S/PV.433 Security Council

Before assuming the duties of President of the Security Council, I should like to thank my predecessor, the representative of the Ukrainian SSR and that country's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Manuilsky, who presided during .July, for the energetic and skilled way in which he conducted our meetings.· Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist' Republic) .(translated from Russian): Thank you, Mr. President. . 3. AdQption of the agenda 4. The Palestme qnesnon

; The Security. Council has before it the'report ,of" QUATRE CENT TRENTE·TROISIEME . SEAi~CE Tenue a Lake Success, New-York, le fcltdi 4 aout 1949, a10 h. 30. . President: M. S. TSARA,PKINE (Union des Republiques socialistcs sovi6tiques) Present: Les representants des pays suivants: Argentine, Canada, Chine, Cuba, Egypte, France, Norvege, Republique socialiste sovietique d'Ukraine, Union des Republique!! soCialistes sovietiques, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. 1. Ordre du jour provisoire (SjAgenda 433) . 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour. 2. La question palestinienne: a) Lettre adressee le 21· juillet 1949 au.Secretaire·general par le Mediateur par interim des Nations Unies:p,01.1t' laPalestin~oPQgr lui transmettre un rapport sui l'etat aduel des negociations d'armistice et de la treve en Palestine {S/1357). 2. Allocution dn President Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe) : Au moment· ou .je vaisassumer les fonctions de President du Conseil de securite, je voudrais remerder mon predecesseur, M. Manouilsky, representant de la Republique socialiste sovietique d'Ukraineet Ministre des affaires etrangeres de ce pays, de la fa<;on energique et habile dont i1 a dirige les debats du Conseil durant le mois de. juiUet. M. MANOUILSKY (Republique socialiste sovietique d'Ukraine) ( traduit du nvsse) :Je remercie le President de ses varoles: . 3. Adol-vtion de l'ord~e du jour 4. La question palestiJUenne Le .PRESIDENT (traduit flu russe) ; Le Conseil de securire est saisi .du rapport presente par . .

The President of the Security Council has received a letter from the permanent representative of the State of Israel to the United Nation'3, Mr. Eban. This letter dated 28 July 1949 appears in document S/1360 and has been circulated to members of the Security Council. In it M~. Eban requc~ts fl,=rmission to take part in the discussion of t 1 e questions on the Security Council's agenda for today. As representative of the 'UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REpUBLICS, I support this request from the .representative of the State of Israel. If there are no furtllf'l:' observations on the matter, as President of the Security Council, .1 shall invite Mr. Eban to take a seat at the CounCIl table.. j Mr.CHAUVEL (France) (translated from French) : This discussion opens in most auspiciops circumstances, for the Council· is to'-day called upon to note the success of one of the activities of the United Nations, the accomplishment of a par- ticularly difficult . an~· strenuous task ~vhich directly affected the exIstence and the secunty of individuals and nations and consequently the security of the world. The result achieved is very important in itself. No less important, because of the consequences, it will have in the near or distant future is the ef- fectiveness shown by the United Nations itself, in spite of the numerous obstacles which were encountered.. No doubt the existence of the Uni- ted Nations is not in itself enough to make everything right with the world all at once; but the a'{ample we have before us· shows clearly that some things, and not the ·least important ones either, would go extremely badly if the Uni- ted Nations did not exist. We must, I· feel, acknowledge the efforts to- wards understanding and agreement made by the parties concerned in reaching t.his settlement. But we cannot pass over in silence the decisive part played by the United Nations Acting Med~­ ator on Palestine in the success of this enterprise. Mr. Bunche has already been praised for his wor]< in various places and on sundry oct:asions more eloquently than I could do it.Nevertheless I should, like to recall his personal courage, his devotion to his duty,his tireless toil, his common sense, his good faith, his good-will, all those very human qualities :which have enabled him to win the confidence of the people with whom hehad to deal and to have so much authority over them. Nous devons, me semble-t-il, reconnaitre l'effort de comprehension et d'entente accompli, dans le reglement intervenu, par les parties en cause. Mais nous ne pou,vons ignorer la part .decisive qui, dans le su,cces de cette entreprise, revient au Mediateur par interim des Nations Unies pour la Palestine. L'eloge deMo Bunche n'est plus a faire. Je veux dire qu'il a ete fait en divers lieux et en diverses circonstances par des .voL'{ .plus eloquentes que la mienne. Qu'il me soit permis cependant de rappeler son courage personnel, son deyouement asa tache, son labeur infatigable,' son bon sens, sa. bonne foi, sa bonne volonte, toutes ces qualites si.humaines qui lui ont vaIu de gagner la confiance de ses interlocuteurs et de prendre sur eux tant. d'ascendant. Now at thedose of a chapter hi a story, which Je youdrais aussi,en ce moment ou s'acbeve will of 'course continue, I should also like to call 'Uil chapitre d'une histoire qui, par ailleursJ va se to mind the memory. of the man who began the poursuivre, evoquer la memoire de celui qui l'a work. .Mr. Bunche's predecessor and former commence, du: predecesseur et. ancien chef. de chief, Count Folke Betnadotte, who fell in the M. Bunche, le comte Folke'Bernadotte,tombe en Le PRESID~NT (tradllit du russe): Le Presi- dent du Conseil de securite a rec;u de M. Eban, representant permanent d'Israel aupres de 1'Or- ganisatiorl des Nations Unies, ~ne lettre en date du 28 juillet 1949, qui figure au document S/1360 et qui a ete distribuee aux membres du Conseil de sc§curite. M. Eban demande 1'autorisation de participer a la discussion des questions qui figurent a 1'ordre du jour de 'cette seance du Conseil de securite. I En ma qualite de representant de 1'UNION DES, RET>UBLIQUES SOCIALISTES sovnhIQUES, j'appuie cette demande du representant d'Israel. Si personne n'a d'autre observation a presenter a ce sujet, j'inviterai, en tant que President, M. Eban aprend:-e place ala table du Conseil. u. Eban, representant d'Israel, prend place cl la table du Coitseil. M. CHAUVEL (France) : L'ciccasion du present debat est heureuse. Le Conseil est en dIet appele cl constater aujourd'hui le succes d'une action entreprise par 1'Organisation des Nations Unies, l'accomplissement d'une tache particulierement lourde et difficile, interessant directement 1'exis- tence et la securite de personnes et de peuples, et'par voie de cons~quence, la securite tout court. Le resultat obtenu est en lui-meme de la plus grande importance. Non moins importante dans ses consequences, proches ou lointaines, est 1'effi- c'acite, dont a' fait. preuve, malgre bien des obstacles, 1'Organisation des Nations Unies elle- meme. Certes, 1'existence de 1'Organisation ne suffit pas pour que, des maintenant, tout·aille bien dans le monde; mais, d'apres 1'exempleque nons a~ons devant nous, il apparait clairement que certaines choses, et non des moindres, iraient tout a fait mal si l'Qrganisation n'existait pas. o~ affairs? Two organs have been set up by the United Nations to deal simultaneously with two different aspects or a single question. One of those organs was personified 'hy he Mediator who had the assistance of a large '>L<l.ff. The other is the Conciliation Commission. The ]Y,[ediator's functions were defined by the Security Council's resolution of 15 July 1948 [S/902], which ordered the parties to desist from furthel; military action and provided for a truce. The Secretary-General was requested to provide the. Mediator with the necessary staff and facilities to enable him to carry out the Council's y,rishes. . . - The Council further decided in the resolutio'.l adopted on 16 November 1948 at its 381st me..:t- ing [5/1080] that an armistice should be con- cluded in all the sectors of Palestine and it called upon the parties concerned to negotiate agree- ments to, that end forthwith either directly or I through the Mediator. The function of the Commission, which was set up by General. Assembly resolutiQn 194 (Ill) dated 11 December 1948, is one of conciliation and mediation with a view to the establishment .of lasting peace in J'alestine. The armisticesrtflcently concluded create a legal situation which. takes the place of the truce imposed by the reso,lutionof 15 July 1948. At the same time t1).ey are in implementation of the Council's injuilctipn to the parties to desist from further military aCtion. , The agreements signed by the parties fulfil the Council's wishes asexpresseain the resolution I have just mentioned. Our objective is achieved and that is why the mission of the Mediator, who was instructed to seek that objective, has also come to an end. That is why Mr:Bunche can say that there is no longer any useful function for him to perform. ' In the conclusions of his report, the Acting Me9,iator raises the question of the prolongation 'of the truce' and of a renewal of the iniunctiop to desist from further military action. Daus les conclusions de son rapport, le MMia- teur par interim pose la question du. maintien. de la treve etceUe d'uil renouvellement de l'injonc- tion a renoncer· a toute action milit~ire. Le rapport de M. Buuche a fait l'objet d'un examen tres attentif de la part de la delegation franc;aise. Cet examen n'a fait naitre quant au fond, ni divergences de vues ni critiques. Je puis le dire en toute surete, ayant pris soin, pour eviter les erreurs d'interpretation, de remonter aux sources. Ce rapport a par contre fait appa- raitre la necessite, en cette matie-re si delicate, d'une grande c1arte et d'une grande precision de vues et d'intentions. Le Conseil est tout d'abord appele a prendre acte d'une situation. Quelle est cette situation? Deux organes des Nations Unies se sont trouvees chargees de traiter concurremment deux aspects differents d'un~ meme affaire. L'un de ces organes etait personnifie par le Mediateur, assiste de nombreux collaborateurs. L'autre est la Commis- sion de conciliation. Le champ d'action du Mediateur etait defini' par la resolution du Conseil de securite [5/9021 en date du 15 juillet 1948, qui ordonnait aux parties de renoncera toute action militaire et stipulait une treve. Le Secretaire gen#al etait requis de lui fournir le- personnel et les facilites necessaires p'our lui permettre de faire prevaloir les volontesdu .Conseil. . La resolution adoptee le 16 novembre 1948 [5/1080] lors de la 381eme seance du Coilseil decidai'i: en outre la conclusion d'ull armistice dans tous les secteurs de Palestine etinvitait les parties a rechercher immediatement un accord a cette fin soit directement, soitpar l'intermediaire du Mediateur. La Commission, issue de la resolution de l'As~ semblee generale 194 (Ill) en date du 11 decem- bre i948, est investie d'une tache de conciliation et de mediation tendant a l'etablissement en Palestine d'un etat permanent de paix. Les armistices recernment conclus creent un etat de droit qui se substitue a la treve imposee' par la resolution du 15 juillet 1948. Ils donnent en meme temps effet al'iIljonction du Consei! portant obligation pour les parties de renoncer a totite action militaire. Les accords signes par les. parties constituent l'accomplissement des volontes du Conseil, expri- meespar la :resolution precitee. L'objet poursuivi est atteint. C'est ell ce1a que la mission dtl Media- teUT. charge de poursuivre cet .objet, est achevee. C'est pourquoi M. Bunche peut dire qu'il ne hii reste plus aucune. tache utile aaccomplir. ~ by the United Nations' Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, but that simply rei:lects the situation at the time when the Agree- ments were drafted, a situation which logically ceases to exist by the fact that those Agreements hav~ been signed, unless the Council decides otherwise. I doubt whether the .Council, upon reflection, would·wish.to prolong the existence of the or- ganization which. was previously intended to help the Mediator carry out his mission, if we admit that. the mission itself is· now concluded. The organization would have to be given a new mission. What would that mission 'be? When the parties concerned have taken a step, which we hope is a decisive one, towflIds. regularizing the situation, does the Council· wish. to .retain, or rather to re-establish on a new basis, such a com- plicated supervisory organ? When, after so many efforts by the Mediator, the parties them- selves have finally consented to come to an agree- ment, would the Council insist on retaining machinery 'which WOUld; seem to imply that the irresponsible a.ctions of the past are still to be expected? .. . If that is not so, it will no doubt suffice for the CotinciI to ask the Commission to make any arrangements. with the •parties which may seem necessary to enable the Mixed Armistice Com- mission to function properly, and to request the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff, by recruitment from among those already on the spot or in any other way. Neverth~less, it would be logical forth~.C.oun:­ cH, while taki;1g note of the Agreements and dra.wing its··cdnclusions, to show the parties that it is still much concerned and is keeping a watch- ful eye on the situation. That is an easy matter. All that we need do is to keep the Palestine ques- tion on.our agenda. Those .are the comments. which the French delegation wishes to make on reading the Acting Si· tel n'estpoint le ellS, i! suffira sans doute que le Conseil engage la Commission a faire avec les parties les arrangements qui apparaitraient necessaires pour. assurer le·bon fonctionnement des commissions mixtes. d'armistice .etprie le. Secretaire general d'assurer, par preU~vementsur le personnel existant.sur place ou de touteautre mamere, lesconcours personnels qui se rev:ele- raient indispensables. Cependant, en prenant acte des accords inter- venus et en. eQ. tirant les. consequences, it·serait normal que le Conseil marque aux parties a la fois sa sollicitude et sa vigilance. Illui est aise de le faire. 11 lui 'suffit de maintenir a son ordre du jour la question palestinienne. Telles sont les observations que suggere a la I do nDt wish anyone to misunderstand the meaning of my statement. I repeat that I con- sider it important for the Council to have a clear' .idea about the following point before it takes any decision: does the Council consider that the truce it imposed should continue indefinitely side by side with the armistices and quite independently, or does it, on the other hand, consider that the annisi:ices replace the truce? In the first case, the Truce Supervision Or- ganization must itself continue to exist and the Question arises whether it should be linked to the Conciliation Commission. In the second case-and the French delegation for its part cbnsiders that there if; an important reason for choosing that solution~only those parts of the Truce Supervision Organization which are necessary to the organs 1>- ..Jvidea for in the Armistice Agreements should remain. The Conciliation Commission. would limit itself to making the necessary arrangements to' that end with the parties concerned. Mr. BUNCHE (Acting Mediator on Palestine) : I have very little to add in elaboration of the statements set forth in my report of _26 July 1949 to the Security Council contained in docu- ment Sj1357. I am fully at the disposal of the Security Council, however, for such additional information or views as its members may require of me, but I think that a few remarks in clarifi- cation of my report might prove useful at this stage. In sum11].ary, the crux of the present situation, as I see it, is as follows. The Security Council called for a truce in the fighting in Palestine and the parties complied. This truce was more thim a simple cease-fire, for it involved certain specific injunCtions as regards the importation of war materials and the introduction of fighting person- nel and men of military age. It also involved an elaborate system of United Nations truce super- vision. Subsequently, the Security Coundl called upon the parti~s to take a .further step towards peace in Palestine, the conclusion of armistice agreements in "the transition to 'perm2nent peace in Palestine", to use the language of the resolu- tion [Sj1080]. The parties have now fully complied with this request. It follows inescapably that the Security Council.truce resolution have been rendered ob- solete by the conclusion of the Armistice Agree- ments[S/1264, Sj1296, Sj1302/Rev.l and S/1353]. These resolutions continue in force, .=however, and they will remain in force until the Security Council takes appropriate action con- Dans le premier cas, l'appareil de controle de la treve doit.lui-meme subsister, et la question qui se pose est de savoir s'il y a lieu de rattacher cet appareil cl la Commission de conciliation. Dans le second cas - et la delegation fran- c;aise, pour sa part, voit une raison. serieuse de choisir cette solution - ne doit subsister de cet appareil que ce qui serait necessaire au fonction- nement des organisme.<> prevus par lel> conventions d'armistice; le role de la Commission de concilia- tion se bornerait cl faire avec lesparties le~ arrangements utiles a cet effet. M. BUNCHE (M.ediateur .par interim pour la Palestine) (traduitde fangla-is) : J'ai tres pen de chose cl ajouter pour commenter le:> declarations formulees dans mon rapport du Conseil en date -du 26 juillet 1949, qui figt~re au doctL.'llent 5'/1357. Cependant, je suis a. la complete disposition du Conseil de securite pour lui fournir tous ren- seignementscomplementaires ou avis que ses membres desireraient obtenir de mol. Mais je pense qu'il peut etre utile cl l'heure actuelle de presenter quelques observations precisant certains points de mon rapport. En bref, l'element essentiel, dans la situation actuelle telle que je la vois, est le suivant.· Le . Conseil de securite a demande qu'il soit apporte une treve auxcombats de Palestine et les parties se sont inclinees.Cette treve etait plus qu'un simple ordre de cesser le feu, car e1le compcrtait certaines prescriptions precises, en ce qui concerne l'importation de materiel de guerre et l'introduc- nori de personnel combattant et d'hommes en age de porter les armes. Elle entrainait egalemeht un systeme complexe de surveillance de la treve par les Nations Unies. Par la suite, le Conseil de securite a invite les parties cl faire un pas de plus vers l'efablissement de la paL"{. en Palestine: con..;. clure des conventions d'armistice afin "de faciliter le passage de la treve actue1le cl une paix per- manente en Palestine'~, pour employer les tennes memes de la resolution [Sj1080]. Les parties ont maintenant pleinement satisfait a. cette demande. I1 s'ensuit inevitableemnt que les resolutions du Conseilde securite relatives cl la treve ont ete rendues caduques par la conclusion des conventions d'armistice [S/1264, S/1296j Rev.l, S/1302/Rev.1, et S/1353l Toutefois,ces resolutions contiilUent cl rester en vigueur et le resteront tant que le Conseil de securite ne pren- Practically speaking, despite the Armistice Agreements, by the terms of the existing Security Council resolutions I am still obligated under the resolution of 15 July 1948 [Sj902] "to super- vise the observdclce of the truce and ... to deal with breaches" of the truce, again to use the language of the resolution. But I may confide in the Security Council that I have borne this re- sponsibility rather like a loose garment since the conclusion of the Armistice Agreements. In any event, the provisions of the Armistice Agree- ments, whkh are the product of voluntary ne- gotiations by the disputing parties, are stronger than the provisions of the truce-stronger by vir- tue of the fact that they are agreements volun- tarily arrived at. They carry the strongest pos- sible moral force, for they r~present voluntary agreement on the part of the disputants. The Armistice Agreements are not the final peace settlement, but the only possible interpre- tation of their very specific provisions is that they signal the end of the military phase of the Palestine situation. The objective now clearly should be to restore normal conditions of pea,e to the fullest possible extent. There can be little doubt that both sides desire to be freed from the many burdensome restrictions and interferences which were imposed under the truce. The entire heritage of restrictions which developed out of the undeclared war should be done away with. There. should be normal access, restrictions on importation and immigration should be elimi- nated, there should be free movement for legiti- mate shipping, and no vestiges of the wartime blockade should be allowed to remain as they ar~ inconsistent with both the letter and the spirit of the Armistice Agreements. In my opinion, great care should be taken to avoid any aCtion which would in any way weaken the force of the Armistice Agreements or tend to discredit them, or which would appear to ques- tion the good .faith of the parties signatory to them. In· the fourth paragraph of the memoran- dum which I have attached to my report as an annex, I suggest that the Security Council might indeed wish merely to reaffirm the simple cease- fire order set forth in its resolution of 15 July 1948. This suggestion is based on the assump- tion that despite the Armistice Agreements, the Security Council might wish to maintain its basic injunction against any fighting, pending the final peace settlement. As I interpret the Security Council's previous action in this matter, the basic approach has been an order against resort to mili- tary action. That is an unconditional cease-fire, the implementation of which was by means of a truce carrying specific terms· and obligations. Practically speaking, it would probably be the the implementation of which was by means of a reaffirmation of a simple cease-fire were incorpo- rated in a· new resolution by this Council, in the event of any renewed fighting in Palestine, the .matter would be quickly brought to the attention Fratiquement parlant, je suis tOlljours tenu, malgre les conventions d'armistice et en vertu de la resolution du Conseil de securite en date du 15 juUlet 1948 [Sj902J, de surveiller l'observa- tion de la· treve et "de trancher les cas de viola- tion", pour employer encore une fois les termes de la resolution. Mais je puis avouer au Conseil de securite que, depuis la conclusion des conven- tions d'armistice, cette responsabilite a ete plutot leg-ere a mes epaules. En tout cas, les dispositions des conventions d'armistice, qui sont le resultat de libres negociations entre les parties en conflit, ont plus de force que les stipulations de la trcve, en raison du fait que c'est librement que ces con- ventions mlt ete conclueso Elles comportent la force morale la plus grande possible, parce qu'eJles representent un accord condu volontaire- ment par les parties adverses. Les conventions d'armistice ne constituent pas un reglement pacifique definitif, mais la seule interpretation possible de leurs dispositions cxtremement precises est que ces conventIons marquent la fin de la phan: militaire du conflit en Palestine. I1 apparait clairement que le but a poursuivre maintenant devrait etre le retablisse- ment, dans la plus large mesure possible, de con- ditions normates de pabc. Il n'est pas douteux que des deux cotes les parties desirent etre liberees des nombreuses restrictions et interven- tions genantes qui leur ant ete ilnposees pendant la treve. Tout I'-ensemble des restrictions, rp.sultat de cette guerre non dedaree, devrait etre aboli. L'acces a ces regions devrait ctre normal; les restrictions a l'importation et a l'immigration devraient etre levees; la navigation reguliere devrait jouirde sa liberte de mouvement; tOllS les vestiges du blocusrie guerre devraient etre sup- primes, car ils.sont incompatibles non seulement avec la lettre mais encore avec l'espritdes conven- tions d'armistice. A mon avis, le plus grand soin devrait ctre apporte a eviter toute mesure de nature a dimi- nuer en quoi que ce soit la force des conventions d'armistice ou ales discrediter, ainsi que toute mesure semblant mettre en doute la bonne foi des signataires. Au quatrieme paragraphe du memorandum que j'ai joint en annexe a mon rapport, j'emets la. suggestion que le Conseil de securite pourrait mcme simplement desirer affirmer a nouveau l'ordre de cesser le feu con- tenu dans sa resolution du 15 juillet 1948. Cette suggestion repose sur l'hypothese que, malgre les conventions d'armistice, le ConseiI de securite desirerait maintenir sa prescription fondamen- tale, l'interdiction de combattre, en attendant le reglement pacifique definitif. Selon mon interpre- tation des decisions prises jusqu'a present par le Conseil de sectirite en la·matiere, son action fon- datnentale aete l'interdiction de tout recours auX mesures de caractere militaire, c'est-a-dire un cessez-Ie-feu sans' condition; dont l'application devait etre assuree au moyen d'une treve com- portant des conditions et des obligations precises. Pratiquement, qu'une disposition reaffinnant uil simple cessez-Ie-feu soit incorporee ou non dans une nouvelle resolution du Conseil, it est a pre- The suggestion is that only the injunction against resort to military action, that is to say, the cease-fire order in the 15 July resolution, should be reaffirmed and that the rest of the reso- lution should be !:onsiden'!d henceforthi as inap- plicable. In view or the Armistice Agreements, such an injunction is not indispensab1'e, but it would perhaps have the value of keeping the hand of the Security Council on the Palesth,e situation, pending itS definitive settlement--al~ though the representative of France has just sug- gested another way of doing that, -by keeping the item on the agenda. In view of the great influ- ence' on the progress towards a solution whir.h has thus far been exerted by this Council, I would consider it highly desil'able that the Coun- cil should pot prematurely detach itself complete- ly from the Palestine situation. Sub-paragraph 2 (c) of the Get).eral Assem- bly's resolution of 11 Dp.cember 1948 [194(111)] provides for the transfer to the Conciliation Commission of fundionE 'assigned to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine by resolutions of the Security Council. The resolution of 11 De- cember transferred to the Conciliation Commis- sion all the fUlictions previously assigned to the Mediator under General Assembly resolutions. Since .11 December, therefore, my functions as Acting Mediator have consisted of tri;1ce super- vision and armistice negotiations, both under Se- curity Council resolutions. Since the Armistice Agreements are concluded and since they render any continued truce ~upervision unnecessary, in my view there are in fact no functions remaining to me now, and therefore none to transfer to the Conciliation Commission. The truce supervision personnel has been drastically reduced; at the present time the Observer Corps consists of only thirty-five officers and thirty-four enlisted men. This number can still be reduced, since it is esti- mated that no more than thirty or forty observers at the outside need to be retained to a:ssist the parties, at their request, in the supervision of the terms of the fou!;, Armistice Agreements. This is United Nations assistance which the parties themselves request in the Armistice Agreements, and which the United Nations should of coun;e grant. It must, however, be emphasized that the parties themselves have devised their own agree- ments for joint supervision of the terms of the voluntary agreements, and the United Nations therefore has no general responsibility for the supervision of the Armistice Agreements. In other words, in conclusion, in response to urging by the Security Council, the disputing parties have made very great strides towards peace. The Armistice Agreements, all but one of which have now been in effect for several months, are proving very effective. There is cer- ,tail1ly no basis' whatsoever for questioning the good faith of the Parties to those Agreements' or En d'autres termes, et en conclusion, pressees. par le Conseil de securite, les pades au conflit ont franchi de grancls pas vers la paix. Les con...; ventions d'aimistice, qui sont toutes, sauf une, en vigueur depuis plusieurs mois, s'averent tres efficaces. It n'y a certainement aucune raison pour niettre en cloute la bonne foides parties a ces conventions ou leurs intentions futures en ce'

I think that the most suitable procedure for us to follow in considering the Acting Mediator's report would be to begin by addressing any questions we may have to Mr. Bunche. After he has replied, we might go on considering this report and e..'l:amining proposals on the substance. If there is no objection, we will follow this procedure. Has anybody any questions to ask the Acting Mediator in connexion with his report? If there are no questions we will proceed to consider the substance of Mr. Bunche's report. Does anyone wish to speak? Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt): I am not now going to ask all the questions which I might feel impelled to put to Mr. Bunche. At the moment, however, I should like to ask him a question about one point which, if my understanding is correct, has been mentioned by the representative of France: I am referring to the correlation between the Truce and the Armistice Agree<- ments. It seems to me that the representative of France was wondering whether the truce should be continued or discontinued under present circumstances and in spite of the Armistice Agreements. I should like some clarification from Mr. Bunche on this point, if possible. Mr. BUNCHE (Acting Mediator on Palestine) : I shall be happy to attempt to answer the question put by the representative of Egypt. The situation, as I see it, is that the Security Council imposed a truce which did· not envisage the end of the fighting but which, in its terms, merely provided that there w,?uld be no fighting. .It left the armies arrayed against each other. It was inde11nite in its duration, and it maintained a situation in which tension was inevitable. The Security Council then called on the parties to .tak;:: a step looking toward the liquidation of the military phase of . the conflict by the negotiation and conclusion of armistice agr.eements. The parties complied with that request, which was contained in the resolution of 16 November 1948 [Sjl080]. It seems to me that the conclusion of those Armistice Agreements, as I have indicated in my prepa:oed statement, renders completely obsolete and unnecessary the truce and the conditions of the truce. Indeed, there was an obligation on the Le PRESIDENT (tradllit du, russe) : A mon avis, la fa~on la plus logique de proceder a. l'examen du rapport presente par le Mediateur par interim serait que les membres du Conseil posent tout d'abord des questions a. M. Bunche, s'its le desirent. Lorsque celui-ci y aura repondu, le Conseil pourra passer a la discussion de son rapport et a. l'examen de ses propositions quant au fond. Si personne n'a d'objections a. elever, il sera pro.cede de cette maniere. Quelqu'un desire-t-il poser des questions au Mediateur par interim a. propos de son rapport? • Si personne ne desire poser de questions. le Conseil abordera la discussion du rapport de M. Bunche quant au fond. Y a-t-iI queIqu'un qui desire prendre la parole? Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypte) (traduit de l'anglais): Je ne vais pas poser maintenant a. M. Bunche toutes les questions que je pourrais eprouver le besoin de lui poser. Je desirerais, cependant, pour I'instant, le questionner sur un point qui, si je comprends bien, a ete mentionne par le representant de la France. I1 s'agit de la relation entre la treve et les conventions d'armistice. I1 m'a semble que le representanii de la France se demandait si, dans les circonstances actueIIes et malgre les conventions d'armistice, la treve se continuait DU non. M. Bunche pourrait-it nous donner quelques eclaircissements sur ce point? M. BUNCHE (Mediateur par interim pour la Palestine) (traduit de l'anglais): C'est avp.c piaisir que j'essayerai de repot;ldrea. la question posee par le representant de 'I'Egypte. A mes yeux, la situation est la suivante: le Conseil de securite a impose une treve qui prevoit, non pas la fin des hostiIites, mais simplement qu'iI n'y aura pas d'hostiIites. La treve laissait les armees l'une en face de l'autre en ordre de bataiIIe. Elle etait d'une duree indefinie et laissait subsister une situation comportant un etat de tension inevitable. Le Conseil de securite invita aIors les parties a prendre des mesures en vue del la liquid,ation de la phase miIitaire du conflit par la negociation et la conclusion de conventions d'armistice. Les parties acquU~sceret;lt a cette demande, qui se trouvait dans la resolution du 16 nocembre 1948. [Sj1080]. A mon avis, la conclusion de ces ~onventions d'armistice, comme je I'ai indique dans . ma declaration, rend la treve et ses, conditions absolument caduques et inutiIes. Il existe meme pour le ConseiI de securite l'dbIigation, qui me parait J'espere avoir apporte les ec1aircissements desires par le representant de l'Egypte. I hope that clarifies the point raised by the representative of Egypt. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypte) (traduit de fanglais): Je prends note de la reponse que vient de nous donner M. Bunche, de laquelle je retiens qu'il nous a declare, entre autres chases, estimer que les conventions d'armistice rendent cac\ucs - absolument eaducs, d'apres ses propres termes - la treve et son mecanisme, y compris les restrictions que ce1ui-ci imposait. Je suppose que· lorsque M. Bunche parle des restrictions imposees par la treve, ilentend celles qui furent imposees, par exemple, par les resolutions du Conseil de securite, telles que celles du 15 juillet 1948 [S/902], du 29 mai 1948 [5/801], ainsi que flar toute autre resolution relative it la treve et qui iinposait des restrictions. Je tiens a remercierM. Bunchepour sa reponse tres nette it ma question. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt): I wish to take note of the answer just given by Dr. Bunche, from which I understand that he told us, among other things, that he considers that the Armistice Agreements render obsolete-Completely obsolete, according to what he said-the truce and its machinery, including the restrictions. I take it that when he talks of the restrictions of the truce, Dr. Bunche means such resolutions of the Security Council as those of 15 July 1948 [Sj902], 29 May 1948 [S/801], or any other resolution connected with the truce and imposing restrictions. I wish to thank Dr. Bunche for the clear answer he has given to my question. Mr. EBAN (Israel) : The Government of Israel gave immediate and wholehearted support to the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 16 November 1948, calling for "negotiations ... with a view to the immediate establishment of the armistice". In proposing that resolution the representative of Canada called attention [380th meeting] to the need for a new impetus moving away irom the precarious balance of a military truce towards the procedures of pacific settlement. The Acting Mediator reminded the Security Council that the armed conflict had become M. EBAN (Israel) (traduit de l'anglais): Le Gouvernement d'Israel a donne un appui immMiat et s'incere a la resolution adoptee par le Conseil de securite le 16 novembre 1948 et qui invite les parties ades negociations "aux fins de condure· immediatement un armistice". En proposant cette resolution, le representant du Canada a appe1e l'attention [380ente seance] sur la necessite de donner une nouvelle impulsion afin de passerde l'equilibre precaire d'une treve militai:re aux procedures d'un reglement pacifique. Le Mediateur par interim a rappele au Conseil de securite que le conflit arme etait deventi absolument vain. Il poursuivait [380eme seance] : "Quels qu'aieht pu etre les objectifs des Arabes' en Palestine au printe1iI.J,psdernier, presque six mois ont passe et ces objectifs n'ont pas ete atteints. D'autre part, l'objectif des Juifs a ete de defendre le peuple et l'Etat d'Israel . . . I'Etat d'Israel est maintenant . . . une realite' solide- . ment etablie malgre une opposition (:oncertee. Cette opposition a done cesse d'avoir un but pratique si 1'0n considere les objectifs qu'elle s'etait primitivement assignes." A tout moment, la question fonda..-nentale dans le conflitpalestinien fut celle de l'existence et de la souverainete legitimes de l'Etat d'IsraeI. La ~tterly futile. He went on to say [380th meet- ~ng] : "Whatever might have 'been the objectives of Arab arms in Palestine last spring, almost six months· later these objectives have not been achieved, On the other hand, the objective of Jewish arms has been to defend their people and .. :. . State ... against attack. The State of Israel .. . is a strongly entrenched fact today, despite concerted opposition, and that opposition therefore, has ceased to have practical purpose in terms of its own stated original objective." At all times the fundamental issue in the Pal- ,estine conflict was the rightful existence and sovereignty of the State of Israel. The internation- , There was a note .)f imagination and faith in that call; for at no previous time during this savage and inveterate conflict extendhlg over three decades, had Arab representatives agreed to establish formal contact with Jewish representatives for the settlement of opposing claims. Sceptical voices were thprefore heard, casting doubt on the realism of making the prospects of a settlf"ment depend upon the chances of direct negotiation. Those sceptical voices became more insistent a few weeks later when the General Assembly too, by its resolution of 11 December, called for a political settlement to be attained not by authoritative intervention from outside but by negotiations leading to voluntary agreements. The responsibility for evolving a full settlement in two stages was thus placed squarely and irrevocably on the parties themselves. The report of the Acting Mediator now lies on the table. It is the record of triumph in a bold enterprise whichl the Security Council set afoot eight months ago. Only~in one major respect does the report conspicuously fail to describe the true origins of this success. My Government is a signatory to all four Agreements. It has been actively concerned in each episode of these "tortuous and difficult" negotiations. It therefore knows from most intimate experience how much the.successful outcome is due to the patience, thf!) tact, the skill, and the tenacious idealism of Mr. Bunche. These high qualities of mind and spirit, harnessed to the great cause of international co-operation, have brought auout an achievement of immeasurable benefit to the peoples of the Near East and of abiding value to the prestige of our Organization. As Mr Bun'che lays down his functions, the Government of Israel wishes publicly to convey to him its sentiment of profound appreciation and esteem. The highest reward of any such mission must lie in the consciousness of many human lives saved from slaughter and of international authority vindicated as the supreme deterrent to war. This merit, and with it the gratitude of peace-loving men in the Near East and everywhere, extends from Mr. Bunche to General Riley, Mr. Vigier and. other United Nations representatives who faithfully participated in this mission of peace. The draft resolution presented by Canada and Norway [Sj1362] pays eloquent tribute to the work of Count Bernadotte, out of whose mission and report the conc~pt of the armistice originally emerged. I1 y avait dans cet appel une certaine imagination et une certaine foi, car jamais jusque la, au cours du combat aauvage et acharne qui s'etait poursuivi pendant trente ans, les representants arabes n'avaient accepte d'entrer en relations officielleg avec les representants juifs en vue du reglement de leurs revendications opposees. Aussi des voix sceptiques se firent-elles entendre, qui jugeaient peu realiste de tabler sur les chances que pouvaient offrir des negociations directes pour un reglement de la question. Ces voix sceptiques se firent encore plus insistantes quelques semaines plus tard quand l'Assemblee generale, elle aussi, par sa resolution du 11 decembre, invita a un reglement politique de la question auquel on devait parvenir, non pas par une intervention autoritaire de l'exterieur, mais par des negociations menees en vue d'aboutir a des accords librement conc1us. Ainsi etait nettement et irrevocablement placee sur les parties eIles-memes la responsibilite d'elaborer un reglement complet en deux etapes. Le rapport du Mediateur par interim est maintenant devant nous. I1 enregistre le triomphe remporte en une entreprise audacieuse lancee par le Conseil de securite voici huit mois. Sur un seul point, de grande importance, le rapport omet - et cela est manifeste - d'indiquer it quoi il faut attribuer en realite ce succes. Mon Gouvernement est signataire des quatre conventtons. I1 a pris une part active it chacune des phases de ces negociations "bngues et difficiles". Son experience lui a donc montre directement combien 1'0n doit cet heureux resultat it la patience, au tact, it l'habilete et it l'idealisme tenace de M. Bundle. Sa haute valeur spirituelle et intellectuelle, mise au service de la noble cause d-= la cooperation internationale, a permis d'obtenir un resultat d'un prix inestimable pour les peuples du P ...oche-Orient et qui sera d'un effet durable pour le prestige de notre Organisation. Au moment ou M. Bunche abandonne ses fonctions, le Gouvernement d'Israel tient a lui exprimer publiquement ses sentiments d'estime profonde et de vive appreciation. Pour toute mission de ce genre la plus grande recompense ne peut resider que dans la conscience d'avoir sauve du massacre de nombreuses vies humaines et d'avoir prouve que l'autorite internaionale avait le pouvoir supreme d'empecher la guerre. Ce tnerite, ainsi que la gratitude des hommes epris de paix dans le Proche-Orient comme dans le monde entier, reviennent egale..nent au general Riley, a M. Vigier et aux autres representants de 1'0rganisatioll des Nations Unies qui ol1t loyalement participe a cette mission de paix. Le projet de resolution presente par le Canada et la Norvege [Sj1362] rend un :lOmtrl.age eloquent al'ceuvre du comte Bernadotte; c'est de sa mission et de son rapport que vint l'idee premiere d'un armistice. .... Parmi ces principes, la lec;on que M. Bunche tire de l'experience de ran passe est d'une importance absolument primordiale. I1 ecrit [S/13571 : Paramount amongst these principles and absolutely over-riding in its importance is, the lesson which Mr. Bunche deduces from the experience of this. past year. He wrote [Sj1357]: "Les negociations qui ont permis d'aboutir a Ces accords ont ete, dans chaque cas, longues et difficiles. Mais eUes prouvent que, lorqu'il a ete possible d'amener les parties a negocier, e1les ont pu, avec 1'assistance de 1'0rganisation des Nations Unies, arriver a un accord raisonnable et honorable." "Lorsqu'il a ete possible d'amener les parties a negocier." La conclusion qu'il convient de tirer ici est que la procedure des contacts directs est d'un effet decjsif sur le resultat final. On ne peut arriver a un accord sans etablir de contacts. Par des contacts, on ne peut guere arriver a autre chose qu'un accord. I1 est extremement significatif qu'Israel et un Etat arabe ne se soient jamais rencontres pour negocier sans aboutir finalement a. un accord forme!. Ayant reconnu la verite de ces principes primordiaux, le groupe auquel avait He confie le soin de la mediation s'est montre infatigable dans ses efforts pour rapprocher les parties. I1 n'a impose a celles-ci aucune doctrine personnelle. I1 n'a formule aUCUD: jugement. Un accord ne peut etre impose de 1'exterieur; il ne peut venir que des parties en cause. Aussi est-il d'un heureux augure que la directive de l'Assembtee generale cOllfol'mementa laqueUe l'effort de conciliation se poursuit maintel13.nt souligne surtout, eUe aussi, la necessite d'atl'iver a un accord sur les questions pendantespar voie de negociations, pour lesquelles on peut avoir recours aux services de la Commission de conciliation. "The negotiations leading to the Agreements were in each case tortuous and difficult. But they demonstrate that once the parties could be brought together they could, with United Nations assistance, be led to reasonable and honourable agreement." "Once the parties could be brought together." The conclusion here is that the procedure of direct contact has a decisive effect on the final result. You cannot get agreement without contact. With contact you can hardly get anything except agreement. It is immensely significant that Israel and an Arab State have never met in negotiation without ending up in formal accord. The mediation organization, having seized this central truth, was indefatigable in bringing the parties together. It imposed no doctrine of its own. It passed no judgments. Agreement cannot be imposed from without; it can only emerge from within. It is thus a happy augury that the General Assembly directive under which the conciliation effort now proceeds also lays its main emphasis on the need to reach agreement on outstanding questions by negotiation in which the services of the Conciliation Commission are available. The fact that these negotiations were tltortuous and difficult" is also of great significance; it is a. warning against premature despair or recourse to short cuts. In each of these negotia- 'tions there were moments of imminent breakdown and a strong temptation to admit failure. bP ., .. Le fait que ces .negociations aient ete"longues et difficiles" est egalement tres signifi<;atif; cela montre qu'il ne faut pas ceder a un decouragement premature, ni vouIoir aller au plus court. Au cours de chacune de ces negociations, il y eut d~s moments ou leur rupture paraissait imminente et One of the factors contributing to the succesS of these negotiations was thl;l. procedure of bilateral meetings. Since Israel was in contact with each Arab State individually, it was possible to relate the agenda to specific and practical issues affecting the interests of two parties and two alone. Thus the complications of inter-State relations were kept down to the minimum. The conditions affecting Israel's relationship with the Arab· States are obviously not identical in each case or uniform for the area as a whole; geographical and political differences were important ~n respect to the armistice, as they must be in respect to the final territorial settlement. So. much for the procedures and principles Tels sont la procedure et les principes qui ont which have led this venture to success. The conduit cette entreprise au succes. Le Conseil de texts of the Armistice Agreements lie before the securite .est saisi des textes des conventions d'ar- Security Council. They deserve a brief comment, mistice. Elles meritent un bref commentaire, since they now regulate the. precise relationship puisque maintenant ~lles reglent cl'une maniere of Israel with all the neighbouring States, and precise les rapports d'IsraeI avec tous les Etats thus constitute a provisional settlement which can voisins, constituant ainsi un reglement provisoire only be replaced by a peace agreement. It is a que seul pourra remplacer un accord de paix. matter of considerable satisfaction to my Govern- C'est, pour mon Gouvernement, une source de ment to find: its essential relations with its four vive satisfaction de voir que ses relations essencontiguous neighbours resting at this moment tie1les avec ses quatre voisins im.'liediats reposent upon foundations of mutual consent. On every maintenant sur le consentement mutuel. Pour inch of ground where the authority of the Israeli chaque pouce de terrain sur lequel le Gouverne- Government is effective,we have at this moment ment d'Israel exerce effectivement son autorite, the agreement of the Arab State concerned and nous avonsactuellement l'acord de I'Etat arabe of the Security Council, under the aegis of which interesse ainsi que du .Conseil, de securite, sous these agreements were reached. l'egide duquel ces conventions ont eteconclues. The Armistice Agreements, though provisional, En depit de .1eur cara~tere provisoire, les conhave elements of stability which therefore offer ventions d'armistice presentent des elements de a sound basis for the transition to permanent stabilite et offrent, de ce fait, une base saine pour peace. Mr.. ~l1nche points out that they were le passage it. l'etat de paix permanente. M. Bunche negotiated at governmental level and thus involve fait remarquer qu~elles ont ete negociees au plan the highest considerations of political good faith. gouvernemental, aussi faut-il les considerer Moreover, a pattern of normal andi orderly life comme empreintes d'une extrem:e bonne foi po!itihas spontaneously grown out of these agreeque. Par aiUeurs, un ordre de vie normal et ments. Civilians as well as soldiers are vitally regulier s'est spontanement etab!i a la suite de affected by .them. The. armistice lines do 1l0t ces conventions, quiaffectent de fa<;on vitale aussi merely separate armed forces. They mark the bien l'element civil que l'element militaire de la clearly .defined areas of full civil jurisdiction. population. _Les !ignes de demarcation fixees par The Government, the courts, the legislatures, the l'armistice ne font pas seulement que separer les security authorities of each respective State operforces armees. Elles determinent les regions ate smoothly and unchallenged up to the appro-. clairement definies de pleine. juridiction civile. l.e priate armistice line. These! lines.thus have tlie Gouvernement, les tribunaux, les corps legislatifs, normal characteristics of provisional frontiers les services de surete de chacundes Etats respecuntil such time as a new process of negotiation t1£s ~fonctionnent sans heurts ni protes.tattons a and agreement determines the final territorial l'interieur de leurs lignes de demarcation. Ces settlement. They are also stabilized by the muttlal .lignes offrent done les caracteristiques,normales,. L'un des facteurs qui ont contribue au succes de ces negociations fut la procedure des reunions bilaterales, Israel ayant ere en contact avec chacun des Etats arabes separement, 11 fut possible de faire porter l'ordre du jour sur des questions precises et pratiques interessant les deux parties, et elles seules. Ainsi, les complications des relations entre Etats furent reduites au minimum. Les conditions dont dependent les rapports d'Israel avec les Etats arabes ne sont evidemment pas identiques en chaque cas, ni un1£ormes dans l'ensemble de la region; les differences d'ordre geographique et politique apparurent importantes lors de la conclusion de l'armistice, comme elles l'apparaitront lors du reglement territorial definitif. The condjtions in which the dispositions of these Agreements may be changed are set out in articles XII of the Israeli-Egyptian and Israeli-Hashemite Agreeme:nts, and in articles VIII of the Syrian and Lebanese Agreements. In each Agreement the relevant article reads: . "This Agreement, having been negotiated and conduded in pursuance of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948 calling for establishment of an armistice in order to eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition from the pr~sent truce to permanent peace in Palestine, shall remain in force until a peaceful settlement between the parties is achieved, except as provided in paragraph 3 of this Ar~icle." . Paragraph 3 makes provision for revisions "by mutual consent" or eventual recourse to the Security Council after a year. The effective position, therefore, is that these Agreements have no time limit and can be altered only by agreed amendments or terminated by a peace settlement to be concluded between the parties. It becomes evident, therefore, that further progress toward final peace can only be made by maintaining and developing the procedures of contact and negotiation used in the Armistice Agreements. The General Assembly's resolution is quite logical in envisaging the peace settlement as an extension of the scope of the armistice negotiations; and the Conciliation Commission has the same powers in relation to the peace talks as the Mediator had in respect of the armistice negotiations. The Armistice Agreements are not peace treaties. They do not prejudice the final territorial settlements. On the other hand, . the provisional· settlement established by the Armistice Agreements is unchangeable until a new process of negotiation and agreement has been successfully consummated·. Israel has repeatedly announced its readiness for this new process of negotiation. While we should be prepared to negotiate the transition from armistice to peace at any time, hhers are hesitant or if other problems such as that of .. refugees appear for the moment mqre urgent, we shall take our stand for as long as necessary on the precise and meticulous observance of the Agreements already reached. These Agreements not only regulate the day-to-day relations of Israel with the neighboring Arab States ; they also contain what Mr. Bunche in his report describes as "a non-aggression pact". . My Government, for its part, supports the Mediator's conclusion tha't the military phase of this problem has beellterminated. We go further . and say that the military phase should never have regun. We should, however, prefer to contem- ~ Israel will observe each of these A~reements and every part and section thereof. It will maintain them scrupulously in every respect until a new agreement is reached. Israel has no ambitions with respect to the four Arab signatories, except to establish relations of neighbourliness and regional fraternity with them all. Under these Agreements, Israel holds nothing and occupies nothing which has ever belonged to or been awarded to any of the four signatories. Thus, all the objective conditions exist for a lasting and deepening accord to be reached after a new process of successful conciliation. To the attainment of that accord, my Government will address its most strenuous efforts at all times. The conciliation effort at Lausanne is beginning to show substantial progress-partly, I hope, under the influence of certain proposals and procedures recently put forward by the Israeli delegation. Nevertheless, ill: must be recorded .that no direct Arab-Israeli meetings have yet taken. place, a,nd experience proves that a prolonged period of such direct contact may be a necessary prelude to eventual agreement. It would therefore be prudent to assume that the Armistice Agreements may be for some substantial time determining factors in Arab-Israeli relations and in the everyday. life of the Near Eastern region. In these circumstance.;;, it is necessary for the Security Council and the signatory Governments to take an steps required for the precise and exact observance of these Agreements. The results already achieved and the spirit of conciliation now generated. must be zealously conserved. It is in that spirit that I turn to a few specific issues which arise at this stage. My Government fully supports Mr. Bunche's conclusion that the truce period has been left behii1d and that the first phase of the transition to peace has been successfully accomplished. It is therefore inevitable that many of the arrangements associated with the supervision of the truce must now be superseded. The observation machinery has, in any case, been progressively reduced, 'and it is logical now to arrange for its complete liquidation. The United Nations. will then be represented in the Near- East only by the officers serving as chairmen of the Mixed Armistice Commissions established in each Agreement by the voluntary act and invitation of the signatory Governments. In a sense, therefore, the Security Council terminates its period of active control. This does not mean, however, that the influence of the Secarity Council has ceased to be a factor of consequence in the maintenance atl.d further development of peace. I apply this reflection especially to the question .Cette consideration s'applique specialementala of arms supplies. If the Security Council were question des fournitures d'armes. Si le c.:onseil d... Israel respectera chacune de ces conventions dans toutes ses parties et dans tous ses paragraphes. Il les observera scrupuleusement a. tous egards, jtisqu'cl la signature de nouveaux accords. IsratH n'a pas, cl l'egard des quatre Etats arabes signataires, d'autre ambition que d'etablir avec eux des relations de bon voisinage et de fraternite regionaIe. Aux termes de ces conventions, Israel ne detient rien, n'occupe den qui ait jamais appartenu ou qui ait janiais ete attribue cl aucun des quatre signataires. Ainsi, toutes les conditions necessaires sont reunies pour permettre la conclusion d'un accord durable et profond, apres une nouvelle procedure de conciliation couronnee de succes. A realiser cet accord mon Gouvernement CQnsacrera en t<;>ttt temps ses efforts les plus acharnes. L'effort de conciliation fait a. Lausanne commence cl faire apparaitre des progres sensibles, en partie, je l'espere, sous l'influence de certaines propositions et procedures recemment suggerees par la delegation d'Israel. Neanmoins it faut nc.er qu'aucun contact direct entre Arabes et Israeliens n'a encore eu lieu, et l'experience prouve qu'une periode prolongee de contact directs de ce genre semble etre le prelude necessaire d'un accord final. Il serait donc prudent de St'pposer que les conventions d'armistice pourront, pour un temps assez long, etre les facteurs qui determineront les relations entre Arabes et Israeliens et dans la vie quotidienne du Proche-Orient. Dans ces conditions, il est necessaire que le Conseil de securite et les Gouvernements signataires prennent toutes les meSures requises pour I'observance precise et exacte de ces conventions. Les resuItats deja acquis et I'esprit de conciliation qui est ne maintenant doivent etre preserves avec un soin jaloux. C'est daus cet esprit que j'aborde a present quelques-uns des problemes precis qui se posent a. ce stade. Mon Gouvernement appuie entierement la conclusion de M. Bunche selon laq~elle la periode c;le treve appartient au passe et la premiere etape de transition vers la paix a He franchie avec succes. Il est inevitable, par consequent, que nombre des dispositions liees a la surveillance de la treve doivent maintenant etre remplacees. L'organisme d'observation a ete progressivement reduit, d'ailleurs, et il est logique maintenant de prendre des mesures pour sa liquidation complete. Les Nations Unies ne seront alol's representees dans le Proche- Orient que, par les fonctionnaires qui font office de presidents des commissions mixtes d'anl1istice instituees dans chacune des conventions par un acte volontaire et sur l'invitation des Gouvernements signataires. En un certain sens, par consequent, la periode de controle actif du Conseil desecurite se termine. Cela ne signifie pas, cependant, que l'influence Clu COllseil de securite ait cesse d'etre un facteul' important dans le maintien et le developpement ulterieul' de la paix. ... ~ounced an ambitious plan of rearmament. Iraq and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan have treaty connexions with the United Kingdom, which, unless the Security Council will decide otherwise, would involve the immediate renewal of heavy arms supplies to those countries. It is not difficult to imagine what Israel's attitude must be in the event that its neighbours would embark on large-scale rearmament. Many Members of the United Nations, although protected by the provisions of the Charter, nevertheless show deep concern for the state of their defences. Such concern is all the more natural and understandable on the part of a State which has recently been the vidtim of a .concerted attack by each of its neighbours and which has not yet managed to establish stable and normal relations with any of them. These considerations added to the tone of certain propaganda impose a clear duty upon the Government of Israel, in the name of the very survival of the State. Israel cannot allow itself.to be overtaken. It cannot in any circumstances suffer itself to reach a state of military inferiority'which might be a temptation to renewed assault. Its very obligation to contribute to the stability of the Near East imposes upon it the duty of preparedness. ~dmettre d'etre place dans un etat d'inferiorite militaire qui pourrait etre une tentation de renouveler l'assaut. L'engagement meme qu'it a pris de contribuer a la stabilite du Proche-Orient lui impose le devoir d'etre pret. It est done clair, que, si les restrictions imposees par .le Conseil de. securite sont entierement levees et si le rearmement a grande echelle devient la politique des Etats arabes, le Proche-Orient va etre le theatre d'une course aux armements. Nous nous demandons si la'paix recemment conquise est deja assez stable etassez forte pour pouvoir aisement survivre a la tension d'une telle competition. Le Conseil de securite doit 'prendre la responsabilite de repondre a cette question. Quant a flOUS, nous n'hesitons pas a dire que la prudence la plus elementaire:exige le maintien de la politiqUe actuelle du Conseil de securite en matiere d'armes..Parce que nousconsiderons les conven- . tions d'armistice comme un resultat hautement remar<;]uableet important, nous demandons instamment qu'on agisse avec. une extreme prudence , pour les maintenir. . Clearly, then, if the restrahts imposed by the Security Council are entirely lifted and largescale rearmament becomes the policy of the Arab States, the Near East must become the scene of an armaments race. We ask ourselves whether the newly won peace is already so stable and so firm as to easily survive the strains of that competition. The Security Council must takel the responsirility of answering that question. For our part, we have no hesitation in saying that the mast elementary prudence requires the maintenance o~ the Security Council's present arms policy. It is because we regard the Armistice Agreements as a highly notable and significant achievement that we urge the utmost caution on pehalf of their· preservation. In urging the clear expression of the Security Council's mature judgment, my -delegation is conscious that this policy also conforms wi.th the general welfare of the Near East. Vie do not prqfess to understand how, if}- the existing social and economic conditions of that area, any Government can voluntarily wish ,to apply the greater part of its resources to the purchase of lethal weapons. The stability. of democratic institutions throughout that region can be assured not by competition in the purchase of arms but by co-operation in the tasks of social and econo,.. inic development. This is the general doctrine which Isra,el upholds with respect to tP,e needs of its regional environment. If the acquisition of arms is to be the main pursuit of all Governments in this area, then in all questions arising between Israel and the Arah States the security consideration is bound to _assume undue weight. In these circumstances we feel that there is nothing to be lost and much to be gained by calling upon Member States to maintain the existing policy of the Security Council with respect to the supply of arms. On the other hand, it is clear that certain restrictions which arose out of a situation of actual war are now' no longer appropriate in the new circumstances. The Armistice Agreements call upon the Governments concerned to aJ:>stain from any "war-like or hostile act". It is selfevident that acts of armed force are clearly precluded; but it would seem equally obvious that artificial restrictions upon legitimate commerce and shipping should now be abandoned, for it would be difficult to -prove that to deprive a neighbouring State of essential commodities .which it obtarns .legitimately from abroad is not an "act of hostility". Therefore, it has been useful to hear the Acting Mediator's authoritative view fhat the present situation would justify the abandonment of acts of interception .and blockade which, in so far as they had any legal basis, rested upon the assumption of official hostilities. I believe that this authoritative approach, if heeded by,both parties,'should·solve many vexatious problems, indudWg the practice of seizing cargoes of civilian commodities passing through §uez on their way to Israeli ports. The first of the Armistice Agreements under discussion was signed early in March, and the second' a morfth later. The practice of the ensuing weeks has proved that. the machinery set up .for the implementation of these Agreements iseffedive for that purpose, and· thatt a sincere desire to ensure their success is generally appar:' enton all sides. . En insistant' pour que le Conseil de securite exprime c1airement son jugement reflechi, ma delegation a conscience que cette politique est egalement conforme a. l'interet general du Proche- Orient. Nous ne pouvons pas arriver a. comprendre comment, dans les conditions sociales et economiques actuelles de cette region, un gouvernement peut desirer volontairement consacrer la plus grande partie de ses ressources a. l'achat d'armes meurtrieres. La stabilite des institutions democratiques dans toute cette region sera assuree, non pas par la concurrence dans l'achat des armes, mais par la cooperation dans les reuvres de progres social et economique. Telle est la doctrine generale que soutient Israel, en ce qui conceme les besoins de toute la region environnante. Si l'acquisition d'amles doit etre le but principal de tous les Gouvernements dans cette region, alors, a. propos de tous les problemes qui pourront se poser entre Israel et les Etats arabes, les considerati()ns de securite prendront obligatoirement une importance excessive. Dans ces conditions, DOUS estimons qu'il n'y a rien a. perdre, qu'il y a au contraire beaucoup a. gagner, en irivita.nt les Etats Membres a. ma,intenir la politique actuelle du ConsdI de securite en matiere de foumiture d'armes. D'un autre cote, it est evident que certaines restrictions, qui trouvaient leur raison d'etre dans une situation de guerre effective, ne conviennent plus maintenant, dans les circonstances nouvelles. Les conventions d'armistice invitent les Gouvernements interesses a s'abstenir de tout "acte de nature belliqueuse ou acte d'hostilite". I1 va de soi que l'action des forces armees est ainsi nettement exclue; mais il semblerait egalement evident que les restrictions artificielles imposees a. ·la navigation et au commerce reguliers devraient maintenant etre levees, car il serait difficile de prouver que priver un etat voisin de produits esseritiels qU'il a acquis de l'etranger d'une maniere reguliere ne constitue pas un "acte d'hostilite". I1 est bon, par consequent, que nous ayons entendu l'opinion autorisee dti Mediateur par interim, suivant laquelle la situation presente justifierait l'abandon d'actes d'interception et de blocus qui, pour autant qu'ils aient eu quelque base legale, reposaient sur l'hypothese .d'hostilites ouvertes. Je pense que .cette opinion autorisee, si eUe etait acceptee par les deux parties, permettrait de resoudre blen des problemes delicats, y.compris la pratique de la ' saisie de cargaisons de marchandises a..usage civil, passant par le Canal de Suez, en route vel'S les ports d'Israel. . La premiere des conventions d'armistice dont it s'agit a ete signeeau debut de mars, et la seconde un mois plus tarn. L'experience des semaines suivantes a prouve que le mecanisme organise pour l'application de ces conventions repond a. son objet et que toutes les parties font preuve d'un desir sincered'assurer leur succes. T~lis agreement covers, amongst other things, the situation in Jerusalem. Under its provisions the city has been restored to the full dignity of normal daily life; Article VIII records the agreement in principle arrived at between the two Governments at Rhodes with respect to the free movement of traffic on.vital roads,'including the Bethlehem and Latrun-Jerusalem roads; the resumption of the norm:;ll functioning of the cultural and humanitarian institutions on Mount Scopus and free access thereto; free access to the Holy Places and cultural institutions and the use of the cemetery on the Mount of Olives; and the resumption of other vital services in the interests of Arabs and Jews alike. A special committee was appointed, composed entirely of representatives ~f the two Governments, which was called upon by the Agreement to formulate the precise plans and arrangements whereby these objectives could be secured. The Government of Israel has announced its willingness to work in the Special Committee for the carrying out of these provisions, or if quicker action could .be secured thereby, to. transfer .jurisdiction with respect to this article to the Mixed Armistice Commission on which the United Nations is represented, in addition to the two Parties. At the moment, however, no 'progress h;lS been achieved. The Hashemite Government remains unwilling to· discuss the requisite plans and arrangements. This.is not a question of detail. It derives great significance from the special nature Of the places involved. The activities that centre around Mount Scopus and the Mount of Olives have an importance that extends far beyond the local environment.' To prevent the Hebrew University and the Hadassah Medical Center from resuming their operations is, at one blow, to depreciate the entire level of intellectual and medical activity in the Near East. It does not make the position any better to reflect that the refusal to operate the provisions of article VIII also impairs access to Holy Places and the water supply of the entire city. The United Nationshas a special responsibility here, for. Mount Scopus is a demilitarized area under United Nations control; we suggest that it does not befit the dignity of the United Nations to be in occupation of the chief centres of higher learning and health in the city, and sllnultaneously to watch their neglect and ruin. . In other cases where' demilitarized zones have been placed provisionally under United Nations supervision, it has at least been laid down that b Civilian activities .~houl,d be restored. Such a ~onsidered in the peace negotiations. But while the area is under this special regime, it seems to us. that the principles of the armistice itself require special efforts to secure the operation of these institutions and the restimption of access imd public utilities as defined in artide VIII of the armistice agreement. It would, •I'submit, be ~i1structive to have the Acting Mediator's opinion on whether, it is satisfactory for the United Nations to be maintaining this zone on Mount Scopus without the resumption of norm[., civilian activities therein. A settlement of this one question would complete the record of full, absolute and precise compliance with every single pr?vision of eacli of the Armistice Agreements. .... The Security Coumiil may ju~tly record the four-fold armistice as a milestone in its efforts to ,eontribute to the pacification of the Near East. Th~ ,methods .andprinciples· followed in this . enterprise may be significant not only for the future conciliation effort between Israel and the Arab States; but also as a general guide to the United Natl. ,us in its task of pacific settlemep.t under the Charter. For the moral of Mr. Bunche'sreport doe"" not concern Israel and the Ar,aJ:> States alone. If a dispute so deep-seated and passionate can· yet respond to the. process of· conciliation. and be terminated, by mutual agreement, surely there can be few issues of international ~onflict that will not· respond to the same process. , All who have helped to achieve this result have i thus deepened the confidence which the United Nations.inspires in the peoples of the world and have exalted the credit of international institutions. . The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I have been informed that the French delegation has agreed to forgo the F,'rench interpretation of Mr. Eban's statement so as to save time. If the French delegation does not. insist on interpretapon, we can proceed with our.discussion. Mr. CHAUVEL (France) (translated from French): On the contrary, the French delegation. is' awaiting with great interest the interpretation, of Mr. Eban's speech. It would obviously have been simpler to have had simultaneous inter:- pretationas usual, but since that has not been provided, my delegation wo~ld like to .hear the interpretation. 0,. The PRESIDENT '. (translated from RU$sian): . 1n that case, will you, please prOceed. to the French, interpretation. . Atthis.Pointth,e interpretation.into French lIf ' the Israeli representative\~ remarks 'l!Jas given. "The PRESI!>Jf~Tettr~nslated from Russian): I . :have, fonr'more names on my list of speakers: the ' ..representative of the United Kingdotn; the Act- I ~ission dereglement' pacifique que leur confie la Charte. Car la morale du rapport de M. Bunche ne concerne pas seulement Israel et les Etats arabes. Si un differend aussi profond et passionne peut cependant se preter it la procedure de con,. ciliation et prendre fin par un accord mutuel, il y aura surement peu de cas de conflit international qui ne puissent se preter it la meme procedure. Tous ceux qui ont contribue a obtenir Ce resultat ont ainsi renforce la confiance QUe les Nations tJni~s inspir~t:lt apx peuples dumonde et ont ·rehausse le'prestige des institutIons internationales.· . Le PRESIDENT (traduit dte rllsse) : On rn'avise que la delegation de la France consent a renoncer ,a I'interpretation en fram;ais du discours de M. Eban, ceciafin de gagner du temps. S'ilen est bien ainsi, le' Conseil peut poursuivre imrllediate'" ment la discussion. - M. CHAUVEL (France) : Au contraire, la dele,. gation franc;aise attend avec beaucoup d'interet l'interpretation de l'intervention de M. Eban. I1 eut .ete.evidemment plus simple d'avoir ,une interpretation simultanee, conformement it I'usage; cependant~ comme cela n'a. pasete le cas, il serait agreable it ma delegation que l'on proceclafal;interpretation. · ,Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe) : Dans ce cas, it ya etre procecle a l'interpretation en ftanc;ais. Il est alors p'/ocede al'interpreta-tion en fratt- (;ais 4~disct):u/rs dw representant. d'Israel. Le.PRESJ;bENT·Ctmdui£ldu ;~sse') ~ Il y a encore qllatre., orate.urs in.,.scrits, a. ~ay.oir:le repr~se'!t~.n ·du Royaume-Unt,' le Medtateur par ,mtentn • till'I.. ilSdUl!QCBil1 I I HI. FOUR HUNDRED AND THIRTY· FOURTH MEETING· QUATRE CENT TRENTE.QUATRIEME SEANCE Tenue aLake Success, New-Yc-rk, le jeudi 4 aout 1949, a15 heures. Held at Lakf' Success, New York, on Thursday, 4 August 1949, at 3 p.m. President: M. S.. TSARAPRINE (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) Presents.: Les representants des pays suivants: Argentine, Cariaaa, Chine, Cuba, Egypte, France. Norvege, Republique socialiste sovietique d'Ukraine, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. P:~'sident: Mr. S. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) Present: The representatives of the following countries: Argentina, Canada, China, Cuba, Egypt, France, Norway, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Repu'blics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. 5. La question palestinienne (suite) 5. The Palestine question (continued) At t-he invitation of the President, Mr. Bunche United Nations Acting Mediator on Pale~tine, and Mr. Eban, representat-i'U'e of Israel, took their seats at the Council table. Sur l'invitation duPresident, M. Bunche, Me- idiateur par interim des Nations Unies pour lIa Palestine, et M~ Eban, Representant d'Israel, prennent place ala table du C;onseil.

I have just received a letter from the representative of Svria [S/1363], asking to be allowed to take part in the discussion. The representative of the Secretariat will read the letter. Le PRESIDENT (tradllit du russe) : Je viens de recevoir du representant de la Syrieune lettre [S/1363] dans laquelle il demande l'autcirisation de prendre part a la discussion.·Le representant du Secretariat va en donner lecture. M. ZINCHENKO (Secretaire generale· adjoint charge des affaires .du Conseil de securite) (trOiduit. de l'anglais) : Void le"texte de la lettre de la . delegation syrienne: "Au nom du Gouvernement de la Republique syrienne, j'ai l'honneur de vous prier dem'autoriser a participer sans droit de vote aux deba* . du Conseil de securite sur le rapport du Mediateur par interim pour la Palestine, conformement a l'Article 31 de la Charte etaux artides 37 et 38 du reglement interieur provisoire du Cbnseil de ,secllrite. . "le saisis cetteoccasl0n de. vous renouveler l'a!'3urance de ma ha-ute consideration." Mr. ZINCHENKO (Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Security O:>Uncil Affairs): The letter from the Syrian delegation reads as follows: "On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Syria, I have the honour to request you to permit me to participate without vote in the discussions of the Security Council in connexion with the report of the Acting Mediator on Palestine, which is in accordance with Article 31 of the Charter and of rules 37 and 38 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council. "I avail myself of this opportunity to express to you the a.ssurance of my high consideration." (Signed) Rafik ASHA (Signe) Rafik ASHA , Le PRESIDENT (traduitdtt russe) : Y a-t-il des membres du Conseil <',.ui desirent presenter des observations? Si personne n'a d'observation a presenter, il sera fait droit ala demande durepresentant de la Syrie.

Have the members of the Security Council any observations to make? If there are none, the Syrian representative's request will be granted. Sur l'inviation du President,. M. Rafik Asha~ ;representant de la Syrie, prend place ala tabU du Conseil.

Thetext of the Syrian representative's letter will be circulated. shortly·.by the Secretariat to all members of the Security Council. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Le texte de la lettre adressee par le representant de la .Syrie sera distribue incessamment a tous les membres du Conseil par les soins du·Secretariat., We shall resume the discussion of the Acting Mediator's report on the Palestine question. . I Nous poursuivons maintenant la discussion dtt rapport du Mediateur par interitnsur la question palestinienne. FRANCE Editions A. Pedone 13, rue Soumot PARIS, Ve GREECE-GRECE "Eleftheroudakis" Lihrairie internationale Place de la Constitution ATID:NES GUATEMALA Jose Gouhaud Gouhaud & Cia. Ltda. Sucesor 5a Av. Sur No. 6 y 9a C. P. GUATEMALA HAITI Max BoucheIeau Lihrairie "A la Caravelle" Boite postale 111-B PORT-AU-PRINCE ICELAND-!SLANDE Bokaverzlun Sigfusar Eymundsonnar Austurstreti 18 REYKJAVIK INDIA-INDE Oxford Book & Stationery Company Scinma House NEW-DELHI IRAN Bongahe Piaderow' 731 Shah Avenue TEHERAN IRAQ-IRAK Mackenzie & Mackenzie The Bookshop BAGHDAD LEBANON-LlBAN Lihrairie .universelle BEYRCUTH LUXEMBOURG Lihrairie J.Schummer Place Guillaume LUXEMBOURG F~. Topic Narodnl Trida 9 PRAHA 1 DENMARK-DANEMARK Einar Munksgaard Nplrregade6 Kf/lBENHAVN DOMINICAN REPUBLlC~­ REPUBUQUE .DOMINICAINE Libreria Dominicana CalleMercedes No. 49 Apartado656 CIUDAD·1'RUJILLO ECUADOR-EQUATEUR Muiioz Hermanos y Cia. Nueve de Octuhre 703 Casilla 10-24 GUAYAQUIL NETHERLAND5-PAYS·BAS N. V. Martinus Nijhoff Lange Voorhout 9 'S·GRAVENHAGE NEW ZEALAND- NOUVELLE-ZELANDE Gordon & Gotch, Ltd. Waring Taylor Street WELLINGTON Unitt>d Nations AssociatioD. of New Zealand P. O. 1011, G.P.O. WELLINGTON NICARAGUA Ramiro Ramirez V. Agencia de Puhlicaciones MANAGUA. D. N. EGYPT-EGY~n Lihrairie "L~ Renaissance d'Egypte'~ 9 Sh. Adly Pasha CAffiO &THIOPIA-ETHIOPIE Agence ethiopienne de puhlicite P.O.Box8 ADDIS-ABEBA NORWAY-NORVEGE Johan Grundt Tanum Forlag Kr. Augustgt. 7A OSLO PHILlPPIN§:S D. P. Perez Co. 132 Riverside SAN JUAN, RIZAL \. POLAND-POLOGNE Spotdzielna Wydawnicza "Czytelnik" 38 Poznanska WARSZAWA SWEDEN-SUEDE A.-B. C. E. Fritzes Kungl. Hofhokhandel Fredsgatan 2 STOCKHOLM SWITZERLAND~SUISSE Lihrairie Payot S. A. LAUSANNE, GENEVE. VEVEY, MONTREUX, NEUCHATEL, BERNE, BASEL Hans Raunhardt Kirchgasse 17 ZURICH I SYRIA~SYRIE Librauie universelle DAMAS TURKEv.-TURQUIE Lihrairie IIachette 469 Istillal Caddesi BEYOGLU-IsTANBUL UNION OF SOl .TH AFRiCA..... UNION SUD·AF~~CAINE . Central News Agency .. Commissioner & Rissik Sts.. JOHANNESBURG .and at CAPE'1'O and· DlJ'1mAN UNITED KINGDOM- ROYAUMfi·UNI H. M. Stationery Office P. O. Box 569 LOr.DON, S.E. 1 and at RM.S.O. Shops in LONDON, EDINBuRGH, MANe .. CAlIDIFF, BELFAST, BmMINGHA. and ~RISTOL •..~-. ", UNITED"STATESOFAMElRICA ETATS·UNIS D'AMERIQUE International Documents Sem Colllmbia University Press 2960 Broadway NEW XQRK 27, N. Y. URUGUAY Oflcina de Representaci6n. de Editoriales . Av. 18 de Julio 1333 Esc. 1 MONTEVIDEO VENEZUELA EscritorfaPerez Machado Conde a Pifiango 11 CARACAS YUGOSLAVIA-YOUGOSLAVI .Drzavn() Preduzece Jugoslovenska Knjiga Moskovska Ul. 36 BEOGRAD