S/PV.455 Security Council

On behalf of the Council, I should like to welcome Mr. Etnest Gross, alternate representative of the United States who is sitting in the Council today for the first time. CONSEIL DE SECURITE PROCES..VERBAUX OFFICIELS QUA1"RE CENT CINQUANTE. CINQUIEME SEANCE Temee a Lake Sf,tccess, New-York, le lU1Uli 12 decembre 1949, a15 !seures. 1. Ordre du jour provisoire (SI Ag'enda 455) 2. Adoption de l'ordre du jour L'ordre £f~t j01tr est adopte. 3. Question indonesienne In my capacity as representative of CANAD...·., I. should now like to make a short statement in' regard to the draft resolution (S/1431), dated 12 December 1949. which has been submitted by my delegation and which has been circulated to members of the Council. As President of the Council, I have. naturally been conscious of my duty to do what I can to conserve the CQuncil's time. Prior to our meeting today, I have therefore .lad a sei."ies of informal consultations with. t ,e representatives of the parties -- that is, t.her~presentatives pf the Republic 0:£ Indonesia and of the Netherlands·- to ascertain their vi,.ws concerning the action which the Council codd most appmpriately take to assist them in the future. For a considerable period now, my delegation has followed the developments in Indonesia with close attention a1)d deE.p .int~rest. Recently, we, as wen as other delegations representer on the Council, received the special report of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia [Sj1417] and the detailed annexes thereto. [Sj1417/4dd.1], and we have studied them with great care. On the basis of these reports and in the light of the views expressed to us by the parties, my delegation has prepared the draft resolution which is before theCounci Speal<;ing as the representative of Canada, I believe that this··, draft resolution is appropriate in. the existing situation and that it provides the a.ction which is required. I hope therefore that it will commend itself to members of the Council. The'draft resolution begins by noting with satisfaction the special report of the United .Nations Comillission for Indonesia, dated 10 November 1949, which records the successful outcome of the Round .Table Conference .at The Hague. The resolution goes on,to .congratulate the parties on having reached agreement and to commend the United Nations Commission for Indonesia for the contribution which it has made is giving assistance to the parties. The resolution welcomes the forthcoming establishment of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia as an independent,. sovereign State. Finally,.it requests the United Nations Commission for Indonesia to continue to discharge the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Security Council, and, inparticttIar,·to observe and assist in the imp1em~ntation of the agreements reached at the Round Table Conference. The Commission will also, of course, report, as· required, to the Security Council. It seems to my "delegation that these are the essential matters to be ta..1{en into account in any r~solution which the Council should adopt. on this question at the present·stage. There is a further remark which I should like to make at this time. In the view·of the Canadian de1egation, the agreement reached at The Hague .. is dramatic evidence of the ability of the Security Gpuncil. to.discharge its ·functions under Chapter VI·· of .the Charter concerning the. pacific. settlement· of .disputes. For nearly two and a half Je voudrais, en ma quaHte de representant du CANADA, £aire un brei expose concernant le projet de resolution qui a ete presente par ma delegation et qui, le 12 decembre 1949, a ete distribue alL"'C mem'bres du Conseil sous la cote 5/1431. En tant que President du Conseil, j'ai le devoir de faire tout ce que je peux pour economiser le temps du Conseil. En consequence, avant la seance d'aujourd'hui, je me suis entretenu officieusement avec les representants des parties - c'est-a-dire avec les representants de la Republique d'Indonesie et des Pays-Bas - afin de connaltre teurs opinions en Ce qui concerne ·les mesures les plus appropriees qu'a. leur sens le Conseil devrait prendre pour les aider dans l'avenir. Depuis assez longtemps, ma delegation suil: de tres pres ~t avec un inh~ret profond les evenements d'Indonesie. Comme les autres delegations representees a.u Conseil, nous avons rec;u recemment le rapport special' de la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Indonesie [S/1417] et les annexes detaillees qui s'y rapportent [S/1417/Add.l]. 'Nous avons etudie ces documents avec beaucoup d'attention. Se fondant sur ces rapporf:s et tenant compte des opiniuns que nous ont fait connaitre les parties, ma delegation a prepare le projet de resolution qui est sotunis actuel1ement au Conseil. En tant que representant du Canada, j'estime que ce projet de resolution vient a son heure et qu'il envisage toutes les mesures necessaires. Dans ces conditrons, j'espere que les membres du Consei1lui reserveront un accueil favorable. Darts son preambule, le projet de resolution prend acte avec satisfaction du rappor:t special de la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Indo- . nesie, en date du 10 novembre 1949, qui mentionne l'heureuse conclusion de la Conference de la table mnde a La Haye. Puis, il felicite les parties d'etre parvenues a un accord. de meme qu'il felidte la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Indonesie de l'assistance qu'elle a pretee aux parties. I1 accueille avec satisfaction la prochaine creation de la Republique des Etats-Unis d'Indonesie en tant qu'Etat independant et souverain. Finalement, il invite notre Commission "pour l'Indonesie a continuer de remplir les fonc~ tions. que lui a confiees le Conseil de securite et, notamment, a observer la mise en ceuvre des accords reaHses par la Conference de la table ronde et a aider it leur application. Cette Commission fera, bienentendu, rapport au Conseil de securite, comme on le lui demande. Ma delegation estime que ce sont la lea elements essentiels dont il faut tenir compte dans touteresolution que le Conseil doit adopter a ce sujet austade actuel. Je voudrais faire une autre observation. La delegatibrt canadi~nne est d'avis que l'accord realise a La Hayeprouve de fa'Son frappante. q?e le Conseil de securite peut effectivement s'acqtutterdes fonctions que lui confere le Chapitre VI de la Charte en ce qui concerne le reglement pa.cifique. des differends. Depuis pres de deux td Nevertheless, the Council's role has also been an important one in this matter. The flexible and adaptable procedures which have been worked out by the. Council in the course of several years have in this case, as in others, proved useful for· our purpose of prcInoting peace. This experience emphatically refutes the arguments cf those cynics and pessimists who are inclined to scoff at the work of the United Nations and its various agencies. In this question, as in others which have come before it, the Council has served the cause of peace well. As representative of Canada on this Council, I should ·like to place on record specifically the I satisfaction which my delegation takes in the outstanding contribution made by t.~e Council's representatives in Indonesia - formerly the Committee of Good Offices and the Consular Commission and, more recently, since 28 January 1949, the United Nations Commission for Indonesia. The members of this .Commission have been untiring in their efforts to help. They have show;n great ability and reasoned initiative in the discharge of their duties. They have shown the firmness and tact and discretion which the situation called for, and have particularly won our admiration through the moderation and modesty they showed when the successful progress of negotiatiqns permitted them to withdraw into the background. / Cependant, i1 reste a la Commission a. s'acquitter, pendant la periode de transition, d'un role utile, qnoique secondaire, en evitant les difficultes dans la mise. en ceuvre des divers accords. Aux termes des accords concIus, les parties ont donne a la Commission la mission bien dHinie de les . However, a useful, though a secondary role m ensuring the smooth implementation of the various agreements will still fall to the Commission during the transitional period. The parties have, in the ferms of their agreements, assigned to the Commission the specific task of a~s!sting fhem in carrying out the various pro- , VISIons and observing their spirit and their letter. In view of the work which the Commission has already done, we can look forward with confidence to the Successful discharge of these further responsibilities. aidel~ a executer les diverses dispositions de ces accords et a en respecter l'esprit et la lettre. Si nous considerons l'ceuvre deja accomplie par la Commission, .nous pouvons esperer en toute confiance qU'elle s'acquittera heu,reusementde ces nouvelles responsabilites. Mr. VAN RorJEN (Netherlands): I wish first to thank the President very sincerdy, in the name /of my delegation and in the name of my Government, for the kind words with which he has welcomed the outcome of the Round Table Conference. We in the Netherlands feel that this is, indeed) an occasion for felicitations; we ourselves are IllOSt happy at the success of that Conference. - . M. VAN ROIJEN (Pays-Bas) (traduit de l'anglais): Au nom de ma delegation et de mon Gouvernement, je tiens tout d'abord a remercier tres sincerement le President des paroles aimables avec lesquelles i1 a salue l'issue de la Conference de la table ronde, Nousautres Hollandais, nous estimons qu'iI y a certeslieude se rejouir, et nous nous felici'tons du succes obtenu par la Conference. Je suis heureux depouvoir formu1erque1ques courtes observations qui tiendront lieud'un brei Many factors have contributed to the success of the Round Table Conference. Not the least of these was the constructive statesmanship shown by the· Indonesian delegates headed by Mr. Hatta a1l4 Sultan Hamid. I am also happy to be able to p~y a tribute here to the helpful part played by the United Nations Commission for Indonesiaguided by the Security Council's ruling of 23 March [421st meaing] , for which the Canadian delegation was so largely responsible - both at the preliminary conference at Batayia and at the Round Table Conference at The Hague. With patience, perseverance and resourcefulness, the members of the United Nations Comrm'1sion for Indonesia lent their good offices whenever an appeal was made to them. By smoothing out a mimber of difficulties.and by proposing 'Compromises when .deadlocks threat- ~p.e<J.} th~, United Natious Commission for Indonesia -served a very useful .purpose indeed in the solt1tion of this complex problem. In paying this tribute to an organ of the United Nations, I do not however imply that my Government has changed its opinion on the question of the competence of. the Organization to deal with the dispute. It remains a matter of regret to us·that the Netherlands Government's repeated suggestion.that the International. Court of Justice should be asked to pronounce on the question 'of COlupetence was never heeded. In this respect, I feel bound to state that, however useful the part played by the United Nations Commission for Indonesia during. these last' months and however grateful we are to that Commission - for we are grateful, . as I have already. said - it should not be forgotten or overlooked that,as I have already had occasion to state before the Security Council, there was always a great and sincere. willingness on the part, of the Government and the people of the Netherlands ft-lIly· to .m~etthe aspirations of the Indonesian. peoples toward self-government and independence. The difference of opinion between the Security Council and ourselves did not bear upon the goal for which were striving, bt.tt tlpOn the way to reach it and the timing: For that reason my. Government is profoundly·convinced that even without the assistance of the Security De nombreux facteurs ont contribue at! succes de la Conference de la table ronde. Parmi ces facteurs, les qualites politiques constructives dont ont fait preuve les representants de l'Indonesie - a la tete desquels se trouvaient M. Hatta et le sultan Hamid - n'ont certes ~as ete l'un des moins ill1portants. Je suis egalement heureux de pouvoir rendre hommage ici a l'aide apportee par la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Indonesie - conformement a la decision du Conseil de securite du 23 mars [421eme seance], decision dont la responsabilite re~rient Ji largement a la delegationcanadienne - tant a la Conference preliminaire de Batavia qu'a la Conference de la table ronde qui s'est tenue a La Haye. Faisant pt:euve de patience, de perseve:a~ce et d'inge~io­ site, les membres de la.CommISSIon des N.?t1ons Unies pour l'Indonesie ont prete leur concours chaque fois qu'un appel leur a ete adresse; ainsi, en aplanissant un grand nombre de difficultes et en proposantdes solutions transactionnelles lorsque la situation mena~ait de devenir inextricable, la Commission a beaucoup contribue a resoudte ce probleme complexe. En rendant cet hommage a une Commission des Nations Unies~ je ne veux pas dire que mon Got.1vernement ait changed'avis sur la question de la competence de l'Organisation en ce qui conceme le reglement du differend. Nous regrettons encore qu'on n'ait jamais tenu .compte de l'idee que le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas a emise a plusieurs reprises et qui tendait a soumettre la question de competence a la Cour internationale de Justice. A cet egard, je me sens tentt d'affirmer que, si utile qu'ait ete le role joue par la Commission des Nations. Unies pour l'Indonesie durant les derniers mOls, et si reconnaissants que noUS soyons a cette Commission - car nous lui sommes effectivement reconnaissants, je l'ai deja dit - il ne faut, comIue j'ai deja eu l'occasion de l'affinner, ni oublier, ni negliger le fait que le Gouvernement et le peuple des Pays-Bas ont toujours fait preuve du desir profondement sincere de repondre aux aspirations des peuples indonesiens a l'autonomie et a l'independance. Les divergences d'opinion·quise sont elevees entre le <::onseil de securite et nous-memes ne con<:ernaIent pas le but a atteindre, mais la question des me,.. thodes a employer et des delais necessaires. C'est pourquoi mon Gouvernement est convaincu que, ,meme sans l'aide du Conseil de securite et de 5011 The successful conclusion of the Round Table Conference marks, as was so eloquently pointed out [SJ1417JAdd.l] at the closing session of the Conference by Mr., Herremans, Chairman of the week of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia "the end of a conflict, the ;;lolution of a: problem, the birth of a nation and the foundation of a union". The considerable concessions and tven sacrifices to which my Government consented at the Round Table Conference were of course made in view of obtaining a well-balanced agreement, freely entered into by Indonesia as an equal. partner, and hence having a stable and enduring character. With regard to the" financial arrangements, for instance, we kept in mind the consideration that Indonesia should be launched on its career of independence without unduly heavy burdens. or liabilities, for, in this respect, the task before the Government of the young State of the Republik hulonesia Serikat will be formidable enough as it is. It may, therefore, not be entirely out of place for me to take this opportunity to express my confidence, that other Gover.nments will be Inspired to follow a similar course when the time comes for them to negotiate with the Indonesian ,Government on .the settlement of outstanding financial obligations. , There is one undertaking entered into by my Government at the Round Table Conference to which I should like to draw the special attention of the Council. This is the undertaking on the part of the .Netherlands whole~heartedly to sponsor, immediately after the transfer of sovereignty, the application of the Republik Indonesia. Serikat for membership in the United Nations. My Government sincerely hopes that when the time comes this application will receive the unanimous approval of both the Security Council and the' General Assembly. . May I further point to a. provision to which my Government and the people of the Netherlands attach very great importance. This is article 2 of the Agreement on Transitional Measures, which will be found as appendix XI in document Sjl4l7JAdd.1. Itstates: ' "The division of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia into component states shall ?e established finally by the Constituent Assembly Si plusieurs gouvernements ont 'Plus ou moms droit a notre reconnaissance pour la cooperation dont its ont fait preuve pendant le conflit, le Conseil de securite comprendra certainement que je desire mentionner specialement 'le Gouvernement beIge et r~merder tout particulierement le representant de la Bclgique de la cordialite et de la comprehension dont son pays n'a cesse, pendant ces derniers mois, de faire preuve a I'egard du mien. Comme M. Herremans, qui etait, cette semainela, President de la Commission des Nations Unies 1)our l'Inq.onesie, I'a si eloquemment fait remarquer [SJ1417JAdd.l] a la dernit~re seance de la Conference de la table ronde, l'heureuse issue de cette Conference marque "la fin d'Ull conflit, !a solution d'un probleme, la naissance d'une nation et la fondation d'une unien". Les c{)ucessions importan{ ~s, voire les sacrifices, que mon Gouvernement a faits a. la Conference de la table "onde ont, bien entendu, ete consentis en vue d'obtenir un accord bien equilibre, auquel l'Indonesie partidperait comme une partie,egale en droits, et qui, partant, aurait un caractere de stabilite3t de permanence. En ce qui conc~rlle les dispositions financieres, par e::r.emple, nous av-ons tenu' compte du fait qu'il convenait que l'Indonesie entrat dans la carriere de l'independance sans etre genee par des , charges' ou un pa.ssif trop lourds; ell efIet, a cet egard aussi, la tache qui attend le Gouvernement du jeune Etat de la Republik Indonesia Serikat sera bien assez redoutable. Peut-etre n'est-il pas absolurnent hors de propos que je saisisse cette occasion pour exprimer mafermeconviction que lorsque d'autres gouvernements, aleur tour, negoderont avec le Gouvernement de l'Indonesie le reglement des obligations financieres qu'illui reste a acquitter, its seront incites a adopter une atti~ tude analogue. I1 est un engagement que mon GouvernemeIlt a contraete a la Conference de la table rondeet sur lequel jevoudrais attirer tout particulierement l'attenticn du Conseil. C'est l'engagement PrlS par les Pays-Bas d'appuyer sans. reserve la demande presentee par la Republiklndonesia Serikat en vue d'etre admise en qualite de Membl'e dans l'Organisation des Nations Unies aussitot qu'aura eu lieu le transfert de souverainete: Mon Gouvernementespere sincerement que, le moment venu, cette demande recevra l'approbation unanime du Conseilde' securite et de l'Assembleegenerale. Puis-je signaler uneautre disposition alaquelle mon Gouvernement et le peuple des Pays-Bas attachent une tresgrande importance? Ils'agit de l'artic1e 2 de l'Accordsur les mesures de transition qui'figure comme annex.e Xldan~ .l~ document S/14l7/Add.I. Cet artlcle est mnSl COl1lSu: "La division de la Republique des Etats-Unis d'Indonesie en Etats constituants distincts sera reglee en dernier ressort par l'Assemblee"'~onsti­ tuante, conf.ormement aux dispositions de la' ' Constitution provisoire de la Republique des "Each component state shall be given the opportunity to ratify the final cQnstitution. In case a component state does not ratify that constitution, it win be allowed to negotiate ~bout a special,relationship towards the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands." This article, as may ,be seen, provides for a way in which the populations of different territories of Indonesia may exercise their right of self-determination. This right of self-determination was guaranteed to the people of Indonesia both by the Linggadjati Agreementl in articles 3 and 4, and by article 2 of the RenviIle principles and article 4 of the additional principles [S/649, appendices XIII and VIII]; it also found expression in the memorandum of 22 June 1949 concerning the Round Table Conference which was drawn up receritlyat Batavia [SJ1373]. In this connexion, I may be permitted to inform the Security Council that when, last week, the Second Chamber of the Netherlands Parliament approved the results of. the Round Table Conference by a vote ot71 to 29 __ which is, I may add, more than the"required, two-thirds majority - it also adopted an amendment to the bill for ratificatinn submitted by' the Government to the eff~ctthat the Netherlands Government, after, due consultation with the Government of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia,' should not fail to approach the United Nations Commission for Indonesia, or some other appropriate organ .of the United Nations, ,with a ·view to ensuring the full implementation of the right of self-determination as provided by article 2 of the' Agreement on Transitional Measures. While thisantendlnent does not affect the contents of the Round Table Conference agreement in any way and does not touch upon the ratification itself, it imposes upon the' Government of my , country the solemn duty of doing everything within its power to ensure, after close consultation with the Government of Indonesia, the practical implementation of the prinCiple of selfdetermination. In respect of the ·Canadian draft resolution [SJ1431] -before us I wish to state that my delegationis in agreement with the contents of that .resolution and believes that its adoption by the Security Council would be helpful to all parties concerned in carrying out the provisions of the agreements reached. at The Hague. HA chaque Etat constituant sera assuree la possibilite de ratifier la Constitution definitive. Si un Etat constituant ne ratifie pas cette Constitution, it pourra negocierl'etablissement de relations speciales avec la Republique des Etats-Unis d'Indonesie et le Royaume des Pays-Bas." Comme on le voit, cet article assure aux populations des differents territoires de l'Indonesie le moyen d'exercer leur droit a disposer d'ellesmemes. Ce droit des' populations a ,disposer elles~memes de leur sert a ete garanti au peuple \ d'Indonesie et par l'Accord de Linggadjati1, dans ses articles 3 et 4, dans l'artic1e 2 des principes du Renville, et dans l'article 4 des principes additionnels [Sj649, annexes XIII et VIII]; il est egalement enonce dans le memorandum du 22 juin 1949 re1atif a la Conference de la table ronde recemment redige" a Batavia [S/1373]. A ce propos, on me permettra sans doute d'informer le Conseil de securite que la seconde chambre du Parlement des Pays-Bas a approuve, la semaine derniere, les resultats de la Conference' deja table ronde, par 71 voix contre 29, soit, je le fais remarquer, par un nombre de voix superieur a la majorite requise des deux tiers. Elle a, en meme temps, adopte un amendement au projet de loi portant ratification de l'accord qui lui etait soumis par le Gouvernement; cet amendement tend a ce que le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, apres s'etl."e dument concerte avec le Gouvernement de la Republique des Etats-Unis d'Indonesie, se mette sans faute en rapport avec la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Indonesie ou tout autre organe competent des Nations Unies, afin d'asstlrer le plein exercice du droit. des peuple~ a disposer d'eux-memes, tel que le prevoit l'article 2 de l'Accord sur les mesures d,~ transition. Cet amendement n'in£1ued'aucune faCSon sur le contenu de l'accord .conclu a la Conference de la table, ronde, et n'a nul dIet sur la ratifica- "Hon ~eme de cet accord; neanmoins, it impose au Gouvernement de mon pays le devoir solennel de faire tout ce qui est en son pot1V'oir pour assurer, apres des consultationssuivies, avec le Gouvernement indonesien, l'application effective de ce principedu dfoit des peuples a disposer d'eux-memes. ' En ce qtli concerne le projet de resolutiondu ' Canada [SJ1431] dont nous sonunes saisis, je tiens aindiqtler que ma delegation accepte le .contenu de cette resolution et pense que son adoption par le Conseil de securite permettrait a toutes les parties interessees d'executer les accords conc1us a La Haye. . ,In conclusion, I should like to state, as my personal conviction based on my. experience during the. preliminary conference at Bptavia and the Round Table Conference at The Hagtle, that the Netherlands and Indonesia are about to enter upon a new period in their relationship, a period of friendship and co-operation,.and that they will thus contribute to forming a new and vital link between the peoples of the East and those of the West. We shall, I feel sure, prove once more to the world, to a world which continues to need such proof, that when in a controversy,however tense and involved, there is good will. and good faith on both sides, there are no difficulties that cannot be overcome, no Rroblems that cannot be solved. Mr. PALAR (Indonesia): I wish to thank the President whole-heartedly for the friendly words he used in congratulating my Government on the results Of the Round Table Conference at The Hague. M. PALAR (Indonesie) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je tiens it 'remer.cier de tout creur le President pour les felicitations .amicales qu'ila adressees a nlonGouvernement au sujet des resultats dp la Comerence de la table ronde de La Haye. Nous avons re~u 'le document S/1417 du 10 novembreet le document S/1417/Add.l· du 14 novembre 1949 qui contiennent, avec ses annexes, le rapport de ·la Commission des Nations Dnies pour l'Indonesie. sur la Conference de la table ronde. Le premier de ces documents contient an paragraphe 115 la phrase: "La Commission est heureuse de faireconnaitre 1 qu'a .son avis les negociations menees'a.La Haye ont ete couronnees d'un succes completo" Enverite, ces negociations ont etecouronnees de succes, Il1aison.ne peut pas dire, bien entendu, que l'une·et l'autre partie soient pleinement satis~ faites de l'accord. En fait~ pour, aboutir a cet accord, chacune des deux parties a du faire des concessions. Pour notre part, nous avions decide de veiIler a ce qu'aucune des concessions. que nousferions ne'puisse avoir pour eftet de detourner la Cbnference de son objectif, a savoirle transfert reel, complet ··et inconditionnel de la souverainete; et tel a ete pour nous, au cours des negociations, le critere, le principe directeul". We now have before us document S/1417, dated 10 NoYember, and document 5/1417/Add.1, dated 14 November 1949, containing the report and annexes. submitted by the United Nations Commission for Indonesia on the Round Table Conference at The Hague. In paragraph 115 of the first of these two documents the report states: "The Commission takes pleasure in reporting. that, in its jUdgment,the negotiations conducted at The Hague were eminently successful." And indeed the negotiations have been concluded successfully. Of course, no one can very well contend .that the agreement reached fully satisfies either of the parties. In fact, it appeared to ~e necessary for both !:-arties to make concesSIOns in order to reach this agreement. However, in whatever concessions we on our part made, we were determined to See to it that these concessions did not in any way prevent the attainment of the purpose for which the Round Table Conference was held, namely, the transfer of real, complete and unconditional sovereignty. In· fact that was the ultimate yardstick and the guiding principle in our considerations through- G,ut the·negotiations. hi Article I of the Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty [Si1417/Add.l, appendix VJJ) states: "The Kingdom of the Netherlands uncn!lditionally and irrevocably transfers complete sovereignty over Indonesia to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and thereby recognizes said Republic of the United States of Indonesia as an independent and sovereign State." The Hague agreements also provide the framework for future co-operation between the Netherlands and the Rep~blic of the United States of Indonesia as two independent and sovereign States, a co-operation on the. basis of free will, •equality a.'id complete independence. The Statute of the Union establishes the foundation foT.' this co-operation. But here again it was the question of full and complete sovereignty which, for us, was the final criterion. In werking out the Statute of the Union, the Indonesian delegations were scrupulously careful, while laying the foundation for the desired cooperation with the Netherlands, to avoid in any way impairing the exercise of full sovereignty by the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, and were equally careful to provide safeguards which would prevent either party - I repea.t, either party - from playing a dominant role in any way in this form of co-operation. What is the character of this Indonesian- Netherlands Union? In article I of the Union Statute [S/1417/ Add.1, appendix IX] it is stated that the Union "effectuates the organized cooperation .between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of the United States of Indonesia on the basis of free will and equality in status with equal rights". And it is further stated that: "The Union does not prejudice the status of each of the two partners as an independent and sovereign State." The purpose for which this Union has been createQ is set forth in article 2'0 paragraph 1, which reads: "The Union aims at co-operation of the partners for the promotion of their common interests." Thus, it is clear that this Union is an organ of two individual, fuHy sovereign States which shall be utilized by the two partners for cooperation in fields of mutual interest. The instrument of co-operation, the Union, will be headed by the Queen of the Netherlands who will effectuate "the spirit of voluntary and lasting co-operation .between the partners". In her capaciv] of Head of the Union, the Queen of the Netherlands will have no executive authority w' atsoever, L'article premier de la Charte de transfert de souverainete [S/1417/Add.1, annexe VII] stipule que "le Royaume des Pays-Bas transfere a la Republique des Etats-Unis d'Indonesie, de fa- <;on inconditionnelle et irrevocable, l'entiere souverainete sur l'Indonesie et par la meme reconnait ladite Republique des Etats-Unis d'Indonesie comme un Etat independant et souverain". Les accords de La Haye definissent aussi les principes de la cooperation future entre les Pays- Bas et la Republique des Etats-Unis d'Indonesie en tant qu'Etats independants et souverains, cooperation fondee sur la liberte, l'egalite et l'independance totale. Le statut de l'Union etablit les bases de cette coopera.tion. La encore, c'est le critere de la souverainete entiere et complete que nous avons adopte lorsque les delegations indonesiennes ant discute le statut de l'Union. Nous voulions, en dIet, en jetant les bases de la cooperation avec les Pays-Bas, eviter soigneusement tout ce qui pourrait porter atteinte a la pleine souverainete de la Republique des Etats d'Indonesie, et nous voulions egalement prendre toutes les precautions pour que ni l'une ni l'autre des parties interessees - je dis: ni l'une ni l'autre - ne jouent un role preponderant clans la: collaboration envisagee. Quel est le caractere de cette Union entre les Pays-Bas et l'Indonesie? L'artic1e premier du Statut de l'Union [Sj1417/Add.1, annexe LX] stipUle que I'Union "realise la cooperation orga- -- nisee du Royaume des Pays-Bas et de la Republique des Etats-Unis d'Indonesie fondee sur le plein gre, l'egalite de statut et l'egalite de droits". It y a aussi la disposition suivante: "L'Union ne porte aucunement Mteinte au statut d'Etat independant et souverain dont jouit chacun des deux Etats membres." L'article 2, paragraphe 1, expose le but de l'Union: "L'Union a pour but d'assurer la cooperation des Etats membres en vue de favoriser leurs interets communs." 11 est done clair que l'Union est un organe compose de deux Etats entierement independants et souverains, organe qui sera utilise par les deux Etats membres en vue d'assurer une cooperation dans les domaines ou its possedent des inten~ts communs. L'instrumentde la collaboration, l'Union, aura a sa tete la Reine des Pays-Bas qui personnifie "l'esprit de collaboration volontaire et durable entre les E1:ats membres". En qualite de chef de i'Union, la Reine des Pays-Bas ne disposera d'aucun pouvoirexecutif. Le Statut de 1'Union n'oblige aucune des parties aact:epter un accord sur tm sujet d'interet commun si l'autre partie est d'tm avis contraire. Si les deux parties desircnt que la Conference des ministres de l'Union prenne une decision, cette decision doit etre prise a l'unanimite. Rien dans le Sta,tut de 1'Union et dans les reglements d'application ne restreint la souverainete de chacune des parties. Les Pays-Bas avaient tout d'aborel voulu que la Republique des Etats-Unis d'Indonesie ne puisse prendre ceri.Jnes mesures relatives aux interets neerlandais en Indonesie qu'apres le consentement des Pays-Bas, mais les delegations indonesiennes ont finalement obtenu que les accords prevoient en ce cas une simple consultation entre les deux Gouvernements; c'est ce que ran .constate en lisant le texte des accords. Ainsi, la liberte d'action et la souverainete de la Republique des Etats-Unis d'Indonesie demeurent entieres, non seulement pour les questions d'interet commun, mais aussi lorsqu'il s'agit des interets neerlandais en Indonesie. The Statute of the Union does not compel either party to undertake to enter into agreement on matters of common interest if that party does not deem it necessary to do so. If it is mutually desired to have the conference of Union ministers take a decision, that decision must be reached unanimously by the ministers of both partners. Therefore, there is nothing in the Union Statute or in the agreements regarding the functioning of the Union which in any way restricts the sovereignty of either party. An e.xamination of the articles of the agreements reached will also make it clear that although the Netherlands had originally insisted that its consent should be required for certain measures to be undertaken by the Republic of the Unitea States of Indonesia with regard to matters touching on specific NetherIands interests in Indonesia, the Indonesian delegations were successful in their f'iforts to limit the agreements to stipulating only that consultation on such matters would be required. Therefore, not only with regard to fields of common interest but also with regard to matters of specific Netherlands interest in Indonesia, the freedom of action of the sovereign Republic of the United States of Indonesia will in no way be impaired. Let us turn for a moment to consideration of the fields of common interest in which the Statute provides that co-operation shall take place, namely the field of foreign relations and defence and, "as far as necessary, finance, and alsD in regard of subjects of an economic and a cultural nature". Examinons maintenant .ces questions d'interet commun au sujet desquels le Statut prevoit la cooperation; eUes se presentent dans le domaine des relations exterieures, de la de£ense, et aussi, "autant qu'il sera necessaire, en matiere de finances, ainsi que dans les questions d'ordre economique et culturel". In the field of foreign relations, the agreements provide for mutual consultation and co..,operation where mutual interests are involved, without in any way prejudicing or limiting the right of each of the partners to conduct his own foreign relations· and determine his own foreign policy. Mutual consultation and co-operation with regard to matters of foreign relations does not in any way limit the full and complete sovereignty of each of the partners in the Union. Dans le domaine des relations exterieures. les accords prevoient que les Etats membres se concerteront et coopereront lorsque leurs interets communs seront en jeu, etant entendu que le droit de chacun des deux partenaires d'assurer ses relations exterieures et de determiner sa politique etrangere ne se trouvera nullement restreint ou limite. Dans le domaine de la politique etrangere, la cooperation, les .consultations ne limiteront en rien la souverainete des deux associes, souveX'ainete quidoit demeurer entiere. With regard to matters of trade and finance, it is stipulated that as long as the Republic of the United States of Indonesia has certain liabilities towards the Netherlands, the former shall consult the Netherlands before taking action on certain matters in which the interests of the Netherlands are concerned. Consultation, however, between two sovereign States does not bind either party. En ce qui concerne les questions commerciales et financieres, il a ete prevu que, tant que la Republique des Etats-Unis d'Indonesie aura certaines dettes a l'egard des Pays-Bas, eUe devra consulter ce pays avant de prendre des mesures affectant les inten~ts neerlandais. Toutefois, ces consultations entre Etats souverains n'autont pas pour effet d'obliger rune ou 1'autre des parties. The assumption by the Republic of the United States of Indonesia of debts. incurred by the Netherlands East Indies Government represents a concession on the part of the Indonesian delegation, but a concession which does not in any way infringe the full, unconditional and complete sovereignty of the Republic of the United States ..of Indonesia. Le transfert des dettes du.Gouvernement des Indesneerlandaises a la Republique des Etats- Unis d'Indonesie a ete accepte par la delegation indonesienne comme une concession, mais cette mesure ne porte nullement atteinte a la souverainete entiere et inconditionnelle de la Republique. The .Agreement on co-operation between the Union Partners in the field of defence [S/1417/ 4dd.1, appendix XX] provides in article 1 that •. ......-....~~- L'acco:rd sur la cooperation entre les membres de l'Union dans le domaine de la de£ense nationale [S/1417/Add.1, annexe XX] prevQit al'ar- It is clear, therefore, that in the irovlslons we have made for co-operation with the Netherlands, we have maintained our freedom to determine on which particular points we will co-operate. Moreover, in each specific instance, the respective parliaments of the two parties will make the ultimate decision. This holds true also for those matters on which we have agreed to consult with the Netherlands in advance; the final decision still remain~ with the Government of the Republic of the United States ui -Indonesia. Thus, we have here two sovereign States which have voluntarily agreed to co-operate with each other on a basis of equality, laid down in an agreement which, like all other agreements, can be terminated if and as soon as it becomes dear that either of the parties has ceased to abide by it. It goes without saying that, having concluded the Hague agreements, we are determined to implement them fully and in good faith. We have in the past, during the -period when the Indonesian question. was being dealt with by the Security Council, made many and rather L'accord prevoit en outre que, en cas de menace d'agression dirigee contre l'un ou 1'autre des Etats associes, les deux parties devront se t:oncerter. Cette disposition qui prevoit des consultation, mais non obligatoirement un accord - de meme que les disp6sitions relatives aux affaires etrangeres et aux questions financieres et commerciales - est e..., tous points semblable aUX stipulations qui figurent dans les accords concIus entre Etats independants tout au long de l'histoire ; en un mot, ces dispositions ne restreignent nuIlement la souverainete de chacun des Etats membres de l'Union. I1 apparait done clairement que, en acceptant d'agir en cooperation avec les Pays-Bas, nous avons specifie que nous demeurions entierement libre de determiner les cas dans lesquels nous accepterions de collaborer avec les Pays-Bas. De plus, dans chaque cas particulier, c'est aux parIements des deux Etats qu'il appartiendra lie prendre la decision finale. Cette disposition s'applique aussi lorsqu'iI s'agit d'une question au sujet de laquelle l'Indonesie a par avance accepte de se concerter avec les Pays-Bas; la decision fillale appartient ici encore au Gouvernement de la Republique. . Ainsi, deux Etats souverains ont librement .accepte'd'agir en cooperation sur un pied d'egalite, et cela a ete stipule· dans un· accord qui, comme tous les accords, poutra devenir' caduc dans le cas ou il serait prouve que rune des parties a cesse d'en respecter les ternies. I1 va sans dire que nous sommes determines a appliquer pleineme:p.t et de bonne foi les accords de La Haye que nous avons signes. Au cours de la periode precedente, c'est-a-dire lorsque le Conseil de securite etait saisi de la question de 1'Indonesie, nOtts avons fait des con';'A In many instances we have had to pay for these failures and concessions in blood and suffering. Nevertheless, it might be well not to dwell on these points~ for we realize that without the intervention of the Security Council the Indonesian question would have been solved on the battlefield by force of arms, and that the positive assistance rendered by the United Nations Commission for Indonesia helped to bring about a solution. At the Round Table Conference at The Hague, we again made concessions. However, as I stated earlier, those concessions do not constitute restrictions on our sovereignty. The New Guinea issue could be considered a territorial restriction of our sovereignty. But, as the Council is well aware, this question must be settled within one year. We are determined that New Guinea shall be sharing our sovereignty within a year. In assuming the debts'of the former' Netherlands East Indies, we have made 'a concession by taking over part of the debts incurred by the Netherlands authorities in financing two wars directed against us. I' need hardly point out, however, that in conducting negotiations with another party, the best means of inducing the other party to make concessions is to make some concessions yourself. And this assumption of debts in no way imposes a restriction on our sovereignty. For the duration of our liability to the Netherlands, we have agreed to consult that Government before taking certain measures with regard to economic, financial and monetary matters. As I have said, such consultations have no binding consequences; ultimately, we ourselves will decide upon and carry out the necessary measures as we see fit. In agreeing to accept the Queen of the Netherlands as the Head of the Indonesian-Netherlands Union, we indeed made a psychological concession from the point of view of our' nationalist feelings. We did this with the full realization of the great psychological importance of this matter for the Dutch. In making this concession, we were also well aware of the fact that the Head of the Union will have no executive powers and that therefore this can in no way restrict our sovereignty. It is clear that, despIte the concessions made~ the Republic of the United States of Indonesia will jo.in the family of nations as a completely soveretgn State. This was made possible, in the first place, by the endurance of our courageous On peut considerer que, du point de vue terri~ torial, nptre souverainete ne sera pas entiere-tant que la question d~ la Nouvelle-Guinee demeurera pendante; mais le Conseil n'ignore pas que cette question doit etre reglee d'ici un' an, et nous sommes decides' a etendre notre souverainete sur la NouvelIe-Guinee au ~ours de l'annee prochaine. En reprenant a notre compte les dettes con.. tractees par le Gouvernement des Indes neerlan-_ daises, nous avons fait une concession, puisque' nous avons accepte que nous soit transferee une partie des dettes contractees par les antorites neerlandaises pour le financement des deux cam.., pagnes dirigees contre nous., I1 n'est guere besoin de rappe1er que, dans une negociation, le meilleur moyen pour une partie d'obtenir de l'autre des concessions, c'est d'en faire e11e-meme que1ques~ nnes. Et le trans£ert de dettes que nous avons accepte ne restreint en rien notre souverainete. ]usqu'a ce que nous ayons rembourse aux Pays-Bas le montant de cette dette, nous avons accepte de nous concerter avec le Gouvernement neerlandais avant de prendre certaines mesures cl.'ordre economique, monetaire .et financier. Comme je l'ai deja dit, ces consultations ne nous imposent aucnne obligation: nous prendrons nous-memes la decision finale quant aux mesures utiles et a la fac;on de les appliquer. . En consentant a ce que la Reine des Pays-Bas soit placee ala tete del'Union Pays"-Bas-Indonesie, nous avons fait, du point de vue de nos sentiments nationaux, une concession; nons savions, en effet, toute l'importance psychologique que les Pays-Bas attachaient,a cette question. Toutefois, en fais~'1t cette concession, nons tenions 'compte du fait 1ue le chef de I'Union n'aura aucunpouvoir executif et qu'ainsi notre souverainete de-' meurera entiere. 11 est done clair que la RepubIj,que des Etats- Unis d'Indonesie, malgre'les concessions, qu'e1le it faites, prendra place dans la communaute internationale enqualite d'Etatpleinementsouverain. Et, si ce resultat a et-~ atteint, c'est en premier lieu grace a la perseverance et au courage du I should like to stress here that sovereignty alone is not our ultimate goal. To us~ sovereignty is an instrument, an indispensable instrument for ensuring and preserving the democracy for which our national movement for freedom has never failed to fight and will never fail to fight. It is also an instrument, and the only possible basis on which to secure for our people the betterment of their living conditions, and to secure and safeguard political, economic and social justice. We shall also use our sovereignty to work for the independence of all peoples who are still •' struggling to free themselves from colonial domination. We shall use our sovereignty to assist, to the utmost of our power and abilities, in establishing and safeguarding world peace and prosperity~ within the framework of the United Nations. At this point I should like to make some observations with regard to the continued functioning of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia, and in relation to the draft resolution submitted by the representative of Canada. Paragraph 116 of the Commission's special report to the Security Council on the Round Table Conference, states: l<The Commission,having participated in the Conference in compliance with the directive of the Security Council, and having assisted the parties to reach agreement, will continue to carry out its functions in accordance with its terms of reference, and observe in Indonesia the implementation of the agreements reached at the Round Table Conference." I want to stress the fact that the Commission will continue to carry out its functions in accordance with its terms of reference. . This is.a point I fttlly support, especially because there remains a crucial issue to be solved. According to the' terms Clt the Hague agreements, the question of New Guinea must be s~lved within one year. The positions taken by the two parties on this issue, however, are at the moment extremely far apart. It will be, a, very difficult task to bring those divergent viewpoints together, and it seems to me that for this purpose the assistance of an experie.lced mediating body will be indispensable. It is for this reason that, in my opinion, the United Nations CommissiClnfor Indonesia should assist in the solution of the New Guinea question~ on the basis of the Commission's terms of reference. A speedy and satisfactory sCllutlon of the New Guinea question will be vital in facilitating the very co-operation which .both parties .agreed upCln in the Hague ,agreements. The.difficult negotiations ~hich will have to be undertaken on the New GU1l1ea question will cast a shadow on the co-operation be- Je tiens a dire que, pour nous, la souverainete n'est pas une fin en soi: c'est un instrument, le seul instrument qui puisse nous permettre d'etabUr et de maintenir ce regime democratique potU' lequel notre mouvement de liberte nationale a sans cesse combattu et pour lequeI it combattra a nouveau~ le cas echeant. La souverainete est aussi l'instrumcnt, le seul instrument qui nous permettra d'ameliorer les conditions de vie de notre peuple, d'etablir et de maintenlr la justice dans les domaines politique, economique et social. Nous nous appuierons sur notre souverainete pour travailler a. l'independance de tous les' peuples qui luttent encore pour se liberer du joug colonial. Nous nous appuierons sur notre souverainete pour cooperer~ par tous les moyens dont nous disposons, a. l'etablissement et au maintien de la paix et de la prosperite du monde dans le cadre de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Je voudrais maintenant faire que1ques observations au sujet de la prorogation de la Commis~ sion des Nations Unies pour l'Indonesie et au sujet du projet de resolution presente par le Canada. Le dernier paragraphe du rapport special au Conseil de securite sur la Conference de la table ronde declare: "La Commission, qui a participe a la Conference~ conformement aux directives du Conseil de securite, et qui a aide les parties a. trouver un accord, continuera a remplir ses fonctions con~ formement a son mandat et observera en Indonesie l'execution des accords conc1us a la Conference de la table ronde." le tiens a souligner le fait que la Commission continuera a remplir ses fonctions conformement a son mandat. J'appuie entierement cette disposition, surtout parce qu'il reste un probleme decisif a. resoudre. Conformement aux termes des accords de La Haye, la question de la Nouvelle-Guinee doit etre reglee d'ici un an. Toutefois, les opinions des deux parties a cet egard different beaucoup 1\ l'heure actuelle. Il sera tres difficile de concilier ces points de vue differents; il me semble qu'a cette fin l'aide d'un organisme de mediation experimente sera indispensable. C'est pourquoi la. Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Indonesie devrait, a. mon avis, aider a trouver une solution a; la question de la Nouvelle-Guinee, en se fondant sur son mandat. I1 est indispensable de parvenir rapidement a une solution satisfaisante de la question de ,la Nouvelle-Guinee pour faciHter la cooperation meme que les deux parties ont decide de realiser en signant les accords de La Haye. Les negotiations difficiles qu'il faudra entreprendre au sujet de ·la Nouvelle-Guinee risquent de compromettre la collaboration entre I therefore support the Canadian draft reso~ lution whole-heartedly. Finally, my delegation wishes to express its sincere appreciation and thanks to all those who have contributed to the settlement of this dispute. \Ve thank them for their assistance in opening the way for the Netherlands to transfer its sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia, to which the Republic of Indonesia will also transfer its sovereignty in accordance with the agreement reached at the Inter-Indonesian Conference last summer. We are especially grateful to the Security Council and its organs, the Committee of Good Offices and the United Nations Commission for Indonesia. I am sure that the Security Council and the General Assembly ~re as grateful as we are to India and Australia for having brought this matter before them and given the United Nations the opportunity to intervene and to e,xercise its valuable influence. In closing, I want to pay a tribute to Mr. van Roijen, whose statesmanship was largely instrumental in bringing about a meeting of minds in Indonesia, so vitally important in reaching the final agreement at The Hague. We appreciate the manner in which the Dutch received our people at The Hague and we feel that that will provide a good basis for fruitful co-operation in the future. Mr. SUNDE (Norway) : As representative of a Government which has long taken a keen interest in the distant but important problems of Indonesia, I should like to associate myself wholeheartedly with the congratulations which are being extended to the participants in the Round Table Conference at The Hague on their signal achievement. History has taught my own people that selfgovernment and independence are precious assets which must never be taken for granted. We are therefore especially aware of and interested in the striving of other peoples for their independence. In the case of Indonesia that interest be~ came mixed with distress as we realized that the Indonesian people's movement for independence brought them into conflict with the Netherlands, a country to which we are closely related and with which we have alwavs been on particularly friendly terms. .- My Government has not always seen eye to eye with the Netherlands in regard to the pace at which it would be possible for Indonesia to en'ierge from colonial dependence to sovereign rule, or in regard to the methods which would be best calculated to further that end. But today bygones should be :bygones. In my opinion it is clear evidence .of the moderation and flexible statesmanship of the Netherlands e· J'appuie done sans reserve le projet de resolution du Canada. Enfin, ma delegation tient a feliciter sincerement, en les remerciant, tous ceux qui ont contribue a regIer ce differcnd. Nous les remercions de leur aide, qui a permis nux Pays-Bas de transferer leur sotlverainete aux Etats-Unis d'Indonesie. Ceux-ci se "erront egalement transferer, conformement it l'accord conclu it la Conference irter-indonesienne rete dernier, la sottverainete de la Republique d'Indonesie. Nous sommes particulierement reconnaissants au Conseil de securite et a ses organes, it la Commission de borts offices et cl. la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Indonesie. Je suis certain que le Conseil de securite et l'Assemblee generale sont aussi reconnaissants que nous envers l'Inde et I'Australie, qui les ont saisis de cette question, donnant ainsi a. l'Organisation des Nations Unies la possibilite d'intervenir et d'exercer son influence si precieuse. En terminant, je tiens it rendre hommage a. M. van Roijen, dont les qualites d'homme d'Etat ont largement contribue a. realiser l'accord en Indonesie, accord qui, a son tour, a contribue dans une lllesure si illlportante cl. la conclusion des accords definitifs intervenus a. La flaye. Nous remercions les Hollandais de 1'accueil qu'its ont reserve a. nos representants a. La Haye, et nous estimons que cette attitude constitue un excellent point de depart pour ttne collaboration feconde dans I'avenir. M. SUNDE (Norvege) (tradztit de l'a:ngla:is) : En qualite de representant d'un Gouvernement qui, de longue date, s'interesse vivement aux importants probletnes qui se posent dans la lointaine Indonesie, je Hens cl. m'associer sans reserves aux felicitations que 1'on adresse aux participants de la Conference de la table ronde cl. La Haye a l'occasion des resultats remarquables qu'ils ont obtenlls. L'histoire a appris a. mon peuple que l'autonomie et 1'independallce sont des biens precieux qu'ilne faut jamais cOllsiderer comme une chose norlllaIe. Nous comprenons donc les autres peupIes qui luttent pour leur independance, et nous nous inte- ~sons specialenlent cl. eux. Dans leeas de -1'lndo,- .,ie, cet interet s'est mele d'une certaine tristesse, car le mou",.·ement d'independance des popuIations indonesienues les amenait cl. lutter contre les Pays-Bas, Etat avec lequel nous entretenons des rapports etroits et des relations qui ont toujours ete particulierement amicales. Mon Gouvernement n'a pas toujours partage la maniere de voir des· Hollandais en ce qui concerne les delais dans lesquels 1'Indonesie pourrait passer du statut colonial cl. l'autonomie ou en ce qui concerne les methodes qu'it convenait d'appliquer pour atteindre ce but, I Mais, aujourd'lmi, it faut passer l'eponge et oublier le passe. J'estime que le Gouvernement neerlandais nous a donne la preu'Ve in'Mutable I should also like to extend my warm congratulations to the Indonesian participants in the Hague conference. Surely no settlement would have been possible without wise statesmanship and a firm will on their part to reach a peaceful settlement. They have shown a clear grasp of those essential principles of international peace and justice on which the United Nations is founded, and my Government hopes very soon to be able to welcome the new republic as a Member of our Organisation. I think it is also a matter of particular gratification that the Indonesians and the Dutch have <pledged themselves to continue their former co1}aboration on a'voluntary and equal basis in the Netherlands-Indonesian Union. The new State will surely enter upon its difficult tasks with energy and youthful enthusiasm. In the technical field, however, it wi111.tndoubtedly need assistance from older and more developed countries. I feel sure that such assistance will be generously offered by the Netherlands whose long experience in the Far East qualifies it particularly for this task. Last, but not least, I should like on behalf of my Government to pay a tribute to the members and officers of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia. They have shown themselves worthy representatives of our Organization, and its prestige and authority have been enhanced by their s:onspicuous achievement. Inasmuch as the United Nations does not have the authority to impose solutions, it is all the more gratifying that its methods of conciliation and good offices have been developed into efficacious instruments for the re-establishment and preservation of peace. The Commission's most important and most arduous task has 110W been completed. I agree, however, that we should rely on it to give further assistance to the parties in observing the implementation of the Hagtie agreements, and I shall therefore support the Canadian draft resolution. \ In conclusion, I should like to express the sincere hope that the agreements will be speedily ratified. I am confident that they will prove equally satisfactory and beneficial to the parties concerned and that they will constitute an important contribution towards the establishment of peace and the rule of law in South East Asia. Mr. GALAGAN (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist M. GALAGAN (Republique socialiste sovietique Republic) (translated from Russian): After. a d'Ukraine) (traduit diU nesse): Apres une pe- 'certain interval, the Security Council is again riode d'interruption, le Conseil de securite retaking up consideration o~_t~e_~~eS~i~~~~ Indo- . prend l'examen de la question indonesienne.On4 En terminant, je Hens a. exprimer l'espoir sincere que les accords seront rapidement ratifies. Je suisconvaincu que ces accords donneront egalement satisfaction aux parties en cause et que celles-ci en beneficieront egalement; ils contribueront sans doute dans une mesure importante a l'etablissement de la paix et de la legalite dans le sud~est de l'Asie. In that war, the Dutch forces are using modern weapons, including tanks, aircraft and artillery, "'hich they receive from the United States. They are burning down Indonesian towns and villages and exterminating 'the Indonesian people who refuse to submit to the Dutch occupiers and to the Hatta clique, which has betrayed the interests of· its people. According to Press reports, particularly fierce fighting against the resistance forces of the Indonesian people is taking place in the area of Surakarta. More than half of that town with its many thousands of inhabitants has been burnt down by the Dutch occupiers. The Indonesians are also being wiped out in the areas of Jogjakarta, Kediri and other regions. In the southern part of Celebes, Netherlands troops under the command of the Dutch officer Westerling have .killed more than 30,000 Indonesians. Selon les communiques de la presse, des combats particulierement violents contre les' forces de resistance indonesiennes se deroulentdans la region de Soerakarta.Plus de la moitie de cette vilIe avec plusieurs milIiers d'habitants a ete incendiee par l'occupant neerlandais. Des massacres ont egalement lieu dans ,les regions de Djokjakarta, de Kediri et en d'autres lieux. Dans la partie meridionale de Celebes, plus de 30.000 Indonesiens ont ete extermines par les troupes neerlandaises placees sous le commandement de 1'0fficier neerlandais vVesterling. . Yet the representative of the Netherlands tells us here that Indonesia has entered upon a course of friendship and co-operation. The slaughter of Indonesians reached a particularly high pitch of brutality in the second half of October of this year in the areas of Malang, Pasundan and others. At the present time, thousands of Indonesian political leaders are still confined in Dutch prisons. It is quite fair to ask why the Security. Council, which has had this question before it for almost four years, has proved incapable of settling the situation in Indonesia, and who is responsible for the events taking place there at the present time. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR which, in January 1946, was the first to draw the Security Council's attention to the events in Indonesia2 in pursuance of Article. 34 of the United Nations Charter, has pointed out repeatedly that those responsible for exterminating the Indonesian. people and forcibly depriving them of their lawfill right to create their own independent State are, above all, the United States and the United. Kingdom. From the very inception of the Indonesian Republic, those States, pursuing their economic and strategic interests in Indonesia, have togetller with the Dutch Et le representant des Pays-Bas vient nous dire ici que l'Indonesie est entree dans la voie de l'amitie et de la collabOl:ation. La population indonesienne a subi des massacres particuIierenlent atroces, au cours de la seconde quinzaine d'octobre dernier, dans les regions de Malang, de Pasundan et autres. Des mUliers d'hommes politiques indonesiens continuent a. peupler les prisons neerlandaises. On est fondea se demander, d'une part, pourquoi le Conseil de securite, qui s'occupe de la question indonesienne depuis pres de quatre ans, n'a pas ete en mesure de la regler et, d'autre part, sur qui retombe la responsabilite des evenements qui se deroulent actuellement dans cette region. La delegation de la .RSS d'Ukraine qui, en janvier 1946, a pris l'initiative d'attirer l'attention du ConseiI sur les evenements d'Indonesie2, 'confonnement a l'Article 34 de la Chartedes Nations Unies, a souligne a. maintes reprises que, si la population indonesienne se trouvait en butte aux. massacres et si e1Ie se voya:it ater, par la force, le droit qu'elle' possedait de se donner un gouvernement independant, la responsabilite en retombait au premier chef sUr les Etats-Unis et . le Royaume-Uni; cherchant a. sauvegarder leurs interets economiques et stratl~giques en Indonesie, ces pays sont, des l'avenement de la Republique Despite the systematic deterioration of the situation in Indone!;ia, of which the inclusion of the Indonesian question in the Council's agenda in July 1947 was sufficient evidence, the Council throughout its consideration of the matter failed to adopt a single effeCtive decision directed towards stopping <the Dutch aggression against the Republic of Indonesia. Proposals to that effect were always met with stubborn resistance by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, and were eventually defeated by them. A few examples from the Council's work leave no doubt concerning the fact that the representatives of the colonial Powers, together with the Netherlands, were doing what they could to strangle the Indonesian people and the Republic of Indonesia. As we know, the Security Council on 1 August 1947 [173rd meeting] adopted a resolution {S/459] calling upon both'sides to cease military operations in Indonesia. It is obvious that the Council should not have confined itself to adopting such a resolution but should have taken du,e steps for its implementation, the more so as there was every indication that the Netherlands did not intend to cease its military operations against the Indonesian people. . We also know that the representative of the Soviet Union proposed the creation of an authoritative commission of the SecurityCottncil to supervise the implementation of the cease-fire order. That proposal was, however, not adopted, because of the negative vote of the representative of France, one of the permanent members of the Security Council, who made use of his right of 'Veto against the USSR proposal [194th meeting]'. Having prevented the adoption of the USSR proposal on the creation of a Council commission) , the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom succeeded in persuading the En faisant rejeter cette proposition par le Conseil de' securite, la majorite du Conseil s'est, en realite, rendue complice de I'agression neerlandaise qui visait a detruire la Republique d'Indonesie. Malgre l'aggravation progressive de la situation en Indonesie, aggravation dont temoigne la reinscription de la question indonesienne aI'ordre du jour du Conseil en juiIlet 1947, le Conseil de securite, pendant toute la periode au cours de laquelle il a examine ce probleme, n'a pris aucune decision efficace pour mettre un terme a l'agression neerlandaise contre la Republique d'Indone-. ,sie. Les propositions tendant a eette fin se sont toujours heurtees a la resistance opiniatre et au sabotage des representants des Etats-Unis et du Royaume-Uni. Il sOOit de citer un certain nombre d'exemples puises dans les travaux du Conseil de securite pour se rendre compte que les representants des Puissances coloniales ont fait, avec les Pays-Bas, tout ce qu'ils pouvaient pour etrangler le peuple indonesien et la Republique d'Indonesie. Commeon le sait, le Conseil de securite a adopte le 1er aout 1947 [173eme seance] une resolution [S/ 459] invitant les deux parties interessees a cesser les hostilites en Indonesie. Bien entendu, le Conseil ne devait pas se borner a adopter cette resolution; i1 devait egalement en assurer la mise en <:euvre, d'autant plus que, selon certaines indications dont i1 disposait a l'epoque) les Pays-Bas n'avaient nullement l'intention de cesser les hostilites contre le peuple indonesien. . Nuln'ignore que le representant de l'Union sovietique a propose de ereer une commission du Conseil de securite dotee de l'autorite necessaire pour assurer le controle de la cessation des hostilites. Toutefois, cette proposition n'a pas ete acceptee, car un des membres permanents du Conseil de securite - en l'espece, le representant de la France -a vote contre le projet de resolution de rURSS, usant de son droit de veto au moment du vote sur le projet de resolution [194eme seance]. Apres avoir fait· echouer la proposition de l'URSS qui visait a la creation d'une commission du Conseil, les representants des Etats-Unis et du Royaume-Uni ont obtenu que le Conseil de Sur de l'appui de la Commission consulaire, appui que -lui garantissait la composition rneme de cette Commission, le Gouvernement neerlandais n'a tenu aucun: compte de la resolution du Conseil de securite en date du 1er aout 1947 et n'a pas cesse les hostilites. The Netherlands Government, confident of the support of the Consular Commission, the actual composition of which made suCh support a foregone conclusion, absolutely ignored the Security Council's resolution of 1 August 1947 and continued its military operations. Malgre le fait incontestable que les Pays-Bas ne se sont pas conformes a. la resolution precitee du Conseil de securite prescrivant la cessation des hostilites, les representants des Puissances coloniales au Conseil de securite et a. la Commission consulaire ont continue a. proteger l'agresseur neerlandais et ont sabote meme les mesures les plus elementaires qui devaient permettre de retablir la paix en Indonesie. In the face of undeniable proof of the failure of the Netherlands Government to abide by the, Security Council's cease-fire order of 1 August 1947, the representatives of the colonial Powers in the Security Council as well as in the Consular Comlti13sion continued their policy of encouraging the Dutch aggressors and prevented the adoption even of minimum measures towards the establishment of peace in Indonesia. The representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Belgil.1m in the Security Council defeated [217th meeting] a Soviet Union proposal providing that the forces of both sides - the Netherlands and Indonesia - should be immediately withdrawn to the previous positions which they occupied before the beginning of military operations' [S/575], although that proposal represented a minimum measure which the Security Council might have taken towards a solution of the Indonesian question. Les representants des Etats-Unis, du Royaume- Uni, de la France et de la Belgique ont empeche le Conseil de securite [217eme seance] d'adopter la proposition de l'Union sovietique [Sj575] qui stipulait que les troupes des deux parties interessees ~ les Pays-Bas et l'Indonesie - seraient retirees immediatement sur les positions qu'elles occupaient avant le debut des hostilites. Or, en adoptant ces dispositions, le Conseil de securite aurait fait un premier pas vers la solution de la question indonesien:ne. By voting against that minimum proposal, the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and the other colonial Powers proved that they actually supported the Netherlands in its fight against the Indonesian people for the restoration of the old colonial regime in Indonesia. En votant contre ce minimuni de mesures proposees, les representants des Etats-Unis, .du Rovaume-Uni et des autres Puissances coloniales ont montre en realite qu'ils soutenaient les Pays- Bas dans la lutte menee par ce pays contre le peuple indonesien, en vue de retablir en Indonesie l'ancien regime colonial. The majority of the Council, then, rejected the proposal for the dispatcll of a Security Council commission to Indonesia to supervise the implementation.of the Council's resolution providing for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of. the forces of both sides to their original positions, as well as other proposals which, though not entirely adequate, would have furthered the settlement of the situation in Indonesia. Having done so, the majority of the Security Council, under pressure from the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom - the two main patrons of the _ Netherlands in the Security Counciladopted [218thmeeting], as we know, the United States draft resolution [S/597] which in substance shifted the whole responsibility for the solution of the Indonesian question from the Security Council to the so-called Commission of Three composed of the representatives of the United States, Belgium and Australia. This Commissionas I shall illustrate - turned out' to be a tool of United States' policy in Indonesia and not an organ of the Security Council intended to promote the settlement of the Indonesian question. The United States and United Kingdom representatives also prevented the Council from taking effective measures in December 1948, when the Netherlands tteacherously resumed .._--~-.~ La majorite du Conseil de securite a donc rejete la proposition visant a. envoyer en Indonesie une commission du Conseil de securite qui aurait ete chargee de -veiller a. la mise enceuvre de la resolution du Conseil relative a. la cessation des hostilites et au retrait des forces armees des deux parties en cause sur, les positions qu'elles occupaient avant le debut des hostilites; elle a egalement rejete d'autres propositions qui, sans etre absolument satisfaisantes, favorisaient cependant le reglement de la situation en Indonesie; ensuite, la majorite du Conseil, sous la pressioll des representants des Etats-Unis et du Royaume-Uni , - les deux principaux protecteurs des Pays-Bas au Conseil de securite - a adopte [218eme seance]' comme on le sait, le ptojet de resolution des Etats-Unis [S/597] qui, en somme, enlevait l'eritiere responsabilite de la solution de la question indonesienne au Conseil de SeCUl'ite pour la transferer a. la Commission dite des trois, .composee .des, representants des Etats-Unis, de la, Belgique et de l'Australie. Cette Commission, comme il sera demontreulterieurement, s'est comportee comme l'instrunlent de la politique des Etats-Unis en Indonesie, et non COmme un 01"- gane du Conseil de securite charge.de favoriser la solution de la question d'Indonesie. Lorsque, en decembre 1948, les Pays-Bas ont tra:itreuse- The United States of America and the United Killdgom ~ot only systematically prevented the Council from taking steps to put a stop to military operations in Indonesia. put while doing so they supplied the Netherlands with all types of modern weapons. which have been used to exterminate the Indonesian people. According to the New York Times. United States aid to the Netherlands amounted to 402,800,000 dollars for the period between April 1948 and March 1949 alone. Furthermore, the Nethedands used a considerable part of the aid it has been receiving since the very beginning of the Marshall Plan to finance its fight against the Indonesian ··people. According to a statement made by former Secretary of State General Marshall on 23 July 1947, a full brigade of Netherlands troops had been trained and equipped in the United, States -to fight against the Indonesiah people. According to that authoritative statement, the United States supplied the Netherlands with 54 bombers, 64 fighters,117 field-guns, 159 machine-guns, and considerable amounts of other military equipment and material. The Star reported on 11 January 1949 that United States armaments of all types had been sent to Java and Sumatra for; over 1. period of two years. The same newspaper indicated that as the Netjlerlands troops had been equipped with British and United States material, they had enjoyed the advantage of being able to obtain supplies from neighbouring.bases in South East Asia. Moreover, as is common knowledge, the United 'Kingdom has also lent military aid ... to the Netherlands. Such a policy on the part of the United States and of the United Kingdom towards Indonesia was contrary to the fundamental purposes ·and principles of the United Nations ChCJ,rter, which has proclaimed the right of every people to self-determination and independence. Instead of granting such independence and self-determination to the Indonesian people, who have been exhausted by an unequal struggle against Japanese imperialists and Netherlands, United States and British colonizers, attempts are being made again to subject them to the yoke of colonial slavery and to restore the old colonial regime in Indonesia, and it was for this purpose that the Round Table Conference was ~onvened.' The Council is now asked to approve the decisions of that .conference by showing that they correspond to the interests of the Indonesian people. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR does not approve of those agreements, for it believes that they restore. Cl system of colonial slavery from which the Indonesian people have already suffered for a considerable period of time. The report of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia on the Round Table Conference at The Hague and the agreements signed at that , conference clearly prove that. both by its character and the results it has achieved, The Hague Con- Non seulement les Etats-Unis et le Royaume- Uni ant systematiquement empeche le Conseil de securite de prendre des decisions en vue de mettre fin aux operations militaires en Indonesie, mais encore its ont fourni aux 'Pays-Bas toutes sortes d'armements les plus modernes, qui ont servi it massacrer les pop'Ulations indonesiennes. C'est ainsi que, d'apres le New York n:mes, rien qu'entre avril 1948 et mars 1949, les Etats- Unis ont mis it la disposition des Pays-Bas 402.800.000 dollars, en plus des secours qu'its ont fournis it ce·pays depuis la mise en pratique du Plan Mar...nall, secours que le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas a utilises en grande partie pour lutter contre le peuple indonesien. Le general Marshall, ancien Secretaire d'Etat, a de'Clare, le 23 juiIlet 1947, que toute une brigade de troupes neerlandaises, qui devait etre envoyee en Indonesie pour lutter contre le peuple indonesien, a ete entrainee et equipee aux Etats- Unis. Aux termes de cette declaration venant d'une source si competente. les Pays-Bas ant re~u des Etats-Unis S4' )bombardiers, 64 chasseurs, 117 canons, 159 mitrailleuses et de grandes quantites d'autres armes et de materiel de guerre. Le journal Star a publie le 11 janvier 1949 une depeche selon laquelle des armes americaines de toutes categories auraient ete envoyees, pendant deux ans, it Java et it Sumatra. Ce meme journal a signale, en outre, que les troupes neerlandaises avaient cet avantage qu'elles avaient it leur disposition du materiel britannique et americain et pouvaient donc se ravitailler it partir de bases :voisinessituees en Asie du Sud-Est. On sait d'autre part que le Royaume-Uni a, lui aussi, fourni une aide militaire aux Pays-Bas. Cette politique adoptee par les Etats-Unis et le Royaume-Uni a. 1'egard de 1'Indonesie etait contraire aux buts et principes essentiels de la Charte des Nations Unies, qui prodame le droit de chaque peuple it disposer de lui-meme et it avail' une existence indenendante. Au lieu d'aocorder cette independance et ce droit de disposer de luimeme au peuple indonesien affaibli par sa lutte inegale contre les imperialistes japonais et les colonisateurs neerlandais, americains et britanniques, on s'efforce de luiimposer, une fois de plus, le joug de la servitude coloniale et dereta-' blir en Indonesie le vieux regime colonial. Tel etait, en effet, le but de la Conference de la table ronde. On propose maintenant au Conseil de securite de sanctionner les decisions de cette Conference, et 1'on affirme· qu'elles correspondent aux inte,.. ret~ du peuple indonesien. La delegation de la RSS d'Ukraine n'approuve pas ces accords, car elle estime qu'ils rejettent le peuple indonesicll a 1'etatde servitude coloniale dont il a souffert pendant une si tongue periode. A 1'apP1.1i de' ma these, je vais citeI' le rapport etabli par la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Indonesie ausujet des travaux de la Conference de la table ronde de La Haye, ainsi que le recueil des accords conclus au cours de cette Con£~ A study of those documents clearly.reveals who played the main part at The Hague Conference and whose interests are fostered by the agreements reached there. The aim of those agreements is 'to sanction the ~cquisition.of Indonesia's natural resources by foreIgn monopolies and to deprive the Indonesian people of their legal right to set up their own independent democratic gov~rnment. In other word~, the sole aim of the bargam struck at The Hague IS to restore the old colonial practices and regime in Indonesia. The main provision of The Hague agreements concerns the creation of the United States of Indonesia and of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union. As is well kown, that question is not new. Both the United States of Indonesia and the Netherlands-Indonesian Union were imposed on the Indonesian people as far back as March 1947 under the extremely unfavourable terms of the Linggadjati Agreement. At the ·time that agreement was signed, the Indonesian Republic extended over an immense territory inc1u<:l.ing the Islands of Java, Madura."arid"Sumatta, with a population of many millions. The Dutch. occupiers however and their protectors, to WIt, the United States and the United Kingdom, did not wish the Indonesian Republic to become a'member of the United States ,of Indonesia with the frontiers it had at the time of the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement. They realized full well that with its many millions of people, its own army and its great natural resources, the Indonesian R~public would greatly hinder the achievement of,' their imperialistic aims in Indonesia even if it became a part of the notorious United States of Indonesia. Consequently,relying on support and aid from the United States and the United 'Kingdom, the Dutch ,aggressors, decided first to deal the Indonesian Republica series of heavy, military blows, to deprive it of its most important economic regions, to partition the territory they conquered into various puppet states headed by their' own nominees, and only then to tackle the creation of the United States of Indonesia. That was the plan of the Dutch colonizers and those who stood behind them. Violating the agreements it had concluded with the Indonesian Republic and the decisions of the Security Council on the cessation of military operations, the Netherlands Government began to carry out that plan in a consistent manner. One year after the conclusion of the Linggadjati Agreement, Dutch troops were already in, possession of the richest oil and rubber regions of Java and Sumatra. They conquered the eastern and western part of Java, the northern part of central Java, the main plantations on the eastern coast of Sumatra, the oil·bearing r.·.._~~~ Comme on le sait, cette question n'est pas nouvelle. L'idee, des Etats-Unis d'Indonesie et de 1'Union neerlando-indonesienne a ete imposee au peuple indonesien, des le mois de mars 1947, par l'Accord de Linggadjati, qui etait fort asservissant. Au moment de la' signature de cet Accord, la Republique d'Indonesie englobait un vaste ter-:- ritoire qui comprenait les iles de Java, de Ma~ doura et de Sumatra et qui avait, de nombreux millions d'habitants. Cependant, les occupants neerlandais etleurs protecteurs ...::...- les Etats-Unis et le Royaume-Uni .:.- n'Haient pas interessesa ce que la Republique d'Indonesie' adhere aux Etats-Unis d'Indonesie en conservant le territoire qu'elle detenait au moment de la signature de l'Accord de Linggadjati. Ils se rendaient bien compte qu'une Republique possedantune population de plusieurs millions, une armee, independante et d'importantes ressources naturelles les empecherait serieusement a. atteindre leurs objectifs in1periaHstes en Indonesie, meme au caS ou e1le adhererait aux fameux Etats-Unis d'Indonesie. C'est pourquoi, s'appuyant sur 1'aide et le secours des Etats-Unis et du Royaume-Uni, l'agresseur neerlandais a decide, d'infliger tout d'abord a. la Republique d'Indonesie une serie de gravesdMaites militaires, de lui •arracher ses regions les plus importantesdu' point' de vue economique, de creer" dans les territoires qu'il aurait·,occupes, toute une serie d'Etats fantJches, de mettre a. la tete de ces Etats des hommes a la solde des Pays-Bas et de passer ensuite a. la creation des Etats-Unis d'Indonesie. Tel etait le plan des colonisateurs neerlandais et de tous ceux qui les soutenaient dans les coulisses. Le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas a applique ce pland'1.1ne fac;on consequente, violant les accords conclus precedemment avec la Republiqued'Indonesie et enfreignant, les decisions du Conseil de securite relatives a.'la cessation des hostilites. Un an apres la signature de l'Accord de Linggadjati, les troupes neerlandaises avaient mis Ia'main sur les regions de Java et de Sumatra, les plus riches en petrole et en caoutchouc. Elles se sont empa- > rees des territoiresoriental et occidental de Java, du nord du territoire central de Java, des plantations les plus importantes sur la cote',est de, Su- Having achieved that aim, the Dutch, relying on the active support of the United States and working through the Three-Power Commission, imposed upon the Indonesian Republic a new enslaving agreement, signed aboard the U.S.S. Retwille and called the Renville Agreement, which re-stated the need for the creation of the United States of Indonesia and of a Netherlands- Indoresian Union. It soon became clear, however, that the Netherlands did not want the Republic to enter the United States of Indonesia even in that weakened and reduced state. First, the Netherlands made use of every possible device to de;,'.y the negotiations provided for in the Renville Agreement, and· then, in December 1948, they treacherously resumed military operations and embarked on the •. last stage of the liquidation of the Republic. Only when that aim had been achieved and when the Indonesian Republic had been reduced to the status of the sultanate of Jogjakarta headed by the Hatta clique, did the Dutch offer to convene the Round Table Conference at The Hague to work out concrete measures for the creation of the United States of Indonesia and of a Netherlands-Indonesian Union. Thus the Indonesian '-peop1e were prevented from taking part in determining the nature and aims of the proposed United States of Indonesia although that right had been guaranteed to them even by the unfavourable Linggadjati and Renville Agreements. Instead of the lawful representatives of the Indonesian people, the Round Table Conference at The Hague was attended by the Hatta clique which had betrayed the interests of the Indonesian people and had sold itself to the United States and Dutch colonizers. At that conference, Hatta and his clique represented the interests of the feudal ruling circles of Indonesia who were serving the United States, Dutch and other colonizers, rather than -the interests of the Indonesian people. This is borne out·by the fact that local Republican organs have no contact with the so-called Hatta Government and are completely independent. even in the regions under Netherlands occupation. Consequently, the very composition of the Round Table Conference - the Netherlands, the Federal Consultative Assembly representing the puppet States set up by the Netherlands, and the Hatta cliqueand the participation ofthe United Nations Commission for Indonesia, which is the tool of United States policy, determined .in advance the character of the United States of Indonesia and of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union as a new political form of colonial slavery for the Indonesian people. Apres avoir atteint ce but, les Hollandais, se servant de la Commission des trois Puissances et beneficiant du secours actif que leur accordaient les Etats-Unis, ont impose a la Republique d'Indonesie un nouvel accord asservissant, qui a ete signe a bord du navire de guerre americain Renville et qui est connu sous le nom d'Aceord du Rcnville. Cet accord confirmait, lUl aussi, la necessite de ereer des Etats-Unis d'Indonesie et une Union neerlando-indonesienne. Cependant, il s'est revele bientot que les Hollandais ne voulaient pas accepter la Republique ~ au sein des Etats-Unis d'Indonesie, meme clans ces limites reduites. Tout d'abord, ils ont sabote par tous les moyens les negociations relatives au reglement politique que prevoyait l'Accord du Renville. PttlS, en decembre 1948, ils ont perfidement repris les hostilites et sont passes a l'etape qui devait mettre clefinitivement fin a l'existence de la Republique. C'est seulement apres avoir atteint ce but, apres avoir reduit la Republique d'Indonesie au sultanat de Djokjakarta domine par la clique de Hatta, que les Hollandais ont propose de convoquer la Conference de la table ronde a La Haye, qui devait elaborer des mesures d'ordre pratique en vue de creer les Etats-Unis d'Indonesie et l'Union neerlando-indonesienne. Ainsi, on a empeche le peuple d'Indonesie de prendre part aux negociations qui devaient determiner le ca:racb~re et les objectifs des Etats-Unis d'Indonesie bien que, meme aux termes des accords aussi asservissants que ceux de Linggadjati et du Renville, il etait prevu que ce peuple devrait avoir cette possibilite. Au lieu de representants legitimes du peuple indonesien, c'est la clique de Hatta qui a participe a. la Conference de la table rondea La Haye, clique qui a trahi les interets du peuple indonesien et qui s'est vendue aux colonisateurs americains et neerlandais. Hatta et sa clique representaient a la Conference de la table ronde, non pas les interets du peuple indonesien, mais les interets de la classe feodale qui est a la solde des colonisateurs americains, neerlandais et autres. Pour s'en r~ndl'e compte, il suffit de r.appeler que, meme dans les regions de l'Indonesie controlees par les autorites neerlandaises d'occupation, les prganes republicains locaux ne maintiennent aucune relation avec le pretendu Gouvernement Hatta et agissent en toute independance. C'est pourquoi la composition meme de la Conference de la table wade - a savoir les Pays- Bas, l'Assemblee federale consultative rppresentant les Etats fantoches erees par les Holiandais, la clique de Hatta - et la participation aux negociations de la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Indonesie qui est l'instrument de la politique des Etats-Unis indiquent que les Etats-Unis d'Indonesie et l'Union nerlando-indonesienne ne sont envisages que comme une nouvelle forme: de servitude coloniale qu'it s'agit d'imposer all. peuple indonesien. The whole of the internal life of the United C'est le Gouvernement neerlandais qui contro- States of Indonesia will be under the control of lera toute la vie interieure des Etats-Unis d'Indothe Netherlands Government. The Government nesie. Le Gouvernement de ces Etats-Unis ne of the United States of Indonesia will be unable pourra prendre aucttne decision sans le consenteto carry out any decision which is not sanctioned ment du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, car, aux by the Netherlands Government, as article 12 cif termes de l'artic1e 12 du Statut de l'Union, toutes the 'Union's Statute lays down t.1lat all decisions les decisions du Conseil des ministres de rUnion of the conference of ministers of the Netherlandsneerlando-lndonesienne doivent etre prises al'una- Indonesian Union must be taken unanimously, nimite, c'est-a-dire avec i'assentiment des Paysthat is to say with the agreement of the Nether- Bas. lands. The proposed United States of Indonesia is deprived of the right to have independent relations with other States. Under article 3 of the agreement concerning foreign relations, neither member of the Union can conclude any international agreement or be a party to any international juridical act affecting the interest of the other member without consultation with that member. That means that the United States of Indonesia will be unable to have its own foreign policy and will have to ask for the agreen:ent of the Netherlands Government on every question. Les Etats-Unis d'Indonesie que 1'on se propose de creer n'auront pas le droit d'avoir des relations independantes avec d'autres Etats. L'artic1e 3 de l'accord relatif aux relations exterieures stipule qu'aucun des membres de l'Union ne conclura de trait6' ni n'accomplira aucun autre acte juridique, dans les relations internationales, qui mctte en jeu les interets de l'autre membre, a mains d'avoir .consulte ce dernier. Cela signifie que les Etats-Unis d'Indonesie ne pourront avoir de politique exterieure independante et devront solliciter l'approbation du Gouvernement neerlandais sur toute question qui les interesse. L'article 4 du meme accord empeche en fait les Etats-Unis d'Indonesie d'avoir des representa.nts diplomatiques a l'etranger et reserve ce droit au Gouvernement neerlandais. Ainsi donc, en matiere de politique etrangere, tout comme dans d'autres domaines, les Etats-Unis d'Indonesie ne pourront pas exercer leur souverainete. The practical effect of article 4 of that agreement is to prevent the United States of Indonesia from establishing its own diplomatic representations abroad and to reserve that right for the Netherlands Government. The United States of Indonesia is consequently also deprived of the rights of a sovereign State in the field of foreign relations. The Netherlands will also exercise complete control over the economy, finances and trade of the United States of Indonesia. The aim of the agreements on those questions is to keep the natural wealth and economy of Indonesia under the control of the monopolistic enterprises of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and more particularly the United States, and others, and guarantee to them high profits at the expense of the legitimate interests of the Indonesian people. Les Pays-Bas exerceront un controle absolu sur l'economie, les finance" et le commerce des Etats-Unis d'Indonesie. Les accords condus sur toutes ces questions visent a maintenir le controle exerce par les monopoles neerlandais et ~ritan­ niques, mais surtout par les monopoles asneficains et autres, sur les richesses naturelles et 1'economie indonesienne, et a leur assurer des benefices enormes au detriment des interets du peuple indo· nesien. The desire of the Dutch colonizers to restore and strengthen the former colonial regime in Indonesia is patent in all those agreements. Tous ces accords montrent clairement que les colonialistes neerlandais cherchent avant tOtr.t a retablir et a consolider le regime colonial q'li a existe jusqu'ici en Indonesie. Under article 1 of the Financial and Economic Agreement, "the Republic of the United States of Indonesia .also recognizes . .' . that the rightful claimants be restored to the actual exercise of their rights". In other words, the agreement strengthens the domination of the Dutch and - other colonizers posing as "rightful claimants". Aux termes de 1'artic1e. premier de 1'accord financier et economique "la Republique des Etats- Unis d'Indonesie accepte... que... les ayants droit legitimes recouvrent effectivement l'exercice. de leurs droits". En d'autres termes, les colonisateurs neerlandais et autres, qui pretendent etre des ayants· droit, consolident par ces accords leur emprise sur l'Indonesie. Le paragraphe 4 de 1'article premier du meme accord stipule que la nationalisation qui s'r.:lffectuera "par voie d'expropriation ... n'affectera en Paragraph 4 of the same article lays down that nationalization ". .. which will be carried out 1IiIit. o~ exprOpriatio: : 'N: ,shallh~~eno in- No doubt is left on this point by article 5 which states.that "the enterprises and estates" - this means foreign estates - "will co-operate with and enable participation of Indonesian capital subject to this being justified from a business point of view". This article deprives the United States of Indonesia of the possibility of developing its natural resources; for it is obvious to all that Indonesian capital cannot compete with that of large United States, United Kingdom and other companies which have already gained control over the basic wealth of Indonesia, namely, oil. rubber and tin. Article 8 guarantees high profit to foreign •'enterprises. It states: "The burdens imposed on bqsiness as a consequence of fiscal measures and social and other measures customary in a modern country will be kept within such reasonable limits that under normal circumstances business can be carried on, permitting normal replacements, depreciations and reserves and permitting &. reasonable profit for the capital invested in the enterprises... All these articles maintain Indonesia in the role of a source of raw materials for foreign monopolies and deprive the Indonesian people of the right to develop the economic resources of the country in their own interests. Furthermore, the Indonesian people are being saddled with the heavy burden of paying a considerable part of the Netherlands colonial administration's debt. The section on the settlement of' debts imposes upon the United States of Indonesia the responsibility for repaying debts and loans contracted by the Netherlands colonial administration in Indonesia from 1932 onwards. The amount owed to the Netherlands is over 1,000 million guilders, to the United States over 75 million dollars, to Canada over 15 million dollars and to Australia 8,500,000 pounds. Over and above those amounts, the United States of Indonesia is also to.repay. the loans granted by the United States to tlie!ioyernment of the Netherlands Indies for the purchase of surplus United States military equipment in Indonesia used by Netherlands troops a.gainst the Indonesian .people. The Indonesians are now asked to pay for that equipment and also to shoulder all the expenses incurred by the Netherlands when waging war against the Indonesian people. The section on co-operation in trade policy legalizes Netherlands financial and. economic interests in Indonesia. Paragraph 3 of a.rticle 20 is indeed quite frank on this point: ".. , As a result of history, the Netherlands have considerable economic and financial interests in Indo- ,nesia. The Republic of the United States of Indonesia will take due account of such interests." This article safeguards for the Dutch an eco- L'article 5 du meme accord ne laisse aueun doute a. ee sujet. I1 y est dit en effet: "Les entreprises et les domaines - etrangers, bien entendu - coopereront avee les capitaux indonesiens et permettront leur participation, si cette procedure se justifie du point de vue industriel et commercial." Cd article empeche les Etats-Unis d'Indonesie de developper leurs propres ressources nnturelles, car it est certain que le capital indonesien ne pourra pas soutenir la concurrence des grandes compagnies americaines, britanniques et autres, qui ont deja. mis la main sur les richesses principales de l'Indonesie: le petrole, le caoutchouc et l'etain. L'article 8 de l'accord financier et economique garantit aux compagnies etrangeres des benefices considerables. I1 y est dit: "Les charges que les mesures fiscales et saciales et autres mesures courantes . . . font peser sur les entreprises industrielles seront maintenues dans des limites raisonnables, . . . permettant de faire des remplois, amortissements et reserves de caractere normal et de tirer un revenu raisonnable des capitaux investis dans les entreprises." Tous ces articles maintiennent l'Indonesie dans une situation qui en fait une sour-ce de matieres premieres pour les monopoles etrangers et empechent le peuple indonesien de developper ses ressources economiques dans ses propres interets. D'autre part, its imposent au peuple indonesien le lourd fardeau des dettes contractees par l'administration coloniale neerlandaise, dettes dont it sera oblige de payer me grande partie. L'accord relatif au reglement des dettes prevoit que les . Etats-Unis d'Indonesie devront payer les dettes et les emprunts contractes par l'administration coloniale neerlandaise a. partir de 1932. Ces dettes comprennent plus d'un milliard de florins dus aux Pays-Bas, plus de 75 millions de dollars aux Etats-Unis, plus de IS millions de dollars au Canada, et plus de 8.500.000 livres a. l'Australie. Les Etats-Unis d'Indonesie devront, en outre, s'acquj.tter de la dette que le Gouvernement des Indes neerlandaises a contractee vis-a.-vis des Etats-Unis en vue d'acheter les surplus de materiel de guerre americain entrepose en Indonesie, materiel que les troupes neerlandaises ont utilise contre le peuple indonesien. On·propose done aux Indonesiens de payer ce materiel et meme de couvri~ les depenses engagees par les Pays-Bas pour mener leurs operations militaires coptre le peuple indonesien. La partie de l'accord relative it la collaboration en matiex:e de politique· commerciale legitime les interets· economiques et financiers des Pays-Bas en Indonesie, et le paragraphe 3 de l'artic1e20de cet accord le reconnait en toute sincerite. I1 y est dit en effet: "Par suite de l'evolution historique, les Pays.,Bas ant en Indonesie des interets econo-" miques et financiers considerables. La Republique des Etats-Unis .d'Indonesie tiendra dument compte Special attention should be paid to the regu~ lations concerning the Netherlands armed forces in Indonesia after the transfer of sovereignty. The Security Council should pay particular attention to the fact that the regulations concerning Netherlands naval, land and air fighting forces in Indonesia do not provide for their immediate withdrawal from the country. Although some of these articles mention the withdrawal of Netherlands fighting forces after the transfer of sovereignty to the Umted States of Indonesia, they contain so many reservations that the Netherlands fighting forces will always be able to fi'nd a pretext for remaining in Indonesia fo1." any length of time. C'est ainsi que l'article premier du reglement relatif aux forces terrestres dispose que "les forces terrestres sous commandement neerlandais seront retirees de l'Indonesie ou reorganisees aussitot que possible ...". Que veut dire cette reorganisation des troupes neerlandaises en Indonesie? Elle signifie qu'il s'agit simplement de regrouper ces troupes et de les incorporer aux forces armees des Etats-Unis d'Indonesie, c'esta-dire de les maintenir en Indonesie. On prevoit d'avance les difficultes qui pourraient empecher l'evacuation de l'Indonesie par les troupes neerlandaises, et les Pays-Bas ne manqueront pas d'en pmfiter a l'avenir pour retarder le retrait de leurs troupes d'Indonesie. L'article 22 du reglement precite declare: "S'it apparait comme le Gouvernemet..t des Pays-Bas le craint, que le manque de moyens de transport ou d'autres difficultes techniques empechent que le retrait des troupes s'effectue dans les six mois qui suivront le transfert de la souverainete, le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas laissera les autorites de la Republique des Etats-Unis d'Indonesie prendre librement connaissance du detail des dispositions par lesquelles le Gouverne1l1ent des Pays-Bas se sera efforce de rapatrier. l'arrilee royale des Pays-Bas." Ainsi donc, le Gouvernement neerlandais laisse entendre des maintenant qu'il ne sera pas en mesure de retirer ses .troupes d'Indonesie·dans les delais prevus par les accords de La Haye. A. ce propos, il convient de rappeler aux membres du Conseil de securi'te que le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas ne s'est jamais plaint d'avoir des difficultes lorsqu'il s'agissait d'envoyer des troupes en Indonesie, et que, maintenant. non plus, it n'eprouve aucune difficulte a depecher en Indonesie de nouveaux contingents militaires. Etant donne que, comme l'a montre toute l'histoire de la question indoncsienne, le Gouvernement 11eerlandais n'est nullement interesse au retrait de ses troupes d'Indonesie, it est tout a fait , certain qu'il profitera de cet article pour justifier la presence de troupes ncerlandaisesdans cepays, meme apres le transfert de la souverainete. , Les lettres qui ont ete echangees entre les differentes deIegations a la Conference de la·table ronde au sujet des questions 1l1ilitaires, ainsi que l'artic1e 6 du reglement relatif aux forces navales For instance, article 1 of the regulations concerning land fighting forces states that "The land forces under Netherlands command shall be withdrawn from Indonesia or be reorganized as soon as possible ..." What is to be understood by the reorganization of Netherlands land forces in Indonesia? It means that Netherlands forces will be· regrouped and incorporated in the armed forces of the United States of Indonesia; in other words, that they will remain in Indonesia. Provision is made in advance for various alleged difficulties in connexion with the withdrawal of Netherlands troops fmm Indonesia. They will, of course, be used later on by the Netherlands to delay that withdrawal. Article 22 of the above-mentioned regulations states that "Should it become evident as the Netherlands Government regretfully foresees that lack of shipping or other technical difficulties will prevent the completion of the withdraw'al within six months after the transfer of sovereignty, the Netherlands Government will gladly give the authorities of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia free access to details of the arrangements and endeavours of the Netherlands Government for the repatriation of the Royal Netherlands Army." Thu.e" the NetherlandsGovernment is already letting it be known that it will not be able to withdraw its troops from Indonesia within the time limit laid down by the Hague agreements. In connexion with this reservation, members of the Security Council should recall that the Netherlands Government never complained of any difficulties when it had to dispatch troops to Indonesia nor does it experience any difficulty at present in speedily transferring new military units to Indonesia. As the whole history of the Indonesian question clearly shows that the Netherlands Government is not intel"est<~d in withdrawing its troops from Indonesia, it can be safely assumed that this article wi~l be used to justify the. retention of Netherlands troops in Indonesia even after the transfer of soverclgnty. Th~ exchangeqt correspondence on military questions between delega.tions at the Round Table Conference and also article 6 of the regulations concerning the Netherlands naval fighting forces Nor is any provision made in the Hague agree- 1llents for the withdrawal from Indonesia of the Royal Netherlands Air Force. Instead, the preparatory sub-committee on the reorganization of the Netherlands air forces in Indonesia is required to pay particular attention to "the pr~blem of voluntary enlistment of Netherlands All' Force personnel with the Air Force of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, in order that the said enlistment may take place as soon as possible after the transfer of sovereignty". Thus, under prete..'\.t of the reorganization of tHe Netherlands armed forces in Indonesia and of various far-fetched technical objections, the land, naval and air forces of the Netherlands will remain on Indonesian territory. The expense of maintaining the Netherlands troops left behind in Indonesia falls upon the United States of Indonesia, in other words, on the Indonesian people, who are expected to receive these troops as the representatives of a friendly nation and to put all facilities at their disposal, despite the fact that these troops have for four years been exterminating the Indonesian population and destroying tens of thousands of the best patriots of the Indon~sian Republic, who were fighting for the independence of their people. Finally, the Hague agreements provide for the maintenance in Indonesia of Netherlands military missions which will, in effect, deal with all questions of a military nature. This analysis of the Hague agreements, although far from complete, clearly shows that their fundamental aim is to restore the old colonial regime in Indonesia: in other words, what the Netherlands troops, with the help of the United States and the United Kingdom, have been seeking to achieve by force .of arms for more than four years. And we are now being asked to approve them. Anyone who asserts that 'they express the good will of the parties concerned should compare the texts of the agreements with those of the ultimata repeatedly sent by the Netherlands Government to the Republic of Indonesia. Such a comparison affords convincing proof that, without exception, all the demands of the Netherlands ultimata are reproduced in full in the agreements. Take, for example, the conditions presented to the Indonesian Republic during the Indonesian- Netherlands negotiations in the spring of 1946. , The Dutch then demanded that the Republic of Indonesia should become part of the Kingdom Les accords de La Haye ne prevoient pas non plus que l'aviation royale quittera 1'1ndonesie. Au lieu de cela, le sous-comite preparatoire charge d'examiner la reorganisation des forces aeriennes neerlandaises en 1ndonesie est invite a etudier avec un soin tout particulier "le probleme de 1'engagement des mel11bres des forces aeriennes des Pays-Bas dans 1'arrnee de 1'air d~s Etats-Unis d'1ndonesie, etant entendu que ces engagements pouITont s'effectuer aussit6t apres le transfert de la souverainete". Ainsi donc, sous pretexte d'une reorganisation eventuelle des forces arl11ees neerlandaises en·1ndonesie, sous pretexte de toutes sortes de difficultcs techniques qu'on a inventees d'avance, les forces terrestres, navales et aeriennes neerlandaises seront maintenues sur le territoire de 1'1ndonesie. Les depenses necessaires a l'entretien des troupes neerlandaises laissees en 1ndonesie devront etre couvertes par les Etats-Unis d'1ndonesie, c'est-a-dire par le peuple indonesien, auquel on .propose de reconnaitre ces troupes comnle representant une nation amie et de mettre a leur disposition toutes les facilites voulues. Or, ces troupes ont massacre la population indonesienne pendant quatre ans, et ont assassine des dizaines de milliers de patriotes de la Repttblique indonesienne qui luttaient pour l'independance de leur peuple. Enfin, les accords de La Haye prevoient que les Pays-Bas maintiendront en 1ndonesie des missions militaires qui, en realite, contr6leront toutes les affaires militaires du pays. Cette analyse des accords de La Haye est loin d'etre complete; toutefois, elle suffit a montrer c1airement que le l11archandage de La Haye vise essentiellement a retablir en 1ndonesie 1'ancien regime colonial. Or, c'est la precisement le but que les troupes neerlandaises· ont cherche a atteindre, par la force des flrmes, pendant plus de quatre ans, avec le concours des Etats,:Unis et du Royaume-Uni. Et voici que 1'on propose au Conseil d'approuver ces accords. Ceux qui affirment que les accords de La Haye expriment la libre volonte des parties en cause feraient bien de comparer les textes de ces accords a ceux des ultimatums que le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas a adresses a plusieurs reprises a la Republique d'1ndonesie. Cette comparaison montrerait dairement que toutes les exigences formulees par les Pays- Basdans ces ultimatums sont reproduites en entier dans les documents de la Conference de La Haye. _ Examinons, par exemple, les conditions que les Pays-Bas ont posees a la Republique d'Indonesie au cours des pourparlers qui ont eu lieu au prilltemps 1946. Quels buts poursuivaient a.ce mo-. ment-Ia les Hollandais? Its cherchaient a i!.1cor·' The Netherlands ultimatum of 27 May 1947 demanded the establishment of an all-Indonesian federal governmel't, to consist of representatives of the Netherlands Crown. It was proposed that the Indonesian Republic should renounce its right to independent relations with foreign governments, dissolve its army and ph:l.ce all questions of defence in the hands of the Netherlands. All these demands are to be found in the Hague agreements; they are included in them without any changes whatsoever.. It is no accident that the Hague agreements met with such warm support from certain members of the Security Council. The latter realize that if those agreements are implemented they will duly safeguard the political and economic interests of the colonial Powers in Indonesia, in particular the interests of the United States of America. It is well known that as early. as 1947 the Government of the United States insisted that the Netherlands Government should take steps to recover the plantations in Indonesia owned by United States and other foreign interests, which were still in the hands of the Indonesians. In a note to the Government of the Indonesian Republic, transmitted by the United States Consul in Batavia, the Government of the United States demanded the acceptance of the Netherlands ultimatum of 27 May 1947. The Dutch newspaper T1'ouw drew attention to that fact and pointed out that, under pressure from the United States, the Indonesian Republic would probably agree to the establishment of a federal government under Netherlands sovereignty. Those members of the Security Council who approve the "deal" made at The Hague ought clearly to understand that widespread democratic circles in Indonesia, as well as the resistance forces of the Indonesian people, do not recognize either the Round Table Conference or its decisions. Nor do they recognize the Hatta Government, which signed those shameful agreements. A manifesto published by the resistance forces of Indonesia, and signed by the leader of. the patriotic movement in central and eastern Java, says that no decision of the Round Table Conference which limits the authority of the Indonesian Republic \vill be recognized by the Indonesian people. The manifesto calls for the release of political prisoners and also protests against the dissolution, by the self-styled Hatta Government, of the armed forces of the Indonesian Repub~ic, which are defending the independence of theIr country against foreign invaders. The cruelty of the Netherlands occupation forces ~)l1ly strengthens the resistance of the !ndonesIan people, which has already driven the 111vader from the mountainous regions of both central Java and Sumatra. Try as it may, the Netherlands Government will not be able to conceal the· fact that units of the Republican Army are refusing to obey the orders of Hatta and that officers and men of those units are· going over en masse to the resistance forces. It is _ r ··ttr On sait que le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis a insiste, des 1947, pour que le Gouvernement neerlandais prit des mesures pour reprendre aux Indonesiens les plantations qu'ils occupaient encore et qui appartenaient a des Americains (~u a d'autres ressortissants etrangers en Indonesie. Dans une note adressee au Gouvernement de la Republique d'Indonesie et transmise par l'intermediaire du consul des Etats-Unis a Batavia, le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis demandait que I'ultimatum; des Pays-Bas en date du 27 mai 1947 fftt accepte. Cette information a pare dans le journal neerlandais Troltw qui a declare que, cedant a la pression des Etats-Unis, la Republique d'Indonesie accepterait probablement la creation d'un gouvernement federal place sous la souverainete des Pays-Bas. Les menlbres du ConseiI desecurite qui approuvent le "marche" de La Haye doivent se rendre compte que l'opinion publique democratique ainsi que les forces de resistance indonesienne ne reconnaissent, ni la Conference de la table ronde, ni les decisions ,qu'elle a prises. Elles ne reconnaissent pas le Gouvernement Hatta qui a signe ces accords deshonorants. Dans une declaration publiee par les forces de resistance indonesienne et signee par le chef du mouvementpatriotique des parties centrale et orientale de Java, il est dit que le peuple indonesien ne reconnaitra aucune decision de la Conference de la table ronde pOl"tant atteinte a1'autorite de la Republique d'Indonesie. Cette declaration demande la mise en libelte lies prisonniers politiques, et proteste contre la demobilisation, par le pretendu Gouvemement Hatta, des forces annees de la RepubIique d'Indonesie qui de£endent l'independance de leurs pays contre l'envahisseur. La cruaute manifestee par les occupants neerlandais ne fait que renforcer la resistance du peuple indonesien, qui a deja chasse l'envahisseur des regions montagneuses du centre de Java et de celles de Sumatra. Malgre tous les efforts qu'il deploie, le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas ne pourra pas dissimuler le fait que les troupes de l'armee republicaine n'obeissent pas aux ordres de Hatta et que les soldats et les officiers passent en masse a la resistance. On sait que la seizieme·brigade de In the light of the above, the Security Council must condemn the Hague agreements as incompatible with the purposes and principles of the United Nations and as representing a flagrant violation of the right of the Indonesian people to freedom and self-determination. The Security Council must reject the draft resolution submitted by the Canadian delegation and work for a real settlement of the conflict between the Netherlands and the RepUblic of Indonesia in the interests of·the Indonesian people rather than of the United States and other colonial Powers. Now a few words about the so-called United Nations Commission for Indonesia. That Com- .pllssion, lrnown-earlier under the name of "Committee of Good Offices", was created for the purpose of supervising the implementation of the Security Council's cease-fire order [5/459] and assisting the parties in their negotiations towards a settlement of controversial issues. However, as was to be expected, it has failed to carry out either of those tasks. It has been transformed by the United States into a screen for Netherlands aggression in Indonesia and an instrument of pressure intended to force the RepUblic of Indonesia to accept the Netherlands demands. The Renville. and Hague agreements, concluded with the- Commission's co-operation, expose the latter as a tool of United States politics in Indonesia. It is a known fact that one of the members of that Commission, namely the representative of the United States, entered into secret negotiations with the Hatta clique, which, together with the Netherlands, is fighting the forces pf resistance and all democratic elements in Indonesia. In the course of these negotiations, he informed Hatta that the. United States Government would assist him in the suppression of the Iiberationmovement of the Indonesian people. By acting in such a way, the United Nations Commission for Indonesia has compromised its -position in the eyes of the people of Indonesia and has entirely lost its confidence. '.It can therefore be of no use whatever in regulating' the situation in Indonesia, and should be dissolved. The Commission should De replaced by a new authoritative commission of the Security. Council eomposed of all States members of· the Council. The creation of such a commission is also necessitated' by the .fact that-the Netherlimds has systematically and treacherously violated all decisions' of" the Security Council and. agreements .concluded pre,:iously with the Republican Government. ,The Netherlands Government has not carried out a single one of the Security Council's .decisions on the cessation of military operations in Pour toutes ces raisons, le Conseil de securite doit condamner les accords de La Haye; en effet, ils sont incompatibles avec les buts et les principes de 1'0rganisation des Nations Unies, et violent directement le droit qu'a le peuple indonesien a l'autonomie et a l'independance. Le Conseil de securite doit rejeter le projet de resolution soumis par la delegation du Canada, et assurer un reglement veritable du conflit qui oppose les Pays- Bas a la Republique d'Indonesie; ee reglement doitetre conforme aux interets du peuple indonesien lui-meme, et non aux interets des Etats-Unis et d'autres Puissances coloniales. Quelques mots p.laintenant sur ce qu'on appelle la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Indonesie. Cette Commission, connue egalement sous le nom de "Commission de bons offices", a ete chargee de veilIer a l'application de l'ordre de cesser le feu en Indonesie [5/459], donne par le Conseil de securite, et pour faciIiter les negociations entre les parties en vue de parvenir a un reglement des questions Iitigieuses. Toutefois,.cette Commission n'a bien entendu rempli aucrine des taches qui luietaient assignees. Les Etats-Unis s'en sont servis pour camoufler l'agression commise par les Pays- Bas en Indonesie et pour exercer une pression sur cette derniere afin de l'obliger a accepter les ulti- 'matums des Pays-Bas. Les accords du Renville conclUS sous les auspices de cette Commission, de meme que les accords de La Haye, montrent clairement que cette Commission n'etait qu'un instrument politique des Etats-Unis en Indonesie. On sait que l'un des membres decette Commission, a savoir le representant des Etats-Unis, a entrepris des pourparlers secrets avec la clique de Hatta qui lutte aux cotes des Pays-Bas contre les forces de resistance et contre tous les elements democratiques de l'Indonesie. Au cours de ceS negociations, ce representant a declare a Hatta que le Gouvernenient des Etats-Unis viendrait a son aide pour reprimer le mouvement de liberation du peuple indo~esien. En agissant de la sorte, la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Indonesie s'est compromise aux yeux du peuple indonesien qui a perdu toute confiance en eUe. Elle ne peut dont etre d'aucune utilite pour regler le conflit d'Indonesie, et it faut mettre fin a son activite. A. la place de cette Commission, il faut ereer une nouveUe commission du Conseil de securite, douee de l'autorite necessaire et composee de representants de tous les Etats membres du. Conseil. I1 est d'autant plus necessaire de creer cette commission que les' Pays-Bas ont toujours viole, cyniquement et methodiquement, toutes les decisions du Conseil de securite et tous les accords qu'ils avaient conc1us precedemment avec le Gouvernement de la Republique. Le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas ne s'es'~ :on"; fOrnle a aucune dedsion du' Conseil de securite tendant a mettre fin aux operations militaires en Is it possible after that to trust the word of the Netherlands Government? What guarantee can there be that it will cease exterminating Indonesians fighting for their independence, and will keep its promise to withdraw its troops from Indonesian territory? What guarantee .can there be that it will not ignore the Security Council's decisions in the future as it has done in the past? N0 ~uch guarantees can be given. That is why, if the Security Council really wants to regulate the situation in Indonesia, it niust take into account the experience Of the past years and adopt a decision which will put an end~ once and for all, to Netherlands aggression in Indonesia and enable the Indonesian people to create its own independent democratic State. With those ends in view, the delegation pf the Ukrainian SSR is submitting the following draft resolution [S/1433] for the Security Council's consideration: {The Security Council, "With a view to regulating the position in Indonesia, "Deems it essential that the following measures be taken: ."I. As a first step, to withdraw the Netherlands forces to the positions occupied by them before the commencement of hostilities in December 1948; "2. To demand that the Netherlands Government release the Indonesian political prisoners and put an end to the campaign of terror waged by the Netherlands occupation authorities against the Indonesian people; . "3.' To propose the establishment of a United Nations Commission, composed'of representatives of. the States ~embers of the Security Council, which should observe the implementation of. paragraphs 1 and 2 above and also to investigate the activities of the Netherlands authorities which have' taken the form of brutal terrorism, murder and persecution of the democratic leaders of the Indonesian people; "4. To instruct the Commission to prepare, and submit to the Security Council within three months, proposals for the settlement of the conflict between the Netherlands and the Indonesian ~e'public on the basis of the recognition of the 1l1d~pendence and sovereign, rights of the IndoneSIan people; "5. To dissolve the United Nations Commisl?ion for Indonesia."

In view of'the fact that we have already had a; simultaneous interpretation of the last speech into French, I would ask the tt 8ft Peut-on, dans ces conditions, ajouter foi aux declarations du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas? Y a-t-il une garantie quelconque qu'il mettra fin a l'extermination des Indonesiens qui lutlent pour lenr independance,.et qu'il respectera sa promesse de retirer ses troupes d'Indonesie? Y a-t-il une garantie quelconque qu'il tiendra compte a l'avenir des decisions du Conseil de securite? De telles garanties n'existent pas. Si done le Conseil de securite desire vraiment regler le con£11t d'Indonesie, i1 doit tenir compte de l'experience des annees passees; il doit prendre une decision qui mette fin une fois pour toutes a l'agression neerlandaise en Indonesie et qui permette au peuple indonesien de creer un Etat democratique independant. Ac,=t effet, la delegation de1a RSS d'Ukraine presente au Conseil de'securite leprojet de resolution suivant [S/1433]: - . "En vue de retablir une situation normale en Indonesie, "Le Conseil de securite "Juge indispensable de prendre les mesures suivantes: "1. Comme premiere etape, retirer les troupes neerlandaises sur les positions qu'elles occupaient avant le commencement des operations militaires en decembre 1948; "2. Demander au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas de liberer les prisonniers politiques indonesiens et de mettre fin a la terreur,que les autorites neerlandaises d'occupation exercent contre lepeuple indonesien; "3. P):'oposer la creation d'une commission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies dont feraient p-artie les representants des Etats membr~s du Conseil de securite et qui serait chargee de veiller a l'execution des dispositions des paragraphes 1 et 2 d-dessus, ainsi que d'enqueter sUr l'activite desautorites neerlandaises, qui se manifeste par... une terreur cruelle, des assassinats et la, persecut!on des chefs democratiques dupeuple.indonesien; - "4. Charger la commission de preparer et' de presenter au Conseil de securite, dans un'delar de trois mois, des propositions relatives au reglement du conflit entre les Pays-Baset la Republique d'Indonesie, en partant du priricipe de la reconnaissance de l'independance et des droits~ouve­ rains du pettple indonesien; "5. Dissoudrela Commission des NationsUnies pour l'Indonesie." Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'angla.is) : Je voudrais demander au representant de 'la France, etantdomleque la dernlere intervent~on a fait M:r. CHAUVEL (Fr~nce) (translated from French) : If it is clearly understood that this does not create a precedent, I am quite ready to waive consecutive interpretation into French, especially since I think I have heard this speech before.

First of all, I wish to thank the representative of France for his consideration for the Security Council. I call upon the representative of Argentina on a point of order. Mr. .ARCE (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): I see that it is past 6 o'clock. A few moments ago I noticed the unedifying sight of a speech being interpreted into English and nobody listening to it. The conference room was empty and the Council table was also half empty. I do not believe the members of the Council can be asked to undergo that ordeal and I move 4- that the 'meeting should adjourn an.d that the dis'cussion should be continued later.

I am in the Security Council's hands as regards the question of adjournment, which is a motion that must be put to the vote without debate. However, I would observe merely that I have had requests from two speakers, one of whom is a ~ember of the Security Council and another member who is here by request, to make their speeches today. Therefore, I feel I must put the question of the adjournment of the meeting to the vote. A vote was ta·ken by show of hands, as follows: In favo,ur: Argentina. Against: Canada, China; France, Norway, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northeru Ireland. Abstaining: Cuba, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist RepUblics, United States of America. . .The motion for adjmtrnrnent was rejected by 5 votes to 1, with 4 abstentions. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan): The people and Government of Pakistan warmly welcome the settlement arrived at between the re.presentatives of the Netherlands and the people of Indonesia at The Hague. We respectfully en:- dorse the remarks made by the President and by the representative of Norway on the subject of the draft resolution which the President has proposed this afternoon to the Security Council. The Cot.l11cil has heard the representatives of the Netherlands and of Indonesia on the matter. Each has given the Council his own analysis of 't4e terms of the settlement. I would respectfully wish· to draw attention to what we heard from Mr. van Roijen on the subject. !Iere is the most unequivocal declaration on behalf of the , Netherlands delegation of the three salient features of this settlement. Mr. van Roijen says: M. CHAUVEL (France): S'il est bien entendu que cela ne cree pas un precedent, je suis tout dispose a renoncer a l'interpretation consecutive en francsais, et cela d'auta.Il;t plus que j'ai l'impression d'avoir deja entendu ce diseours. Le PRESIDENT (tradttit de l'anglais) : Tout d'abord, je desire remercier le representant de la France de sa deference envers le Conseil. Je donne la parole au representant de l'Argentine sur une motion d'ordre. M. ARCE (Argentine) (tradttit de respagnoZ) : Je vois qu'il est plus de 18heures. Nous venons d'avoir a l'instant un spectacle peu edifiant: personne n'a ecoute l'interpretation en anglais qui a ete donneei d'un disc.Jurs. La salle etait vide, et la table du Conseil etait ademi desertee elle aussi: I1 ne me semble pas possible de soumettre les membres da Conseil a ce veritable supplice; et je suggere de lever la seance et de poursuivre le debat une autre fois. Le PRESIDENT. (traduit de Z'anglais) : Je suis lie par le COllseil de securite en ce qui concerne l'ajournement; une proposition en ce sens doit etre mise aux voix sans discussion. Toute£ois, je voudrais simplement faire remarquer que deux 'orateurs, dont l'unest membre du Conseil de seeurite et dont l'autre est ici sur invitation, m'ont demande de prendre la parole aujourd'hui. Je me vois done dans l'obligation de mettre aux voix la proposition d'ajoumement. Vote pour: l'Argentine. .Votent contre: Canada, Chine, France, N01'- vege, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Ir- lande du Nord. S abstiennent: Cuba. Republique socialiste so- vietique d'Ukraine, Union des Republiques socia- listes sovietiques, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. Par 5 voiz contre une, a·vec 4 abstentions, la proposition d'ajournernent est rejetee. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) (traduit de l'anglais) : Le peuple et le Gouverne- ment du Pakistan accueillent chaleureusement l'accord intervenu a La Haye entre les represen- tants des Pays-Bas et les peuples de l'Indonesie. Nous souscrivons respectueusement aux observa- tions que le President et le representant de la Norvege ont formulees au sujet de ce reglement et a l'appui du projet de resolution que le Presi- dent a presentecet apres-midi au Conseil de securite. Le Conseil a entendu ace sujet les declarations des representants des Pays-Bas et de l'Indonesie. Chacun de ces representants a fait au Conseil son propre expose analytique des conditions de ce reglement. Je. voudrais attirer respectueusement l'attention du Conseil sur les declarations de M. van Roijen a ce.sujet. C'est la declaration Ja plus categorique formulee au nom de la delegation des Pays-Bas sur les trois caracteristiques prin- cipales du reglement. M. van Roijen a dit: I1 n'y a aucune reserve ni aucune tergiversation d'aucune sorte quant a l'oetroi d'une souverainete inconditionnelle, complete et reelle. Je cite encore: There is here no kind of reservation or equivo- cation with regard to the granting of uncon- ditional, complete and real sovereignty. I quote again: "En deuxieme lieu, pour les Pays-Bas comille pour l'Indonesie, nous croyons qu'en creant I'U- nion neerlando-indonesienne nous avons jete les bases solides d'une amitie durable, qui ne saurait manquer de se traduire a l'avantage mutuel des deux Etats parties a cette Union." "Secondly, we believe that in the Netherlands- Indonesian Union a firm basis has been laid for an enduring friendship which cannot fail to be {)f great mutual advantage to both the Nether- lands and Indonesia." C'est la le moyen d'instaurer, ·entre l'Odent et I'Occident, la seule sorte de cooperation qui puisse, en derniere analyse, assurer et maintenir la paix internationale. Cela veut dire que cette cooperation sera fondee sur l'egalite et la liberte completes. Ceux qui etaient jusqu'ici maitre et sujet, suzerain et vassal, seront desormais des amis, des associes, des egaux. I1 n'y aura nul exercice de l'autorite d'une part, nul sentiment, nulle marque d'inferiorite de l'autre. Enfin, M. van Roijen a ditdans sa declaration: , This would bring about between the East and the West co-operation of a character which alone, in the ultimate analysis, can assure and maintain international peace. That is to say that this co- operation will be on a basis of complete equality and freedom. Those who were hitherto ruler and ruled, dominant and subservient, will hence- forth be friends, partners and equals. There will be no exercise of authority on one side and no sense or mark of inferiority on the other. I again . quote from Mr. van Roijen's statement: "Thirdly, the world at large will have gained the benefit of peace and order in a very import- ant part of the globe, where peaceful progress can provide new safeguards against the forces which thrive on disruption and chaos." "En troisieme lieu, le monde tout entier y aura gagne de voir regner la paix et l'ordre dans une partie du globe tres importante, ou des progres pacifiques peuvent constituer de nouvelles garan- ties contre les forces qui prosperent dans les trou- bles et dans le chaos." Needless to say, that is a development which would be particularly gratifying to Pakistan and its people and to the other peoples and govern.:. ments in that region of the"world. Indeed, I may endorse the character of this settlement in the words of Mr. Herremans, who described it as marking "the end of a conflict, the solution of a problem, the birth of a nation and the foundation of a union". Est-il besoin de dire que c'est la un evenement qui repondrait tout specialement aux vceux du Pakistan et de son peuple, ainsi qu'aux autres peuples etgouvernements de cette region du monde? En verite, je caracteriserai ce reglement clans les termes de M. Herremans qui fa depeint comme "la fin d'un conflit, la solution d'un pro- bleme, la naiss'ance d'une nation et la fondation d'une union". The Council has also heard the assurances of the representative of Indonesia that those whom he represents are sa.tisfied that the settlement embodies a series of compromises and conces- sions which, nevertheless, constitute an uncon- ditional and irrevocable transfer of complete sovereignty. On their side, also, there is no doubt on that point. Le Conseil a, d'autre part, entendu le represen- tant de l'Indonesie donner l'assurance que ceux qu'il represente sont convaincus que ce reglement contient un ensemble de solutions transaction- nelles et de concessions qui constituent, neanmoins, un transfert inconditionnel et irrevocable de la souverainete totale. De leur cote non plus, it n'y a aucun doute sur cet aspect de la question. The United Nations Commission for Indo- nesia is o~ the same view: In chapter XII, para- graph 115, of its report to the Security Council, u.nder the heading "Conclusions", the Commis- sion says: La Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Indo- nesie partage la meme fac;on dei voir. Au para- graphe 115 du chapitre XII de son rapport a.u Conseil de securite, intitule "Conclusions". on lit : "The. Commission takes pleasure in reporting that,. in its judgment, the negotiations conducted at The Hague were eminently successful. The Commission is confident that as a result of the transfer of real, complete and unconditional sovereignty, the new relationship between the peoples of the Netherlands and - Indonesia can evolve to the mutual advantage of the partners of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union." "La Commission est heureuse de faire con- naitre qu'a son avis les negociations menees a La Haye ont ete couronnees d'un succestomplet. La Commission est convaincue qu'apres le trans- fert de la souverainete reelle, complete et ·incon..: ditionnelle, les nouvelles relations qui s'etabliront entre les populations des Pays-Bas et de l'Indone- sie evolueront a. l'avantage mutuel des membres de l'Union neerlando-indonesienne." ~e view the settlement with profound satis- !actlOn. We are conscious, however, that a' great (leal still remains to be done, both with regard I·' to the implementation of what has been achieved -W' ~ 11 • N~us accueillons ce reglement avec une pro- fonde satisfaction. Nous avons conscience toute- fois qu'il reste encore beaucoup a faire,. tant en ce qui concerne la mise en ceuvre de ce qui a ete Mr. 'tSIANG (China): The agenda which the ~, CounCil adopted at the beginning of this meeting requires that we should concentrate our discus- sion this afternoon on tile special report·and its appendices. That special report deals exclusively with the Round Table Conference at The Hague and the agreement~_reached there. As to events which preceded the Round .Table Conference, they are not· open for discussion this. afternoon. They represent a very long story;- and we have discussed them here many, m.any· times. . On several occasions my, delegation was highly . critical of the conduct of tlie Government of the NetherIands,but this afternoon we are here to discuss the Round Table Conference and the agreements reached there. As to this. matter, which is b~fore. us, my delegation has only praise for the three delegations which took part in that conference and for the United Nations Com- mission which helped to promote the agreements. My delegation wishes to associate itself with much of what was said at t~e beginning of the meeting by the President and with much of what was. said by the representative of Norway. This is indeed an occasion .for congratulations. It is one of success for the people of Indonesia and for the Government of·the .Netherlands, as' wen as for the United Nations. Before. I conclude I should like to. make two further remarks. The analysis of the Round Table Conference, as presented to us by the r~presentative of the Netherlands.. was a states- manlike pronouncement. I appreciate·.greatly the services which Mr. van Roijen has· rendered to the cause of peace. However, even in that state- ment, he reaffirmed the views of his delegation regarding this Council's competence in this matter. I.notice that the United Nations Commission played a very active role in the Round Table Conference. While I would not claim that the Commission was chiefly responsible for the suc- cess of the Conference, I think that it is agreed that the United Nations did contribute substan- tially to the. success of the C:onference. Finally, I should like to say a few words '.:vith· regard to the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Re- public and the speech which led to the submission of that resolut~on. I find that both the speech and the resolution are simply mischievous. I did not :find anything constructive either in the speecil or .in the reso- lution. So far as the speech is concerned - and it was a v~ry long speech - I disliked most· the slur which it tried to cast upon the leader of the Republican delegation, Mr. Hatta. There is no reason why this .Council should cast any slur upon Mr. Hatta. There is no question that he has served the interests of his country and his people well. He is a true patriot. Anybody here who casts a slur upon Mr. Hatta would do so only with a mischievous purpose. As to the resolution, I find that it is not constructive :on the contrary, it is, as I have just said, mischievous. The first operative clause deals with Witll- drawal of Netherlands forces. That problem has been settled, and settled very satisfactorily ana justly, in the agreements reached at The Hague. There is no reason why we should here undo that settlement. The second paragraph takes up the question of political prisoners. As soon as the transfer of sovereignty is made, that will become a ques- .tion to be dealt with by the Government of the United States of Indorlesia ----' it will not have to be dealt with by the Government of the Nether- lands-- and that transfer of sovereignty will Occur in a matter of days. There is.no reason why, at this moment, the Security Council . should pass· any .resolution at all dealing with the question of political prisoners. The resolution submitted by the Ukrainian SSR goes on to propose the establishment of a new United Nations commission. We have had a Commission there. China is· not ·represented on that Commission. In spite of that fact, Iacknow- ledge that the present Commission has done well. There is 'no reason why at this moment we should send a new commission there. There is every' reason for us to renew the mandate of the present Commission. S Enfin, je voudrais dire quelques mots au sujet du projet de resolution qu'a presente la delega- tion de la Republique socialiste sovietique d'Ukraine et du discours a la suite duquel ce projeta ete presente. A mon avis, le discours, et aussi le projet de resolution, sont tout simplement malfai_sants; je n'y trouve rien de construetif. En ce qui concerne le discours - qui etait fort long - le passage oit ron cherche a .porter atteinte a la reputation de M. Hatta, chef de la delegation republicaine, m'a particuIierement choque. It n'y a auctule raison pour que le Conseil porte atteinte a la reputation de M. Hatta. Nul ne saurait contester qu'll rend de grands services a son pays et a son peuple. I1 est un vrai patriote. Quiconque porte ici atteinte a la reputation de M. Hatta ne pe\'.tt avoir que des intentions malveiIlantes. En ce qui concerne le projet de resolution, je ne lui trouve aucun carac- tere constructif: au contraire, it est,comme je l'aidit, malfaisant. Le paragraphe premier du dispositif a pour objet le tetrait des troupes neerlandaises~ Cette question a deja ete reglee, d'une fac;ontres satis- faisante et equitable, dans les accotds conc1us a La Haye. Le Conseil ne doit pas de£aire ce qui a ete fait. . Le par.agraphe 2 du prbjctconcerne -la question des prisonniers politique.Des que le transfert de la souverainete sera accompli, cequi aura Heu dans quelques jours, c'est au Gouvernement des Etats-Unis· d'Indonesie, et non pas au Gouveme- ment des Pays-Bas, qU'if appartiendra de regler cette question. Le Conseil de securite n'aa:acune raison d'adopter une resolution concernant les prisonniers politiques. Le projeti de resolution de la RSS d'Ukraine propose ensuite la creation d'une nouvelle com- mission des NationsUnies. Nous avons deja eu un.eCommission .en Indonesie. La Chine n'y est pas representee. Neanmoins, je re.comiais que cette Commission a fait ceuvre utile. L'envoi en Indonesie d'une nouvelle commission n'est nulle.,. ment justifie ence moment. Au contraire, tout nous poussea renouve1er le mandat de la Com- missionactuelle. <' La seance est levee d 18 h. 40. FRANCE Editions A. 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