S/PV.467 Security Council

If there are no objections, we sha11 have consecutive interpretationfor the general debate, which we are about to hold on the question of India and Pakistan. Mr. SUNDE (Norway): It is with considerable uneasiness that I have followed the developments in the Kashmir case since the Security Council resumed consideration of it in December last. The valiant efforts of General McNaughton have failed to bridge the gap between the positions of India and Pakistan, and the poison from this festering wound in the relations between the two great nations is aL"llost daily breaking out in new exacerbated disagreements. At the Council's [458th] meet.ng on 29 December 1949, 1 addressed myself particularly to General McNaughton's proposaJ.l His suggested'basis of agreement seemed to me, 1 said, eminently fair and just, and 1 added that 1 failed to perceive what objections the parties could muster against the proposaI that would be reconcilable with their avowed common goal of a free and impartial plebiscite. l purposely couched my statement in cautious terms because 1 realized thàt it would be unwise to attempt a final and categorical evaIuation as long as the parties themselves had not expressed their opinions. Sincè that meeting we have heard long and carefully argued submî -"ions from both parties. These submissions have coverëd practically an aspects of the Kashmir conflict. Their important burden, however, has been the arguments for and against the McNaughton proposal. Today we have an adequate basis for judging that proposaI and the parties' reactions to it. 1 feel, therefore, that as members of the Security Council we have a duty, at this stage, to express our opinions dearly and forthrightly. Only in this way will it be possible for the Council to help the parties towards the elaboration of a just and workable solution. I have listened to the statements of the parties with keen attention and have studied the verbatim records [463rd, 464th, 465th and 466th meetings] with scrupulous care. 1 have also endeavoured conscientiously to keep an open mind to all the arguments in order not to allow myself to be prematurely persuaded by any particular line of reasoning, however convenient it might seem. But now the time has come for a final appraisal, and there is no longer any doubt in my 1 General McNaughton's report on the India-Pakistan question, document 8/1453, is dated 3 February 1950. The proposaI discussed at the 458th meeting was circulated as a conference room paper. ~e slightest ('hange. Both parties have proposed amendments to it, and it is possible that some of its provisions rnight be improved upon. But as for the essential , fentures and the approach to the problem, 1 am firl111y convinced that General McNaughton is right. His proposai proceeds from the obviously correct point of departure: India's and Palcistan's agreement !bat the future status of Jammu and Kashmir shall he determined in accordance with the will of the peoFle. This agreement, first briefly stated in part III of the 13 August 1948 resolution [Sjll00, paragraph 751,2 and subsequently elaborated in greater detail in the 5 January 1949 reso1ution [S/1196, paragraph 15] ,2 is not merely an important part of the edilice which has been laboriously built up by the ComnUssion in the two resolutions; it is the keystone which carries the' whole structure and to which aU the other parts are intimate1y related. This does not mean that the other parts of the struc.. tule of agreement should be discarded or disregarded: on the contrary. On this point also 1 agree with General McNaughton. The substantial measure of agreement on fundamental principles which has already been reached between tne two Governments undcr the a"'spites of the United Nations must be preserved. We must bear in mind that it was under the terms of this agreement, incorporated in the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan which 1 have just mentioned, that cease-fire orders \Vere issued by the opposing parties on 1 January 1949 [Sjl196, paragraph H]. The cease-fire agreement of 27 July 1949 [Sj143ù, Add.1, annex 26], completely demarcated on the ground, is also based upon and integrated into the same structure. Any attempt to bypass or whittle away its basic principles would jeopardize the cease-fire which has so painstakingly 1 been established by the Commission. We know {rom the Commission's own admission that a certain part of this structure has been rendered outmoded and inadequate by subsequent changes in the dynamic situation. This, after aU, is not very surprising. It would have been a miracle if an agreement designed to cover a short. transition period had rètained its full validity after its implementation had been delayed for more than a year. The problem is not a mathematical equation but one whichconcerns human 1 visoires PiOOstan, b4u~ novembre 3 IFor the texts of the first and second interim repoi:tsof the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, documents 8/1100 and S/l196, see.ofjicial Records of the Sec'Urity Council, Third Year, Supplement for November 1948, and Fourth Year, Supplement for January 1949. There is one important condition, however. The new provisions must be so designed as to.fit into the existing edifice. The whole agreement as it stands will he put in jeopardy if the parties, or oue of them, press for new pro"isions which -run counter to the structural principles. And the essential principle is of course - 1 think it bears repeating - that the future status of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will or the people. Every argument wmch bypasses or disregards this agreed objective is not only irrelevant at this stage but potentially destructive of the solid body of agreement which has been achieved. And this is undoubtedly what General McNaughton had in mind wheu, in his proposal, he deprecated unprofitable discussion of past issues. 1 agree that it is not always easy to determine which arguments are, and which are not, relevant to the issues which remain unresolved. It does not s~em difficult, however, to prune away a number of arguments as cntirely unrelated to the remaining issues. The unreso1vcd issues, as we all know, relate to part II Of the 5 August 1949 resolution dealing with the demilitarization prior to the plebiscite period. Certain principles are set forth in this part of the resolution which form the accepted basis for an agreement, the details of which remain to be worked out. Sorne of these principles have become defective and inadequate as a result of subsequent developments; when those principles have been replaced by· new ones which take account of the new situation, the structural skeleton will have to he filled out with the masonry of necessary details in order to become an organic whole. - This remaining task should be comparatively simple if the parties keep firmly in minù its nature and limità- tions. The problems will become insoluble, however, if the parties go beyond the immediate issues and press arguments which tend -to negate the structural principIes of the existing agreement; _ In tms important respect it seems to me that both the parties have erred. Arguments for and against the conclusive legal effect of the Maharaja's letter of accession to India seem to be irrelevant at this stage. The same applies to arguments tending to show thàt economicand strategie factors, or factors J:'elating to the population's dominant religious allegiance, favour accession to one of the parties rather than to the other. Such arguments are not only irrelevant; they are hannful· because they undermine the main principle of 1would like to add that t.'lis principle, this keystone of t.he whole structure, has an importance which transcends the obligatory force it derives from the consent of tbe parties. The principle has its intrinsic value because it embodies the only criterion for determining Kashmir's fate which is compatible with modern democratic ideals. It should be borne in mind that the unsolved problems concern only the practical pI'Ocedures through which demilitarization can be carried out on both sides of the cease-fire line in order to bring about conditions which will enable the Plebiscite Administrator to take' over. The parties should therefore faithfully abstain from advancing, let alone pressing, arguments which are incompatible with or unrelated to this objective. Within this rather narrow compass of legitimate disagreement l see only two important considerations against which the opposing arguments should be weigh~d and measured. One is that the demilitarization must be carried through as quickly as possible. The other is that the demilitarization should be so staged as to eliminate fear at any time on the part of the people on either side of the cease-fire line. On this point again. l find mysdf in full agreement with the main principles of the McNaughton proposaI. In conclusion, l beg the parties again to reconsider their positions and to take full account of their solemn obligation under the Charter of the United Nations to sett1e their international dispute by peaceful means in SUCi;' a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. It would be a tragedy with unforseeable consequences if they should give up their attempt to reach an amicable solution; it would be doubly tragic because a c1ear path towards an equitable and honourable settlement is so clearly indicated in the McNaughton proposaI. Sir de l'anglais): souviendront -du bref exposé et j'ai les propositions McNaughton. jourd'hui .les ont J'ai taines la lumière représentants Tous reconnaître 5 Sir Alexander CADOGAN (United Kingdom) : Members of the Security Council may recollect that in the course of the brier debate on this subject which took place on 29 December [458th meeting] l made a statement concerning the at~itude of the United Kingdom Government and indicated its general support for. the proposaIs made to the parties by General McNaughton. 1do not propose to repeat again today thë considerations which l put forward then, and which have been fully endorsed by my Government, which has now instructed me to add certain observations in the light of the statements which have been made tothe Council by the representatives of India and Pakistan. AIl of us her'~ must be agreed that this issue is cne of importance to us aU, and one' which demands that The Kashmir dispute has been before the Security Council now for over two years. Much work bas been done, work in the Couneil itself and by the Commission, and although a solution is not yet ,at hand, that work has been by no means fruitless. Here is an area of agreement, not so large as we'should wish or lDight have expected, and we must think twice befol'e we discard any solid element of agreement on whicha settlement might he built. 1 do not mean that we must be rigid or inflexible. Wc are here to deal justly and impartially with matters which comebefore us, and we must, of course, take due account of all developments which may be relevant. But if this .CouneiJ is to function effectively now, and ID the days to come, we must insist that its authority be respected and its recommendations be not made simply to be discarded or ignored. 1 say this atonce because 1 have Mt there isa tendenèy to reopen the earlier history of this matter in way which èartnot contribute to the peaceful settlement which it, is our duty .to devise. ~ne!'al McNaughten inbls statement on 29 December expressed the view that any legalistic. or historical approach to the matter would entail the examination of a complex mass of'detail. 1 have no~ wish to enter into sttc::h past history. . , The representative of Pakistan submitted that the history of the Kashmir dispute did not begin with the influx of tribesmen in October 1947. Any attempt to fix the initial responsibility for the present. state of affairs would ÎI;l.volve investigation of the daim made by Pakistan that the fighting beganwhen t.1}e Maharaja màdeunprovokèd attacks' on his Muslim-subjectE1. do not expressany view on that daim, but 1 refer to this point. as an instance of the dangers. that lie in harking back to the detailedhistory of this matter. It seems to me that we may risk losing sight of ourreal purpose ilirough becoming involved in the. discussion of numbers of points which are not directly relevant to a' practicalsolution. of the. probrem. l know that has been argued that proposaIs must beexamin~d against the background of past events. In many negotia~ tions' that is the case, .but wémust remember that, in this case, if we.can achieve' what we desire, that is, to enable the people of Kashmir. freely to express their wishes, by which the fate of the State will be decided, canisme: librement Pakistan permettant aux naître leurs vœux. les de vent, alinéas général What we are discussing is really a question of l1lechanics, of preparing for that free expression !'lf the will of the people. Both India and Pakistan have given their agreement to a procedure which will enable the people of Kashmir to make known their views. l am indeed glad to note that. in their statements to the Council the representatives of India and Pakistan seemed to be in full agreement with the objectives set out in suh-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of General McNaughton's proposals [5/1453]. graphe tion libre plébiscite aura lieu,à sible. néa dit librement trouvons tions Pakistan importance. que la volonté sont d'exprimer se Let us refresh our memory of paragraph 1. Subparagraph (a) refers to the intention that the future of the State shall be detel'mined by a free and impartial plebiscite. But, more than this, the clause provides that the plebiscite should take place as early as possible. l repeat: as early as possible. Sub-paragraph (b) under- Hues the desire of both Governments to settle the dispute in accordanc~ with the freely expressed will of the inhabitants. Surely we have in these two clauses, to which both the Indian a.'1d Pakistan Governments subscrihe, a most important principle. Both Governments ackr.owledge th~,t the will of' the people is to be decisive, and they agree that the people should be given an opportunity freely to express their desires as ~uickly as is found practicable. diques tenir de de le et deux cher volonté peut-elle passe Far be it from me to brush aside legal considerations when they are relevant, but can it be argued that the hopes and aspirations of the people of the State are in any way dependent ripon the question of who exercises sovereignty ovt;r· Kashmir at this time? Then, again, there are the questions of the disbanding and stationing of troops. Can it be the wish of either side ta lay itself open to charges that it is preventing the expression of· the will of the people in a free and unfettered manner? Can either side afford to prolong the present deadlock by insisting that this. or that·force should be disbanded at this or that time? One merely has to pose these questions to know the answers. How, then, can either side feel justifi~!i in pursuïng points suchas these which can do no good and which, unintentionally l know, merely serve' to frustrate the early expression of the will of the people? Delay is dangerous. In this case, it is no healer. Unless positive action is taken without delay, the present malady, which besets not only the 'ilnfortunate State of Jammu and Kashmir but also the whole sub-continent, may become incurable. Can it be anyone's wish to allow legal points of doubtful relevance to stand in the way ofprogress? Here, again, one merely has to pose the question to know what the answer will be. If safeguards or guararitees are required, it is up to' the United Nations to provide those safeguards or guaran- Considerable progress has been made towards the fulfilment of the undertakings given by the Prime Minister of India. With the agreement of boô parties, a man of world-wide renown has been nominated by our Organization to administer the plebiscite. Moreover, both parties have agreed to the performance by our nominee of certain functions, including the final disposal of armed forces remaining in the State, as pre1iminary to the plebiscite. These seem to me to be very substantial steps towards the eventual settlement of this matter, and l can see no valid reason why we should not be able to complete our task along the lines on which we have so far proceeded. It seems to me that the time has come for the Council to give lead in the matter, and for the members to indicate frankly what, in their view, might break the present dead10ck and contribute to the achievement of a solution which would be just and equitable and which they would expect bath parties to accept. l cannot attempt to concea! the disappointment of my Government that the proposals put forward by General MeNaughton to the two parties were not accepted. My Government feels that these proposals indicate broadly a basis upon which this matter could be disposed of quickly and fairly. l must confess that we are very sorry to learn that the replies of the two Governments showed that the high hopes which we had entertained in regard to the outcome of General McNaughton's discussions could not he rea!ized. It is now the duty of the Council to devise other means of carrying forward their plans. l think there can be no doubt in anyone's mind about the attitude of the United Kingdom after the remarks l have made this aftemoon. My delegation has had the advantage in these last few days of consultation with a number of other delegations, and we have been able to put our name to a joint draft resolution which is being submitted this aftemoon for consideration [S11461]. l should wish it to be quite clear tliat, in acting as one of the sponsors of thi~ draft resolution, my delegation im~tial plebiscite. It is, therefore, incumbent upon toth Governments to make every effort towards putting illto effect the arrangements set out in the Commission's resoiution of 5 January 1949. Ta tum to the question of demilitarization, members of the Council will observe that the draft resolution submitted to them does not follow General MeNaughton in his suggestion that agreement should be reached in New York in regard to the matters listed in paragraph 3of General McNaughton's proposals. If the Council decides to appoint a representative of the kind suggested in the draft resolution, 1 should consider it appropriate to leave it to him to decide upon the procedure he intends to adopt. 1 should hope that he might find it possible to begin negotiations here in New York. 1 would conclude by commending the' draft resolutian ta the.Council and to the parties. No doubt one or other of these, or even both, will find in it things that they would have changed; that must always be the case in any attempt to bridge differences of opinion, but 1 trust both parties will recognize in this draft resolutian a sincere attempt on the part of members of the Security CouncN to formulate proposaIs that will be fair and effedive. vVe are, 1 hope, on the way to a solution of a difficulty that has been embittering for tao long the relations between the two countries COllcerned. It is not, unfortunately, the only question at issue between them, but if it could be satisfactorily settled much else might follow. The ultimate method for settlement is agreed; we are only hampered and obstructed by differences of opinion as to how we can come to achieve that settlement, and 1 most devoutly hope that the deliberations of this Council, at this time, may make a useful contribution to the removal of these differences. les resolution qui leur est présenté ne suit pas la suggestion du énumérées vraient faire le est sera cédure la York. aux projet partie, des toujours promis vaincu de membres propositions sommes, à tions seule elle questions On ployer délais gences cèrement tribueront de avec tion formément [457ème gation forts participation une activité. constater avec l'objectivité testées, Mr. CHAUVEL (France) (translated from French) : My delegation had followed with the keenest sympathy the efforts at conciliation General McNaughton made during his presidency of the Council in accordance with the Council's action of 17 December 1949 [457th meeting]. The French delegation had encouraged him to continue his eHorts even after the expiry of his term of office as President and as a representative to the Council, and has therefore studied the report of bis activities with particular attention. 1 cannot concea;! my delegation's disappointrnent at finding that, once again, the conscientious efforts of a man whose impartiality and moral authority cannot he challenged, came up against the aU too familiar obstacles. What is the situation today, twenty-six months after the question was brought before the Conncit and almost fourteen months after the Commission's second resolution? The parties have agreed to the resolution of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. On 1 January 1949, they effected the cessativn of hostilities, and on 27 July 1949 they agreed to the establishment of the cease-fire line [S/1430/ Add.1, anne.~ 26]. They have accepted the principle of a plebiscite and consented to the appointment of AdmiraI Nimitz as Plebiscite Administrator. That is alt In other words, only the first of the three stages laid down in the resolution of 5 January 1949, the cessation of hostilities, has been completed. On the other hand, there has been no progress towards the conclusion of a truce agreement which, in practice, can be based only on demilitarization, nor, despite the appointment of AdmiraI Nimitz, towards ol'ganization of the plebiscite. In fact, for some time past, demilitarization has been the main obstacle to all ~fforts: not the principle of demilitarization, but the way to carry it out. If we consider the different interests involved, we see that the main issue is the political a:llegiance of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. That issue concems, first and foremost, the populations of those two States, and 1 may add, in passing, that whatever the solution of the problem, the question of refugees cannat be left out of account, as regards both their participation in the plebiscite and their ultimate settlement. It also concems, obviously and for various reasons, the two States which claim a right to those territories, that is, India and Pakistan. 1 must stress, however, that whatever importance India and Pakistan may attach to the defence of their respective c1aims, they have a still greater interest to consider: the cessation of the conflict which divides them and sets them against each other. In view of the present state of Asia and the world, it is unthinkable that two great countries which have recently acquired full sovereignty and have to face all the problems of organization and a11 the political, economic and financial adjustments following on that new status, shou'1d exhaust their strength in a struggle which has destroyed their past solidarity and· compromises the dolidarity which geography imposes upon them for the future. Is it possible that these two States, belonging as they do to the same great group of sovereign States, and Mr. GROSS (United States of America) : l wish at the outset to associate my delegation unreserved1y with the statements which have been made this afternoon by the representatives of Norway, the United Kingdom and France. The dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir is but one of many problems which have strained relations between India and Pakistan since these new nations were created by the partition of former British India..The Council will recall that, when India placed the Kashmir case before this body in January 1948 [S/628],8 Pakistan on its part submitted three other problems [S/646 awi S/646/Corr.l]4- namely, the deve10pments in the State of J unagadh, the recent massacres of migrating peoples in the Punjab, and the difficulties which had arisen with respect to certain partition. agreements between India and Pakistan. The Counci1 then decided, and my Government believes it was a wise decision, that aIl of these problems were interrelated and that a settlement of the Kashmir dispute would open the way to a satisfactory disposition of the other issues. What has happened since? Unhappily, the differences between India and Pakistan have multiplied and spread.. Today, the two countries are engaged in economic warfare wruch has resulted in almost complete cessation of trade between them. Sucb other issues as the Punjab rivers question and the évacués' property problem remain unresolved. In short, relations between India and Pakistan have markedly deteriorated. This is no light thing. The fa:te of more 400 million people is involved, people who, only two and one , Ibid., annex 6. This picture has a brighter side. The leaders of India and pakistan know that the differences between their countries are thwarting the legitimate aspirations of their people. They have repeatedly declared that these differences must be removed, and removed peacefully. This Couneil can, therefore, be confident that both Governments will direct their best talents and their unremitting efforts towards the settlement of their own disputes. The Security Couneil stands ready now, as in the past, to assist them. If the parties, with the help of this Cauneil, can find a solution of the Kashmir problem, my Government has faith that the good will of India and Pakistan will speedily find the means of removing their remaining differences. The Security Council has dealt with several matters of great importance to the international community, and the body of experience which it has gained has perhaps to some extent been generalized. When confronted with a dispute involving armed conflict, the first task for the Security Council has been to obtain a cessation of hostilities. The disputants must stop fighting. This means a cease-fire, and a cease-fire Hne. If necessary, this Couneil must, as it did in the Palestine case, act expressly under Chapter VII of the Charter in insisting upon an end of hostilities. A cease-fire, however, is mere1y a temporary restraining measure. It is the first essential action in removing excess heat from controversies which have passed the boiling point. The Council's experiellce has shown that the heat is quick to develop again when other steps looking towards a lasting settlement are not quickly taken. The next step, roter the fighting is stopped, is to draw the opposing forces away from each other and to reduce them, by degrees if necessary. As this process continues, the strain on the cease-fire line eases; its importance diminishes; a more permanent arrangement.takes place, such as the armistice agreements in Palestine .and the truce provisions of the Renville Agreement [5/649, appendix XI] in the Indonesian case. The wisdom gained from these and other experiences was recognized by the New Delhi Conference on Indonesia, held some thirteen months ago. Two important lessons can be drawn from previous Security Couneil experience. First, the elimination of military pressure between the parties to a dispute is merely a stop-gap measure, which must be quickly tollowed by a lasting political settlement. Secondly, while effectuation of a cease-fire and a demilitarization programme lS a process in which this Couneil 13 In the case now before us, India and Pakistan have agreed to the application of this general pattern. As a result of the praiseworthy and painstaking efforts of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and the co~ope.ration of India and Pakistan, both Governments have agreed upon certain bases of settlement which are set forth in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan dated 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. The principles underlying these resolutions are: that hostilities should cease; that the State should be demilitarized in order to establish more normal conditions of life for its inhabitants; and that the final disposition of Kashmir should be in accord with the wi1l of its people, to be determined by a free and impartial plebiscite. The first principl~ was effected by the ceasefire, worked out by the parties themselves, on India's initiative, on 1 January 1949, and by the agreement in July 1949 on a definitive cease~fire line. Unhappily, the parties, despite the efforts of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and more recently of General MeNaughton, have been unable ta reach agreement on the implementation of the demilitarization phase of the Commission's resolutions. The impediments to agreement have derived, at least in part, from conflicting claims with respect to legal and technical aspects of the dispute. For example, India's position bas been based in some part on its legal claim that the State of Jammu and Kashmir has acceded to India. On the other hand, Pakistan, in addition to opposing this daim, has pointed to certain geographic factors, economic ties and communal affiliation as offsetting the claim on India. From the outset of this case it has been evident. that agreement between the twc nations for an enduring settlement of the dispute must he reached on broad political grounds. The two nations at an early stage accepted the principle that the question of accession of the State should be determined by the will of the people freely and impartially ascertained under the auspices of the Security· Council. For these reasons, therefore, while the Security Council and the United Nations Commission for India and :;:'J.kistan have from the beginning listened with the greatest respect ta the contentions of the two parties on the legal and technica1 issues, they have consistel1tly taken the position that .a determination by them of these issues was neither essential nor conducive to a just settlement of the question. Thus, in seeking to advance this settlement within the existing area of agreement, we should avoid unprofitable discussion of these disputed issues and focus our attention on the pressing problems of the present and the future. In approaching the problem of demi:1itarization it is important to keep these considerations in mind as Thus, the Security Council, in the draft resolution which has been placed upon the table, and which my delegation joins Cuba, Norway and the United Kingdom in 'sponsoring, directs itseH towards this immediate and essential objective. In the circumstances of tms case it seems necessary for the Security" Couneil ta call upon the parties, as this draft resolution does, to agree on a workable plan of demilitarization and to carry out that plan as a necessary preliminary to the final stage of determining the wishes of the people of the State. The Security Couneil would also fuHil a duty by providing the means for helping the parties reach agreement. This' would be done by appointing a representative to carry forward the work started by the Security Couneil and the Commission, and to supervise such arrangements for demilitarization as will be agreed upon. The demilitarization proposaIs placed before the two parties by General MeNaughton unfortunately did not prove acceptable to the Govemment of India. The basic·principles governing these proposaIs are, in our judgment, fair and sound. The draft resolution propased by the United Kingdom, Norway, Cuba and the United States would calI upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to prepare and to execute a plan of demilitarization on the basis of these principles. A basic principle of General MeNaughton's proposals is that the armed forces on either side of the cease-fire Hne should be reduced, by withdrawal, disbandment and disarmament, in such stages as not to cause fear at any point of thne to the people on either side of the cease-fire line. The armed forces should be reduced in this manner to the minimum compatible with the maintenance of security and of local law and order. They should be reduced to a level sufficiently low, and should be so disposed, as not to inhibit the free expression of public opinion in a plebiscite. This principle has not been objected to by either party. The concept of accomplishing demilitarization within a single period, rather than the two successive periods envisaged by the Commission's resolutions, is consistent with what should be the controMing consideration in the demilitarization of Kashmir, that is, the need to minimize at all stages the possibility of a resumption of fightingacross the cease-fire line. The process should therefore be so timed that at the conclusion of the demilitatization period there should be no armed force in the State with any aggressive potential. The proposaIs also rest on the principle of embracing aUateas of the State, including those to the north of the cease-fire line, in a co-ordinated programme of demilitarization. This is likewise, in the opinion of my Government, an appropriate principle, consonant with the essential objective of any demilitarization. The Commission's conclusions in respect of the demilitarization of the northem area are clear and, in our view, sound and .practica1. The Commission concluded that "the entry of Indian forces into the area north of the cease-fire line wotdd a1most inevitably lead to a renewal of hostilities" [S11430, paragraph 273). The Commission's report continued [S11430, paragraph 275]: "The situation in the northern area today is such that the posting of garrisons by the Indian Army at any point beyond those which are now held by it would result in an extension of military activities by the Govemment of India although it need not necessarily imply an increase in the military potential which both Governments have agreed is not to take place on either side." l continue to quote from the next paragraph of the report of the Commission: "The Karachi Military Conference of July has settied the· question of·the cease-fire line. The line is now. demarcated and agreed to by India and Pakistan. Until such time as the conditions envisaged in the resolution of 5 January have been created and normal life begins to retum to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the line which is today a guarantee against a resumption of hostilities should be scrupulously observed by the Governments of India and Pakistan, and the opposing forces should remain behind it." In our view it is eminently fair and sound, and in fulfilment of our duty as members of this Council dedicated to peaceful settlements, to recommend to the parties that they accept a principle which strengthl should like now to turn to that part of the draft tesolution which envisages the appointment of a United Nations representative to assist in the preparation, and to supervise the implementation, of such programme of demilitarization as mayemerge from future negotiation!'. This feature of the draft resolution a~so has the full support of my Government. It is considered judgment of the Commission that a single person can now most effectively' conduct the negotiations and consultations with and between the parties. General MeNaughton endorsed and acted upon this recommendation of the Commission. In the discharge of the duties which the Security Council would entrust to such a representative, the closest and the most continuous relations with the two Governments will be neeessary. The mutual understanding and confidence which should forro the background of these relations can best be built up and maintained by a single individual. In saying this, of course, l do not wish to disparage the relationship which existed between the Commission and the two Govemments. l merely wish to stress that eontinuity and the resulting accumulation of understanding so necessary to subtle negotiations, are likely to be achieved more readily by one person than by a body of diverse personalities with the ever-present risk to continuity throu15n changes in personnel. In negotiations of the present nature, shades of meaning play their part and these are less likely to be 10st when stored in the memory of one individual than when dispersed, and perhaps differently evaluated, in the minds of several. l am privileged to join several of my distinguished colleagues on the Council in sponsoring the draft reso- 1ution which has been presented to the Couneil this afternoon. We have attempted, as loyal members of the Security Council and asfriends of both India and Pakistan, to bring to bear upon the Kashmir problem the lessons that this CouncHhas learned in other disputes and the knowledge that we have gained of the special factors 'inv<;>lvedin the present dispute.We believe that this draft resolution derives from the princip1es already aetepted by the parties. We are confident that it will contribute to the improvement of relations between India and Pakistan by enabling them to move expeditiously toward the dernilitarization of Ml'. HSIA (China): As 1 listened carefully ta the most able and' ski1ful statements presented by the representatives of India and Pakistan, 1 became increasingly convinced of the complexity and seriousness the dispute and wish therefore to endorse the thoughtful conclusion of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan in which it is stated [S/1430, paragraph 278] : ~-~The"oots of the Kashmir dispute are deep; strong under-currents - political, economic, religious - both Dominions, have acted, and do' act, against an easy and prompt solution of this outstanding dispute between India and Pakistan." My de1egation is persuaded, as was the Commission, that both Governments are ."keenly conscious· of their duties and responsibilitiesas Members of the United Nations, and that both desire a final and peaceful , solution of the Kashmir question:' It is therefore our earnest belief that both Governments will aHow reason and moderation ta prevail in their· deliberations so that some peaceful solution of, the existing difficulties may be found. Meantime the situation ca11s for patience, perseverance and statesmanship on the part of tlsall. For this reason 1 do not propose ta offer any comment on the broad and complex background of the relations between the two sister Dominions, and like the Commi~sion, 1 shall confme my brief. remarks to the .specific problems arisingout of theimplementation of the agreement entered into by India and Pakistan under "'he resolutions·of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. It is of course a mal. -:'" of rtlgret that these specifie problems have become \l'eritable stumbJ=~,., blocks to the implementation of the truce agreelnent. Genet;al McNaughton'sproposals were not ~acceptable because of the same diffieulties. I·refer to'the issues. of the disposaI of the Azad Kashmir forces, the withdrawal of troops, and the defence and administration of the northern area. In this connexion Iwish to make a general ob,;, servationbyunderscoring the conclusion of the Commission when it says that the· difficulty in disposing of these issues to the satisfaction ofboth Governments has been out of proportion to their.real importance. It has been agreed by aIl parties concerned that a .ftee and impartial plebiscitealone will give a final and peaceful solution of·the Kashmir question, and that such a plebiscite should be held·as soon as possible. If the method and objective are sincerely desired by both India and Pakistan, then none of these so-called issues sh.ould have any real or permanent significance, for theyare onlyimportantas preliminaries to a successful plebiscite. Let me first. takè the· issue of the Azad Kashmir forces. 1 think the Commission has rightly pointedout that the Azad forces have a strength which changes the military -situation anQ, to th.at extent, makes the It is also significant to note the concluding paragraph of the Commission's analysis of the problem [511430, paragraph 226] : "It cannot be said that either side has complied with the letter of part l, section B of the resolution, which prohibits any increase of military potential by either country in the territory of Jainmu and Kasbmir." It is true that the 13 August resolution made no mention of the Azad forces or of how and when they should be disposed of. But what is the actual difference in point of view between India and Pakistan in this matter? On the one hand, we have the declaration by the Government of Pakistan of 30 May 1949 [5/1430/ Add.1, annex 49j that the disposal of th~ armed forces in the territory will be determined by the Cornrilission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local authorities, in accordance with sub-paragraph 4 (b) of the Commission's resolution of 5 January h949. My delegation accepts this as an assurance that the Azad forces will be withdrawn, or otherwise disposed of, before the holding of the plebiscite. On the other hand, we have the memorandum of 18 May 1949 [S/1430/Add.1, annex 48] in which the Govemment of India declares it to be "of the uttnost importance. • . [that] the discussions regarding the procedure and phasing of the disbandment and disarrning should com- :. mence immediately after the truce is signed". Lastly, we have the issue of the defence and administration of the northern area. In this particular controversy the Commission has been placed in a very embarrassing position by the conflicting daims of India and Pakistan. The Commission has stated very dearly in paragraph 273 of its third interim report (S/1430] its reasons for refusing to accede to India's claim. The relevant passage reads: "The authority of the State Government had not only'been challenged; by 1 January 1949, the authority of the Jammu and Kashmir Government had been eliminated from the area. The entry of Indian forces into' the area north of the cease-fire line would almost inevitably lead to a renewal of hostilities. In consequence the Commission could expect that the Government of India. taking into consideration the wholly temporary nature of the truce, would he willing to waive a claim which was to be decided shortly thereafter in the preparation of conditions for the holding of the plebiscite." Le d'objections, aura

If there a're no objections, the next meeting of the Security Council will be held on Tuesday, 28 February, at 3p.m. The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.