S/PV.425 Security Council

I would remind the members of the Council that. at the 384th meeting of the Security Council held on 15 December 1948, the representative of Pakistan was.asked to come to the Council table. In answer toa question by the President, he said that his statement would take a considerable time. It was then decided that this statement should be given when the Security Council was once more meeting at Lake Success. In accordance with this decision, the representative of Pakistanis asked toda,y to address the C9uncil. CONSEIL DE SECURITE PROCES.VERBAUX OFFICIELS QUATIDEME ANNEE No 2~ QUATRE CENT VINGT-ClNQUIEME SEANCE Tenue aLake Success, New-York, le jeudi 19 men 1949. a 15 heures. President: M. J. CHAUVEL (France). Presents: Les representants des pays suivants: Argentine. Canada, Chine, Cuba, Egypte, France, Norvege, Republique socialiste sovietique d'Ukraine, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. 1. Ordre du jour provisoire - (SI Agenda '425/Rev.1) 1. Adoption, de l'ordre du jour. 2. La question de Haiderabad: a) Lettre adressee par le Ministre des affaires etrangeres et des relations imperiales du . .Pakistan, le 4 mai 1949, au President du Conseil de securite, touchant la question de Haiderabad (S/1317). 2. Adoption de l'ordre du jour 3. La qllestion de Haiderabad (suite) Surl'invitation du President, Sir Benegal N. Rau, representant de l'Inde, et Sir Mohmnmed Za!rulla,h Khan, reprBs~ntQtnt du Pakistan, pren- n(/nt place a·la tab-le du Conseil. Le PRESIDENT: Je rappelleque, le 15 decembre 1948, au COUiS de la 384eme seance du Conseil de stkurite, le representant du Pakistan a ete appele a prendre place a la·.table du COL:seil. En reponse a une question du President, le represen- tant du Pakistan a dtklare que SOl'. expose serait fait au moment ou le Conseil de securite serait de nouveau installe a Lake Success. C'est en application de cette decision que· le representant du Pakistan est appele, aujourd'hui,a prendre la parole. . Sir Benegal N. RAu, (I:uia) : I am very grate- ful to the members of the Security Council for giving me this opportunity to amplify what has been stated in the letter which members have already received regarding the issue of compe- tence. When I speak of comptence, I prefer to say that the question I am arguing is the compe- tence of Hyderabad to make this complaint. I do not wish to be d' -'.1rteous in any way and, although it comes t" the same thing, I sho~lr rather not refer to the competence of the Secunty Council to hear Hyderabad. I hope to be very brief. Let us see where we now stand. This case started as a complaint by Hyderabad on 21 August 1948 [S/986] under Article 3~, paragraph 2. of the Char'~r of the United NatlOns. That Article reads: "A State which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to );he attention of the Se~urity Council or of the General Asesmbly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter." Menlbers of the Council will notice that the Article opens with the words "A State". Hydera- , bad has never been a State in the international sense, .as I shall explain presently. India con- tended and still contends that Hyderabad was not competent to appeal to the Security Council under the Article in question. While the issue of competence thus raised was pending, India was forced to take certain action in Hyderabad to put an end to the prolonged lawlessness and disorder which were disturbing not only Hyderabad itself but also the adjoin~g districts of India. When 1 say lawlessness and disorder, I am not using an idle phrase. The disclosures made at the trial of Sydney Cotton, which has just concluded in London, ~il1 probably come to the members of the Secunty Council as, a surprise, although I am distressed , to. say that they ~ri1l not be a great surpdse to the people of India. Cotton was convicted two days ago, and was ordered to pay a fine, for gun-running in Hyd~ra­ bad. It is to be noted that he pleadedgul1ty. According to the evidence at the trial-the trial was held in a London court-the offences related to the carrying of arms and ammunition of war repTl~sentants de l'Inde et du Pakistan, etant donnt~ que ces deux Etats ne sont pas membres du Conseil. Sir Benegal N. RAu (Inde) (tratiuit de l'anglais) : Je suis tres reconnaissant aux menlbres du Conseil de securite de m'avoir donne cette occasion de developper ce -lui a eU~ dit dans la lettre dont ks membres sont deja. saisis, en ce qui concerne la question de competence. Je tiens a. preciser que, lorsque je parle de competence, j'entends celle de Haiderabad a. presenter cette plainte. Je ne voudrais manquer de courtoisie en aucune maniere et, bien que cela revienne au meme, je pre£ere laisser de cote la question de savoir si le Conseil de securite a competence pour entendre Haiderabad. Je me propose d'etre bref. Actuellement, la situation est la suivante: Cette question a commence par la plainte que Haide- rabad a formulee le 21 aout 1948 [S/986], en vertu du paragraphe 2 de l'Article 35 de 1a Charte des Nations Unies ainsi conl;u: "Un Etat qui n'est pas Membre de 1'Organisa- tion peut attirer l'attention du Conseil de securite oude l'Assemblee generale sur tout differend auquel il est partie, pourvu, qu'it accepte preala- blement, aux fins de ce differend, les obligations de reglement pacifique prevues dans la presente Charte." Les membres du Conseil remarqueront, que l'Article commence par les mots "Un Etat". Or, Haiderabad n'a jamais ete un Etat au scns inter- national du mot, comme je le demontrerai. L'Inde a toujours estime que Haiderabad n'a pas com- petence pour faire appel au Conseil tie securite aux termes de l'Article dont il s'agit. Pendant que la question de competence ainsi soulevee etait pendante, l'Inde a ete 'contrainte de prendre certaines mesures en Haiderabad pour mettre un terme 'a. l'anarchie et au desordre qui troublaientde fac;on prolongee non seulement Haiderabad lui-meme, mais aussi les regions avoisinantes de l'Inde. Lorsque je dis anarchie et desordre, je n'use pas d'une formule vide de sens. ' , Les revelations du proces de Sydney, Cotton, qui vient de se terminer a. Londres, surprendront sans doute les membres du Conseil de securite; mais, et je regrette d'avoir a. le dire, elles n'eton- neront guere les habitants de l'Inde. Il y a deux jou.rs, Cotton a ete condamnea. une amende pour contrebande d'armesen Haiderabad. Ilconvient de remarquer qu'il a plaide cQupable. D'apres les temoignages produits au proces, pro- ces qui a eulieu devant uil tribunal de Londres, le ,delit avait trait au transport d'armes et de The next meeting took place 01;1 20 May at Secunderabad. Giving the details of the contract, which is said to have been destroyed when Hy- derabad capitulated, an official witness said that the sum of 400,000 pounds sterling was to be paid to the firm. There was also mention of pay- ment to certain officials in Karachi. The contract was finally drawn up at the house of the Hydera- bad Agent-General in Karachi on 27 May, nearly three months before Hyderabad's complaint to the United Nations. From the start until June, two air trips' carry- ing arms and ammunition were' made daily and the effort was speeded up towards the end of June. On 10 July an aeroplane was flown to Warangal carrying 920 rifles or Sten .guns alld 64 boxes ef ammunition, 'each box containing 1,000 rounds. That was the particular transaction for which Cotton was convicted. I ask the members of the Security Councilto note the dates. The contract was finally drawn up. on 27 May 1948; the complaint was dated 21 August1948., The operations which India Was compelled to take did not start until about the middle of Sep- tember. In these circumstances, the surprise is not that India acte..., but that it did not act earlier. .India was ultimately driven to take action. The operations lasted only three or four days, because the people of the State were really behind them. At the end of that period, the Ministry which had authorized the complaint resigned, and the ruler, the Nizam, withdrew the complaint. The letter of withdrawal addressed by him to the Secretary- , General on 22 September 1948 [S/1011] con- cluded as follows: UTo resolve all doubts in the matter,'r now formally address this letter to· you and request you to note that the complaint, made by my G?vernment to the Security. Council has been , 'Ylthdrawn by me. I would add for your informa- _* that on 17 SePtember.~~~48,the Ministry, at , U Afin de dissiper tous les doutes a cet egard, nous nous adressonsformellement a·V;)Uspar .la presente lettre et VOllS prions de noterque la plainte adressee par notre ,Gouvernernerifau Conseit de securite a eteretiree par notts. Nons , ajouterons,a titre d'information, que leminis-:- On 5 October 1948, the Nizam followed this up with a Firman or decree, in the foHowing terms: "It has been brought to my notice, and I have also seen in the foreign Press, that statements have been made to the effect that I am acting under dun~ss and that I am not allowed free movement-in short, that I am not a free agent in any matter. This is absolutely incorrect. On the contrary, my relations with the Indian Union and the military administration. are .extremely cordial. No pressure ef any kind is being brought on me. In fact I am paid all the respect and the c~urtesy due to the high position I hold as Head of the State." It will thus be clear that whatever al;tion India took was in effect directed not against the Head of the State nor, of course, against its people, but against'a particular set of ministers who, were kept in power by a military· organization known as the Razakars. How did those Ministers get into pmver? I 'shall not use my own words but shall borrow • Lord Mountbatten's: they got into power by engineering "a coup" ht November 1947 which "caused India completely to lose their faith in Hyderabad". The document in which these'words appear has been printed in The Complaint of Hyderabad against the Dominion of India, Ap- pendices, page 135, . What were the methods which those Ministers used? Once again. let me quote. from a letter written to the Nizam by Lord Mountbatten, who, referring· to certain incidents which had hap- penedshortly before the coup, said: "....if these methods of coercion had not been . permitted to .interfere with the carrying out of Your Exalted Highness's wishes at so crucial a moment, the story of relations hetween India and Hyderabad would have been written by a very different and far happi~r pen". w ~." .. ' • These are Lord Mounthatten's words, and the document appears in· The Complaint of Hydera- bad against the Dominion of India, Appendices, page 83. What support did they enjoy? Once more I shaUnot use any words of my own, because I represent one particular side in this controversy. . I shall quote agai1+ from Lord Mountbatten's letter to <the Nizam .written on 8 April 1948, nearly five ml;>nths after the coup: "You will have noticed that during the course of the last few months, the ruler of nearly every State inthi§sub-continent which is in relationship with the Dbminion o£:tndia. has,introduced, -or has declared his intention: of introducittgin the near future~·truly responsible and representative minist,~s, qui etaient maintenus au portvoir par une organisation militaire conIiue sous le nom de Razakars. . Comment ces roinistres sont-ils parvenus an pouvoir? Ce n'est pas mon opinion que je vais donner, mais ceUe de lord Mounthatten: ils se sont empares du pouvoir en faisant "un coup d'Etat" au mois de novembre 1947,cQup d'Etat rea la suite duquell'Inde a perdu toute confianc{, -en Haiderabad". Le texte d'ou·. ces rrlpts sorit extraits figure a la page 135 [te.:rteanglais1 du document intituleComplaint of Hyderabad against the Dominion of India, Appendices. Quelles on't ete les methodes empl~yees par ces ministres? Permettez-moi de citer encore un passage d'une lettre ecri~e au Nizam par lotd' Mountbatten. Voicice qu'il disait au sujet de certains incidents qui se sont produits pert apres le coup d'Etat en question: "Si les methodes de contraint1e n'etaient pas . venues entraver, a tin moment crucial, l'execution . des volontes de Votre Altesse Serenissime, les relations entre l'Inde.et Haiderabad auraientpris un tour bien different et infinitnentplus heureux.." Tels sont les ternies employes par lqrd Mount.:. batten. Cette lettre figure a la page, 83 [te.:rt~an­ glais] du document intitule CO'Inpla'i,nt of. H~de.. rabad against the Dominion·of India, Appendices: Par qui ces ministres ont-its ete soutenus? Cette fois encore, ce n'est pas moi"ej.t1i repondrai, carje representel'une des parties ac~di£rerend. Je citerai un passage d'une lettre e{:r1te par lord Mountbatten au Nizam le 8 avril ,1948, c'est.- a-dire cinq mois en:viron apres le coup d'Etat: "Vous avez ~ertainementremarqt:le' qu'au cours de ces derniers IDois les. chefs de presque- tous les Etatsqui,.dans la· peninsule ii:l,dienne, sont en relation avec le Dominion de.1'Indeont etabli, oU VVbat did these particul~rM;inisters dQ while in power? That they could.not maintain law and order has already been stated; but t1:ley also made pretty free with State funds. I have pere a list of pecuniary transactions-not e:Khaustive--run- ning to over 2.5 million pounds sterling-that is 10 million dol1ars...,.....which, to put it mildly, re- quires a good deal of e:lCplanation. Some of them find a sinister f>xpll.\nation in the facts which have just come to light in the course of Sydney Cotton's trial. I·ask, is there al1ything.of inteffiational si~ifi~ Je pose la question: Y.a-t-il quol que ce soit cance ,n ~ll ~his?Do n<:>t let Us; 1:l~decl away by dans ces incidents qui ait une port~~,intef.!l~'" words. This cOD1pl~hlt is not really . made by tionale? Ne nous !ai~sons P<lS ~garer pa.r les mCl)t~. Ifyderabad, but by certain individuals whQ had. La plainte qon.t i1 ~'agit, ce n'est pas Haiderab<ld. once usurped a littlebrief autlWrity ~n Hyderabad qui l'adeposee, mais des individus qui,' pendant and hay~ n0'Y lQ§t it. ~'h~y hav~ ceased to repre- un temps tres l;ourt,. aVl:\ienfustlrpe lepouvoir sent th~ ruler; they neVer represellt~cl the peopl~. en :aa~4eraba.cl) et q1,ti depuis l'ont perdu. Ces: ~"hat~ver dilSlmte or situ:itiol:1 they c~-eated·in individus ne representent plus le chef de l'Etat, et ~J:q.erab~d hl;ls nQW cc;>me to <ll1 ~d, and con., ja111ais ils n'olit represent~ le peuple. Toute sitlJa" dItions !1regradu~ny s~tt1ing down to nQr1l1~; tionque ceshon:ut!esoritpu ereer, tout differend :rheNizam an,d ~iso&1<;er~ Pave bee]], co-ope~a.t- qu'ils ant pu provoquer en Haiderabad, ont pri~ mg with the Indian a\ltl1Qritie~ in Hyderabad fqr fin aujou.rd'hui et la ~ituation redevient progress~" the restoration of law and 'oJ.:deJ.:. 'No Hindu- vement nQrmale. Le, Niza!Ii et SOJ;1' personnel Muslim clashes ~ave' been reported during the las~ <:ooperent C\vec les a,utorites de nnde au reta:bli$.. two or three months. Relations between the sementde l'ordre et de la loien Haiderabad~ t,,:o .commul1ities are cordial: . Various good-will Depl1isdeu..'C 01,l trois Dloisa,ucunhetlrt Ile s'e~t . mISSIons•led .bypromillent Muslims fr9D1 variou$J produit ~ntre lndiet1set.. Mahqmetans et. ce5. parts of lndIa~a~e toured Hydera:bad. There is l·grGupes.entre~~I1l1el1td.es ~elatiol1sempreintes 4~ po .ban or re~1rlctlonon the.entty of. any yisitorcordi~lite.; lIa\dera1;>a<1. a ~te.visite par4il.Ierent~s mtolIyderahad. Pfe~!> represen~atives from rnd!!! ,.. mIs,sion!> :<1,e ~onciliationcon4uites par de~p~r", ~p.d•abro~d, have vIsIted,.the S~ate without le~ or~onnalites.em4t~t~~;tppartenant~u~ populatiQP~ hIlldra1.1ce. ' 'IllUsulI11l;\lJ,esdes differentes, parties 4e rInd~, A,1J'" T.he future of the State and its relationship with lndla~ l;tre matters which have been .left to be decided.by !he people. f.\r.t~ngements· are in train. for C011,vemng aCOl1stItuent assembly for this purpose.•·.Electoral·roUs.based on adult franchise" are ~1.19;erpr,epar:ition..lt is hoped that all arrange-' m~nts for elections to. the. constituent assembly wIll be completed by this autumn.. Meanwhile a distingt1ished retired· Botish official, who 'was Sir bz_.......~ ----._ ~une b~rri~re, !iueun,e res~riction~'~st O,ppq{3~~!! l'ep.tree QtrS "isitet11~seti, If~iderabadldes corre~... pond.!1n.t~ge press.e vevus·de l'llldeou de retran... ger (;mtvisit~ Haidera,bad, sa,ns entraye 11i «:0Pc" trainte.· ' , C'~st le peuplede Haiderabad qui deciderflcde· Jlavenii.'" de l'Et~t .et de ses relations·avec .l'lnde.~ D~s dispositions ontetepriseSPO\1r.qu'W1eAss~­ bleeconstituante.se reunissea cet effet. Les adultes auront le droit de vote, et des listes electorales sont en preparation.. On peut esperer qu'a l'at;1- tomne ,tQut sera pret pour les ,elections a rAs- semblee •constituante.Deja, le GOllvernement de l'lnde anomme commeconseiller a1.Ipresde' Thns, even the United Kingdom, which knew intimately all the facts relating to the Indian States, including Hyderabad, declined to recog- nize them as becoming international entities upon the. passing of the Indian Indepevderice Act. It should be remembered that, from Novembet 1947 onwards, tbe!"e has been a standstill agreement, or an •equivalent. arrangement, under which th~ Do'- minion of India has aclusive charge of Hydera- bad's foreign relations.. That is one great differ- ence between Hyderabad and the Indonesian Republic. .The other differenc..' is equally impor- tant. I~ sure that the members of this Security Council are familiar with the map of India. There is a chain of. Indian States. stretching in a line from north to south and east to west. If Hydera- bad and the rest of them .can claim to be inde~ pendent States, as a. result of the Indian Inde- pendence Act, and if they can become independent by virtue of their own claim, irrespective of :recognition by any other country, then there will bean end to India. Indonesia is not in the heart of the Netherlands as Hyderahad and the other Indian States are in the heart of India. As some one has said, "You can live without your appendix and be the healthier for it. bl~t you. cannot live without your heart:' I should like to make· this perfectly clear, thai· India cannot possibly recognize any {if these Indian States lying within its borders as independent, any more than the United States Au cours de la discussion de l'Indian Indepen. dence Act, Sir Hartley Shawcross, du Royaume- Uni -'- c'est-a-dire du pays meme ou cette loi a ete adoptee - a declare, le 14 juillet 1947, a la Chambre des Communes: "On peut' dire ttne t~hose aU.J1J.oins avec c:ertitude: c'est que nous n'avons pasl'ifiterition de reconnaitre les Etats", c'est-a-dire les Etats indiens "comme des entites internatienales separees lorsque la loi entrera en vigtieur, le 15 aoftt." C'est ainsl quememe le Royaume-t1ni, parfai- tement au courant de tous les faits interessantl~ Eta.ts indiens, y compris Haidetabad, s'est refuse a reconnaitre q'l1'ils deviendraient des entites internationalcs apres le vote de l'Indian Indepen- dence Act. I1 convient de se rappeler que, depuis noveinbre 1947, un Accord de statu quo, ou un arrangement similaire, a charge le seuJ Dominion de l'Inde des relations intemationales de Haide- rabad. C'est la unedifference essentielle entre HaIderabad et la Republique d'Indonesie. Il y a une autre difference tout aussi· irimortante. le suis certain que les membres du Conseil de secu- rite connaissent bien la carte de l'Inde. Sur cette carte on· peut voir une chaine d'Etats .. indiens s'etendant dtt nordau sud et de l'est a l'ouest. Si Haiderabad et les a::tres Etats peuvent pretendre etredes Etats independa,nts, en raison de l'Indian Indepe.ndence Act, et s'ils peuvent obtenircette independance du seul fait de leur revendication, sans avoirbesoin d'etre reconnus par aucun autre pays, ce sera la fin de l'Inde. L'Indonesie ne se trouve pas auceeur des Pays-Bas comme Haiderabad et les autres Etats indiens se trouvent au ceeu! de l'Inde. L'onpeut vivre, a-t-on dit, sans son appendice et ne s'cn porter que mieux, mais on ne peut pas vivre sans son ceeur. Je desire faire entendre c1airement qu'il est impossible aI'Inde de reconnaitre l'inde- pendance d'aucun des Etats indiens qui se trouvent a l'interieur de ses frontieres, de meme qu'il est .~ conc~n. Questions are put and answers are given de l'Inde comme des questions relevant de sa in all such matters in the Indian Constituent competence. C'est a l'Assemblee constituante de Assembly to which the Government of India is l'Inde. devant laque1le le Gouvernement de nnde responsible. India has at present, even after the est responsable, que les problemes de cet ordre creation of Pakistan, a population of something sont poses et que repo!1se est faite aux questions, _ like 30 million Muslims, and no ~vernment cz.n souIevees. L'Inde possede act"JeUement, meme possibly afford to ill-treat so large'illm influential apres la constitution du Pakistan, une population a population, or indeed,any section of it. TheyId'envrron 30 millions de Musulmans et aUfrlln ha':e been ~ted re~resentati~n ,according to gouvernement ne s~urait se. p~rmettre de mal: theIr numbers In the Indian Constituent Assembly, 1 traiter une populanon aUSSl lmport.<t.nte, aUSSi The Indian Cabinet is a oompDsite one. It (;on- int1uenteni meme une f....-action quelconque de tains seven ffindus, two MusIiw.s, two Christians, cette pop~ation. Lee Musulmans ront representes two n.lembers 'Of the Scheduled Castes-:-or the proportionneUement a. leur nombre al'Assemblee so-called untouchables-and one Sikh. Any C{,~stitua1ltede l'Inde. Le cabinet de l'Inde a une genuine grievance of the Muslims in any part of composition mooe. n se compose de sept Hindous, India can he voiced by any Muslim or.· other de deux Mnsulmans, de deID.. Chretiens, de deu."C member in the Constituent Assembly, which is hors-caste'et d'un Sikh. Tous!esgriefs legitimes at once a safeguard against incorrect or exag- des Musultnans de n'importe quelle partie du gerated statem,entsand a means of prompt redress territoire de l'Inde peuvent etre exposes pat les where the facts call Ior redress. membres, musulmans ott autres, de l'Assemblee constituante - ce qui e,st a la fois un moyen de reprimer promptement les abus quand ils ont ete eftectivement consommes et de prevenir les affirmations incorrectesou exagerees. Au cours des demiers mOls s'est etabIie une pratique tres'satisfaisante, celle des conferences entre Dominions, qui reunissent les representants de l"Inde et du 'Pakistan pour discuterde pro- blemes tels que le relevement des'rMugies, le traitement des minorites, etc. . Puis-je demander si,dans les conditions que je mens de decrire, le' mamtientle la question de Haiderabad a. l'ordTe du jour du Conseil presente une utiIite quelconqrie? Comme je l'ai dit, ce qui se passe ou s·est passe en Haiderabad ne peut etre considere c~mme ayant' une importance sur le. plan international. De plus, il existe dans l'Inde desmoyens constitutionneIs suffisants pour redres- ser tous les griefs legitimes. Jevoudrais assurer le Conseil que les tentatives souvent repetees pour creer i propos de Raiderabad unecertaine agi- tationau ConseiIde securite, qui se trouve a une distance si grande des Iieux memes ou se derou- lent cesevenements, sont des tentativeB qui ne peuvent servir aucune fin utile. Les debats ne sont que pretex.tes a. des declarations qui enfIam- Inent les passions religieuses dans l'Inde et 1:rou- blent ainsi la paix inreneure' de ce pays. Tonte question de competence mise a. part, si le Conseil de securite desire- des informations sur i'une quelconque des questions conct(>tes qui se posent dans l'Inde, il ne sera pas diffidie de les lui four- In recent months there bas sprung up a very salutary practice of what are called Inter-Do- minion Confe:-ences between India and Pakistan to discuss pToblems suCh as the rehabilitation of refugees, the treatment of minorities, and so on. May I ask whetherany usefUl purpose is served, in the circumstances which I have described, by keep~g tb.e subject of Hyderabad any longeion the :agenda of this Council? As I have said, what has,happened UT what is happening in Hyderabad cannot be said to be a matter of international con- Cetn. Not only that,' but adequate constitutional means, of .1'edress exist in India itself for any matters requiring .'redress. These" recurrent attempts to agitate the subject in this Security . (A)unci1, w~ch is thousands of :miles away from the actual sceneo! events, .ean, I submit, serve no .useful purpose. They merely give 0ppoitunities !or statements whiCh inflame communal passions In !ndia and disturb India's internal tranquillity. Qurte apart from·any question-of-jrrrts-diction, if t:he Security Cooncil desires any information on any specific points from India, there should be no great difficulty in supplying it. But I respectfully urge that to :retain this subject any longerbn the agenda of this Seeuritv CounCIl ,~ neither rntessary nor desirable, .apartfromthequestion The PRESIDENT (translated from French) i I. observe that, in accordance with custom, th~ representative of India, in dealing with the ques- tion of jurisdiction, has spoken at some length on the substance of the matter. However that may be, I repeat that the decision to hear the representative of Pakistan on the question· of Hyderabad was taken on 15 December last. ')oes any member of the Council wish to make addi- tional observations with regard to that decision? Since there are no observations, I call upon the representative of Pakistan to speak. Sir Mohammed ZAFRULLAH Khan (Pakistan): I am extremely grateful to the Security Council for affording me this opportunity of making my submission on behalf of Pakistan on the problem of Hyderabad. In the course of my sub- mission, and mainly at the beginning of i\:, I shall attempt to deal with the question of compe- tence also, which the representative of India has placed before the Council. At this stage I could only deal with it from an academic point of view. The narrative of events relating to Hyderabad itself will indicate, with reference to the actual position, to what extent the submission made on behalf of India can bear exmination. Before I enter upon my submission on the problem itself, I wish to make two brief submissions to the _Security Council on a very general character. I do so with apologies as they might appear to be matters of so simple a character as hardly to need mention here. In .the first place, it has been assu;med by the representative of India that a discussion of the problem before the Security Council will lead merely to the inflaming of public opinion and might lead to embarrassment for the Government of India within India itself. On that point I desire to submit that-although my submission is bound to present a point of view to the Security (:ouncil with which India entirely disagrees and which it contests-I shall attempt to make my submission on the basis of facts which are either uncontested, in the sense that they are contained in authoritative correspondence which has passed between the Governmep.ts of India and Hydera- bad, or are drawn from sources which cannot be desc;ribedas in'any sense prejudicedagainst ~ndia. I shall refrain as .far as possible from making my su.·bmission to the Council in any manner which could cause .any offence' in any quarter, including India itself, though as. I have said, our points of view differ seriously in respect qf this matter. -. . . Secondly, I wish to submit, as a preliminary sta.tetnent, that it is a very naive·simplification of this problem to say that.India, out of its own necessities or considerations of its own security, was' compelled to take this·action and that, the action having been completed, there is nothing more to do about it. I am sure th;it the narration )fevents wilIconvincethe members of the 3ecurity Council that Illdia's action, by whatever name it might be· described on one side or the other, was entirely unjustified; that it amounted En l'absence d'observations, je donne la parole au representant du Pakistan. Sir Mohammed ZAFRULLAH Khan (Pakistan) (trttduit de l'anglais) : Je suis tres reconnaissant . au Conseil de securite de me permettre d'exposer le point de vue du Pakistan sur le probleme de Haiderabad. Au cours de: ma declaration, specia- lement au debut, j'essaierai de traiter aussi la question de competence, que le representant de l'Inde a soumise au Conseil. Pour le moment; je ne pourrai traiter cette question que d'un point de vue purement academique. Un expose des evenements concernant directement Haiderabad, et notamment de la situation actuelle, etablira jusqu'a quel point ·les argument::; presentes au nom de l'Inde peuvent supporter l'examen. Avant d'aborder le probleme, je voudrais presenter au Conseil deux breves observations de caracte.re tres general. Peut-etre pensera-t-on qu'il etait it peille besoin de presenter ici des observations aussi simples; d'avance, je prie le Conseil de m'excuser. En premier lieu, le representant de l'Inde a pretendu que, si le Conseil discutait ce probleme, cela aurait pour effet d'enflammer l'opinion pu~ blique et de creerdes difficultes pour le Gouverne- ment de l'Inde, sur son propre territoire. La declaration que je vais faire (et je sais que l'Inde se refuse completem.e'nt a accepter le point de vue que je vais exposer au Conseil, qu'elle contE:ste meme), j'essaierai de fappuyer sur des faits m- contestables: sait sur des faits qui sont exposes dans la correspondance officielle echangee entre les Gouvernements de l'Inde et de Haiderabad, soit sur de5 faits provenant de sources qui ne peuvent, en aucuire fac;oh, eti:'e soupl;onnees. de prevention contre l'Inde. Je m'efforcerai, autant que possible, de ne rien dire qui' puisse offense~ qui que ce soit, pas meme l'Iilde - bien que les points de vue de l'Inde et du Pakistan soient, je l'ai dejarappele, fort differents. La sel:onde observation preliminaire que je tiens a faire est la suivante: c'est simplifier le probleme d'une maniere vraiment trop naive que de dire que l'Inde a ete oblige~ de prendre de telles mesures poursauvegarder sesinterets pro~ pres et sa prQpresecurite et que, tes mesures ayant eteexecutees, il n:y a plus den afaire. Un expose des evenements convaincra, Yen suis sur, les membresdu Conseil que l'action menee par l'Ind,e, de quelque fal;onqu'on la qualifie de part In lay language, it amounts to this: that, as the result of treaties betweein the United Kingdom and the Nizam, the Nizam's foreign relations were conducted by the British, and the Nizam was not at liberty to establish independent foreign relations with other States. Under section 7 of the Indian Independence Act of 1947, all treaties ·between the Indian States and the United King- domcame to an end, and, with those treaties, the relationship of paramountcy or suzerainty also came to an end. No doubt the .Security Council would like to know the answer to the following question: If the only restriction Upon the Nizam's full sover- eignty came to an end, then what did Hyderabad become, if it was not an independent State or a State entitled to its independence? Sir Benegal N. Rau has quoted froin the speech of the Attorney~General of the United Kingdom, made during the course of the discussions of the Indian Independence Bill, s.::ving that it Was not the intentio11- o,f His Majesty's. Government to· grant recognition to the Indian States as independent States, on 15 August 1947. That does not mean, as I shall presently shnw, that the States would not become, from that date, independerit. AIl that was indicated was .that it was the hope of His Majesty's. Governinent that the Indian States would decide either to accede to either Pakistan . or to India, and in order not to create barriers ~e way of t= fUlfi~:::~: that hope, it was, Le Conseit de seeurlte, aux termes de la Charte, doit prendre toutes les mesures necessaires au maintien de la paix internationale, it est le seul organe ayant competence pour traiter ces ques~ tions; it faut qu'il les traite, sinon le monde tom~ ben'. dans le desordre et le chaos. Le probleme de Haiderabad est soumis au Conseit de seeurite depuis le 21 aout dernier, comme Sir Benegal N. Rau vient de le rappeler. Or, pour diverses raisons, dont la principale est que l'lnde ne tenait pas a. ce que ce debat ait lieu, l'historique des evenements n'a jamais ete :fait devant le COilseil. En dehors de la question posee par le representant de l'inde - celle de savoir $i Haiderabad est ou non un Etat, et s'it a droit ou non a. l'indepen- dance - it est un fait bien connu, c'est que le probleme de Haiderabad interesse tme region qui a une tres grande superficie et une population tres importante: .une sU1Jerficie de 214.175 kilometres carr<~s, petipIee de 17 a. 18 millions d'haLitants. QueUe est historiquement la position de Haide- iabad? Du point de vue international, .Haiderabad est-il, a-t-it ete, ou n'est-il pas, un Etat? Depuis qu'il est devenu un Etat - de quelque genre que ce soit - Haiderabad n'a jamais ete considere, sauf geographiquement, comme une partie de l'Inde. Pour ne parl:er que d'une epoque reccnte, le Nizam de Haiderabad a ete l'allie des Britan- niques au temps ou leur domination s'exerc;ait sur la plus grande partie de la peninsule indienne, et l'on a dit tantot que le Nizam etait un allie de second plan des Britanniques, tantot qu'il etait leur vassal. En langage simple, la situation est la suivante: aux termes des traites passes entre le Royaume- Uni et le Nizam, ~e Gouvemement britannique assurait les relations internationales du Nizam, lequel n'avait done pas le droit d'entrer en rapport direct avec les Gouverncments etrangers. La section 7 de l'Indian Independence Act a mis fin, en 1947, a. tous les traites en vigueur entre le Royaume~UnieUes-.Etats indiens et, par conse- quent, a. la domination (I!1 :-,uzerainete ~xercee par le Royaume-Uni sur ces Etats. Le Conseil de secttrite se post".ra assurement la question que void: attenduque lli seule limite imposee a. lapleine souverainete du Nizama ete supp'rimee, qu'~st. done devenu Haiderabacl, sinon un Etat' independantou un Etatayant droit. a. l'independance? L'attorney g~n~ral du Royaume- Uni a declare, au cours de la discussion d~ l'Indian Independence Bill--- Sir Benegal N. Rauvient de le rappeler - que le Gouvernementde Sa Majeste n'avait pas l'intention de r~connaitre J'indepen- dance des Etats indiens le 15 aont 1947. ceta ne signifie pas, et je vais le demontrer, queces Etats ne sont pas devenus independants a. partir de cette date. Tout ce que l'attomey general VQlltait dire C'etait que le GouvernemeIitde Sa Majeste esperait que les Etats indiens se joindraient, ou bien au Pakistan, pubien a. J.'Inde.. Et, pour ne pas mettre obstacle a. la realisation .decet ~s:poir;, on declara que le Gouvemement de Sa MaJeste n'entendait .pas reconnaitre les Etats in<:iielils a. la. - What does that mean? It means that the States would be independent, that it was hoped that they would choose to accede either to one Do- mion or to the other, but that time must be given for them to make the decision and, in any case, they must make that decision· to come in with one or the other willingly. It obviously meant, therefore, that if they did not come in, they would continue to be independent. 'Fhey might find it awkward, in actual fact, to continue that inde- pendence; by force of their geographical situation -as the representative of India has said-for lack of resources, or, in the case of many of them, lack of size, etc.-but the juridical position was perfectly clear; The Attorney-General has been quoted. Let me give a slightly more extensive quotation from his remarks during the course of the debate in the House of Commons on 14 July 1947: "His Majesty's Government realize that'it is bound to be some time before the States will have all the information before them to enable them to take a final decision. Indeed, the'constitutions of the Dominions will have to be altered so as to per- mit and provide for the accession of the States and to define the terms on which that accession may take place. We believe that tlle future of the States inevitably lies in association with British India, with whose territory their own are inextri- cably intertwined. But, we regard the decision which the States have to take as being their de- cision, and we do not intend to bring any pressure to bear upon them. We hope, as I have said. that the .States will associate themselves with 0111e or other of the new Dominions in a federal or treaty relationship on fair terms, fairly and amicably negotiated Mr. Patel, speaking from the newly Le Premier Ministre du Royaume-Uni, M. Attlee, parlant a la Chambre des Communes, le 10 juillet 1947, au sujet de l'Indian Indepe1J- dcuce Bill a declare: "En meme temps que les traites et accords pren- nent fin, les Etats recouvrent leur independance. C'est l'espoir du Gouvernement de Sa Majeste que tous les Etats, le moment venu, trouvent la place qui leur convient au sein de run ou de l'autre des deux Dominions, dans le cadre du Commonwealth britannique. Mais tant que la constitution des Dominions n'aura pas ete etablie de faC10n a incorporer les Etats en tant qu'asso- cies volontaires, les liens existant entre les uns et les autres devront avoir un caractere moins organiquc et un certain temps devra s'ecouler avant l'institution d'un regime d'ensemble." Qu'est-ce a dire? C'est dire que les Etats indiens seront independants; que 1'0n espere voir ces Etats se joindre a run ou l'autre des Dominions, mais qu'it faut laisser aUx Etats le temps de pren- dre une decision et que, en tout cas, its prendront cette decision librement. Evidemment, cela veut dire encore que, si les Etats ne se joignent pas a run ou l'autre Dominion, its demeureront inde- pendants. En fait, it pourra se reveler diffidle pour ces Etats de cemeurer independants, soita cause de leur situation- geographique, comme le representant de l'Inde Fa fait observer, soit parce qu'ils manquent de ressources, soit, et c'est le css de beaucoup d'entre eux, parce qu'its ont une trop faible etendue, etc. - mais la situation de ces Etats est, du point de vue juridique, parfai- 'tement claire. On a cite deja ce qu'a dit l'attorney general, mais je voudrais lire maintenant un plus long extrait de sa declaration a la Chambre des Com- munes, le 14 juillet 1947: "Le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste reconnait qu'un certain temps devra s'ecouler avant que les Etats disposent de tous les renseignements qui leur sont necessaires l,)our prendre une decision definitive. Il faudra, certes, que les constitutions des Dominions soient modifiees pour pel'mettre et prevoir l'adhesion des Etats et pour en determiner les conditions. Nous pensons que, dans l'avenir, les Etats sero:.:t fatalement amcnes a s'associer a l'Inde britannique, dans le territoire de laquelle leurs propres territoires sont etroitement imbri-· ques. Mais nous considerons que c'est aux Etats eux-memes qu'il appartiendra de prendre une telle decision; et notre intention est de n'exercer sur eux aucune pression. Notre espoir, je l'ai dit, est que les Etats s'associent arun QU al'autre des nouveaux Dominions par des traitesou par des liens federa~~~'.~~~~:~_,~~~ditions eq~~t:bless1'l Lord Listowel, then Secretary of State for India, speaking in the House of Lords on 16 July 1947, in the course of the debates on the Bill, observed as follows: "From the date when the new Dominions are set up, the treaties and agreements which gave us suzerainty over the States will become void. From that date, the appointments and functions of the Crown Representative and his officers will termi- nate and the States will be masters of their own fate. They will then be entirely free to choose whether to associate with one or other of the Dominion Govemments or to stand alone and His Majesty's Government will not use the slightest pressure to influence their momentous and volun- tary decision. Whatever the future relationship between the ne\v Dominions and the States may be, it will require prolonged consideration and discussion before the final adjustment can be made." ' I trust that these brief excerpts from the speeches of responsible Miilisters, including the Prime Minister, before Parliament, when the India Independence Bill was under discussion, will put it beyond doubt that so far as His Majesty's Government and the British Parliament are concerned, the position was and is that on the termination of suzerainty-which was the only restriction upon the sovereignty of the States-these States becam~ independenlt. And it was then for them, voluntarily and without any pressure and coercion, to decide whether each of them would accede to India or to Pakistan, or would, in the terms of the then Secretary of State, Lord Listowel, stand alone. In so far as the position of India itself is con- cerned, the very able and learned representative of India, who was in charge of India's case on Kashmir before the Security Council-Kashmir being another of the Indian States-said the fol- lowing, on 15 January 1948, when addre~sillg the 227th meeting of the Security Council: "... when the Indian Independence Act·came into force, Jammu and Kashmir"-this was the State involved in that Jispute-"like other States, became free to decide whether it would accede to the one or the other of the two Dominions, or remain ilndeperident". I repeat "remainindepend- ent". This is a clear recognition of that fact that the result of the Indian Indepe.ndence Act was that the States were· independent. They could ~hereafter choose to accede to one or the other : of th two Dominions, or they could remain independent. ,On the same day, the same representa- tIve, addressing the Security Council, said the following: tiThe question of the future status of Kashmir vis-a-vis her neighbours and the world at large, and a further question, namely, whether she . s~ould withdraw from her accession to India, and either accede to Pakistan or remain independent, b K Le meme jour, le representant del'Indea de- clare egalement au Conseil de securite: "La question dustatut a venir du Cachemire eri ce qui concerne ses voisins et le'monde en general, et la.question ulterieure, a savoir si ce pays doit se retirer de l'Inde et acceder au Pa- kistan tin rester. independant avec le droitd'obte- The problem is different, but the juridical aspect of the question admits of no doubt, and it admits of no doubt in th~; words of the representative of Indi!l hi!l1s~f. But the clinchip.g argument, if I might sor~spectfuIIy submit, has been advanced by the learned represeIltative of India himself this afternoon while addressing the Security Council. He has said that the decision whether the State qfHyderabad should or shoulq not accede to India has been 1eft to the free wIll of the people wIlo will decide it by means of a plebis- cite, preparations· for which are now going for- ward by w~y .of preparation of electoral roles, and so forth. Sir Benegal N. RAU (Illdia): I should li~~ to speak .•. Sir lVlopamqxed ZAFRUL~~ Khan (Pakistan): I thought tl!e expression used was that ~t. was for the p~ppl~ pf :ijyder~bad to decide t4«:ir relation- ship with India, but ~f th,e repr~sentative of India desires to correct me, I am quite willing that he sho~lq iptervene ~Ild do so, ~s I lllight wen pave mis!mder~tood wha~ h~ was st~ting. The PRESIDE:NT (tran~lated fr.om French): Does the representative of IIldi~ wish to corr~ct a pas,s~ge in tl1e s.tatement 0.£ th~ rep~~sent;:l#ve ofP~kistan? . . . Sir Benegal N. RAu (India) : The e,xact words used are: "The future 6f the State and its rel~­ tionship with India are matters which hav~ been 1 .it to be decided by the people. Arrangements ~r~ in trail1forcotrvep.ing a ~onstituem assembly ·for thi!> Rurpo~e." . Sir Mohammed ZAFRUI.LAH ·Khan (Pakistan)·: I accept that~orrection: "tile future and the .State and its. relationship with Jndia". .Now has the State a choke as to what relationship it would have with India? And if it has a choice and the people, as the result of this plebiscite, re~otd their S'irBel1~g<j.1 N. RAu (Il1de) (traauit de l'{lnglais) : Je demande la parole ... .Sir Mohammed ZAFRULLAH Khan (Pakistan) (traduit de l'anglais) : I1 me sembhlit, d'apres les termes employes; que le representant de l'~nde avait 'voulu dire qu'il appartenait au peuple 'de Haiderabad de decider deja nature de ses rapports av~e l'Inqe, Jnais $~ le r;presenta1!t ,de l'~nde qesirji: me reprendre, je SUIS to~t .pret f ~ccep~er ses corrections, car il se peut queJe n'ale pas blen cO!1lpds "le" sens de ses dec1~ra#ons. Le PRESIDENT: Le representant de l'Inde desire-t-il rectifier' un passage de l'expose du r~presetJtant dq Pak~stan? . Sit Benegal N. RAu (Inde) (traduit de l'anglais) : Les termes employes sont les suivants: "Cest le peuple de Haiderabad qui decidera de l'avenir de l'Etat et de ses relations avec l'Inde. Des disp.Qsitions ont ~te prises pour qu'tJlle Assem- blee eonstituante se reunisse a cet ~ff~t." Sir Mohammed ZAFRTJLLAH Khan (Pakistan) (traduit de l'iLnglais) : Je.prends aete de eette correction:" "l'avenir de l'Etat et ses relations . avec l'Inde". Mais l'Etat est-i1libre actuellement d;exercer un choixen ce qui concerneses relations avec l'Inde? Et s'il le peut et si le peuple, par le....... Sir Mohammed ZAFRULLAH Khan (Pakistan): I quite understood that position. As a matter of fact, the representative of India did go on clearly to state that India cannot recognize the independence of any of ·those States under any circumstances. I was merely drawi11g atten- tion to the fact, which I shall elaborate a little further when I come to the question of the nego- tiations between the two States, that while India goes on saying that today, in the course o~ these negotiations India clearly stated, and India still goes on to imply, that it is for the people to decide what the relationship of the State to India is going to he. Or, une decision implique un choix; iriais le . representant de l'Inde n'a pas expliquequelle alternative est laissee au peuple. Lui donnera-t-on le choix entre le rattachement it l'Inde et l'inde- pendance ou entre le rattachement it l'Inde et le :rattachement it l'Inde? , Now, a decision means choosing either one thing or another. The representative of India has not explained what choices are. open to tpe people from which to make their selection. Will they be called upon to decide, "Do you accede to India, or do you want to remain independent?", or will they be called upon to decide, "Do you accede to India or do you accede to India?" Sir Benegal N. RAu (India): So far as inde~ Sir Benegal N. RAu (Inde) (trad~it de pendence is concerned, I think it has been made . l'anglais) :. En ce qui cortcerrie l'independance,. clear that India will not recogilize any of. the : je pense qu'll a ete etahli clliirement que l'Inde Indian States within its borders as independent, :. ne reconnaitra l'independance d'aucun des Etats in the same way as which, in the old days, no Iir- ;indiens sitties a. l'interieur de ses frontieres,; de dian State was regarded as independent. However, i meme, dans le passe, aucun Etat iridien n'etaif there are two choices open; the State can decide iconsidere coinme indeperidant. Cependant, l'Etat to accede, .which carries with it the privileges of :se ti'ouve en presence de deux possibilites : il peut membership in the legislature, and so on; or it soit opter pour son rattachement a. l'Inde, ce qui need not accede-but it will be subject to having i entraine, entre. aufres privileges, ce1ui d'avoir its eXternal affairs looked aftel" by India. So far :acces au corps legislatif, soit ne pasopter pour ce as independence is concerned, India's position. is rattachement et accepter, alors, que l'Inde s'oc- quite cleat. Withih those limits, it is open to' the cupe de ses affaires exterieures. L'attitude de State to say either "Wesliall accede"· or <'We ! l'Inde est done tres c1aire.Dans ces liinites. l'Etat shall remain outside"....:;;but, in that hiffer case, it est libre de se rattacher it l'Inde oU den'Y'pas w-ill b.e in tHe sam,e position iit which it was in: ,consenfit; mars, dans ce· derider cas, sa: pos-ition the days befoi"e 1947..sera exaciemeht la ttleme qa'avant 1947. Sir Mohammed ZAFRULUH Khan (Pakistan): Sir Mohammed ZA:FRULLAH Khan: (Pakistil.liy I shall notcarry ona controversy across the. table' : (traduit de l'dttglais): Je ne V'ai:s pas engager with my learned and distinguished ffiend. By : une contro\Terse avec nion ertidii et dlstingue this. time, I hope; the Security Council is· in fUll ! artli. ]'espere que le Conseil est ttlain'tenant en possession of tlie facts as to Wha.t Irtdia'sposition .; possessior -'le fous les ele·ments qui definissent is today: that t.1fe' people of Hyderabad will have' la position ~..::tuelle de nnde, a savoir que 1ep~it­ the.choice of deciding whether theY' will accecJ:~t6 pIe de H&iderabad pourra choisir de· se rattachef India and. h'a.nd bver the conduct of their foreign a. l'Iude en abandonnant it ce pays 1~ soin de diri.. affairs to' Tndia or whether they will not accede~ ger ses affaires etrailgeres 6u· de rester ind-epen- to India~f1d will hand over the conduct of their' i dant, en corifiant qtiuird meme al'Iride la condtiite foreign affairs to India just the same. . de ses affaiies etrangeres'.. My submission is, however, that the juridical Je soutiens que, du porntde vue jtiddique, la posifiori~is, quite. clear, both on the termscii the situ:ation est ~laite,du fait de l'Ind'iart Indepen- Iridian Independence Ad.arid on.the.expIanatron dence Act et des .e~pHcations que le Premier.Mi..; of tIiose terms ftfrnisned to the Britisli Parliament nl~tre et ses col~egue5 ont fourrties au Parlement bytne British prIme M:iri~s£er ani} his colleagues, btitannique a.n sujet de eette loi. L'Inde a reconnu ,Oii theadffiissiCllis Of India' itself; nothing cbl1ld: elle-iTieine (et rien ne peut .~.tre plus. daira. eel: be c1eal'efi:1ia:ti'tlie §fafemerit 01 Sir Gdpa-laswa~i egard qtl~ la dedaratio'u' de Sir Gopalaswami AyYiingaroefore the ... Security Gofincil [E27th' AyY~l1igar deva~t le Coii~ei1'de securite). [227eme . mee#ng)'thattlie States were eritiNed' tdth'eir SBtlnce] selonlaqueUe les Etats avaient droit a bindependence and.that, asS:. matfer~f. fad£ su~rr l'fhdependarice et que.. de fait, ceUX:d'ehtt~_e~~.,L... Sir Mohammed ZAFRULLAH Khan (Pakistan) (trciduit de l'anglais) : Ce1a, je l'ai hien compris. En fait, le representant de I'Inde a aussi declare sans equivoque que l'lnde ne peut, en alicun cas, reconnaitre l'independance de run quelconque de ces Etats. J'attirerais simplement l'attention du Conseil sut le fait suivant, sur lequel je revien- drai par la suite lorsque j'arriverai aux negocia- tions entre les deux Etats: contniirement a. ses affirmations actuelles ati sujet de l'independance, l'Inde a declare sans amhages ati cours des nego- ciations entre nos Etats et elle continue it laisser entendre rtlaintenant qu'i1 appaftierit au petiple de decider de la nature des rapports futUrs entre Haiderabad et l'Inde. The representative of India has said that one cannot draw upon the analogy of Indonesia because Indonesia had been given de facto recog- nition by certain States and therefore, in some manner or other, had become a State. Out of the major problems that have come before the United Na~ions in which Article,2, paragraph 7, has been invoked by the State against which the complaint was made, the two outstanding ones-if not the only two-were the question of the treatment of Indians in South Africa and the problem of Indo- nesia. It is somewhat of an it:ony' that, in each of those cases, India was the complainant or a co-complainant. Let us consider the question of the treatment of Indians in South Africa. Indians in South Africa, although unjustly and unfairly deprived of the most valuable rights of citizenship and subjected to severe forms of racial discrimination, are nevertheless subjectsef the Union of South Africa. There is no question there of any State, much less of any independent State-no ques- tion of political fre~dom or liberty in. the sense of .the setting up of an independent State. Nevertheless, India was able, rightly and success- fully, .to plead before the Committees. of' the GeneralAssembly and before the General Assem-' bly itself that the~question was one of international character, tl:tat it could validly be taken note of and discussed by the General Assembly, and that. recommendations in regard to it could be made . by the General Assembly. . Again, Indonesia, although' struggling ·for its. independence and certainly, in our view, entitled toindependen~e, and now nappily assured of. its independence-at least, so we hORe, after the . recent agreement between the Netherlands and-the Republic of Indonesia-was, when the war with Japan broke out, a colony of the Netherlands, and. the Netherlands could perhaps with some plasi- bility, Hnot with some justi~cation, argue that the ; Le representant de l'Inde a declare qu'on ne ,peut faire de rapprocL~ment avec la question indonesienne, etant donrie que l'Indonesie a ete reconnue de facto par certains Etats et qu'elle est done devenue, d'une maniere ou d'une autre, un Etat. Parmi les problemes iroportants qui ont ete soumis a l'Organisation des Nations. Unies et au sujet desqueIs 1'Etat contre lequel on avait porte plainte a invoque le paragraphe 7 de l'Article 2, les deux prillcipaux - sinon les seuls - sont la question du traitement des Hindous etablis dans I'Union Sud-Africaine et la question indonesienne. On peut constater avec quelque ironie que, dan~ les deux cas, l'Inde a ete la partie plaignante ou 1'une des parties plaignantes. Exa~inons un instant 'la question du traitement des Hindous etablis dans 1'Union Sud-Africaine. Les Hindous etablis dans ce pays, bienqu'ils soient injustement prives des droits civiques les 'pltts precieux et victimes. de discriminations raciales severes, sont neanmoins des ressortissants de l'Union Sud-Africaine. It n'est· pas question ici d'Etat, encore moins d'Etat independant, nide liberte politiqueau sens ou l'implique la creation d'un Etat independant. Neanmoins, 1'Inde a reussi, a bon droit, a soutenir devant les Commissions de l'Assemblee .generale etdevant l'Assemblee generale elle-meme,quecette questionavait un caractere international, qti'eUe pouvait,a juste titre, etre prise en consideration et.discutee' par l'Assemblee 15enerale, et que cette derniere pou- vait presenter des recommandationsace sujet. . Quant a fIndonesie, qui lutte maintenant pour l'independance, independance .a laquelle j'estime qu'ellea certainement droit, et qui a heureusement maintenant l'assurance de l'obtenir -Je 1'espere du moins apres 1'accordintervenu recemment entre les Pays-Baset la Republique d'Indonesie- c'etait unecoionie needandaise, lo:t:"sque la guerre avec.le Japona eclate, et.Jes Pays-Bas pouvaient peut,.etre, pour des.motifs pla~sibles,,sinonavect"'f I submit, will all respect, that the matter is not domestic. The question of the treatment of Indians in South Africa, though it has a political aspect, is essentially a humanitarian problem. The problem of Indonesia, without going into technical terms, is both political and humanitarian. The problem of Hyderabad is, in the first place, a matter of the securing of international and·regional peace; next, it is a politi~al question; and finally, it is a humanitarian question. It is a matter of peace because the military action of India constitutes- and I.mean no offence, but I have been at a loss to sdect any other expression for its description -an aggression against an independent State, and therefore a breach of international peace. It also constitutes a grave threat to the maintenance of peace between India and Pakistan. The representative of India has again invited the attention of the Security Council to the fact that there are in India today over 30 million Mus- iims, .which is true. He has also said that no government could afford to ill-treat so large a minority. Let us hope that is so. But in the past occurrences and incidents have taken place which have created grave doubts in the minds of Muslims both in India andin Pakistan, not with regard to "the intentions of the Government·of India in this respect, but certainly sometimes with regard to the ability of that Governtrtent to safe- guard the minorities. But it,is the hope !lOW.that the major difficulties, which ,:ertainly arose after 15 August 1947, have been overcome, so far as the treatniento£ Musl:"'Lls in India is concerned and, indeed,·of other minorities, that their treat- trtent will in fact be as desirable, as fair and as just as not only the Government of India may desire, but as·the· GoVernment of Pakistan may desire..I concede .that: But this is not a question of the treatnient within India lof a minority. It nz................. _ Je me permets de declarer, pour ma part, que ce n'est pas une affaire d'ordre interieur. La question du traitement des Hindous etablis dans I'Union Sud-Africaine, si elle presente un aspect politique, est essentiellement d'ordre huma- nitaire. La question indonesienne, sans faire de distinctions techniques, est a la fois politique et humanitaire. Le problem.e de Haiderabad inte- resse au premier chef le maintien de la paix sur le plan international et regional; ensuite il a un aspect politique et, enfin, un caract1~rehumanitaire. La paix est en jeu puisque -les operations militaires entreprises par l'Inde - je ne voudrais pas em- ployer une expressio~ offensante, mais j'ai de la peine a en·choisir une autre - constituent une ·agression contre un Etat independant et par con- sequent .une rupture de la paix intema#onale.· ·Elles menacent aussi gravement la paix entre l'Inde et le Pakistan. Le representant de l'Inde a encore attire ·l'at- tention·du Conseil de securite sur le. fait qu'il y a aujourd'hui dans· l'Inde plus de.30 millions de. Musulmans. C'est exact. I1 a egalement •declare qu'aucun gouvernement ne pouvait se permettre de maltraiter une minorite aussi importante. Es- peronsqu'ilen estainsi. Toutdois, des evenements" et des incidents qui ont eu lieu· dans le passe ont fait. naitre des. doutes serieux dans I'esprit des Musulmans, tant dans l'Inde.qu'au Pakistan, en ce qui concerne non pas les intentions du Gouver- nement de l'Inde a ce sujet, mais plutat, dans ·certains cas, son aptitude a proteger les minorites. On espere maintenant que les plus graves des difficultes qui av~ient bel et· bien surgi·apres le 15 aout 1947 ont ete resoltles ence quiconcerne le traitement des Musulmans et, egalernent, des autres'elements minoritaires etablis sur le terri- toire indien, et que· ces minoritesseront traitees avec autantde justice et d'equite que.le desirent non seulement le Gouvernement. de .l'Inde mais aussi le Gouvernement. du Pakistan..Je ve~x ·bien t~e principle rea,son why, onbe~al£ of P~stan, a.u nom dti Pakistan, i'ai eteman.de a\1 Consei1lors I reque&teq tlIe Security Council at th~ 3~2nd de sa $82eme sel:\nce d~ w'accorder une audience. meeting to grant me a hear-in~ on this probleJ:ll. , Secondly, this problem is of a political character. It affects the independence and sovereignty of a State: On that I have already made my submission. It .is also a humanitarian problem. It h:;l.s in- volved, as I shall presently show, large masses of people in.suffering, in misery and inP«:rrsecution, and the passing of their lives in fear. There is persecution of the minority in Hyderabad, w~ch is continuing. There is persecution of members of the Government of Hyc1erabad as it existed at the time India took its military. action. They are still being persecuted. There is persecution of highly-placed' indiv~duals. For all these reasons, it is a proplem which it is fitting for th~ Security Council to en~ertain~ to look into, and to devise: some m~ans of solv4tg. I now invite the attention of the Security ·Cbuncil.to the development of the dispute. ·What ha~~ happened? I am afraid it will hav~ to be a somewllat deta.Ued narr1;\tiv<:, but I shaU try t9 cond~!le .it as· t:l1uch as I can•. If the membel.'s . of the'Se~urity Council ~l,"eto ha~e ~ity aet~ei1;tli!e idea, of hoW tl;J.~ trouQ)~ aros~ ~nd; ~h~t i~s im- .portaJ:it ~~ments qr~" I ~u~t they wiJl,.be p.1iep~x~d ., to bear with me wlliIe 1 draw their attention to wli~t h.a,st~~n. pl~c~,l>~seq' on liitthodtative . dO~1,11~wn~$. w~ich passedbetwe~n fhe Government of Ryd~r~badan,d.the Governm.eIit of India..Inci- dentally, some.of those pass1;lgt;ls from ~e very voluminous correspondence which J shall select .for pl?-cing before the Security Council will also bear upon the· question of competence. which the r~pres.$tative of :fndia has raised. As· soon as the atwouncem~nt of 3 J1¥le .t947 wasm~de 'by. the:sritish Prime 1v.[inister, which indicat~d.how thecons.titutiollal pr<?ble~ ()f .~l1diCl was to ·he.resolved77I;,ythesetting u,P.o£ the tWQ ind.epend~t· States., and so on77tI1e :Nizam tp.a.de thcr •foUowipg q,ec1qrati()n.. I s1J.a,lI n()w' r~ad pa!:"a- graph 20f th~declar~ti.()n, ()~ d~<;ree· of "t?~ Nizam: what is, called) m.the :Vernacul~r, a, Flr- man. Tlli~ is p -agraph 2 ()ftheFirma~ ofHis. ~x\!J.lted .Highllt the Nizam) issu«:r<;! on H.Juil,e 1947. . "The basis .of the· division of ,British India:·.is cOmmunal. In my State, 'however,.the tvv0 major c01l1Wutiities live side by iide. and I·ilavesought, since lbecamel'uler, to prOIn.Ote by' every meallS. good and friendly relationspetweenthem.~y ancestors and I have always-regarded the Muslims and the Hindus as the two eyeso£theS~~e a,nq..: J'aidit que ce probleme .presentait aus.si un aspect po.1itique. n concerne, en effet, l'indepen- dance et la souverainete d'un Etat. J'ai deja. expose mes vues a. ce sujet. . Le probF~me a ega,lemeJ;1t un'aspect humanitaire. Je '\l'ail? montrer qu'il est une cause de souffrances, de miseres et de persecutions pour une partie considerable de la population, qu'it oblige a. vivre dans la crainte. La minorite continue a. etre perse- cut<~e en Haiderabad. On continue egalement a. y persecuter les membres du Gouvernement de Haiderabad qui etaient au pouvoir au moment ou l'Inde a entrepris son action militaire, ainsi que de bauts fonctionnaires ou des notables. Pour toutes ces raisons, il convient qUe le Conseil de securite examiIle le probleme, et trouve le moyen de le resoudre. J'attire maintenant l'attention des membres du Conseil sur I'evolution. du differe.nd. Que s'est-il passe? Je crains de devoir faire un recit quelque peu det~ilIe, j'essaierai pou,rtant d'etre aussi bref que. possible. Si les membres du ConseiI ,veulent a,voir une idee exacte de la: fa,cson dont le copflit a commence et de ses el~me~ts importants, je suis persuade. qu'ils me perUlettrgnt de leur si~aler. les evenements qui ont eu lieu, en me fqndant sur des dOcuments dignes de foi ~chang~s entrele Gouyernement de Haiderabad et le Gouvernement de l'Inde. Incidemment, certai~s des extraits que je choisiraidans unecorrespondance tres volu~ mineuse pour les presenter au ConseiI de securite ont egalement.quelque rapport avec la question de conipet~nce. que· le representant de l'Inde a soulevee. :pes qUe le Premier Ministre eut annonce, le 3 juin 1947, comment le probleme constitutionnel . q.,e nnde aJ4it etre resolu, 110tamment pa~ la cr~a:tion, de deux Etatsind~pendants, le Nizam a fait la declaration suivante. Ye vais vous donn,er 'lectur~ d.u plragraphe 2 de cette 4ecla~ation Ott dMret d~l N'iz~, qUe, da.nsla 13,~gu.edu pays,. Q}1 appelle un. firinan... Voici le paragraphe ~ du finnan de Son Altesse le Niz~, publie 1<: 11 juin 1947. . . . "Le parmge de 1'Inde britannique t:epose s.ur le prindpe de la separation des com.~unautes reli- gieuses. Bans. n1pn Etat, cependant, les .q,eux prin- cipales cot:l1munautesvivent cote ~ cote et je me· s.uis effpt:ce, depuis>que j'aipri~ la etirection des affaires publiques, cle maintenir par ~ous les moyens entre ..eUes des reiations ~cordiales et arnicales. ... ..... ~ Thus, almost within a' week of the announce- ment of the plan of 3 June, the Nizam, who was then, I suppose----,.presutUllbly ~venin the view' of the Go~lernment of India and of Sir Benegal N. Rau-.,..,.acting freely, announced his decision fhat he was not going to participate in the Con- stituent Assembly either of Pakistmt or of India, as he wanted to keep aloof. Then on 9 July he wrote a letter to the Crown Representative, that is, the Goverpor-General; who then occupied two positions: the Viceroy of Ip.dia was the Goyernor.,. General of British India and was Crown Repre- sentative vis-a-vis the States, so'that any relation- ship between the States and British India was conducted by him not as Governor.,.General of India 'but as the representative of His Majesty the King. I shall read from a letter addressed to the Crown Representative on 9 July 1947: "As Your Excell~ncy knows, both befo.re you '·went to England and while you were there, ~ askeq. thatmy State shou.1q. be accorded DOIIlinionstaw,s when the ,British should leave India. r have always 4jtherto felt' assured' that after 'more than a ,century of £.a.~t4ful alliaIlce, during whic;h I have repos~d all my confi<ience iJf the' British, I.should certaip.ly be able to remain without question within the .family of the British ~om­ inonwealth. Clause '1 appea.rs to deny me even that. I still hope that IlO, <iifficulty will'be allowed to impede direct relations between me and His Majesty's Goyernment. I was rf.~ently infor~ed that Your Excellency had undertq.ken to en(S1,1r~ 'q~e yous ne vous r~die2; en AngLeterre et, de r~r .dans la grande familIedu Commonwealth ,Jlritannique. LacIause 7.semble me refuser jus;' qu'a. c,ela. J'espere,cependant,' qu'aucunediffi,.,. culte ne viendrafaire obstacle a. retablissement de rela.tions directes'entre le :Gouvernemeiit de5a. Majeste et moi-inem.e~ J'a.itece~entapprisqu~ Votre ,Excellence §'effor<;ait d'obtemr qu'un~ de- claration fut faite' auPadement, autorisant l'eta- hlissement de telles relations. J'espere sincerement que ces re1ations,une fois etablies, se transfor": 'meront en une union plus etroite encore entre mon ~ pronoum;emnt in ,Pa.rliament to establish that such relations can be entertained.. My'hope is that, once esta1;>lished, these relations will q.evelop ~to clos~r union betweep. !py Stat~ 'arid'the Btitis,h Crown to which for so many years I have been tied in faithful alliance. Meantime, I 's;hall undertake and continue active negotiations with th,e ,new Dominion~'jn order to,;reach ,sensible practkal arran,g~en,ts for the transition period, so; that the, futllre at lridj<l1l. ~ta~es and:rn<:lia 'generally can be assured, sof,ar ~s 'possiple,in an orderly fashion. . "1 fe~l bound' to titake thi~ protest to Your ~xcelleri~y ,ag~in~t the way .in which my· s.t~te ,r beingabandoneq. by its' old ally, the BrItish Ainsi, guere plus d'une sem~ine avant la publi- cation duplan du 3 juin, le Nizam qui,a rnpn avis; et vraisemblablement meme cle l'avis du' ~ouvernement de l'lnde et de ~ir Belleg~l N. E:a\1~' agissait en toute liberte, a fait connaitre sa deci- sion de ne pas participer aux. travaux d'auctlne des AssembIees constituantes, .que ce fUt celle du Pakistan ou celle de l'Inde, et de se temr a. l'ecart. Le 9 juillet 194'1, le Nizam'a envoye une lettre au representant de la .Couronne, c'est.,.a.-dire au Gouverneur general, qui occ~pait ~lors 'HI1-c:l double position; le Vice-Ro~ etait, en effet~ Gou- verneur general de 1'Inde britannique et represen- tant de la Couronne aupres des Etats,'de sorte' qu'il dirigeait les relations entre les Etats d'une part et l'Inde britannique de 1'autre, non pas en tant'que Gouverneur general de l'Inde, mais en qmilite de repres.entant de Sa Majeste, Voic~ <:lonc un pas- sage d'une lettre ~dressee,au .representant de la Couro,nne, a. la date du -9 juin 1947: "CQmme Votre Ellf.:cellen~e le sait;avant mem..e pouve~u, alors quevous vous trouyi~z da~,s ce pays; j'FJ,i demande q1.1,e mon Etat rec;oive le statut de Domimpn, au momep.toules Britanniques quit:- teront 1'Inde. Jusqu'ici, j'ai toujours ete persuade que, apres plus d'un siec1e d'ailiance loyale avec la Grande-Br~tagne- periode au cmirs de laqu~lle mon pays a' pl~ce t04te sa confi,ance dans Jes Br~tati1;J.i.q~es - je pourrais, sans.conteste, det1\e:u.,. ~t~t et ~~ Coqronpe brit~nnique, a.laq~el1e je suis l~ed~puis tant 4'anne,espar l'alliance la plus Jgy~e. pans l'intervalle, j'engagerai et jepour- ~mh1'ra.ides Regociatiop.s activesavec lesnouveaux ' Dominions, en vued'arrivera. un arrangement r~iso1J.J-1~lee.t ,.pn~tiquepo:t,1r·laperiode·de tran- ~itio,p,per#lettantde regIeI', 4ans lecalme, autant q\t.epqssible, 1'~vell!rdes Etatsin4ien~ et de l'Ind~ ~ll- ~~J].~,ral. 'fJesuis contraint de protester,atip1'es q.e Votre Excellence, contre la facson. dont mon Etat se wit abaRdonnepar son 'allie traditionnel•. le \ '~'As YourExceilency knows, while Hyderabad "Comme Votre Excellence le sait bien, si Haide- is necessarily closely connected in various ways rabad s'interesse necessairement de tres pres, et with what will now become the Dominion of a,bien des egards, au sort du futur Dominion de India, there are also mar.y ties-between my State l'Inde, i1 e~t egalement uni par de nombreux liens ~d the future Pakistan Dominion. It will be au futur Dominion du Pakistan. Votre Excellence within Your Excellency's knowledge also that in n'ignore pas non plus que d~s cet Etat, que mes this ~tate, which my ancestors and I have ruled ancetres et moi-meme gouvernons depuis plus de for more than two centuries, there has been little deux siecles, les troubles religieux ont toujours communal disturbance, and the cleavage on ete, ;rares et que la division entre membres des religious grounds has always been much less acute differentes confessions a toujours ete moins pro- than in British India. It is my earnest wish to fQnde que dans l'Inde britannique. Je desire pursue a policy which will enable this freedom vivement poursuivre une pOlitique telle que l'har- from discord and disorder to continue, and formonie et l'ordre continuent de regner dans le this purpose I must take into account the import- pays et, a cette fin, je dois tenir compte de rim- ance of maintaining good relations with both L~e portancequi s'attache au maintiende bonnes rela- new Dominions. tions avec l'unet l'autre des nouveaux Dominions. "It is not yet clear how far and in what manner the Indian Dominion and the Pakistan Dominion will consult and eo-operate on matters of com- mon concern or how closely their policies can be integrated on the essential subje-:ts of ex,ternal affairs and defence. I understand that this is a matter which,',it is 'recognized, cannot be re- solved before 15 August It is not possible for me to contemplate an organic union with either"- this was his firm declaration of policy-"of the Dominions until I am more fully informed on these matters. I am bound at this stage to wait and see hQW the relations between the two Do- minionsare regulated and developed. '''I was happy to observe that in the recent debates in Parliament on the Indian Independence Bill the difficulties of the in-mediate position for such States as Hyderabad did not pass unnoticed. I need only remind Your Excellency, by way of illustration, of three speeches for the Govern- ment which recognized that the States ought npt fobe asked for hurried decisions at this- Nncture and that a treaty rather than a federal'relationship might be, the solution .in. present ,circum')taD.c~l)." Then the Nizam goes on to quote from" the declaratior:rs. made in Parliament, some of which I have already read out to the' Security Council. Latero~l in the' course of the same letter he goes 'on to say: "I have naturally and necessarily taken into account the fact that the Dominion of India is my neighbour and I am fully.prepared'... to enter into a treaty with them whereby a suitable arr~ng~~ellt.is, made in respect,of land com- munication,so that all-In.dia standards are recog- nized, and' through· communications .and',mutual "Nous ne savons pas encore nettement dans queUe mesure et de queUe maniere le Dominion de l'Inde et celui du Pakistan se consulteront et coopereroriten ce qui concerne les questions d'in- teret commun, ni jusqu'a quel point ils pourront coordonner leur politique dans les domaines essen- tiels des affaires etrangeres et de ladefeFlse. ]'entends que c'est la une question qui, de l'avis commun, ne peut etre resolue avant le 15 aout. I1 m'est impossible" et cette declaration definit fertnement la politique du Nizam "d'envisager une union complete avec l'un oU: l'autre des Do- minions avant d'obtenir des renseignements plus complets. Pour le moment, je, suis oblige d'attendre etde voir comment s'etabliront et se deveIopperont les relations entre les deux Dominions. "]'ai remarque avec satisfaction qu'au cours des derniers. debats qui ont,eu lieu, au Parlement au sujet de l'Indian Independence Bill, on n'a pas passe sous silenceles difficultes que presente la situation actuelle pour des Etats tels que Haide- rabad. A titre d'exemple, il me suffitde rappeler a Votre Excellence,trois discours prononces, au nom du Gouvernement, ou it est reconnit qu'il ne faut pas inviter les Etats, a prendre des deci- siOns hatives en ce p.1oment critique" et qu'un traite, plutot que l'etablissetnent de relations fMe- rales,pourrait constituer une solution adaptee aux circonstances." Le Nizam cite ensuite' des declarations faites au Parlement, dont j'aideja donne partiellement lecture au ConseH de securite. n declare plus loin, dans la meme lettre;' "NatureIlement, j'ai ete 'oblige de tenir compte du fait que le Dominion de l'Inde est mon voisin et' je suis' entierement pret .•. acouclure avec luiun. traite contenant des dispositions' appro- priees, en ce qui 'ccincerne les communications terrestres, de'maniere .a. faire observer ltismemes regtes dans toutle'territoirede 1'Inde, et a as:surer Je saute une phrase et je poursuis: "Je suis tres heureux que les deux !louveaux Dominions soient ~ompris dans la famille du Commonwealth britannique. Je voudrais que le traite ·colJ.tienne une clause selon laquelle si, par malheur, l'une des deux parties decidait, al'aven~, de quitter le Commonwealth, l'autre partie devrait etre Iibre de reviser les dispositions du traite. Car, malgre les termes de la section 7 de I'lndian Independence Act, je ne peux croire que, apres plus d'un siecle d'aIIiance fidele, le Gouvernement I omit one sentence and continue: {'It is a matter of deep satisfaction to me that both the new Dominions wil1 be within the family of the British Commonwealth of Nations. I should want a provision inserted in the. treaty where.by if, unhappily, either party should at some future date decide to secede from the Common- wealth the other party should be free. to review the provisions of the treaty. For,'in spite of the provisions of section 70f the Indian Independence Act, I cannot believe that after more than a century of faithful alliance,' it is the intention of the British Government to throw my State out of the Empire against my will." . britanniqL~ a1t l'intenHon d'exclure mon Etat de I'Empire, contre ma volonte." Le Nizam declare encore dans cette lettre: Then he goes on to say: "Avant de passer aux autres dispositions qu'il serait necessaire d'inclure dans un tel traite, it me faut constater avec surprise et regret que les auto- rites du futur Dominion de l'Inde ont refuse d'en- trer en relations avec .la Commission de negocia- tions de Haiderabad (bien.que ceIJ.e-ci se £tit tenue it leur disposition aDelhi pendant deux semaines, jusqu'au 5 aout) et de negocier avec eIIe sur aUCUl1 sujet, y compris les accords de statu quo et la question de Berar, a moins que Haiderabad ne se declare pret,comme condition prealable, a accepter son rattachement a l'Inde. La Commis-- sion a fait savoir tres clairement que Haiderabad etait pret et dispose it entamer des negociations en vue de I'elaboration d'un traite, sous la seule reservequ'il ne soit pas question de rattachement." "Before I turn to other provisions which would need to be included in such a treaty, I must record my astonishment and regret that, though Hydera- bad's Negotiating Committee was available in Delhi for a fortnight until 5 August, those who will be responsible for the Dominion of India refused to negotiate with them on any subject, even including standstill agreements and Berar, unless as an essential preliminary Hyderabad was prepared to agree to accede. It was made abso- lutely plain by my Committee that, short of accession, Hyderabad was ready and willing to enter into treaty relationship." . On peut lire un peu plus loin: Then, a sentence or two lat~r, he says: "I! est admis que la section 7 de I'Indian Inde- pendence At. ne regIe pas tous les problemesqui se posent. C'est precise.ment pour~~tte raison, que Haiderabad etait·vivement desireux de con- clure un accord de statu quo, mais les autorites du futl'''' Dominion de I'Inde se sont absolument refusees it prendre part it de telIes negociations. Mon pays fera neanmoins de son mieux, meme en I'absence d'un accord;pour eviter toute obstruc.. tion administrative qui ne saurait. manquer de nuire aux deux pays. Si des difficultes de Cette nature seproduisaient, le Dominion de l'Inde en serait entierement· responsable." At tI1atvery early date it was quite clear what La position des deux' parties etait deja tres the position taken up by both sides was.· The claire a cette date. Le Nizama declare: "Je recon- Nizam said, "I recognize the fact that India is my nais que l'Inde est notre voisine, qu'il nous faut ne.ighbour,that I have to have close treaty and conclure un traite et entretenir d'etroitesrelations frIendly relationships with them, and that that amicalesavec ce pays, et quece traite doit viser t:eaty will cover all the subjects of .communica- ledomaine des con11!lwications.clelade£ense.et hons, of defence and of extemal affairs, but those des a{faires etrangeres, tnais c'est par voie de must be regulated by treaty and not by accession." traite~etl;lon <ie rattacbementqti'il faut proceder." IIIiIIII.UlltIJiJJilj"UltfIJ.'.IJMSM.I,...JJJ__I!!l!lIiIJ.LIMI: ll[. ·111 •••UI . "It is recognized that section 7 of the Indian Independence Act does not cover the whole gro~nd. For this very reason H y(i<:~rabad was a1lX1OUS to negotia:t~ a standstill agreement, but those. responsible for the Dominion of India de- cl!ned to take part in such negotiations. My State WIll nevertheless do its best, even without such an agreement, to avoid any administrative dead- lock which is bound to cause inconvenience to both. If any such deadlock or inconvenience should occur, the fault will rest squarely on the Dominion of India." . . "I 1('!2irn (though I find it hard to believe) that in 'defiance of my admitted rights, the new Do- minion of India mean to start their career by seizing my territory. I cannot but regard this refusal to negotiate, except on terms that Hydera- bad first agrees to accede, as coercion and pres.:. sure to join and a compulsion to a hurried de- cision. And I hope that even at this late hour, through the good offices of Your Excellency as Crown Representative with special responsibilities to see that His Majesty's Government pledges to the States are honourably fulfilled, this policy may be reversed. ~or it is utterly. }nconsisteI!t w~th th~ declared pledges and pohcy of HIS Majesty's Government." . Then, the Crown Representative wrote back on 12 August 1947, and I quote an extract from that letter: . "As you know, ~e anxiety of the Dominion is to achieve stability which they feel cannot be adequately secured tmless all the States which are situated within their borders are prepared to come into organic union with theri1. I myself, as I have told your Negotiating Committee. and your Adviser, believe that accession to the Union wouid be to the mutual advantage of the Do- minion and your Stat~. But I fully understand your difficulties and I have no wish to hurry you to a decision. In the circumstances, although I ,shall cease to be Crown'Representative On 15 Aug- tist, I have secured the assent of those who will be' responsible, for the Govetnment of the Do- minion· to my continuing negotiations.with ,Your Exalted. Highness for .a further p-eriod of two months, during which I hope we shall be able to reconcile our views. During this period the offer to·accede on the terms which.I have already pro- posed will (as a special ~"l:ceptiof1) r~main open in the case of Hyderabad." Then a little later on: "I learn that your Exalted Highriess is cdrt.;, c!ern~dIest a deCision not in present Circum.;, starleesto accede would be freated as a hostile act by ffleDominioil, and your. State mig1it .be suJ;Jjetited.toblockade, brit I am satisfied that the 'l~adets of tllenew Dominion haveilo intention of applying'suclfpressure/' We shall. presentiysee .what actually. happened litter.6iJ~ .•I invit~ .aWiriticiil.to tWo sentences out ofaspeedima8e by theN~zaih orl14 August 1947 (jii the occasion· of afai"ewell .banquetfo the BtItishResidenf, wnosesuzeramtY was to end. ,The.British Resident was to depattr from Hydera.:. . bad; rea-vittg:the State enHre1yftee ta~6iiducStits Le 12 aotit 1947. le representant de la Cau- ronne a repondu par une lettre dont je citerai les passages suivants: "Comme vous le savez, le Dominion est vive- ment desireux d'etablir "ne situation stable, ce qui, a son avis, ne peut se faire que si tous les Etats enclaves dans ses frontieres sont disposes a s'umr organiquement avec lui. Ainsi que je l'ai declare a votre Commission de negoci~tions et a votre Conseiller, je suis personnellement con- vaineu que le rattachement de Haiderabad a l'Union serait profitable aux deux Etats. Je n'en comprends pas moins la situation difficile dans laquelle vous vous trouvez et je n'ai pas.l'inten- tion de vous presser de prendre une decision; Daiis ces conditions, et bien que je doive cesser le 15 aotit d'etre representant de la Couronne; j'ai obtenu .de ceux qui assumeront legouver- nement du Dominion l'autorisatioll de continuer les negClciations avec Votre Altesse Serenissime pendant une nouvelle periode de deux mois, au cours'de laquellenous pourrons, je l'espere, nous mettre d'accord. A titre tout a fait exceptionnel, la proposition de rattachement que j'ai faite a. Haiderabad, sera 'maintenue pendant ce temps aux conditions que j'ai deja exposees." Plus loin: "Votre Altesse .Serenissirile craint, me 'semb1e- t-il, que 3i eUe decide dans les Circo~st::lttces ac- tue1Ies:. de ne pas se rattacheral'Inde; le Dominion ne cOJisidereceUe deCision coIrime une mani- £cistation d'hostilite et que votre Etat ne soit soumis aun blocus; pounant; je suis convaincu que le~. dirigeaJits<lti· nouveau Dominion ,n'ont pas l'inteiltidn d'ex.ercer une pression de ce genre." , Nous .. ~llons 'Voir.cequi, en. fait, est. sUrvenu' plus fard. ]'appelle votreatt.eJition sut deux' phrasesd'un discours ptoilonce par le. Nizam, le 14aotit1947, a l'occasiori d'unbanquet d'adieJ,t 9ffettau Residentbtitannique, dont lasuzerai- netevemiitde cesser. Le Resident btitanniq4e dev1iit quitter Haidefabad .et lais~er cetEt~tentie­ remeJif •libre .de dirigerses affaires. interieures et exterieures, ce qu'il etait parfaitenient capable Then, in a telegram to the Crt>wn Representa- tive, on 14 August, while sending his greetings to him on his pending assumption of the Governor- Generalship of a free India, the Nizam went on to say: "It is my earnest desire and the wish of my Government and people that we should live on terms of the closest amity with Y01,1. I trust that the greatest cordiality and friendship will exist in our relations in the pursuit of common aims and objectives. and that these relations will be strengthened by the freedom which has been won for the whole of this great sub-continent." But apparently that was freedom for Iridia and not for the States. The Governor-General, as he then had become on 15 August, speaking in the Constituent Assembly of the Dominicn of Ip.dia, made the following observation with regard to the Nizam: liThe only State of the first importance that has not yet ·acceded is the premier State, Hydera- had. Hyderabad occupies a unique position in view of its siie, population and resources, and it has its.special problems. The Nizam, while he does not propose to accede to the Dominion cif Pakistan, has not up to the present felt able to accede to the Dominion of India. His Exalted Highness has, however, assured me of his wish to co-operate in the three essential subjects of extern..1 affairs, defence and communications with that Dominion whose territories surround his State. With the assent of the Government, negotiations will be continued with the Nizam and I am hopeful of feac.1ting a solution satisfactory I to all." . Then the negotiations went on. Represent~tives went back and forth between Hyderabad and Delhi. .All sorts of proposals were made, but India· st90d .firm on. accession .(l;ndnotlling ..else, so that the Nizam inhis telegram dated, 23 August to the Governor-General of India, said this: "As you know from my letter of 8 August, Hyderabad is ready to try. to i'eachagreetnent WIth you on the basis explained in that letter, but short of accession. I am therefore not pte- pared to negotiate for aCCession thtlUgh very ready to negotiate on the linesdesttibed in my letter." .ThisW'astlnder no ptessurefrom "a body of ~gsters". as responsible administrators were _ n "Le seul Etat d'i!nportance qui n'ait pas encore opte pour son rattachement a l'Inde est le grand Etat de Haiderabad. Du fait de son etendue, de sa popuktion et de ses ressotl1'ces, cet Etat oc- cupe un rang unique et il a des problemes qui lui sont propres. Bien qu'il n'envisage pas le rattachement de Haiderabad au Dominion du Pakistan, le Nizam n'a pas, .jusqu'a ~resent, ern pouvoir accepter le rattacheinent an Dominion de l'Inde. Son Altesse Serenissime m'a toutefois assure de soh desir de cooperer·avec ce Dominion dans les trois domaines priinordiaux des affaires etrangeres, de la de£ense et des cohmiunications; 50n Etat est. en effet enclave dans les territoires .du Dominion de l'Inde.Avec le consentement du Gouvemement, les negociations continueront avec . le Nizam et j'espere que nous parviendrons a une solution quidonnera satisfactiol'l a. tous'" Lea negotiations se poursuivirent done. 'L-es representants firent de constantes ailees d venues entre Haiderabad et Delhi. pe.multiples propo- sitions furent faites, mais ·l'Inue.maintint cate- goriquementsa position: le rattacheipent et rien d'autr~; atissi,dans un telegraniriie eh date du 23 aout,adresse au.Obtiverneur general de l'lride, -le Nizam deciarait-il: "Comme vous le savez par ma lettre du 8 aoiit, Hil.idetabad s'effotcei'a deparvetiir a. uriaccord avec. vous stir lesbases dposees dahs cette lettre, saft£ eft cequi c6ficerne le rattachement. Je.ne ~;uis pas dispose a.··eiitrer.eh poutparlers elJ. vue du tattachement, mais. jele stiis to~t. it fait a. negocier dati~ le sens indiqtll~ ..dans ma lettre." . Ce fuessag~ n.'iL pas efe. redige'sous la ,pression d'itrie "bande de gangsters". -.-- nom donne plus \ "But mv letter of 8 August 1947 (to which I would refer for its full terms), I offered to enter into a treaty with the Dominion of India of·which important features were: (a) that I would under- take that th~ foreign policy of Hyderabad would be conducted in general conformity with that of the Dominion of India; (b) that Hyderabad would contribute an agreed number of troops for the defence of the Dominion of India (though it was stipulated that if the Dominion of India and the Dominion of Pakistan pursued mutually hostile policies, Hyderabad would remain neutral); (c) that reasonable provisions should be included as to communications so as to ensure the maintenance of all-India standards of safety, the provision of interchange and through traffic facilities." He goeson to say further in the letter: "Hyderabad is half the size of France and has a population of 17 million, more than twice as many as any other Indian State and considerably more than Canada or any other ;British Dominion outside India. It has been under Moslem rule for seven centuries and under the Asafia dynasty for more than two. But there has been little com- munal strife, indeed what there has been is negligible compared with communal discord in British India. Where it has occurred in the State, it has not been indigenous but an in- fection from outside. All communities here have been loyal to me and my forefathers and have been proud to be Hyderabadis, whatever their creed. .In these circumstances, Hyderabad is fully entitled to maintain its separate identity. But, short of accession, it is ready and willing to make such a treaty of association with the Do- minion as will not only secure friendly relations but will lead to the fullest· co-operation. More- over, we shall welcome suggestions from the Dominion of terms calculated to make our asso- ciation more real and binding." acc~leillerons favorablement toutes les dispositions que pourra suggerer le Dominion pour rendre notre associati?n plus etroite et plus solide." . Le Nizam fait observer plus loin: "Je redoute que le rattachement a l'Inde ne. provoque dans notre Etat lesmemes troubles desastreux et sanglants et j'estime qu'il est de mon devoir de les eviter dans l'interet de mes sujets." Ainsi, l'attitude adoptee par le Nizam etait tres nette; Il n'agissait aucunement sous la pres- sion d'un cabinet ou d'un groupe de ministres; d'ailleuf£, conime nous le verrons plus tard, au- cunepression ne fut exercee de quelque cote que ce flit. Le Gouvernement du Nizam presenta . par la suite des propositions potivant devenir les clauses d'un traite, mais, dans unelettre du . A ----------- ---~~------~.~ ~ - ~_._ - ."~' Later on he observes: "lam •apprehensive· that accession would in- troduce the same ruinous disturbance and blood- shed in. my State, and I am satisfied that it is my duty in the interests of my subjects to avoid this. Therefore, the stand taken·by the Nizam was made quite dear. There is no .question of his being under pressure from any cabinet or body of ministers,though when we come to that we shall find that ther.e was actually no question of any kind.of pressure at all from anybody. In a letter. dated 24 September from the Governor- General ·of India to the Nizam the Governor,. Le Nizam declare plus loin, dans la meme lettre: "L'etendue de Haiderabad est la moitie de celle de la France et sa population atteint 17 m:H- lions d'habitants, soit plus du double de celle de tout autre Etat indien; elIe depasse de beau- coup ~elle du Canada ou celIe de tout autre Domi- nion britannique, en dehors de l'Inde. Depuis sept siecles, sa reli~ion officielle est l'islamisme et depuis plus de deux siecles regne la dynastie Asafia. Il y a eu peu d'antagonisme religieux entre les diverses communautes; en fait. les dis- sensions ont ete negligeables si on les compare aux dissensions religieuses de l'Inde britannique. Lorsqu'elIes se sont manifestees dans notre Etat, elies n'ont pas ete d'origine locale, mais fomentees de l'exterieur. Toutes les communautes de notre Etat ont ete loyales enversmes ancetres et moi- meme et sont fieres d'appartenir a Haiderabad, quelle que soit leur croyance. Dans ces conditions, Haiderabad est pleinement fonde a conserver son identite propre. Mais, -exception faite du rat- tachement, it est pret a conclure un traite d'asso- ciation avec le Domini.on, non seulement pour s'assurcr avec lui des rapports cordiaux, mais pour favoriser la cooperation la plus complete possible entre les deux pays. D'ailleurs, nous "This is an arrangement which they cannot accept. . . . Indeed, if Your Exalted Highness is prepared to .accede, you will receive the fullest co-operation from the Dominion in obtaining for your State any arrangements which you may reasonably suggest for the advantage :tnd pros- perity of Hyderabad. Nor need Your Exalted Highness apprehend any interference with your internal sovereignty and autonomy with Hydera- bad." Again, therefore" internal sovereignty and autonomy are admitted. There is no question with regard to that, and India itSelf has. offered to guarantee it. The whole effort to obtain acces- sion means only one thing-that the Nizam was not prepared to submit his external sovereignty to any restraint from India, whatever he may have been prepared to do by way of treaty. There- fore, if he was not independent, what else was he? He is completely sovereign inside his State, and the Governor-General says that India will guarantee that sovereignty, if only he will accede to India on foreign affairs, defence and communi- cations, and give up his legislative authority, which India does not possess. If India does not possess it and he does, then he is completely independent. The very insistence upon a.ccession predicates that the Nizam was independent. Why else the .insistence upon accession, if he was already subordinate? In reply to this the Nizam again sets out a IQng reply dated 26 September in which he reiterates in the -last sentence: Done, la souverainere nationale et l'autonomie sont admises. It n'y a aucun doute a ce sujet, et l'Inde elle-meme s'est offerte ales garantir. Tous les efforts deployes potir obtenir le rattachement de Haiderabad n'indiquent qu'une chose; c'est que le Nizam n'etait pas dispose a tolerer que, dans ses relations avec l'exterieur, sa souverainete fut soumise a une contrainte de la part de l'Inde, quels que soient d'ailleurs les sacrifices qu'il fut pret a consentir par voie de traite. Si, dans ces conditions, le Nizam n'est pas independant, qu'est- it done? Il eat souverain absolu a l'interieur. de son Etat, et le Gouverne\.tr general declare que l'Inde garantira cette souverainete s'il consent au ratta- chement en matiere d'affaires etrangeres, de de- fense et de communications et s'il abandonne a l'Inde son pouvoir legislatif, que l'Inde ne possede pas. Si l'Inde ne possede pas ce pouvoir et que Haiderabad le possede, c'est done que Haidera- bad est completement independant. Le fait meme d'insister pour obtenir le rattachement presuppose que le Nizam est independant. Si le Nizam etait deja subordonne, pourquoi une telle insistance? En reponse, le Nizam envoie encore une longue lettre, en date dti26 septembte, clans la derniere phrase de laquelle it repete : "Permettez-moi enfin d'assurer une fois de plus a Votre Excellence, comme je l'ai. fait dans des lettres precMentes, que, exception faite du ratta- cheinent, je suis et resterai pret dans l'avenir, au moment ou le Dominion de l'Inde desirera re- prendre les negociations, a conc1ure avec h~! '1n traite ou un accord sur les trois points suivants: affaires etrangeres,de£ense et communications." Le probleme tout entier est tout a fait clair. D'une part, des efforts desesperes de la part du Nizam pour maintenir son independance juridique, bien qu'il soit dispose a conclure un accord arnical en tenant compte, sur.les trois points susmention- nes, des desirs et des besoins de l'Inde. Plus tard, le 29 novembre, un Accord de statu quo intervint entre.l'Inde et le Nizam. Cet Accord etait indis- pensable parce.que, sous le regime de la suzerai- nete britanniqpe sur les Etats et de la souverainete totale sur l'Inde britannique, de multiples accor.rls Haient le Gouvernement de l'Inde et les Gou- vernements des Etats, et la rupture ou l'abrogation soudaines de ces accords auraient cause de grandes difficultes, sinon des troubles plUG graves, pour 1IItt•••• I.ll\I!hll~.ia!lflI_.tLlIIIiIIl!I illJ ...... ... K --------- . "Finally, let me assure Your Excellency once more, as I. have assured you in previous letters, that, short of accession, I am ready now, and shall remain ready at any future time when the Dominion of India wishes to re-open negotiations, to enter into a treaty or agreement about the three subjects of external affairs, defence and communi- cations:" The whole dispute is per.fectly clear. On the one side there is a desperate effort on the part of the Nizam to maintain his. juridical indepen- dence, though he is prepared .to come into any amicable, friendly arrangement which would be in accordance with India's desires and needs in' respect of these. three subjects. Later oh, bn 29 November, a Standstill Agreement was entered into between bdia and the Nizam. The Stand- still Agreement was essential because, during the British regime with its suzerainty over the States and full sovereignty over British India, a.ll sorts of working arrangements were in operation be- tween the Government of India and the Govern-·· ments of the States~. and thesu'dden disruption ltArticle 1. Until new agreements in this behalf are made, all agreements and administrative arrangements as to the matters of common con- cern, including external affairs, defence and com- munications, which are existing between the Crown and, the Nizam immediately before 15 August 1947, shall, in so far as may be ...ppro- priate, continue as between the Dominion of India (or any part 'thereof) and $e Nizam. Nothing herein cont~ined shall impose any obliga- tion or confer any right on the Dominion: ' "(i) To send troops to assist the Nizam in t!te maintenance of internal order. " (ii) To station troops in Hyderabad territory except in tillle of war and with the consent of the Nizam, which will not be unreasonably withheld, any troops so stationed to be withdrawn from Hyderabad territory within six months of the termination of hostilities." Obvi0ttsly, the war here referr~d to would be ~ ,war with a third Power. The Agreement con- tinues: "Article 2. The Government of India and the N~zam agree for the better execution of the pur- poses of this Agreement to appoint Agents in Hyderabad and Delhi respectively," and to give every fa~ility to them for the discharge of their ftL"l~J{)ns. "Article 3. (i) NQthing herein contained shall ~nclude or introduce paramountcy functions or ,~reate any paramountcy relationship. "(ii) Nothing herein contained and nothing done in pursuance hereof shall be deemed to create in favour of .either party any' right con- ~inuing after, the date' of termination of this i,\greement, and nothing herein contained and ~othing done in pursuance,her~ofshall be deemed to derogate from any J;'ight 'which, qut for 'i:his Agreement, would have been exercised by either party to it after the date of ~ermination hereof. ltArticle 4. Any dispute' arising out of this Agreement or .out of agreements or arrange- ments.hereby continued shall he referred to the ~rbitration of two arbitrators, one appointed by e,ach of the parties" and an qmpireappointed' by those arbitrators. . (tArticle 5. Thii:Agreement shailcome into force at once and shall remain in force for a period of one year." .' Whatever the articles of this Agreement might provide,the last two articles had this effect. The ,standstill Agreement. was to continue for a year and. if any dispute arose between the' two with regard to the interpretation. ofthe·l\.gx;eement or ~e carrying of it intoeffect, it was to be referrtd to arbitration, oneaf1)itrCl,tQrto ,be.J:'J.awefi.byeach "Article premier. jusqu'a ce que de nouveaux accords soient conclus acet egard, tous les accords et arrangements administratifs ayant trait aux questions d'interet commun, y ~ompris les affaires etrangeres, la de£ense et les communications, in- tervenus entre la Couronne et le Nizam avant le 15 aout 1947, seront proroges, clans toute la mesure necessaire, entre le Dominion de l'Inde (ou toute partie dudit Etat) et le Nizam. Aucune des cl..ases du present Accord n'impose au Do.. minioIl l'obligation ni ne lui confere le droit: "i) D'envoyer des troupes pour aider le Nizam a maintenir rordre a l'interieur.de son Etat; "ii) De faire stationner des troupes dans le territoire de Haiderabad sauf en temps de guerre et avec le consentement du Nizam qui ne devra, pas le refuser sans raison valable, toutes les troupes stationnees devant etre retirees du terri- toire de Haiderabad dans les six mois qui suivront la cessation des hostilites." Il est evident que la guerre a laquelle i1 est fait allusion ici serait une guerre avec une troisieme Puissance. L'Accord continue en ces termes: "Article 2. Le Gouvernement de l'Inde et le Nizanl conviennent, pour assurer l'execution la plus satisfaisante des clauses d,u present Accord, de nommer des representants a, Haiderabad et a Delhi respectivement, et de leur facUiter l'exercice de leurs fonctions. "Article 3, i) Aucu,ne des dispositi.ons du pre- sent Accord ne vise a accorder d'attributions de suzerainete ni a creer de relations de suzerain 'a vassal. ' . "ii) Aucune des clauses clu present Accord hi aucune mesure prise en exec~tion de ses dispo- sitions ne seront considerees comme creant en faveur de l'une ou de l'autre des parties un droit encore valableapres expiration du present Accord, nicomm.e portant atteinte aux droits qui, en l'ab-' sence du present Accord, auraient pu etre exerces par l'une ou I'autre des parties apres expiration du presen,t Ac::cord. "Article 4. Tout differend issu de l'appljc~~ioll du present Accord.ou d'accords ou arrangel.11etlts maintenus en vigueur par le present act~ sera soumis a l'arbit-liage de deux juges-ar~itres, de~i­ gnes respectivement parchacune des parties, et d'un arbitre designepar ces juges. ' "Article 5. Le presep.t Accord entre en vigueur immediatement et reste. valide pour une perioqe' d'u,t1a.~." Quelle quesoit la teneur des. ~rticles' decet Accord, les deux derniers 'contenaient" des stipu" lation~ precis'es. L'Accordde statu quo qevalt rester .en vigueur pendant un an et, an cas oU: des litiges s'eleveraiententre les deuxpartiesau sujet de ViRterpretation de l'Accord ou desa mise en ceuvre~ its devaient etresoumisaI'arbitl'age . ~ Le 29 novembre, c'est-a-dire le jour meme ou intervenait l'Accord, le Gouverneu,r geneJ;9-1 ecri- vait au Nizam et essaya,it encpre de le persuader d'accepter le rattachement. Dans sa le~re, il disait notamment: "Place comme l'est Haiderabad, sea interets sont illdissolublement' lies a ceux de l'Inde et mon Gouvernement espere que, ayant l'expiratioIl, de l'accord. aetuellement en vigueur, Haiderabad .sera ameme de se r,eunir au Dominion'de l'Inde." On 29 November, the same date, the Governor,. General wrote to the Nizam anq. again tried to persuade h:im to accede. In the course of this letter he said: "Placed as Hyderabad is, its interest~ are in- extricably bound up with those of ~ndia,; and my Government hope that 1>efore the present agreement e~pires, it will be possible for Hydera- bad to accede to the Dom~on of Incli~." Later on, and this is extremly impOltant, ~e says: "As regards the supply of a~s and equiP'" moot, the Dominion Government will be able to ~upply your legitimate requirements. "Mon Gouvem,ement n'a aueune objection 'a ce que vouscontinuiez a avoir un agent general a Londres ni a ce que vous nommiez ailleurs des representants Charges de fonctions analogues, si vous le jugez necessaire. A eet egard, il est tres heureuX d'avoir l'assurance de votre Gouver-: nement, assurance a laquelle vous n'ignorez pas que le Gouvernement de l'rnde attache une grande importance,que l'activite de ees representants s'exen:el,Cl en, parfait ac~qrd avec cel,le' des repre- sentants du Dominion de l'Inde et se lirn,itera aux questions ayant proprement trait aux echanges commerciaux." "My Government have no objection to your 1.llaintaining :pI Agent-General in London an,d ~ppointing similar representatives elsewhere if ~ecessary. In this connexion they are very glad to' have your assurance, to which you will appre- ~iate that the Government of India attach, grea,t iplportance, that the activities of such represent~­ tives will b.e fully co-ordinated with those of the ~epresentatlves of the Dominion of India and Will ~e. confined to matters properly relating ~o trade and commerce. .' As I have submitted to the Council, this' refer- ence to the supply of arms and equipment by the Dominion of India to the Nizam's Government to Comme je l'ai declare au Conseil, la mention faite de la fourniture d'armes et d'equipement par ·le Gouvernement de l'Inde au GOl1Yern~J,nent clu: Nizam, pour satiGfaire a~ legitimes besoins, de ce dernier, est extremement importante. En depit de l'Accord de sta.tuq1£OJ l'Inde amanque a ses engagements en ne fournissartt den qui' .eut pu permettFe aU Nizam d'equipcr sa pp-lice ou,son 'armee selon ses besoins legitimes., Des lors.·que le Gouvernemen,t de Haiderabad eut·perqu tout ~eet his legitimate requirements is extremely nnporta,nt. In spite of this Standstill Agreement, India failed. to supply anything for the equipment ofthe police or Of the arttly of the Nizam for his l~gitimate requirements. When the Government of Hyderabad became convinced that there was no hope of, obtaining any supplies from India, when 'it found that it wasbei.l1g ~ubjected' to a.' ~spoir d'obtelJ.ir des fournit1,1res dennde, ~t cons- ' tate qu'iletait soumi,s, a unblocus et que le Gou.,. vernement de ·l'Inde .tnontrait touteintention .de faite usage de la force, si necessaire,p01.lr con": traindre le Nizam ,3. accepter le rattachement a i'Inde, peut':"on raisonnablement blatner Hll.ide~. rabadd'avoir voulu obtenir des artnes ,de l'exte., 'rieur? ~locl\ade and that the Government of India ha<.:1; eyery intention of using'force,· if' it b:ecame neces- sary,·to cOD;lpel~e, Nizatn to'accede, the~, if the NJz~m P.ad. recourse to obtaining arms from the outSide, Can 4.e.reasonably be bla~ed for' that? ,'. . ,- , !he rep,resentative of :fu,dia has placed bl;for~ ~e Counc1ll11atter showing thatgun-runt,lingwas ~~J;'anged. by Hyderabad and WllS il.'l<1ulged in by It. .In the first place, one of the items to which he specifi<;ally drew attention, arid which was'des- cribe,d as "cheese", was' anti-;'l1rcraft ~!1S~' why ~oes 'any, g?vernl,l1ent try to g~t ~~i,.aircraft guns? Tha,t.1S a very signific~p:t itet,n~ lIydetabad ~a~. 1!4?,W1t~~~~.ai~c.r!1ftJ)l' ~~ll11~ 0.£ 1;l.o~bi:gg .~nyb~dy. 111e .!1t~empt to. obt.lin anti.-ajr~ra£t ~ cet Accord;'le Conseil de securite prendra con- naissance de cette plainte, comme des revendi- cations de l'une et l'autre partie, mais la maniere dont l'Inde a applique, pour sa part, les cl~uses de l'Accord merite de retenir l'<lttention. Plus loin - et ceci est fort important - le Gouverneur general declare: "En ce qui concerne la foumiture d'armes et de' materiel, le Gouvernement du pominion sera en mesure de pourvoir a vos besoins legit~es. , ~e rept:esen,tapt.de l'Inde a, entrepris de ~emon­ ~Ier aU ' Conseil que la c.ontrebande' d'armes ava,it et"; encoura,gee et qrgiAnisee Par Haidera1:>ad. ~'une des- £Ol1r.:nitl1!eS sur.lesquelles il ~. pa:rtiel1- li~rement aij:lre l'attentioll - ~ournitureqq..i se camo~~la.it,.par.ait-il, ell.livrai.son de ~+omage - eta-it co~stittt~e par de l'a:J;tillerieantiaerienn~. D~ni>ql1el1>~tl,1~ Gollvernement. essaie-t-i~' d'obte- pir ce genre de 1tJ:atedt::1? Voilaqt.!i estsigni(icatif.' ij:a.i4er{lb~d ne posseclClit pas d'avionsmilitaires. "1 see also that with the same purpose he agreed to amend the recent Currency Ordinance in order to take the sting out of it, as he expressed it, by permitting, as a matter of concession, travellers to use Indian currency for their bon3 fide requirements." Both these matters require a little expla.nation. "Hyderabad had, as it had every right to do, advanced a loan of 20. crores-a crore behlg 10 million-of rupees to Pakistan and had trans- ferred to Pakistan securities in that amount. India raiaed an objection, saying that Hydera1?ad, in doing that, had been guilty of, shall we say, an unfriendly act, or, at any rate, had acted against 'the spirit of the Standstill Agreement, and that it would be a gesture of friendliness towards India and a proof of their good will if they would request Pakistan not to put the securities on the market; that is to say, not to realize them, during the period of the Standstill Agreement. At that time; the Prime Minister was Mr..Laik Ali, who has subsequently.been described as the head of a gangster government. While in Delhi, he promised to make this request of Pakistan; ~nd. he did so. The ruler, the Nizam, says he had no authority to do that. It was a v~ry embarrassing thing to request the Government of Pakistan, after the loan had heen advanced to .it, .to freeze this loan; as·it were, and not to put the securities··on "J'ai lu le proces-verbal de la discussion qui a eu lieu les 2 et 4 mars, entre ma delegation, vous-meme et M. Menon. Je constate que, au dire de Votre Excellence, le plus grand service que pourrait rendre mon Premier Ministre, a l'occasion de sa visite a Karachi" - c'est, je le rappelle, la capitale du Pakistan - "serait de faire en sorte que ce qu'on est convenu d'appeler le pret de 200 millions de roupies ne soit pas rea- lise pendant la duree de l'Accord de statu qttD. J'apprends que, a votre avis, le reglement de cette question contribuerait aapaiser les soupc;ons que le Gouvernement de l'Inde entretient al'egard de Haiderabad. Mon Premier Ministre, en pre- nant sur lui de demander au Gouvernement du Pakistan de· ne pas mettre sur le mal'che les va- leurs en question pendant la duree de validite de l'accord, a certainement outrepasse les pou- voirs qui lui sont expressement conferes. Vous ne manquerez pas d'eL""mer qu'une telle propo- sition, faite au Pakistan longtemps apres le transfert des valeurs, pose pour I'Etat un pro- bleme embarrassant ;mais je comprends qU'il se soit engage dans cette voie, emporte par son zele a faire tout en son pouvoir pour eliminer un sujet de suspicion qui, dans l'esprit de Votre Excellence, etait prejudiciable a l'efficaeite de l'Accord de statu quo. "Je vois aussi que, dans la meme intention, it a consenti a amender le recent decret monetaire, y apportant, comme il l'a explique, des adoucis- sements et permettant aux voyageurs, a titre de concession, d'utiliser la monnaie indienne pour leurs legitimes besoins." Ces deux sujets appellent une breve explication, Haiderabad, comme il etait parfaitement fonde a le faire, avait consenti au Pakistan un pret de 20 crores de rou~ies (le crore equivaut a 10 mil- lions) et transfere aU P?kistan des valeurs a concu:rrence de ce montant. L'Inde a objecte que, ce faisant, Haiderabad s'etait rendu coupable d'un ade, dirons-nous, inamical, avait agi a tout· le -mains contre l'esprit de l'Accord de statuqttD; eUe a fait valoir qu'il y aurait un geste de bien- veillance ... envers l'Ind~, en merne temps. qu'une marque de bonne. volonte, a prier le Pakistan de ne pas mettre les valeurs sur le marche, en d'au- tres termes de ne pas les reaIiser, pendant la duree de l'Accord de statu qu.o. A l'epoque, le Premier Ministre etait M. taik Ali, ulterieure- ment depeint comme le chef d'un gouvernement de gangster~. Il promit, pendant son sejour a Delhi, d'adresser cette requete au Pakistan, ce qu'il fit effectivement. Le Nizam declare que le Premier M:inistre n'avait pas anlorite i ur agir....J dela sorte. Il etait extremement genant, une fois le pret octroye, de prier en quelque sorte le Gau- W.l-len I come to deal specifically with this Quand j'entrerai dans le detail de son cas, je case I shall be able to show that he was no demontrerai qu'il n'avait rien d'un politicien; politician at all; he was a businessman, who was c'etait un homme d'affaires, auquel le Nizam, se requested by the Nizam, in the midst of a so:t trouvant dans l'embarras, avait fait appel pour of emergency, to come and undertake the responSl- occuper le poste de Premier Ministre. La realite bilities of the Prime Minister of the State. The est exactement l'inverse du tableau que le repre- picture absolutely is the reverse of that which sentant de l'Inde s'est attache a en brosser. Nous the representative of India has tried to paint. venons de rappeler un des actes de ce Premier Here is one of his acts. It is not a case of the Ministre. Or, nous ne yoyons pas, en l'occu,rrence, ruler wanting to comply and the Prime MinisterIun souverain desireux d'agir dans un certain saying, "No, we must not." The ruler says he sens, auquelle Premier Ministre dit categorique- had no authority to do this. He has done it, but ment: "Non, it ne le faut pas." Le souverain he has done it in order to remove a likely cause declare au contraire que le Ministre n'avait pas of friction. qualite pour agir comme il l'a fait. It n'en a pas moins agi, mais dans l'intention expresse d'ecarter une cause <le·desaccord eventueL I would say this with regard 'to the second Prenons l'autre question, celle du decret mone- matter: the Nizam has currency of his own; taire: le Nizam a une monnaie a. lui; l'Inde bri- British India has a currency of its own; th~ tannique egalement; la monnaie du Nizam n,a Nizam's currency is not legal tender in British .pas cours legal dans l'Inde britannique. Le Gou- India. Apparently, the Nizam's Government had vernement du Nizam avait,semble-t-il, edicte un passed a currency ordinance saying- that Indian decret proclamant que la monnaie de l'Inde n'au- currency would not be legal tender in Hyderabad. rait pas cours legal en Haiderabad. Le Dominion The Dominion of India took objection to that. de l'Inde a proteste contre cette mesure, Notez It is all one-sided: "Your currency is not legal le procede unilateral: "Votre monnaie n'a pas tender within our Dominion, but our currency cours legal dans notre Dominion, mais. notre should be accepted· within yours." On this, the monnaie a nous devrait etre acceptee dans votre Nizam says: "I see also that, with the same pays." Or, a ce propos, le Nizam dedare: "Je purpose, he agreed"-that is to say, the Prime vois aussi que dans la meme intention, il "c'est-a- Minister-"to amend the recent currency ordi- dire le Premier Ministre" a consenti a. amender nance in order to take the sting out of it, as he le recent decret monetaire, y apportant, comme expressed it, by permitting, as a matter of conces- it l'a explique, des adoucissements, et permettant sion, trav'ellers to use Indian currency for their .aux voyageurs, a. titre de concession, d'utiliser la bona fide tequirements"-that is to say, within' monnaie indienne pour leurs legitimes besoins"- Hyderabad. That, again, shows the attitude of that a. l'interieur de Haiderabad, s'entend. Voila. done particular Prime Minister towards getting these une nouvelle preuve de la maniere dont ledit matters settled amicably, if it was possible so Premier Ministre entendait, si possible, regler les to do. qUestions a l'amiabl~. On 5 April 1948, the·Nizam again wrote to the Le 5 avrit 1948, le Nizam a adresse au Gou- Governor-General, as follows: verneur general une nouveIle lettre, disant: - "Information, which has reached me in Hy- "Des renseignements qui me sont parvenus a. derabad, gives me reason to think that the letter 'Haiderabad me portent a croire que la lettre que addressed to my Prime Minister by your States votre Ministere des Etats a adressee a monPre- Ministry was in the nature of an ultimatum to be mier Ministre etait une· sorte d'ultimatum qu'il regarded as a'prelude to an open breach of y aurait lieu de considerer comme un prelude a friendly·relations. lam therefore making a .final une rupture ouverte des .relations amicales. En appeal to you to exercise your good offices to consequence, j~ vous conjure une derniere ~ciis de prevent such a contingency. bien vouloir vaus entremettre pour prevenir une telle ev~ntualite. "rai ete heureux quand, a. la fin de novembre 1947, l'Accord de statu quo. est finalement entre en vigueur; je pensais en efIet que, si un modus vivendi pouvaits'etablir pour un an au· moins" avec un peu de bonne volonte de part etd'autre, la mefiance diminuerait et que l'experience acquise amenerait le Dominion ase rendre·compte· qu'une . formed'association autre que le rattachement etait; apres tout, possible· et satisfaisante. "Malheureusement, l'Acl:ord de statu quon'a pas jusqu'iciete observe sans heurts. Toutefois, la situation n'est pas irremediable et nos premiers . espoirs· peuvent .encore tenaitre. L'interpretation "I was glad when, at th~ end of November 1947, the Standstill Agreement was finally ~e­ cuted, because I thought that, if a working arrangement continued fora year or so with good will on both sides, suspicion would diminish, and that, in.the light of experience, the Dominion would discover that some form of association, other than accession, was after all practicable and satisfactory. "Unhappily hitherto the Standstill Agreement has not worked smoothly. But thesituatiCln.can be remedied and our original hopes revived. There are difficulties in interpreting the obljga- ••r_.... -..~ pott~uite, some.of them iritroduced for the first .portailCe" clont certaines sont Itientionnees pour la time. Btit in the discussions whiCh you had willi premiere fois. Mais dans vos ,entretiens avec ma my delegation in Delhi at th~ begitming of Marcn deIegationa Delhi, au debut de mars, vous aviez you sai~ th~t the. so-called rakistari loan and. the dit que .ce qui faisait obstacle a~ relations ami,; currency -regulation confinmg cash fransactlOns cales c'etait ~urtout r~prunt dIt "emprtint d1,1 in my State to my own currency were tlie princi- Pakistan" et le dedet ri10netaire qui he tolerait, ~al o~st.ades. t<?, good-~ill•. I~. tli.eca~e..o~ .tlie I' dans mon Etat, pour l~s transacti0!1s au comp!ant, loan; my GovemmeIlt hav~taken the acti~n.whtch que ma propre monnate. En ce 9U1 conceme I em- you yourself suggested and I have every hope prunt, mon Gouvemement, a prIs les mesures que that ,it .will pe effective., So f~ras:the <;~~r~~cy vous avez suggerees vous:,m~1l!e et rai tout lieu regulatto;Il. tS consemed, ~y Prtme M;t~Ist~r d'esperer qu'eUes seront SUIVIes d'effet.En ce agreed atthe De1hi.Conference.to ~end .tt, tp qui concerne le decr;t monetaJre; mon Pre~ie~ • order to take. the sting o1,1t o~ tt, by makl1~g tt, Miilistre a consenti a la Conference de DelhI; a i~~pp~ca~le ~().~raveU~rs.for tliei~ b~na fid~. re- le modifier, en vue'de lui apporter des adoucis.: q,;urements.. Tli~ ne7essli~f amendment has SInce .sen'1tnts, et it a ~dmis ~e.s aerogationsen' ce qui been made and pubbshed. concerne les besoms legttimesdes voyageurs. Les modifications riecessaires ant ete appiJrtees au texte et puoliees depuis lors." THe letter goes on j:oread : "Whathas concerned me nas been that, whereas, the. British regularlysuppIied me with arms aria equipment, I have had no arms, equipment or ammunition whatever fot my Forces or. Police since July 1947; That inspitebf the express promise of the Governot.;General that regular sup- plies will be continued for legitimate purposes; .I have constantly pressed your Government· and YburExceUency. on this .subject but·while youI' Government have objected to my getting my re:; quirements from either sources"Jhey have supplied me. with ..nothing the1t1s~lves,with theresult that I have been.gravely emban;<lssed both in train~ng my troops and in maintaining law and order." What is the Nizam to do? The Govt!rnment of India agrees that it win continue to sl-lpply the Niiam with arms and equipmeI\t for l~gitimate tjeeds, both forhispoIi~e ~nd h~s arme<:Lforces! !t adually does not.supply him.witha.ilything and it objects to his obtaining anything frotnliIl out- side '.source. What was the position .to, b.e ?,.,It tliis was ndtcoefcion; wnat else was it,? The letter continues: etAn •equallytense'sitttation"hasbeen cteat~d By the Government of IndiaiJi relation to the t,rade,. c01l11l1erc~ .and ·(:!conom~clife of. Hyd~raba4. On iitany. occasions· I' exp.ressed to yo,U,. through Sir'.WaIter .•Moncktpnall.d others, my .appreben:, sionthat, if lchm;e, as I had b~en assured I could, to remail1 ..independent, the Governrilent 'pf Iilailiwoitld seek to coerce riieiittoatcession' by ail economic boycott or even, bynpditig sOI1le~.. La letire continue eomme suit: ,iCe qui m'a inquiete, C'esf que, alots qu'aupa- ravant les Britanniques me foumissaient regu: lierement des armes et du materiel, je n'airec;u ni afmes, ni materiel, ni munitions d'aucune sorte pour tnonarmee ni pour ma police, depuis juillet 1947. Et cela, bien que le Gouvemeur general eut formeUement profnis que les livraisoris regulieres. se poursuivraient tartt qu'i1 s'agirait. de besoins ·legitiines; Je n'ait:es~e.d'insIster aupres. de votre Gouverriement et de Votte Excellence ace sujet. mais, tout en s'opposant a'ce que je m'adresse a d'autres sources pour satisfaire a mes l1esoins, votre Gouvetnetnent ne ni'a rien fourni lui-meme, par suite de quoi J'ai ete. extre:me:ment embar~s§e, fant pour instruire mi:s ttoupes que pout faire respett~r la loi et mairttehit l'Ordre." . Que doitfaite le Nizam? ;Le GOJ;ivernement de ,1;Im:le prorilet-de continuer,asatisfaire aux besoins 'legitimes dti Nizani enarm<lS et en inateriel,tailt pour. sa police que pour ses forces armees. En .fait, it ne lui-fournit rien dl1 tout et s'oppose meme ace qu'i1 s'approvisl0nne a d'autres sources. Com-, ment qualifier cette situation? Si ce n'est .pas la de lacobtrainte, qu'est-cedbnc? Je poursuisma lecture: .' "Le .Gouvernemenf de l'Indea cree une' situa- . tion t6ufaussi aifficiiepbtir Ieconithert;e et la vie econ6mique de Haiderabad. Je vous ai fait part, amaihtes reprises, par le. canal de Sit Waiter Monckton et a'autres' personne,s,.de la crainte que j'eprouvais, .si je choisissais de "rester indepen- dant'(c<;lJ,nmeon w'avait. assure .llue. je pouv~is le faife), de voir.le Gb\1vemement de .1'Inde chercher a.rile .. cOiithlindte.a demander Jerattachemeht, su~p~ndre,le ravitaillement en medicaments, four- p.itqres I medicales et produits necessaires ~tL~ hOpitatp!:, ainsi qu'en .chlore d~stine it la des~p.­ feftion des reserves d'eau de ~OIl peuple. :Mon ~an confirm,. what I say of their'own kIiowledge. .Nor'hall it·been s~riously chall~pg-ed by the offi- ~ers of your Goyernment. I have hitherto made no public protest.' But if it is now i!1tended to create an open breach of friendly relations, I can no lonier r~aiti silent. Whateve~ differen~es pf opiniop there ~ay be on the questIon of Hydera- bad's decision in pres~nt circutnstances. hot to Go~verneJ11ent"a en mflins des preqves formeIJes 4e t0l.lt ce que j'ava.p.~e. B.eaucoup de Britan:- Hiques et d'au~es etrilI1-g~rsquiont sejourne clans mon Etat au c0l.lrs, 4e ces derniers mois peuyent confirmer, en toute co~naissance de cause, ce que je dis. D'ailleurs, les fonctionnaires de votre Gouvernement ne l'ont passerieusement conteste. Je me suis abstenu jusqu'ici de toute protestation publique, mais .si 1'0n v~ut ma,intenant ro~pr~ acced~, th~ wprld must know the way in whi~h HYd~rabad hasbe~n treated. . ouvertem~nt nos re1a~ions ~icales, je ~e saurais garder plus 10ngtemp~ le sih~n<;e. QueUes qUe ,sgieJ:lt les divergence~ ge vues quaJlt a la qecis~qq. 9-~ Haiderabad. <le ne pas se tattacl1er it l'Inde dans ~es cir~on!>tatlc~s. actuelles, il faut que le nwn.c!e s;lch,e de quelte maI1-iere Haiderabad a ~te tmite. ' "En 1947, leGQ1.1ve~ement britanniqu~ a d~'l' nORce unilateralement les Traites conclus entre lui etmon Etat. Je me demande si Votre Excel- lence se rappelle la lettreque je lui ai adresseeen sa qualite de reprisentant de la Couronne, le 9 juillet 1947. J'en joins une copiea la. preserite, en meme temps·qu1une copie de la seule reponse a cette lettre qui me soit jamais parvenue." ."~n. 1947 the Bri~ish Gov~rnment unilaterally den~:m!1~ed the Treaties between the1l1.and my, State. I wonder if Your Exc~llel1!=Y rem~mbers : my letter to you as Crown Representative dated "9 J]11y 1947. I attach a copy together with a copyqf the 'only reply I ever received to it." The only reply he paq received was that the Crqwn Representative.wpulji .place'the letter· pe- fore His Maje$ty's GoverQniel1t. But later all he .. explained that, owing to thepres£ure of business, b d y some· f.\1istak~ in *eoffi!=e, that h~d. !1()tb~en , one. ' Tpe NizaIIl ~oqtinues: L,;tdite r~ponseinfoI11laitle Nizam qu~ le repre- sentant de la Couronne transniettrait sa lettr~ au Gouveme1l1ent de Sa. Majeste. Mais, par la suite, le representant de la Couronne expliquait.que la tr.~smis~ioq.n'~vaitpas ep liet;, "dt1 'fl!:itg'yne el1rellf desonsecretari3:~, alors deborde de ~rava!l~ . J;..e. N.i~~ continue ~nsi: ~~Je me suis ab!'!tenu jusqu'ici de publierces documents, mais ilme £aut, maintenatlt enper:- mettie. lapublication.L'histoirr. dir~-t":"elle que les Britanniquesne se sont pas faitfaute de sacri., fier ·leurs amis eprouves, parce que·· "ces amis n'etaient .pas a meme .de leur causer. de· serieux ennuis? "1.havehitherto-refrained'from publishingthese documents .but now. I must release, them: Will history say that the British were content to sacri- fice their tried friends because they had too little nuisance value? "The world must knli,whow,between them,the British Government and theNewGovernment of f'll fautque le monde sache qu'a eux deux, le Got~vernement britafmiqueet le Gouver-. nement de l'Inde - je ne cherche pas it preciseI' la part de responsabilite qui .revienta. Ind~a.,-I do not seek .to 3:pportion blame.:.-have demed fulfilment of the promise that I.shouldbe hi' " "Last year the British, without consulting me, severed all the ties which bound my State to the King-Emperor. Will Your Excellency not keep faith with me now? To break faith with the weak causes perhaps less immediate disadvantage than to break faith with the strong, but assuredly in the end it brings its retribution. I hope Your Excellency will forgh-e me for this frank and honest expression of my feelings and sentiments." Now what is the position? India has com- plained that there were breaches on the side of Hyderabad, that there was disorder, that there was this and that. Here is the Nizam's own . personal letter to the Governor-General setting out the position on his own side, and it is eloquent testimony to what was actually happening. In reply, on 8 April" 1948, the Governor-General observed as follows, in the course of his letter. It is a long letter but I shall read out only. two or three short extracts. He said: . "I feel that it is my duty to set Your Exalted Highness's mind at rest on one point. You refer to assurances, which I have given to you in the past, that I would never be a party to improper pressure on your State. These assurances remain as good today as when they were given. Neve,r will I,. the constitutional Gove:mor..;General of India, be a party to any such proce":"re." " r shall stop here for the moment to'reflectthat, as constitutional Governor-General of India he was a party to nothing at all; and therefore this is an as~urance without any meaning. He was ndtputting the pressure. He had no authorIty. Therefore, he was not a party to the pressure that was being put, and the assurance "1 would never be a party" was. really meaningless. Later, he goes on to say: , . "But this I must make clear to you. These assurances were given at a time when both my Government and yours were united inthe resolve to make the Standstill Agree~ent work. .I can assure yoU tha.t such a resolve still holds the field, so f;J.r as the Government of India are concerned. It was a sinister warning. Later on, he said: "Si vous pouviez vous resoudre maintenant a constituer un Gouvernemellt vraiment represen- tatif des desirs et des aspirations de l'ensemble de votre peuple, je crois que vous serviriez gran- dement l'avenir de l'ensemble cle la peninsule." Cela constitue une mise en demeure. L'Inde a parle de discordre intestine et de souverainete nationale. Void maintenant le Gouverneur gene- ral constitutionne1 de l'Inde qui met le Nizam en denleure de realiser, a des fins determinees, des re£ormes constitutionnelles a l'interieur' de son territoire. Et, comme je me fais fort de le de- montrer, le Nizam n'est pas reste sourd acette suggestion, bien que le Gouverneur general n'eut pas qualite pour la faire. Void la derniere phrase de la lettre. "If you could now see your way to introducing a Government truly representative of the desires and aspirations of your people as a whole, I believe that you will do a great service to the future of the whole of this sub-continent." Here is a demand. India has been tal.ldng of domestic disputes and internal sovereignty. Here is a demand by the constitutional Governor-General of India asking the Nizam to carry out constitu- tional changes inside his Dominions, towards a particular end. And as I shall show, the Nizam was not unresponsive to that suggestion, though the Governor-General had no authority or right to make it. The final sentence -is this: "Pour finir, permettez-moi de vous dire que, pas plus que Haiderabad n'a, vous 1'affirmez, l'intention d'engager une action offensive contre l'Union indienne, l'Inde n'a la moindre intention d'entreprendre une telle action contre Haide- rabad. Je terminerai par cette cOtlsideration:. gardons-nous de croire que, quelque gravequ'une situation puisse devenir, il n'y ait rien a faire pour y remedier, et que tout ce que nous puissions faire, c'est d'etre fatalistes et de nous attendre au pire. Je continuerai a faire de mon mieux. Je vous ai expose comment vous pourriez, a mon avis, contribuer a la solution du probleme." Ceci etait ecrit le 8 avriL Si je voulais, imitant la methode de mon docte ami, comparez les dates, je rappellerais que cela se passait un mois avant le coup de l.urce qui a eu pour resultat l'occupation militaire de 1'Etat de Haiderabad. Nous venons de voir le Gouverneur general constitutionnel donner l'assurance que, quelque grave que la situation puisse devenir, eUe .ne serait jamais desesperee, conjurer le Nizam de ne pas s'attendre au pire et l'assurer que nul ne songe a entreprendre une action offensive co~tre l'Etat de Haiderabad. ''Finally, let me tell you that, in'the same way as you say that there is no intention of offensive action by Hyderabad against the Indian Union, there is no intention of offensive action by the Indian Union against Hyderabad. I will end with this thought. Let us not believe that, however serious a situation may become, there is nothing that can be done to retrieve it, and that all we can do is fatalistically to await the worst. I will continue to do my best. I have told you how I I think you could help." This was said on 8 April. If i'were to· follow my learned friend's method of comparing dates, this was within five months of the military action which occur;ied the State of Hyderabad by force. ~ere is the constitutional Governor-General giv- mg assurance that, however bad the situation might become, it would never be irretrievable; and urging him, therefore, not to go on believing the worst, and assuring. him nobody was going to take any offensive action against the State. Le 22 avril, le Nizam ecrivit au Gouverneu:c . general; voiciun extrait de sa lettre: On 22'April, the Nizam wrote to th~ Governor- General, and in the course·of his letter he said: "Vous pensez, m'a.-t-on dit, que, si le rattache- ment ne se fait pas, le GOtlvernement de l'Inde ne s'estimera pas en mesure de resister a hi pression de l'opinion publique, laquelle a sans . doute ete soulevee par la campae,one de propagande hostile. qui, depuis quelque temps, a ete menee d'une fa~on suivie contre Haiderabad. 1..'on a suggere que, a dHaut du rattachement, l'onpour- rait donner satisfaction a l'opinion publique de l'Union indienne en annon~ant qu'tin gouverne- ment responsable allait etre constitue en Haide- rabad et que certaines autres mesures seraient prises. L'on a meme insinue qu'il serait bon que je fasse une declaration dans ce sens la veille de' l'ouverture du Comite.du Congres pour l'en- semble de i'Inde, leque1 doit se reunir le 24 de ce mois. I1 m'est difficile d'examiner une suggestion emanant d'une autorite exterieure, alors qu'll s'agit de relations constitutionnelles entre un chef d'Etat ets( n peuple, c'est-a-dire d'une affaire "It.has been conveyed to me that you believe that, In the absence of accession, the Government o~ .India feel that they would not be able to WIthstand the pressure of public opinion which, I daresay, has been arousedasa result of the adv~rse propa~anda which has been persistently carrIed onagamst Hyderabad for some time. As an alternative to accession, the announcement of responsible government as an immediate aim and certain .other measures, have been suggested'with the. object of satisfying public opinion in the Indian Union, and a hint has been dropped that an announcement from me on the eve of the meeting of the All-India Congress Committee, to be held on the 24th of this month would be de- sirable.. It is difficult for me t; consider any sug~~st1on emanating from an outside authority bearmg on the constitutional relationship between the. ruler and the people of this State~ which b" :OUld be" viewed purely as an internal affair. The Goyemor-General had suggested that, in order to satisfy public opinion in India, the N'izam should take steps to introduee a responsible gpvetim1ent in his dominion, and I say that the Nizanl has not heen unresponsive, although he points 'out that that is no bUsiness of the Govern- ment or the people of India. . From the Firman to which the Nizam ,refers I quote the following: t'Having given special cohsiderationto these ideas, I had ordered the formation of a com- ipiftee with a view to increasing the powers of the Assembly toaD. appreciable extent. H:.\ving regard, however; to the present circumstances, it is desirable that the repJ:'esent:.uv(~s of the people should have a due share in framing the new con- stitution~ It is also desirable that the representa- tives of the important sections.of the country be associated equally to work out the proposals, with due and full regard to the general' conditions and trends of thought in the country, and -after taking into account the present aspirations of the people to shoulder greater responsibilities. Until such time as these proposals are formulated and a new government. based on these proposals is formed, I trust that these political part;~, which are not represented in the present interim Government, will join and take prcper share in shouldering the responsibilities of govemment." Next, I quote from a ,speech of the Prime Minister of lfyderabad to the Hyderabad Legis- lativ:~ .Assembly,.which was •already in existence, on 27 April 1948. Let him also speak for lilin~ self; it will show what the character of the man was. In th~courseoHhis sp,eech, he observed: "'l'helndiaii .·Union·appears .fo. teel'that Hy.. derab~<1" must accede toit and that, if accession does not come abolitj there woUld be frouble.·They clf,i1ot like" to think of Hyderal:>ad in any other te~s.. If Hyderabadpersists ,in tliihking on. dif- ferentlines.. she is to be for:r;ed to accept the lines on whic1l the InJian Union wishes her to t'iink. ffave. w~not, a. right to ,ask why . we should be' forced to .think only in. termsspedfied by the 'Union if we can offer tnemP!1rgootl wiJ1:'friend.. sh.ipj and co-oPeration ina dillerevt manIit:.(? And ·\vhy,. if we ask this simple question,shouldit be ~egarc1ed, ,as .' anu~friel1qlyact?A,fter .all, wh.at ha~ the'Indian",Union, ··.with. aU·.as·..·might, its .r~sources ~ndits great future, to worry about if Hyderabad .prefers··,t() tnaintain an honCl!lrable pO:;iti0n for itself.? . . . , ·... ('From aMufJuly '1947 onwards. Hyderabad bas/been experiencinganeconomk blockade, on a,ccount?fwltichtlie{)opulatioilisbeingniade to . sUtJ:ergreat h~~dsliipsinsecuringthe dire!l~ces.. ·Sities (?iY1if~., Her borders'~avebeenturned' into ,·.l1utiting'skt'ounds for' raiders, communists; or ..' ''': ..' ~_ ': ',. . I' ~'It semble que l'Unit>n ilidienne juge que Hai~ derabaddoit se rattachera elleet que, sUe ratta~ chement ne se fait pas, des ~roubles se produiront. L'Union indienne n'envisagepas d'a~tre solution possibie'pour Haiderabad.Et si Haiderabad con: tinue a. etred'uri avis different, il faut l'obliger a. adopter 'la position que 'I'Union indienne veut Juivoir prendre. N'avons.:nous pa;s le droit de nous demander pourquoi nous senons tenus de 11'envisager.que la.solution'preconisee par·I'Union ixrdienne,alors que nous pouyons offrir a. l'Union Uheautre solution qui lui· assurera:itno~re bonne volonte, notre amitie. et notre cooperation? Et pourquoi lesimple fait de poser une. tell~ question serait..ilconsidere·cbmme un aete inamiCal?Apres tout, .en quO! le fait que Haiderabad pre£ere . conserver la situation honorablequ'il occupe peut-ilinqnieter l'Unionindienne, qui dispose de tantde puissance et de tant de ressources et qui _a unsrg~and avenir devant elle? "Depuisle.moisce juillet 194-7environ, Haide~ l'abad 'asubi utiblpcus economique. quia .•inflige de grandessouffran,ces a. une population qui lutte pburassurer son existen.ce.materieHe. Les fr(".;'~ tieres du paysontservideterrain de chasse adeS pillards, a. des~ol11~_~~istes et a. d'autres individUstIIIM "Must the Indian leaders always think in terms of using force against Hyderabad, and, if so, for what purpose? Must Hyderabad always suspect the Indian Union of aggressive designs, and can that apprehension not be a1~ayed? If we all keep on talking and thinking in bellicose terms it is sure to lead to disaster and no one knows where it will end. It is no use allowing things to go so far. Once conflagration is started it is not easy to control. "It will be our earnest endeavour to maintain and promote peace and friendship to the last moment. But if, in spite of all our efforts, we are compelled and force is used against us and art unavoidable situation not of our seeking is created, then there will be no course left for us other than to face it honourably with courage arid determination, to. the bp.st of otir ability, and leave the end in the hands (1f Providence. We Dlay be weak and helpless but our cause is just and out faith in the Almighty is unshakable. . "I am on.:: of those who believe that a happy settlement with Hyderabad in the very early stages would have had a very sobering effect upop. inter- communal relations both in India and Pakistan; in fact, I believe that its psychological reaction would have greatly minimized, if not altogether eliminated, the stark tragedy that was enacted in East and West Punjab. I ~ti11 believe that the great tension throughout· southern India c~n be. ceased and we can all start On the rQad of mutual regard, peace and prosperity. "Mahatma .Gandhi, that. great sage; of India" told me only the day before his·tragic assassina-' tion that shanti1 was more precious than anything els.e a~.<l, advised me to, work for peace at any Ph~~. On my part, I fully. believe in that nqb1e advIce· and shall spare no effort to follow tnf.ct: golden principle, eV6.tl though, unfortunately, some of the Mahatma's close and more ardent followers might, choose. to talk: of 'aggression, force and blockade. communaut~s. C'est a. mon avis une fort mauvaise politique que de pousser des gens au desespoir, surtout quand cela est parfaitement inuti1e. "Les dirigeants de l'Inde ne peuvent..i1s envi- sager, qaand i1 s'agit de Haiderabad, l'emploi d'atitres moyens que la violence? Et pourquoi done vou1bil' user de la violence? Faudra-t-il done que Haiderabad continue a. preter a. l'Union indienne des desseins agressifs, et est-ce que cette crainte ne pourrait pas etre apaisee? Si nous continuons, 1es uns et 1es autres,· a. ne penser qu'a. la guerre, a. ne par1er que de la guerre, il est certain que nous alions vel'S 'Un desastre dont personne ne peut mesurer l'etendue. 11 ne sert a. rien de 1aisser la situationempirer. Lorsqu'un conflit a eclate it n'est pas facile de s'en rendre maitre. "Nous ferons, j'QRqu'au dernier moment, 1es plus grands efforts pour maintenir et etablir des relations amicales et pacifiques. Mais si, en depit de tous nos efforts, on use a. notre egard de la conti"ainte et de la force et si, fata1ement, l'on cree ainsi une situation qui n'est pas celle q!1e nO,iS voudrions, alors,. it ne nous restera plus qu'a fa:ire face a cette situation avec hbnneur, courage et determination, pour autant que.nouS le poul'rons, et en nous en remettant aux decisions de la Providence. Peut-etre sommes-nous faibles et sans ressources, mais notre cause est juste et nacre foi en le Tout-Puissant demeure inebran- lable. "Je suis de ceux qui croient que, si la question de Haiderabad avait ete reg!ee d'Urie fat;on satis- faisante des le debut, 1es relations entre COIl1!1lU" nautes, aussi bien dans I'lnde que dans le Pakis- tan, se seraient nettement d~tendues. Je suis convaincu que l'effet psychologique d'un tel regIe- ment ent ete de reduire considerablement 1'am- pleur des evenements tragiques qui ont ~u lieu dans i'est et l'ouest du Pendjab et peut-etre meme d'y mettre fin. Je .coutinuede croire que 1'on pent porter remMe a la situation,si tendue f}ui existe dans tout le sud de l'Inde,et·que rious pouvons totis prendre,dans un sentiment de confiance mutuelle, la voie qui mene a la paix et a. la prosperite. . . "Le Mahatma Gandhi, ce grand sage de l'Inde, the disait, la veille meme du jour oili1 fut tragi- quement assassine, que, de tails les biens le plus plus precieux est la shanti\ et i1 m~engageait a. rechercher a tout prix la paix. Ce noble coriseil a pour moi la plus· grande valeur et jen'epar- gneraiaucun effort en vue de mettre en appli- ,cation ce haut prmcipe, .quand bien meme, malheureusement, 'certains de ceux qui. ont 'ete les disciples 1es plus proches du Mahatm.a,etles plus ardents, pa,rletaient de b!oct1~, d'agression, de violence. "Both the peoples of India and Pakistan have already undergone great hardship and privation. In the face of these events, any narrow-minded outlook or aggressive tendency could never be forgiven. "I would like to assure the Indian Union that our efforts will be fuU}· concentrated on main- taining law and order along the borders, and we are ever ready to offer and seek co-operation. I would also like to make it clear that it is not our objective to enter into any alliance with outside Powers directed against the Indian Union. I would once again appeal to the Union authorities to remove all suspicion and build up an atmos- phere of mutual confidence and friendship." That is the man who is alleged to have imposed his will upon a reluctant Nizam, and to have kept him from accession. "Reference to arbitration, moreover, coulcl be "Le recours a. l'arbitrage ne pourrait d\.1 reste regarded, as a practical solution, only if the constituer une solution pratique que si le Gou- Hyderabad, Government ,were agreeable,',to taking vernement de Haiderabad envisageait de prendre cenainsteps immediately which could be regarded immediatement certaines "mesures qui puissent as a genuine token of that Government's desire to vraiment demC!ntrer que ce, Gouvemement desire maintain cordial and friendly' re!ationswith the eutretenir avec le Gouvernement de' rInde des Government of India." relations cordiales et anllcales!' Then they set aut the steps which they think' La lettre enonc;ait ensuite les mesures que le "are necessary ,as.s,uch tokens. That amounts to I Gouvernement de l'Inde considerait comme' ne.., practically runningthe Government ofHyderabad c~ssaires pour qu'une telle demonlltration soit for themselves and giving that GovernIllent,orders' faite : c'etait, en realite,'vouloir prendre,en mains and directions.as to how it should arrange its' le Gouvernement de Haiderabad, en donnant ace internal affairs. Gouvernement des ordres et des dir~ctives relati- vement a. la conduite des affaires interieures du. pays. But'the point is •this :,here was this Agreement, concluded, on 29 November 1947. It" provided that, if there ,'were any differences with regard to interpretation or implementation, those differ.. ences were to be settle(iby arIJitration. Differences are alleged on both sides. , TIle Nizam's Govern- ment says: "All right, let ~usresolve theIllby ,...arbitration in' accordance with the agreement." Void done comment se posait la question :un accord llvait ete 'conclu le 29, novembre 1947. ,Cet accord prevoyait que, si des, diverg-ences se , produisaient quant a l'interpretatio~ OU l'execu- tion. 1'0n aurait recours a l'arbitrage. Chacune des deux parties av~_i4.geclare,que desdivergenc~s ,•• '" existaient., Le, Gouvernement du Nizam a dlt-~~ alors: t<Tresbien, soumettDn~a l'a~bitrage legcd Now, let me cite one or two instances with regard to the economic blockade. There is a telegram dated 18 May 1948 from the Secretary to the Nizam's Government, Ex':' temal Affairs Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of States, which reads as follows: "One hundred and forty wagons of salt booked to Hyderabad have been stopped by railway authorities at Manmad under orders of Bombay police. Apart from the fact that this is an in- fringement of the Standstill Agreement, salt is a commodity most essential for maintenance of life of community. Kindly take necessary action to remove restrictions and let me have a tele- graphic reply." "Cent quarante wagons de sel a destination de Haiderabad ont ete retenus a. Manmad par les autorites ferroviaires, sur l'ordre de la police de Bombay. Cette mesure a ete prise en violation de l'Accord de stat1{ quo. D'autre part. le sel est un produit absQlument essentiel ala vie de la popu- lation. Veuillez, je vous prie, faire le necessaire pour lever ces restrictions et me donner votre reponse par telegramme." . Suit la mention des ordres, decrets, .etc., pris a l'occasion de cette mesure. C'est la un simple exemple de cas (I'U des expeditions ont ete arretees. En realite, la liste des produits dont l'entree en Haiderabad a ete empechee comprend, ainsi que le Nizam l'a declare, des medicaments, des p~o­ duits necessaires a la vie et surtout le chlore, utilise pour purifier l'eau. Par suite du manque de ce produit, le cholera s'est declare en Hai- derabad. "Dans une lettre du 23 mai au Premier Ministre de Haiderabad 'au Premier Ministre de l'Inde, it est fait de nouveau allusion a cette question dans les termes suivants: "Le paragraphe 4,·'de votre lettre specifie: "Etant donne que les .points en litige sont deja. tres nombreux, i1 est clair que la procedure d'arbi- trage risquerait. d'absorbet, tout .cequi reste de la p:;riode d'tin an pendant -laq~elle l'.A;cco~d .doit rester en vigueur~et qU'on, dtsposera~r7aU1s1 de trop,peu de. temps pour mettre en application la sentence arbitrale. Le re~ours a l'arbitrage ne pourraitdu reste constituer une solution pratique que si le C:rauvernement de Haiderabad envisageait de prendre immediatement certaines mesures qui puisscntvraiment de1l1ontrer que ce Gouvemement desire entretenir avec le Gouvememetit de l'Inde des relations cordiales et amicales." Le Gouver- riement du Nizama, des le debut, ·,faittous les efforts et tente de taus les moyens pour. aplanir, par des negociations'et echa!!ge, •~e'vues ".ami- caux, les. divergencesexistat:tt~s. 11 a, dans:,J.1ne large mesure, reussi a combler le fbsse, auX. conferences., qui ont encore eti 'lieu entre la dele- gation de Haiderabad et le Gouverneurgeneral, les 2et 4 mars, 1948. Mais,alors q1j.'ila pris tOlltes les dispositionsconvenues aces confe- rences, le Gouvernement duNizam doit,a son grand regret, constater que le Gouvemement de l'Inde n'a, lui, ",pris aucune mesure e:rI' vue de l'application de l'Acc9rdou, de l'execu- tion des promessesprecises 'faites par ses repre;. santants, les 2 et 4 mars. Dans ces circonstances, il apparait all Gouvernement du Nizam qu'il, Then the actual orders and decrees, and so on, are quoted. This is just one example of what was being stopped. As a matter of fact, the list of the other commodities which were stopped from entering,Hyderabad included, as the Nizam has said, medicines and stores, the ordinary necessities of life, but most of all, chlorine, which is 'used for the purification of water. As a result of this privation, cholera broke out in Hyderabad. " In a letter of 23 May from the Prime Minister of Hyderabad to the Prime Minister of India, this matter is again referred to, and he says: , "In paragraph4 of the letter it is stated that, 'considering the large number of points on which differences have already emerged, it is clear that arbitration on these points would take up all that remains c)f the Period of one year for which the Agreement is to run, lea"<!ing little sC,ope for the implementation of the award of the arbitra- tors. Reference to arbitration,moreover,cbuld be regarded as a practical solution'only if the' Hyderabad Government were agreeable to taking certain steps immediately which could be regarded as a genuine token of, the Government's desire to maintain cordial ahdfriendlyrelations with the Government of India: The Nizam's Govern- ment have, 'from the very' outset~ used all their efforts and endeavours to resolve differences by negotiation and friendly interchange of views. They, succeeded, in bridging ·the ',gulf .to a large extent at the conferences held between the Hy- derabad delegation, and the Governor~General as late as2 and 4 March 1948. But while the Nizam's 9<>vernment'havetaken all the steps 'agreed upon tntI:e Conferences, it isa matter of. great dis- appomtmentto them that the Government of India have,nobtaken any steps whatever tf,lwards the implementation of the Agreetnent or of the specific promises made by the representatives of the Government of India on 2 and 4 March. In these circumstances it, appeared- to' the Nizam's b.,.GO•.•v.e.rnm.,,_en_t__th_at no other way was left but to Towards the end of this long letter, he sums up the position as foUt"Ws: "1 shall now sum up my principal points: ttl. Hyderabad earnestly desires to niaintain the most friendly and cordial relations with the Indian Union. . "2. Hyderabad has been anxious to settle poi~ts of difference by friendly negotiations but, failing that, Hyderabad must demand arbitration as provided for in the Standstill Agreement. "3. Th~ problem of the Ra?akars cannot be co~sidered in isolation but can be dealt with saHs,factorily as'~ p~rt ofa general security s~ttle-. ment." 'r.{le :j?C!zq~(Jrs a.lle th,e volunt;;try organization wl1i~4 tl1e, Governmept ef lndia had asked to be·di~sqlved Rnd Qisb~nQed. t:4. ~yq~rablld is pr~p~req ~o. enter in~o a r~PPlQcral arr~gewent with India for. the .re.,. s~r~jqing of 'pr9P'~ganda ag~iqst either Govern~ m~d. jfl!2U.g:1} ·I.'ress,t1J,diQ anQQther Ille~ill- of P.H."St'"~' , 11;1 c-onolusion he expresses the hope that every- thing will 1;,e amicably settled. l'.{l~ :rtmSIPE]iT (t1it;lns{atgd from Fren~Jt,):· I~v~ew of the lateness of thehol.1r, I should like tq aslf the t:eprese~tativ~"9f.Pakistan how. much ~~ tlCE sJil1 ne~ds to cowpMehisstatement. ,Sin ¥9h~Jl1mea ,Z~F~ULl:..t\ir·:KI14tl (Pakistan): 'I.'h~v~ ~JPlos.t' cOt}cluded the·factual presentation. Extra~s ~~9.P1.~bout, six O1O.1"e· documents remain ~q ~.e ~it~Q. A£t~r the facts hjwe been brought toAh~ ~o~i.~eof t1W Security Council, my. con.:: clq~~~g,J:~li..I!1i$siQn Wou.ld take ahQut as much tiP.!e?s, i.\t"'9~ ,i.n ()p~J;!ing; the ~caeebefore I cited '~~.,gQ~u.~~t~, Jp. t9t~l, it would ce~tainJy'be over' .,a!1'4cmr, f Q1' which .1.beg. the indulgence of the S:e~rity Oou*H,'1;lefor;e laould conclude. It 11:iig}itpossiply be an hour and a half. I sh;;tll try lui-~eme que ledit arbitrage est demande. Le Gouvernenient du Nizam ne peut se rallier a l'idee que le Gouvernement de l'Inde subordonne racceptation de l'arbitrage a l'engage~eQt de Haiderabad ,de prendre des mesures,. queUes qu'elIes soient, desirees par le Gouvernement qj.l l'lnde. Une telle attitude n'est pas conforme a~ termes de l'Accord, Accord que Haider~bad est desireux de respecter en sa totalite." Vel's la fin de cette longue lettre, le Premier Ministre resume la situation commesuit: "Je vais maintenant resumer mes principales remarques: "1. Haiderabad. desire sincerement maintenir ies rell1tions les plus amicales et les plus cordiales av~c rUnion indienne. "2. Haiderabad souhaite ardemment regler tou- tes les divergences par des negociations amicales mais, si cela se revelait impossible,. Haiderabad se verrait oblige de demander l'arbitrage, tel qu'il est prevu dans l'Acc;ord de statu quo. "3. ,Le probleme des Rasakars ne peut etre examine 'isolement, mais peut etre regIe d'un~ fa~on satisfaisante dans 1.Ul accord general de securite." . Les Razakars sont 1'0rganisation de vo1ont;Fres dont le Gouvernement de l'lnde avaitdeman~~ la dissolution. . - - '~ N. II~ide1"abadest dispos~ a conc1ure aveG l'Inde un ~rrangement engageant reciproqllem~nt le.sde~ parties a restreindre·. toutecamp~gpe c~ntre l'autre partie, par la presse, la,.radio (.Ill par ~ciut alltre moyen de· publidte." En conclusion, .leMinistre exprime l'espoil' que tout sera regIe de falion amicale.· . , . LePRtsIDENT: Etarit donne. l'hettre avancec, j e.demandeau representant dti Pakistan de.coni- bien' de temps il a enC'.orebesoinpour completer son expose. ' Sir Mohammed ZAFRULLAHKhan. (Pakistan) (traduit .de .i'angIitis) ~ ren ai pl'esque. termine avec la presentation.des faits. I1 :me teste encore it citet des C:8:traits d'environ six documents. Mon expose final; apres' que lesfaits auront eteportes. a laconnaissance ..du .Conseil, prendra environ autant de temps qu'il m'en a fallu pour presenter l'affaire avant de citer les documents. Au total, faurais ·it demander au Conseil de securite de . tn'accotder plus. d'une heure pour me germettre. de conclure. It se peut que ce soit une heute et demie. Je m'efforcerai. de condenser mon expose le plus possible. Je me rends compte queles. Le PRESIDENT: Je sais que les differents mem- bres du Conseil n'ont la possibilite de sieger ni demain ni lundi. Le representant du Pakistan accepte-t-il de reprendre'SOn expose mardi apres- midi?

I know that the members of the Council will he unable to meet either tomorrow or on Monday. Will the representative of Pakistan agree to continue his statement on Tuesday afternoon? Sir Mohammed ZAFRULLAH Khan (Pakistan) (traduit de l'anglais): En ce cas, peut-etre le Conseil ne verra-t-il pas d'inconvement - etant donne que je n'insiste pas pour qu'il se reunisse vendredi ou lundi - a poursuivre maintenant la discussion; je pourrais condenser davantage encore mon expose et terminer celui-ci d'ici une heure ou meme dap.s un temps moindre. Sir Mohammed ZAFRULLAH Khan (Pakistan): In that event, perhaps it would be convenient to the CCluncil-as I do not insist if the Council cannot meet on Friday or Monday-to continue now so that I could condense my statement still further and concluded it in the course of the next hour or less. .Le PRESIDENT: Y a-t-il quelques observations a. propos de cette suggestion?

Are there any comments on this suggestion? M. TSIANG (Chine) (traduit de l'anglais): ,Je ne vois pas pourquoi le Conseil ne pourrai~ pas se r~unir demain apres-midi afin de permettre au representant du Pakistan de terminer son expose. Apres cela nous pourrions nous ajourner pour permettre aux membres du Conseil de lire les declarations dans le compte rendu et de re£lechir a la question. Le Conseil pourrait~alors se reunir de nouveau niardi. Mr. TSIANG (China) : I do not know why the Council could not meet tomorrow afternoon in order to enable the r~presentative of Pakistan to finish his statement. After that, we could. adjourn to enable the members of the Council to read the statements in the record and think over the problem. The Council could then meet again on Tuesday. . M. GUTIERREZ (Cuba) (traduit de l'espagnol) : Cette reunion a lieu. immediatement apres la doture de la session de l'Assemblee generale, dont les dernieres seances se sont prolongees jusqu'a. deux ou trois heures du matin, nous astreignant aun travail intense. 11 me semble que l'etat de fatigue dans lequel nous nous. trouvons n'est pas propice a la lucidite et a la serenite qu'exige l'examen de l'importante question que nous devqns aborder; la delegation de Cuba croit qu'il serait preferable de differer l'examen de la question jusqu'a la seance de mardi prochain. En ce qui me concerne,. jene me sens pas en excellente sante et je ne serai peut-etre pas' a. meme d'assistera. une seance demain. Mr. GUTIERREZ (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): We have met immediately after the end of the General Assembly, in the closing days of which'we had to work extremely hard, with meetings lasting until two and three in the morning. I do not think this state of fatigue is the best one in which to achieve the clarity of mind and the calmness witli which the very important matter under consideration should be treated, and the Cuban delegation considers it would be more appropriate to postpone this item until next Tuesday's meeting. Personally, I do not feel in the best of health ~nd should probably not be able to attend a meet· mg tomorrow. Sir Mohammed ZAFRULLAH Khan (Fakistan) (traduit de l'anglais) : Etant donneles paroles que viertt de prop.oncer le representant de Cuba, je .ne suggererai meme pas que le Conseil de securite continue a sieger maintenant,ou tienne une autre seance a quelque mom.ent que ce soit avant mardi, si ce jour est le jourle plus proche qui convienne au Conseil. En consequence, je serai pret a terminer mon expose devant le Conseil, le mardi 24 mai. Sir Mohammed ZAFRULLAH Khan (Pakistan) : In view of the words of the representative of Cuba. I would not even suggest that the Security ~o~nci1 might be pleased either to continue the slttmg hoW or that a further m.eeting should. be held any earlier than Tuesday, if that is the earliest day which is convenient to the Council. I shall therefore be ready to conclude my statement to the Council on Tuesday, 24 May. Le PRESIDENT: le suispersuade que les membres ,du Conseil appreci~ront la courtoisie du representant du Pakistan.

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