S/PV.457 Security Council

At the suggestion of the Secretariat, I should like to make one small alteration in the provisional agenda: to delete the word "and" in the last line of paragraph 2(a) and to add, at the end of that line, the words "and Sj1430jAdd.3". 3. The India-Pakistan question The PRESIDEN1:: On behalf of the Security Council, I should like to welcome the members of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. -'1 aIll! b Cm T ' ',~~.• .•• , QUATRE CENT CINQUANTE- SEPTIEME SEANCE Tenue a Lake Success, New-York, le sgmedi 17 decemb1'e 1949, a 11 heures. President: le general McNAUGHTON (Canada). Presents: Les representants des pays suivants: Argentine, Canada, Chine, Cuba, Egypte, France, Norvege, Republique socialiste sovietique d'Ukrai- ne, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. 1. Ordre du jour provisoire (SjAgenda 457) 1. Adoption de I'ordre du jour. 2. Question Inde-Pakistan: a) Lettre, en date du 5 decembre 1949, adres- see au Secretaire general des Nations Unies par le President de la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Inde et le Pakistan pour lui presenter le troisieme rapport, provisoire de la Commission (Sj1430, S/1430jAdd.l et Sj1430j Add.2). 2. Adoption de l'o~dre .Iu jour Le PRESIDENT (traduit, de l'a1zglais): Sur le conseil du Secretariat, je pro~,ose d'apporter une lI~gere modification a I'ordre du jour provisoire, i savoir, de supprimer le mot "et" clans la der- niere ligne du para'; :lphe 2 a et d'ajouter a la suite decette ligne ics mots "et Sj1430jAdd.3". 3. I"a question Inde-Pakistan Sur l'invitation dtt Pr~sident, Sir BenegCll N. Rau) representant de l'Inde,et Sir M ohammad Z«frulla Khan, representant dzt Pakistan, pren~ nent place a la table du Conseil de secttrite. Le PRESIDENT (trad'uit de l'anglcds) : Au noni du Conseil de securite, je tiens. a souhaiter la bienvenue aux membres de la Commission des N ~tions Unies pour l'Inde et le Pakistan. Mr. SAMPER (Chairman of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan): I am honoured to represent the United Nations Com- mission for India and Pakistan before the Security Council and, on behalf of the Commi&- sion, I wish to express our appreciation for the Council's reception. The members of the Security Council will recall that, when the Council received the Com- mission in Paris in November 1948 [38200 meet- ••ing], conversations were underway looking towards an a "eement between the Governments of India and .t:'akistan on the principles relating to a free and impartial plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and that the result of these conversations was subsequently embodied in the Commissi9-tJ.'s resolution of 5 Ja11ua1"Y 1949 [S/1196, 'paragraph 15]. The Security Cotmcil is aware that the Govern- ments of India and Pakistan, on their own initia- tive and before the Commission had reached the Sub-Continent again, made the cease-fire order effective as of 1 January 1949. The Commission is pleased to report that the high· commands of the Indian and Pakistan Armies made every effort to avoid ;ncidents and violations of the cease-fire during th~ very diffi~:ult time when no line as such existed, and that it was due largely t.o their attitude of conciliation and understand- ing that the military conference in Karachi in July of this year .led to the agreement on a line. The task of demar~ating the line was achieved thtough the assh;tance of United Nations military observers under the Commission's military ad- vis(~r. The immediate and vital objective of the Set~l1rity Council-,-namely, the cessation of hos- tilities in the State of Jammu and Kashmir-has tnlllS not only peen achieved, but ensured, through the co-operation and the good will Of the two Governments. . The Commission, unfortunately, cannot ~!lform the Security Council that substantial progress has heen made in the implementation of t!;te succeed- Jug parts of the Commission's resolutions of 11 August 1948 [S/1100,[Jc.ra;graph75]and 5 Jan- uary 1949. After eight months of negotiations, .the Commission has deemed it advisable, having in mind the import~nce of continuing an active 1riOV~l1~t. towards a solution of the· problem, to , refer the matter back to the Security-Council. WebeHeve, thut the pa.entbody will 1110rl.l easily M. SAMPER (President de la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Inde et ie Pakistan) (tt'aduit de l'anglais): Je sui5 tres honore de representer au Conseil de securite la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Inde et le Pakistan, et je tiens a remercier le Conseil, au nom de la Commission, de l'accueil qu'il nous a reserve. Le CO!:lseil de securite n'a pas oublie que, lorsqu'n a accueilli la Commission a Paris, en novembre 1948 [382eme seance], les Gouverne- ments de nnde et du Pakistan avaient entrepris des pourparlers pour essayer d'aboutir a un accord sur les principes qui devaient regir un pll~biscite libre et impartial dans l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire; it se rappelle aussi que, par la su~te. les resultats de ces pourparlers ont ete consignes dans la resolution de la Commission en date du 5 janvier 1949 [S/1196, paragrctphe 15]. Le Conseil n'ignore pas que les Gouvernements de l'Inde et du Pakistan ont, de leur propre . initiative, et avant mfune le retour de la Commis- siDn sur ·les lieux, execute, des le 1er janvier 1949, l'ordi"e de cesser le feu. La Commission est hel1reuse de signaler que les ha' Lts commande- ments des armees de I'Inde et du Pakistan n'ont rien neglige pour eviter les incidents et les viola- tions de la suspension d'armes pendant la periode ;:res difficile ou il n'existait pas encore de ligne de demarcation; eUe a egalement plaisir a souli- gner que c'est surtout grace al'attitude conciliante et comprehensive de ces hauts commandements que la conference militaire qui s'est tenue a Karachi au mois de juillet de cette annee a pu aboutir a un accord sur le trace d'c.me ligne de demarcation. Le travail de demarcation propre- ment dit a ete effectue, sur le terrain, avec l'aide des observateurs militaires des Nations Untes et sous la haute direction du conseiller militaire de la Commission. Ainsi, non seulemerit l'objectif immediat et essentiel du Conseil de securite - it savoir, la ces~ation des hostiliteR dans I'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire - a ete atteint, mais encore la stabilite de l'etat de choses actuel est garantie par la comprehension et la bonne volonte des deux gouvernements interesses. La Commission n'est malheureusement pas a J~.;f'!:; d'annoncer au Conseil de securite que des ul."O",res l' ~ables aient ete realises dans la mise en ;.: ·1.V"'.' des autres parties des resolutions de la (.smmissicl11dti 13 a6itt 1948 [S/1100, para[jrapJie- ..- 7.:7] et du 5 j~nvier 1949, Apres huitmois. de fJ.(~gociations, 'la Commission, consciente qa'il importe de ne pas cesser de faire d'actifs efforts pour resoudre le probleme, croit ,devoir renvoyer la question au Conseil Qe securite. Elle estime, en effet, que cet organe superieur trouvera·.plus ,~ The Commission's thir' interim report [S/1430 Voila plusieurs jOllrs que les membres d!l atld S/1430j Add.1 and Add.2] has been before Conseil de securite ont en mains le troisieme members of the Security Council for several rapport provisoire de la Commission [S/1430. days now, and I do not believe it will be necessary' S/1430jAdd.l et S/1430/Add.2] et je crois qu'il to take up the time of the Council by going into est inutile d'abuser du temps du Conseil en me a lengthy expose of its contents. Membfors of lan~ant dans un expose detaille du contenu de ce the Council are aware that, throughout eight rapport. Le Conseil sait que, pendant huit mois, months, the Commission endeavoured to mediate la Commission s'est efforcee d'ecarter les obstacles the differences which existed in the way of imple- qm s'oPP'osaient ala mise en ceuvre de la partie II menting part II of the first resolution dealing de la premiere resolution relative a la treve, qui with the truce and principally concerned with the traitait principalement du retrait des troupes withdrawal of troops [S/1100, paragraph 75]. ISjll0q, paragraphe 75]. La Commission est The Commission maintained direct contact with demeuree en contact direct avec chacun des deux the two Governments individually in New Delhi gouvernements, ce1ui de New-Delhi et celui de and in Karachi. It instituted sub-committees. It Karachi. Elle a cree des sous-commissions. Elle drafted truce terms of its own, which were pre- a elabore elle-meme des couditiovs de treve qU'elle sented to the two Governments and which, in a soumises aux deux gouvernements et qu'elle a the light of the response of the two Governments, ensuite modifiees, en tenant compte des reponses were modified in so far as this was possible, keep- de ces deux gouvernements, dans la mesure ou ing in mind the fram~work and' the principles c~la etait possible sans perdre de vue les idees which were our guides. The Commission also dlrectrices et les principes dont elle devaits'ins- suggested a joint political meeting with the two pirer. La Commission a egalement propose aux Governments for the purpose of reachingagl'~e- deux gouvernements de se reunir avec elle en ment on the truce i this meeting was subsequently conference politique commune, en vue d'es!;ayer cancelled by the Commission.· Finally, in a last d'aboutir a U.~l accord sur la treve; la Commission endeavour, the Commission asked the two Gov- a dti cependant, par la suite, renoncer a cette ernments if they would be willing to submit to reunion. Enfin, dans un derniet effort, la Com- arbitration the differences arising behveen them mission a demande att.-..:deux gouvemements s'ils .as regards the implementation of part II of the accepteraient de soumettre a l'arbitrage les diver- resolution of 13 AUgi.tst 1948. gences de vues qui les separent quant a la mise en ceuvre de la name II de la resolution du 13 aotit 1948. ~ The third interim report endeavours to set forth objectively, impartially and comprehensivel}" the reasons for the unsuccessful outcome of the negotiations, which cover the period from Feb- rua.ry to September 1949. It has been the· Com- mission's intention to show how the strict letter of previous commitments has become more and more rigid in a changing and dynamic situation,· and. how questions which, in the light oiwe over-all problem and of the objective pursued by the two Governments and by the United Nations in the dispute, might be considered as of lesser importance have, in fact, impeded positive action on the part of the two Governments, in spite of their desire to proceed to a settlement. Dans son troisieme rapport provisoire, la Commission s'efforce d'exposer avec objectivite et impartialite, et de fa<;on tres detaillee, les raisons pour lesquelles les negociations qui se sont poursuivies de fevrier a septembre 1949 n'ont pas abouti. La Commission a entendu montrel", d'une part, comment l'observation stricte et a la lettre d'engagements anterieurs fait de plus en plus obstacle a un accord, alol's Que la situation est en evolution constante; d'au~re part, comment des questions qui - si 1'6n considere l'ensemble du probleme et le but auquel aspirent, dans ce differend, les deux gouvernements et -l'Organisation des Nations Unies - sont d'impor- tance secondaire, ont, en fait, contrarie toute action positive de la part des deux gouvernements, malgre le desir de ceux-ci d'aboutir a un reglement. The facts of the ca.s~e are clear. The main issues stand well defined. The Commission be- lieves that three of these issues are the most import~nt:first, the withdrawal of troops from ~he State, which is essential for the creation of conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite; secondly, and closely linked, the disposal of the. Azad Kashmir forces in the western part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir; and thirdly, the administration and. defence of the northern areas of the State. t~oisiemement, ·l'administration et la de£ense des regions septentrionales· de l'Etat. Nous esperonsque les observati0nsqui ont ete inspirees a la COn'Unission pat l'~xPerienc~per­ mettront des mesuresttltei'ieures, SOl1S les auspic~s de l'Organisatiou des Nations Unies et avec·ia • With this information at hand, gathered from the past experience of the Commission it is our hOJ:e that fu.tpre action under the auspices of the Untted Natmne and with the co-operation of Les faits sont nettement 61:ablis. Les questions essentielles sont bien definies. La Commission estime que les trois questions lesplus importantes sont les suivantes.:.premierement, leretrait des ~roupes de l'Etat.condition indisnensable a l'org~isation d'uu",plebiscite libre ef impartial; deuxlemement, la question du .sort des forces Cachemire Az,;J qui se trouventdans la zone occidel?"ale de l'Etat de Jammuet Cachemire question etroitement liee a la .precedente;.enfin: I have the privilege formally to present for th~ consideration of members of the Security Council the third interim report of the United Nations Cpmmission for India and Pakistan. The report was prepared in Geneva and was signed there by four of the ·five members: the repre- , sentatives of Argentina, Belgium, Colombia and • the United States of .l\l11erica. The representative of Czechoslovakia reserved his position at the time of discussion of the report until a later date. At a meeting of the Commission held yesterday afternoon at Lake Success, the representative' of Czechoslovakia presented his delegation's minority views [S/1430jAdd.3]. Before concluding these brief remarks, may I express the Commission's gratitude to the Govern- ments of India and Pakistan for the courtesy, con- sideration and warm hospitality which they have extended to the Commission during its stay on the Sub-Continent. We are convinced that both Governments wish to find a peaceful and a final solution of this dispute and that it is the intention of the Governments of India and Pakistan to con- tinue to co-operate with the United Natiol1s for this purpose. The Commission and its Rapporteur, the Bel- gian representative, of course remain' at the dis- .posal of the Security Council and its President. Mr. SUNDE (Norway) : First of all, I should like to compliment Mr. Samper on his lucid ex- position of the work of the United Nations Com- mission for India and Pakistan. His statement well supplements the Commission's excellent report of 5 December. I believe that I repres~Ilt the general feeling of the Security Council when I praise the COlIllPission f01'it5 repor.:. It is succinct, yet complete and comprehensive, and testifies clearlyto the unwavering effort of the Commission to· carry out its difficult and pressing task in a spirit: of fairness and impartiality which does credit not only to the Commission itself but also to the United Nations. Nevertheless, the nlost important part of the Kashmir problem stml'emains unsolved. Let us not, however" forget the very i"ea! progress that has be.en achieved by· tb~ COttID:;i;ssion. There is , no more fighting., -A· !:eas(~-tlje line has been drawn\andagreed to 1.y the {:'P~Oll-ing partie~. J'ai I'honneur de soumettre officiellement a l'ex.amen du Conseil de securite le troisieme rapport provisoire de la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Inde et le Pakistan. Ce rapport a ete prepare a Geneve et y a ete signe par quatre des cinq membres de la Commission, a savoir les representcl.tlts de I'Argentine, de la Belgique, de la Colombie et des Etats-Unis d'Amerique. Lors de la discussion du rapport, le representant d~ la Tchecoslovaquie a provisoirement reserve son attitude. A la reunion que la Commission a tenue hier apres-midi a Lake Success, ce repre- sentant a expose le point- de vue minoritaire de sa delegation [Sj1430jAdd.3]. Avant de terminer ce bref expose.. je me permets d'assurer les Gouvernements de l'Inde et du Pakistan de la reconnaissance de la Commis- sion pour la courtoisie dont ces gouvernements ont faitpreuve envers dIe durant son sejour dans la sous-continent, ainsi que pour les egards dont elle y a ete 1'0bjet et I'hospitalite qu'elle y a re~ue. Nous sommes persuades que ces gouvernements tiennent tous deux. it aboutir a une solution pacifique et definitive du diffcrend aetuel et qu'ils ont l'intention de continueI' it collaborer, it cette fin, avec I'Organisation des Nations Unies. Bien entendu, I.aCommission et son Rapporteur, le representant de la Belgique, se tiennent a I'entiere disposition du Con::;cil de securite et de son President. M. SUNDE (Norvege) (traduit de l'anglais): Tout d'abord, je tiens a feliciter M. Samper de l'expose lucide qu'il vient de faire de l'activite de la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Inde et le Pakistan. Sa declaration complete de la maniere la plus heureuse l'excellent r~pport de la Commission en date du 5 decembre 1949. Je crois tradurre les sentiments du Conseil de secu- rite en faisant l"eloge du rapport.de la Commis- sion. I1 est succinct et cependant complet et temoigne clairement de l'effort incessant qu'a deploye la Commission en vue des'acquitter de sa tache ardue et urgente clans un esprit d'equite et d'impartialite qui fait honneur, non s~ulement it la Commission elle-meme, mais· aussi a l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Neanmoins, l'essentiel. de ia question du Cachemire reste sans. solution. N'oubIions pas, cependant, les progres tangibles .realises •par la C'>mmission. Lescombats ont cesse. Ulle ligne de demarcation a ete traceeet acceptee par les deux parties en presence. -Cela, ensoi, n'est deja pas Il ne servirait a rien, toutefois, de pretendre ignorer que la route dans laquelle I'Organisation des Nations Unies s'etait engagee, avec l'espoir de voir aboutir son effort de mediation, s'est reveIee sans issue. Il me semble Que n~eure est venue de notlS arreter pour faire -le point de la situation; je me demande s'il ne serait pas possible de trouver quelque nouvelle technique, d'aborcler le probleme sous un angle nouveau qui permettrait de repondre a. la necessite d'une solution et aux vceux- ardents des parties en presence, e!1 les concretisant dans l'accord definitif espere de taus. Je doute sincerement Qu'il soit utile de ressasser a. nouveau au ConseiC de securite les questions multiples et complcpces qui sont en jeu en l'occur- rence. De simples suggestions, lorsqu'elles sont presentees au Conseil de securite, deviennent rapidement des opinions fermement ancrees, et les arguments exposes dans la chaleur de la discussion ont tendance a. se parer trop vite de tous les attributs du prestige national. Peut-etre, neanmoins, une discussion de ce genre se revelera- t-elle ulterieurement necessaire. Mais ne vaudrait- il pas mieux commencer par exolorer d'autres possibilites, d'autres voies, ou, s'11 m'est permis de m'exprimer franchement, un raccourci? It serves no purpose.. however, to close our eyes to the fact that an impasse has been reached on the main avenue along which the mediation effort of the United Nations has so fal progressed. It seems to me that the time has come to stop and take new bearings, and I am wondering whether some new te~hnique or approach might 110t be. found by which the need and earnest desire of the parties for a solution could be translated into the final agreement for ,vhich we are all hoping. I frankly doubt the utility of threshing out again in the Security Council the manifold and complex issues which are at stake in this case. Tentative suggestions swiftly become un- alterable opinions when they are expressed in this Council, and arguments advanced in the heat of discussion have a tendency to become vested \vith the habiliments of national prestige. Such a discussion might yet become necessary. But would it not be better first to explore another approach, another avenue, or-let me Sfty frankly -a short cut? Vie have this 1110nth as our President the repre- .sentative of a country which is closely related to both the parti<::s by ihe ties of friendship and common interest which prevail in the Common- wealth of Nations. Our President possesses also to an eminent degre.e the authority, as well as the broad-minded impartiality so necessary for the reconciliation of opposing points of view. It is my suggestion, therefore, that the President should meet informally with the two parties and e..'Camine with them the possibility of finding a ffiutuaUy satisfactory basis for dealing with the Kashmir problem. This procedure was adopted at various times during the first four months of 1948 and led to the Council's resolution of 21 April of the same year [S/726]. Nous avons ce mois-ci pour President le repre- .sentant d'un pays etroitement lie aux deux parties par les sentiments d;amitie et l'interet commun qui unissent les pays du Commonwealth. Notre President possede egalement, a. un haut degre, i'autorite, l'impartialite et la largeur d'esprit si necessaires pour condlier des points de vue opposes. Je propose done Que le President ait des entretiens officieux avec les representants des deux parties et examine avec eux la possibilite de rechercher, dans cette question du Cachemire, une base de discussion qui soit acceptable pour les deu~ parties..Cette procedure a ete adoptee a. plusleurs reprIses, au cours des quatre premiers mois de 1948, et a determine la resolution du Conseil du 21 avril de la meme annee [S/726] . By adopting this suggestion we should also, in my opinion, take full advantage of the fact that Pakistan and India are represented at the head- quarters of the United Nations by such eminent statesmen and diplomats as Sir Mohammad Za- frulla Khan and Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, who have no. superiors and few equals in the art of negotiation and conciliation. A mOn avis, en adoptant cette proposition, nous .mettrons pleinement a. profit le fait que le Pakistan et l'Inde sont representes au siege des Nations Unies par des bommes d'Etat et des diplomates aussi eminents que. Sir MOhall1111a-d' Zafrulla Khan et Sir Girja ShankarBajpai, qui n'ont point de maitres et peu d'egaux clans l'art de la negoci,ation et de la conciliation. . . In conclusion, may I say that if my suggestion Pour concIure, permettez-moi d'ajouter que si ma proposition est adoptee, nous demanderons'au President de soumettre au Conseil de securite toute proposition qui pourrait resulter de ses entretiens avec les deux parties. 1S adopted we should request ~he President to r~port .bact.<: to the Security Council for its con- sld~ratlOn any proposal which might develop durmg his meetings with the parties. Sir A1exander CADOGAN (United Kingdom): Sir Aler ~o.r CADOGAN (Royaume-Uni) In the first place I should like to endorse warmly (tmduit de '·;<flais): Je voudraistoutd'abord what has. been said by the speaker who pre- m'associer chaleureusement a. l'hommage. que ceded me 111 tribute to the Commission and to its l'orateur qui m'a precede a rendu ala Commissibn report. It seems to me that the members of the et a son rapport. Il semble que lesmemhres de <;ommission have done. a very excellent,conscien- la Commission aient accompli un travail excellent, tlOUS and useful work, of :which we may take consciencieux et extremement utile, .dont nolL,<; .advantage. . I pouvons tirer profit~ ~~~~-"~~ accept~ la mission qu'on lui propose, et si les parties, comme j'en suis convaincu, acceptent egalement la proposition faite, eUe est susceptibk~ de donner d'exceUents resultats.. As the representative of Norway has pointed Ainsi que le representant de la Norvege l'... fait out, that does not derogate in any way from the observer, cette procedure ne porte aucunement powers of the Security Council. It does not atteinte aux prerogatives du ConseH. Elle ne remove the matter in any way from its purview; soustrait nuUement la question a. sa juridiction; it merely prepares the work for it in the most e1le ne fait que preparer, de la maniere la plus efficient manner possible. Naturally, every pro- efficace possible, la tache du Conseil. Bien posal will come back to the Council for sub- entendu, toute proposition eventueUe devra etre mission and final decision. The Council remains soumise au Conseil, aqui appartiendra la decision master of the proceedings. But I do think that finale. Le Conseil reste maitre de la conduite de the procedure that has been proposed by the repre- l'affaire. Mais je reste persuade que la procedure sentative of Norway would conduce best to a proposee par le representant de la Norvege est •' satisfactory and, I should hope, a rapid agree- la meilleure a suivre pour abol,ltir a un accord ment, and if it is agreed that that procedure satisfaisant et - on peut l'esperer - rapide, et, should be tried it will have, I am sure, our si le Conseil decide d'adopter cette procedure, very best wishes for its success. nous ferons les meilleurs vreux pour son succes. Mr. CHAUVE~ (France) (translated from I .M. CHAUVEL (France): Je tiens a m'associer French) : I wish to support whole-heartedly both tres chaudement aux eloges qui ont ete adresses the Norwegian and the United Kingdom repre- a la Commission, a son rapport et a son Rappor- sentative's feelings in regard to the Commission, teur, tant par le representant de la Norvege que its report and its Rapporteur. I also wish to par le representant du Royaume-Uni. Je tiens support-quite as whole-heartedly-the sugges- egalement a m'associer - et tres chauden'lent tion that the President should himself undertake aussi - a la suggestion qui a ete faite suivant to hold conversations with the parties in an en- laqueUe le President se chargerait lui-meme de deavour to find means of settling the question. I mener des conversations avec les parties pour am convinced that this would be the procedure essayer de degager les elements d'un reglement most likely to result in finding and preparing a de cette affaire. Je suis convaincu que cette proce- settlement, and I am equally, convinced that no dure est natureUement la plus propre a faciliter one is better qualified than the President to carry la recherche et l'elaboration d'un reglement et je it out and make the most of the fortunate pres- suis convaincu egalement que nd n'est plus qua- ence here of the. most highly qualified repl"esen- lifi6 que le President pour la conduire et pour . tatives of the two countries concerned. I there- tirer le meilleur parti de l'occasion favorable fore support very strongly the suggestion of the qu'offre la presence id des representants les pIns Nox:wegian representative, and hope that the qualifies des deux pays interesses. C'est par President will accept it. consequent avec beaucoup d'insistance que je m'associe a la suggestion du repliesentant de la Norvege. ]'espere que le President voudra bien l'accepter.

In response to the suggestion Le PRESIDENT (tradttit de l'anglais): Pour made by the representative of Norway and suprepondre a la suggestion dl.! representant de la ported so graciously by the representatives of the Norvege, appuyee si favorablement par les repre- United Kingdom and France, I wish to say that sentants du Royaurne-Uni et de la France, je- I am more than happy to place my services at tiens a declarer que je serai heureux de me the dispo,sal of the Council for the purpose they mettre a la disposition .du Conseil aux fins qui have indicated,.namely, that with the consent of ont ete definies, a savoir que, avec l'assentiment the Council I should seek to traverse the ground du ConseH. je m'efforcerai par des contacts perand the information which is available personally I ':J:1ileh avec les representants de l'Inde et dtt ¥.dth the representatives of India and Pakistan, ~ Pt;;;:;'t:::r2 l:l'explorer le terrain et d'etudier la .and then to. endeavour to present to this Council I,'. ~.'_.:(.l1.'il'X; cation dont on dispose afin de pouvoir ~ome propos~. which is mutually satisfactory to ,r'o'csp,te" au Conseil une proposition qui soit thetw? pa~es concerned and which might comsati:;io.~::>ante pour les deux parties interessees et mend Itself In due course to the Council. qui-puisse, en temps utile, etre recommandee att , Consei!. Needless. to say, I feel greatly honoured by Je n'ai pas besoin d'ajouter que je me sense the suggestion which has been made and I am tres honore pat la proposition qui a ete faite et most happy to have this opportunity to serve, que je suis heureux, d'une part, de saisir l'occa~ as I hope I may, the two members of the Common.,. sion qui m'est·offerte de me rendre utile, comme wealth, India and Pakistan, and also' to be of .je l'espere, a deux metnbres du Commonwealth" Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from R1~$sian): I think the Secl.<rity Council ought to give a hearing to the parti<:s. The it7m on our agenda is the India-PakIstan questton. We have heard today only a three-minute statement by the Chairman of the Commission. We should heal' the parties, acquaint ourselves with the situation at first hand and only then make a decision on this question of .procedure, the purpose of which is, in effect, to find ways and means of settling the dispute. Befor~ we reach the stage of trying to find means of settling the dispute between India and Pakistan. all members of the Council should hear the' parties represented here,' so as to have the necessary grasp of the substance of the question and not base themselves only on the Commission's report. Only then, I think, shall we be able to consider tll(" question raised here in connexion with the Norwegian relJresentative's proposal. Naturally we are all anxious to save time, but the Security Council should not reduce the time of discussion to nothing at all. I would therefore consider it more appropriate if we heard the parties before doing anything else. Afterwards we might resume consideration of this procedural question. Actually, it is not even a procedural proposal so much as a proposal regarding the form which the Council's work should take or the way in which the Council should approach the' problem. Those are the doubts which I have on this matter. The .PRESIDENT: I have listened most atten- Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'angla.is): .J'ai tively to the remarks of the representative of ecoute attentivement les observations du reprethe Soviet Union. I &11ould like to caIl his attensentant de l'Union sovietique. Je voudrais tout tinn, in the first instance. to the fact that the .d'abord attirer son attention sur le fait que j'ai Chair had already declared the proposal adopted. deja declare la proposition adoptee. Je voudrais Secondly, I should also like to remind the repreegalement rappeler au r:epresentant de l'Union sentative of the Soviet Union that the represovietique que les representants de I'Inde et du sentatives of India and Pakistan are seated at Pakistan siegent a ce Conseil et qu'ils ont eu this table and that they had every opportunity toute 0PP0r1:unite de prendre la parole s'ils le speak if they had so wished. In consequence, T desiraient. En consequence, je considere la consider the matter is closed, and I now propose question regIee, et je propose maintenant d'ajourto adjourn the meeting. ner la seance. Mr..TSARAPIUN (Union of Soviet Socialist M. TSARAPKINE (Unian des Republiques RepublIcs) (translated from R1tssimt) : When I socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe) : Je asked to speak, the President had not yet made tiens a preciser tout d'abord que, lorsque j'ai any ruling on this question. Thll,!: is my first demande la parole, le President l" 'avait pas encore pOInt. pris de decision. . Secondly, the point at issue is not only whether En second Iieu, i1 s'agit, lion seulement .de the representatives of the parties wish to speak, savoir si les representants des parties venlent but also whether the members of·the Council wish prendre la parol,;;" :.uais aussisi les' membres du to hear thezp. . Conseil desirent les entendre. 0 Some members of the Council such as the Certains membres clu Conseil, notamment les , representatives of Norway~ France ~nd the United representants de laNorv~geJ de la France et clu ~: stated the~ o~ini:n.:"",:..._R...o...y_::~:~~:!i, ee sont de!~~r~no.~ces aC:!~:ltj~.·, M. TSARAPKINE (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (trad1tit du russe) : I1 me semble que le Conseil de securite devrait tout de meme entendre les representants des parties interessees. C'est la ouestion Inde-Pakistan qui figure a l'ordre du jour. Le Conseil n'a entendu que le President de la Commission qui a fait une declaration de trois minutes. 11 faudrait donc entendre les parties elles-memes exposer la situation. C'est alors seulement que le Conseil pourrait se pronOllcer sur cette question de procedure qui consiste a trouver des methodes permettant de regler le differend. . Mai:;, a ~'ant de parvenir a cette phase, avant de rechercher les methodes propres a regler le differend qui a surgi entre I'Inde et le Pakistan, tous les membfes du Conseil devraient entendre les representants des parties, qui assistent aux debats; ensuite, its pourraient examiner cette question quant au fond, et non pas seulement sur la foi du rapport de la Commission. Cela permettrait au Conseil d'ex...miner e:ette question qui a surgi a la suite de la proposition qu'a falte le representant de la Norvege. Bien entendu, nous aimerions tous gagner du temps; toutefois it ne faut pas que le COllseil de securite reduise a neant le temps np.<:essaire a la discussion. Je croisdollc qu'il conviend~it d'entendre tout d'abord les representantsdes parties. Ensuite, le Conseil pourra revenir a. l'e.'<:amen de cette proposition de procedure. D'ailleurs, it ne s'agit pas tant d'une proposition de procedure que d'une proposition pllrtant sur les methodes de travail du Conseil de securite, sur la fa~on dont il doit aborder la solution de ce probleme. Tels sont les doutes qui me sont venus a l'idee. I do not know why we have to adopt this particular method of examining the question, i.e.) entrust the matter to the President without discussing it in full Council. So far, I have no views on whether the President should be instructed to consult with the parties and acquaint us with his views later on. I have formed no opinion on this matter. I cannot form an opinion until \\ -: have discussed the matter-'---in other words, antil we have heard the parties. We really cannot adopt such a decision all at once without hearing the parties. I feel such a procedure would be most unusual and perhaps even improper. ..

I would again remind the representative of the Soviet Union that the representatives of the two parties are sitting at this Council table, and that they have every right to ask to be permitted to speak at any time they may wish. I also would remind him t.hat, according to the custom of the Security Council, thE representatives of the parties will also be present at our future meetings so that there will be full' opportunity for them to take part in the debate on any occasion and to any extent they may wish. I take it that the remarks of the representative of the Soviet Union are tantamount to challenging the conclusions which we have reached, and I think, therefore, that the first step we should properly take, instead of having the suggestion which was made to us by the repr:esentative of Norway adopted hy consent, is to put it to the vote. Accordingly, we shall now vote on the suggestion which has been made by the representative of Norway.