdonesie, mais cJans d'untres affaires dont il a ett egalcment atraiter. Qtlels enseignements peut-on degager de ceU", experience? J'ai deja eu l'occasion, atl cour.s ci'une intervention allterieure [405ema seances], de rappeler combien le Conseil avai~ e~ a s~ fclicitcr de la prudence dont sa C.onUTI1SSl 0n 'lit ~reuve dans l'affaire du Cachemlre. J e voudu l5 me rMerer aujourd'hui a un ex~mpJe plUS. ~ecent emprunte a l'affaire de Palest1l1e. Le 1-Iedlatcur par interim ayant fait rapport sur de ~rav~s violations ele la treve dans le Negeb, le Conset! de securite avait adoptt, le 4 novembrc demier [5/1070], une resolntion <lUX termes de laquelle les parties etaient invitces a retirer lellfs forces derriere des lignes provisoires que le Me.diateur par interim etait cbarge dc tracer. That is the end of the quotation, In view of thi.~ repeated refusal to comply with its resolution of 4 November, the Security Cottnci1 adopted a new resolution [5/1169] on 29 Decem- ber wllidl requested the Governments coc.cerned to implement without further delay the resolu- tion of 4 November and the instructions issl1ed by the Acting Mediator in i1ccordance with thilt resolution. Although that reso!Lltion merely re- newed a frequently repeated request, and although it has purposely been drafted in 11 s[lirit of extreme moderation, the Union of Soviet Socialist Repl1b- lies and the United State~ of America did not feel that they could give it their <lpproval. But what di.d the Acting lVfediator do? He -did not consider that the attitude of Israel was sdficient reason to break off his attempts at Con- ciliation. On tllC contrary, for nearly two months mote he continued ttntiringly his efforts at con- ciliation ::md tnus, on 23 February last, without the Israel troops ever having carried out the withdrawal called for in the Council's resolution an armistice W<lS finally concluded between Egypt "nd Israel, an armistice in which tile promise of a tinall'etum to peace can be seen. That is the experience 1he Council has had in 1he ~alestine question. I recall that precedent cer~alOly not for the sake of criticizing the patlence, or rather the forbearance which the Securily Council has shown in that question. At that time Belgium had a seat on the Council. From the very beginning it never ceased to recom- mend, prudence, and I mentioned that example Duly III order to advise the Council to use it as a guide in the preSent case. , It could be. said. first of all, that the question IS one of eql1lty. Such a consideration of equity seems to be all the more pertinent since, while the cO!llpetence of the Couneil did not seem clis- ptltable .i11 the case of Palestine, in the case c;f IndoneSia several members of the Council have always considered it very doubtful. But ~lOt only a question of equity is involved. !here IS also the question of ascertail1ing what IS the most appropriate method of Obtaining the result soug-ht by the Council. In th.at connexion there is no reason to believe that the patience exercised in the Palestine question could not pro~ pn~s de deux mois encore, et c'est ainsi que, le 23 fevrier dernier, sans que les forces d'Israel el1Ssent jamais effectue le repli que leur prescri- vait la resolution du Conseil, un armistice iut finalement _conc1u entre l'Egypte et Israel, armis- tice dans lequel on petlt voir la promesse d'un retour definltif ala paix. Voila l'experience que le Conseil a bite dans l'<lff<lire de Palestine. Si je rappelle ce precedent, ce Il'est certainement pas pOUT critiquer la patience ou plutot la mansuetude clont le Conseil de securite fit prel1ve dans cette affaire. La Belgi- que siegeait a cette epoque .:tu Consei1. Des le debut, elle ne cessa de recommander la prudence, et je n'ai fait etat de eet exemple que pour con- seiller au Conseil de g'en inspirer dans le cas present. On pourrait dire, tout d'aborcl, que c'est la une question d'equite. Semblable consideration d'equite ser.-lit d'autant plus valable que, tancEs que la competence du Conseil ne paraissait pas contestable dans le cas de la Palestine, plttsieurs membres dL! Conseil l'ent toujours consideree comme tres clouteuse dans le cas cle l'Indonesie, rl1ais il n'y a p<LS seulement Lme question cl'equite, I1 y a atlssi la question de savoir quelle est la methode la plus propre it conduire au re- sullat que poursuit le Conseil. A cet egard, il n'y a auctlne I'aison de croire que la patience temoignee dans l'affaire de Palestine ne puisse Indonesia~l question is no longer serious matters of principle, as was the case in the Palestine question, but merely questions of methods and procedure. There has been substantial agreement for some time on the end to be achieved: the transfer of sovereignty, exercised until now by the Nether- lands, to the United States of Indonesia, which will be a confederation enjoying complete inde· pendence. There is even agreement on the time when this transfer COllld be effected. I believe that this fundamental point cannot be stressed too frequently, because in this respect the situa- tion is often wrongly presented. According to some people, it would seem that, after the adoption of the last resolutiun of the Council, the Netherlands refused to comply with an injunction directing them to free the peoples of Indonesia. However, such an injunction does not exist and cannot exist for two reasons: first of all, the Charter does not conier such powers on the Security Council, even in those matters where its competence is unquestionable, which is not the case here, Even when the LOl1nciJ has grounds to do so, when it is acting by virtlle of Chapter VII, its power to take a decision, to enjoin, is, under Article 39, limited to the measures specified in Articles 41 a11042. Articles 41 and 42, however, rerer not to the substance of the dispute, but to the means of coercion Ior maintaining or restoring international peace and secmity. With regard to the settlement of the substance of a question, the Council can only make recom- mencJ<ltions, and it could not be otherwise. To acknowleclge the Council's right to decide (on the liberation of the peojlles of Indonesia, or of any other people, would be the equivalent of granting it tbe atlthority to settle the fate of a territory, to determine likewise its allegience, in a word, to settle categorically the question whether a State should or shol1ld not be dismembered, or whether a new State should or should not be created. It was never the intention of the authors of the Charter to confer SUch powers on the Security Council. ~~owhere in the Charter can any pro- vision be found from which it can be concluded that the Members 01 the United Nations, of whom only five are protected by the veto, have tonsented to placing their destiny, and even their very existence, in the hands of the Council. cl'e.mettn~· nne injonction est, aux termes de l'Article 39, limite nu);: mesures prevl1es par les Articles 41 et 42. Or, ces Articles 41 et 42 se rapportent, nOlI [Jas au fond du litige, 1llaiS al1X moyens de r:oerdtion propres a maintenir OLl i retablir la paix et la securitc intemationales. Qt1ant all reglement dll fond, le Conseil ne peut faire qt1e des recol11m.andations, et il ne saufait en etre autrement. Ecconnaitre au Conseil le droit de decider la Eberation des peuples d'Indonesie ou de n'importe quel alltre peuple reviendrait a Ini reconnaitre le droit dc t-egler d'a1ttorite le SOl't d'un tenitoire, de determiner de mcme son alle- geance, en un mot, de tranche!" imperativcment la qnestion de savoir si un Etat doit DtI ne doit p<lS e.tre d€mem1.Jre, si un notlve! Etat duit ou ne dait pas prendre naissance. Or, il 11'a jamais e!e dans les intentions des autems de la Charte de conferer une telle pllis- sauce au Conseil de securite. On chercherait en vain dans la Charte l1n~ disposition (jUt permit de conclure (jue les Membres de l'Organisation des N<ltions Unies, dont cinq seutemcnt sont pro- teges par ie veto, ont cOnsenti a remettre leur sort, et jusqu'a leut existence, entre les mains du COHseiL J'ai en l'honnellr de partlciper au..... delibera- tions du Comite qui, a la Conference de San- Francisco, eialJora les dispositions dont it s'agit. J'en ai garde I'impression tres nette que les Etats qui n'etaient pas appeles a exercer un droit de veto n'auraient jillnais admis sernblable concep- tion. Ai-jc besoin d'ajollter que, si j'ai cite le Chapitre VII, c'est 11l1iquement pout"' rendre plus evident encore ce que j':lv:lis a dire, ce Chapitre etant celui qui, dans la Charte, confere le plus de pouvoirs au Couseil? En fait, je n':li nllnement entendll sugg!erer parcette reMrence que le Conseil serait jUl'ieliquement fondc a recouriT, en ['occurrence, a. ce Chapitre, et (jtl'il serait politi- quernent opportun de le faire. At tbe San Francisco Conference I had the honotlf of participating in the debates of the Com- mittee wbich drew up the provisions in question. From those discussions I retain the very clear impression that the St<ltes which were. not des- tined to exercise the right of veto would never have ;ldmitted any such concept. Need I add that I quoted Chapter VII only to make what I had to say even clearer, since that Chapter of the ClUlrter is the one which confers most powers on the Council? In fact, I never meant to suggest by that reference that, at this juncture, the Council would be legally justified in resorting to this Chapter and that this would be a politically expedient moment to do so. d'Ind?n~sie, ce ne sont plus de graves questions de pnnclpe, comme c'etait le cas clans l'affaire de Palestine, mais l1niquement des questions de modalites et de procedure. I1 y a en effet aCLOrd depuis longtemps sur le but a atteindre: le transfert de la souverainetc, exercee jusqu'ici par les Pays-Bas aux Etats- Unis d'Inclonesie, qui serant one ~onfederation jOHissant d'une pleine independance. I1 y a meme accord sur l'epoque vers laquelle ce transfert pourrait etre effettue.. Je crois qu'on ne saurait assez insister sur ce point fondamental, car la situation est SOllvent presentee de h<;on erronee a cet egard, 11 semble-rait, d'apres certains, que les Pays-Bas se soient refuses, a la suite de la derniere resolu- tion dll Conseil, a se soumettre i une injanction leur prescrivant de liberer les peuples de l'Indo- nesie. Or, semblabJe injonction n'existe pas. Elle ne sal1rait exister, et ccla pour deux raisons: lout d'abord, la Charte ne confere pa.s semblablc [)Ol1voir au Conseil de securite, meme la ou sa competence est indubitablement etablie, ce qui n'est pas le ca5. Meme lorsque, fonde a le faite, le Cotlseil agit sUr la base du 01apitre VII, le ponvoir qu'a le Conseil de prendre une decision, Aillsi que j'ai deja. eu precedemment I'occasion de le faire ressortir, les difficultes qui se pre- sentent sont essentiellement relatives, non pas a l'emancipation de l'Indonesie, mais a. l'importance du role que doit remplir dans cette emancipation le Gouvernement de la RepubLique d'Indonesie. Certains pe.nsent que le role de ce GOl1vernement doit etre. predominant; d'autres n'en sont pas convaincus. Pour sa part, le Gouvernement necr- lnndais se. refere i cet egard aux propositions de M. Cochran, representant des Etats-Unis att sein de la Commission. Quoi qu'il en soit, s'il )' a divergence sllr ce point, c'est-a.-dire sur l'impor- tance du role que le Gouvernement de la Republi- que est appele 1J. jOller, tout le monde, en revan- che, y compris le GOtlvernement neerlandais, est d'accord pour dire que ce sont de libres elections ou l'Organisation des Na~ions Unies aura ses observatellrs qui doivent decider, en dernier res- sort, de telle maniere que le resu1tat final echappe a toute contesL1.tion, As I have already bad occasion to point out in the past, the present difficulties are essentially related not to the emancipation of Indonesia, but to the importance of the role which the Govern- ment of the Republic of Indonesia sholtld play in that emancipation. Some people think that the role of that Government shouk! be predominant; others are not convinced of that. The Nether- lands Government refers in that connexion to the proposals of Mr. Cochran, the United States representative on the Commission. At all events, if there is disagreement on this point, that is to say, on the importance of the role which the Government of the Republic should play, at least everyone including the Netherlands Govern- ment agrees that free elections, at which United Nations observers would be present, should in the last analysis decide the question so that the final results WQLtld be beyond dispute. De meme, aucune discordance ne s'est fait jour, au cours des debats de janvier, sur les phases sLlccessives qui devmient y conduire, c'est-a.-dire: constitution d'ul1 gouvernement provisoire, libres elections, constitution d'un Etat federal, transfert de la souverainete .i cet Etat federal. Lil<ew;se, no disagreement arose in the course of the debates in January on the successive phases which shotlld lead to that goal, that is to say: the establishment of a provislona1 government, free elections, establishment of a federal State, transfer of sovereignty to that federal State. Telle etait la situation au moment ou le Consei1 a interrompu ses deliberations it y a qudques semaines. Or, voiei qu'un nouvelle et tres impor- tante etape vient d'etre franchie: les Pays-Bas sont arrives a la conclusion que 1es difficultes aux.quelles se heurte l'emancipation complete de l'Indonesie ne pourront etre entierement surmon- tees que lorsque Ta souverainete aura He trans- feree a un gouvernement federal representant fidelement l'ensemb1e de l'Indonesie. C'est ce qui les a conduits a proposer de bru1el' les etapes, d'accelerer le plus possible le transfert de la souverainete, de faire en sarte que ce transfert puisse s'effeduer le ler mai prochain - soit plus d'un an avant la date indiqt:.ee dans la derniere resolution du Conseil - de proceder simultane- ment a la conclusion du trait!!: d'ltnion entre les Pays-Bas et les Etats-Unis d'Indonesie - qui auraient ete ainsi definitivement foncies - et de reduire par la. au minimum les dispositions transi- toires. Such was the situation up to the moment when the Council interrupted its discussions some weeks ago. But a ne\v and very important stage has just been reached: the Nether1<:tnds has arrived at the conclusion that the difficulties hindering the complete emancipation of Indonesia cannot be completely overcome until sovereignty has been transferred to a federal government truly repre~ sentative of the whole of Indonesia. That is what has led it to propose that the transfer of sO"vereignty should be carried forward and expe- dited ~s much as possible, and that matters. should be so arranged that this transfer can tnke place on 1 May next, or more than a year before the' date mentioned in the last resolution of the Council, and further to propose ,that the parties concerned shculd proceed simultaneously to the conclusion of a treaty of lmion between the Neth- erlands and the United States of Indonesia which would thus be formally established. Transitional measures would thereby be reduced to a minimum. Cette proposition fut adressee simultanement au President de l'Assemblee consultative federale et au President de la Repl1blique d'Indonesie - je dis bien, au President de la Republique d'Indo- nesie, ce litre indiquant qu'il ne semble pas y avoir de contestation quant a la qualite en vertu de laqllelle cette invitation est adressee a M. Soekarno. This propsal was sent simultaneously to the President of the Assembly for Federal Consulta- tion and to the President 0 f the Indonesian Re~ public-I repeat, the President of the Indonesian Reptlblic, this title indicating that there does not see~l to be any doubt concerning the capacity in whIch Mr. Soekarno was extended this invitation. Cette proposition fut aussit6t aceeptee par les representants des Etats federaux qui ne sont certes pas les fantoches qu'an a dit, puisque les dirigeants de la Republique les consultent et discutent avec eux, et on nons l'a dit hier [416.hne seance], qu'ils ne sont pas toujours d'accord avec le Gouvernement neerlandais, . This proposal was immediately accepted by the re.pre.sentahves of the federal States, who are certamly not the puppets some have claimed them to be, since the leaders of the Republic consult them and discuss with them and since, as we were told yesterday [416th meeting], they do not always agree with the Netherlands Government. propose~ c~nference, and I think that the new co!-Umlllu~atlon rS/1270/Add.3] which we re- ceived this mornmg does not alter Prcsiclent 50e- karno's position on that point. But he adds that the Government of the Republic cot11d not decide to participate in the proposed conference unless prior to that. it had alre.'ldy been re-established at Djokjakarta. The Government of the Re1ublic' strengthened by the Council's resolt1tion ~1ake~' tl~~ return to Djokjakarta a prelimina~}' con- (IIt1011. On the other har:d, the Nether1<mds Gov- ernment considers that the local situation makes an immediate stationing there impossible and thinks that this stationing would have an un- fortnnate effer.t on the negotiations. In his interesting statement made yesterday, the representative of the United States stressed the fact th.at, according to the Netherlands pro- posals, the mterval between the beg-inning of nego- tiations and their conclusion or at the very least, the r<ltification of these negotiation~, wouli1 only be of twelve wee:,s dluation; he <ldded that he did not see, in these circumstances, why the re- establishment of fie Government of the Republie in Djokjakarta couM not be effected immediately. Blltll1<IY I draw tIle attention of the repr~senta­ tive of the Uniled Statl"S to an important point? If the proposed negotiations end, it is not to the Government of the Repllblic that the sovereignty would thlIS be transferred, but to the established Government of the United States of Indonesia_ At all events, the Council has a Commission on the .~pot. thf: mission of which is to provide it with in (orm<ttion. What does the Commissioll think of the objec- tions raised by the Netherlands? Does it accept the responsibility for guaranteeing that the Re- publican Government's return to Djokjakarta will not cause disorder, as thf' Ne.thf'rlands Govern- ment fears? Does it accept the responsibility oi guaranteeing that a ret\'rn to Djo1(jakam will have no effect on the result of the negotiations? No, the report of the Commission is silent in that respeet. Is thc COllncil ncvertheless going to di~regard this aspect and :s it, without concerning itself with the local situation, merely going to request the Netherlands Government to comply? Did the Coundl ant:: its Commission act thus in the Kash- mir question? D:d the Acting Mediator proceed thus in tl1e Palestine question? To be sure, the desire of the m~mbers of the Government of the Republic to consult their compatriots before participating in decisive nego~ tiations is legitimate and understandable. But, in the vast territory of Jav<l, is Djokjakarta really the only place where the leaders of the Republic can gather before participating as a Government -and with complete freedom-in the proposed con fereace? Here, in a word, is the only obstacle which still stands in the way of getting ont of the imp:'lsse: it reduces itself to the question of whether another site cellld be chos~n temporarily by the Government of the Republic. I should yallt~ Ildfe dUll procltain transfert de la sou- veralUe~e et qu'il approuve en principe I'objet de la conference pro1Josee _ et je crois que la nOI1- velle comlllllnicn.ti0!1 [S/127.~/Adrl3J qui nOllS est par~~nlle cc: mat~n. lie modtht pas, Sttr cc point, l~ posItion du PreSident Soekarno _ mais il aJoutc ,que le Gouvernement de la Republique ne pOIl1..~alt prend~e la decision tie participer i la ~on:erence proJclee que s'il etait auparavant rc~ tnstalle a Djokjakarta. Le Gouvemcmcnt de la l\.6[Jubliljlt~, furt de la resolution du ConseH fait du retour a Djokjalcarta Ul1e conditionpr&lable. Au .c~ntraire, le Gouvcrnement des Pays-Bas ~onsl,d~re 9.t1e la .situation 10,cale rend un sejour llnmedIat lrnposslble et eshme que cc se-jour exercera un effet funeste SU!- les negociations. Le representant des Etats-Unis, dans Son inte- ressant ,expose d'hier [416iJ11te seance], a souligne que, survant les propositions des Pays-Bas, l'i11- tervalle ne serait qUe de douze scmaines entre le debut des negociations et leur aboutissement OU, tout au mtlill~, la. consecration de ces negocia- tioDs; i1 a ajoute qu'i' ne voyai1: pas, dans ces conditions, pourquoi la reinstallation du Gouver- nement de la Republique a Djokjakal'ta ne pour- rait pas se faire immediatement. Mais puis-je attir~r i'attention du repre~entant .dcs Etats-Unis SUr un point impcdant? Si les negoeiations proposees aboutissent, cc n'est pas au Gotlvernement de la Repllblique que la sou- verainete serart ainsi transferee, c'est all gouvel'- nement des Etats-Unis d'Indonesie qui auraient ete foncies. Quoi qu'iI en soit, le Conseil passede sur place une Commission dont la nissiol1 est de J'eclalier. Que pense la Commission des objections pre~ sentees par les Pays-Bas? Prend-elle la responsa- bilite de garantir que J'ordre ne sera pas ~roub1f par le retour du Gouveruernent reptlulicain a Djokjakarta, comllle le Gouvernell1ent neerlandais le- redoute? Prend-elle la responsabilite ue garatl- tir que le retour.it Djokjakarta sera sans efet sur le SllCcE~S des negociations? Non, le rapport de 1:;. Commission est nmet acet egard. Le Conseil va-t-il neanmoins passer outre et. sans se pl'eoccuper de la situation ]m;ak, va-t-il se bomer a inviter le Gouvernement l1eerlandais a s'executer? Est-ce ainsi que le Conseil et sa Co."11rnission ont agi clans 1'affaire dll Cachemire? Est-ce ainsi que le Mediateur par interim a agi dans l'affaire de Palestine? Certes, le elesir des membres elu GOUVt:1JlCment de la Republique de prend;e, cont,act ave~ le~rs compatriotes avant de pa.-tlClper a des negoCla- tions dedsives est legitime et comprehensible. Mais, dans eet immense territoire de Java, DjJkjakarta est-'il vraiment le seul endroit OU les dirigl"ants de la Republiquf' pl1i_~.~ent se rendre avant cie participer en tant que Gouvernemcnt et en p1eine liberte, ala confel'ence proposec? pour sortil' de l'impasse, voila, en somm~, I'urlique obstacle qui ;ub~iste encore!, H Se rectt~t i la question de savolr SI un autre Siege pourrmt elle adopte a titre provisoire- p;\!" le Gouverne- ment de la RepubI\que. Je voudrais rappe1er Pourr.ait-on eoncevoir, clans ces conditions, que, si on y met suffisamment d'ingeniosite, de patience et de conciliation, cet obstacle demetlrera insur- montable alors qu'Oll touche presque au but? Pour ma part, je considere ccla COllll1le inCOll- cevable. Is it conceivable in these circumstances, that, if sufficient ingem~ity, patience and conciliati~n are brought to bear that obstacle should remam , . h d' insurmolwtau[e when the f,ioalls almost reac e . For my part, I consider it inconceivable. Les membre!; du Conseil ont ccrtainement con- science de l'importance decisive du st~de auql'.el l'affaire d'Indonesie est arrivee. Des a present, la Rc.publique et les pelLples d'Indonesie ont acquis l'essentiel: leur independance est ccrtaine; per- senne ne [eur dispute la faeulte de l'obteni!'; publiquement, devant le monde cntier, les Pays- Bas ant proclame qu'ils etaiellt prets a la realiseI', non pas le ler juillet 1950, e011lme le prevoit b c1erniere resohltion dn COllseil, mais d'une maniere presque immediate. POllr que le transfert de srll1- vcrainete s'effecttlc, il faut qU'Ull gOtlvernement rej:lresenlatif soit cOll.'ititue. Ensui.k, des elections li!.lres auront lieu sous le contr6le de l'Organisa- tion des Nations Unies. Quel risque y a-t-il encore, dru1S ccs conditions, que 101 volonte d~s populations ne puisse ]Jas prevaloir? The members of the COllncil are certainly COll- scious of the decisive importance of the stage which the Indonesian qltestion has reached. Up until the present time, the Republic and the peoples of Indonesia }.ave obtained ;vhat really matters: their independence is certam; no one denies them. the right to obtain it; publicly, before the entire world the Netherlands has proclaimed that it is ready t~ carry it out, not on I July 19S~, as provided in the last resolution of the CounclJ, but almost immediately. For the transfer of sovereignty to take ?lace, a representat!ve govern- ment !lIust beset up. Then, free electiOns, under the conlrol of the United Nations, will be held, Under these conditions. what risk remains that the will of the populati~n will not prevail? Ainsi, quoi qu'il arrive, l'il1dependance se fera. Le tout esl de savoir ql1uncl et comment. Sera-cc i\lll11ediatement, dans une atmosphere de con- corde? Sera~ce au contraire dans \lne atl110sphere de ressentiment et d'all1crtume, apres que le5 violent:es actuelles se scr<lnt pro1ongces pendant de longs Illois encore? Voila l'enjeu elu confiit de procedure qui retarde encore la solution. Thus, no matter what happens, independence will be attained. The whole question is to know when and how. Will it be immediately, in an atmosphere of h:lrmony? Or will it be in an atmosphere of resentment and bitterness, after the present violence has continued for long months to come? Here is what is at stake in the pro- cedur<Jl dispute which is still delaying the solrttion. Peace and order are seriotlsly disturbed in all of East Asia. If action by the Security Council were determined solely by virtue of the fact that it shoulders the main responsibility ior peace and L'ordre et la paix: sont pl'ofonclcment troubles dans toute l'Asie orientale. Si l'action <tu COl1scil de sewrite devait etl'c determinee par l'uniqlte raison qu'il e.xen::e la p1'illcipale rcsponsabitite dans le domaine de la paix et de La securite, il n'y <1. guel'e de regions, dans toute j'Asie orienla[e, Oll il r,e serait fonde a intervCllir, au meme titt'e que ceJui auque1 i1 l'a fait en Indonesie. Mais cc qui, dnns les limites de l<l. Charte, doit detenninel' son action, c'est la possibiEtc d'intervenir utile· meut pour le retablissement de la paix et ue la securite en Indonesie. L'essentiel est de fonder le plus tot possible une federation viable dans laquelle tOlltes 1es popu1ations d'Indonesie aient leur place et qui, clans la plenitude de son inde- . pendance, soit t1l1 factenr de stabilite. seCl1~ity, there are h<.rdly any areas in the whole ?f East .Asia where it would not be j\'.stified in lOterfcrnng on the same grounds as it 11<1s done in Indonesia. But, within the limits of the Charter what lTIllst determine its action is the possibility it has of inten'ening tlsefnl1y to restore peace ~nd secl1rity in Indonesia. The essential thing lS to set tIp as soon as possible a viable federation in which all the people of Indonesia will have their place and which, in the fLl11ness of its inde- pendence, will be: a stabilizing factor. The objective of the Security Council and of the Commissi~n, .which is .its organ on tl,e spot, should be to ,lld In the aChlevernent of this result by bringing to hear all the political intelligence and persevering ingenuity which the organs of the Security Council were recently :lble to show, and that wtth complete Success, both in P:llestine and in Kashmir. .L'?bjecti.f dll Conseil de secttrite c:t de la. C~I11­ mtSSlOn qUt est son ol'gane sur place devralt etrc d'aider <i realiser ce result;:tt, ell y apportant tout le sens politique et la perseverante ingeniositc dont ]cs organes du Consei1 de securite ont recem- ment Slt faire prettve, avcc pIein succi~s d'ai11ems, aus~i bien en Palestine qu'att Cachemire. Such is the constrltctive spirit in wbich the Security Council should dire:ct the activities of its Commission in Indonesia. I hope that it will reCIuest the Commission to devote all its efforts firstly, to removing the diffictllties which still prevent the opening of decisive negotiations which should give birth to the United States of Indonesia and enabJ~ the latter shortly to assume the sovereignty which the Netherlands is prepared to trans fer to it. Tel est l'csprit constructif dans leqnelle COllseil de secnrite dcvrait orienter I'action de sa Com~ mission en Indonesie. Je souhaite ql1'i1 demande a cel1e-ci de Consacrer en premier lieu taus ses efforts :l ecotlrter les difficultes qui s'opposent encore :l l'ouverture des w~gociatiol1s deeisives qui doivent donner naissance aux Etats-Unis d'Indonesie et permettre it. ces derniers de recueil- lir a une date rapprochee la SOllverainete que les Pays~Bas sont prets a leur tral"i.sferer. M. HOOD (Al1straIie) (tradwit de I'anglais); Je re.grette de constate, que rie.n oe ce qu'a dit le representant de la Belgiquc ne peut modifier le fait absolument evident en presence duquc1 .se tronve le Consei1 ue securite, et qui constitne une des questions Its plus claires dont it ait eu a s'occuper. La situation que le Conseil examine en Cl'. moment n'aul'Uit pl1 etre exposee plus c1airement el en termes pllts precis qll'elle ne ]'a ete par les orateurs qt1: se sont adresses atl Conseil hier et uujomd'hui. 11 existe, certes, l\ne lmanimite re- marquable a propos de la majeure partie des elements de la situation en presence de lnqllelle le Conseil se trouve. On a tente de representer la c1isCltssion dans l<!.quelle le Canseil est actueIlcment engage comme n'etant qu'uoe nouvdle cta[)e oit s'offre uneserie de solutions differentes parmi 1esquelles iJ pourra, en temps utile, choisir celJe qui lui parait la plus indiquee; ces tentatives ne tieunent aucun compte de la situation reelle. Apres un temps assez long - et qui, si je puis dire, a parll trap long it certains d'entre nous- le Consei1 a. emis un jugement en termes peses , avec soin dans Sil. resolution du 28 janvier demie:r. CeUe resolution represente aujourd'hui le juge- ment murement rcflechi du Conseil, et rien de ce qui s'est produit ne devrait lui faire <Ibandonner I'opinion qu'i! :l exprimee clans eette resolution. Or, qu'invite-t-on le Conseil it {aire? Mr. HOOD (Australia); I am afraid that nothing which the representative of Belgium has said can alter the very plain fact which the Security Council has before it-one of the clearest issues with which it has had to deal. The situation now before the Council could not have been more lucidly or plainly put than it has been by the SIJeakers who addressed the Council yesterday and today. Tbere is, indeed, a mast remarbble unanimity, for tbe greater part, as to the situation with which thc Council is confronted. Attempts to represent the present stage of the discussion in the Council as just one more stage in which the Council has before it a series of alternative courses, among which it could, in due COl;rse, select that which seemed to be most advisable, are entirely beside the real facts of the situation. After a considerable period-and to some of us it seemed, may I say, an excessive reriod- tile Cotmeil formed a judgment in careiully con~ sidered terms in its resoltttion of 28 January last. That resolution stanos today as expressing the carefully arrived at judgment of the Council as a whole, and nothing which has happened should deflect the Council from maintaining its attitude and position as laid down in that resolution. But what is the Council being invited to do? Yesterday [416th meeting] the representative of the Netherlands suggested that, after all, nothing very much was involved; the Council had only to reconsider its resolution, take account of what were alleged to be new factors in the sitlla~ tion, and, following precedents which were stated to have been set in earlier cases, revise its con- clusions and start off again on :m entirely new course. This morning the Council has heard the repre- sentative of Belgium also indicate methods by which the Council has in the past acquiesced in modification of its original decisiom and con- chtsions. But the essential difference in this respect in the case now' before the Council is Bier [416~nM sJawe], le representant des Pays-Bas a emis I'avis que, apres tout, i1 ne s'agissait de rien de tres important; il snffisait que le Conseil reexamine sa resohltion, tienne compte ell'. Cl'. qu'on a appe1e des facteul"s nO,I- veaux et, suivant les precedents qui, dit-on, ant ete etablis dans des cas anh~rieurs, revise ses conclusions et reparte clans uue direction toute nouvelle. Cl'. matin, le representant de la Belgique a indi- que comment, dans le passe, le Conseil a ete amene a modifier ses decisions et conclusions initiales. Mais la elifference essentielle que pre- sente le cas actuel, c'est que la Commission du Conseil est sur les 1iellx. Dam le cas de la Pales~ vVhat are the reasons which are brought before the Council as jllstifying the acquiescence of the Cotmcil in the proposal of the round table con- ference put forward by the Netherl<ll~ds?, 'vVhat are the reasons adduced to the CouncJ! \vlth one of the essential points, if not the most essential point, of the Council's resolution, ~amely, ste,?s for the restoration, both geograplncal1y and, 10 every political sense, of the RepLlblic of Indonesia? Here it is necessary to point out what appears to me to be a fl1ndamental fallacy in reasoning which the representative of the Netherlands laid before the Council in his statement yesterday, In that connexion with what he described as the inability of tIle Netherlands Government to carry out that part of the Council's resolution relating to the restoration of the Republic, he explained to the Council at some length that the conditions which a restored Republic would meet on its return to Djokjakarta would be beyond the power of such a restored Republican Government to control, and that the Netherlands, therefore, felt that it could not take the responsibility of setting about the re-establishment of tIle Republic, The representative of Belgium lllls just asked whether the Commission itself is prepared to guarantee that law and order would be preserved if the Republican leaders were permitted to return to Djolcjakarta and to re-establish themselves as a government. That, as I see it, is a fallacy. The Security Cotlncil is asked to accept a reversal of its own decisions beCaL\Se of conditions which have arisen solelv and entirely because of the refusal of one of the parties to carry out what the Security Council had recommended and, in- deed, had directed should be done, Is not that an absurdity?' What sort of reason is it to bring before the Council to say that something cannot be done because certain circumstances ;Ire now pres~nt which would not have been present if in the first place the party concerned had complied wit.h. the directions of the CotlTIcil? That is an argument which must be, and I am sure is, utterly l\nacceptable to the Security Council, and can in no cOllceiva'D1e way carry any conviction, On the other hand, if the Security Council is to have before it r.ew circumstances and new factors, what of the new factors which were brought before the Council yesterday by the representaitve of Indonesia himself? Are those not far more real? Axe not tbe military facts Il convient de signaler id un argument ql1i, dans l'intervention faite hier devant le Conseil par le representant des Pays-Bas, me para'it proci~der d'un raisonncment entierement faux. Parlant de l'impossibilite dans laquellc se trot1verait le Gou- ....ernement neerlanclais de se conformer il. la partie de la resolution du Conseil qui a trait au retablis~ sement de la Republique, le representant des Pays-Bas a expose assez longuement all Conseil que la situation en presence de laqLlelle une Republiqtle retablie se trouveralt a son retour a Djokjakarta serait teIJe, qu'lln GOLlvernement republicain reconstitue dans ces cond~tions n'en serait pas maitre; 1es Pays~Bas estimaient donc qu'ils ne pouvaient pas prendre la rcsponsab'lhte d'entreprendre de retablir la Republique, Le representant de la Belgiqnc vient de de- mander si la Commission elle:meme peut donner l'assnra',lce que I'ordre public serait maintcnu si Ies dirigeants de la Republique etaient autorises a retourner a Djokja1<<l.rta et a reconstituer 1etlr Gouvernement. A mon avis, c'est la un raisonne- mcnt faux, On demllnde au Conseil de securite de tonsentir arapporter une de ses propres decisions en ra.ison de circonstances qui result-ent unique- ment et .entihement du refus oppose par l'une des parties aux recommandations et meme nux instructions du Conseil de securite, N'est-ce pas absurde? Comment peut-on alJeguer devant le Conseil qu'une chose est impossible par suite de circons'!ances existant actuellement et qui ne se seraient pas produites si, en premier lieu, la partll."l interessee s'etait conformee aux. instructions du Cor.seil? C'est la un argument qui doit etre ~ qui est, j'en suis sur - entie.rement inadmissible aux yellx rlu Conseil de securite et qui ne peut,. d'aucnne maniere, etre convaincant. D'autre part, si le Conseil de securite doit prendre connaissance de eirconstances et cl'ele- ments nouveaux; que dire des nouveaux elCments- que le representant de l'Indonesie lui-meme a· portes hier a la connaissance cl',l Conseil? Ceux-ci ne sont-ils pas bien plus reels?, Les faits d'ordre: I do no: know whether any formal act on the part 0 f the Security Council is in cO:J.templation at this stage, but it is at least certain that the Council will not wisil to, and callnot, escape or put aside the responsibility for maintaining its resolution of 28 January and accepting whatever consequences under the Cllarter would follow in the event of continued non-compliance with the resolution on the pact of one of the parties. It may be tbat wllat J hope will prove to be the very dearly expres~c.d f(;eling of be Sf>cl1rity Council, b accordance with the repor: of its own Commission, w:ll have an influence of a pr;lctical kind On he position of the Netherlands Govern- ment, and I sir,cerely trust that it will. At leas!, let that feeling of the Security Council be clearly expressed in the rem<.ining part of this discussion, and' let the Netherlwds Government, against which, may I say again, neither the Council nor a::Iy of the parties present seated amend tr.e COl1ncil table :ee1s any animus, make no mistake about wbt the feeling of the Council is. Let it accept willingly and readily now what it must feel to be its proper oblig~tions a::; a Member of the United ~abons. It is not too late for a new appro<lch by the Netherlands to this q1.lestion. There was nothing in the resolution of 28 ]<.nuarr which cOllld be held to be an unreasonable rcquiren1cnt for the Netherl~_nrl" to carry Otlt; indeed, representatives on the Security Cotmci1 will recollect what considerable pains the Cottncil took not to exceed reasonable or practi- cable bowds in what was laid down in the terms of that resollltion. One outstanding example is the very moderate stlpltlation in the resol!.I(on regardi:1g the with- drawal of Netherlands forces harT. Repuhlican territory. On the o~her r.and, ~he resolution was in no pa~t more speciiic or more explicit than in its requirement that the Netherlanes authorities should proceed immedi<ltely to take steps toward the restoration of tl:c Rept1blie: firstly, as:l. politi- cal entity, which the Security Cottncil has always recognized it to he; and secondly, as an equal partner in the negotiations which the resoltttion contemplated. Why cannot the Netherlands make some ap- proach :n th"t direction? If a substantial and advantageous result is expected from the proposed round table conference, would it not much more easily be arri'ved at-ann what wottl::! the Nether- lands have to lose-by acting in accordance with the requirements laid down by the Security Council) The representative of the United States yesterday very dearly exposed the basic con- ditions which, other things being eqttal and the Republican authorities ~hemselves being agree- ab:e, might~rst:ade the Security Council to agree to the :talding of a conference broadly on the lines proposed by the Nethe:;lands. Those two cO:lditions ar~, of course, the rt'storation of the ~inccrcmcnt qu'il en sera ain~i. Il faudrait au moins que, pendant la derniere partie de oeHe discussion, le 'sentiment clt: Conseil de securite sait c1aireoent exprit:"Je, ~t que le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, a l'egard d:.tquel, je puis le repe:er, ni le Conseil, ni ?el"$onne a la t"ble dtl Conseil ne nou~Tit la moindre animos:te, n2 se meprenne pas Sur le sentiment reel du Conseil. Que ee Gouvernement accepte mainte- mnt, de bon gre et S;l:1S difficulte, ce cu'll cbit considerer comme les c.bligations qui Jut incom- bent en tant que Membre de I'Organisation des Nations Unies. T1 n'est ::>as trop tard POtU" que les Pays-Bas CO:1siderent et probleme SOltS un nouvel angle. Rien, dans la resolution du 28 ja:wier, ne peut etre considere comme imposant une obliga- tion deraisonnable aux Pays-Bas; tn fait, les membres du Conseil de securite se souviendront du mal que le Consei1 s'est donne pour que les cispositiollS de h re!>Oluti.Q:1 restent duns des ['mites raisonnables et posslbles. Un exemple frc.ppant de ce soud est burni par la disposition tie.> moderee wncernant le retl'ait c.es forces neerlalldais(;5 dt1 territDlre ee la Re~ publiqt;e. D'autre par~: .Ie resolution T1'~:'~, nulle part kl.llll':UfS, plus preL:ISe et plm expliClte qlle lorqu'elle exige que les autorites neerlandalses prennent irmnec1iatement des mesures en "Vue du rptablissement de la RepubHqt1e, d'abord en :ant qu'entite politique - qualite que le Conseil tU! a to-ujours reconnue - et, ensuite, en tant que pnrtie, sur un pied d'entiere egalite, am.:: negocia- dons envisagees dans :a res:)lution:. Pocrquoi le:; rays-BlIs ne peuvent-ils P:'l.S s'engager clans c~tte direction? Si l'on escompte que la conferente de la table ronde qui a e.t6 proposee donnera des resultats importants et avantageux, n'aboutirait~on pas bcaucoup plus aisement iJ. ces ~esulta.ts en s~ coIlforrnant aux c<lnditions econdes par le Conseil de securite? Les Pays-3as pourraient~ils y perclre quelque chose? Le representant des Etats-Unis iJ, expose tres clairement :tier [416bne seance] les condi- tions essentielles qui devraient etre remplies pour que le Con3eil de securite accepte evel:tuellement la rt\uni<lrt d'une conference sur une base cones- pondant d'une fai:;on generale a celle c..u'ont pro- posee les Pays-Eas, tontes choses ega1es d'aillettrs I quote further: "By accelerating the transfer of sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia, the obstacles connected with the formation of an interim government, which have so far proved insur- mountable, may possibly be avoided." The opinion of the President of the Republic of Indonesia in het agrees with the original purpose of the Netherlands proposal, Both parties now agree that an advance in the date of transfer of sovereignty would simplify, if not remove, many of the hamssing problems which have been before the two par~ies. It seems to me that the Security Council should give this element proper appreciation. It is a concession 011 the part of the Netherlands, and to take a concession made as of no value is, to say the least, certainly not the way to encourage any concession. Therefore, I call the attention of this Council, first of all, to this great element of agreement in the situation, namely, advancing the date of the tnmsfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to Indonesia. In the second place, we have this proposal of a round table conference. What is the Republican reaction to tltat proposal? I again read from the letter of President Soekarno as follows; "I can agree in principle with the purpose of such a conference." The round table conference as a procedtlre, as a method, as a mode of negotiation, seems to be acceptable to everybody. The conditions sur- rounding this conference have been criticized objected to and contested, but this round tabl~ conference as a procedure seems to me to be acceptable to everybody concerned. I find no reason why this C;0u?cil should. object to this pro~ cedure or should I~S1St on or dIctate to the parties ct?ncerned any paltlcular mode of negotiation, pro- ".Ided the ter.ms of the Security Council's resolu- tlO~ are carned o~t. ,We insist on the implemen- tatIon of the obJecttves of our resolution' we have no reason to insist on an)' particular m;thod by which that implementation may be 'eached. It therefore seems to me that 'we should start with t!lese t;"o elements of agreement. However, there. IS a? Important element of disagreement in the sltaatlon. We all know what it is: it is this question of the restoration of the Republic. In reg~rd to this matter, the Netherlands has cate- goncally ~tated th~t it will not do it, although the Secunty CotlnCll asks for it in the resolution of 28 January. Let tlS, however, examine this matter still further. What is the real difference invohed? I confess that, after my stUG)', I am not clear as to what the real difference is. There is the invi- "Peut-etrc sel'a-t-il possible, en accelerant le transfert de sOllverainete aux Etats-Unis rl'Indo- nesie, d'evitcr les obstacles, insurmontables jusql1'i present, que pose la creation d'un gouvernement provisoire." L'opinion du President de la Republique d'In- donesie s'accorde, en fait, avec le but initial de la proposition des Pays-Bas. Les deux parties conviennent maintenant ql1e, en avalH;ant la date du transfert de souverainete, on simplifierait et on supprimerait la pIupart des problemes inquie- tants en presence desquels se trOl1vent les deux parties. 11 me semble que le Conseil de securite devrait accorder a ce point I'attention qu'il me-rite, Il represente une concession de la part des Pays- I3as; or, considerer une concession faite comme e-tant sans valcur, n'est certainement pas - et c'est le moins qu'on puisse dire - le moyen cl'encourager a faire d'autres concessions. J'attire donc tout d'abord l'attention des me~­ bres dll Conseil sur ce point important au sUJet duquel les parties sont d'accorcl, a savoir, qu'il convient d'avancer la date du transfert de la. souverainete par les Pays-Bas a l'Indonesie. En second lieu, il y a cette proposition de con- ference de la table ronde. QueUe est la reaction des Republicains a cette proposition? Je cite de nouvcau un passage de la lettre du President Soekarno: "Je peux accepter, en principe, l'objet d'une telle conference". La conference de la table roucle constitue une procedure, une methodc, un mode de negociation qui paraissent acceptables achacun. On a critique. les conditions dont s'accompagne cette conference, on les ra desapprouvees et attaquees, mais la con- ference de la table roude, en tant que mode de procedure, me parait etre acceptable pour tous les interesses. Je ne vois pas pourquoi le Conseil eIcverait des objections contre cette proceclure, ni pour que11e raison il imposerait aux parties interesse-es tm certain mode de negociation, pourVll que les dispositions de la resolution du Conseil de securite soient applique-es. NOllS exigeons que les prescriptions de notre resolution soient executees, mais nom 11'avons pas dc raison d'imposer la methode par laquelle eILes doivent l'etre. H me semble 'donc que nous devrions partir de ces deux points sur \csquels les parties sont d'accord. Mais il existe un point de desaccord important. Nous le connaissons tous: c'est la question du retablissement de la Republique. A cet egard, les Hollandais ont declare categorique- ment CJr,'ils ne retabliront pas la Republique, bien qile le Conseil de securite le demande dans la resolution du 28 janvier. Examinons ce.pendant la question plus a fond. Ott y a-t-il veritablement difference d'opinions? J'avoue que, apres avoir etudie la question, je ne vois pas bicn en ql10i consiste cette difference. Then, in the communication of the representa- tive of the Netherlands to the President of the Security Coundl [5/1274], there is the follow- ing very significant passage: "In this connexion a reasonable basis of nego- tiations may be found in the oral note of the United States member of the Committee of Good Offices submitted informally to the Netherlands delegation cin 10 September 1948, providing for a representation of the Republican territories by one-third and of the Federal territories by two- thirds of the total number." That means that, after this process of transfer of sovereip.pty has gone through, the Government of the Netherlands visualizes a future Republic of Indonesia in the United States of Indonesia which will occupy a position in that federation amounting to about one-third. That is the final project that the Netherlands Government leads us to villualize. Therefore, today, as a round table conference starts, there is some recognition of the Republic of Indonesia. In the end, there will be a Republic of Indonesia, occupying onc-third of the total influence in the federation. So far as that suggestion of the United States member of the Committee of Good Offices is concerned, it is my understanding that the Republican leaders aJso accept it. ~ 111 a communication frdm Prime Minister Hatta to the Assembly for Federal Consultation, there is also an indication of the Republican attitude. Vice-President and Prime Minister of the Repub- lic of Indonesia, Mohammed Batta, writes the following to the Chairman of nFo1 [5/1270]: "I think it is not necessary for me to state here exhaustively that the Government of the Republic of Indonesia aims at the formation of a free and sovereign Republic of the United States of Indonesia, in which the RepLtbtic of Indonesia occtlpies an equal position, not more and not less, with the other member States." That statement itself indicates that so far as the final result is concerned, the position of the Republic, in the minds of its leaders and in the mind of the Netherlands Government, is not so very different. Therefore, the difference ties in the very short period between now a?d that transfer. It is evident that the Repubhc must eventually be reconstituted. The Netherlands refuses to allow reconstitution to t:'1ke place immediately. That is the difference. What does it mean? "Vhy does the Netherlands refuse to accept our resolution? Does the stand of the Netherlands Government involve the remaking of the Republic before it is reconstituted? We have • Byzondel' Federcwl Overleg (Federal Assembly for Consultation). Ensuite, on trouve dans la communication <lu representant ,des Pays-Bas au Conseil de securite [S/1274], le passage suivant, qui est tn~s signifi.- catif: "A cet egard, on pourra trouver tine base raisonnable de negociation dans la note verbale presentee officieusement a la delegation des Pays- Bas, le 10 septembl'e 1948, par le representant des Et<;lts-Unis a la Commission de bons offices, note prevoyant une representation d'un tiers pour les territoires repl1blicains et de deux tiers pour les territoires federaux." Cela signifie que le Gouvernement des Pays- Bas envisage l'existence, lorsque la souverainete aura ete transferee, d'une future Republique d'Indonesie dans les Etats-Unis d'Indonesie, laquelle representcra environ un tiers de la fede- ration, Te! est le projet definitif que le Gouverne- ment des Pays-Bas nous al11ene a envisager. Ainsi donc, aujourd'hui ott commence une con- ference de la table ronde, la Republique d'Indo- nesic est reconnue clans une certaine mcsure. En definitive, il y aura tl1le Republique d'I,n~one.sie, detenant un tiers de l'influence dans la federatwn. Je crois comprendl'e que les. chefs rept~blicains acceptent egalement la suggestion du representant des Etats-Unis a la Commission de bons offices. On trouve aussi, dans une commu}lication du Premier Ministre Hatta a l'Assemblee consulta- tive federa.le une indication sur la position des republicains. 'M. Mohammed Hatta, Vice-Presi- dent et Premier Ministre de la Republique d'!ndo- nesie, ecrit ce qui suit au President du BOFt [S/1270] , "Je n'ai pas, me semble-t-il, a m'etendre ici longuement Stlr le fait que le Gouvernement de la. Republique d'Indonesie vise a. la formation d'u~e Republique libre et souveral1le ,des ~tats-.Ums d'Indonesie, dans laquelle la Repubhque mdo- nesienne occuperait une position egale - ni in~ ferieure, ni superieure - a celle des autres Etats membres." Cette declaration elte-meme montre que, en ce qui concerne les resultats definitifs, la si-tuation de la Republique, dans l'esprit de ses chefs et dans I'esprit du Gouyernement ?e; Pays-,B.as, n'est pas teltement differente. La difference reSIde donc clans la tres cotute pcriode qui s'etend de maintenant jusqu'au moment du transfert. I1 est evident qu'il faut, en definitive, retablir la Repu- blique. Les HoUandais refusent de permettre qu'eIle ,soit l'etab1i~ i~nmediatem;nt. C'est en cela que reside la dIfference. Qu est-ce que c~la signifie? Pourqt1~i le~ Pays-Ba~. refusent-tls d'accepter notre resolut101l? La posltlOn du G~u­ vernement des Pays-Bas suppose-t-eUe le remame- 1 By:Jonder Federaal Overleg (Assemblee consultative federal). The reasons which have been given are, in the first place, that reconstitution of the Republic HOW would mean a loss of prestige for the Feder- alists and the enhancement of the prestige of the Repttblic. That, we are told, the Dutch could not stomacb. This reason seems to me to be very fiims/,. If the prestige of the :Federalists has to be ll[Jhetd by the Netherlands and by Dutch mili- tary puwer, it is the kind of prestige which is very weak indeed. Nowadavs the world has made all politicians in all countries patriots, if not super- patriots. A political party in any country which has to rely on foreign arms to enhance its domes- tic prestig,e dues not appear to have a very bright future, In any case, as I have said, that reason seems to me to be flimsy. Another reason was given yesterday by the representative of the Netherlands, namely, appre- hension in regard to peace and order and terror and reprisals if the Repl1blic should be reconsti- tuted immediately. I confess that that reason seems to my delegation to ue on sounder ground. The pcssibiltties along that line do exist. I can speak on this aspect with some al1thority be- cause my own fellow cOlmtrymen have sufferer! grievously during the last year and a half. How- ever, the ca~lses of such disorder are not so simple, <lnd for the moment I should like to call the attenllon of the SeCl1rity Council to the fact that that aspect of the matter is fnily covered by its resolution of 28 January. In the preamble there is this paragraph: "Considering that the establishment and main- tenance of law and order throughout Indonesia is a necessary condition to the achievement of tile exprC'S5ed objectives and desires of both parties;" That is in the preambl~. The very first section of the operative part of this r~solutioll has tllis sentence: " . caUs npon both parties to co-operate in the restoration of peace and the maintenance of law and order tfuonghollt the area affected". In sllo.paragraph 4 (f), we again have that consideration inclllded in the following passage: "The Commission should assist in achieving' t11e earliest possible restoration of tbe civil administration of tlle Republic, To this end it shall, after consultatioll wttll the parties, recom~ mend the extent to which, consistent with reason- able requirements of public seemi!)' and the pro- tection of life and property! areas controlled lly the Republic under the Renville A!!reement (out- side of the D}okjllkarta area) should be progres- sively returned to the administration of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, and shall supervise such transfers." Therefore, tllat consideration of the Nether- lands is a reni consideratio'l. The Council took that into consideration in drafting this resolution. If t1lat is the real reaSOll, I should tbink that Ollr Commission could he~p the two p<:trties to come Cette phrase Se trouve dans le. preambule. Des le paragraphe premier dl1 dispositif de cette resolntion, on trotlvc la. phrase suivante: " Invite les cleux parties a tollaborer au retablissement de la paix et au maintien de l'ordre public dans toute la region illtercssee". On retrouve la meme preoccupation a l'a1inea 4 f), clans le [J<lssage suivant: "La Commission pretera SOn concours en vue ele retablir le pltlS tot possible l'aelministration civile de la Rept1bliquc. A cet effet, elle indiql1era, pal' voie ele recommandation et apres avoir can- suite les parties, dans CJt1elle mestu"e, SOl1S reserve cles exigences normales ue la securite publique et de la sal\vegarde des vies !lttmaines et des biens, les reg'LCllS (hormis la r&gion de Djokjakarta) contr6[ees par la RepubliquC': en vertu de l'Accord dtl Renville, devront progressivell1ent etre a nou- veau confiees :l I'administrittioll du Gouverne- ment cle la RepulJliql1e indol1esienne, et elle con- tr61era l'execution ele ce transfert." Cette preoccupation des PI8}'s-Bas est done bien reel1e. Le Conseil en a teon compte en redigeant sa resolution, Si telle est la veritable r<Lison, j'estime ql1e la Commission pourrait <Licler les deux pal'tie.'i a abontir a un accord. Je propose Those two paragraphs call for restoration of peace and restoration of tht. Republic. Those subjects touch or.ly the two parties. The federal States are not involved in this war; they are not involved in the restoration of the Republic. Those two matters were placed at the head of the operative p~rt of the resolution, i:J paragraphs I and 2. Then, in paragraphs 3 and 4, we went on to deal with the larger problems: the interim gov- ernment, the tr2nsfer 0: sovereignty, tbe con- stituent assembly, and the future constitution of Indonesia. After studying all these paragraphs, 1 have come to the conclusion that the round table con- ference can be i'. substitute only for paragraphs 3 and 4 of our resolution. It cannot in any Wily be made a substitute for paragrarhs 1 and 2. Paragraplls 1 and 2 cove~ matters which concern only the Republic and the Netherlands. Those matlers should be treated by those parties with the assistance of our Commission; there is no reason why they SllOUld be brought ttp at the round table conference· I have therefore come to the same condusion as the representative of Canada. I would Sl.lgg7st that our Commission propose to the two partIes that tl1ere should he a conference in Indonesia- it can be called a preliminary conference-to arrange for the implementation of paragraphs 1 and 2. After sl.:ch a conference has made some progress, we can proceed with that round table confere:lce to deal with the large;r aspects of the Indonesian problem. \Vhen I say that a preliminary conference should be held to cover the matters dealt with in paragraphs 1 and 2 of our resolution, I do not mean to scggest tbt there should be all)' negotiation on the prinr:iples of those two para~ graphs. The principles are settled: there s~ould be no more fighting, either by regular ar~les or by guerrillas, ar.d there mus! be a rest?ra~lOn of the Republic, beginning wlth the DJokJakarta area. Those principles, I say, are settled. B~t the procedure, the time-table, the mutual r~ponsl­ bilities in these :wo matters, need to be discussed and agreed to by the two parties. Such a pre- liminary conference should deal with matters of d~s m~,?:)res. de ~~I ou tel parti jDlitique; des dlSpos~tlOns m~~rcJs:mt touteS represailles pour des ra/sons pOlitlques; des dispositio:ls en vue du maintien rigoureux. de l'ordre public: et de la sauvegarde des vies humaines et des biens. Ainsi, tout en reconnaisilant que 1es craintes e.prouvees au 9ujet du maintien de la paix et de l'ordre public; et de la restitution ded b"iens sont legitimes, j'estime que nous disposons des mDyens neo:.:es_ saires pO'lr atteindre un objectif de cet ordre. . ·Si nous etudiom attentivement la resolution dll 28 janvier 1949, nous constatons que le proW~me indonesien se pr~sente' sous deux aspects. Le dispositif de la. resolution comprend plusieurs paragraphes. Les feragraphes premier et 2 tra:tent de questions qui interessent directernent et imm.e~ diatemen: les deo; parties seulement: le Gou- vernement des Pays-Bas et la Republique d'Indo~ nesie, Ces deux: paragraphes demandent le retabEsse- ment de la paix et la restauration d~ la Republi- que. Ces questions concernent les deux parties seulement. Les Etats federaux ne sent pas impli- qu~s dans cette gtterre; la restauration de la Republique ne les interesse pas. Ces deux ques- tions ant ete placees en tete du dispositif de la resolution, aux: paragraphes premier et 2. Les paragrap~es 3 et 4 traite:lt de pr,)blemes plus vastes: le gouvcnement provisoire, le transfert de la souverainete, l'assemblee constituante et h constitution future de l'Indonesie. Apres avoir Hudie taus ce~ paragraphes, je suis arrive a la conclusion que la conference de la table ronde ne peut remplacer que les disposi- tions des parngraphes 3 et 4 de la resolution.. elle ne pent, en aucune fao;;on, remplacer celles des paragraphes premier et 2. Les paragraphes pre- mier et 2 traiter,t de questions qui interessent uniqllement la Republique et 1es Pays-Bas. Les deux parties devraient les examiner avec le con- cOllrs de la Commlssion du Conseil; il n'y a pas de raison pour qu'elles soient portees devant la conference de la table ronde. Je suis donc a~rive a la mbne conclusion que le reprpgr.nt~nt du Canada. Je sug~ere que ~a Commission propose. aux deux parbes de tentr une conierence en Indonesie - ap?elons-la con- ference preliminaire - ponr prendre des disposi~ tions en vne de la mise en ceuvre des paragraphes premier et 2. Lorsque les travaux: de cette con- ference seront assez avances, la conference de la table rO:lde pour~a s'ouvrir et trailer les aspects plus vastes du probleme indonesien. Quand je dis qu'il comiendrait ~e reunir une conference preliminaire pour exam~ner les ques· tions visees aux paragraphes premIer et 2 de la resolution, je n'ent~cl.s pas pa~ l~ qu'ii ~ev.rait y avoir des negociatlOns au sl1Jet des pnnctpes contenus dans ce, ,J,eux para.graphes, Ces principes sont etaJlis: les armees regulieres et 1es pa1tisans doivent cesser les hostilites, et i1 faut restaurer la Repu:'ll.que, en commen~ant pat k:- re.tablir ?ans la region de D:okjakarta. Ces pnnClpes, Je le repete, sont etajlis. 11 faut. cepend<tnt que l~s deux parties diseutent et convlennent de la pToce~ dure a suivre, de l'ordre des debats et des. re~ sponsabilites reciproques dans ces deux affalres. I would go a little further. If such a pte~ liminary conference is not accepted by the two parties concerned, we should instruct our Com- mission to refrain from participation in the round table conference at The Hague. Without such a preliminary conference and without the reaching of agreement at this conference, the round table conference either cannot be called at all or, if called, would yield no results whatever.

In view of the time, and as there is no other speaker on the list, I propose that the Council adjourn and meet again on Monday, 14 March at 3 p.m. If there is no objection, the meeting will be considered closed. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de I'espagnol) : Etant donne qu'il est tard et que la liste des omteurs est epuisee, je propose au Consei! de lever la seance; la prochaine seance aura. lieu le lundi 14 mars a 15 heurs. La s;ance est lefJee Q 13 h. 30.