S/PV.446 Security Council

Mr impression was that when a speech was being delivered in Russian one heard the French on the earphones and the English by cons~cutive interpretation afterwards. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): I was able to 1 _ar the English right along.

,That was npt the intention. General McNAUGHTON (Canada): Since the interpretation is also bei.ng given in English, it is a great convenience for us to receive it in English while the speech is being delivered. It helps us very: much to follow it. The PRESIDENT: I did not know that it could be done. - General McNAUGHTON (Canada) : It was done yesterday and I found it to be of great convenience.

Unless I heRr any objection, I assume that the Council would wish to continue our practice of yesterday. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America): If we follow yesterday's practice, that would mean having double interpretation into English. I prefer a single interpretation into English. Mr. MUNOZ (Argentina): As a compromise, can we not have simultaneous interpretation for the general debate only, so that the long speeches are not repeated consecutively? I think that might be a compromise. Then we would revert to the procedure we adopted yesterday.

Yes, if that is desired. My only objective was to gain a little time by not having two consecutive interpretations of any one speech, which is what we achieved yesterday. Then, as regards the general debate, which will proceed if the agenda is adopted, I take it that the Council wishes to continue yesterday's. practice. M. AUSTIN (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (tradtlit de l'cmglais): Pourquoi traduire deux fois en anglais les discours prononces en russe? J'ai constate hier que, apres avoir entendu par les ecouteurs une premiere interpretation des.discours il a faUu que j'en entende ensuite une seconde. J'estime qu'une seuie interpretation en anglais nous suffirait et que ce devrait etre une interpretation simultanee. Le PRisIDENT(traduit de l'anglais) : Je pensais que, lorsqu'un discours etait prononce en russe, nous entendions l'interpretation simultanee en franc;ais, puis l'interpretation consecutive en anglais. M. AUSTIN (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais) : J'ai pu entendre hier l'interpretation simultanee en anglais. Le PRESIDENT (traauit de l'anglais): Ceci n'etait pas prevu. Le general McNAUGH'l'ON (Canada) (traduit de l'(Jng1ais) : L'interpretation en anglais etantde regIe, c'est tres commode de l'avoir en meme temps que le. discours lui-meme. Cela nous aide beaucoup a suivre ce discours. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : J'ignorais que ce ffrt possible. Le general McNAUGHTON (Canada) (tradttit de l'ang1ais) : C'est la maniere dont on a procede hier et j'ai constate qu'elle etait extremement commode. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Si personne ne s'y oppose, je considererai que le Conseil desire que 1'0n continue de proceder de la meme . rpaniere qu'hier. M. AUSTIN (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de ['anglais) : Si nous suivons la meme methode qu'hier, il y aura eJ,eux interpretations en langue anglaise; je pre£erer~is qu'il n'y en ait qu'une. M. MUNOZ (Argentine) (traduit de l'anglai~): Ne pourrait-on adopter une solution intermedi.aire et ne recourir a l'interpretation simultanee que pendant la discussion generale afin que les longl1es interventions ne soient pas repetees en interpr~ta­ tlon consecutive? Ceci pourrait etre une solutIOn de compromis. Nous reviendrions ensuite a la methode adoptee hier. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Cela est possible si le Conseil le desire. Je cherchais seu1~' ment agagner un peu de temps en evitant d'av~ir deux interpretations consecutives de chaque diScour's et nous y avons reussi; en fait, hier. ,le crois doric comprendre que pour la dis~ussi0n generale qui va. s'ouvrir apres l'adoption de l'ordre. du jour, le Conseil desiresuivre la methode adoptee hier.

Would that be agreeable to the Security Council? Mr. CHAUVEL (France) (traitSlated from French): I do not quite understand how that system wotud work out.

The representative of Argentina has proposed that for the general discussion -t.~at is, the opening discussion of the itemthere should be simultaneous interpretation only, with no consecutive interpretation. Mr. CHAUVEL (France) (translated from French) : I think we had better keep to the system we used yesterday, which proved quite satisfactory. .

Then Ithin.l<: if one member of the Council wishes to continue yest~rday's procedure, perhaps we ought to do that. It does save a little time. 3. Adoption of the agenda 4. Letter dated 29 July 1949 from the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission to the President of the Security Council (8/1377) Le PRESIDENT .(tradttit de l'anglais): Les membres du Conseil de securite se souviendront qu'a la [445em,e] seance, heir apres-midi, le repre- sentant du Canada a presente un projet de reso- lution qu'il avait fait distribuer que1ques jours auparavant. Ce projet figure dans le document S/1386. 11 est mis en discussion maintenant. .. Si pers'Jnne ne demande la parole. jevais mettre aux voix le projet de resolution du Canada.

The members of the Security Council will rememuer that at our [445th] meeting of yesterday afternoon, the representative of Canada presented a draft resolution which he ~ad circulated some days berore. It, is to be found In document S/1386. That document is now under discussion. If there 'are no speakers, I must put the Canadian draft resolution to the vote. Mr.MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Soc~alist Republic) (translated from Russian): I am aware that there were different points of view on !he question of atomic energy in the Commission; 1t would therefore seem desirable to -hear an exp1an~tionfrom those who support the Canadian reso1utlOn. That would enable us to take part in the debate.

I should like to hear the views Le PRESIDENT (traduit de ['ang1ais) : J'invite of any members of the Councii who wish to sup-1es membresdu Conseil qui desirent appuyer le port t~e draft resolution presented by the repre... projet de resolution du Canada a exposer leut' ~entatIve of Canada. What that draft resolution maniere de voir. Ce projet de resolution nous proposes isa fairly simple procedure, and I should propose d'adopter uneprocedure relativement not have thought that it required any very elaborsimple et je ne crois pasqu'il soit. necessairede ate statements in its sUIlport. . Therefore, . I faire des exposes tres detailIes en sa faveur. Nous ~hou1d.have thought there would be no difficulty I·. devrions....d.. o.nc, semble-t-il, pouvoir sans difficulte. ~tng t: a,:~~te·~ponit now. nous prononcer a son .egard maintenant,.' . Le PRESIPENT (traduit de ['anglais): Le Conseil accepte-t-il cette proposition? M. CHAUVEL (France): Je ne comprends pas. tres bien ce que ce systbne donnerait. Le PREf:IDENT (traduit de ['anglais): Le representant de l'Argentine a propose que, pendant la discussion generale - c'est-a-dire pendant le premier echange de vues auque1 donnera lieu le point inscrit al'ordre du jour --1'on ait recours a l'interpretation simultanee et qu'il n'y ait pas d'interpretation consecutive. M. CHAUvEL (France): Je crois qu'ii vf,.ut mieux s'en tenir au systeme adopte hier, leque1 a denne toute satisfaction. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de ['ang1ais): Si t~n membre du Conseil desire que fon continue de proceder comme hier, peut-etre devrions-nvus le faire. I1 est incontestable que cette rnethode fait gagner un peu de temps. 3. Adoption de l'ordre du jour 4. Lettre, en date du 29 juillet 1949, adressee all President du Conseii de secmite par le President de la Commission de l'energie atomique (8/1377) M. MANUILSKY (Republique socialiste sovie.,. tique. d'Ukraine). (tmduit du russe): Je~ais que des opinions divergentes se sont manifestees, au sein de la· Commission, sur la question de 1'energie atomique; aussi me semble-t."il indique 'lue ceuxqui soutiennent leprojet de resolution du Canada prennent la parole pour expliquer leilr attitude, apres quoi il nous serait possible <;le prendre part au debat. \ Any unprejudiced person can be only non- plussed and deceived by the reso~utions submit- ted to the Security Council by the majority of the Atomic Energy Commission. It is simply astounding that the representatives of the Anglo-American bloc, disregarding the peoples' will to peace, should have dared to pro- duce two documents on the all-important question of world peace and security-the Chiuese and United States resolutions,.;- which represent nothing more than bureaucratic formality. By SUbmitting these resolutions for the approval of the Security Council, the representatives of the Anglo-American bloc certify that they have not complied with and have nO intentio,n of complying with those most important resolutions of the Genera.l Assembly, resolution 1 (I) of 24 January 1946 entitled, "Establishment of a Commission to deal wi~h the problems raised by the discovery of atomIC energy", and resolution 41 (I) of 14 De- cember of the same year entitled, "Principles governing the general regulation·' and reduction of armaments". The (~hallenge to world public opinion which is indicated by the SUbmission of such resolutions as those now before us can be explained only by the fact that the ruling circles of the United States have had their judgment shaken and h~ve come to believe that they can really lay down the law to the whole world. It will be remembered that others have acted with the same presumption in the past and that it led to no good. It often happens that people who proclai!U loudly that they will .force everybody' to capItulate do so not out of consciousness of strength, but out of their own fear. May not the authors of the Chinese and the United States resolutions belong to that category? Presump- tuous people are usually sure that they need net prove anything and that whatever they say shOUld be taken on their word. It is obvious that such an attitude has been exhibited by the authors of the resolutions before the Security Council. Mud- died. thinking, lac~ ?f supp0:oting arguments and constant contradIctIOns are the distinguishing features of these resolutions. As an example, let us take one of the, basic theses of the United States resolution: that the Soviet Unio~ is interest~d only in the prohibition and d~structI?n of atomIC weapons, but does not want mternatIOnal control to ensure that no more . :'ltomic weapons are produced, that the stocks of atom bombs are destroyed and that the nuclear fuel which they contain, as well as all atomic energy, is used only for peaceful purposes. Les resolutions presentees au Conseil de secu. rite par la majorite de la Commission de l'energie atomique ne peuvent que plonger tout esprit impartial dans une perplexite et une deception pl"Ofondes. I1 est stupefiant que les representants du bloc anglo-americain aient ose, au mepris de la volonte de paix des peuples, presenter, au sujet de la question qui presente une importance pour la paix et la securite des nations, les projets de resolution de la Chine et des Etats-Unis, qui rele- vent d'unE. conception purement bureaucratique. En soumettant ces projets de resolution a.l'appro- bation du Conseil de securite, les representants du blcc anglo-americ;lin ont mis en evidence qu'ils n'avaient pas appliqu~ et qu'ils n'en}enda~ent pas , appliquer les plus lmportantes resolutlcns de l'Assemblee generale, a savoir: la resolution 1 (1) du 24 janvier 1946, intitulee "Creation d'une com- mission chargee d'etudier les problemes souleves par la decouverte de l'energie atomique", et la resolution 41 (1) du 14 decembre de la meme annee, intitulee "Principes regissant la reglemen- tation et la reduction generale des armements". Il faut cl'oire que les milieux dirigeants des Etats- Unis pnt l'esprit troubl~ et qu'ils ont l'impression de pouvoir reellement dicter leur loi au monde; c'est la seule explication possible nu deft lance a l'opinion publique mondiale du fait de la pre- sentation de semblables resolutions. On sait que certains predecesseurs presomp- tueux ont deja agi de cette maniere et qu'ils n'ont abouti a. aucun resultat serieux. 11 arrive souvent que ceux qui annoncent a grand fracas qu'ils vo~t faire capituler tout le .monde adoptent cette atti- tude, non point parce qu'ils ont ~~mscience de leur force, mais simplement parce qu tls ont peur. eux- memes. Les auteurs des resolutions de la Chme et des Etats-Unis ne feraient-ils pas partie de cette , categorie de personnes? Les gens presomptueux ont la conviction qu'ils n'ont pas besoin de prot1v~r quoi que ce soit et que tout c;-.qu'ils disent dOlt etre cru sur parole. Ce sont VlSlblement des con- siderations de cette sorte qui ont guide les aute?~s des resolutions presentees au Conseil de secunte. La confusion des idees, l'absence de toute ar~u­ mentation solide, l'accumulation des contradlc-. tions sont les traits caracteristiques de ceS resolutions. Prenons, par exemple, l'une des the~es f~nda­ mentales de la resolution des Etats-Ums, ~U1va~~ laquelle l'Union sovietique ne s'interesseralt qu ~ l'interdiction et a 1a destruction des armes atoml- ques et ne desirerait pas l'etablissement d'':11 con- trole international empechant la productIOn d~ nouvelles armes atomiques, assurant la destruc- tion des stocks de bombes atomiques et tendant a ce que le combustible nucIeaire .qu'elle,s co~­ tiennent, ainsi que toute laproductIOU' d'energJ.e atomique, ne soient utilises qu'a des fins purement pacifiques. . ~tion, and especially' a p.olitical action, must ha,:e il est impossible de croire. En efIet, tout acte some motivation behmd It. There are !I0 unI??tl- humain, et surtout un acte de caractere politique, ated actions either in everyday or m pohtlcal est determine par certains mCJtifs. 11 n'existe pas life. Yet this absurdity ~s served up to the ?ecur- d'acte sans motif, pas plus dans la vie politique ity Council in the Untted States resolutIOn. as que dans la vie ccurante. Cette absurdite est pre- something to be taken for granted, a.s an axIom sentee au Conseil de securite dans la resolution requiring no proof. Equally absurd IS the _ot.her des Etats-Unls comme que1que chose d'absolu- United States thesis to the effect that the: Dntted ment evident, comme un axiome qui n'exige States, which piles up atomic w~apons, reJe~t~ !he aucune demonstration. On rettouve ce meme Soviet Union proposal concerntng the pr<;lh1b1t10n caractere d'absurdite dans la seconde these des of atomic weapons and does not want Its at?m. Etats-Unis selon laqueUe les Etats-Unis, qui accu- bombs destroyed, and is supposedly endeav<?T1ng mulent les armes atomiques, qui ecartent la pro- to eliminate atomic. weapons from the nati~nal position de l'Union sovietique tendant a interdire armaments of States, among them the Untted J'arme atomique et qui ne veulent pas detruire States itself. leUTs bombes atomiques, desireraient exclure les armes atomiques des armements nationaux et, en . particulier, des armements des Etats;.Unis. Who will believe this fantastic assertion, which Qui voudra crcire une affirmation aussi fan- represents absurdity number two? The authors taisiste, qui constitue la deuxieme absurdite? Les of the United States resolution are undaunted by auteurs de la proposition des Etats-Unis ne the fact ·that their contentions do not and can- S01lt guere deconcertef par le fait que leurs asser- not represent the truth. The truth is that it was tions contredisent et ne pe1!vent que contredire the USSR which OP 11 June 19472 proposed a la re~l;te. Or, en realite, c'est prec1sement l'URSS draft convention on the establishment of inte~- qui,._ 11 juin 1947, a presente un projetde narional control of the production of atomlC convention2 pour l'etablissemeht d'un controle energy in order to ensure its use.not for the mass international de la production de l'energie atomi- destruction of peaceful populatIOns b.ut for t~e que afin que celle-ci soit utilisee, non pour la welfare of mankind. A further fact IS that thIS destruction massive des populations pacifiques, draft convention was rejected by the Anglo- mais pour le bien de l'huma.nite. Les faits indi- American bloc, headed by the United States. <juent, en outre, que ce projet de convention a ete rejete par le bloc anglo-americain, a la· tete duquel se trouvent les Etats-Unis. The record further shows that the Soviet Union Les faits prouvent encore que c'est sous la delegation's proposal to destroy the stocks of pression de la delegation des Etats-Unis qu'a He atom bombs and to utilize for peaceful purposes repottssee la proposition de la delegation de the fuel they contained was rejected under press- I'Union sovietique tendant a detruire les stocks ure from the United States delegation. The de bombes atomiques et a utiliser,a des fms paci- record shows that it was the obstinacy of the fiques le combustible nucleaire qu'elles contien- United States delegation which prevented the nent. Les faits prouvent que c'est l'obstination Geperal Assembly and the Security Council from de la delegation des Etats-Unis qui a empeche adopti:q.g the USSR proposal which was submit- l'a<1option, par l'Assemblee generale et le Conseil ted by Mr. Vyshinsky, now Minister forFore~gn de securiti" de la proposition presentee, a la Affairs of the· Soviet Union, during the tlurd troisieme session de l'Assemblee generaleS, par session of the General Assemblyll and which was M. Vychinsky, maintenant Ministre desaffaires put forward again by the USSR delegation in etrangeres de l'URSS, et renouvelee dans le projet its proposal of 25 February 1.949 [S/1246/. de resolution de la delegation de l'Union sovic- Rev.1]; that proposal was for the simultaneous tique en date du 25 fevrier 1949 [S/1246/Rev.ll: conclusion and implementation of conventions on cette proposition visait a la conclusion et a· la the. prohibition of· atomic weapons and .on the mise en vigueur simultanees d'une convention sur establishment of international control of atomic l'interdiction de l'arme atomique et d'une con- energy. vention sur l'etablissement d'un controle inter- national de l'energie atomique. The truth is that the representatives of·' the La verite, c'est que les representants dubloc Anglo-American bloc have been engaging in anglo-americain se sont livres a des discussions empty chatter and· senseless discussions and have stt~riles et a une activite futile, et ont cree de deliberately brought up various secondary or toutes pieces une serie de questions accessoires altogether unimportant questions in order to. et sans importance afin de tourner la question evade the basic question squarely put before them fondamentale nettement., posee par .la delegation by the USSR delegation-that of the prohibition . de l'URSS, qui est t..:elle de l'interdiction des of the atomic weapon and the es.tablishment of armes atomiques et deA'etablissement d'un con- G!ne~at Assembly, Part I, An1'~e's-to··· the Plenary J,!ue,tmgs, page 372 (document A/723). IID ··· . 2 Voir les Proces-verbat~%r(}fficiels de la COffJmission de Z'energie atomiqlle, dellziime annee, No 2. 3 Voir les Documents officiets de·la troisieme session de l'Assemblee generale, premiere partie, Annest!s aus seances plenieres, page 372 (document A1723). ba~e the dishonourable game ?f t~e ~tomic poli- ce jeu malhormete des politiciens de l'atome. La ticIans. '. The USSR delegation, mSIstently de- delegation de 1'Union sovietique a demande avec manded an answer to the question whethet' the insistance que la delegation des Etats-Unis fasse Unite~ States delegati0Il: was ready to ~gre.e "to connaitre si elleetait prete a accepter "l'etablisse- the slIIlultaneous establIshment of stnct mter- ment simultanement avec 1'interdiction de l'arme ~ational ~ont.rol over all ~aci1ities fm' the extr~c- atomique, d'un controle international strict s'~xer­ hon of ~tomlc r~w matenals,. and the prod?ct~on lSant en meme temps sur toutes les entreprises o~ atomIC I?c:tenals and atomIc,energy, be~l~g s'occupant de l'extraction de la matiere premiere WIth the mmmg.of the or~ and mc1u<;lmg facI!It1e; atomique, de la fabrication de matieres atomiques, for the productIOn of finIshed atomIC matenals. et de la production de l'energie atomique, a partir de 1'extraction du minerai et y compris les entreprises produisant des m;:-tieres atomiques finales"4. Voict la reponse carach~ristique, vide de sens et empreiti.te d'hypocrisie qu'a donnee la delegation des Etats-Unis5 : "Les Etats-Unis acceptent le contr6le d'un organisme internationaL stir toutes les phases de la production, depuis 1'extraction du minerai jus- qu'a. la preparation des produits finis, comme cela est prevu dans les recommandations de la C'1- mission. de l'energie atomique de 1'OrganisatlOn des Nations Unies, approuvees par l'Assemblee generale. "... Ces recommandations ne proposent pas que le c6ntrole soit exerce en premier lieu sur les mines ou sur les usines produisant les com- bustibles nudeaires, ni que toutes ces formes de controle soient appliquees simultanement.'~ Mais alors que proposent donc les recomman- dations adoptees par l'Assemblee generale? Si on les interprete ainsi, elles ne proposent rien. Ce sont des arguments creux qui, selon le plan de la delegation des Etats-Unis, doivent empecher et faire echouer l'interdiction de l'arme atomique et le contr61e de la production de 1'energie atbmi- que. C'est comme si vous demandiez a quelqu'un s'il vous reste encore beaucoup de chemin a parcourir pour arriver a destination et qu'iI reponde: "le chemin n'est ni long, ni court, ni intermediaire entre le long et le court". La dele- gation des Etats-Unis estime peut-etre que des reponses de cet ordre representent le comble de l'habilete diplomatique et du machiavelisme; mais, de 1'avis de touthomme sense. c'est la une methode grossiere, un jeu malhoimete, auxquels des hommes d'Etat serieux ne devraient pas avoir recours lorsqu'ils examinent de graves problemes internationaux. Here is the characteristically meaningless and hypocritical reply of the United Statesde1ega- tion:5 "The United States agrees to control by an . international agency over all stages of production, . irom'the mines to the production of the finished product, as provided in the recommendations of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission which were approved by the GeneraLAssembly. ". . . These recommendations do not propose that mines be controlled first, or that nuclear fuel plants should be controlled first, 0.1 that all con- trols should be put into effect simultaneously." What, then, do these recommendations, approved by the General Assembly, propose? If· that is how they are to be interpreted, they pro- pose nothing. They are hollow proposals by means of which the United States delegation intends to thwart and prevent both the prohibi- tionof atomic weapons and the control of pro- duction of atomic energy. It is as though you asked.a man how far you had to go to reach y<;mr destination and he replied : "neither far nor near, nor anything between". The United States dele- gatibn.may regard answers of that kind as the height of clever diplomacy or Machiavellianism, but' in the opinion of any right-minded person they are nothing but a cheap trick in a sordid game unworthy of responsible statesmen dealing . with grave international matters. Prenonsencore une autre absurdite, la troi- sieme, celle que contient la resolution du repre- sentant de la Chine. S'effor<;ant de donner :le serait-ce qu'un semblant de raison aurejet du projet de resolution de I'URSS du 25 fevrier 1949, le rer resentant de la Chine en arrive a conclure qu'il est inutile d'elaborer une convention sur le eontrole international de l'energie atamique. I1 se fonde sur le fait que le projet de resoiution de l'Union sovietique sur le controle international de l'energie atomique,.en date du 11 juin 1947, a ete rejete-parce qu'il "ne tenait pas compte des donnees techniques actuelles dans le domaine du contrOle de l'energie atomique". Af' absurdity number three, let us take an e=cample from the Chinese representative's resolu- tion. 'In his endeavour to furnish some semblance of grounds for rejecting the USSR resolut~onof 25 February 1949, the Chinese representative arrives at the conclusion that there is no need to prepare a convention on the. international control of atomic energy. He gives as his motive that the Soviet Union draft resolution of 11 June 1947 on the international control of atomic energy was rejected because it did not take into consideration "the existing technical knowledge of the problem of atomic energy control". Lebon sens devrait montrer, semble-t-il, que, si une convention a ete rejetee paree qu'elle ne tenait pas compte des "donnees techniques actuel- les", cela :le peut nullement servir de pretexte pour refuser' de travailler a l'elaboration d'une convention en general. Mais le repres~ntant de la Chine l1'a cure du bon sens humain ;d'ailleurs, les representants du bloc anglo-americain n'avaient presente, pour leur part, aUCtlll projet de con- vention et ne pouvaient le faire; carle proJet de convention presente par I'DRSS le 11 juin 1,947 etait a tous egards irreprochable; il tenait pre- cisement compte de toutes les donnees techniques ac!..t:elles Jans le domaine de. la production de l'energie atomique et indiquait les mesures les plus effieaees permettant d'exercer un controle international de l'energie atomique. It would seem to be ordinary common sense that, if one convention was rejected because' it did not take into consideration "exlst!ng technical knowledge",that cannot serve as a reason for refusing to work out any convention whatso- ever. But ordinary common sense does not con- cern the Chinese representative; besides, the rep- resentatives of the Anglo-American bloc did not submit any draft convention of their own and could not have done so, for the USSR draft con- vention of 11 June 1947 was completely irre- proachable; what it did precisely was to take into account all technical knowledge in the field of atomic energy production and to indicate the most effective measures of international control of atomic energy. But that is not what is at stake. The crux of the matter is that the representatives of the Anglo- American bloc, and the United States representa- pves first and foremost, wished to use the myth of "existing technical knowledge" of atomic energy to prove that, instead of setting up an international organ of control, it was essential to set up another body-an international trust for the exploitation of mines, enterprises processing ,uranium ore and extracting nuclear fuel and so on; this trust would be the sole owner of all those enterprises. This is nothing less than an attempt on the part ofthe Du Pont monopoly, the General Electric Company and the. Westinghouse Com- Mais ce n'est pas tellement de cela qti'il s'agit. Ce qui importe, c'est que les representants du bloc anglo-americain, et surtout les representants des Etats-Unis, se sont efforces d'utiliser d'hypo- thetiques "donnees techniques actuelles" dans le domaine de l'energie atomique, pour demontrer la necessite de creer, a la place d'un organisme international de contrOle, un autre organisme, un trust international pour l'exploitation des mines et des entreprises traitant le minerai d'uranium, produisant le combustible nucleaire, etc.; ce trust serait le seul proprietaire de toutes ces entre- prises. Ceci est bel et bien une tentative des Du Pont, de la General' Electric, de la Westing~ house, pour etablir un monopole et coneentrer entre leurs mains la production atomique mon- diale, Et cette tentathTe est determinee, non par les "donnees techniques" dans le domaine de l'energie atomique, mais par les relations sociales existant dans cette partie du monde qui est fondee sur la propriete privee et sur la loi du profit. ~any to gather into their hands the world produc- tlOn of atomic energy. This attempt is governed not?y "technical knowledge" in the field of atoml~ energy but by the social structure prev- al~nt m that part of the world which rests on pnvate ownership and the laws of profit. Que viennent· faire id les considerations teeh., niques? What have technical considerations to do with this? L'energie atomique peut etre mise au service des peuples de tous les pays, quel que soit leur systeme economique et social. Les representants de I'Union sovietique voulaient precisement obtenir quel'energie atomique soit utilisee pour le bien de l'humanite tout entiere. Les represen- tants des Etats.;Unis,·au contraire, veulent faire <;n sorte que l'energie ato!71ique soit utilisee a des fins de destruction. Atomic energy can be made to servethe interests ~ ..the p~oples of every country, irrespective of elr ~oclal and. economic systems. Therepre,. sentatlves of the Soviet Union are seeking to ensure th.at atomic energy is used for the good of all. mankmd. As opposed to this, the represen- tat~ves of the United States wish to do, and are domg, everything in their power to ensure its Use for purposes of destruction. The very attempt of the Chinese representative to drag in technical considerations to justify the claims of private firms merely serves to prove that the dominant circles wish to use contempo- rary science to further their own selfish interests. There is a veritable abyss, which those who are politically unsophisticated can see with the naked eye, between the statements made by the United States representatives in the United Na- tions and those of their Government. While the United States representatives in the Atomic Energy Commission or the Security Council try to convince us that United States official circles are in favour of the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of international control of atomic energy, responsible official circles outside the United Nations make statements of a very different order. For example, on 10 June 1949 General Gmar Bradley, Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff of the United States Armed Forces, declared at Lafayette College, where he received his doc- torate of science: "I see no immediate indication that we (Americans) will reach any of those peaceful aims bv abandonment of our present monopoly of the"'atomic bomb, or through weak- ening of our armed forces." Such a statement is hardly compatible with the willingness of the United States to agree to the prohibit.ion of atomic weapons or United Nations control over the. production of atomic energy, of which we were assured by the United States representatives in the Atomic Energy Commission. Not less significant is the sensational announce- ment made by the United States Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Krug, at the United Nations Scien- tific Conference on the Conservation and Utiliza- tion of Resources, that there could be no question of control of atomic energy 1:or at least twenty years. One cannot help wondering who is speak- ing the truth: Mr. Krug or the United States rep resentatives in the Atomic Energy Commission, who have stated repeatedly that the United States Government is anxious to implement the General Assembly resolution of 24 January 1946. l'inb~rieur des Etats-Unis, qui, 10rs de la Con- ference scientifique des Nations Unies pour la conservation et l'utilisation des ressources natu- relles convoquee par 1'0rganisation des Nati.ons Unies, a affirme· qu'il ne saurait etre questlO~, avant vingt ans, d'etablir un controle de l'energle atomique. On se demande qui dit la verite; est-ce M. Krug ou sont-ce les representants des Etats- Unis cl la Commission de l'energie atomique, les- quels ont declare plus d'une fois que leur G?U- vernement desirait se conformer cl la resolutIOn de l'Ass~mblee generale en date du 24 jartvier 1946? Should we believe ~hese representatives or Eest-ce eux que nous devons croire, ou bien, should we believe Senator Hickenlooper, who par exemple, le senateur Hickenlooper qui insis~e wishes to hand over all atomic energy production pour que la production de l'energie atomique SOlt to the military? Everyone knows, in the United entierement confiee aux militaires. Tout le monde States as well as in other countries, that in spite sait, tant aux Etats-Unis que dans les autr~s of United Nations prohibition of war propaganda, pays, que, malgre la condamnation par l'Organl- as laid down in General Assembly resolution sation des Nations Unies de la propagande de 110(II) of 3 November 1947, war hysteria in the . guerre, formulee dans la resolution 110 (H) de United States continues. This is confirmed by l'Assemblee generale en date du 3 novembre 1947, La tentstive meme du representant de la Chine visant a. meler a. ce probleme des consideration~ techniques sur lesqueIles pourraient s'appuyer les pretentions des firmes privees, temoigne de la manU~re dont les classes dirigeantes s'efforcent de mettre la science modeme au service de leurs interets egoistes. Un abime separe les declarations de la delega- tion des Etats-Unis a. 1'0rganisation des Nations Unies et celles du Gouvernement de ce pays; cet abime, meme des gens ignorants en politique peuvent l'apercevoir sans difficulte. Au moment meme ou le representant des Etats-Unis cl la Commission de l'energie atomique ou au Conseil de securite s'efforce de nons assurer que les milieux officiels des Etats-Ums preconisent l'inter- diction de l'arme atomique et l'etablissement d'un controle international de l'energie atomique, les milieux officiels responsables, exterieurs al'Orga- nisation des Nations Unies, font des declarations d'un tout autre ordre. C'est ainsi, par exemple, que, le 10 juin 1949, le general Omar Bradley, Chef d'etat-major general des forces armees des Etats-Unis, a declare a. Lafayette College, en recevant le grade de docteur honoris causa: "Je ne vois pas la possibilite pour nous (Americains) d'atteindre nos buts pacifiques si nous renonc;ons a notre monopole sur l'energie atomique ou si nous affai- blisson3 nos forces armees." Il est peu probable que cette declaration puisse cadrer avec les affir- mations des representants des Etats-Unis a la Commission de l'energie atomique, suivant les- queUes les Etats-Unis seraient prets a. accepter l'interdiction de l'arme atomique ou le controle de l'Organisationdes Nations Unies sur la pro- duction de l'energie atomique. Non moins revelatrices sont les declarations sensationnelles de M. Krug, S'ecretaire d'Etat a "United States war plan for fighting Russia is blueprinted", says this article. "War if it comes is to start where the last one stopped, with an atom-bomb attack on enemy cities. . . . The first b b· " phase: atom om mg. "General Bradley stated"-this publication goes on to say-"that the United States must fling the full force of its strategic air offensive against the enemy's heartland. First priority is t9 the delivery of atom bombs on enemy targets ... these targets include Moscow, Russian war industry to the south and behind the Urals, bomber bases and impurtant military installations. They are to be reached by B-36 bombers if war comes in the next few years, by new B-52 jet bombers if war comes after that time." "Le general Bradley, lit-on plus loin dans ce journal, a declare que les Etats-Unis doivent diriger tout leur effort strategique aerien contre les principaux centres de l'adversaire. L'attaque des objectifs ennemis au moyen de bombes ato- miques doit avoir la priorite. .. Parmi ces objec- tifs figurent Moscou, l'industrie de guerre russe au sud et au-dela de l'Oural, les bases de l'aviation de bombardement et les installations militaires de grande importance. Ces objectifs doivent etre atteints par des bombardiers B-36, si la guerre commence dans quelques annees, ou par les nQU- veaux bombardiers a. reaction B-52, si elle com- mence plus tard." Que dira la delegation des Etats-Unis en pre- sence de declarations (~e ceUe nature? Comme on le voit par la citation que j'ai faite, les intentions de ceux qui dirigent ree11ement les destins des Etats-Unis it Wall Street ne ressem- blent guere aces roucoulements ayant pour theme la paix, le controle international de l'energie ato- mique et l'elimination de l'arme atomique des armements des Etatf-Unis, roucoulements par lesquels les diplomates des Etats-Unis a la Com- mission de l'energie atomique s'efforcent d'endor- mir la vigilance des peuples. Personne n'a oublie la declaration categorioue du president Truman, qui a dit, le 6 avrit 1949, qu'il n'hesiterait pas, dans l'avenir, si c'etait necessaire, a utiliser la bbmbe atomique comme a Hiroshima et it. Nagasaki. Il semble que ce soit par erreur que, avant meme que le representant de la RSS d'Ukraine ait terniine son discours et avantque les partisans du point de vue oppose' aient pris la parole, on ait commence a admettre le public dans la sa11e, ce qui est que1que peu genant. What does the United States delegation have to say to such a statement? As can be seen from this quotation, the inten- tion of the true Wall Street arbiters of the fate of the United States hardly resembles the dove- like cooings about peace and international con- trol of atomic energy and the removal of atomic weapons from United States armaments-a cooing with which United States diplomats in the Atomic Energy Commission hope to relax the vigilance of the peoples. No one has forgotten the categorical statement made by President Tru- man, on 6 Apri11949, that he would not hesitate, should it ever become necessat'y, to use atomic bombs in the future, as was done at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There appears to have been a mistake, as mem- bers of the public have been admitted before the representative of the Ukrainian SSR has finished his statement, and before the supporters of the ?ther point of view have started speaking. This IS somewhat disturbing.

I think that, in practice, there Le PRESIDENT (trcuiuit. de l'anglais): Je ne crois pas qu'it y ait, en fait, de regIe etablie: Nous n'avons jamais applique de regIe tendant' a fermer au public l'acces des salles de seance pendant les interventions. It me semble que le public entre sans bruit et ne gene pas beaucoup. I1 me s,emble qu'un orateur devrait etre beauco1J.p plus flatte de voir le public ~.ffluer que de voir la salle se 'Vider. ar~ no rules about that. We never have any regl1 l~tlons in force about closing the public admis- SIOn doors while speeches are in progress. I think the public comes in very quietly and that it does not cause much disturbance. I should think that a sp~ake: would be more gratified to see a crowd COmlOg m than to see the audience going out. Mr..MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist RepublIc) (translated from Russian) : I am very grateful to the President for his explanation, but M. MANUILSKY (Republique socialiste sovietique d'Ukraine) (tradllit du,russe) : Je remercie beaucoup le President decette explication, mais There is something highly ludicrous about the attempt of the authors of the United States draft resolution to shift the responsibility for the failure of the Atomic Energy Commission's work to the delegations of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, which have striven and continue to strive for the simultaneous conclusion and implementation of conventions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of international control over the production of atomic energy. The attempt is all the more ludicrous in that we are all aware of the course which the United States delegation followed in order to bring to an end the work of the Atomic Energy Commission, as well as of the effort made by the USSR delegation to continue the Commission's work. This attempt is stin more ridiculous because everybody knows of the stubborn fight for peace which the peoples of the Sqviet Union ar~ waging, a fight inw-hieb they are not alone. A powerfUl movement towards peace is sweeping all peoples. The overwhelming majority of the population of every country is opposed to war. As Generalissimo Stalin said, "The horrors of the last war are too fresh in the memory of the people, and the social forc~s which stand for peace are too powerful to, permit Churchill's disciples of aggression to overcome them and head them towards a new war." Founding their belief on these wise words of the greatest man of our time, anU. strong in their support of .the ever increasing movement for peace, the Soviet delegations demand, with increasing insistence, that the General Assembly deci·· sions of 1946 should be implemented. Let those who wish to sabotage these most important deci., sions stop hiding behind the wordy. General Assembly resolution 191(III) of 4 November 1948. They dare not say, nor can they prove, that this resolution has superseded the decisions of 24 January and 14 December 1946. He who ventures to say anything of the sort will eventually be unmasked as a champion of war and an enemy of peace. The United States delegation will not find in this resolution any instruction to suspend the Atomic Energy Commission's ,work. . On the contrary, this resolution invited the Atomic Energy Commission to resume its work, which was in fact interrupted in the summet of 1948 by the.sabotage of the Anglo-American bloc. M. TSARAPXINE (Union des Republiques soda~ listes sovidiques) (traduit du russe) : Void deja la troisieme fois que le Conseil de securite entreprend l'examen du probleme de l'energie atomique. Dans le .cas present, de meme que dans les deux pren1iers c;:as, la Commission de l'energie atomique a soumis au Conseil de securite, non pas des projets de convention interdisant les armes atomiques et etablissant un controle rigoureux de l'energie atomique, comme l'exigent les resolutions de l'Assemblee generale en date des 24 janvier et 14 decembre 1946, mais deux nouvelles resolutions, qui, de par leur teneur, visent un but absolument oppose. Ces resolutions proposent, en reaHte, de renoncer purement et simplement a la mise en ceuvre des resolutions de l'Asse..rnbIee generale en date des 24 janvier et 14 decembre 1946. Les resolutions presentees par la Commission de l'energie atomique tendent essentiellement a: 'premierement, empecher. que des mesures pratiques ne soient prises en vue d'interdire les armes atomiques et d'etablir un controle de l'energie atomique et, deuxiemement, mettre fin aux travaux de la Commission de l'energie atomique. C'est ainsi, par exemple, que les auteurs de l'une de ces resolutions, qui figure au document AEC/42, declarent sans ambages, pOUf complaire aux fauteurs de guel're, qu'a leur avis i1 serait inutile de poursuivre, au sein de la Commission de l'energie atomique, l'examen des propositions vh,ant a ce que la Commission entreprenile imme~ diatement l'elaboration d'un projet de convention portant interdiction des armes atomiques et' d'un projet de convention etablissant tincontrole sur l'energie atomique. Quant au projet de resolution figurant au do'cument AEC/43, et soumis a l'origine par le repr~­ sentant des Etats-Unis, it vise essentiellement a suspendre, pour une periode indeterminee, leg travaux de la Commission de l'energie atomique qui, comme on le sait, a ete chargee parrAssemblee generale d'elaborer dans le plus brefdelai possible une convention sur l'interdiction des armes atomiques et une convention sur le controle de l'energie atomique. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): This is the third time that the Security Council is taking up the oroblem of atomic energy. Today, as on the other two occasions, the Atomic Energy Commissi.on has not placed before the Security Council draft conventions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict control of atomic energy, as required under the General Assembly resolutions of 24 January and 14 December 1946, but has submitted two new resolutions which, by their very substance, pursue the opposite aim. These resolutions actually advocate downright refusal to implement the General Assembly resolutions of 24 January and 14 December 1946. The basic aim of the two resolutions submitted by the Atomic Energy Commission is, first, to prevent the· adoption of practical measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of control of atomic energy, and, secondly, to bring about the cessation of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission. Thus, the authors of one of the resolutions which is before us in document AEC/42, anxiotls to please the instigators of war, say outright that they consider that no useful purpose can be served by further discussions in the Atomic Energy Commission of proposals to the effect that the Commission should immediately proceed to the preparation of a draft convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons and a draft convention on atomic energy control. The fundamental purpose of the other resolution, originally submitted by the United States representative and before us in document AEC/ 43.. i~ that t~e work of the Atomic Energy CommISSIOn, whIch wek"11ow was instructed by the ~eneral Assembly to prepare as promptly as pos- SIble a convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons and a convention on atomic energy control, shOUld be discontinued indefinitely. ~ll this is beib~ done to further the aggressive. L'objet de tout cela est servir la politique d'apohcy of the United States, which has taken a 'gression des Etats-Unis qui ont adopte, a l'egard position in the matter of the prohibition of atomic de l'interdiction des armes atomiques et de l'etaweapons and the establishment of control of blissement d'un controle de l'energie atomique, atomic energy that is known to all. The United l'attitude que 'nons connaissons tous. Les Etats- ~tates wants neither the one rior the other, and Unis ne veulent ni interdiction ni controle. Ill; a~ :esolutely opposed them for three years, s'opposant a la conclusion et ala mise envigueur reslstmg the simultaneous conclusion and enforce- I s'Qbstint, depuis trois ans, ales empecher en ment. ?~ two conventions, a convention on the simultanee de deux converitions, dont l'une porihohrb~tton of atomic weapons and, in connexion terait interdiction des armes atomiques et l'autre erewlth, a. convention on the control of atomic etablirait uti controle sur l'energie atomique. Bien ene~gy. ThIS is not, of course, done openly an, entendu, ils ne le font ni ouvertement ni difect~-, straIghtforwardly, but in disguised and devious ment, maisd'une fat;on voilee et detournee: ways. Th~United States representatives on the Iiin;; Energy CO~~ission ~edare that theY',too, In reality, this plan has nothing in common with the concept of control. It is a fantastic plan to,ylace, through the instrumentality of an mternatIOnal organ, vast numbers of enterprises and whole branches of industry in other countries under United States control. It is unrealistic and politically indefensible. The United States has always known very well, and knows now, that its grasping scheme is quite unacceptable and will be rejected by the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it continues to press for its adoption, saying that either there will be the kind of control it proposes, or there will be no control and no prohibition of atomic weapons at all. When the Security Council considered the first report of the Atomic Energy Commission6 in 1947, the USSR delegation said that the plan set fo.rth in the report was unacceptable, and submItted amendments7 to the two main parts of the report, "General Findings" and "Recommendations". The amendments proposed by the Soviet Union Were intended to remove the inconsistency between the recommendations contained in the report and the General Assembly resolutions of 24 January and 14 December 1946. Under pressure from the United States, the me~bers of the Council avoided adopting any deCIsions on the important questions raised in the USSR amendments. The Council referred the report back to the Atomic Energy Commission. In its resolution of 10 March 1947 [S/296] , the Security Council urged the Atomic Energy Commission "to develop as promptly as possible the specific proposals called for by section 5 of the • See Official ,Records of the Atomic Ellergy Commissioll, First Year, Special Supplement. control~, ni interdiction des armes atomiques. Lorsque le Conseil de securite a examine, en 1947, le premier' rapport de la Commission de l'energie atomique6, la delegation de l'URSS a fait observer que le plan expose dans le rapport etait inacceptable et dIe a apporte des amendements7 a deux parties essentielles du rapport: "Conclusions generales H et "Recommandations". En presentant ses amendements, la delegation de 1'Union sovietique cherchait a mettre les recornmandations contenues dans le rapport en harmonie avec les resolutions de l'Assemblee generale en date des 24 janvier et 14 decembre 1946. Sous la pression des Etats-Unis, les memb.r~s du Conseil se sont abstenus de prendre une deCIsion sur les questions importantes que soulevaient les amendements de l'URSS. Le Conseil a renvoye le rapport a la Commission de ·1'energie atomique. Dans sa resolution du 10 mars 1947 [S/296], le Conseil de securite a invite la Corn: mission de l'energie atomique "a elaborer ausst rapidement ,que possible les propositions concretes • Voir les P oces-verbau~ officiels de la Commissiofl de l'eneruie atomique, premiere annee, supplement special. , 'Voir les' ProceS-'l/erblUt~ officiels dlt Conseil de set«- rit£.. deu~ieme annee. No 15, l08eme seance. In June 1948, the Atomic Energy Commission presented its second and third reports to the Security Council. Instead of draft conventions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and control of atomic energy, the proposal at the end of part I of the third report was that the work of the Atomic Energy Commission should be suspended. Thus, a year after the Security Council's decision and two years after the General Assembly's resolutions in which the Atomic Energy Commission was asked to prepare draft conventions, the Atomic Energy Commission asked the Security Council to endorse its decision to suspend the Commission's work. The delegation of the Soviet Union at that time categorically opposed the cessation of the Atomic Energy Commission's work. It proposed that the Commission should continue its work with a view to fulfilling the duties conferred upon it by the General Assembly resolutions of 24 January and 14 December 1946. Those highly important documents define .the basic direction and substance of the work of the United Nations in the cause of maintaining and strengthening international peace and security: The General Assembly resolution of 24 January 1946 speaks of the establishment of a Commission which shall make specific proposals to the Security Council ". . . (c) for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction", as well as cc••• (b) for control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes". The same main tasks were reaffirmed in the resolution dated 14 December 1946 entitled "Principles governing the general regulation and reduction of armaments". That resolution deals not only with the problem of atomic energy but also with the question of tlle reduction of armaments, those two questions-prohibition of atomic weapons and reduction of armaments and armed forces-being inseparably linked together. In connexion with the question of atomic' energy, the General Assembly resolution of 14 December 1946 "urges the expeditious fulfilment by the Atomic Energy Commission of its terms of reference in section 5 of the General Assembly resolution of 24 January 1946," and recommends "; .. that the Security Council expedite consideratlon of a draft convention or conventions for the creation of an international system of control and inspection, these conventions to include the prohibition of atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now and in the future to mass destruction and the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes". The USSR delegation categorically objected to such proposals for the scuttling of the Commission's work, and in 1948 it voted against a proposal to that effect, submitted again by the United States representatives at the 318th meeting of the Security Council on 11 June 1948. But the attempts of the United States deleg~­ tion to put an end to the work of the Atomic Energy Commission did not stop there. Everyone knows that at the third session of the General Assembly the United States delegation tried, without success, to obtain the General Assembly's consent to the cessation of the Atomic Energy Commission's work. The General Assembly did not dare assume so grave a responsibility, and adopted resolution 191 (IHJ, which provides for the resumption of the Atomic Energy Commission's work instead of its cessation. Nevertheless, the United States and some other countries which follow its lead have continued to sabotage the General Assembly resolutions of 24 January and 14 December 1946 and, as a result, the Atomic Energy Commission has come before the Security Council for. the third time without draft conventions on prohibition and control. Instead, we are again being asked to endorse the' decision to end the Commission's work, thereby shirking the task of developing measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of atomic energy control. The United States is stubbornly maintaining its dictatorial position on this question; it does not wish to come to t terms with its partners as equals; it wishes to dictate its terms and threatens that there will be a race for atomic weapons if its unacceptable plan for control is not accepted. Thus at the [318th] meeting of the SeC1.lrity Council held on 11 June 1948, the United' States representative, Mr. Jessup, said "All Governments are faced with one or other of two alternatives: either a continuation of the race in atomic armaments, or agreement on a system of international control in'which all nations would have confidence because they believe it to be effective. There is no middle way between these two alternatives." What is that if not an ultimatum and a threat? Such threats, however,can affect only the timid or those who have nothing to lose by acceptingthe United States plan and have already lost their independ~nce and freedom of action. It is well known, however, that the Soviet Union belongs to neither of these categories. Mr. ]essup's speech which I have just quoted refersto'international control in which all nations would have confidence because they wouldrecogmena~ant de s'engager dans une course aux armements atomiques si leur plan inacceptable de controle n'est pas adopte. C'est ainsi que le representant des Etats-Unisau Conseil de securite, M. Jessup, a declare a la [318~meJ seance du ConseiI, le 11 juin .1948: "Tous les gouverne~ ,ments se trouvent places devant le diIemme sui- . va.nt: soit continuer la course aux armements atOlniques, soit se mettre d'accord SUt 1.1ll systeme de controle international qui jouirait de la confiance de toutes les nations parce que ces nations en admettraient l'efficacite. 11 n'y a pas de solution intermediaire entre ces deux possibilites." N'estce pas la une mena.ce.et un ultimatum? Cependant, ces menaces .ne peuvent influencer que ceuX dont les nerfs sont faibles ou ceux qui, ayant deja perdu leur~ independance et Jeur liberte d'action, n'ont tien a perdre a. l'adoption du plan des Etats-Unis. Quant a. l'Union sovietique, on sait qu'elle, n'appartient a. a.ucune de .ces categories. Dans la declaration de M. Jessup que je~iens de citer, il est ,question d'un co.ntrole i.nterl1.at~on.:JJ..dtt .-.""" qui jouirait de la confiance de toutes les natlOns, . ' , The control plan proposed by the United States bears not the slightest resemblance to genuine control. This plan is not concerned at all with control, but with empowering an international body to take possession of, and to do as it wishes with, the production of nuclear fuel and atomic products throughout the world. Is that really control? It may be control in the eyes of Wall Street but, in our opinion, it is an open attempt, on a world-wide scale, to place the most iinportant branches of industry in other countries and on every continent under the control of the United States, such control to .be exercised through the instrumentality of an international control agency. But the Soviet Union has no intention of placing its most important undertakings under United States control or of handing over the possession of those undertakings to an international body which would have complete management of them. It is quite obvious who would have the real power in an international control organization such as that proposed in the United States plan. An examination of the activities of such fnternational organizations, for example, as the International Monetary Fund or the International' Bank for Reconstruction and Development will show beyond a doubt that although both those organizations are called "international", they are really in the hands of the United States and pursue, internationally, a financial policy which is in complete accordance with the policy of the United States. Both these international organizattons are really tools of the State Department of the United States. The international control body suggested in the United States plan would be in a similar, if not a worse, position. It is easy tci envisage the disastrous economic and political consequences which would befall countries coming under the control of such a body, which would own their most important enterprises, or even whole branches of their industry, and would have the right to do whatever it pleased with them. That is not a plan for. control but a plan for ec~nomic intervention by the Un~ted States disgUlsed as international control. It has nothing in common with control in the true sense of that word. . The proposal to give an international body the rtght to ?wn and exercise complete.control over undertakmgs engaged in the production of atpmic energy, together with unlimited rights to carry out other important functions linked with the ?wnership and management of those undertakmgs an~ the disposal of their production,,,¥ould lead.to mterference.·by the control organization in the In~ernal affairs and life of the various coun- ~ gestion de ces entreprises et a l'utilisation de leur production, 1'on risque de voir cet organe intervenir dans les affaires interieures et dans la vie meme des pays interesses. L'adoption de Nul n'ignore qui serait, en fait, le maitre de 1'organe international de controle propose par les Etats-Unis. I1 suffit d'examiner l'a~tivite d'organes internationaux tels que le Fondsmonetaire international ou la Banque internationale pour la reconstruction et le developpement, pour se rendre compte que ces deux organismes, qui sont pourtant qualifies d' "internationaux",. sont en fait domines par les Etats-Unis et suivent, dans le domaine international, une politique financiere entierement coordonnee avec celIe des Etats-Unis. Ces deUx organismes internationaux ne sont, en reaIite, que des instruments du Departem~nt d'Etat. L'organe international de controledont le plan des Etats-Unis propose la creation serait dans une situation semblable, sinon pire. Il est aise d'imaginer les consequences desastreuses, economiques et poIitiques, auxqu~lIes auraient a faire face les pays· soumis au controle d'un organe de ce genre, d'un organe qui serait le proprietaire de leurs entreprises les plus importantes, OU meme de branches entieres de leur industrie, et qui aurait le droit d'en disposer a. sa guise. Cen'est pas la un plan de controle,ri:tai~ un plan d'intervention economique des Etats-Unis, clfectuee sous les apparences d'un controle international. Ce plan n'a rien a voiravec un controle' dans le sens propre de. ce terme, . En attribuant a l'organe international de controle la propriete et le droit absolu de dispose! des entreprises produisant l'energie atomique, ainsi que des droits etendus pour exercer d'autres fonctions importantes .liees a la ptopriete et a la The control pr.)posals submitted by the representative of the Soviet Union on 11 June 1947 contain the fundamental' premises for working out a convention on the control of atomic energy. They are capable of ensuring strict and effective international control. But you do not want to reach agreement on that basis, as agreement on the question of atomic energy does not enter into the calculations of the United States. The United States' does not want agreement on that question, as it is opposed to the prohibiting of atomic weapons and, consequently, to any form of control. That is precisely why the United States put forward its aggressive and fantastic control plan, drawn up with the <::tear intention that it should be rejected, with the result that there would be no control or prohibition of atomic weapons whatever, which is what the United States wants. The representatives of the United States should state this openly and not hide behind the false pretext of disagreement with the Soviet Union on the question of control. Assertions to that effect are completely false, for in actual fact the United States does not desire the prohibition of atomic weapons and does not want any international control of atomic energy. In support of this assertion we can adduce numerous stat,ements by official personalities,both military and civil, including members of the United States Government. For example, President Truman,. when he addressed the new members of the United States House of Representatives and Senate at the Hotel Carlton in Washington on 6 April 1949, stated that he would not hesitate to decide to use atomic bombs. The United States Secretary for Defense,'Mr. Johnson, stated at the end of July, 1949, in his testimony before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, that the United States would not take part in any disarmament agreement. The United States Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Krug, stated at a Press conference on 26 August that' twenty years would elapse before atomic energy came under tru~' international control. It can be seen that Mr. Krug considered that atomic energy control could not be established for the next twenty years, in other words, not until after the' expiration of the aggressive North Atlantic Treaty. While the United States representat!~es in the United Nations make flagrantly hypOCrItIcal statements on the desire of the United States to prohibit atomic weapons and reduce armaments, and at the same time do everything in their power to undermine the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and of the Commission for Conventional Armaments, that country's military leaders and chiefs of staff are losing no time; they ~re dra;wfug up aggressive plans to attack the SOVIet Umon and the peoples' democracies. In the Atomic Energy Commission the representatives of the United States tells us that they are prepared to prohibit atomie weapons, but simulta1.leously the Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Brac1ley, the officer commanding the United States Air Forces, General Vandenberg, the United States Secretary of Air, Mr. Symington, and the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Johnson, freely tell the United States Congress with cynical franlmess about their plans for attacking the Soviet Union, and state that they have already chosen, among the most important cities in the USSR, seventy targets marked for atomic bombing; and they state that work in that direction is proceeding. Need I mention the numerous maps constantly being published in United States magazines and newspapers which show, by means of arrows, the routes to be taken by United States planes on bombing missions against the cities of the USSR? From all I have said it is quite obvious that the United States is waging an aggressive policy based on the use of atomic weapons, and not on their . pr91libition. 'We are justified in asking the representatives of the United States how these statements can be reconciled with the General Assembly resolutions of 24 January and 14 December 1946, which provide for the early prohibition of atomic weapons and establishment of atomic energy control. Is it not clear from everytlling I have _said that what we have here is not a matter of disagreements about the control plan? The disagreeme~nts are artificial and specially created to conceal the unwillingness of the United States to prohibit atomic weapons. Let us call a spade a spade. The disagreements which have. arisen in the Atomic Energy Commission, about which ,so much has been said, and the impasse reached in the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission on Conventional Armaments can be explained Nous sommes maintenant en droit de demander aux representants des Etats-Unis comment cond... lier ces declarations avec Ies resolutions des 24 janvier et 14 decembre 1946, par lesquelles l'Assemblee generale recommande d'intetdire d'urgence 1'usage des armes atomiques et d'instituer le plus vite possible un controle de 1'energie atomique. N'est-iI pas clair, de tout ce qui precede, qu'il ne s'agit pas id d'une divergence de vues sur le plan de controle? Si 1'0n s'applique a. provflquer ces , divergences, c'est simplement pour voiler le fait que les Etats-Unis ne tiennent pas a. ce queles . armes atomiques soient interdites. Appelons les choses par leur nom. Si ces divergences d,e vues, que 1'on ne cesse d'invoquer, se sont fait jour. au sein de la Commission de 1'energie atomique,' si -cette commission et la Commission des armements de type classique ont abouti cl. une "impasse", c'est uniquement parce que les Etats-Unis ont besoin de ces divergences et de ces "impasses", parce qu'ils -les suscitentet parce qu'ils les perpetuent. Ces divergences de vues et ces "impasses" sont necessaires a. la politique d'agression adoptee pat les Etats-Unis. Quant cl. l'Union sovietiqtte, elle a adopte, a. 1'egard de l'intetdietion des armes' atomiques et ~olely by the fact that these disagreements and Impasses are needed by the United States, that it creates and_perpetuates them. These· disagree· n;ents a.nd impasses are necessary to the aggres- SIve pohcy adopted by the United States. It is in the light of these facts that we have to consider why the Atomic Energy Commission has so far worked out no convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the control of atomic energy, and why the Commission for Conventional Armaments has refused to work out measures for the reduction by one-third of the armaments of the five permanent members of the Security Council. This situation, I stress again, can be fully explained by the aggressive ~oreign policy of the United States. The USSR delegation considers the United States proposal for the cessation of the work of the' Atomic Energy Commission to be an inadmissible and flagrant violation of the important resolutions of the General Assembly of 24 January and 14 December 1946, inasmuch as the Commission has not yet carried out its tasks with regard to the oreparation of conventions for the prohibition ofatomic weapons and for control of atomic energy. I am referring to document AEC/43, which, was submitted to the Commission as a draft resolution by the representatives of the United States and \vhich was adopted by it. [S/1391/Re'~/.l] : "Le Conseil de securite "Ayant pris note de la lettre du President de la Commission de l'energie atomique [S/1377] du 29 juillet 1949, adresseeau President du Conseil ·de securite ainsi que des resolutions adoptees par la Commission a sa 24eme seance, annexees a cette lettre, ((Invite la Commission de l'energie atomique a poursuivre ses travauxconcernant la realisation des objectifs qui lui ont ete assignes aux termes des resolutions de l'Assemblee generale des 24 janvier et 14 decembre 1946." The PRESIDENT: In view of the hour, I wonder Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'ang1ais) : En raison whether the last speaker would agre~ that the de 1'heure tardive, je me demande si l'orateur qui consecutive interpretation of his sp~ech be given vient de prendre la parole consentirait a ce que at the beginning of our meeting this afternoonl'interpretation consecutive de son discours n'ait if, indeed, the· representative of France insists lieu qu'au debut de la seance de cet apres-midi - that it has to be given at all. I think every~ody c'est-a-dire si le representant de la France insiste had earphones, and I checked and ascertamed pour que cette interpretation soitdonnee. Je crois that the speech was in fact being interpreted b?th que tous les representants avaient mis leurs ecouinto French and into English. Therefore, I thmIcIte,ur.•s et j'ai p.u constater que.l'interpretation etait none of it has been missed. However, OU! n<;>rmal donnee a la fois en fran«;ais et en anglais. Je pense procedure would be to have the consecutive m!erdone qu'aucun detail du discours ne nous a echappretation, and I would only suggest.that J?osslbly pe. Neanmoins, la procedure normale serait we might begin the afternoon meetmg WIth that d'avoir l'interpretation consecutive; je proposeconsecutive interpretation. rais done simplement de reporter cette interpretation au debut de la seance de cet apres-midi. S'il n'y a pas d'objection,je vais done lever la seance et demander aux membres de se reunir cet apres-midi a 15 heures. Les membres du ConseiI savent probablement qu'une courte ceremonie a laquelle ils sont tous invites aura lieu cet apres-midi a 16 heuresdans le grand hall pour l'inauguration d'une plaque a la memoire dn comte Bernadotte. Je. proposerai done d'interrompre la seance un peu avant 16 heures et de la reprendre sitot la ceremonie terminee. Je crois savoir qu'elle ne durera pas plus d'un quart d'heure. Therefore, if there is no objection, I shall adjourn the meeting and ask the Security Council to meet at 3 o'clock this afternoon. Members of the Security Council probably know that there will be a short ceremony for the unYeilingof a tablet in memory of Count Berna- _ dotte in the main lobby at 4 o'clock, to which the members of the Security Council have been invited. I would, therefore, propose to interrupt our meeting shortly before 4 o'clock and to resume again immediately after the ceremony is over. I understand that it is expected to last not more than a quarter of an hour. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): As my statement has already been simultaneously interpreted into English and French, I have no objection to postponing the consecutive interpretation until thi.s afternoon. The meeting rose at 1 p.m. M. TSARA.?KINE (Union des Republiques socia- Iistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe) :. Mon discours ayantdeja fait l'objet d'une interpretation simultanee en anglaiset en fran«;ais, je ne vois ' aucune objection a. ce que l'interpretation .~onse­ cutive soit remise a I'apres-midi. La seance est levee a 13 heures. .FOUR HUNDRED AND FORTY· SEVENTH MEETING QUATRE CENT QUARANTE. SEPTIEMESEANCE Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 16 September 1949, at 3 p.m. Tenuea Lake SUiCCess, New-York, le vendredi 16 septembre 1949, a 15 heures. President: Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord) Pres~dent: Sir Alexander CADOGAN(United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland). Pres.ent :' The representp.tives of the following COu..'ltnes: Argentina, Canada, China, Cuba, Presents: Les representantsdes pays suivants: Argentine; Canada, Chine, Cuba, Egypte, France, Norvege, Republique socialiste sovietique d'Ukraine, Union des Repllbliques socialistes sovie-