S/PV.466 Security Council

As in previous meetings, we shall have the benefit of simultaneous interpretation of the .statements made by the parties to the problem under discussion. cours des séances précédentes, le Conseil utilisera l'interprétation simultanée pour les déclarations que les parties en cause ont In my first speech [463rd meeting] I indicated that ail our present difficulties have arisen because of the invasion of Kashmir, by which 1 mean the State of Jammu and Kashmir, by Pakistan troops and their unlawful tivities in the State in the way of building up disruptive forces ml administrations. 1 have listened to the representative of Pakistan patiently and with t.l}e utmost attention, but 1 have been unable to see how he justifies the invasion (lf the State or the subsequent activities the Pakistan ..rm). He read out to us [464th meeting] an appraisal :.JÎ the Kashmir situation by General Gracey, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, dated April 1948. The representative of Pakistan stated that it was upon the recommendations of the Commander-in- Chief that Pakistan felt it necessary to send its army into Kashmir. Let us briefly consider what those recommendations wer~. I shaH first quote from the Commander-in-Chief's summary of deà.uctions, paragraph (f); "An easy victory of the Indian Army in any of the above-mentioned sectors, particularly in the MuzafIarabac;l area, is aImost certain to arouse the anger of the tribesmen against Pakistan for its failure to render them more direct assistance, and might weIl cause them to turn against Pakistan." 1 invite special attention to the words "more direct assistance". This is a most damagh.:g admission, proving that, in spite of the protestations of the represcntative Pakistan here, Pakistan was in fact rendering the tribesmen, even before 20 April 1948, sorne kind of assistance, direct or indirect. The Commander-in-Chief was recommending that the assistance should take a more direct form. This is conclusive proof that India's complaint to the Security Council in January 1948 [Sj628]l was completely true. The representative of Paldstan twitted me upon my use of the quaint phrase that the complaint had "become true".. In view of the proof which he has now himself furnished, I am able to dispense with that quaint phrase and say that "the complaint has been proved to be true". 1 For the texts of the nrst and second interim reports of the Uniteû Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, documents S/1100 and S/1196, see Official Re't:ords of the Security Council, Third Year, Supplement for November 1948, and Fourth Year, Supplement for JaIluary 1949. Document S/628 is forth as annex 28 of docum~t S/1100. duit sentant de avant Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) : I think itwould be convenient if the representative of India were to finish his submission before I said anything. Les raid expédition' dirigée Le tion famille ginable qu'une telle mesure tation En avaient et empêc.;'ent épargnées. Sir Benegal N. RAu (India): Representatives will doubtless remembèr the Jameson Raid in South Africa, where the expedition \/as against the South African Republic. The case is stronger here because the expedition was against a sister Dominion and member of the Commonwealth. It seems almost incredible to me that a step of this kind should have been taken without consulting His Majesty's Government. Indeed, I feel sure that if there had been any such consultation, this step would never have been taken and we should have been spared aU the difficulties that it has created and that now impede our progress. tant des armées conque, qu'il pourrait Je cette porté quelques par 1947 29 The second question which I should like to ask him is whether, at any point of his appraisal, the Pakistan Commander-in-Chief cautioned the Pakistan Government that the step which he was recommending, however justifiable in his view, might constitute a breach of internationallaw. I feel that, in order to protect himself, he would have taken this precaution, having regard to his cOl1duct on an earlier occasion which I shall mention immediately. l quote from a dispatch sent by Douglas Brown from Pakistan on Tuesday, 28 October 1947, which appeared in the Daily Telegraph of London on 29 Odober 1947: ' àl'entrée des troupes indiennes immédiatemerlt mission notamment du , "Mr. Jinnah commanded General Gracey to reply to the Indian Government's move into Kashmir by sending troops immediately up the Murree Road to recapture Baramula, occupy Srinagar and hold its airfield and eut off the Banihal Pass into India. . "General Gracey replied that news had. just reached hlm that Kashmir had joined the Indian Union, so that to sel1d troops there would be an act of war against Hinqui clamé USuch was the reason of the conference held today around the sick-bed of the Pakistan Prime Minister, Ml'. Liaqunt Ali Khan, for which Field Marshnl Auchinleck from Delhi, General Gracey from Rawalpindi and George Cunningham, Governor of the North West Frontier Province from Peshawar, a11 set out by air at dawn. UI l.l.m told that the first point made by the Supreme Commander at the conference was that if the armies the two Dominions came to blows, a11 British officers both sides would i111mediately resign. This would clude the respective Cot11lt1anders-Î11-Chief oi India and Pakistan, Lieutenant-General Sir Rob Lockhart and Lieutenant-General Sir Frank Messervy. General Messervy is expected to return i1l1t11ediately from England, arriving on Thul'sday." vVhntever the answers ta these questions may be, one ;;hing ig denr: tlm.t the justification pleaded by Pakistan is that the sending of tlle troops was necessitated by considerations of self-defence. Such a plea might have passed muster in the old days, but now, fortunately, have the United Nations and its Charter. Article 51 of the Charter reads: ttNothing in the present Charter shaH impair the herent right of individual or collective self-defence if anned attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Couneil has taken the measures necessary ta m?.intain international peace and curity. Measures taken by Members in the exereise this rightof self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Couneil, and shall not in auy way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Couneil under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security." This Article imposes two limitations upon the right of self-dcfence : first, there must be an anned attack upon the Member that exereises the right; and, secondly, measures taken in the exereise of the right of self-defence must immediately be reported to the Security Conncil. In the present instance there was no armed attack Pakistan, and admittedly the sending of the army into Kashmir was not reported to the Security Council. 1 am not making a small legal point. 1 am pointing this out becanse, if the matter had been reported at that stage to the Security Council, we should not have been in the difficult position in which we find ourselves today. l feel sure that the Pakistan Army would not have been allowed to go in, and the subseqnent mischief to which ,"'C took any other view or adopted any other course. It is said that the dispatch of Paldstan troops was ne· cessimted by India's mounting an offensive against the raiders. But surely this was nothing new. The Security Council k'11ew that the Indian ArnIY had gone to Kashmir to repel the invaders, but it is curious to learn that, although Paldstan, according to its defence before this Coundl, was rendering no assistance whatever ta the raiders, nevertheless when it found that India was on the pointof expelHng the raiders, Pakistan found it necessary to send its amlY into Kashmir i11 order to holdthe line. Rut we are told that Pakistan did not do anything more, whereas we have it, both from the majority [5;1430] and from the minority [Sj1430IAdd3] reports of the Commission, that Pakistan not merely heId the line but e.."tended its military control over the northern areas between August 1948 and J~nuary 1949. This was not a case of mere1y holding the Hne, but of o,",cup~ '"g as large apart of the State as Pakistan's military strength permitted. nécessaite contre les veau. était pendant, d'après prêtait aucune jugé les tenir rien fait de plus; de Add.3] contenté d'août militaire n'a une puissance l shaH now proceed to deal with two other points raised by the representative of Pakistan in connexion soulevées cerne représentant désarmement l'on s'ouvrir mière 1948 l'Inde, licenciement avoir lieu durant telle ou telle période, mais si ce licenciement du gros que ,,~th the implementation of the resolution of 13 August. His first poL'Ilt W"...5 that the disbanding and disanning of the Azad forces be10nged to what 1S called the plebiscite period, which 1S ta COlmnence after the implementation ofparts land II of the l'esolution. The real point, so far as India 1S concemed, 1S not whether the disbanding and disarming ofthese forces should fall in this period or that period, but whether it should not take place before the bulk of the lndian Army is withdrawn from the State. Our view'has consistently been that these forces should he d!sbanded and disanned before India is called upon towlthdrawthe bulk ofits army. The COlIllI1ission itself hassaid thatifit could have foreseen that Pakistan would buildup 50 formidable a force as the Azad forces have now become, it would have dealt with the question in p~ II of the l'esolution. Therefore, if we follow the , spmt of the resolution-that is ta say, what the Co1l11l1ÎssIon really would have done if it could have foreseen the , faets-the disbanding and disarrning of the Azad forces should be put on the samefooting as the withdrawal of , t~e Palàstan Army, of which these forces are merely a hmb or adjunct. To this the representative of Pakistan ,answers that the Azad forces are not mentioned in the 'resolutionof13August. In the words of a famons prece- ,dent,the representative of Pakistan's objection is, "It is devr~ent retirer le gros a créerait les deuxième conformons nous réalité licenciement être Pakistan dont le ne ~ot 50 nominated in the bond:' TI 50, if the representative of Pakistan wishes to stand upon the letter of the 5 In other words, what India is required to do by the letter of the resolution is to begin to withdraw the hulk of its forces, but the withdrawal need not be completed. Indeed, the stages of the withdrawal are left to be determined by agreement between the Commission and the Government of India. ûnly the initial stages constitute the beginning, and that is all for which the strict words of the resolutii:>n provide. India's view is that it cannot afford to complete the withdrawal of the bulk of its forces until the Azad Kashmir forces have been disbanded and disarmed. The rea! question, as 1 have already pointed out, is which is to come first : the disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces or the withdrawal of the bulk of the Inùian Army. We say the former, and the Commission supports this contention when it says that if it had been able to foresee what Pakistan was going do, it would have made express provision for the disbanding and disarming of these forces in the resolution of August. 1 now come to the point regarding the northern areas. So far as concerns the territory evacuated by Pakistan troops in the south, part II, section A, paragraph 3 the resolution of 13 August provides that the territory shall ,be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission, this, of course, subject to ·the assurance given to India by the Commission that this part of the resolution will not be interpreted or applied in practice so as to bring into question the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir Government over the portion of its territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops. Let me draw attention to 'the words "or applied practice". The meaning is obviously' that ndther theory nor in practice was the sovereignty of the State to he questioned in that territory. If the contention of the representative of Pakistan is that the territory referred to inc1udes the northern areas as well as the southern areas, then the assurance will apply to both. But if, held by the Commission, the reference was only to the territory to the south-west and did not inc1ude the northern areas, then there was a sepg,rate assurance in respect of the northern areas given in the Commission's replyof 25 August [S/1100, paragraph 79] to the second letter of the Prime Minister of India of 20 August [S/1100, paragraph 78] to which 1 have already referred in my speech. Therefore, on whatever interpretation, an assurance of the unquestioned sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir State was given to India; and, in our view, that assurance was repeated in sub-paragraph 3(b) of the resolution of 5 January 1949. 1 have quoted that particular sub-paragraph once before, but 1 shall quote it again because we attach great importance to it. The sub-para- My learned friend, the representative of Pakistan, twitted me at one poi.nt of his ~,peech with cla~ming.cred~t for India for accepting the proposals contamed m thlS resolution on 23 December [5/1196, anne% 4] whereas Pak.stan accepted them two days later [5/1196, an- IlB% 5]. What l was commenting upon in thatpart of my speech was the delay in Pakistan's acceptance of the resolution of 13 August. But, apart from that, the difference oftwo days between 23 December and 2S December is of very greai: significance, as l shall presently explain. India askedfor the insertion of sub-paragraph 3(b) in the resolution of SJanuary 1949 bev.:ause it attached the greatest importance to the unquestioned sovereignty of the State throughout its territory, and the words of the sub-paragraph necessarily implied that the powers of the State, whether in the northern areas or in the southem areas or anywhere else, would remain with the State before the holding of a plebiscite. However, my distinguished friend stated yesterday [465th meeting] that in a mèmorandum of 25 December the Chairman of the' United Nations Commission for Illdia and Pakistan gave him an explana- 1 tian of the sub-paragraph which stated that it meant practically nothing, that it was a mere formality, and so on. lf any snch exp!anation was given to the Pakistan Government on 25 December, that ie to say, two days after the proposals had been accepted by the Government of India, cleady that explanation is flot binding upon the Government of India. The holding of the plebiscite for the entire State and the unquestioned sovereignty of the State over its en~re territoiy are inseparaLly connected. The southern areas may be administered, under the surveillanœ of the United Nations, by local authorities appointed from among the local inhabitants by the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This would be in accordancé wi~h the resolution of 13 August, as interpreted to India. l may mention that Sheikh Abdullah's Government at present includes a member of the rival organization, the Muslim Conference. 1 shall now proceed to deal with some of the specific point:;; raised by the representative of Pakistan. He covered a great deal of ground, and. l do not propose to follow mm into every detail; l shall confine myself to the more salient points in his argmnent. He opened with a longish discourse on ]unagadh, Hyderabad and various other matters. We are at present concerned only with the Kashmir issue. l do not know what the other members of the Council feel, but, speaking for myself, l have found it difficult enough to master thefacts of the Kash- :rur issue. If we are to be asked at the same rime to go tnto al1 the other matters which are alleged to ne in dis- One thing has emerged clearly even from the extracts which my distinguished friend has quoted from various statements made by the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister of India, which is that in every disputed case there should be a reference ta the will of the people. That is the criterion which, subject ta certain conditions as to the restoration of normal conditions, India has offered to apply in Kashmir. Th.::·~ is, however, one fundamental difference between the c:.J.ses of Hyderabad and Junagadh, on the one hand, and Kashmir, on the other. In Kashmir, as 1 have already st&.ted in my original speech, a large section of the Muslims-that 1S ta say, a large section of the majority community-are themselves in favour of remaining in India. This is not Illdia's fault; it is a plain fact, for which 1 have already tried give severa! reasons. In Hyderabad and Junagadh, the other hand, sa far ar: 1 am aware, no section of the population that forms the majority has ever been in favour of acceding to Pakistan. This is a fundamental difference which is apt ta be forgotten in these facile analogies. My distinguished friend has often referred to the "socalled accession" of Kashmir to India, as if there were sorne legal defect therein. Members will find this aspect of the case fully discussed in annex 43 to the majority report of the Commission [Sj1430jAdd.1]. 1 do not wish to weary the members of the Council with a long legal disquisition on the subject of accession. 1 would only mention that, under the Constitution which was force in India after 15 August 1947 and until26 January .1950, specific provision had been made as to the exact mode of accession of Indian States. In passing, 1 may observe that that Constitution was practically an enactment of the British Parliament. Under section 6 of that Constitution, often referred to as the Government India Act, 1935, an Indian State shall be deemed to have acceded to the Dominion if the Governor-General has signified his acceptance of an instrument of accession executed by the Ruler, etc. The rest of the section merely deals with the contents of the instrument. This is aIl that was required for accession: an instrument executed by the Ruler and accepted by the Governor-GeneraI. On 26 October 1947, the Ruler actually executed such an instrument of accession; and, on 27 October 1947, the Governor-General, Lord Mountbatten, signified his acceptance of that instrument. Constitutionally, therefore, all the requirements of accession were complete. accepting the instrument, Lord Mountbatten said to the Ruler: demandant aide militaire, aujourd'hui de défendre et moi-même décidé nement provisoire appelé Ministre." "Meanwhile, in response ta Your Highness's appeal for military aid, action has been taken today ta send troops of the Indian Army ta Kashmir to help your own forces to defend your territory, and ta protect the lives, property and honour of your people. My Government and l note with satisfaction that Your Highness has deeided ta invite Sheikh Abdullah to form an interim Government ta work with your Prime Minister." l'offre populaire rétablies. le point de vue constitutionnel. As l have repeatedly said, India still stands by the offer contained in that letter, to submit the question ta the will of the people as soon as normal conditions are restored. But this does not in any way affect the position that for the time being accession is legally and constitutionally complete. Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan devoted a good deal of his speeeh towards proving why it was essential, from Paldstan's point of view, that Kashmir must aecede to Paldstan. Let me quote his exact words [464th meeting] : "The possession of Kashmir can add nothing to the economy of India or to the strategie security of India. On the other hand, it is vital for Pakistan." That is to say, the possession of Kashmir is vital for Pakistan. Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan is apparently no longer content with accession; he desires possession. At this point of his argument he seC'ms ta have forgotten that the matter is to be decided not by the comparative needs of Paldstan and of India, but by the wishes of the people of Kashmir. Indeed, as l heard him developing this part of his argument, l began to understand more and more clearly why a large section of the Kashmir Muslims are nervous of acceding to Pakistan. If l may say so without any offence, the wolf may need the lamb desperately, but the lamb may have different wishes in the matter. It is beeause India has no need to exploit Kashmir and can give it the fullest politieal and economie freedom that a large section even of the Muslims of Kashmir wish to remain in India. This part of his argument sounded very mueh like the Lebensraum doctrine. partie de taché paroles nè The representative of Pakistan joined issue with me over my statement that the bulk of the trade of Kashmir was in the areas now included in India. l shall therefore give the exact figures of the three years immediately preceding partition. These figures were eompiled from official records for the information of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. In the year 1944- 1945 Kashmir imported 46 million rttpees worth of goods from the areas now included in India and 12 million rupees worth of goods from the areas now included in With reference to timber, on which Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan dwe1t at some length, the official records show that eleven-eighteenths of the timber exports, including fil' logs, were for consumption in India, and seven-eighteenths for consumption in Pakistan. It must, of course"be admitted that during the years in question India was a single country, an undivided country, and the figures I have quoted are to some extent based upon the best estimate that could be made of the proportions certain goods consumed in the areas now included India and in Paldstan, respectively. To that extent the figures are a matter of opinion. I shall concede that. The main consumer of Kashmir timber was and continues to be the Indian railways. The representative of Paldstan repeatedly referred to the stoppage 01 water from certain irrigation canals. shaH therefore mention a few salient facts. Previous ta the partition of India there were sixteen canal systems in the undivided Punjab. As a result of partition, twelve of these systems have fallen exclusively into "lNest Punjab, that is, into Paldstan. Only three are in East Punjab, which is in India. One, the Bari-Doab C mal, is divided between the two. The total discharge of the five rivers of the Pllnjab in the winter seél.son is 47,500 cusecs,l" of which West Punjab and Bahawalpur in Pakistan get 39,500 cusecs, and East Punjab, with its States, only about 8,000 cusecs. In other words, five-sixths of the supply has been given to Pakistan and about one-sixth ta India. West Punjab is a highly developed surplus food area, whereas East Punjab is under-developed and a deficit food area liable to severe and frequent famine. In December 1947 a stand-still agreement was signed by the Chief Engineers of the East and West Punjab for the continuance of the supply ta Pakistan canals from head waters in India, subject, of course, ta payment. This stand-still agreement was ta last only up ta 31 March 1948, but in spite of reminders from the East Punjab 1& Cubic feet per second. Members of the Council will remember that among the reasons given for the marching of the Pakistan Army into Kashmir, one was that Pakistan feared that India '. would stop the water from the Mangla Head Works. The representative of Pakistan might at least have mentioned that, two days earlier, as a result of the Prime Minister of India's personal intervention, India had resumed the supplies which, owing to the continued negli- ! gence of the Pakistan Government of West Punjab, had been suspended. The representative of Pakistan repeatedly charged me with having said that there was no trouble within the State before 22 October 1947. He made a partial correction of that error yesterday, but l should like to correct itcomplete1y, so far as l am concerned. His exact words were [464th meeting] : "The representative of India yesterday said that he denied the assertion by Pakistan that anything had happened before 22 October." l have been unable to find any such stat·ement in my speech. What in fact l did say was thaî: the trouble in the State had caused the Maharaja's accession on 26 October, and not that the Maharaja's accession had caused the trouble as is often represented or misrepresented. In other words, what _ said was that the trouble occurred before 26 October. l did not say that there was no trouble before 220ctober. The representative of Pakistan has tried to make put that the trouble was a battle for freedom in which tribesmen from across the border joined as v0lunteers. In this connexion, l should like to invite the attention of the members of this Council to certain remarkable disc10sures made in the Press in this country in February 1948. The wrÎ'''er was an American ex-G.I.2 who was for some months a Brigadier-General in what was called the Azad Ka~~:nnir International Brigade. l have photostatic copIes here of what he wrote, and these photostatic copies are here for anyone to look at. l shall quote only a few extracts. Speaking of himself, he says: "1 never cared about the issues involved. For me it was a job and ex- 2 A United States Second World War soldier (from the military expression "Government Issue"). Incldentally, l am quoting from an account bearing the date of 12 February 1948. To resume: "1 did not get particularly excited, although he did. l was more interested when he asked me what l wanted for serving Asad. Behind me someone suggested 1,000 dollars a month. 'You can have anything you want,' said Ibrahim." Speaking of the tribesmen he was commanding, the Brigadier-General says: "But there were always more tribes leaving the barren hills for raids on the fertile valleys. Although they were Muslims themselves, they did not care about the ,issues of the Kashmir Muslim revoIt against India. They wanted excitement and loot. When the Indian Governmentcharged that we encouraged the savage tribesmen in wanton looting and raping, our publicity men countered with the statement that the Pathans were volunteers for our cause, fighting in a special international brigade. The fact that the brigade was headed by me, an American, lent colour to this story. Now, 8,000 Pathans had cooJe down from Dir State in Pakistan's north-west province to get their share of ,booty. We rushed them to the front as fast as we could get trucks. The Pakistan Government co-operated gladly, lending us trucks and gas. This was done, l think, because they wanted to get the Pathans out of Rawalpindi before they started to loot there. l returned to the front ten days later to take over my international brigade." Such was the nature of the "battle for freedom" in which the tribesmen are said to have taken so prominent and honourable a part. Let me add, for the information of members of the Council, that the fight for freedom in Kashmir started not in October 1947, or even in September 1947, but twenty years ago, and it has been continually waged during this period by the man who is now heading the People's Government, Sheikh Abdullah. As The representative of Pakistan referred to the large number of refugees that had come over into Pakistan from the Indian side of the cease-fire line, and he pointed ta this fact as proof of aggression, tyranny and what-not by India. It is unfortunately true that there has been a stream of refugees across the frontier on both sides, whether in Kashmir or elsewhere. This is not a feature peculiar to Kashmir. It was the result of the partition andthe communal frenzy that unfortunately accompanied it. There are large numbers of Hindu refugees and even Muslim refugees who have come over to the Indian side of the cease-fire line in Kashmir because they felt unsafe on the other side, and their number also runs into hundreds of thousands. The resolution of 5 January makes provision for the repatriation of all these refugees on either side, and indeed this will be one of the most difficult tasks to be completed before the holding of the plebiscite. l have already drawn the attention of the members of the Security Council to the fact that, even as late as August 1949 in the presence of certain United Nations observers, the Muslim inhabitants of certain villages which were on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line insisted on moving across to the Indian side. As the representative of Pakistan said, "Facts are worth more than arguments," and here are faets which can be confirmed by the United Nations observer, Lieutenant Wayne. l can fumish the fu1lest details of these happenings if they are required for purposes of verification. They are contained in a report made by the Administrative Officer of Gurais. According to the representative of Pakistan himself, twothirds of the population of the entire State is still on the Indian side of the cease-fire line and, n~edless to say, the vast majority of that population consists of Muslims. l now come to the extract which l quoted from Margaret Bourke-White's book.s The representative of Pakistan seems to be doubtful of the facts mentioned in the extracts, and he asked me, "Where was the Constitution referred to in the first sentence of that extract?" l have it here in my hand. It is entitled New Kashmir, and is described as a draft constitution and outline economic plan for the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It opens with the words : "We the people of Jammu and Kashmir, Y'rlakh and the frontier regions inc1uding Poonch and ChL..i.ni, comaHalfway to Freedom, Margaret Bourke-White,· Simon and Schuster, New Y.ork, 1949. Article 2 of part 1 of that draft constitution reads: uFreedom of conscience and of worship shall be guaranteed for a11 citizens." As to the facts actually stated in the extract from Margaret Bourke-White's book, there can hardly be any doubt, because they are corroborated by the account another eye-witness, Father Sha.11ks. When 1 made my original speech, 1 did not wish to read out the details given by Father Shanks, because they do not malœ pleasant reading. Since the representative of Pakistan is not content with what 1 have already stated, however, 1 am compelled to read out the further details now for the information of the Council. The account was reproduced in the Daily Express of London, dated 11 November 1947. He deseribes the attack on St. Joseph's Con- 'vent in the fo11owing words : "The tribesmen came shooting their way down from the hills on both sides of the town. They climbed over the hospital watls from all sides. The first group burst into a ward, firing at the patients. A twenty-year-old Ind::ln nurse t!'Îed to protect a Muslim patient whose baby had just been born. She was shot dead first; the patient was next. Mother Superior Aldetrude rushed into the ward, knelt over the Indian nurse and was once attacked.-and robbed. Assistant l\.1:other Teresalina saw a tribesman point a rifle at Mother Aldetrude and jumped in front of her. A bullet went through Teresalina's heart. "At that moment, Colonel Dykes, who had assured us we would not be attacked, raced from his room a few yards along the terrace to get the Mother Superior out of danger, shouting at the tribesmen as he l'an. But the Mother Superior feIl, shot, and Colonel Dykes collapsed beside her with a bullet in his ôtomach. Mrs. Dykes l'an from her husband's room to help him. She, too, was shot dead" and so on and so on; 1 shall not read out the full details. While the representative of Pakistan seems to doubt the veracity of Margaret Bourke-White, he seems to accept without reservation the statements made by Ml'. M. N. Roy, whom he now describes as a "non-Muslim patriotic politica1leader of India". This particular gentleman has been a patriot in many. countries-to mention them in order: Russia, China, now India, and tomorrow, in view of the admiration he app1ears to have evoked, perhaps Pakistan. tout. exception certaines amené In reality, there is, no intransigence at all. India's position has ,been consistent throughout, except that, for the sake of peace, it has made certain concessions which, unfortunately, have not brought peace. Ministre de presse qu'il a tenue à l'Inde. avait In conclusion, l shûuld like tû qUûte what the Priil1e Minister said about the Kashmir issue at a Press conrerence in Delhi soon after his return ta India. He was asked what statements he had made on this subject, and bis reply was : . "What 1 said was that the Kàshmir issue, or any such issue, could be resolved in three ways. The first was one of war, whatever the result; the other was continuation of the stalemate as it is now j and the third was some kind of settlement by mediation, if it cottld be brought about directIy. de question quelle l'état obtenu parvenir "1 definitely said that resolution of an issue of this kind by arbitration was not possible. Mediation means soudre faut aident La 1 other people helping the parties themselves in coming to a settlement. There cannot be any compulsion about mediation. '.'And 1 said further that we wanted to do everything to mcrease the prestige of the United Nations by its being associated with that mediation as it had been in the past." possible Nations cette l'activité de et Then, referring ta the activities of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, the Prime Minister , repIied: "1 am not prepared ta say that there have h~en no results at all. There have been many results : Ohe major 15 n'a CCMaybe it is a difficult question, in the sense that passions have been roused. l am not going into the merits at this moment. It takes time. Maybe one has to go step by step." Asked about the next step to solve the deadlock, the Prime Minister said that, whatever may he the next step, it should be under the auspices of the United Nations; what form it should take, could be considered later. l have tried to deal with the more important parts the speech of the representative of Pakistan, but it must not be assumed that, because l have not had time to deal with every detail, anything that l have not controverted is admitted. l should like to comment upon these other m~tters,if l think necessary, at a subsequent stage. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan): Today's statement of the representative of India to the Securîty Council does not calI for a lengthy reply, but inasmuch as it is charged with a great deal of skill that he undoubtedly possesses, clarification of some of the points is necessary. My learned friend's main point is that it is the presence of Pakistan forces in the State which has become the main obstacle in the way of a settlement, l was happy to note, however, that his very opening sentences are in full accord with the situation as we view it. He stated that the two sides are agreer.l upon the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, and the task before the Counci1 is to settle the procedure according which they cau he implemented. As l have said, l am happy that, at least to that extent, as regards principle the two sides are agreed. With regard to the point of the presence of Pakistan forces in the State, though l shall comment presently upon the arguments made by him, the fact is, as it is now quite clear to the Security Counci1, that the entry of those forces took place early in May 1948. The very first the two resolutions subsequently accepted by both Govne un Cela équivaudrait faits. Surely that situation cannot today be put forward as something that obstructs the further progress of the implementation of those resolutions. That is reversing the chronology altogether. My learned friend then entered into the question of the justification or non-justification of the step taken by the Pakistan Government in this respect.. Again, the main reply to that contention is that aIl of that must have been discussed with the Commission, and was certainly taken into account by the Commission before it made its proposais. Ta bring up that matter today is to go back ta aperiod anterior even to the presentation by the Commission of its first resolution. It is an attempt to throw aside the agreement with which the submission of the representative oi-India to the Security Council started today. He said that we have agreed upon those two resolutions, and that the task before the Security Council is to find the means to lay down the procedure for their implementation. Those resolutions, as l have said, deal ,vith the whole situation and take note of it in every respect. prise par le fondée opposer la formulant équivaudrait ment où C'est de la dit, résolutions sistait à Ces situation tions le d'un constituaient-elles Souverain son rattachement. The representative of India then put two specific questions, stating that that was an action against a sister Dominion. Why was it an action against a sister Dominion? His contention is that it was so because the Ruler had offered accession to India and India had accepted that accession. My reply to my learned friend is that Junagadh had offered accession to Pakistan on 15 September 1947, which was accepted. India marched its forces -into the State of Junagadh on 9 November 1947. Was that or was that not aggression against a sister Dominion? According to the representative of India, by virtue of its accession Junagadh had become part of Pakistan. That being so, the marching of Indian forces into Junagadh on 9 November 1947 either was or was not an aggressïon iagainst a sister Dominion. Ifit was an aggression against a sister Dominion, then the marching of Pakistan forces a 1947, ment de l'Inde n'en a pas moins donné ordre d'entrer Cela d'un représentant ment, grante troupes If the reply is that aggression \Vas con1ltlitted by India, thèn it is îlot for India now, six months later, to raise the tomplaint of aggression against Pakistall. And India was not guilty of aggressiol1, how can it charg{' with ag-gression? If it was not aggression in either case, then. the questions posed hy the representative of India do not arise. If it was aggression in India's case, I shall unswer Sir Ben.egal N. Rau's twù questions if he will pleased ID nnswer my question. Before India marched its troops inta Junagadh, \Vas His Majesty's Govermnent tousulted or iufonned? In the words of my learned frien.d, Illdia was <tcommitting aggression against a sister Dominion.," l wish to ask whether or not its Cornmanderin-Olief, wIten sanctioning this movement, cautioned Governmeut that by moving these troops into Junagadh it weuld t--e guilty of aggression against a sister Dominion? "Vhen these questions are answered b)T my iearned friend, l shait attempt to answer his questions. Then the representative of Illdia read out Douglas Brown's -{ patch about certain things of which even am unawcle up to this day. I am unaware what e."Cactly took place because l have not studied that problem and l was not then in tlle Government. But is he prepared 10 acœpt the account of a newspaper correspondent with regard 10 confidential consultations which took place between different organs of tlle Government? Does he know 10 wbat e."d:ent they are true or whether they are fab-e or garbled? And if so, would he be prepared afu.-wer stmiIar questions put by me to him with regard 10 Kasbmir? The truth of the matter is that these matters are irreIevan.t today, apart from the question of the rights or wr.ongs of il. There is no wrong committed by Pakb-tan whatsoever in this respect, because apart from an other justifications, fuma had itself furnished the fullest j&-tmc:ation by interpreting these matters in regard fu Junagadh in the way which l have described to the Cmmcil. A~ ilie representative of India said that if Pakistan nad taken ilie precaution of infonning His Majesty's Gawermnent before taking this action, or if Pakistan had étendu son contrôle militaire aux régions septentrionales. Hier, catégoriquement 1948, cette des ne Maharadjah. aucun régions, contrôlaient comment postérieurement ou celles du Cachemire ou ration oppose quelque prend raient trionales, l'erreur ainsi. les sive Dras l'ensemble de The representative of India has said that Pakistan extended its military contml over the northern areas. l dealt with this matter in detail yesterday and l stated categorically to the Security Council that on 20 August 1948, when the Prime Minister of India first l'aised this matter with the Commission, the Maharaja's administrative authority did not extend to one inch of those territories which are now in dispute. The Indian military forces have at no time been in control of any part ôf those areas, but certainly on 20 August 1948 they were not in control of a single inch of the territory. If that \Vas 50, how is it alleged today that it was after that date that the Pakistan forces or the Azad Kashmir forces had somehow consolidated their positions? That statement of mine is not controverted, and nothing else is alleged in answer to it, yet the theory is being developed that the Pakistan forces consolidated their control over the northern areas because somehow the Commission has fallen into the error of assuming that that had happened. As a matter of faet l said that after that date the Indian military forces, as a result of their November offensive, had taken possession of the Zojila Pass, of Dras and Kargil and had been able to relieve them. AIl those towns, and the whole of that line, is now on their side of the cease-fire line. ' Discussing the Azad Kashmir forces, the repl'esentative of India said that his Government's view had consistently been that the Azad Kashmir forces should he disbanded before the bulk of the Indian Army was withdrawn. He said that he was not concerned whether that happened in the second stage or in the thil;"d stage, but that the Indian view had consistently been that they must de estimé retrait importait deuxième nement devaient indienne de lution cette du à un arrangement accepté par néa L'alinéa retrait pays cours de la période ou b~ disbanded before the bulk of the Indian Anny was wlthdrawn. The actual fact is that the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian Anny was provided for in the se~o~d part of the resolution of 13 August. The Com- , mIssIon clearly explained that the whole of the resolution of 13 August did not touch the Azad Kashmir forces, the disbandment of which-an arrangement to which the Government of India agreed-is provided for in s:..Lbparagraph 4(b) of the resolution of 5 January 1949. Sub-paragraph 4(a) of that resolution deals with the final disposaI of the remaining Indian forces aftel' the b~k had been withdrawn in the truce stage and after the dlsbandnient and disannament of the Azad Kashmir The representative of India again reverted ta his argument based on the phraseology of sub-paragraph 3(b of the resolution ot 5 January 1949 to the effeet that the Plebiscite Administrator shall derive hi'j authority from the State of Jammu and Kashmir. l went into that matter in detail yesterday and l will not repent my arguments, but the represcnb1.tive of India said that while India !lad been given certain explanations and we lmd been given certain explanations, neither side Imew at the timc what explanations had been given to the otller side, though those explanations have subsequently been published. If the explanations and clarifications given India are to be binding, though they do not amount what the representative of India contended, and those which werè givell to us are not to be binding, is that not applying one rule ta one side and another rule to the otller? That is why it was suggested that if any conflict arose aver those clarifications given to either side, the arbitrator should decide. Anybody who arbitrates will obviously look both to the language of the resolutions and to the c1arificatic.'s and assurances given to bôth sicles; he will endeavor to find out what \Vas understood by eacll side and to what each side agreed. As a matter of tact, the Government of Pakistan was itself so conscious of this-that any agreement arrived at must an agreement upon the same things and in the same sense --that, in replying to the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, one of the main points made by the Pakistan Government was that any clarifications given to the Goyermnent of India must be communicated to and accepted by the Govermnent of Pakistan, and any clarifications given to the Government of Pakistan must communicated to and accepted by the Government India before it could be said that an agreement had been reached. That has been our point and that was one the conditions on our side which has been described amounting to a rejection of the resolution. But we are not responsible for that situation. In my letter dated 6 September 1948 [Sjll00, paragraph 97], addressed to the Chairman of the Commission, wmch contained the reply of the Government Pakistan to the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, p~araph 10 states: That is what we were pleading for. propos 13 un soit The second plea that we made on that occasion was lhat pa,rt III of the resolution of 13 August should be elaborated sa as to build up a scheme for the holding of the plebiscite in arder that the whole thing should become complete up ta that fina! stage. In paragraph 11 of my same letter 1 added: tions sous commission soient les éventuellement puissent être acceptées par le Gouvernement du Pakistan, et sous accepte et impartial qui doit décider si mire dans lution [Sj726], la llSubject ta the clarifications and elucidations furnished by the Commission to the Government of Paldstan being accepted by the Government of India, and the elucidations and clarifications, if any, furnished by the Commission ta the Government of India being acceptable to the Government of Pakistan, and provided the Government of India accept the conditions laid down in par~ B(paragraphs 6 to 15, bath inclusive) of the Security Council's resolution of 21st April, 1948 [Sj726], as explained by the sponsors of the resolution in the Security Council, for a free and impartial plebiscite ta decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede 10 India or Pakistan, the Govermr.ent of Paldstan accepts the proposais contained in the Commission's resolution..." adoptée: devait sions qu'elles en aient eu connaissance ou non, elles ont accepté la des doit la qui a été par les parties de parties." questions résolution l'armée de et That was our attitude then. Our attitude clearly was that each side must hïlOW the clarifications and elucidations given to the other, but in any case, whether they knew or not, they have accepted the resolution. If a question arises that the language of the clarifications or elucidations is in conflict or has to be reconciled to the situation or to the language of the resolution then, surely, it would be the business of the arbitrator who was proposed-or of any other arbitrator who might be accepted -to study the matter, hear bath parties, and say, "Here is what was intended by the Commission and accepted by both parties." For that matter, after that stage the points which are completely taken care of by the resolution are concluded, and the withdrawa1 of the bulk of the Indian Army and the questions of the authority of the State, of sovereignty and of integrity, are dealt with and taken care of in the resolution. Then the representative of India said that, although he would not go into the question of Junagadh and approfondir Hyderabad because they were irrelevant, he would say bad that large sections of Muslims in Kashmir favoured qu'un grand nombre de Musulmans du Cachemire étaient India and that therefore the two cases were distinguishen able. In the first place, the two cases are not irrelevant. pas 1 do not explain the out1ines of these two cases in an parfaitement attempt ta invite the Security Council to pronounce upon ce them. 1 am quite conscious of the faet that they are not noncer befor~ the Council at this stage. However, 1 invite the n'en est pas attentIon of the Security Council to those cases to illustian trate what was the Government of India's own interpreillustrer 21 When the represeutative of Indin snys thnt a large section of the Muslims in Kashmir favour Indin that beggil1g the question. That is the whole point at issue. How many? But even if they do, the obvious course ta take is for us to proceed to the stage of n free and impartial plebiscite in which neither side has any advantage, in which neither side is ahle to exercise any influence or coercion, and in which the people are left entirely free to decide for themselves to which side they wish to accede. If thev find that their inten=;;t~. thefr desires and their mllbit10ns impel th~rn ta uccede· to India, they will be free to accede to India. \Vhcre is the difficulty? Where is the prohlem? Then the representative of India referred to a sentence of mine. He said that I had stated that the possession of K:.lshmir was vital ta Pakistan. He will, however, do me the justice of recalling that nt that stage aU that I \Vas arsuing \Vas that if one \Vas to take the prima fada grounds which Lord Mountbatten had pointed out to the Rulers themselves, all those factors \Vent in favour of accession ta P;ùdstml. If the matter had to be decided on the basis of those considerations, the accession of Kaslunir ta Pakistan should have talœn place on those grounds. If, in arguing that point, I on one occasion used the word "possession" instead of "accession" the representathre of India cannot argue, "There it is. They want ta eat up Kashmir. It is a case of the wolf and the lamb:' Those who have followed the course of events in Inma with regard to the Indian States and the situation of the Indian States which have acceded ta Pakistan, are well able to decide for themselves which is the case of the wolf and the lamb--whether it is that of India or of Pakistan. 1 wonld complete this portion of my remarks by saymg that, while l did present that argument, l went on to say that, in spite of all these factors, we had accepted the position that the decision should be by means of a free and impartial plebiscite ta be held in Kashmir so thaï the people could decide ta which side they wanted 10 go. ""Vhat is wrong with that? On the basis of an the :factors which apply to the situation, Kashmir should have acceded ta Pakistan, but in spite of that, Pakistan 1.5 willingthat the democratic method of the people freely expressing their wishes should he followed and that the decision should take pIace in accordance therewith. 'l'he representative of India cited certain trade figures, alih.ough he himself added that India Was at that time nnpartitioned and that bis figures, therefore, were not exact:. 1 would say that they were not even approximate. à propos et que, été nous nous étions abstenus de toute démarche. l'historique ferait efforts avec nement vaihs refusaient de ou sous un autre tion The representative of India made certain observations \Vith reg"cl.rd to the dispute concerning the canal waters, and 1 was again amused by his saying that, in spite of reminders to us before the expiry of the interitT' agreement, we took no action. As a matter of fact, the history of that dispute, if it were before the Security Coundl, would disclose that during the month of March every effort of our engineers to get into touch with the Indian engineers in order to settle the further working of these head works was frustrated hy their evasion. They would not agree to meet our engineers on one exéuse or another, and then, on 1 April, they cut off the waters. vrai, accord temporaire fut conclule 4 mai 1948. je avons vue a contre accord eau, déposions de que, si l'Inde s'emparait clef pour si devance? pense l'Inde Or The waters remained cut off for about six weeks. True, the representative of India had stated that on 4 May 1948 an ad interi'm agreement was arrived at. But that ad interim agreement, as 1 have said, was arrived at at the point of the pistol, and, as 1 have already stated, seeks ta base India's point of view, at any rate, on the ground that India is entitled to the whole of the water and would sen it to us only on payment of seigniorage. Were we not entitled to assume, in spite of that agreement and in spite of the restoration of the water on those termsthat we deposit the price of the water in the form of seigniorage-that if India once secured possession of the Mangla Head Works of the Jhelum irrigation system, it would insist upon the same view being accepted, and that unless we agreed to pay seigniorage, we would not be given any water? Was that apprehension not justified? l thlink that it was fully justified. The representative of lndia said yesterday that 1 had not mentioned that an agreement had been arrived at. 1 did mention the agreement. As a matter of fact 1 even used the expressionthough it may not be acceptable to the representative of lndia-that it was arrived at at the point of the pistoI. Then my learned friend referred to my criticism of Margaret Bourke-White's remarks. He said some sort of Constitution had been drawn or was proposed. But what that lady said was: "While the People's Government in Kashmir's capital was completing these things..." Where was the People's Government at that date? Even S~eikh Abdullah, though he had been released from pnson toward the end of September, was 110t associated with the Government in any form at aIl. He became Prime Minister much later. He was associated with the then Prime Minister after 26 October. The Maharaja, With regard to the Baram111a Convent, I must say that my learned friend was not at all fair when he said that perhaps I was not content with what he had quoted previously. I myself said that there had been regrettable incidents in Baramula. My learned friend himself had conceded, quite fairly and justly, that we were not responsible for those incidents. We have not denied that the tribesmen were guilty of that kind of thing. Equally with the Government of India, we have deplored those incidents. But I did take up my learned friend's point, or the point he sought to make, to the effect that we had done nothing to prevent those incidents. I showed what we hàd done to prevent them, and I said that I pleaded guilty to this: that the Government of Pakistan at that time did not take the only appropriate action that should have taken, more particularly in view of the fad that there was a stand-still agreement with the Government of the Maharaja. We should have moved Pakistan troops into the State both to stop the disor.ders that were taking place on account of the tribesmen and also to stop the persecution of the Muslim section of the population by the Maharaja's troops. We did not do that, and therein we committed a serious default. If my learned friend's poil•• is that we were guilty of neglect in that respect, then, as I have said, I plead guilty. Then r quoted something from Mr. M. N. Roy. certainly was guilty of saying that Mr. M. N. Roy, whatever his ideology and bis political views, whether one agrees with them or not, was a non-Muslim Indian patriot;. I am quite certain I said something to that effect. If that is such praise from me of Mr. M. N. Roy that my learned friend cannot tolerate it, well, I cannot help it. But Mr. M. N. Roy is a non-Muslim, that is to say, he is not a Muslim. He is Indian: I do not know whether or not that is denied. Whether his patriotism takes the • Reference is to the meetings of the Security Council in January, February and March 1948. soit les quelques dire: été en droit il Qu'aurais-je de quoi And was l guilty in introducing his views, for whatever they may be worth? They may not be binding upon anybody. But he gave expression to his opinions, and, inintroducing those views, l had to say something about who he was. If 1 had merely said "Mr. M. N. Roy says Ibis", the Council certainly would have been entitled to wonder, "Who is this man that he is talking about?" 1had to give sorne description of him. VVhat could 1 have said less than 1 did? And of what was l guilty in saying it? l shall not try to make a reply in regard to the rernarks of Brigadier-General Haight, the ex-G.r. who became a Brigadier-General under the Asad Kashmir Government. 1did not quote those remarks during the previous debates, although they were then available. And there \Vere very harsh things said by him about both sides, in arder to get a price settled, 1 have no doubt, for the communications that he was prepared to make for the Press in the United States. l shall not quote them today. Mr. Ayyangar quoted them even two years ago, and, while quoting them, he suddenly came upon this expression: ''Both sides are lying extensively"-or sorne such adverb -"over this issue." Mr. Ayyangar stopped at that point and said: "Well, l hope he is not lying"-and then he \Vent on to comment upon bis further remarks. qu'on a "G.I." mire cours communication. pour payer presse des Etats-Unis. M. moment cette mentent à logue. j'espère commentaires cette quelles qu'il It is not necessary to advert to that matter. If that is the kind of evidence on which my learned friend bases his case, he is welcome to it. He then furnished an analogy. He said it was as if we had offered, as trustee, to sell a house to a friend or neighbour for 10,000 dollars. The friend or neighbour says "1 am willing to take the house." Both have agreed that the house shall pass to the friend. The whole question is :what is the consideration? We have asked 10,000 dollars. We are first offered 5,000 dollars, then we are offered 3,000 dollars, then we are offered 2,000 dollars. l'Inde maison vendre voisin seraient seule question aurait au éminent analogies ne à présence, corporé celle points quels en des trouve. points My learued friclld th~n said that they are willing to accept 1l1ediation) though ther would not accept arbitration. But wlmt has been gomg on durinp.' the past two years if not mediationP Mediation was u{ldcrtaken and cal'ried through) and it rcsulted in an ag"reement just over no year aga. The issue is MW the Împlementation of that agreement. The mcdiation has) to the extent to which ~\g"reement was l'eached) successfully achieved its tas1\:. An agreement havÎllg becn arrived nt, the t'1ediation lmvillg hrought about agreement) the question now is : How ig that agreement to he implemcnted? There are various ways of implementing it, and 1have illdicated some of thcm to the Security Council. But mcdiatiou cannot start afresh with the whole thing. Are we gaing to spclld year after year merely in attempts to mediate, reopenillg' everything that may already have beell agreed upon and starting afresh? The crux of the matter is what my learned friend stated in his first two or three sentences. The efforts of the Commission resulted in the reaching of agreements on the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5January 1949. If either party raises a question with regard to the interpretation of an)' portion of those agreements, it is not a question of mediation. The prohlel11 is to deterl11ine hy some fair and impartial method, what those agreel11~nts meau, what the parties had agreed tOI and to aive effect ~~ ~ My leamed friel1d says that the prestige of the United Nations lS iuyolved. l also say that the prestige of the United Nations is involved. But, if that is the case, let us accept what the United Nations says. How is the prestige of the United Nations to he upheld? By declining, time a.fter time, to do what the United Nations suggests or recommends? The prestige of the United Nations can onIy he upheld in this ,vay: if the parties have a difference and it is resolved either by the arbitration of a single person or by the arbitration of the Security Council l'tSe1f-if these gentlemen who represent the whole civilized worId, or at least the greatest part of it, consider the whole matter and tell the parties that this is what they bad agreed upon-then the parties should be prepared to carry out that decision. My œncluding rem.arks are these. As the Council now ha.s 10 proœed, after the parties have placed their c.<b--e5 in detail before if:, the main trouble is with regard fi) ilie dffiil'llitariza.tion of this State before the preparations fur the plebiscite cau start. l mea.n that, by and mgi; iliat is the situation. India. ha.s given certain versions of some incidents it compIains of, or of some deaisément Conseil Delvoie, les adopté passé ont été la scène des événements. au parfaitement aucune au trouve peut semblent ensemble. renseignements lui ont donnés dans les 1venture to make a suggestion which could very easily resolve any doubt that might arise in the minds of the representatives to the Security Council. The Commission's military adviser, General Delvoie, has been supervlsing aU these things practically from the date of the second resolution of the Commission, that of 5 January 1949, and he has spent almost the whole of the year 1949 in the affected areas. He must have complete and detailed knowledge of the aetual facts and of the situation. He is a distinguished soldier, completely fair and imparliai, belonging neither to one side nor the other. He has devoted one whole year to this service of the United Nations. He is available to the Council. On any points on which the Council feels in doubt, or on the whole military picture, the Council can ask him for his views and can supplement what it receives from him with regard to knowledge of the faets by such infonl1ation as the parties have given, and can correct to any extent to which a correction may be necessary the views the parties hold with regard to each of these matters. à Nations que Nations Unies et sable, celle modifier de son désir de règler.lent amiable invoqué nous cisé It has been said that India's position is that it desires anamicable settlement, a seulement through the United Nations. AlI true. India's insistence is that, although that settlement should be with the United Nations and the United Nations should take the responsibility for it, that seUlement must be what India says. It is not willing to move from its point of view, and in proof of its desire to settle amicably, and repeated attention being drawn to the fact that we have said we do not want to go to war over these tllings, l made my situation clear on the last occasion when l spoke in connexion with this matter. réponse le 1have now received, since l spoke yesterday, the last reply of the Pakistan Government to the Government of India on tllis matter. The reply is somewhat lengthy and l shall not read it, but after putting forward the kind ofconsiderations l had already mentioned to the Security Council, it says t11Ïs : "In the light of these considerations the Pakistan Government suggest the following joint declaration: "'The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan, being desirous of promoting friendship and good will between their peoples, hereby declare that they condemn resort to war for settlement of any existing or future disputes between them. They further agree that tEe settlement of such disputes shall always be sought through peaceful methods of negotiation and mediation and, if these should fail to bring settlement, by resort to 27 " 'In pursuance of this declaration, both Governments hereby agree to refer to arbitration differences that have arisen or may arise in the implementation of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, which both Governments have accepted for settlement of the Kashmir dispute. "'Both Governments also agree that the canal water dispute shall, if no agreement is reached by negotiation or mediation, be referred to the International Court Justice for decision. In other disputes outstanding between them, such as Junagadh, évacué property, boundary disputes and claims relating to assets, both Governments agree that if no settlement is reached by negotiation and mediation, the matter shall be referred to arbitration. " 'It is their earnest hope, as well as their firm conviè- tion, that the implementation of this declaration and the spirit which.lies behind it will serve to promote friendly relations ,between the two countries and advance the cause of international peace.' " The situation in this respect is that while the Government of India invites us to subscribe to such declarations, it will not make any move towards the peaceful settlement of these disputes, whereas our attitude is set out the declaration that we are willing to subscribe to and to issue and to act upon. l do not see that we are in any way behind India. As a matter of fact, we are mile~ in advance of the Government of India in suggesting practical way of settling the disputes in a friendly manner. To conclude, our position is this. We are prepared to accept the 6 February 1948 draft resolution of the Security Council [5/667] which was under discussion and supported by the six representatives on the Security Council who had already spoken before the Indian delegation withdrew to Delhi for consultation. We are prepared to accept, we do accept, the 21 April 1948 resolution of the Security Council [5/726], the whole of it as stands.. We have accepted, and India has accepted the 13 August 1948 resolution and the 5 January 1949 reso., lution of the Commission. That is the only point where agreement has been reached. Differences have arisen even, as Sir Benegal N. Rau said, with regard to the implementation of the resolution; that is to say, the second part of the resolution of 13 August 1948. !Je accepted and carried through? En lesquelles cet actuellement les deux pendant tions deux plexe incombe responsabilité dis-je, si précise sécurité convient Dominions ainsi Briefly,. again 1 shall repeat Sir Benegal N. Rau's words with which he started this afternoon, namely, that the whole problem before the Security Couneil is how loresolve the differences of interpretation that have arisen !Jetween the two Governments with regard to the truce stage of these two resolutions and to go forward with regard to them. It is a serious enough problem. It is in sorne respects even a complicated probiem. But the task is clear before the Security Cauneil, and that is the responsibility that lies on its shoulders. I trust, indeed Iam confident, that having now so clear a picture of the whole matter before it, the Security Couneil will undertake to discharge, adequately and effectively, this respon·· sibility towards the two Dominions and, indeed, towards thewhole eivilized world and to the cause Qf international peace. Le entendu de membres pouvons

As we have heard the initial statements of the representative:s ofIndia and Pakistan, it seems to me that, if the members of the Conneil agree, we might adjourn the meeting.