S/PV.452 Security Council

1 am. infonned that the list Le PRESIDENT (traduit del"angllJis): J'apprends- . . ofspeake~l!scnarige<fsince the c1osing()£ t~eque la listedes orateufS .inscrits. a .ete modifiee '4pl.st meeting. '. I therefore recognize the. repre"- .c'iep!lis la clotutede la 451eme seance. Je donne s~lltative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist I. donc laparole.au representant de la Republique Repttblic.' socialiste.sovietique d'Ukraine. '·Mr.MA.NuILSKY (Ukrainiati' Sov.iet .Socialist . M. MANUILS.KY (Rep~b1ique socialiste sov.lri~ ~epublic) (tran.slat~d"from Ru.s~): I should tique d'Ukraifie) (tra~'lt!t ti'U. russe) :.le Y~Ju· like to ask the PreSident why the 11sto£speakers drais demand(:t au PreSIdent pCiurquol la Itste ... . -.' " '~- , ; .'See Offtiial. Records' of the third session 01 the General.Assembly; SuPPlemeat.·Nc.,10. M. MALIK (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Pour la declaration que je me pmpose de faire, l'ordre des orateurs n'a aucune importance. I1 m'importe peu que je sois le premier ou le deuxieme a. prendre la parole. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The order of speakers is of no significance as far as the substance of my statement is concerned; it does not matter· wltether I speak first or second. M. MANUILSKY (Republique socialiste sovie:- . tiqued'Dkraine) (traduit dzt russe) : Le 13 octobre 1949, le representant de l'Union sovietique a soumis au Conseil de securite un projet de reso~ luti9n [S/140S/Rev.l] invitant les dnq membres permanents du Conseil de securite a presenter des donnees completes sur leurs forces armees et leuTs armementsde tous genres, y comprls les armes atomiques. . La delegation de la RSS d'Ukraine est d'avis que cette resolution permet de sortir de !'impaS!le dans laquelle lesrepresentants du bloc angI4)"" americain ·ont .fourvoye tant la Commission de l'energie atomique que la Commission des armlements de type classique. Les propositions de l'Union sovietique confirment, une fois de plus, qu'a l'egard de ces questions .l'URSS a· adopte pne politique consequente et qU'elle s'en tient a cette politiq'Ue de, principe. . It1s well known that,' heginni~g at the first On sait que, des la premiere session de l'As~ . session of the General Assembly, 'the Soviet delesemblee generate, les delegations sovietiques ont gations have made great efforts to secure unani- 'fait de grands efforts pour que les >resolptiolll; mous adoption of resolutions 1 (l) of 24 Jan- 1 (I}du 24janvier et 41 (1) du 14decem.bre194ti uary 1946 and 41 (l) of 14 December 1949. It fussent adopteesa l'unal:\imite. 11 importe de: roust be strefisea that the resolution of 14 Decemrappeler que la !'esolution du 14 decembre. a ber 1946 W2,S adopted on the initiative 6f the then ete adoptee sur l'initiative de M. Molotov, qui Minister· of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. etait alors Ministre desaffaires etrangeres de V. M: ,Molotov, who, on behalf of the Governl'URSS et qui a soumis, au nom au Gouverment of the Soviet Union, submitted a proposal nement de l'Union sovietique, ,une proposition on :the general reduction of armaments and protendant a une reduction generale de~ armehibition of the use of atomic energy· for military ments' et a l'interdiction de l'emploide l'energie purposes. However, as the representatives of the atomique a des fins miIitaires. Cependant, etant Mr. MANUILSI{Y (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated from Russian): On 13 October 1949, the representative of the Soviet Union submitted to the Security Council a draft re50lution [S/140S/Rev.1] calling upon the :five permanent members of the Security Council.to &.1pply full and accurate information on all types of armaments and armed forces, including atomic weapons. The Ukrainian delega-tion 'believes that 'this draft resolution offers a way out of the blind alley into ~hich the representatives of t~e Anglo- America.'1 bloc have led both the Atomlc Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armam,ents. The Soviet Union proposals once again demonstrate that USSR policy in these matters has been consistent and based on principle. _An~Io-Americanbloc, despite the General Assem-· donne qu'en. depit de la .resolutio'n adoptee bly's unanimously adopted resolutj.on of 14 De'- a l'unanimite par· l'AssembleegeneraJe le cer.a:ber 1946" have-done everything to obstruct 14 decembre 1946 1es representantsdu bloc the impiemenfationof ti.J.ese decisions, the USSRanglo-americain ant fait tout leur possible pour delegation . submittei..~ on 2S September 1948,' retarder ·la mise en reuvre de ces 6edsions. during the first. part. of the third session ..ofthe la delegation de l'URSS· a soumis. le 25. sep- General Assembly, a newproposa12 0n the protembre1948, a la premiere partie de la troisiimle hibition of atomic weapons and the reduction by session de l'Assemblee· generale" ut,te nouvelle one-third of the. armaments and armed forces proposition2 visant a interdire les armes atomi- -of the.five permanent members of the. Security ques et a reduire d'un tiers les armements et les Council. Lastly, everyone is aware also, of the forces armees des dnq membres permanents du proposals the USSRdelegatioIl made On this Conseil de securite. Enfin, tout le monde connait question at. the 407th i:,neetipg of the Security les propositions que ladetegation dell'URSS a Council.on 8 F.ebruary 1949 [S/1246/Rev.1]. soumises apropos de cette question le 8 fevr~er 1949, .a .la 407eme seance du Conseil de securite [S/1246]. , 2Voir Ies· Documents officiels de la troisieme session de l'Assembtee generale; premiere partie, seances. pUnieres, anne~es, page 18.~. . Millions of simple peoph in all countries under,.. stand that the questions of the prohibition of atomic "weapons and the reduction of armamf.nts are" indissolubly linked with the maintenance of world security, and are an essential part of the struggle for peace. It is thetdore all the more ,strange to hear che statement of the United States representative who, at the Security Council's meeting [451st] of 14 October of this year, saw fit to reproach the Soviet delegations with "pro_ fessing a great impatience about the matter of disarmament" and, allegedly, of "playing fast and loose with the hopes and aspirations of men" by minimizing the difficulty and complexity of the problem. Even if the United States representative ,had said nothing else, that statement alone would show that the United States delegation continues to support' the armaments race; but sin<;e the desire of the masses of the people of all countries for peace has cut the ground from "under the feet of the proponents of war, they accuse tlle proponents of peace df "playing fast " and loose with the hopes and aspirations of rpen". The representatives ot the Anglo-American bloc, entangled in the inconsiste.ncies of their own , policy, are trying to represent their own difficulties ~as ~,n.e difficulty of implementing the red.uction of al1naments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. The stateme.l1.ts of the representatives of the United States, Canada and the so-called "Government" of the Kuomintang reveal an utter lack of hope and faith in the possibility of international co-operation. ' These representatives have again repeated their well-worn theory that the prohibition of atomic weapons and, the reduction of armaments cannot be achieved because,they ,.:laim, of the absence of an atmosphere of confidence in international relations. But it is surely perfectly cleat that such an atrposphere of confidence is not created by itself. Substantial and persistent effort isn(~eded to establish mutual trust and co-operati.on., The USSR proposalrepresents a positive step in that direction. Byrejecting the Soviet Union proposal of 13 October 1949, the representatives of the Anglo-American bloc are jntensifying still further the atlnosphere of distrust. Evetyone under,.. stand-s, ,.after all, that the, armam1ents raCe and war, hysteria cannot contribute to the establishment of, mutual confidence; on the contrary, they create suspicion and strain relations, between ,States still further. Equally unconvincing' and false is the second theory advanced hy the representatives of the Anglo-American bloc, that the Soviet delegations allegedly have a negative attitude towards the subriiissionby States of full and accurate inforn1~t-ion",Q!}armamentsandarme4.forces. "The facts, ana the documents refute such allegations. ltisknown that the USSR draft resolution of 8 February 1949 proposed that the Commission Des millions de simples citoyens) dans tous les pays du monde, comprennent que la question de l'interdiction des armes atomiques et de la reduction des armements est indissolublement iiee au maintien de la securite universelle et constitue un elel1"lentesseritiel de la lutte pour la paix. I1 n'en u ete que plus etrange d'entendre le representant des Etats-Unis faire, a la [45leme] seance du Conseil de secunte, le 14 octobre 1949, une declaration dans laquelle i1 a cru opportun de reprocher aux delegations "sovietiques d'etre "tres pressees de realiser le desamlement" et de "se jouer des esperances et des aspirations de l'humanite" en meconnaissa:nt la difficult6 et la complexite du probleme. Le represental1t des Etats- Unis s'eu fut-il tenu li, cette declaration aurait suffi, a elle seule, a montrer' que sa delegation continue a favoriser la course aux armements. Mais comme les masses populaires dans tous 'les pays du monde aspirenta la paix, les fauteurs de guerre perdent pied et c'est pourquoi ils accusent les partisans de la paix de "se jouer des esperances et des aspirations de l'humanite". Pris dans les contradictions de leur propre politique, les representants du bloc anglo-americain pretendent que les difficultes qu'ils eprouvent eux-memes sont inherentes au probieme (le la reduction des armements et de l'interdiction des ai"mes' ato- ·1p.iques. Les ,declarations des representants des Etats- Unis, du Canada et du pn~tendu "Gouvernement" dl1 Kouomintang laissent transparaitre leiu decouragement et le peu de confiance qu'ils ont dans la possibilite d'etablir la collaboration intern,,- tionale. Ces representairt:s ont reitere leur these rebattue se10n laqueHe il serait impossible d'interdire les armes atomiques et de reduire, les armements parce que la confiance necessaire ferait de£aut dans les relations internationales. Toutefois, il est parfaitement clair qu'une telle atmosphere de confiance ne peut se creer d'elle.. meme. Pour creer cette confiance mutuel1e et cette "collaboration, il faut deployer des efforts considerables et opiniatreset faire preuve de bonne volonte.' Or, la proposition de l'U~SS marque, precisement ,une etape sUr cette voie.En, rejetant la proposition de l'Union sovietique .du 13 'octobre 1949, les representantsdu blocanglo-~c americain ne fQnt qu'accroitre la mefiance. Tout leinonde sait, en effet, que la course au:x: armements et l'hysteri~ belliciste ne sont pas propres a etabliile regne de la confiance mutuelle, qu'el1es sement au contraire la mefiance et rendent encot~. plus tendues les relatiol1s entre les Etats. Tout a~ssi peu convainca1.1te et fausse est la deuxieme these du bloc", anglo-americain s~lon laquelle les delegations sovietiques s'opposeratent a ce que les Etats presentent desrenseignements complets et ex~cts sur leurs armements et leu~s forces armees. Les faits et les documents dementent ces assertions. "" On sait que, dans le projet de l;esolution.qu'elle ,a presente le 8. fevrier 1949, ladelegatlOnde td'It The same draft resolution of 8 February 1949 provided for the creation of an "international control body to supervise and control the implementation of the measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic weapons". Who rejected those USSR proposals? We all know that they were rejected Py the Anglo- American majority in the Security Council. And' now, not being in a position to contest the substance of the facts and documents presented by the Soviet delegations, the representatives of the Anglo-American majority are trying to get away with funny stories about elephants f\11d horses, abolJ.t the need for a child to iearn to crawl before it learns to walk, and so forth. Elementary good faith should have required the representatives of the Anglo-American bloc to recall also the other documents on the question of·the prohibition of atomk weapons and the establishment of control of the .production of atomic en.e;-gy submitted on earlier occasions··by the· Soviet Union delegation in the Security Council. d'~m contrale sur la production de l'energie ato~ mlque. Je veux par1er, en premier lieu, du projetd'une, "Convention iriternationa1e tendanta iriterdire· la production et l'emp10i des armes atomiques utilisant l'energie atomique a des fins. de destruction en masse", projetque la delegation de l'URSS a soumis a la CommIssion.de l'energie atomique le 19 juin 19463• Cette convention comportait, pour les parties cOZi.&"'dantes, l'obligation de ne recouriren aucun cas aux armes atomiques;d'interdire la production et le stockage d'artnes utilisant l'energie atomique et de promu1guer dan;; un delaide six mois des 101s reprimant severement toute in£ractiqn a la convention. . , Deuxiemement, la delegation de la RSS d'lJkraine tient a rappeler les "propositions relatives au contro!e de l'energie atomique" SOUlTIises par le representant de l'URSS 8, la Commission de l'energieatomique, le 11 juin 19474~ Ces propositions contenaient 1es dispositions. essentieHes d'uneconventionpour le. contrate de l'energie atomique; elIes prevoyaienfla creation d'unecommission int~rnationalede contra1e qui devait aveir le droit de proceder a I'inspection des entreprises s'occuparit de l'extrac';:ion des matieres premieres atomiques et produisant. d.es materiaux atomiques et de l'energieatomique, et qui.devait pouvoir effectuer des enquetes a ce sujet; d'a.utre part, cette commission devait etre. chargee d(~ c(mtroler les stocks existants de matieres premieresato,:, miques, de materiaux ·atomiqueset··. de produits atomiques non acheves; d'etudier les opel;ations We have in mirid, first, the "Draft international convention to prohibit the production and employment of weapons based.on the use of atomic energy for the purpose of mass destruction", submitted by the USSR delegation for consideration by the Atomic Energy Commis~ion on 19 June 1946.s That convention placed the contracting parties under obligation not touse.atomic weapons in any cireumstances whatsoever, to prohibit the production and storing of weapons based on the use of atomic energy, and to pass, within a ueriod of six months, legislation providing:'i':- c;re penalities for violators of the convention, Secondly, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR . has in mind the "Propbsa1s 011. the iestahlishment of control of atomic energy", which the USSR - representative submitted for consideration by the Nomic Energy Commission on 11 June 1947,4 Those proposals contailied the ,basic clauses of a convention.for the control of atomic energy; they pl:ovided for the-creation of an international control commission with the right to carry out inspections and investigations of· .facilities for mining atomic raw materials and for the production of atomic materials and atomic energy; tlilis commission would have been further charged ~~ith checking. existing stocks of atomic raw materials, atomic materials,· and unfinished atomic I>~oducts; with studying production operations; WIth observing the fulfilment of .therules of technical exploitation of the facilities prescribed ____ . I .1 SeeOjJicial Records of the Atomic Energy Commis- ,$lon, fir5lt year, 2nd meeting. • Vair les Pt'oces-'lJerbau~ ofjiciels dft la Commission de l'energie atomique,'!lremiere annee, 2eme seance. • Ibid., deuxieme annee. 12emeseance• It would seem that all those documents should have been known' to the Canadian Foreign Minister wh~n he spoke at the last [451st] meeting of the Security Council. And yet it is sufficient to read the record of the Canadian representative's statement to see that he is unfamiliar with the basic docum~nts on the work of both the Commissi<:'m for Conventional Armaments and the Atomic Energy Commission. The documents here referred to by the delegation of the lJkraipjan SSR show that the Soviet .Union proposed; long ago, a concrete, clear and sim.p1e program for the prohibition of atomic weapons, the establishment of control over the production of atomic energy and the reduction ,of armaments. . •,Wpat did the United States, supported by t..he United Kingdom, offer to Counter the Soviet Union progi'atnme? The notorious "Baruch plan", the, funda.m.P.ntal meaning of which was exposed at the time by the Soviet delegations. The "Baruch plan" was 'unrealistic and unrealizable 'for th~ following n~asons: Se<;:ond1y, because its absurd purpose was to . Deuxiemement, parce qu'il tend:iitaun but parmaintain the pnited States monopoly for a long faitement absurde, a savoi!" d'assurer aUx Etatsperiod of time; . Unis ce'1l10nopole pendant une longue periode; Thirdiy, because the "Baruch plan" p:t"qvided Troisiemement, parce que, sous les. apparences for theestablishmfCntof unlimited control by d'un tontrole des sources de matieres premiere: United. States monopolies over the economy, of atomiques et de la prodt.-ction de l'energie atoother States, under the guise of control over the mique, ce "plan Baruch" visait a. assurer aux production of atomic' energy and the sources ()f monopoles americains le contr61e illimite de 1'ecofitomic raw materials; nomie des autres pays; '., Fourthly, be.cause, it hflnded over 'all sources .Quatriemement, parce qu'il attribuait a. un trust of atomic' raw materials ,a.'1d all enterprises 'prointernational la propriete exclusive de toutes les ducing atomic energy, to the owner~hip of an . sour~es de maHeres premieres atomiques et. de interpationaI t~st,·\Vhich was absolutely un-, toutes les entreprises produisapt de l'ene.rgie atbacceptable to States which attached anyva1u:e to mique -- p1.'OpoSitiO:tl parfaitement inacceptable their n0tion:il sovereignty. ' pour tout Etat jaioux de sa souverainete nationa1e. ,Experience itself has shown that the "Baruch Les evenements eux-memes ont montre que le, plan" is tlnreal1snc, but the Anglo-American "plan Baruch'.' etait irrealisable. Neanmoins, la majority is, still trying to cling to that programme majorite anglo-americaine continue a s'accrocher which.- takes 'no account of the £nct3, and which a. .ce plan qui ne tient aucuh compte des realites is now being criticized by ,serious political lea.ders et qui' est tn,aintenant en butte aux critiques and authoritative ·military drc1es in the United d'hommes. politique~ 'competents et, a celles des States itself,,'not to mention other ·countries: Inmilieux militaires qualifies, atix Etats-Unis aussi deed, the stubbornness of the United States delebien que dans d1autres pays. La delegation des gation in defending the "Baruch plan" even now Etats-Unisse couvre vraiment de ridicule lorsis laughabl~ in view of the fact. that the President qu'elles'obstine encore a. defendre le "pla,n Ba- ·of the United States himself has been obliged to ruch", apres que le·President des Etats-Unis luiadmit that the United States does not have a meme· aete force de reconnaitre que son pays monopoly of atomk, weapons. ", ne detient pas le monopole des armes atomiques. Illusions vanish, but facts remain. The illusion Les illusions s'envolent, mais les faits restent. inth.is. case was, the "atomic strategy" of military La ."strategie .atomique" des milieuxr.nilitaires .circles in the United States and the "atomic des E'ta~s-Unis et la "diplomatie atomique"des (ijp10rriacy" of the arbiters of that country's dirigeants de'la politique etrangere de cep~ys ,foreign policy. The convincingandindispu,table n'ctaientqu'illusion. Et c'est un fait irrefutable 'fact is the programme sponsored by the USSR et incontestable que l'lJRSS a presente, il ya three, years ~go, .fo1' the prohibitiprtfoJ_We atomic troisans, un, plan prevoyant l'linte~diction4i4 La delegation de la RSS d'Ukraine espere qu'en fin de compte une evaluation realiste des forces en presence, une saine: conception politique du probleme de la collaboration internatiollale, la marche meme des evene!nents, et surtout l'indomptahle volonte de paix de t.ous les peuples 4uOlonde, forceront les Gouverneltnents des Etats-Unis et du Royaume~U1"1a renoncd a'l'insoutenable attitude qu'ils ont adoptee a l'egard de la reduction des armements, de l'intcnliction des armes atom.iques et de l'institution d'un controlede la profluction de l'energie atomique,. et a entreprendre de mettre en vigueur le plan propose par le Gouvernem~nt de l'URSS, car ce plan sert effectivement la cause de la paix et de la securite internationales. M. MALIK (Union des Republiques socialistes, sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Au cours de· l'etude que les organes de l'Organisation des Na~ tions Unies ont fa,itede la question de la reduction des armements.,.;=t de l'it'.tlerc1iction des armes atomiques, la deIegationde l'l:JRSSa expose~amaintes reprises et d'une fa<.;on deta.illee, ses vues aussi bien sur le probleme de la reduction des armements, de 'la transmission de renseignements relatifs aux armements de type das,<:;ique et auxarmes . atomiques que sur la crea.tion d'un organe international de controle charge de surveiller f':tde controler la mise en pratique des mesures, necessaires ;;" la reduction des armements et it l'interdiction des armes atomiques. . Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): During the diSC!1ssion in the organs of the United Nations of the question of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of i>tomic weapons, the USSR delegation has frequer.. ;r and in detail !;xpressed its views both on th~ question of the reduction of armaments and the transmission of information on conventional armaments and atomic weapons, as well as on the establishment of an international control body to supervise and control the' implementation of measures, for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. Dans la dedaration 'Iu'El a faite, au Conseil de securite le 11 odobre derniel' [450eme' seanceL le representant de l'URSS a egalement fait tin bref expose de l'attit.ude adoptee par son pays. A brief summary of that position was ,also given in the USSR representative's speech on 11 October 1949 [450th meeting] in the Security Council. Lespropositions de l'Union sovietique'relatives a.la reduction des armements eta l'interdictiGn des armes atomiques presentent un, caralctere'concret et pratique et prevoient tl,n plan parfaiteinent realisable permethmt de proceder a la reduction immediate et sans conditions des armements et a rinterdiction des armes ;atomiques. Iln'est point· besoin de reiterer ces propositions. The Soviet Union proposals on the question of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons arE concrete and practical; and provide for a completely attainable system for the immediate and unconditional reduction of, armaments and for: prohibition of atomic weapons. There is no need to repeat those proposals. T6utefois, a la 451eme seance du Conseil de securite, les representant.. de,certains Etats membres du Consdl de securit.e ont \'.herche a.de£orrner l'attitude de I'URSS et a la presenter sous nn jour faux. Faisant appe1 a de:; arguments d'un caractere general et £o:rt peu cOllvaincant, 'eel'... tains representants ont essaye - bien en vain d'ailleurs - de contester le bien-fcinde de la proposition de l'TJnion sovietique, selon laquelle les renseignements a fournir par lespays interesses devraientporter tant Sl1r les forces armees et les armements que sur les al,mes atomiques. Certains de ces critiques ont afftrme que le Conseil desecurite ne pouvait ·prendre de decision sur la transmission de'tenseignenlents relatifs aux arrnenit:nts et aux·armes atomiques pour ,la raisorique deux commissions diffetentes, la Commission des arme·· ments de type c1assique et la Commission de l'eitlergie atomique, sont chargees de cesquestions. Mais c'est precisernentla ou reside la diffictilt:e: le probJeme, de la reduction des armements et de. l'illferdiction des armes atomiques. qui est un '_i * • _ Nevertheless, at the' 451st meeting of the Security Council, the representatives of certain £tates members of the Security Council deliberately attempted to distort and misrepresent the attitude of the USSR. Some of them tried unavailingly,' by means of generai and unconvincing ~rg~ments, to oppose the Soviet Union delegatIon s proposal tha.1 Governments should transmit informatioJ.1 both on armed forces and armaments and on atomic weapons. Some of the critics aI1e~:d that the Security Council could not take decIsIOns on th/e submission of information on arma~ents and atomic weapons because those questI~ns. are 'being 'dealt wi6 by, two separate Co~mlssl.Ons,namely, the Commission for Con- 'VentlOnal Armaments and ,the ,Atomic Energy C?~mission. But, that is precisely where the diffICUlty arises; the, question of the reduction of ' armaments, and the prohibition of atomic w~apons, which is one single question, was arti-' ficmlly and, deliberately divided by opponents of E;:::",amentstOf':. P:~hibiti~ The represental.lve of France tried to justify himself by saying that this division was not made on his initiative. I would remind Mr. Chauvel that no one ascribed the initiative to him. He is merely a faithful follower and executor of instructions. The initiative, as is well-known, was that of the representatives of the United States, who based themselves upon illusory hopes of monopolistic possession of the secret of the atomic weapon, and who, from the very beginning, took the course of artificially and deliberately sepal1.ting atomic weapons from all other kinds of armaments, with a Y:ew, first, to preventing the prohibition of atomic weapons, and t.qen to delaying and undermining the preparation of practical measures for the reduction of armaments. Now they, and the French representative with them, are attempting to reduce th~ entire question to one of obtaining information on the armed forces and armaments of other States. The French representative's reference to General Assembly resolution· 192 (Ill) of 19 November 1948 is also unconvincing, as everyone knows that that resolution was imposed by the Anglo-American bloc for that very same purpose, namely, that of obtaining information on armaments, but avoiding any mention of atomic weapons. The French representative's arguments are full of contradictions. On the one hand, he protests against the submission of informatiotlon atomic weaporis; on the other, he admits the direct connexion between reduction, of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons, and also states that these ate merely two different aspects of one and the sam\~ problem. He also admits that, in spite of the 'fact that two separate Commissions are dealing with two aspects of one and the same problem, the Security Council nevertheless can and shouJd co-ordinate the activities of these two Commissions. If that is so, and there can be no doubt that it is, we have· to be logical and admit that the Security Council can take a decision on -the question. Why can the Security Council not take one decision of principle on the fact that information on conventional armaments and atomic weapons should be submitted by States, irrespective of the existence of two, three or ten commissions? What is there to prevent that?· The existence of two Commissions, arid st~te.,. ments that those Commissions have different terms of reference and competence, cannot constitute an obstacle. The obstade is the unwillingness of the United States to submit information on atomic weapons. Why, then, does the United States show such zeal in defending the propos~~ to obtain information on all other types of armaments? That is also very easy to explain. As the organizer of the North Atlantic aggressive blor., the United States has to collect as much information as possible on the armed forces and armqments of all the countries of the world, while concealing information on atomic weapons from the United N' .tions and world public. opinion. That is the maj,nreason, and 110 far-fetched excuses can con- L'argumentation du representant de la France est pleine de contradictions. D'une part, il s'oppose a ce que les Etats fournissent des renseignements sur les armes atomiques, mais, d'autre part, i1 reconnait qu'iI existe un lien direct entre la reduction des armements et l'interdiction des armes atomiques, et il admet qu'it ne s'agit la que de deux aspects differents d'un seul et meme probleme. Il reconnait, en outre, que bien que ces deux aspects aient He confies it deux commissions differentes, le Conseil de securite peut et doit coordonner l'activite de ces deux commissions. Mais s'il en est ainsi .:.- et il en est bien ainsi - il faut etre logique et reconnaitre que le Conseil de securite a qualite pour prendre une decision sur cette question. POllrquoi le Conseil ne pourrait-il pas statuer qu.'en principe le~ Etats doivent fournir des!enseignements sur les armements de type classlque et sur les armes atomiques, quel que soit le nombre de commissions· qui 's'occupent de ces questions, c'est-a-dire qu'il y en ait deux, trois o~ d~.? Qu'est"ce qui s'y oPP?se? Ce n'est pas le fa!t ~u 11 , existe deux commisslOns ou que ces commlSS10ns ont des mandats differents, c'est le fait que les Etats-Unis refusent de fournir des renseignements sur les armes atomiques. Pourquoi, dans ces conditions, les Etats-Unis demandent-ils avec unetelle insistance qu'on fournis!5e des renseignements sur toutes les autres categories d'armes? L'explicaticin, la e~co;.e,. ~st . fort simple. Les Etnts-Unis, qui ant prIS llll~tla· tive de former· le bloc agressif de, l'Atlan!lque nord, ont besoin de se procurer des renselgnements aussiabondantsque possible sur les forceS I armees et les armements de taus les pays du I monde, tout en disLimulant a 1'Organisation ~es Nations Unies et it l'opinion mondiale les .£::...1 A la 451eme seance du Conseil de seCt1rite, M. Pearson, Ministre des relations e:x:terieures du Canada, a energiqnement soutenu ceux qui avaient pris la de£ense de ce document inacceptable e.t creux. I1 a longuement cherche a nous persuader que la reduction des armements etait une question trop importante pour qu'on la traitat avec faussete ou candeur et qu'elle ne devait pas servir non plus a des manceuvres de propagande ou meme de guerre psychologique. Je .pourrais repondre a M. Pearson ceci: c'est precisement parce que la delegation de l'Union sovietique et le peuple de rUnion sovietique attribuent une extreme importance a la reduction des armenients et a rinterdiction des armes atomiques, mesures qui doivent delivler les peuples dti monde d'une 'Course aux: armements que den ne justifie et liMrer i'humanite entiere du danger d'une guerre atomique, qu'ils proposent aux.Etats de fournir des renseignements tant sur les forces armees et les armements de type c1assiqueque sur les armes atomiques, car ces renseignements seront fort utiles a l'ceuvre de la reduction des armements et de l'interdiction des armes atomiques. C'est le Ministre des relations e."'(terieures d;u Canada qui prend cette ques- .tion a la legere :il cherche, .en appuyant le document soumis par la France, a nous faire croire que, pour elabo::-er un plan efficace de desarmement, il suffirait de reunir des renseignements sur les armementsde type c1assique, et que les informations sur les armes atomiques 'seraient parfaitement inutiles. De telles infoI'lllations· sont .destinees aux naifs, cela est evident; elles sont faites pour tromper les gens nlal informes en leur faisantcroire qu'il serait possible de reduire les armements et meme de realiser le desarmement complet, .sans interdire les. armes atomiques ni fQurdir de renseigneinents a leur sujet.' At the last meeting, Mr. Pearson, the Canadian Foreign Minister, added his active voice to the chorus of the defenders of that unacceptable and empty document. He tried at length to convince us that the question of the reduction of armaments was a serious matter, in which fusincerity· and naivete were inadmissible, and that that ·question could not be used to fulfil propaganda aims or to carry on psychological warfare. I might reply thus to Mr. Pearson : it is precisely because the delegation of the Soviet Union and the people of the Soviet Union take the question of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons very seriously that, in order to strengthen peace and security, to spare mankind an unjustifiable armaments race and to save it from the threat of an atomic war, we propose that Governments should submit information concerning not only armed forces and conventional armaments, but also atomic weapons, because such in{ormation would be highly useful in arriving at a reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. The Canadian Minister does notapproach the question with sufficient seriousness, when, in supporting the French document, he tries to convince us that in order to prepare an effective plan for. disarmament, it is enough to gather information concerning conventional armaments alone and that information concerning atomic weapons is entirely unnecessary. Such assertions are obviously intended for naive people; they are designed to deceive insufficiently informed persons with tales that the reduction of armaments, and e"ep. complete disarmament, can be carried out without prohibiting atomic weapons and without submitting information concerning slich weapons. , The USSR delegation can accept neither such La, delegation de l'URSS ne peut accepter ni ~rguments nor such proposals, since. they are ces arguments, :oi ces propositions, qui nepeuvent hkely only to mislead the peoples of the world, qu'induire en erreur les peuples du monde et don~ and to give the appearance of some activity· in ,ner l'illusion que quelque chose a ete fait pour la t~e redu<:tion of armaments. Using as a distracreduction des armements. A la faveur de la puhon the ·uproar which has been raised around blicite tapageuse qu'on· a faite ala necessite de the collection of information on conventional reunir des renseignements sur les armements de armaments, the Canadian Minister and his senior type Classique,le ministre des relations exterieures partners attempt to divert attention from· the .du .Canada et ses. associes .pluspuissants cherquestions both of the submission of information chent a detourner l'attention.de la •transmission C?ncerning atomic weapons and of the prohibi~. des tenseignements sur les armes atomiqueset bon of atomic weapons. His statement, in .thatIde l'interdictionde c~s armes. Sa declara.tion selon l~hich goes with those af'pirations, and, would agree to the reduction of armaments, such a proposal could be implemented without any magic and without any particular difficulty. The Soviet Union has also proposed that the Commission for Conventional Armaments should, as a first step, prepare aplari for the reduction by one-third of the armaments and armed forces of the five States by 1 March 1950, and submit this plan to the Security Council not later than 1 June 1949 [S/1246/Rev.l]. This is not magic; it is a realistic and concrete proposal which could Le representant des Etats-Unis a longuement expose [451e-me seance] que la question du desar- \Uement devait etre abordee d'une maniere scientifique. Cependant, it s'est hien garde de communiquer au monde sa theorie scientifique du desarmemento Il a beaucoup parte aussi de l'importance q~'il y a a. obtenir des renseignements sur les effectifs militaires et sur le volume des annements, affirmant. que ces renseignements etai~nt essentiels pour assurer le desarmement. Mais iI passe entierement sous silence une question aussi grave que la transmission de renseignements sur les armes atomiques, question dont l'importance n'est pas moindre pour la reduction des armements et surtout pour le desarmement. Une te1le maniere d'aborder le probleme n'a rien de scientifique. Elle ne peut impressionner qU'U!l public compose d'enfants en bas age, de ces memes enfants au sujet desquels le representant des Etats- Unis a dit qu'ils devaient apprendre a. ramper avant de pouvoir marcher ou sauter. Tout comme M. Pearson, il a affirme que le desarmement n'etait pas une tache simple ni facile, qu'il fallait aborder le probleme par etapes et qu'il etait difficile de transformer des guerriers en saints. Si le representant d.es Etats-Unis a recouru. a. tous ces truismes, c'est uniquement pour detourner l'attention dU""Conseil de securite du probleme de la reduction des armements et de I'interdiction des armes atomiques. C'est dans ce meme but qu'il a demande au representant de l'Union sovietique s'it avait quelque formule magique pour reduire les armements. Je peux repondre au representant des Etats-Unis que l'Union sovietique ne' propose pas de formules magiques mais qu'au contraire e1le a propose.et propose taujours des: mesures pratiques qu'il serait aise de mettre en vigueur dans un delai relativement bref. Elle a propose que les cinq membres permanents du: Conseil de securite, qui ont la responsabilite prin~ , cipale du maintien de la paix et de la securite internationales et qui disposent des forces armees les: plus puissantes, reduisent d'un tiers, dans le courant d'une annee, leurs forces armees et leurS' armemerits5• Ce ne Sl)nt pas la des formules ma-' . giques, car, si lesmilieux dirigeants des Etats- Unis n'etaient pas aveugles par ce desir de dominer le monde qui les a pousses a. s'engager dans la course aux arme1l1ents, et s'ils consentaient, au contraire, aaccepter une reduction des armements, cetteproposition pourraient etre mise en pratique sans magie et Sans grandes difficultes. L'Union' sovietique a propose, en· outre,de charger la Commission des armetnents de type' c1assique d'etablir, a. titre de premiere mesure, un plan tendant a. reduire d'un tiers, pour le 1er mars 1950, les armements et les forces armees des. cinq membres permanents du Conseil desecutit~i';'; et de soumettre'ce plan au Conseil au plus tard le 1er juin 1949 [S/1246]. Ce n'est pas la de la Thus it is not the lack of a "magic formula"- .as the United States representative has tried to c01wince us-but the position of the United States which hampers progress in the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. We also differ seriously with the United States representative in respect to the division of·armaments .into conventional armaments and atomic weapons. He has asserted that the separation of these 'two questions supposedly made possible "outstanding achievement" (1 am quoting his exact words) on the part of the··Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments; but there is not a grain of truth in such a statement. Mr. Austin may regard as an "outstanding achievement" the fact tha~ the Anglo-American majority in the Atomic Energy Commission has rubber-stamped the United States proposals on the atomic question embodied in the notorious "Baruch plan" and now puts forward this "plan" as recommendations of the Atomic Energy Commission; but there is no achievement in·that. La distinction qu'on a etablie entre les arme-. ments de type classiqueet les armes atomiques a fait, elle aussi, surgirde serie1t::;c;; divergences de vues entre nous et le rel'i ;:;sentant des Etats- Unis. Ce1ui-ci essaie de nous convaincre que le fait d'avoir dissocie ces deux questions a permis it la Commission de l'energie atomique et a la Commission des armements de type c1assique d'obtenir des "resultats remarquables" (je cite ses propres paroles); cependant, cette affirmation ne correspond pas du tout it la realite. Si le . fait qu~ la majorite anglo-americaine, it la Commission del'energie atomique, a donne son blanc.., seing aux propositivns des Etats-Unis enoncees dans le .fameux "plan Baruch" - plan que cett2 majorite presente aujourd'hui comme une recommandation de la Commission - constituepour M. Austin un "resultat remarquable", je ne puis partager cette mamere devoir. En e:ffet, ce "plan" et ses fameus,;s etapes pre:. voieot que la propriete de toutes les.matieres premieres atomiques dumonge sera confiee au super-trust atomique international que les Etats- Unis proposent de creer. D'autre part, ce plan permet aux Etats-Ums de continuer de disposer clleur gre, en dehors de tout controle et de toute snrveillance internationales, des entreprises pro-· duisant des matedaux. atomiquesetde l'energie atomique, et. cela jusqu'a ce que la·propriete des matierespremieres atomiques aitete transferee a ce· trust. Ouant a l'interdiction des armes atomiques, elle ~st ajournee, aux termes de ce plan, jusqu'au moment ouauront ete franchies toutes les etapes prealables au transfert audit trust des matieresp· ,nieres et de totites les installations servant a la production des materiat1x atomiques et de l'energieatomique. Etant donne qu'il faudra de tres nombreuses annees pour franchir hW.te,s ces etapes, le plan Baruch repousse l'interdichon de l'arme atomique a· unavenir fort lointain, a This "plan" and its notorious stages provide for the transfer of all the atomic raw material of the world to the ownership of the international atomic super-trust envisaged by the United States. With regard to installations for the production of atomic materials and atomic energy, they should, as before, be at the full disposal of· the United States, outside the scope of.international control and supervision, until all atomic raw materials have been appropriated by the saidtrust. According to that plan, the question of the prohibition of atomic weapons is to be postponed until all the stages have been completed in transferring the world's atomic raw materials, and all plants producing atomic materials and atom~c energy, to the atomic super-crust. In vi~w of the fact that many years would be required to complete all those stages, the question of the prohibition· of atOmic weapons is postponed in the Baruch plan tOa distant and unspecified future. Thus, throughout that long period, the "United States The "achievements" of the Commission for Conventional Armaments amount to the fact that that Commission, having adopted in August 19487 the resolution on the alleged impossibility of carrying out a reduction in armaments which was imposed upon it by 0e del<;gations of tI;e United States and the Umted Kmgdom, has m fact buried the· General Assembly resolution of 14 December 1946 concerning the reduction of a:rmaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. Such are theuoutstanding achievements" of the Commission. To call such activities of that Commission Uoutstallding achievements" is tantamount to openly deceiving the peoples of the world. There can be no doubt, however, that the peoples of the world know perfectlywell who are the real champions of the reduction· of armaments and of the prohibition of atomic weapons, and who bitterly oppose such reduction. All this clearly goes to show that what is preventing a reduction in armaments is precisely the separation of the questions of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. Much has been said here by the representative of the United States, by the representative of France and by those who echoed their allegations that the Soviet UnioI.l would not agree to international.control. Such assertions merely constitute an attempt to distort the true position of the USSR, to mislead international public opinion and to conceal an unwillingness to reduce armaments .and to prohibit atomic weapons. In view of such unfair interpretations of the USSR attitude towards control, I feel compelled to quote certain facts ·which prove that the Soviet Union not only does not object to international control, but, on the contrary, has inisisted upon the necessity of such control 'in all its proposals for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. . Let us look at tlle facts. In its proposal of 17 November 1948 on the reduction of armaments ..and. armed· forces by one-third and on the prohibition of atomic weapons, the USSRrecom- .mended the establishment within the framework of the Security Council of an international control body to supervi~e and cont:ol. the implementation of measures for the reductIOn of armaments and armed forces and for the prohibition ·of atomic weapons. That.control body was to be given full official information on the position with regard· to· ~rmed .forces and armaments, including atomic weapons. Thus, the Soviet Union not only proposed the establishment of an international control body; but also proposed that that body .should be Void les faits. Dans sa proposition·du 17 novembre 1948 relative a la reduction d'un tiers des armements et'des forces armeeset a l'interdiction des arriles atomiques, l'URSS a propose de creer, dans le cadre du Conseil de securite, un organe international de. controle· charge de surveiller et de controler la mise .en .pratique des mesures pour la reduction des armements et des for~es armees et pour l'interdiction ges armes at~" miques. Cet organe·international devait etre rotS en possession de. renseignements. officiels et· corn" plets sur l'etat. des forces arm~es et ~es. ar~:.- .ments, y comprts'les armes atomlques. Ams lC, nonseulernent I'Union sovietique-- roposait la creation d'un orgneinternational, mais encore At the same session of the General Assembly, after the Anglo-American majority had rejected the aforementioned USSR proposals, the USSR delegation supported the p~Dposals of the Polish delegation.S Those proposals provided for the reduction by one-third of all land, sea' and air forces of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The Polish draft also provided for the institution of an international control body for the supervision and control of the application of measures for renuction of armaments and armed forces. That body was to be furnished with full official. data on armaments and armed forces. It was also provided that the affirmative vote of all the representatives of the permanent members of the Security Council would not be required for. the adoption of decisions by the international control body with regard to checking and inspection. That is the second fact. On 8 February 1949, when the problem of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons .was discussed in the Security Council, the delegation of the Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution [S/1246/Rev.1] providing for the reduction by one-third of the armaments of the fiv,e permanent members of the Security Council no later than 1 March 1950, and for the submission of full dat~ on their armed forces and armaments of all types, including atomic weapons, no later than 31 March 1949. Thus, it was proposed that the information should be submitted eleven months before the date by which the reduction of armaments was to be carried out. Paragraph 4 of that USSR resolution .provided for the establishment within the framework of the Security Council of an inter.. national control .body to supervise and control the implementation of the measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the pro- ~ibition' of atomic weapons. That is the third fact. . . - Thus, the proposals of the Soviet Union provided for a complete system of measures for the submission of information on' conventional armaments and atomic weapons,for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, and also for the establishment of appropriately strict inter-national· control. .Hence, any allegations that the USSR is not in fav-ourof the reduction of armaments, and that it objects to the sUbmission of information and to international . .control, are contrary to the facts, and their purpose is merely to create confusion, to mislead . insgfficiently informed persons, and to conceal .-----tliereal intentions of. those who wish neither. to reduce armaments nor to prohibit atomic weapons. Ainsi done, les 'propositions de l'Union sovietique prevoyaient tout un systeme demesures relatives a la transmission de renseignements sur les ar1J?ements de type classique et SUr les armes atomiques, a 1· "eduction des' armements, a l'interdiction des cu,.nes atomiques et a l'in:stitution d'un rigoureux controle international approprie. Par consequent, les affirmations" sdon lesqueUes l'URSS serait favorable a la reduction des arme" ments, mais s'opposerait ala transmission de renseignements et a l'institutiOll d'un controle international, ne <:orrespondent pas a la realite et ne sont destillees qu'a' brouiller les cartes, a'induire enerreur les ge!ls mal informes et" a "nasquer les intentions veritables de .ceux qui ne veulent ni -reduire .leurs armements ni taire interdire les armes .atomiques. ~ Nevertheless, the attempts of the authors and supporters of the French draft resolution are not confined to this. The second paragraph of that resolution contains an affirmation that the recommendationsof the Atomic Energy Commission, which the authors of the resolution quite unfoundedly call "the United Nations plan of control and prohibition", provide for the submission of full information on atomic material and facilities, including atomic weapons. Such an affirmation does not in any way correspond to the facts. If the author of this draft resolution had troubled to read the aforementioned recommendations carefully, he would have seen that neither the first9 nor the second10 report of the Atomic Energy Commission, which contained these recommendations, nor the recently issued separate edition of those recommendationsll contains any mention of the submission of data on atomic weapons. Reference to the said recommendations of the Atomic Energy Commission was necessary, because the French representative and his Anglo- Americancolleagues have no convincing arguments with which to justify their refusal to submit information on atomic weapons. They are, therefore, forced to distort the facts openly, claiming that the recommendations of the Atomic Energy Commission already provide for the submission of information on atomic weapons, although they do no such thing. The USSR delegation can take no part·in this juggling of the facts,andcontinues to insist that if armaments and armed forces are to be reduced and atomic weapons prohibited, full data must be provided, not only on armed' forces and armaments, but also on the atomic weapon. The delegation of the Soviet Union will consequently vote against the French draft resolution. The USSR delegation continues to maintain that a reduction in armaments and the prohibition 9 See Official/Records of the Atomic Energy Commis- .sion,firslf: year, Special Supplement. - oVoir les Proces-verbau.'r officiels de la Commission de l'energie atomique,premiere annee, supplbnellt spC~ cial. -I' que leur imposent les depenses militaires. . Quelqt;es mots encOre a propos de 1'a.ssert~on des representants de la France et de la Norvege [451eme seance], selon laquelle la delegation de l'Union. sovietique a la Commission des armements de type classique n'aurait pas combattu le document SOU,i'11is par la France ni 1'envoi de ce texte al'Assetnblee generale. Cela non plus n'est pas exact. La delegation de 1'URSS a cette commission a critique ce document de la fac;on la plus energique et elle a vote contre son adoption12• Ce texte a ete adopte par la majorite anglo-americaine de la commission grace a la methode habituelle de vote. Quant a In delegation de l'URSS, eITe a vote contre. Il est done parfaitement clair que la majorite anglo-americaine d~ cette (~ommission, desireuse d'imposer au Conseil de seeurite et a 1'Assemblee generale sa manii~re de vo.ir, telle qu'elle est ex.- ,posee dans ce.document, 17.'a pas hesite avioler le reglement interieur en transmettant ce texte au Conseil de securite et e:l1 proposant maintenant de le soumettre a 1'AssembJee generale, au lieu de suivre 1'usage etabli et de rediger un rapport sur le travail accompli par la commission au cours de la periode ecoulee, ainsi que sur l'attitude adoptee par chacunedes delegations a1'egard de la question. On affirme, certes, qu'en transmettant ce texte a l'AssembIee generale, .on y adjoindra les comptes rendus relatifs a. l'examen de cette question ala commission, mais cet argument n'est guere valable, car il sera tres difficile aux membres de l'Assemblee de lire tous ces comptes rendus; si, au contraire, on avait etabli ~n rapport comme d'habitude, les membres de l'Assemblee pourraient le lire. Mais on n'a pas redige de rapport, et 1'on s'efforce maintenant, non seulement de transmettre seul le document de' t'ravail fran- <;ais a l'Assemblee generale pour information, mais encore de le faire approuver. Il est evident qU'on ne saurait accepter cette maniere de procedel'. On a pretendu que la commission manquait de temps et que, par consequent, elle n'etait pas en mesure de prepareI' un rapport. Mais cet argument n'est pas valable. La majorite anglo-americaine de la commission a decide, des le ler aont 1949, de transmettre au Conseil de securite le document de travail etabli par le representant de la France. Entre cettedate et l'ouverture de la quatriem.e session de l'Assemblee generate, il s'est ecoule un mois et vingt jours et, pour peu qu'elle 1'ent voulu, la .commission aurait pu recliger son rapport et le soumettre a l'Assemblee strictement en conformite du reglement interieur. Mais on n'a pas tenu ale faire. On etait plus desireux de faire accepter, aussi vite que possible, ce fameux document redige par le representant de la France, mais exposant les idees des Anglo-Americains, et l'on n'a done pas voulu etablir le rapport habituel qui aurait fourni au Conseilde securite et al'Assem.,. blee generale des renseignements sur le cours des 'discussions qui ont porte sur ce texte ala commission et au Comite de travail. I should like to say a few words about the French and Norwegian repre~entatives' attempts 1451st meeting] to· show that, in the Commission for Conventional Armam~nts, the delegation of the Soviet Union ha.d not objected to the French document or to its submission to the General Assembly. This, too, does not correspond to the truth. The USSR delegation vigorously criticized that document in the Commission and voted aaainst. its adoption.12 It was adopted with the h~lp of the usual voting technique employed by the Anglo-American. majority in the Commission. The USSR delegation voted against that document. It is thus perfectly clear that the Anglo- American majority in that Commission, wishing to impose upon the Security Council and the General Assembly its point of view as set forth in that document, has not hesitated to violate established practice by submitting this text to the Council, and by now proposing to submit it, alone, to the Assembly, rather than following the customary procedure of preparing the usual report of the Commission's work for the period und.er review, setting forth the positions on the question taken 'by each delegation. The present position that summary records of the discussion of this question in the Commission will be circulated to the General Assembly is likewise unconvincing. Representatives to the General Assembly would find it extremely difficult to go through all those records, whereas if the usual report were prepared, it could be read. There is, however, no such report ; an.effort is being made to submit ,to the Assembly nothing but the French working paper, and not merely to submit it for information, but to have it adopted. This way of doing things is, of course, unacceptable. It is claimed that the Commission lacked time and was therefore unable to prepare a report. That argument, however, is groundless., On 1 August 1949 the Anglo-American majority in the Commission decided to forward the French working paper to the Security Council. Had it been so desired, during the course of tp,e month ~nd twenty days, between that date and the openlUg of the fourth session of the General Assembly, the Commission could have prepared and submitted its report to the Assemblv in shict accordance with established procedure.' There was, however, no such desire. It was rather desired to have this notorious document, which was drawn up by the French representative but the contents of .whichare Anglo-American, rushed through as qUlck!y as possible without setting before the Security· Council and the General Assembly the usual report presenting informati()n ontlle course ?f the debate on that text in the Commission and Its Working Committee.

I have been requested by a representative to adjourn this meeting not later than 6 o'clock. Ido not wish to curtail anyone's remarks, but I give notice that I intend to adjourn the meeting at that hour. If the representative of the United Kingdom is prepared to speak now. with that understanding, 1 invite him to do so. Sir Alexander C.ADOGAN (United Kingdom) : I Sir Alexander CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) ·think I canlimit my remarks to fairly short (traduit de l'anglais): Mon intervention sera compass. If I run on too late, the President must breve. Si .le parle trop longtemps, je prie le' Precut me short. I do not wish to detain t..lte Council sident de m'arreter. Je ne voudrais pas retenir longer than is necessary, butIdo feel impelled to \l'attention du Conseil plus qu'il n'est necessaire, make one or two comments, mainly factuq.l, on I mais, apres les deux discours que nous venons the two speeches we have heard this afternoon.· I d'enrendre, je ?Ie'vois .contr~itit de pr~se~ter quel- 'i , . . 'lues observatlOfis qUi porter-ont pnnclpalement , 'sur les faits. Both speakers have r~ferred constantly to the obstinate opposition of what they·called the: Anglo:' Americanmajodty or·bloc t-o any proposals for reduction or limitation of armaments,' and they dilated at some length on the heroic efforts of the Governrn.ent of the Sovi~ Union to dosoniething practical about the reduction of armaments. In regardto,that last matter-the practical proposals of the Government of the Soviet Union-,.may I just refer to one of the more important proposals which that Government has made, namely" that Galling upon the five permanent members of the· Security Council to cut their armaments by onethird? That is a very specious proposal. It is not a 'new one. 1 think it was first made, as far as I can remember, years ago. It was discussed and turned down for obvious reasons. What are those reasons? I woUld suggest that they ar~ the following. Anyone who honestly wishes 1:0 do something about the regulation and reduction of armaments IIlustfirststrive to arrive somehow at a'. just equilibrium of armarqents. Once that has been done,it may be possible to make successive cuts of 5 percent, 10 per cent or 30 percent. However, ifa simple, equal-percentage cut is advo- .cated, then, if thereis a disequilibrium in armaments, such.a procedure would'merely perpetuate and intensify thp.t disequilibrium. The equilibrium must be arrived at first. It is a simple arithmetical propositi'on .that .if there. is disequilibrium now and everyone is cut by an equal·percentage, the .disequilibrium is perpetuated. I said just now. that· the. disequilibrium would be intensified. What Imeanteby that was that there might be a Stat~·which had voluntarily disarmed down to whatit considered to be the safety point, at which it retained onlysufficieIlt a,rma.; ments for .the .patrolling of its frontiers,for keeping order at home, and so on. Again, there . might be'another State with a large surplllS for Le PRESIDENT (trad11,it de l'anglCLis): Un membre du Conseil m'a demande de ne pas P:i'Olonger la seance au-de1a de 18 heures. Je ne vetO'~ pas obliger les representants a abreger'leurs declarations, mais j'avertis le Conseil que j'ai I'intention de lever la seance a 18 heUl'es. Si le representant du Royaume-Uni est dispose a prendre la parole dans ces conditions, je la lui donnerai bien volontiers. Les deux orateuI'S n'ont cesse de faire allusion a l'opposition obstinee de ce' qu'ils appellent la majorite anglo-americaine ou le bloc anglo-ame- .ricain a toutes les propositions tendant a reduire ou a limiter les armements. 11s ont longuement expose ·les efforts heroiques faits par le Gouvernementde 1'Union scvietique pour aboutit a un restiltat pratique dans ·le domaine de la reduction' des armements. Sur ce demier point - a savoir les propositions pratiques du Gouvernement de l'Union sovietique - je voudrais rappeler l'une des propositions les plus importantes faites par ce Gouvernement: les dnq membres permanents du Conseil de securite etaient invites a reduire leurs armements dans la proportion d'un tiers. C'estIa une proposition bicn specieuse. EIle n'est pas nouvelle. 11 me'semble qu'elle a ete faite, pour la premiere "fois, il ya quelques annees : eIle a etediscutee et rejetee pour des raisons evidentes. QueUes sont ces raisoJ;1s? Ce sont, amon avis, les suivantes. Si 1'on veut vraiment faire qtie1que chose pour reduire'etreglementer les armements, il faut, en premier lieu, s'efforcer d'etablir, entre les annements .desi!ifferents pays, u.n juste equilibre.. Ce . resultat obtenu, on p.eutoperer des' reductlons successiv:es de 5 pour 100, 10 pour 1000u30 pour 100. Mais, s'il existe. un desequilibre entre· les annem~nts' et qu'on decide siIIlplement d'operer une' reduction ·uniforme, cette methode aurait pour effet' de maintenir· et m,eme d'aggraver le desequilibre. La premiere chose afaire, c'est cretablir unequilibre; un ca1cul arithmetlque el&nentaire montte ques'il y a un desequilibre et qu'on opere une reduction uniJiorme,' le desequilibre subsiste. Je viens de dire que le desequilibre serait aggrave. Supposons, eneffet, qu'un Etat ait'V?lo.ntairement teduit sesafmements jusqu'a lahmlt~. minimum de securite et qu'il· n'ait conserve que lesarmements necessaires pour surveiller ses frontieres,. ma-intenir l'ordre interieur, etc. Et St;PPOsons qu'un autre Etat dispose d'un largeexcedent d'armes eventuellement utilisables pour1.1neagres- Mr. Malik said that there was no magic in it. I am not so' sure. To me it seems better than producing the rabbit out of the hat: it is more like producing the hat out of the rabbit. A great deal of tittle has, been taken up this afternoon in discussing atop1ic energy. We are not here to discus.s that. That is ,discussed in another body,' and .there will very soon 'be ample opportunity for discussing it, in all its aspects, in the General Assembly. It has been said that the discussion of atomic On, a pretendu que ce sont les adversaires dn energy, on the one hand, and of conventional desarmettlent qui ont voulu discuter separement ,armaments, on the other, has been divi~ed into two ,la question de l'energie atomique et celle des armesubjects by the adversaries of disarmament. That ments cIassiques. Ce n'est pas vrai: cette division i;; not true. It was divided into two subjects by a ete operee par l'Assembleegenerale qui a vote the General Assl;mbly, bya r-=solution of the a ce sujet une resolution et meme plusieurs reso- , General Assembly, by more than one resolution lutions. Je sais bien que le representant de l'Union of the General Assembly. I know,o£ course, that' sovietique pretend que cette resolution a ete im-:- the Soviet U mon representative says that the posee a'!'Assem.blee generalepar ce qu'il persiste resolution was imposed on 'the Assembly by what a appeler le bloc anglo-americain. En uncertain he persists in calling the Anglo-American bloc. sens,on pburraif considerer cela comme flatten!" Well, that might, from one point of view, perhaps pourles Etats'-Uni,s et le Royaume-Uni, bien qtl'on be thought to ,be complimentary to the United n'aitpas VOUbl, Yen suis sur,110u5 faire un com- States and the United Kingdom; I attl sure; howpliment. Ce qui est certain, c'est que cette remar.,. ever, it is not irltended to be so. But certain it ,que est une insulte a l'adresse de tous les autres is that it is most offensive to all the other Mem- Mernb.res de l'Organisation des Nations. Unies. bers of the United Nations. . ,I shou14 like now, as briefly as I can, to address myself to the subject which is before this. body at this,moment, and to state, as briefly as I can, the attitude of my Government. At its last session, the General Assembly, in its resolution 192 (Ill) of 19 November 1948, expressed confidence that the Commission for Conventional Armaments, in carrying out its plan of work this year, would devote its first attention to formulating proposals for an exchange of information on conventional armaments and armed forces. My delegation. at the General _ Assembly supported this resolution, because" although we did' not believe that 'it could lead to any spectacular result, we felt that it would be giving ,to, the Security Council ,and t6 t~e COmmission for Conventional Armaments an , honest, practical and important task which, if faithfUlly carried out, would ha.ve two valuable results: first, it would help to create that atmosphere. of international confidence vital to any ~ffective scheme for disarmament; and, secondly, It would' Ilerve as" ap. initial step, a step which ~ould have, to ·be taken before any plan of reductIon 'of armaments· could be put into effect. In .line with the attitune which, we adopted .at the Assembly, my Government has given the most careful consideration to the Commission's plan, which is now before us in document S/1372,and l1li; ,decided to accept these .proposals as constipr~ndre une guerre d'agression. Un'. tel plan de reduction des armements est done macceptable. L'accepter serait vouloirduper l'opinion publique; ce serait prendre la question, non par le commencement, mais par la :fin; ce serait aborder la question a rebours. M. Malik a declare' que ce pla.n n'avait rien de sorcier. Je n'en suis pastres sur. A mon avis, c'est faire mieux que le prestidigita:teur qui sort le lapiri du chapeau, c'est faire sortir le chapeau dn lapin. On a debattu longuement, cet, apres-:midi, la question de 1'energie atomique.- Cette question, le Conseil n'a pas a la discuter, e1le a ete discutee par un autre organisme et l'Assemblee generale va la discuter a loisir et sous,tous lesaspects. Je voudrais maintenant aborder la question dont le Conseil est saisi· et exposer aussi brievement que possible,les vues de mon Gouvernement. A sa del'1liere session, l'AssembIee genera1e a adopte, le 19 novembre 1948 la resolution 192 (HI) dans laquelle .e11eemet 1evceu que, dans l'execution de son plan de. travail, la Commission des arm~ments de, typeclassique se preoccupe. de fiormuler tout d'abord des propo'sitions pour' l'echange d'informationsre1atives aux armements de type c1assique et aux effectifs. Ma de1<~gation a·l'Assemblee genera1e a appuye cette resolution. Nohs ne pensions.pas que cette resolution pourrait avoir •des resultats spectacu1aires; nous estimions' qu'elle aurait poureffet d'assigner, an Conseil de, securite et a la Commission des arrnettlerits ,de type classique une tache honnete, pia'- tique etimportanteet que cette tache, si elle etait 'menee abien, permettrait d'obtenir deux resultats utiles: en premier lieu, on aurait contribuea etablir l'atniosphere de confiance internationale indispensable a tout programme.de desarmement efficace; d'autre part, on aurait franchi une premiere etape, etapenecessaire avant qu'un prograttlme quelconque de reduction des armements puisse etre· mis en application. , . Con£ormenient a l'attitude que .nous avons adoptee a l'Assemblee generale, le Gouvernement du Royaiune"'-Um.a etudie avec soin1e programme de la.cottlmission, tel qu'il nous est soumis dans le doctL.1'11ent S/137~,et a decide d'accepter ces pro- My delegation noted with regret, however, that, in the Commission for Conventional Armaments and in this Council, the delegations of the USSR and the. Ukrainian SSR have flatly rejected the Commission's proposals, without even having subjected them to any constl'Uct1.ve criticism. The representative of the Soviet Union in the Commission has harped upon the theme that all that the Commission's plan was designed to accomplish was to divert attention from the main prob- ". lem of reducingarnaaments to that of collectinginformation. This, to my mind, is almost as strange an argument as to say th~,t to prepare an agenda for the General Assembly is to divert attention from the work of' the Assembly. How can we ever start reducing armaments until we have some idea of what it is that we are reducing, what the existing situation is, and what adjustments should be made in it to produce a stable equilibrium? As a corollary to this argument, the Soviet En guise de corollaire, lerepresentant de rUnioD, . Union representative in the Commission added sovietique a la commission a ajotlte que le plan de that the Commission's plan is a further example la commission constitue un notlvel exemple des of the manner in which the United Kingdom and procedesque le Royaume-Uni et les .Etats-Unis the United States sabotage all concrete measures emploient pour saboter toutes Ies mesures conof arms reduction. The USSR representative in cretes de reduction des armements. Le representhe Commission has even contended that the . tant de l'URSSala Commission a ete jusqu'a number of resolutions on disarmament introduced preteudre que le nol1lbre des resolutions relatives by his delegation is indicative of the more sinau desarmement presentees par sa delegation cere interest which his Government feels in the montre l'interet sineere que son GOllvemement matter. I can only say that it seems to have been porte cl. la question. Je repondrai simplement que' the verdict ofthe Commission and of the General la commission et l'Assemblee generate ont juge Assembly that the quality of these USSR resolu,· que 1a qualite des resolutions de l'URSS n'egalait tions was not commensur2.te with their quantity. pas lear quantite. Je ne pense pas, du reste, que In any case, I do not believe that the General l'Assemblee genenJ,le ait besoin d'autres elements Assembly will require any further evidence to d'appredation pom decouvrir qui fait de l'obsconvince it of the true source of obstruction in truction lorsqu'on che~chea,etablir un programme the formulation of a practical plan for the red'Ucpratique de reglementation et de reduction des tion and regulation of conventional armaments. armements de type classique. V'attitude de l'Uoion To reintroduce in this Council proposals that have . sovietiQue, qui l.'eintroduit devant le Conseil des already been decisively rejected by the Assembly, propositions deja rejeteesde maniere decisive p~r and to refuse to co-operate in the implementation 1'Assemblee et~qui refuse de collaborer a l'apph~ of the clearly expressed will of the A.,serilbly, as cation d'une decision tres nette de l'Assemblee, the Soviet Union has done, is hardly evidence ne parait guere inspiree par le desir de faire of a desire to forward the work of the Commisprogresser les travaux de la commission oU du sion or of the Security Council. Conseil de seurite. Another comment which we have heard from the representative of,the Ukrainian SSR in the Commission is that the proposed census would not form part of a plan oi armaments reduction, but would only be a service to the United States Military Intelligence. The Soviet Union .representative in the Commission criticized. the proposal because it would entail divulging the most secret information of every Government, which under no circumstances waseto be delivered to anybody. La delegation du Royaumc-Uni a le regret de constater que, a la Commission des armements de type classique et au Conseil de securite, les delegations de l'URSS et de la RSS d'Ukraine ont purement et .oimplement rejete les propositions de la commission sans emettre de critiques constructives. Le representant de l'Union sovietiqtie ala Commis"ion, reprenant son leitmotiv, a declare que le plan de la commission n'avait d'autre but que de detourner l'atten!ion du probleme principal, qui est la reduction des armements, vers la question du rassemblement des informations. Cette argumentation me semble aussi etrange que celle qui consisterait a dire qu'etablir l'ordre du jour de l'Assemb1ee, c'est detourner l'attention des travaux de l'Assemblee. Comment pourrions-nous commencer a reduire les armements si nous ne savons pas au prealable de quels armements il s'agit, queUe est la situation existante et queUes mesures .il convient de prendre pour etablir un equilibre stable? Le representant de la RSS d'Ukraine a la commission a pretendu, d'autre part; que le :e~ censenaent propose ne servirait pas al'execunop d'un programme de reduction des armements, matS serait utilise par le Service de renseignements de 1'armee. americaine. Le, representant de l'Uniop sovietique a la commission a critique la proposl~ tion en disant qu'elle aurait pour effet de dnrulgu~r des informations que chaqueGouvernement conS1- The proposal submitted by the Soviet Union delegation in the course of this debate [Sj140S/ Rev.JJ requires, in my view, little co~ent. Its simplicity-,in every sense of the word-is delightful. It is designed to distract attention from the complete unwillingness of the USSR to co-operate in the work of the Commission and the Council. Its failure to make any reference to the necessity of providing adequate procedures for verification of information on either conventiona'l armaments or atomic weapons, is one obvious manifestation of its illusory and unrealistic character. En condusion, la delegation du Royaume-Urii estime que les propositions contenues ·dans le pro'- , lrramme que la commission nous a soumis s'ac- ~ordent parfaitement avec les dispositions ·de la resolution de l'Assemblee generale en date du 19 novembre 1948. Nous voterons doncen faveur du projet de resolution. soumis par le representant de la France. To sum up, my delegation believes that the proposals contained in the Commission's plan now before us are fully in accord with the General Assembly resolution of 19 November 1948. Wle shall, therefore, vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by the representative of Fra.nce. As regards the Soviet Union draft resolution, we believe this to be merely a propaganda device unworthy of the Security Council's serious attention. We shall, therefore, vote in favour of the realistic and constructive alternative draft resolution proposed by the representative of France,· Ouant au p.!ojet de resolution de l'Union sovietiqt:i'e, nous le considerons comme une manceuvre. de propagande qui ne merite pas de reteIlrr l'attention du Conseil de securite. Nous voterons donc en faveur du projet de resolution realiste et constructif presente par la France. M. MANUILSKY (Republique socialiste sovietiqt1e d'Ukraine) (traduit du russe) : Je rn'efforcerai d'etre le plus brei possible. La declaration que vient de faire le representant uu Royaume-Uni appelle une replique immediate. Tous les arguments au.xquels il a eu recours sont tires de l'arsenal de la Societe des Nations. En ecoutant Sir Alexander Cadogan, j'ai eu l'impression que l'ombre .Ote la Societe des Nations apparaissait, que le tOimbeau s'ouvrait et qu'une voix d'outre-tomberepetaitles arguments qui avaient cours a la Societe des Natio!ls. Ces arguments invoques apropos de·l'equilibre des ar~~~ents, 011 les avons-nous entendus? A la Soclete .des Nations. Cet a.rgument de la propagande, 011 l'avons-nous entendu? A la Societe des Nations, Les propositiot:'ls concernant les· informations, qui ne tranchent en rien la question des armements, 011 les avonS-llOUS entendues? A la Societe des Nations. Au surplus, Sir Alexander Cadogan confirme - ce que nous savons fort bien - que c'est lui et les tenants de ce point de vue qui ont combattu, al'epoque, les propositions de des-armement general, puis de desarmement partiel, formulees. par l'Union sovietique. Nous savons tres bien a quoi a abouti cette politique. Le Royaume-Uni .veut-il amener !e monde ala meme situation? 11ne reus- Mr. MANUILSKY (UKrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated from. Russian): I shall try to be as brief as possible. The statement which the representative of the United Kingdom has just made calls for an immediate rejoinder. All the arguments which he has used are drawn from the arsenal of the League of N:ations. While I was listening to Sir Alexander· Cadogan, I had the impression that the shade of the League of - Nations was hovet:ing over liS, t.~at the grave was opening, and tha~ a voice from the beyond was repeating the arguments which were current in the League of Nations. "Where have we heard those arguments regarding the balance of armaments ? At the League of Nations. \i\lhere have We heard this propaganda argument? At the League of Nations. Where have we heard the proposals abOUt information which entirely fail to Settle the question of armaments its~lf? At the Le,ague of Nations. Sir AlexanderCadogan is, moreover, confirmi~g what we already know: that itwas he, and tnose holding. that view who, in that period, opposed the proposals advanced by the Soviet Union for total disarmament, and those made later for partial disarmament. We' very well k~ow the results of that policy. Does the United KIngdom want to lead the world into a similar ; ....... This is my last remark. We have in all honesty proposed the reduction of armaments. That pro~ posal has been rejected and it has been proposed that the information requested should be given. But, once the reduction of arm&n1ents is rejected, what purpose would that serve? Merely, as the repres,~tative of the Soviet Union has said-and as we agree-that of giving certain intelligence services information about the military situation in the various countries. Wc are acting honestly. There is a wish to draw us into something which does not seem to us at all honest. Well then, let LIe others act themselves, but without us. That is the very blief statement which I wished to make in reply to Sir Alexander Cadogan's observation, which seemed to ,me entirely out of place in the Security Council.

I judge that the Security Council is ready to vote. It will vote on the. revised draft resolution submitted by the representative of France concerning the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, which is set forth in document Sj1399/RevJ. Mr. MALIK (Union of, Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian) : I should like to make the following announcement. Under the established procedure, reports of the Commission for Conventional Armaments are submitted to the General Assembly for information only, as are the reports of the Atomic Energy Commission. The fact that a draft resolution is here submitted to which the, USSR delegation cannot agree, against which it voted in the Commission for ~onventional Armaments, and against which it will vote again in the Security Council, gives reason to believe thatthis text has been presented to the Security Council only in order to provoke a veto on the part of the delegation of the Soviet Union. If a veto is required by anyone for the record, then the number of vetoes will be increased by one after the vote on this .resolution. If, however, it is the intention of the Security Council to 'inform the General Assembly of the course'of the discussion on the reduction and regulation of armaments in t..'le Commission for Conventional Armaments, in the Committee related to it, md in the Security Council, it would be best simply to send to the General Assembly. all the documents ,on this matter and not to'take, any decision here fa vote on the draft resolution which is before the Council. ' If such a proposa.1'wetemade,'the USSR delegation would not object to those documents being sent to the General. Assembly.for information, as, was recently done [450th meeting] with the regu" lar report ,for 19480£' the Commission for Con- Void ma derniere remarque. Nous avons propose, honnetement, la reduction des armements. On a repousse cette proposition et on nous propose de donner les informations demandees. Mais, des lors qu'on repousse la reduction des armements, a quoi cela servira-t-il? Uniquement, comme l'a dit le representant de rUnion sovh~­ tique - et IlOUS nous en tenons ace point de vue - ainformer certain::; services de renseignements ' sur la situation militaire des differents pays. Nous agissons honnetement. On veut nous attirer dans une affaire qui ne.nous parait pas du tout honnete. Alors, que les autres agissent euxmemes, mais sans nous. Voila la tres courte d6ciaration que j'ai voulu faire en reponse a la remarque de Sir Alexander Cadogan qui m'a paru tout a fait deplacee au Conseil de securite. Le PRESIDENT (traduitde l'cmglais) : Je pense que le Conseil est dispose a passer au vote sur le projet de resolution revise de la France reIati£ a la reglementatiori et a la reduction des armements et des forces armees, qui figure au document S/1399/Rev.L M. MALIK (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du msse) : Je tiens abire la declaration suivante. Conformement a l'usage etabli, les rapports de la Commission des armements 'de type classique, ainsi que ceux de la Commission de l'energie atomique, sont transrnis a I'AssembIeegenerale a titre d'information. Le fait de soumettre ici un projet ,de resolution, contre lequella delegation de l'URSS a deja vote ala Commission des armements de type dassique, qui lui parait inacceptable et contre lequel elle voteraau Conseil de securite, nous fait soupc;onner qu'on u'a presente ce texte au Conseil de securite que pour provoquer un veto de la part de la delegation de'I'Union sovietique. Si c'est un veto qu'on cherche a enregistret, it est certain que, apres la mise aux voix de cette resolution, it y aura un veto de plus. Mais si le Conseil tient a informer. l'Assemblee generale de la rrlarche des debats qui ont eu lieu, a la Commission des armements de type cIassique, au' Cornite qui en depend et au Conseil de securite" sur la ,reduction et-la reglementation des armements, il serait plus indique de transmettre purementet simplement a l'Assemblee generale tous les .documents relatifs a cette question" sans depder la mise' aux voix du texte dont le Conseil' est saisi. ' ' Dans ce ca,s;la delegation de l'URSSne s'opposerait pas,a ce que ces documentsfussent transmis a,I'Assemblee generale, pour information,a~ 111eme ,titre que 'luia ete recemtI1en~ ~nvoye [450emeseance] le rapport de la CO~mlssl0nirltIJ Does the Soviet Union representative withdraw that imputation? Le representant de rUmon sovietique est-it dispose a retirer son accusation? Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Re., publics) (translated from Russian): I did not refer to the French delegation nor attribute any such intentions to it. I did state, however, that if this resolution is put to the vote it will certainly provoke a negative vote by the USSR delegation; regardless of what the intentions 0.£ the French representative or of those who support his resolution may be, the fact remains that another veto will have been provoked. M. MALIK (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (trad1.f,it Ju russe) : !e'n'ai pas mis en cause la delegation de la France et je ne lui ai pas attribue de te11es intentions. Mais fai dit que, si l'on mettait aux voix ce projet de resolution, la delegation de rURSS votera certaine-' ment contre ce texte. Quelles que soient les inten- ,tions du representant de la France, ou de ceux qui appuient son projet de resolution, le fait demeure qu'on aura provoque ainsi un veto. Si l'on tient a. augmenter ,le nombre des vetos" il faut mettre aux voix le projet de resolution de la Fran(;e. Mais ;si l'on veut simplement soumettre al'Assemblee generale les documents rt:latifs aux debats sur la reduction et la reglementation des armements, quiant eu lieu pendant la periode envi" If that veto is needed for the record, then the French resolution should be put to the vote. If, however, the aim is to transmit to the General' Assembly the documents on the discussion of the question of the regulation and reduction of armaments in the Commission on Conventional Arma:' ments, jn its Working Committee and in the Security Council during the period reviewed, then there is no need to put the subs,tance of this question to the vote. " sagee~ a la' Commission des armements de type c1assique, a son Comite de travail et au Conseil de securite,' it est inutile de mettre aux voix 'cette question en tant que question de fond. C'est a ceIaque se reduisent mes observations: Je n'ai formule aucune accusation a regard de la delegation de la France. . . That is what I had to sav. I made no accusations against the French delegation in that connexion. Le PRESIDENT (trad1tit, de l'anglais): Etant donne la situation assez deplaisante.dans laque1le nous nous trouvons, et '&tant donne que le projet de resolution de la France,prevoit que le Conseil "approuve ces propositions c011U11e constituant . la base .necessaire a la mise en vigueuf du paragraphe 6 de,l~ resolution precitee de l'Assemblee' generale, (;'est-a-dire approuve. lespropositions enonceesdans le document de travail [S/1372,] .et adoptees par la Commission des armements de type c1assique a saJgemeseance, le ler aout 1949, je vais, mettre aux voix le projet de resolutio~ de la France tel qu'il figureau' document S/1399/ Rev.I. . The PRESIDENT: In view of the parliamentary situation, which is not very pleasant, and in view of the fact that this draft resolution "approves these proposals--as constituting the necessary basis for the implementation of the sixth paragraph of the above-mentioned resolution of" the General Assembly", that is, approves the proposals ~n the working paper [S/1372] adopted by the Commission for Conventional'Armaments at its 19th· meeting on 1 August 1949, I shall put the FrenCh draft resolution, set forth in document S/1399/ Rev.l, to the vote.

Is it the wish of the Council that we should now proceed to a vote on the second draft resolution, that submitted by the French delegation and set forth in document S/1408/Rev.l ? Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I think that the French resolution does not differ in substance from the one presented previously which was not adopted in view of the fact that one of the permanent members of the Security Council voted against it. The previous French draft contained the same provisions as the present one, namely provisions for the collection of information on armaments and armed forces only, and not on atomic weapons. Thus there is no real difference between the first and the second version. Consequently the USSR delegation does not consider there is any need to vote twice on one question and one resolution, when the only difference is in the wording.

I treat this as a point of order, and I rule that this is a different and independent draft resolution because of what is to be found in the second paragraph. In the first paragraph, I believe, it does contain material which can be found in the draft resolution which was vetoed, but that does not determine its character as being identical with that of the other proposal. As I say, the contents of the second paragraph are not to bt found in the draft resolution already vetoed. That is my ruling. This is an independent draft resolution and its authors are entitled to have it voted upon. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Re-, publics) (translated from Rztssian): As I have already pointed out, at the beginning of the voting, ot:1ly one conclusion can be drawn from the present situation and from the attitude taken by those supporting the second French draft, namely, that a number of d.elegations in'the Security Council I not only refuse to put their cards on the table and play fairly, that is to say, to give information VotetLt pottr: Egypte, Republique socialiste 50- vietique d'Ukraine, Union des Republiques socia- listes sovietiques. Vote contre: la Chine. S'abstilnment: Argentine, Canada, Cuba, Fran- ce, Norvege, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. Il y a 3 VOi.1; pottr, 1 cont~e et 7 abstentions. Le PRESIDENT (trad-nit de l'anglais): Le Conseil desire-t-il voter maintenant sur le second projet de resolution soumis par la delegation de la France et qui figure au document S/1408/ Rev.2? M. MALIK (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (trad'l£it dzt rttsse) : Il me semble que, au fond, le deuxieme projet de resolution de la France ne differe en rien de son premier texte qui par suite du vote contraire de l'un des mem- bre~ pcrmanents du Conseil de securite, n'a pas ete adopte. Ces deux projets de resolution con- tiennen~ ~s memes dispositions, a. savoir la trans- mission de renseignements ne portant que sur les armements et les forces armees; ni l'un ni l'autre ne prevoient de renseignements sur les armes atomiques et it n'y a donc aucune difference no- table entre ces deux textes. Aussi la delegation de l'URSS estime+elle qu'il est inutile de voter deux fois de suite sur une seule et meme question, de mettre aux voix deux redaotions differentes d'~ne seule et meme resolution. Le PRESIDENT (trad1tit de l'anglais) : 11 s'agit la. d'un point d'ordre et j'estime que ce projet de resolution, en raison du contenu du second para- graphe, est un texte nouveau. Le premier para- graphe c9ntient bien certaines idees deja. enoncees' dans le texte qui a fait l'objet d'un veto, mais cela ne signifie pas que ce projet soit identique a. celui qui a ete rejete. Je l'ai deja. dit, le second para- graphe contient des elements qui ne se trouv~nt' pas dans le projet de resolt;ti?J:.1 qui a f~it yobJet d'un veto. TelIe est ma deCISIOn. Il s aglt bIen d'un projet de resolutio~ nouveau, et les ~~teur.s de Ge projet ant le drOIt de demander qu 11 SOlt mis aux voix. M. MALIK (Union des Republiqttes socialiste~ sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Comme je ~'~l deja. dit avant le vote, la situation qui s'est creee ici et l'attitude adoptee par ceux qui soutienn~nt le deuxieme,projet de resolution de la France n'I~­ diquent qu'une chose, asavoir que, loin de voulol! jouer f:anc jeu et soumettre des renseigne111ents sur les forces armees, les armements de type ~las­ sique et les armes atomiques, certaines delegatlOns~

Is that intended to be a challenge to my ruling? . Le PRESIDENT (trad1tit de lJanglais): Le representant de l'Union sovietique fait-it ~ppel a. la decision du President? . M. MALIK (Union des Republiques socialistes Mr. MAuK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): That is how I view the situation which has arisen. sovi<~tique'S) (traduit du 1'usse): C'est ainsi que j'interprete la situation. Le PRESIDENT (traduitde l'anglais): Cette reponse ne constitue pas un argument valable en vue d'un appe1 contre la decision presidentielle. Je mets done aux voix le projet de resolution de la France, tel qu'il figure an document S/1408/ Rev.2.

That is not an adequate basis for proceeding to a vote on a challenge. I shall therefore put to the vote the F=-ench draft resolution; set for in document S/1408/Rev.1. A vote 'was taken by show of hands, as follows: • In fa:vour: Canada, China, Cuba, Egypt, France, Norway, United Kingdom of Great ,Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. ,Votent .pour: Canada, Chine, CubaJ Egypte,. France, Norvege, Royaume-Uni de Grande...; Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. , .fotetzt cont~e: Republ!que ~ocialiste sovietique d'ukrame, Ul110n des Republtques socialistes so- vietiques. . Against: .Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. SJabstient: l'Argentine. Il y a 8 voix pour, 2 voij,- contre et une absten- tion. Abstaining: Argentina. The reSttlt of the vote was 8 in favour, 2 againstJ and 1 abstention. The resolution was not adoptedJ one of the votes aga~nst being that of a permanent member of the Cmtncil. . M. MANUILSKY (Republique socialiste sovie- tique d'Ukraine) (traduit du rtts,re) : rai vote, bieri entendu, contre ce projet de resolution, parce qu'it compromet l'adoption des propositions que la delegation de I'URSS avait soumises afin d'as- surer une solution satisfaisante du probleme de la reduction des armements de type classique et de l'elimination des armes ?tomiques. , Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrain~an Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated from Russian): I have, of course, voted against this resolution as it would have nullified the USSR proposals which had been presented for the purpose of reaching a positive settlement of the question of reduction of conventional armaments as well as of the elimination of atomic weapons. I must say, however, that the procedure which the President has followed gives the Ukrainian Je dois dire cependant que la methode qu'a sui- vie le President donne a la deIegationde la Republique socialiste sovietique d'Ukraine l'im- pression que, loin de vouloir encourager la colla- boration mutuelle et creer une atmosphere propice a une solution satisfaisante de la question qui figure a l'ordre du jour, le President tient, en realite, a entraver tout desir de collaboration: dele~tion the impression tha,t he wished to create an 'atmosphere not conducive to co-opera- tion and a positive solution of the· question on - our agenda, but one which would in fact work against any desire for co-operation. Adding another veto, or proposing another resolution which would provoke another veto, will not change the situation. Ther~ is an old and good. Roman proverb which says: "Whom the Gods would destroy, they first make mad".. I sh,ould like those pursuing this policy of under- mtning co-optration to bear that. in mind. Qu'il y ait une veto de plus, qu'on soumette encore uneresolution qui appelle un veto, cela ne changera rien a la situation. Je tiens a. rappe1er au Conseil le vieux et bon proverbe romain qui dit: Q1tDS vult Jupiter perdereJ dementa~ prius et je conseille a ceux qui empechent toute possibilite de collaboration d'y re£lechir serieusement. Mr. CHAUVEL (France) (t1'anslated from french): As a result of the votes which have just been castJ the Security Council is unable to ".,ij'ansmit to the General Assembly the result of the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments in the form which the French dele- gation' had suggested and which the majoritv of . the Council accepted. . • ~ M.. CHAUVEL (France): A la suite aes votes qui viennent d'avoir lieu, le Conseil de securite n'est pas en, mesure de transmettre a. l'Assemblee ,generale, dans la forme que la delegation fran- c;aise avait suggeree et que la majorite du Conseil avait acceptee; le resulta't des t-:avaux de la Com- mission des armements de tY::le classique. ItRequests the Secretary-General to transmit these proposals and the records of the discussions on this question in the Security Council and the Commission for Conventional Armaments to the General Assembly." I think that the reference in the text to the recoYds of the discussions of the Commission for Converitional Armaments should meet the wish expressed by Mr. Malik. The PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to this draft resolution? .Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Re- publics) (translated from Russian): That i~ a very kind move on the part of the representative of France; however, this kindn<:ss ?bviotlsly comes a little late. The proposal whlch the repre- sentative of France has just submitted shows that his real intention was not to reach an agreed decision, but to secure a veto both on his first and on his second draft resolutions, whereas, if the reasonable proposal of the USSR had been acted on,such a resolution could have been adopted without a veto. Th~ proposal ~us pro- videstlle answer-to the Presldent s questlOn con- cerning his own and Mr. Chauvel's real intep.tions in submitting, with ..the Pre~i§~nt's support, his first and second. draft resolutiOns. With regard to t1...: proposal which is now before the Council, the delegation·of the Soviet Union would have no objection to transmitting the records of the Commission for Conventional Armaments, of its Working Corrnnittee, and of the Security Council to the General Assembly for its information on the course of the discus- sions on the. question of the reduction of arma- ments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. I should like to add that in stating that it· has no objection, the USSR delegation means that it will not vote against this draft resolution, but will abstain from voting, as it considers that the proposals contained in the French working paper are useless in connexion with the reduction of . armaments and armed forces, and are unaccept- able, since they a,l'e limited to the collection of information on armed .forces and conventional armaments and avoid the question of the trans- mission of info~mation on atomic weapons; .

. 1 should like·some intorma- Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglaJis): Je vou- I tionfrom the two. representatives who have .asked drais savoir si les deux representants qui ont . to speak.· Are their remarks going to·be lengthy?demande la parole veulent faire de longues decla- I As th~C.ouneil. kri .. ows, I hav.e.be~n requeste.d. tol' ration.s. J'ai deja annonce au COnSeilq.".:._.m~. adjourn the meeting at 6 o'cIock." demande de lever la seance a. 18 heures. •. _ ttAyant re~u et examine les propositions contenues dans le document de travail adopte par la Commission des armements de type c1assique a sa 19eme seance, le 1er aout 1949, relatif a. l'exe.. cution de la resolution 192 (II!) de l'Assembh~e generale en date du 19 novembre 1948, "Invite le Secretaire general a transmettre ces propositions ainsi que le compte rendu des d~bats du Conseil de securite et de la Commission des armements d~ type classique sur cette question a l'Assemblee generale." Je crois que la mention, dans ce texte, des comptes ;rendus des debats de la Commission des armements de type classique donne satisfaction a un desir exprime par M. Malik. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Y a-t-il une objection contre ce projet de resolution? M. MALIK (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe) : Le representant de la France est, certes, bien aimable, mais cette amabilite vient evidemmerit un peu tard. La proposition qu'il vient de formuler indique que son intention veritable n'etait point de contribuer a une decision concertee, mais bien de provoquer un veto, tant a. propos de son premier qu'a propos de son deuxieme projet de resolution. En efIet, " si 1'0n avait suivi les propositions raisonnables de l'URSS, une resolution de ce genre aurait pu etre adoptee sans veto. La proposition qu'on vient de formuler maintenant montre clairement queUes etaient les intentions veritables du President et du representant de la France, lorsque M. Chauvel a presente son premier et son deuxieme projet de resolution··et que le President a appuye ces textes. . Pour ce qui est de la proposition dont le Conseil est actuellement saisi, la delegation de l'Union sovietique ne s'opposera pas a ce que lesproces verbaux de la Commission des armements de type classique, du Comite de· travail et du Conseil de securite, soient soumis a l'Assemblee generalea. titre d'information sur les debats concernant la reduction,des armements et l'interdiction des armes atomiques. Je tiel'1s a preciser que, en declarant qu'elle ne S'opposera pas a cette proposition, la delegation de l'URSS entend dire qu'elle ne votera pas contre ce texte. Mais elle s'abstiendra de voter, car elle estimeque·les propositions contenues dans le document lie travail soumis par la France.ne' presentent·au,cune· utilite pour la reduction des· armelllents.etdesforces armees; et qu'elles sont inacceptables, ptiisqu'elles se bornenta·exiger la .remise de renseignements sur les forces armees. et les armements de type c1assique et ne prevoient .pas la transmission d'informations sur les armes" atomiques. M. CHAUVEL (France): Avec ou sans moutarde, l'intention du representant de la France est uniquement que l'As!:erublee soit exactement renseignee: rien de moins, rien de plus., Mr. CHAUVEL (France) (translated from French): Mustard or no mustard, the French representative's intention is solely that the Assembly should have exact information; nothing less, nothing mor~. The PRESIDENT: A vote will be taken on the draft resolution submitted bJr the representative of France [S/1410]. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'angla,is): Le Conseil va voter sur le projet de resolution soumis par le representant de la France [Sj1410].

Do b'1.e representatives wish to have a meeting of the Council tomorrow afternoon? M. MANUILSKY (Republiquesocialiste sovietique d'Ukraine) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je prefl5rerais que nous nous reunissions mardi prochain, 250ctobre. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic): I should prefer to meet next Tuesday, 25 October. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais):' Le Conseil se reunira le mardi 25 octobre, a. 15 heures.

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