S/PV.450 Security Council

Sub-paragraph (a) of item 2 of our agenda, concerns the second progress report of the Commission for Conventional Armaments [S/C.3/32/Rev.1 and S/C.3/32/Rev.1/Corr.1] which covers the activities of the CommissIon . ,for the period 16 July 1947 to 12 August 1948. It was intend( ~ to have this report placed before us a year ago, but the Commission was unable to obtain complete agreement on. the report at that time. The difficulties responsible for that situation have, in the meantime, been resolved, with the result that the report is now before the Security Council for its consideration. ~he report outlines in some detail the nature of the activities of the Commission for Conventional Armaments during the period covered. These activitieJ led to the adoption by the Commission, at its 13thmeeting on 12 August 1948, of two resolutions representing the Commission's findings and conclusions on items 1 and 2 of its established plan of work. Item 1 defines the competence of the Commission in terms of the armaments and armed forces considered to fall within its jurisdiction. Item 2 consists of a statement of the principles to govern the formulation of practical proposals for' the establishment of a system for the regulation and reduCtion of armaments and armed forces. The full texts of the two resolutions appear at the beginning of the progress report before us. ' In view of the heavy demands on our time, I think it is unnecessary to review the reasons underlyirig the adoption of these two resolutions. They have been fully set forth in the records of the Commission for Conventional Armaments and its Working Committee, and they hqve' been adequately summarized in the progress report now before us. Speaking as the representative of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, I should like to offer for the Security Council's consideration the fellow, ing draft resolution [S/1398] which was circulated at the conclusion of our [448th] meeting on 27 September 1949. {(Having r.eceived and examined the second progress report of the Commission for Conven- "tional Armaments, together with its annexes and accompanying resolutions, '. 3. Reglementation et reductio~ des armements et des forces armees . Le PRESIDENT (tradztit de l'cmglais): L'ali- nea a) du point 2 de notre ordre du jour a trait au deuxieme rapport sur les travaux accomplis par la, Commission des armements de type clas·· sique au COUTS de la periodecomprise entre le 16 juiUet 1947 et le 12 aout 1948 [S/C.3/32/ Rev.l et S;C.3/32/Rev.1/Corr.1]. Ce rapport aurait du etre. sotl..-nis au Conseil it y a un an, mais la Commission n'avait pas abouti alors a- un accord complet. Les difficultes qui s'etaient presentees ont ete resolues par la suite, de sorte que le Conseil est en mesure d'examiner main- tenant ce rapport. Le rapport retrace de fa~on assez detaillee les travaux de la Commission, pendant la periode en cause. La Commission a finalement adopte, le ,12 aout 1948, au cours de la 13eme seance, deux resolutions enon~ant les .conclusions auxquelles elle avait abouti relativement aux points 1 et 2 de son programme de travail. Le point 1 definit le mandat de la Commission en ce qui concerne les armements et les forces armees qui sont de son domaine. Le point 2 expose les principes a- appliquer pour l'enonce de propositions pratiques en vue de la creation d'un systeme de reglemen- tation et de reduction des armements et des for- ces armees. Les textes de ces deux resolutions se trouvent au debut du rapport qui nous a ete communique. Etant donne que notre ordre du jour- est tr~s charge, je ne pense pas qu'il soit necessa!re d'~xa~. miner pour queUes raisons ces deux resolutIOns ont ete adoptees. Un expose complet de ces a'gu,. ments se trouve dans les .comptes rendus de la Commission des armements de type classique et de son groupe de, travail. I1s sont.resumes ;1; , tnaniere adequate dans le rapport gm noUS a ete communique. En qualite de representant des ETATS-UN~S D'AMERIQUE, je voudrais soumettre. au Co.nsell , de securite le projet de resolutlOn sUlvant [S/1398] dont le texte a ete distribue a- la fin de notre [448M12e] seance, le 27 septembre 1949. tlAyant req;' et exanzine le deuY.iem~ ~apport sur les travaux accomplis par la CommlsSlOn des armemerits de type' c1assique, a.insi que les an- nexes et resolutions qui l'accompagnent: "Directs the Secretary-General to transmit this report, its annexes and accompanying resolutions. together with the record of the Sec.urity Council's consideration of this subject, to the General Assembly for its information." "Charge le Secretaire general de transmettre a l'Assemblee generaIe, pour information, le rap- port, les annexes et resolutions qui l'accompa- gnent, ainsi que le compte rendu des debats que le Conseil de securite a consacres a cette ques- tion." Mr.. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): After a whole year's delay, the Security Council is being asked to consider the second. progress report of the Commission for Conventional Armaments for the 'period July 1947 to August 1948. The report reveals two diametrically opposed approaches to . the question of the reduction of armaments. On the one hand, there is the attitude adopted by the Soviet Union, which aims at an immediate and unconditional reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons along with the establishment of strict international control; on the other hand, there is the position taken by the United States and the United Kingdom, which have sought to delay and sabotage the prepara- tion of measures to reduce armaments and pro- hibit atomic weapons. M.MALIK (Union des Republiques socialistes sovieHques) (trad'uit du ntsse) : Le Conseil de securite est saisi, avec une annee de retard, du deuxieme rapport sur les travaux accomplis par la Commission des armements de type classique, portant sur la periode de juillet 1947 a aout 1948, Le rapport enregistre les vues diametralement opposees qui se sont' manifesh~es au sujet dp. la reduction 'des armements; d'une part, l'opinion de I'Union sovietique. qui a preconise la reduc- tion immediate et inconditionnelle des arme- ments et l'interdiction de l'arme atomique concur- remment avec 1'etablissement d'un strict controle international; d'autre part, l'attitud~ des Etats- Unis et du Royaume-Uni, qui ont cherche a retarder et a saooter la preparation de mesures tendant a reduire les armements et a interdire l'arme atomique. It is common knowledge that the United Nations was set up with the objective of main- taining international peace and security and of forestalling any new aggression. A reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic '''Teapons would serve the cause of international peace and security and would promote confidence be- tween the large and small nations. It would put an end to the armaments race and ease the burden of taxation borne by the people, besides lifting the weight of exorbitant and--ever-growing mili- tary expenditure from the shoulders of the masses in all countries, large and small alike. Basing its - podtionon these lofty principles, the Soviet Union set a praiseworthy example in this matter. At the.;very first session of the General Assembly in 1946, the Soviet Union-introduced a proposal for a general reduction of armaments and the pro~ hibition of atomIc weapons. Despite considerable opposition, the substance of those proposals was adopted in the form of General Assembly reso- jution 41 (1) of 14 December 1946, entitled "Principles governing the general reduCtion and regulation of armaments". Comme on le sait, l'Organisation des Nations Unies a ete creee dans le but de maintenir la paix et la: securite des peuples et d'empecher de nouvelles agressions de se produire. La reduction des armements et l'interdiction des armes ato- mi.ques serviraient la cause de: la paix et de la securite internationales et renforcerait la con- fiance entre les grandes et petites nations. On pourrait ainsii mettre fin a la course aux arme- ments, aIIeger les charges fiscales et liberer la population des pays grands et petits du lourd fardeau que lui imposent des depenses militaires deja exce~sives et qui vont sans cesse croissant. En se fondant sur ces nobles principes, l'Union sovietique a montre en cette matiere un exemple digne d'eloge. Des la premiere session de 1'As- semblee generale, en 1946, l'Union sovietique a propose la reduction generale des- armemellts et l'interdiction des armesatomiques. En depit d'une forte resistance, ces propositions ont ete a.ccep- tees dans leur ensemble et ont constitue la re~so­ lution 41 (1) _adoptee le 14 decembre 1946' par l'Assemblee generale et intitUlee "Principes re- gissant la reglementation et la reduction gene- rales des armements". On sait que, dans cette resolution, l'Assemblee generale reconnait la necessite _de proceder au plus tot a une reglementation et a une reduction generales des armements et des forces armees et recommande .-au Conseil de securite de mettre rapidement a l'etude l'elaboration, seIon leur ordre d'urgence, des mesures pratiques qui sont indispensables pour realiser la reglel,11entation et la reduction generales -des armements et des forces armees.· Dans cette meme resolution, l'As- semblee generale declare que l'interdiction et Asiswell known, in that resolution the General Assembly recognized .the necessity 'of an early general regulation a.nd reduction of armaments and armed forces, and recommended that the ~ecurity _Council should give prompt considera- tion to formulating the practical measures which '~ere essential to provide for the general regula- tIon and reduction of armaments and armed forces. In the same resolution the General The USSR delegation stated in its proposal [S/229] that it "considers that the general regu- lation and reduction of armaments and armed forces is the most important measure for strength- ening international peace and security and that the implementation of the General Assembly's decision on this question is one of the most urgent and most important tasks of the Security Coun- cil". The representatives of the Soviet Union have always maintained, and still maintain, that view " whenever the question of the reduction of arma- ments and the prohibition of atomic weapons is discussed by the United Nations. The USSR delegation's proposals met with strong opposition, in the Security Council as well, from the delegations of the United States and the.UnitM Kingdom. From the ontset, the repre- sentatives of the United States and the United Kingdom did their level best to separate the . question of armaments reduction from that of the prohibition of atomic weapons-although these two questions cannot really be separated one from the other-their pretext being that it was. im- possible to consider the prohibition of atomic weapons together with the reduction of arma- ments. Although the unfounded nature of such claims is· obvious, the Security CDuncil neverthe- less gave way to the pressure brought to bear by the United States and the United Kingdom, and adopted a resolution [S/268/Rev.1] establishing a commission concerned only with so-called con- ventional armaments. The Commission was in- structed to submit, within' a time ·1imitof three months, proposals for the general regulation and reduction of conventional armaments. These pro- posals are not yet forthcoming, although almost three years have passed since the said Commission Was established. The question of the prohibition of atomic weapons was artificially separated 'from that of the reduction of armaments and was pur- posely' excluded from the competence of the Commission. . Such a beginning held nq promise of good, for the separation of two such inseparably connected questions made it possible for the opponents of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons not ol11y ~o prevent the Atomic Energy Commission· from taking decisions on the 'prohibition of atomic weapons, and thus to hold .up any deciSIon on the establishment of atomic energy control, but also to object, in the Com- mission for Conventional Armaments, to the re- duction of armaments on the pretext that there was no atomic energy control. .The representa:. Les propositions de la delegation 'de l'URSS se sont heurtees, au Lonseil de securite aussi, a urie forte opposition de la part des delegations des Etats-Unis et du Royaume-Uni. Les repre- sentants des Etats-Unis et dll Royaume-Uni se sont tout d'abord efforces de separer les deux prohlemes, indissolublement lies, de la· reduction ,des armements et de l'interdiction des armes ato- miques, sous pretexte qu'il serait 1mpossible d'examiner la question de !'interdiction des armes atomiques en liaison avec cene de la re- duction des. armements. 11 est evident qu'une teIle delegation ne repose sur aucun fondement; le Conseilde securite. n'en a pas moins adopte, sous la pression des Etats-pnis et du Royaume- Uni, une resolution [S/268/Rev.l] portant crea- tion d'up.e comrnissionqui n'a competence que pour ce que l'oh appelle les armements de type classique. -Cette Commission fut chargee de pre- senter, dans un delai de trois mois au p'ius, des propositions' au sujet de la reglementation et de la .reduction generales des arrnements de type cIassique, ce qu'eIle n'a pas encore fait, bien CJ,ue pres de trois ans se soient ecoules depuis sa crea- tion. La question de·l'interdiction des armes ato- miques ftit artificiellement dissociee de celle de la reduction des armements et deliherement sous- traite a la competence de la Commission des ar- mements: de type cIassique. Un tel debut n'etait pas de honaugure. En effet, la disjonction de ces deux questions, 'qui· sont pourtant etroitement liees, a permis aux adver- lOaires de la reduction des armements et de l'inter- diction des armesatomiques non seu1e~ent d'empecher la Commission ·de l'energie atomlque d'adopter une resolution au sujet de l'interdiction des armes atomiques, retardantainsi retabliss~­ ment .d'uncontrole de l'energie atomique;. ~als encore de s'opposer, au sein de la. Commlss~on des armements de type dassique, a la. re~uctl~!l des armements, en prenant pretexte du falt qu 11 d ~of the necessary conventions on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. Les delegations des Etats-Unis et du Royaume- Dni ant repousse, grace cl l'appui d'une majorite docile, le plan de travail que la delegation. de l'Union sovietique avait propose cl la,Commission et lui ont impose leur propre plan qui tend, essen- tiellement, cl 13mpecher l'elaboration de mesures pratiques et de ce fait, la mise en reuvre de la resolution adoptee par l'Assemblee generale pour la reduction des annements, et ce1a sous pretexte qu'll serait imp()ssible de proceder cl la reduction des armements et, d'interdire les' armes atomiques, ce qu'ils ont essaye de prouvercl grand renfort de citations et d'arguments. Les representants' de ces pays n'ontcesse.de .repetero tout au long des travam::.ae la Commi~­ sio1]., cl la maniere d'urie lec;on apprise par creur, la meme formule: "Le desarmement n'est pas possible tant que la confiancene regnera pas." C'est, Sir.,Alexander Cadogan, representant du Royaume-Uni, qui a lancecette formule. I1 a ete energiquementappuyepar .Ies representants des Etats-Unis et de la France. I1 convient de faire remarquer qu'en. cette matiere ,les representants du Royaume-Uai et de la France ont adopte une attitude fort semblableclcelle de leurs predeces- seurs, de triste memoire, qui, cl ,la Societe des Nations, se re£ugiaient eux aussi derriere la for- mule: "Securited'abord ;desarmement apres" et qui, enrejetant les propositions' pratiques de l'Union sovietique, ont empeche la Societe des Nations de parvenir cl une decision, tant en cequi concerne ledesarmement qu'en ce qui concerne. la reduction' des armements et ont, comme ori le sait, pennis cl l'Alleinagne'hitlerienne de s'a:nner jusqu'aux dents et de reussir presque cl aneantii de nombreux pays, dont le Royaume-Uni et la France. The United States and United Kingdom dele- gations, relying on the support of an obedient majority, rejected the Soviet Union plan for the Commission's work and insisted on their own plan. The main object of that plan was to prevent the preparation of practical measures and thereby to hamper the implementation of the General Assem- bly's resolution on the reduction of armaments, on th~pretext that it was not possible to reduce armaments and prohib~t atomic weapons.' In sUPP9rt of their argument, they made use of all sorts of quotations and arguments. Throughout the Commission's work therept~­ sentatives of those countries kept repeating, as if they. had learned it by heart, the formula "Dis- armament is impossible without confidence". That formula was first put forward. by the United Kingdom representative, Sir Alexander Cadogan, and in using it he had the hearty support of the representatives of the United States and France. In this matter, it is' worthy of, note, the repre- sentatives of the United Kingdom and France have changed but little from their unfortunate predecessors in the League of Nations, who also hid behind the phrase "Security first, and then disarmament" and 'who, by rejecting the Soviet Union's concrete proposals, prevented the League from taking decisions on disarmament or the re- duction of armaments. As all are aware, this made it much easier for hitlerite Germany" to arm to the teeth and almost to succeed in destroy- ing many countries, including the United King- dom and France. Thus the well-known game is played again. In the Military Staff Committee the United States representatives delay the attainment of that agreement which· would make it possible for the Committee to reach a decision as to the establishment of armed forces at the disposal of the Selrurity Council, thus preventing the imple- mentation of Article 43, while, in the Commission for Conventional Armaments, they maintain that until Article 43 has been implemented, the reduc- tionof armaments is impossible. Matters thus revolve in a vicious circle. By raising the question of atomic energy con- trol, they pursue the same objective. It is .a well- known fact that the United States seeks above all to limit such control to atomic raw materials, and that it refuses to consid~r the possibility of simultaneotlsly establishing control over under- takings producing atomic materials and atomic energy, and outlawing atomic weapons. Refer- ences to such lack of control have also been used to prevent the preparation of proposals on the reduction of armaments. It is obviously impos- sible to agree with such an approach to that ques- tion. As to the question of peace treaties with Germany and Japan, it is common knowledge that these treaties have' not as yet .been concluded because the United States has violated the Pots- dam Agreement and is deliberately hindering the conclusion of treaties with both countries. Thus, what the United States and United King- dom are really doing is to delay and hinder the preparation and adoption of· practical measures , for the reduction of armaments and the prohi,.. bition of atomic weapons by hedging these about with a number of quite irrelevant claims and conditions not directly related to the question. In direct pursuance of this policy, the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom imposed certain resolutions in the Commission for c--'Conventional Armaments, which the Commission 1s submitting to the Security Council in its report. In'stead of practical measures for the implenien- Onobtient ainsi un schema bien connu. Les representants des Etats-Unis au Comite d'etat- major retardent la realisation de 1'accord qui permettrait a. ce Comite de prendre une decision sur la creation de forces armees du Conseil de securite, empechant ainsi l'application de I'Ar- tide 43 de la Charte, tandis qu'ils soutiennent devant la Commission des armements de type dassique qU'il n'est pas possible de reduire les armements tant que les dispositions de l'Arti- . c~e. 43 ne seront pas appliquees.\ C'est un cerc1e VlCleux. En soulevant la question du control" de 1'ener- gie atomique, ils poursuivent le meme but. Comme on le sait, les Etats-Unis cherchent avant tout a limiter ce controle aux seules matieres premieres atomiques et se refusent cl ce que soit simulta- nement institue le contrale des entreprises pro- ductrices de materiaux atomiques et d'energie atomique;' et a ce que soient interdites les armes atomiques. L'absence d'un tel contrale leur a servi de pretexte pour empecher l'elaboration de propositions relatives a. la reduction des arme- ments. I! va de soi qu'on ne saurait admettreque ces questions soient traitees de la sorte. Quant aux traites de paix avec I'Allemagne et le Japon, on sait que, s'ils n'ont pas encore ete condus, c'est parce que les Etats-Unis ont viole les accords' de Potsdam et qu'ils retardent ades- sein la concl1;tsion de traites de paix avec ces deux pays. I! s'ensuit qu'en somme, la position des Et~ts­ Unis et du Royaume-Uni a. l'egard de la quest~on de la reduction des armements et de l'interdictlOn de I'arme atomique revient a. faire dependre la reduction des armements et l'interdiction des ar,- mes atomiques de multiples exigences et cond1" tions sans rapport direct avec ces questions, for- muIees tout expres pour retarder et emp~cher l'elaboratioh et l'adoption de mesures prat1q~es destinees a. reduire les armements et a. interd1re les armes atomiques. C'est precisement en vertu de cette meme politique que les delegatior;s,de~s Etats-Unis et du Royaume-Uni ont impose;,4 Quiconq-ue etudie attentivement, sans p~rti· pris, le rapport de la Commission et les resolu- tions. qu'il contient, est bien oblige de constater que, pendant tout le cours des travaux de cette Commission, les delegations des Etats-Unis et dtl Royaume-Uni, ainsi que d'autres :.MIegations qui les suivent, la delegation fran<;aise en parti- culler, n'ont cesse de presenter des propositions tendant a saboter 1'application de la resolution adoptee par l'Assemblee gemSrale, a empecher l'ela1:loration de mesu,es d'ordre pratique permet- tant la reduction des armements et l'intermction desannes atomiques et a detourner la Commis- sion de sa tache en ce qui concerne ces deux pro- blemes, en l'obligeant aexaminer des propositions qui ne prevoient pas de teUes mesures. Anyone who studies attentively and without bias the Commission's report and the resolutions contained therein cannot fail to notice that during the course of the. Commission's work, the delega- tions of the United States and the United King- dom, and certain other delegations following in their wake, particularly the French delegation, have continually submitted proposals with the intention of sabotaging the implementation of the General Assembly resolution, of preventing the preparation of practical measures for the reduc- tion of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, and of substituting for such measures proposals distracting attention from these two problems. Ce sont p!"ecisement les Etats-Unis et le Royaume-Uni, qui, ayant declenche la course anx It is the United States and the United King- dom which, having launched an armaments race, have scuttled the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments. The result is that the Commission has prepared no proposals for the implementation of the General Assembly resolu- tion on the reduction of armaments and the pro- hibition of atomic weapons. Up to now nothing has been done to implement that resolution. armem~nts, ont torpille les travaux de la Com- mission des armements de type classique; il en resuIte que cette Commission n'a prepare aucune proposition pour, la mise en ceuvre de la res.:>lu- tion de l'AssembIee generale relative a la reduc- tion des armements et a l'interdiction des armes atomiques. Jusqu'ici, rien n'a eie fait pour donner dIet a cette resolution. While, in the various organs of the United Nations, the representatives of the· United States and the United· Kingdom make interminable speeches on the subject of international confi- dence, aggressive circles in those countries become increasingly active in carrying out their policy of preparing for a new war; this activity is accom- panied by an unjustifiable increase in all kinds of armaments and the excessive expansion of mili- larybudgets, with the result that a growing load of taxation and other material burdens is placed upon the wide masses of the populations of those countries. Tandis qu'au sein des divers organes de l'Gr- ganisation des Nations Unies, les· representants des Etats-Unis et duRoyaume-Uni discourent a perdre haleine sur le theme de la confiance inter- nationale, lesmilieux bellicistes des memes pays redoublent d'activite et poursuivent une politique de preparation aune nouvelle guerre qui s'accom- pagne d'un accroissement injttstifie des arme.;. ments de tous genres et d'une augmentation enorfne des budgets militaires, de sorte que, pour les grandes masses de la pOf'ulation de ces pays, les impots et autres charges deviennent de plus en plus lourds. . We need only mention that, since the end of th7Second 'World War, the budgetary appropri- ations of the United States for milita!"y expendi- I1 suffit de si~aler que dans le budget des Etats-Unis, les sommesaffectees aux depenses militaires ont augmente d'annee ·en annee depuis la fin de la deuxieme guerre mondiale et que les depenses militaires directes et indirectes consti- tuent plus de 50 pour 100 du budget de l'exercice 1949-1950, par exemple. Dansces conditions, i1 n'estpas· surprenant qu'un accroissement aussi enorme des budgets militaires suscite l'inqUietude, meme dans l'entourage immediat du Gouverne- ment. A ce propos, on ne peut eviter de rappeler la recentedeclaration de M. Edwin G. Nourse, Che,f du Conseil d'experts economiques attache a la presidence des Etats-Unis, qui, preconisant la reduction du budget 111ilitaire des Etats-Unis. a declare, d'apres une information parue dans le ~re have increased annually, a~d that direct and Indirect military expenses constitute over 50 per cent of the budget, if.we take, for example, the year 1949-1950. It is not surprising, therefore, !hat such a vast expan.;ion of military budgets IS arousing anxiety even among persons closely connected with the Governrn(;11t. In this con- nexion, attention should be drawn to the recent pronouncement of the chief of the President's COt1lJcilof Economic Advisors, Mr. Edwin G. Nourse, who made the following statement, reported in the New York Post of 7 October 1949, on the desirability of reducing military In these circumstances, it is obviously impos- sible to take seriously the statements on inter- national confidence made by the United ·States representative, for it goes without saying that any increase in military e..'Cpenditure. armed forces and'trained reserves can only complicate the inter- national situation, undermine confidence between nations and intensify anxiety. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons would promote confidence between large and small nations and would serve the cause of peace and international security. While resolutions and speeches proclaim the need to establish confidence, that confidence is being directly undermined by deeds. That is the main reason why nothing has yet been done to implement both General Assembly resolution 41 (1) of 14 December 1946, entitled "Principles governing the general regulation and reduction , of armaments" and General Assemb'y resolution 1 (1) of 24 January 1946, entitled "Establishment of a commission to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy", a fact which undermines the authority of the United Nations. The fact that neither the Commission for Con- ventional Armaments nor the Atomic' Energy Commission has carried out the tasks entrusted to it, can be explained primarily by the fact that the Governments of the United States and United Kingdom have so far made no effort to take decisions that might be acceptable to all peace-loving countries without being prejudicial to the national sovereignty of any of those States. Such is the balance-sheet of the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments. The Commission's report is submitted to the Security Council fo. its approval. The, delegation of the United States has proposed [S/1398] that the Security Council should approve that report and adopt the Commission's resolutions which it con- tains. It is well known' that these unacceptable reso- lutions were imposed upon the Commission -for Tel est le bilan des travauxde la Commission des armements de type dassique. Le rapport de cetteCommission est soumis a. l'approbation d.u Conseil de securite. La delegation des Etats-Ums a propose au Conseil de securite [S/1398] d'ap- prouver ce, rapport et d'adopter les resolutions jointes au rapport de la Commission. Ces resolutions inacceptables ont ete, comme on le satt, imposees a la Commission des arme- The delegation of the Soviet Union would not object to the' proposal that the Security Council should. refer the report of the CommIssion for Conventional Armaments to the General Assem- bly for information only, since that report is, in fact, of an informative nature, reflecting as it does the fruitlessness of the Commission's work between July 1947 and August 1948. The USSR delegation continues to hold the view that the Security Council and the United Nations should immediately proceed to the preparation of practi!:al measures for the reduc- tion of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. That is the only genuine way in which to promote the strengthening of international peace and security and the growth of international confideace. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): I do not know what people will think of our proceedings here today, nor what effect they will have, in general, on men's minds. I know the effect that they have on mine, and I should like just to make one or two short reflections. Here we are, the members of the Security Council, trying to find-or, at any rate, we s:lOuld be trying to find-solutions for these extremely difficult and complex problems. We ought to be sitting round this table exchanging views and suggestions, discussing how we might and a compromise here or an agreement there. Pro- posals have been made and discussed in various bodies, in the Commission for Conventional Armaments, in the Secu:rity Council, and even in the General Assembly itself. I can quite under- stand that it may be disappointing to the Soviet Union and to the Governments associated with Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): Je me demande ce que le public pensera de la seance d'aujourd'hui; je ne sais pas quel effet ce debat aura sur l'opinion, mais je sais l'effet qu'it a sur moi, et je voudrais faire quelques breves remarques. Nous sommes reunis en ce Conseil pour essayer - c'est du moins notre tache - de resoudre des problemes extremement complexes et difficiles. Nous devrions, autour de cette table, echanger des opinions, presenter des suggestions, nou~ devrions rechercher sur tel point, un compromlS, sur tel autre, lL'1 accord. A la Commission des armements de type c1assique, au Conseil de securite, et meme a l'Assemblee generale, des propositions ont ete presentees et discutees. Je comprends que I'Union sovietique et les gouvernements qui s'associent a el1e soient de<;us de ne pas voir triompher Ieur point de vue, mais le fait est que l'Assemblee generate I'a rejete, a une ecrasante majorite.2 Je me demande si le representant de l'Union. sovietiquea raison d'accuser cette majorite d'etre servile, car cette epithete soulevera, je pense, I'indignation dans bien des milieux. ~t that their views do not prevail. But, the fact IS that they do not, and an overwhelming majority of the General Assembly has pronounced against them.2 I doubt whether it is wise of the Soviet Union representative to stigmatize that majority as being servile, because I think that that might be resented in a number of quarters. .In these circumstances, is it useful or even :Vlse for the Soviet Government at this stage to mdulge in a long historical review based on selected facts and considerable distortions in an En quoi peut-il etre utile et me1l1e sage, pour le Gouvernement de I'Union sovietique, de presenter un long expose recapitulatif, ,qui ne contient que certains faits et qui eo. denature beaucoup d'autre5, expose OU I'on ne defend pas seulement la position de l'Uni~n sbvietique, mais ou 1'on e~ort not only to attempt to defend the point of VIew of the Government of the Soviet Union but The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR has criticized that resolution in the past and has taken a negative attitude towards it. It continues to hold these views. It will vote against the resolu- tion, since it does not solve the problem, but actually sabotages the Soviet Union draft reso- lution [S/1405] on the reduction of armaments. This is the statement which the delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic has deemed it necessary to make. Mr. ARcE (Argentina) (translated f1'om Spanish) : Since the views of all the delegations have already been clearly expressed, I would not have taken part in this discussion if the repre- sentative of the Soviet Union had not seen fit to refer once again to the "obedient majority". This was the translation given by the interpreter:. in English, "obedient majority" ; in French, ma,jorite servile". It is quite clear, from a whole series of positions taken, that as far as my delegation is concerned- and, I make so bold as to say, as far as the other delegations referred to are concerned-there has been no such thing. On the contrary, we have tried to see whether there was any possibility of reconciling the opposing points of view of the great Powers and reaching some solution. We have been unsuccessful. It is also clear that we have had an opportunity of seeing that, while some parties were putting all their C"ards on the table, others were not. But in any case, whoever is right, no one regrets more than we do that certain provisions of the Charter cannot be ful- filled because the great Powers which launched mo~ent, j'estime 9,ue nous devons, autant que pOSSible, faire progresser nos travaux et adopter le projet de resolution soumise par la delegation des Etats-Unis. M. MANUILSKY (Republique socialiste sovie- tique d'Ukraine) (troottit dte russe): Le repre- sentant de l'Union sovietique a presente un tableau - d'une exactitude presque photogra- phique - du sabotage systematique dont sont l'objet, au sein des commissions comme au sein du Conseil de securite, toutes les propositions de reduction des. armements. Le projet de resolution [S/1398] qui nous est presente apparait, en realite, comme une espece d'acte d'accusation dresse contre ceUx qui, pendant des annees entie- res, a partir de 1946 ont systematiquement sabote aussi bien l'interdiction des armes atomiques que la reduction des armements. La delegation de la RSS d'Ukraine a cri.tique en son temps cette resolution et a adopte ason egard une attitude negative. Elle n'a pas change d'avis. Elle votera contre cette resolution pour la raison que celle-ci ne resout pas le probleme et que meme elle constitue en realite une manreu· vre de sabotage dirigee contre le projet de reso- lution [Sj1405] que l'Union sovietique a presente pour la reduction des armements. Telle est la declaration que la delegation de la Republique socialiste sovietique d'Ukraine tenait a faire. M. ARCE (Argentine) (tradttit de l'espagnol): Comme toutes les delegations ont deja clairement exprime leurs vues, je n'aurais pas pris la parole si le representant de l'Union sovi6tique n'avait cru necessaire de faire allusion, une fois de plus, a ce qu'il appelle "la majorite servile"; car c'est bien ainsi qu'ont traduit les interpretes: en fran<;ais: "majorite servile", en anglais: obediellt majority. 11 est evident, du fait de maintes prises de posi- tion, que ni ma delegation ni - je l'oserai dire-: les autres delegations visees n'ont vote par serv~­ lite. Nous avons recherche, au contraire, la POSS!- bilite de rapprocher les points de vue opposes des grandes Puissances et de trouver Une solution; nous n'y sommes pas parvenus. D'autre part, noUS avons egalement pu constater a l'evidence que si certains mettent cartes sur table, d'&utre~ ne le font pas. De toute maniere, ou que SOlt la verite, personne ne deplore plus que nOU3 l'impos- sibilite d'appliquer certaines dispositions de.Ia Charte, qui est due au fa:t que lesgrandes PUl~­ sances qui ont pris l'initiative de creer l'Orgam- sation des Natioas Unies s'opposent actuellement . .~ My contribution to this discussion is confined solely to stating once more, for the record, that I protest against certain expressions used by some delegations. They are quite uncalled for and could well give rise to comments regarding other kinds of obedience which, for the moment, I do not care to make. Si j'ai pris la parole, c'est uniquel11ent pour qu'il soit fait etat, une fois de plus, dans les comptes rendus, du fait que je proteste contre l'el11ploi que font certaines delegations d'expres- sions qui ne sont point fondees et qui pourraient d'ailleurs donner lieu a. des observations sur d'autres formes de serviHte dont je n'ai pas rintention de parler pour le moment. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Re- publics) (trmlslatcd from R1tssian): I should like to reply briefly to the remarks of the United Kingdom representative and to the statement of the representative of Argentina. M. l\rIALIK (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (trad1iit die msse): Je voudrais repondre brievement aux observations du repre- sentant du Royaume-Uni et a la replique du representant de l'Argentine. In my statement, I merely set forth facts both about the work of the Commission for Conven- tional Armaments and about the way in which the problem of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons has been discussed in organs of the United Nations such as the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. If Sir Alexander Cadogan wishes to refute those facts, I am prepared to listen to his remarks on the subject. Dans mon intervention, je n'ai fait qu'exposer des faits concernant aussi bien les travaux de la Commission des armements de type cJassique que la fac;on dont a ete examinee la question' de la reduction des armements et de l'interdiction des armes atomiques au sein des organes de l'Orga- nisation des Nations Unies: a. l'Assembtee gene- rale, au Conseil de securite et a. la Commission des armeraents de type c1assique. Si Sir Alexander Cadogan conteste ces faits, je suis tout pret a entendre les observations an'!! peut avoir a. pre- senter sur la question. - Those facts are well known and can be checked. I ventured to dwell in detail on the history of the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments and on the history of the discussion of the important international problem of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons which has taken place in organs of the United Nations, and particularly in the Security Council and in the Commission for Conventional Armaments, because the present mem?ership of the Security Council includes Ces faits sont connus de tous et il est possible de les verifier. Je me suis permis d'exposer avec quelque detail l'historique des travaux de la Commission des armel11ents de type classique, ainsi que rhistorique de l'exal11en qui a ete fait de cette importante question internationale qu'est la question de la reduction des armements et de ~'interdiction des armes atomiques, au sein des organes de l'Organisation des Nations Unies et particulierement au sein du Conseil de securite et de la Commission des armements de type clas": sique, parce que le Conseil de securite, tel qu'il est actuellement compos~, comprend plusieurs membres qui n'ont pris part ni aux travaux du Conseil ni aux travaux de la Commission des armements de type c1assique au cours de l'annee derniere, c'est-a-dire pendant la periode sur laquelle porte le rapport presente par la Commis- siol,1 des arl11ements de type classique. ~ertatn representatives who did not participate In the work of the Council and the Commission for Conventional Armaments last year, that is to say, the year which is covered by the report of the Commission for Conventional Armaments. In reply to Sir Alexander Cadogan's statement that he is awaiting new proposals from the dele- Sir Alexander Cadogan attend, parait-il, de la delegation de 1'Union sovietique qu'elle presente de nouvelles propositions; je suis contraint de repondre que Sir Alexander Cadogan connait fort bien le nombre et meme la nature des propo- sitions que la delegation de l'URSS a soumises a plusieurs reprises a l'Assemblee generale, au Conseil de securite et a la Commission des arme- ments de type c1assique, pour essayer d'obtenir que le Conseil de securite et la dite commission g~tion of the Soviet Union, I must observe that SIr Alexander Cadogan is well acquainted with both the number and substance of the proposals repeatedly submitted by the USSR delegation to the.General Assen;bl!, to the Security Council and to the CommIssIon for Coventional Arma- ments to the effect that the Security Council and th~ said Commission should immediately and '~Ithout fUl:ther delay proceed with the elabora- tion of practical measures for the implementation proc~rlassent iml11ediatement et sans delai a. rela- bor<l,.wn de mesures pratiques en vue de la mise en reuvre des resolutions de l'Assetnblee generale concernant la reduction des armements et l'inter- diction des arl11es atomiques. Toutes cesproposi- tions ont ete chaque fois rejetees par le bloc anglo-americain, notammentpar le representant du Royaume-Uni. Si le representant du Royaume.. Uni peut actuellement proposer quoi quece sait de nouveau, je suis pret a l'entendre et a. etudier ses propositions. ~f the General Assembly resolutions on the reduc- tionofarmaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. All these proposals were rejected, upon each occasion, by the Anglo-American bloc, and dotably by the representat~ve of the United King- om. If the representative of the United Kingdom l~npropose .anything new now, ram ready to Isten to and examine such proposals. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (translated from Spanish) : The representative of the Soviet Union anticipates how the Argentine delegation is going to vote and probably comments on that vote in advance. There is no harm in that. I can vote on the basis of the arguments advanced by certain de1e~ gations or I can vote in some particular.way on the basis of the contrary arguments advanced by other delegations. In other words, if certain argu- ments are not sufficiently convincing, the oppos- ing arguments may induce rue to confirm the opinion I had already formed. But my vote depends on the value of the arguments. Thus, on more than one occasion, a vote may be cast not because of what the speakers say, but because of what they leave unsaid. . What is unacceptable, and what I protested against, is that other motives should be imputed to the voting. The Argentine delegation votes according to its conviction at the time of voting, and not in order to be servile or obedient to any one. In spite of the fact that recent reports say that a bomb has been exploded in his count,ry, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist . Republics has no right to interpret the intentions of others, particularly if he is trying to intimidate us with the explosion I have mentioned. M. ARCE (Argentine) (trad~£it de l'espagnol) : Le representant de 1'Union sovietique anticipe sur le sens dans 1eque1 va voter la delegation de l'Argentine et il commente probablement cc vote par avance. Je n'ai rien a redire a ce1a. Je puis voter en fouction des arguments qU'avancent certaines delegations, ou bien encore je puis voter dans un sens determine en fonction des arguments qu'ava1;1cent, 'en sens contraire, certaines autres . delegations. En d'autres termes, si tel ou tel argument ne parvient pas a me convaincre suffisamment, 1es arguments de la partie adverse peuvent renforcer 1'opinion que je m'etais deja faite sur la question. Mais c'est d'apres la valeur des arguments gue j'exprime mon vote. Cela est si vrai qu~il est bien souvent possible de voter non pasa. cause de ce qu'ont dit les orateurs, mais .a. cause de ce qu'ils ont passe sous silence. Ce qui est inacceptab1e, et ce contre quoi j'ai proteste, c'est que 1'on prete a. un vote une autre cause que la conviction. La delegation de l'Arge~­ tine emet 1es votes qu'elle estime de sort deVOIr d'emettre; .e1le ne vote pas par servilite ni par doci1ite a. l'egard de quiconque. Ge n'est pas parce que, a. ce qu'on dit depuis quelque temps, une bombe atomique a explose sur le territoire. de 1'Union sovietique que le representant de ce pays a le dr',it cl'interpreter les intentions des autres; surtout s'il se propose de nous intimider avec 1'explosion dont je viens de parler. Je ne puis admettre ni n'.admett~~i. jaruais que quiconque - pas plus l'Umon sovletlque quriri:.tl I do not vo~e in this Council by way of servility, but from conviction. I may make mistakes, but I can assure the representative of the Soviet Union that I shall never make the mistake of voting servilely. He knows this because on many occasions we have been very close in our under- standing of certain problems, and at other times I have found myself very far apart from his habi- tual opponents, the United States and the United Kingdom, to which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is in constant opposition. Ce que je tenais a declarer, c'est que le repre- sentant de 1'Union sovietique n'a pas le droit de pader de "majorite servile", qu'il s'agisse d'un vote au Conseil de securite ou d'un vote a l'AssembIee generale. M. Malik, il est vrai, n'a pas fait allusion a ma delegation en particulier, mais il a dedaigneusement mentionne toutes les delegations quiont pu voter en faveur des argu- ments ou des theses des Etats-Unis ou du Royaume-Uni. Je declare, en ce qui me concerne tout au moins, que j'ai vote en faveur de ce que je croyais etre la these juste, et non pas par servilite. Nons n'avons pas appris a etre serviles. Je repete que, si 1'on veut pader de servilite, il sera peut-etre facile, en amplifiant le debat, de faire apparaitre . des,exemples bien plus inte- ressants. What I wanted to make clear is that the repre- sentative of the Soviet Union has no right to talk about an "obedient majority", either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly. Although, it is true, my delegation was not specially mentioned, slighting reference has been made to all those delegations which have voted for the arguments or views of the United States or the United Kingdom. As far as I am con- cerned, at least, I voted for what I thought to be the best argument, and not by way of servility. We are not in the habit of being servile. I would repeat that if we wish to talk about servility, we can carry the discussion further, and perhaps much more interesting examples can be brought forward. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated from Russian): We are now discussing a very serious question" that of the operation of the Working Committee which has dealt with the problem of tlle reduction of armaments. Ouestions like the reduction of armaments are" not joking matters. It seems to me that it ill behooves the Security Council to concern itself with trifling talk. I would suggest that the Council should not stray from the serious question on its agenda, and should not indulge in the kind of discussion the representative of Ar- gentina is trying to draw us into. M. MANUILSKY (Republique socialiste sovie- tique d'Ukraine) (traduit du russe): L'examen des travaux du Comite de travail qui s'est occupe du probleme de la reduction des armements est une question extremement serieuse. On ne plai- sante pas avec des questions telles que la reduc- tion des armements. 11 me semble que le Conseil de securite ne doit pas perdre son temps dans des discussions futiles. Je propose que nous ne nous ecartion Das de l'examen du serieux probleme inscrit it " Jrdre du jout' pour nous lancer dans la discussion dans laquelle cherche a nous entrainer le representant de l'Argentine. I must point -out.that the statements made by the Argentirie representative are unfounded. 'It is . common knowledge that the members of the Security Council do not express their personal opinions here. They do not attend in a personal capacity. They represent their countries. It is also·well known that the various Governments issue instructions to their representatives as· to What position to take on any given question. The Argentine representative, however, apparently contends that the Council is a kind of academy for the holding of discussions in which the various Je dois dire que rien de ce qu'a declare le representant de l'Argentine ne correspond a la realite. Tout le monde sait que les membres du Conseil de securite id presents n'expriment pas du tout leur opinion propre; ils ne siegent pas atitre personnel: ils representent leur pays. Tout le monde sait que les Gouvernements donnenta lenrs representants des instructions relatives a l'attitude qu'ils doivent adopter sur telle ou telle question. Or, le representant de l'Argentine a semble dire que le Conseil setait une espece d'aca- demie oit, au cours du debat, les uns chercheraient a convaincre les autres. Oette affirmation ne cor... Mr. ARCE (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): At the end of my statement I referred to certain examples of servility on which there was no need for further comment. The repre- sentative of the Ukrainian SSR quoted a Russian proverb \"Knock on the 'table, and the scissors will rattle". If that is so, I have no more to say, because the scissors have rattled.

The matter before us is the draft resolution proposed by the United States .delegation, set forth in document S/1398. Does any representative wish to discuss the draft resolution? As no representative now wishes to discuss the draft resolution, I shall put it to a vote. A vote was taken by show of hands, as follows: In favour: Argentina, Canada, China, Cuba, Egypt, France, Norway, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.;. Against: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The result of the vote was 9 in favour to 2 against. The resolution was not adopted, one of the votes against being that ofa permanent member of the Council. Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): I suggest that the Security Council cannot leave the matter there. Since we cannot make the affirmation suggested in the United States draft resolution, I think that it would probably be the unanimous wish of members of the Council that we should at least send to. the General Assembly for its information the report, annexes and accompanying resolutions, together with the record of the Security Council's consideration of this subject. Un proverbe russe dit: "Frappe sur la table et les ciseaux resonneront". Le representant de I'Union sovietique avait constate un fait et nul n'avait rien dit, et voila que le representant de l'Argentine, que personne n'avait nomme, se jette en avant et dit: "Les ciseaux, c'est moi". Je demande au President de nous epargner ces vaines et futiles discussbns; notre temps est trop precieux, l'Assemblee generale siege et chacun de nous a fort a faire. Des questions comme celle de la reduction des armements sont des questions qui interessent la paix et, comme le President le sait par experience personnelle, ce n'est pas un sujet sur lequel on puisse plaisanter. M. ARCE (Argentine) (traduit de l'espagnol): A la fin de ma declaration j'ai fait allusion ades exemples de servilite qu'il n'etait pas necessaire de preciser davantage.·Le representant de la RSS d'Ukraine nous a cite un proverbe russe qui.dit, semble-t-il, "Frappe sur la table, et les ciseaux. resonneront". Eh bien, je crois n'avoir plus rien a dire, car les ciseaux ant resonne I . Le PRESIDENT (traauit de l'anglais): La question qui nous est soumise est le projet de resolution presente par la delegation des Etats- Unis et qui figure au document S/139R Est-ce qu'un representant veut discuter ce projet de resolution? Comme personne ne demande la parole, je mets aux voix le projet de resolution. Votent pour: Argentine, Canada, Chine, Cuba, Egypte, France, Norvege, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, Etats- Unis d'Amerique. Votent contre: Republique socialiste sovietique d'Ukraine, Union des Republiques socialistes .sovietiques. Il y DJ 9voiz POUff" et 2 contre. L'une des voiz contre etant celle d'un membre permanent du Conseil, la resolution 'Ifest pas adoptee. ; , Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): Le Conseil de securit~ ne peut pas, a mon avis, la~511er la question e.n l'e!a~. Puisquenous ne pouvons pas adopter le dlSPOSltlf du projet de resolution des Etats-Unis, je pense que le Conseil acceptera a l'unanimite de trans- mettre simp1ement a l'Assemblee generale, pour information, le rapport avec ses annexes" les resolutions jointes, et le compte rendu des debats du· Consei! a ce sujet. iCThe Securit')/ Council, "Le Conseil de sec~erite, ((Having received and examined the second progress report 01 the Commission for Conven- tional Armaments, together with the annexes and resolutions concerning items 1 and 2 of the Com- mission's established plan of work adopted by the Commission at its 13th meeting on 12 August 1948, which are attached to the report (S/1371), "Ayant reftt et examine le deuxieme rapport sur les travaux accomplis par la Commission des armements de type c1assique, ainsi que les annexes et les resolutions concernant les points 1 et 2 de son programme de travail, adoptees par la Com- mission 10rs de sa 13eme seance tenue le 12 aout 1948, qui sont jointes au rapport (S/1371), "Charge le Secretaire general de transmettre a. l'AssembIee generale, pour information, le rapport, ses annexes et les resolutions qui 1'accom- pagnent, ainsi que le compte rendu des debats que le Conseil de securite a consacres a cette question." . ((Di1'ects the Secretary-General to transmit this repoFt, its annexes and accompanying resolutions, together with the record of the Security Council's consideration on the subject, to the General Assembly for its information." Le PRESIDENT (traduit de Z'anglais): Y a-t-il objection a adopter cette procedure?

Is there any objection to the adoption of this course? M. MALIK (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): I1 serait neanmoins souhaitable de prendre connaissance du texte. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian) : It would be desirable to see the text.

I have one copy which I shall pass to the representative of the USSR, and there are a few other copies if any other representative wishes to read the text. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de Z'anglais): J'ai un exemplaire du texte et je vais le communiquer au representant de 1'URSS; i1 en existe quelques autres dont les membres du Conseil pourront prendre connaissance. S'il n'y a pas d'objection, la proposition est adoptee. Since there is no objection, the proposal is carried. M. MALIK (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): La delegation de 1'URSS s'abstient de voter sur cette proposition. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian) : The USSR delegation abstains from voting on .this proposal.

Very well, the record will ,show that. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Tres bien. Cela figurera au compte rendu. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic): The delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic abstains. M. MANUILSKY (Republique socialiste sovietique d'Ukraine) (traduit de Z'anglais): La delegation de la Republique socialiste sovietique d'Ukraine s'abstient de voter.

The record will show that also. In view of the present parliamentary situation I ~hould like the record to show that the motion is carried by a vote of 9 in favour, with 2 abstentions. We shaH now proceed to the consideration of SUb-paragraph (b) of item 2 of the agenda. Le PRf.SIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Cela figurera egalement dans le compte rendu. Dans ces conditions, je voudrais que le compte rendu mentionne que la proposition a ete adoptee par 9 voix, avec 2 abstentions. Nous allons examiner maintenant le paragraphe b) du point 2 denotre ordre du jour. . . M. CHAUVEL (France) : Le Conseil de securite etait saisi de deux textes differents qui lui ont eteadresses pour approbation par la Commission des armements de type dassique, apres qu'ellememe les eut adoptes. Mr. CHAUVEL (France) (translated from French): The Security Council had before it !wo different texts which have been submitted for ItS approval by the Commission for Conventional Arma~e1,1ts, after having been adopted by that CommlsslOn. . The first [S/1371] related to the implementatlton ,of General Assembly resolution 41 (1) of 4 December 1946. . Le premier [S/1371] avait trait a. l'execution de la resolution 41 (T) de l'Assemblee generale en date du 14 decembre 1946. Le second des.deux textes soumis a. l'approbation du Conseil est un plan de travail adopte par la Commission le ler· aout 1949 [S/1372] en execution de la resolution. 192 (HI) de l'AsgembIee generale .en, date du 19 novembre The second of the two texts submitted for the ~ouncll's approval is a working paper adopted by t e Commission on 1 August 1949 [S/1372J in pursuance of the General Assembly resolution ~(II~:. of 19 Nov~~b~r_l~~~n.~~eGeneral On 19 November 1948 the General Assembly Le 19 novembre 1948, I'Assemblee generale a recommended that the Security Council should recommande au Conseil de securite "de pour- "pursue the study of the regulation and reduction suivre l'etude de la reglementation et de la reducof conventional armaments and armed forces tion des armements de type classique et des forces thtough the agency of the Commission for Conarmees par l'intermediaire de la Commission des ventional Armaments" and at the same time armements de type c1assique" et, en meme temps, c expressed the earnest hope that the Commission elle a emis le vceu que, dans l'execution de son for Conventional Armaments, in carrying out its plan de travail, la Commission des. armements plan of work, should "devote its first attention"- de type c1assique se preoccupat "de formuler 1 stress the word "first"-"to formulating protout d'abord" - j'insiste sur tout d'abord - posals for the receipt, checking and publication, "des propositions pour la reception, la verification by an international organ of control within the et la j>ublication par un organisme international framework of the Security Council, of full inde controle, dans le cadre du Conseil de securite, formation to be supplied by Member States with d'informations completes a fournir par les Etats regard to their effectives and their conventional Membres touchant leurs effectifs et leurs armearmaments". ments de type c1assique". This General Assembly recommendation has led to the text presented by the French delegation and submitted for the consideration of the Security Council. As Mr. Schuman, the Fi'enchForeign Minister, pointed ,out to the General Assembly' on 19 N0- vember 1948,3 any reduction in armed forces, whether it relates to effectives or material, is valid only if States accept the setting up of a. system of disarmament control at the same time as a system of collective security. This system of guarantees necessarily entails, in the first place, an undertaking by States to publish periodic statements as to their effectives, armaments and ground installations; secondly, the signature of a convention setting up under the Security Council an organ, not subject to the veto regulation, which will make immediate use of the military information; and finally, a system of verification by checking the facts on the spot. No Power shoulcl, it seems to us, withdraw all or part of its territory from this mutual disarmament control which is, moreover, parallel to the control of atomic weapons. Once this control is established, the reduction of armaments could be carried out in progressive stages, on the basis not only of the potential strength of the various States, but also of their juridical and geographical status. The requirements of priority of control forced the French delegation to reject,4 at the first part of the third session of the General Assembly, t.he plans put forward by the Soviet Union and Poland, both of . which advocated a reduction of land, sea, and air forces before a control organ was operatirig effectively. Such an organ must both guarantee Cette recommandation de l'Assemblee generale a donne lieu au texte presente par la delegation franc;aise et soumis a l'examen du Conseil de securite. En effet, comme M. Schuman, Ministre franc;ais des affaires etrangeres l'a souligne, le 19 novembre dernier,3 devant l'Assemblee generale, toute reductioc des forces armees, qu'il s'agisse des effectifs ou du materiel, n'est valable qui si les Etats acceptent l'etablissement d'un systeme de controle du desarmement en meme temps, d'ailleurs, qu'un systeme de securite collective. Ce systeme de garantie comporte necessairement, en premier lieu, l'engagement des Etats de publier les declarations periodiques de. leurs effectifs, de' leurs armements et de leurs mfrastructures; en second lieu, la signature'd'une convention instituant aupres du Conseil de seeurite un organisme affranchi de I'hypotheque du veto, qui exploiterait immediatement les informations militaires; enfin, un syst~me de verification par controle sur pieces et sur place. Aucune PUissa~ce ne devrait, nous semble-t-il, derober tout ou partie de son territoire a ce controle mutuel de desarmernent qui est, au surplus, parallele au controle des armes .atomiques. Ce contr'ole etant en place, la reduction des armements pourrait C s'effectuer progressivement par tratlches, compte tenu non seulem~nt .du potentiel des Etats mais encore de leur SItuation juridique et geogr~phique. Les necesite~ du controle prealable ont contraint la delegatIon fra~­ c;aise a rejeter,4 a la premiere partie de la t~Ol­ sieme session de l'Assemblee generale, les proJets de I'Union sovietique et de la Pologne, tous deux preconisant une reduction des forc~s te;restres,· navales et aeriennes avant que fonctlOnnat e:ff~c­ tivement un orga:n:i.sme de controle. Cedermer. My delegation has no illusions as to the limited part that can be played by the Commission for Conventional Armaments. The great work of disarmament laid upon us by the Charter cannot be undertaken on a permanent basis before the special agreements stipulated in Article 43 have been signed, and before the Security Council has at its call "armed forces, assistance, and facilities . . . necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security". Not until then will States which have carried out these provisions of the Charter know their obligations exactly, and decide the minimum of human and economic resources to be diverted to armaments. Further I am aware that the Commission for Conventional Armaments can discharge its functions only in close relationship with the Atomic Energy Commission. Each of these Commissions, however, has a clearly defined task, and the interdependence of the studies they are making with 'a view to achieving their aims does not justify any encroachment, such as certain delegations have wished us to sanction, by either Commission on the province of its neighbour. In conclusion, I would state that the French delegation continues to favour disarmament, which, in its opinion, is more likely to guarantee general security than rearmament. It considers, moreover, that the study and preparation of the limitation of armaments cannot depend upon the prior establishment of international confidence, since the lack of agreement which continues to exist among the great Powers on a basic question sustains and even aggravates the crisis of confidence, and seems to justify the armaments race. The French delegation is convinced that periodical statements by the great Powers on their effectives and armaments, statements that would be, subjected to measures of verification which would guarantee their accuracy, would contribute greatly to an improvement in international relatiut:ls, first by permitting the armaments race to be halted, and subsequently byproviding the basis for an effective and equitable limitation Of those armaments. Guided by these ideas and basing its action on the proposals contained in the working paper adopted on 1 August 1949 by the Commission for Conventional Armaments, the Fre..nch delegation has the honour to submit to the Security Council the draft resolution set forth in document S/1399 which was distributed at the 449th meeting.

The draft resolution submitted by the representative of France on the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces is before the Security Council. Does any representative wish to speak on that draft resolution? Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Re~ttblic) (translated from Russian) : The dele-: gatIon of the Ukrainian SSR has already had an' opportllnity to express its opposition to the so- Ma delegation ne se fait pas d'ilI·'sion sur le role limite de la Commission des armements de type classique. Lagrande reuvre de desarmement qui nous est prescrite par la Charte ne pourra etre engagee sur des bases definitives que lorsque les accords speciaux prevus par l'Article 43 auront ete signes et que le Conseil de securite aura a. sa disposition "les forces armees, l'assistance et les facilites . . . necessaires au maintien de la paix et de la securite internationales"; alors seulement, en efIet, les Etats.ayant accompli ces prescriptions de la Charte connaitront avec exactitude leurs obligations et determiaeront le minimum des ressources humaines et economiques a. detourner vers les armements. Je n'ignore pas non plus que la Commission des armements de type classique ne pourra executer son mandat qu'en relations etroites avec la Commission de l'energie atomique. Mais chacune de ces commissions a une tache nettement definie et l'interdependance de leurs etudes pour la realisation des fins qu'elles poursuivent ne justifie pas un empietement, par l'une ou l'autre, sur les attributions de sa voisine, comme certaines delegations nous ont pries de le faire. Je concluerai en affirmant que la delegation franc;aise demeure favorable au desarmement car, selon elle, il est, plus que le rearmement, de nature a. garantir la securite generale.Elle estime, en outre, que l'etudeet la preparation de lalimitation des armements ne sauraient dependre de l'etablissement prealable de la confiance internationale, car le desaccord qui persiste entre grandes Puissances sur une question essentielle entretient et aggrave meme la cdse de confiance et semble justifier la course aux armements. Elle est convaincue que la declaration. periodiqne, par les wandes Puissances, de leurs effectifs et de leurs armements, declaration soumise a. un controle qui en garantirait la veracite, contribuerait puissamment a. la detente de l'atmosphere internationale en permettant, d'abord, d'arreter la course aux armements puis ensuite de fournir la base d'une limitation efficace et equitable de ces memes armements. S'inspirant de ces idees et se fondant sur les propositions contenues dans le document de travail adopte le 1eraout 1949 par la Commissiori . des armements de type classique, la delegation,~~~C franc;aise a l'honneur de soumettre au Conseil de securite le projet de resolution qui a ete distribue au cours de la 44geme seance sous la cote S/1399. Le PRESIDENT (trad'Uit de l'anglaisj: Le Conseil est saisi d'un projet de resolution soumis par le representant de la France et re1atif a. la reglementation et a la reduction des armements et des forces armees. Quelqu'un demande-t-il la parole a. ce sujet? M. MANUILSKY (Republique socialiste sovietique d'Ukraine) (traduit d'U russe) : La delegation de la RSS d'Ukraineadeja. eul'occasion, it la Commission des armements de type cIassique, d'exprimer Son opposition a ce qu'on a appele "le document de travail fral1c;ais. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR is opposed to the French working document because the latter completely ignores such extremely itnportant decisions of the General Asseniblyresolution 1 (I) on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the control of atomic energy of 24 January 1946 and resolution 41 (I) on the. principles governing the general regulation and reduction of armaments of 14 December 1946. Those resolutions constitute directives for the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments. The aim of the so-called French working document is not to reach agreement on the reduction of armaments. and armed forces, but, on the contrary, to divert the Commission for Conventional Armaments from its real task by substituting, for the question of the reduction of armaments, the question of collecting information. The French working document is an attempt by the Anglo-American majorit-j in the Commissionfor Conventional Armaments to ignore the concrete-proposals submitted by the. Soviet Union on25 September 19485 and of 8 February 1949 [S/1246/Rev.1]. The aiIIl of those proposals was to achieve a real reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic weapons. By severing the collection of information from the basic task of reducing armaments, the French working paper tries to place the United Nations at the service of the intelligence organs of the United States and the United Kingdom. . The delegation of the Ukrainian SSRregards the so-.called French working document as unacceptable because, whiie it demands that information .should be -supplied on _armaments and armed forces, it is completely silent on the need to supply information on atomic weapons, .In view of the aboveconsiderations,th~delegation of the Ukrainian SSRrejects the so-calledFrench working paper.

Are there any other sp~akers, or shall we proceed to a vote? Mr. MALIK eUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian) : The second docum.ent ._placed today before ~e Security Coui:rcil'[S/1372] isthe so-called French working paper submitted by.the French delegation to the Commission for Conventional Armaments and adopted by th~ Anglo-American majority in that Commission. _. -The gist of that document is _that its authors, and those who have inspired them, are trying to get information, from ,all States Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Quelqu'i.tn demande-t-il encore la parole ou pouvons-rious proceder au vote? M. MALIK (Union des Republiques socia~i~tes sovietiques) (traduit d1t russe): .Le deuxlerne document propose aujaurd'hui a l'examen du Conseildesecurite [Sj1372] estce qu'on appellt; le document de travail fran<;ais, qui a ete.pr~Se?te par la delegation de la France a la Comnusslon des' armements de.type c1ssique et adopte par la majorite anglo-americaine de cette C01Ilnusslon. Les propositions contenuespans ce documen~ revelent les'inte~tions de ses· auteurs et de ceulC As the representative of the Ukrainian SSR has already pointed out, it is not difficult to understand what lies behind the French proposals and whose interests they reflect. 11 est aise de comprendre ce qui, en realite, se dissimule derriere les propositions franc;aises et quels sont ceux dont eUes de£endent les interets; le representant de la RSS d'Ukraine a deja. signale le fait. Comme je l'ai deja fait remarquer, lorsque, ala Commission des armements de type classique, lamajorite anglo-americaine a adopte, en. aoat 1948, les fameuses resolutions sur la pretendue impossibilite de reduire des armements, eUe a, en fait, sabote la mise en reuvre de la reSOlution 41 (1) de l'Assemblee generale du 14 decembre 1946 stir la-reduction des armements ,et 1'interdiction des armes atomiques. As . I have already indicated in a previous statement, when the Anglo-American majority in the Commission for Conventional Armaments adopted its notorious resolution on the alleged impossibility vf reducing armaments, in August 1948, in fact it sabotaged the implementation of the General Assembly resolution 41 (I) of 14 December 1946 on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. L'Union sovietiqu~, an mois de septembre 1948, a presente a la troisieme session de I'Assembh~e generale des. propositions· precises en vue de la mise en ~uvre de la'dite resolution de l'Assemblee. L'Union sovi~tjque a propose a ce moment-la. de reduire d'unJi.er~, au cours de l'annee, toutes les forces armees'-et les armements actuels des Etats- Unis, duRoyaume-Uni, de I'Union des Republi... ques socialistes sovietiques, de la France et de la Chine,' c'est-a-dire des cinq Puissances qui, du fait de leur Qualite de membres permanents du Conseil de seturite, sont.responsables au pr~mier chef du maintien de la securite internatioriale. Les representants des Etats-Unis etdu Royaume- Vni se sont violemment eleves contre.cette propo- 'sltion. Ils n'ont rien neglige pant mobiliser les delegations qui les suivent docilement et faire repousser les propositionsdel'Union sovietique. During the first part of the third session of the General Assembly in September 1948, the Soviet Union made concrete proposals in accordance with .the above,.mentioned resolution. The Soviet Union then proposed that within one year there should be a· reduction by one-third of all existing armaments and armed forces of the United States, the United Kingdom, theUniort of Soviet Socialist Republics, France and China, namely. the five countries which, as permanent members of the Security Council, bear the main . responsibility for the maintenance of international security. That proposal was fiercely opposed by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, who spared no effort, in order to have it rejected, to mobilize the delegations which obediently followed them. 1 Having rejected those proposals, the United States and United Kingdom. delegations>' on 19 NaV-ember 1948 imposed their .own· resolution on the General Assembly, providing that the ,utrtmission for' Conventional Armaments should draw up·proposals for the collection of' information concerning the size of the armed forces and the conventional armaments of aU States Members of the United Nations. Apres avail' fait repousser ces propositions, les delegations des Etats-Unis et du ••Royaume-Uni ant impose ai'Assemblee generale,·le 19 novembre 1948, .• leur propre'resolution prevoyant •que la CO!,llIllisslon des. armements de type c1assique s'emploieraitapreparer des propositions en~vue du rassemblement de renseignements sur l'importance .numerique. d~sfo.ices. armees "des ..Etats Membres .de l'Orgatiisation des NationsUnies ains! que sur I'huportance de leurs armementsde type classique. . At the insistence of the United States .and United Kingdom delegations, thequestibn of SUpplying information on atomic weapons was not included in that .resolution ; nor was the questjon of preparing practical steps for the reduction. of armaments and armed forces, re- La question de la·remise de renseignements sur les armes atomiques, sous la pression· exercee par les delegations des ,Etats-Unis 'et du 'Royaume- Uni,n'est pas soulevee da."1s cette resolution; la .guestion de l'elaboration.de mesures pratiques 'propres a amener la reduction des armements.et des forces armees.ri'a pas ete davantage soulevee ·dans. cette resolutioninacceptable.. De cette fac;on, les .Etats~Unis.·. et le· Royaume-Uni s'effor<;aient ouvertement de s'opposer a ce que .fussent prises des mesures. propres a recluire les armements. et ne s'interessaient qu'a la seule question du rassemblement des renseignements, dans le but evident de·se procurer des·informations sur.les armements des autrespays, tout en s'appliquant, a l'abri de fl~c.ted in that unacceptable resolution. Thus,the United States and the United Kingdoffiopenly chClse to thwartartd prevent the elaboration of tneasures for the reduction. of armaments, arId concentrated all their efforts on the question of collecting information, obviously.for the purpose of obtaining data on the armaments of' other COuntries. -At the same time, and under a variety ~~texts; they tried to conceal, from the United The USSR delegation, however, submitted concrete proposals to the Security Council on both the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. It suggested [Sj1246jRev.1] that the Commission for Conventional Armaments should be instructed, "as a first step, to prepare a plan, to be submitted to the Security Council by 1 June 1949, for the reduction by one-third of the armaments and armed forces of the five permanent members of the Security Council \no later than 1 March 1950". It also proposed to "instruct the Atomic Energy Commission to submit to the Security Council by. 1 June 1949 both the draft of a convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the draft of a convention for the control of atomic energy, with the understanding that both conventions shall be concluded and come into force simultaneously". .It was further suggested that an international control body to supervise and control the implementation of the measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic weapons should be established within the framework of the Security Council. . The proposal of the Soviet Union also provided that the permanent members of the Security Council should submit full data on their armed forces and armaments of all types, including atomic weapons, not later than 31 March 1949. .. The French representative, Mr. Chauvel, author of the draft resolution before the Security Council which calls for the approval by the b.~· Council of the French working paper, misleads t: e Council when he pretends that the USSR delegation, both in the General· Assembly and in the Security Council, limited its proposals to demanding that there should first be a reduction in armaments, and that only afterwards should data on armaments be submitted, but without any verification of those data. This statement·is not true, and is obviously being made for the purposes of propaganda, and with the objective of misleading international public opinion and seeking to justify the submission, by him, of an unacceptable resolutio.n. La proposition de I'Union sovietique prevoya~t aussi que les membres permanents du Consed de securite fourniraient pour le 31 mars 1949 aU plus tard des renseignements complets sur leurs .forces armees et sur tous les types d'armes, y compris les·armes atomiques. L'auteur du projet de resolution actuellement. soumis a l'approbation du Conseil de securite,qUl demande au Conseil d'adopter le document ~e travail framsais, c'est-a-dire M. Chauvel, repr~­ sentant de la France, induit en erreur le Consel1 de securite quand il pretend que la delegatio?, de l'URSS a l'Assemblee generale et au Consed de securite se I'erait bornee a presenter des propositions demandant que d'abord les armements fussent reduits et qu'ensuite seulement. f.ussent fournis des .renseignements. Cette affirmatton ne correspond pas a la realite, elle est evidemment une manceuvre de propagande et eIle a pour but de tromper l'opinion pubIique internationale, to~t en pretendant justifier la presentation parlulmeme d'une resolution inacceptable.· ~ The USSR delegation adhered to the same position during the discussion of this question in the Security Council in February. At the [407th] meeting on 8 February, it submitted specific proposals. The French representative, Mr. Chauvel, appears to have been absent, but his place was taken by Mr. de la Tournelle. For that reason, before alleging that the USSR was proposing the reduction of armaments without the submission of data on armaments and control, Mr. Chauvel might well have consulted the record and familiarized himself with the proposals of the Soviet Union. I shall take the liberty of quoting these proposals. Point 1 of those proposals, submitted to the Security Council on 8 February, contains the following provisions: "To instruct the Commission for Conventional Armament!!, as a first step, to prepare a plan, to be submitted to the Security Council by 1 June 1949, for the reduction by one-third of the z.rmaments and armed forces of the five permanent members of the Security Council not later than 1 March 1950." . I repeat: the plan for the reduction of armaments and armed forces to be submitted by 1 June 1949. Points 4 and 5 of the same proposals are as follows: "4. To consider as essential the establishment within the framework of the Security Council of an international control body to supervise and control the implementation of the measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic weapons; "4. De reconnaitre la necessite absolue de creel', dans le cadre du Conseil de securite, un organe international de controle pour surveiller et controler l'application des mesures pour la reduction des armements et des forces armees et pour l'interdiction de l'arme atomique; "5. To consider it as essential that the permanent members of the Security Council submit full data on their armed forces aild .armaments of all types, including atomic weapons, not later than 31 March 1949.'" . "5. De reconnaitre comme indispensable que les membres permanents du Conseil de securite presentent, au plus tard le 31 mars 1949, des donnees completes sur leurs forces' armees et leurs armements de tous genres, y compns l'arme atomique." La delegation de l'URSSproposait donc q~e la Commission des armements ,de type classlque elaborat et presentat un plan. de reduction des armements, mais seulement pour le ler juin 1949, et la reduction des armements n'etait prevue que pour le ler mars 1950. Quant aux renseignements complets sur les forces a:rmees et les The delegation of the USSR thus proposed that the Commission for Conventional Armaments prepare and submit a plan for the reduction of armaments only by 1 June 1949, while the actual reduction would have been carried out only by 1 March 1950. As for full data on armed forces and armaments, including atomic weapons, they • Voir les Documents offieiels de la troisieme session de l'JAssemblM generale, premiere partie, Seances plenieres, Annexes, page 372. The USSR delegation's concrete proposals were rejected in the Security Council, with the support of the French delegation, by the United States and United Kingdom delegations, which are interested solely in collecting information on the armed forces and armaments of other countries, but which consistently refuse to agree to the sub~ mission of data on 'atomic weapons. It was in these circumstances that the notorious French working paper on the coIIection of information .. on armed forces and conventional armaments f4-st saw the light of day. This document says not a word about the preparation of proposals for a reduction in armaments, but has much to say in favour of proposals to collect information on conventional armaments and armed forces. Nor does it mention the submission of information on atomic weapons. The, United States and United Kingdom delegations are actively supporting these French proposals, which they have now submitted to the Security Council for approval. It is quite obvious that those who have written and inspired this notorious document have one aim in view: to reduce the entire question to the collection of data on armaments and armed forces, setting aside not only the question of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of the atomic bomb, but that of the submission of information on atomic we<;!.pons also. NaturaIIy, it is difficult to defend such a position. The United States and United Kingdom delegations are obviously in an awkward position, while the French representa':' tive is even compelled to distort facts. AIl this proves that, in the Commission for Conventional Armaments, the Anglo-American majority has not only prevented the implementationof the General Assembly resolution of 14 December 1946 on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, but that it has also violated its own General Assembly resolution of 19 November 1948 recommending that the Security Council should pursue the study of the regulation and reduction of armaments. ' During the current year, between the General Assembly's third and fourth sessions, the Commission for '. Conventional Armaments has done nothing to implement this recommendation, owing to the efforts of the .United States and United Kingdom delegations,aidedby the French dele,;; Si l'on part de ce point de vue, il est tout a fait evident que les propositions fran<;aises, qui ne prevoient que la fourniture de renseignements au sujet rles forces armees et des armements de type c1assique, sont inacceptables. Ces propositions ne prevoient la fourniture d'aucun renseignement au sujet des armes atomiques; elles n'etabIissent aucun lien entre la fourniture d'informations sur les armements et le probleme de la reduction de ceux-ci. Or, c'est pourtant ce1a qui devrait etre le but principal de la fourniture de renseignements au sujet des armements. En raison de tout ce qui vient d'etre dit, la delegation de rUnion sovietique a vote, a la Commission des armements de type c1assique, contre l'adoption du document de travail de la France, et elle agira de meme au Consei1 de securite. La delegation de I'URSS considere que, pour elaborer les mestires relatives a la reduction et a la reglementation des armements, il est indispensable d'etre en possession de renseignements non seulement sur les armements de type c1assique, mais aussi sur les armes atomiques. La delegation de rURSS considere que la proposition de la France est inacceptable egalement du point de vue de la procedure. Selon les pratiques constantes, la Commission des armements de type c1assique doit s,-)umettre au Conseil de securite des rapports periodiques sur la marche de ses travaux. II y a quelques instants a peine, un rapport de ce genre, portant sur la periode de juillet 1947 a aout 1948, a ete soumis au Conseil de securite [S/1371]. Qu'est-ce qui vient ne changer? Pourquoi n'avons-nous pas, a I'heure actuelle, de rapportemanant. de .la Commission des armements de type classique· qui expose la position de toutes les delegations qui ont pris part a la discussion du document de la France et de la question de la reduction des armements a. la Commission des armements de type c1assique? . D'habitude, jusqu'ici, les rapports de. la Commission exposaient le point de vue de toutes les delegations qui etaient intervenues au cours de&debats. Et voici que maintenant, les delegations des Etats-Unis, du Royaume-Uni et de la France tentent de tourner cette regIe generalement acceptee, d'enfreindre l'ordre etabli. Il faudrait que 1'0n se borne a transmettre a la quatrieme session de l'Assemblee generale, a l'exclusion de tout autre renseignement, ce qu'on appeIle le document de travail franc;ais,. qui ne fait qti'e.,'Cposer unilateralement le point de vue angh-americain. La delegation de l'URSS ne peut accepter une proposition de ce genre,. qui viole le reglement interieur et les fac;ons d'agir generalement adoptees a I'Organis;;l.tion des Nations Unies. En ce qui concerne le fond de la question, la delegation de l'Union sovietique estime, comme je l'ai deja dit, que, pour elaborer les mesures relatives a la' reduction desarmements, i1 est From this point of view, it is quite evident why the French proposals for collecting data only on armed forces and conventional armaments are unacceptable. These proposals do not provide for the submission of data on atomic weapons; they establish no connexion between the submission of data on armaments and the task of reducin5' armaments, which should be the principal purpose for receiving such information. In view of these considerations, the Soviet Union delegation voted against the French working paper in the Commission for Conventional Armaments, and will vote again in the Security Council against the adoption of this document. The USSR delegation .considers that, if measures for the reduction and regulation of armaments are to be drawn up, it is essential to have information not only on conventional armaments, but on atomic weapons .as well. The USSR delegation considers the French proposal unacceptable on procedural grounds also. Under established practice, the Commission for Conventional Armaments should submit to the Security Council periodical reports on the progress of its work. Only a few minutes ago such a report for the period from July 1947 to August 1948 was submitted to the Security Council [S/1371].What has changed ? Why, at the present time, is there no report from the Commission for Conventional Armaments setting forth the positions of, all the delegations which took part, in the Commission for Conventional Armaments, in the discussion concerning the French document and the reduction of armaments? Up to the present, the Commission's reports usually have set forth the views expressed by all delegations in the course of debate ill the Commission. Now the United States, United Kingdom and French delegations are trying to bypass this generally acepted rule in disregard of . established practice. All other information being omitted, nothing need be done beyond sending to the fourth session of the General Assembly this so-called French working paper, which presents o~ly a ot;le':'sided picture of the Anglo-American- VIewpoint. The USSR delegation cannot agree to "such a proposal, which violates the procedure and accepted practice of the United Nations. In re~'rd to the substance of the question,as ~h~ve alre~dy stated, the delegation of the.Soviet .. mon conSIders that data on armaments, mc1udlUg information' on atomic weapons, are indisclThe. Security COttncil recognizes as essential the submission by States of information on armed forces and cOilventional armaments as well as information on atomic weapons." In submitting this proposal, the delegation of the Soviet Union hopes that all delegations which declare themselves to be in favour of fair play and of honestly placing their cards on the table so that the praiseworthy aim of the reduction of armaments and armed forces, and the prohibition of the· atomi~ weapon, may be attained, will support this proposal of the USSR delegation, which provides Ior the submission of information both on armed forces and conventional armaments and on the atomic weapon.

It is now SAS p.m. If there is no objection, we shall adjourn until Friday at " 3 p.m. a:p.d open the meeting with the interpretation of this long speech then. Is there any objection to that? Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I presume that my speech is not so long that an experienced Secretariat interpreter, such as Mr. Sherry, who usually interprets the speeches of the USSR repersentatives with such great competence, will require more than twenty to twenty-five minutes to interpret it. I therefore feel that it would not be too inconvenient to devote the next twenty-· five minutes to the interpretation of my speech, after which we could decide upon our future work.

I hear an objection, and therefore we shall .j we the interpretation now.

Would it he convenient for the Council to meet again on Friday afternoon, 14 October, at 3 o'clock? Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt): With regard to the item to which I have called the attention of the Security Council and which is now included in our agenda, I would point out that the First Committee of the General Assembly will not be meeting during the coming few days and that, in view of the importance and urgency of the question of the demilitarization of the area of Jerusalem, it might be well for the Security Council to consider the possibility of having at least one meeting during those days when the First Committee will not be meeting.

I have made inquiries and .find that the Secretariat will have to examine the question whether the Security Council can hold a meeting this week in addition to that scheduled for Friday,· 14 October. There are other Committees which are scheduled to meet on some of the following days. The question will therefore have to be examined as to whether "Le Conseil de secur-ite reconnait qu'il est indispensable que les Etats fournissent des renseignements tant sur les forces armees et les armements de type classique que sur l'arme atomique." En deposant cette proposition, la delegation de I'Union sovietique espFre que toutes les delegations qui entendent adopter une position honnete qui veulent que, honnetement, les cartes soient mises sur la table afin que 1'0n puisse atteindre ce but louable qU'est la reduction des armements et des forces armees et l'interdiction de l'arme atomique, soutiendront cette proposition de la delegation de l'URSS qui tend a. la fourniture de renseignements aussi bien sur les forces armees et les armements de type classique que sur l'arme atomique. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): I1 est 17 h. 45. S'il n'y a pas cl'objection, nous nous ajournerons jusqu'a. vendredi a. 15 heures et la seance commencera par l'interpretation de ce long discours. Est-ce que tout le monde est d'accord? M. MALIK (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Mon intervention n'est pas te11ement longue et je suppose que, pour le fonctionnaire du Secretariat si experimente, M. Sherry, qui generalement interprete en anglais avec tant de competence les interventions des representants de I'URSS, l'interpretation ne demandera pas plus de vingt a. vingt-cinq minutes. Aussi me semble-t-il qu'il ne serait pas difficile de consacrer vingt-cinq minutes a. cette interpretation, apres quoi nous pourrions resoudre la question de ce que nous devons faire plus tard. Le PRESIDENT (tradttit de l'anglaisj: Comme il y a une objection, nous allons entendre cette interpretation immediatement. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Le Conseil . est-it dispose a. se reunir ·le vendredi apres-midi 14 octobre a. 15 heures? Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypte) (traduit ~e l'anglais) : En <:e qui concerne le point sur lequlll j'ai attire l'attention du Conseil et qui a ete insere dans notre ordre du jour, je voudrais signaler que la Premiere Commission de l'Asem- blee generale ne se reunira pas dans les quelques. jours qui vont suivreet qu'etant donne I'impor- tance et l'urgence de la question de la demilitari- sation de la region de Jerusalem, it conviendrait que le Conseil de securite envisage la possibilite de tenirau moins une seance durant la periode pendant laquelle la Premiere Commission ne se- reunira pas. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): D'apr~s' les renseignemehts que j'ai recueillis, le Se~re· tariat devra examiner la question de savoir SI le Conseil de securite pourra tenir une seance cette- semaine, en plus de celle qui est prevtle pour vendredi 14 octobre. Des reunions sont en effet pr~vuespour d'autres Commissions dans les. quelques jours qui vont suivre. Il y aura done

I did not intend by my remarks to suggest that we should insert another item between the beginning and ending of our consideration of the item now before us. We shall, of course, finish with this item before we start to consider a new item-unless some major reason exists for chat1ging the order. I am informed that our next meeting could possibly be held before Friday. If representatives have no objection, perhaps we could leave it that they will be notified if it is possible to hold a meeting before Friday. Le PRESIDENT (tradItit de l'anglais): Je n'ai pas voulu dire que nous devrions examiner un autre point avant d'avoir acheve le debat sur la question que nous traitons actuellement. n faut naturellement en finir avec ce point la. avant d'en examiner un autre - sauf s'il y a une raison majeure de modifier cet ordre. I'apprends que notre prochaine seance pourrait avoir lieu avant vendredi. S'il n'y a pas d'objection, nous pourrions nous en' tenir la; il est entendu que les membres du Conseil seront avises au cas ou le Conseil pourrait se reunir avant vendredi. Mr. MAUK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian) : I would like to point out that a meeting of the six sponsoring Powers of the Atomic Energy Commission has already been arranged for Thursday, 13 October. M. MAuK (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit dIt russe) : Je voudrais faire remarquer que, pour le jeudi 13 octobre, on a deja prevu une reunion de la Commission des six Puissances promotrices, membres de la Commission de l'energie atomique.

That meeting has been postponed because it conflicted with another meeting. This question of time has become exceedingly difficult and it is not for tIie Council to make the necessary negotiations. That will have to be done by the Secretariat. I am perfectly willing to adjust the calling of a meeting to the conditions as they exist. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): La date de la seance a ete remise parce qu'elle coincidait avec celle d'une autre reunion. Cette question d'horaire est devenue tres difficile et ce . n'est pas au Conseil qu'il appartient de faire les arrangements necessaires: c'est la tache du Secretariat. Je suis tout dispose a tenir compte de toutes les exigences de la situation, pour fixer la date d'une seance du Conseil. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt): I spoke previously in order to suggest that the Council should take advantage of the rare fact that the First Committee will not meet until 15 October, and perhaps not until 17 October. I thought this Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypte) (traduit de l'anglais): J'ai propose que le Conseil tire parti du fait exceptionnel que la Premiere Commission ne se reunira pas avant le 15 octobre, ou peut-etre meme le 17 octobre. I'ai pense que cela avancerait la marche des travaux du Conseil. Ce que je voudrais, c'est moins presenter une objection qu'attirer l'attention du Conseil sur l'interet qu'it aurait a envisager une telle possibilite. ~ight allow the Council to get through some of Its business. What I say now is not so much in the nature of an objection, as in that of calling the attention of the Council to the usefulness of exploring this possi?i1ity. . The PRESIDENT: That is a good suggestion and it will be taken into account. However, there are other Committees that will meet and it happens that the representatives' to the Security Council are interested in some of them. I do not feel that any objection has been made . Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Cette suggestion est excellente et nous en tiendrons compte; mais des Commissions doivent se reunir et les membres du Conseil suivent les travaux de certaines de ces commissions. Comme il n'y a pas d'opposition, le Conseil va s'ajourner jusqu'au vendredi 14 octobre a 15 heures, etant' entendu que si le Secretariat peut fixer une date plus proche, les membres du Conseil en seront informes. an~, therefore, the Council will adjourn until FrIday, 14 October, at3 p.m., with the proviso that. if the Secretariat can arrange a time for an earlIer meeting, the representatives will be notified. The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m. La seance est levee d18 h. 15. FRANCE Editions A. Pedone 13, rue Soumot ·,pARIs. Ve ~~REECE-GRECE "Eleftheroudakis" Librairie intemationale Place de la Constitution ATHENES GUATEMALA Jose Goubaud Goubaud & Cia. Ltda. Sucesor 5a Av. Sur No. 6 y 9a C. P. GUATl':MMoA HAITI Mu Bouchereau Librairie "A la Caravelle" Boite postale llI-B PORT-AU-PRINCE ICELAND-ISLANDE Bokaverzlun Sigfusar Eymundsonnar Austurstreti 18 REYKJAVIK INDIA-:INDE Oxford Book & Stationery Company Scindia" House NEWDELm IRAN Bongahe Piaderow 731 Shah Avenue TEHERAN IRAQ-fRAK Mackenzie & Mackenzie The Bookshop BAGHDAD LEBANON-LlBAN Librairie universelle BEYROUTH LU~!t1BOURG Librairie J. Schummer Place Guillaume LUXEMBOURG N~THERLANDS-PAYS·BA5 N. V. Marfurq.s Nijhoff Lange Voorhout 9 'S-GRAVENHAGE NEW ZEALAND- NOUVELLE·ZELANDE Cordon & Gotch, Ltd. Waring Taylor Street WELLINGTON United Nations Association of New Zealand P. O. 1011, G.P.O. WELLINGTON NiCARAGUA Ifannro Ramirez V. Agencia de PuhIicaciones MANAGUA, D. N. Libr~e··"La Renaissance d'Egypte" 9Sh.Adly P&$ha CAmo ETHIOPIA-ETHIOPIE Agence ethiopienne depubIicite P. O. Box 8 ADDIS.ABEBA NORWAY:-".NORVEGE .lohan Grundt.Tanum ForIag Kr. Augustgt. 7A . OSLO PHILIPPINES D. P. Perez Co. 132 Rive:rside SAN JUAN, .RIZAL POLAND-POLOGNE Spotlhielna Wydawnicza "Czytelnik" 38 Poznanska WARSZAWA SWEDEN-SUEDE A.-B. C. E. Fritzes Kungl. Hofbokhandel Fredsgatan 2 STOCKHOLM SWITZERLAND-5UtSSE Librairie Payot S. A. LAUSANNE, GENEVE, VEVEY, MONTREtJX, NEUCn:ATEL, BEPoNE, BASEL Hans Raunhardt Kirchgasse 17 ZumcHI SYRIA-SYRIE Lihrairie universeUe DAMAS TURKEY:-fURQUIE Librairie Hachette 469 Istiklal Caddesi BEYOGLU-IsTANBUL UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA- UNION 5UD.AFRICAINE Central News Agency Commissioner &Rissik'Sts. JOHANNESBURG and at CAPETO and DURBAN UNITED KINGDO~ ROYAUME·UNI H. M. Stationery Office P. O. Box 569 LONDON, S.E. 1 and atH.M.S.O. Shops in LONDON, EDINBURGH,MANCHES CARDIFF, BELFAST, BIRMINGIW4 and BRISTOL UNITED5TATES OF AMERIC ETATS·UNIS D'AMERIQUE Intemational Documents Service Columbia University Press 2960 Broadway NEW¥ORK 27, N. Y. URUGUAY " Oficina de Representaci6n de Editoriales Av. 18 de Julio 1333 Esc. 1 MONTEVIDEO VENEZUELA Escritoria Perez Machado Conde a Pifiango 11 CARACAS YUGOSLAVIA-YOUGOSLAVIE Drzavno·Preduzece Jugoslovenska Knjiga Moskovska HI. 36 BEOGRAD