S/PV.469 Security Council

Before we take up the question of the adoption of the provisional agenda, I wish to place on record our appreciation of the intelligent and capable way in which our lellow-member, the representative of Cuba, directed our discussions last month. Mr. Blanco gave evidence of his great persona! abilities, for which aU the members 01 the Council are grateful to him. Le passer tiens représentant tant dernier. personnelles, . Mr. BLANCO' (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): 1merely wish to thank the President most heartily for the kind words which he has just addressed to me. M. voudrais dent mon 2. Adoption of the agenda 3. The India-Paki§tan question (continued) Before calling on the representatives of India and Pakistan, l wish to inform the Council that the repre- sentative of the United Kingdom has asked, on behalf of the four authors of the joint draft resolution, to be allowed to make an explanatory statement deemed nec- essary in view of questions raised by the interested parties. Sir Terence SHONE (United Kingdom) : l have been deputed by my three fellow-sponsors of the joint draft resolution now before the Council to make a short state- ment on behalf of all four of us with a view to c1arify- ing certain points on which we have been given understand there may be some doubt. We have been asked to explain in greater detail the intentions which we had in mind in including in para- graph 1 of the operative part of our joint resolution the words "on the basis of the principles of paragraph of General McNaughton's proposaI". The sponsors believe that the general approach adopted by General McNaughton was right and they eons,ider that, in the existing situation and in the light of the information which has been made available ta them, the suggestions contained in paragraph 2 General McNaughton's proposaIs [S/1453] are not only entirely fair and reasonable, but also best calcu- lated to facilitate the early settlement of the dispute. It would seem to be unsuitable for the Council to more than to recommend these suggestions in general terms to the parties and to the United Nations repre- sentative. In working out a programme of demilitariza- tion, it would be expected that due account would be taken of the opinion of the Couneil and that the programme would follow broadly the lines indicated by General McNaughton. The United Nations rep- resentative would, no doubt, be guided also by the statements made at Lake Success by members of the Security Council. Subject to this, the United Nations representative would, of course, have a certain amount of discretion to adjust this course in the light of any fresh considerations which might arise. . The sponsors of the joint draft resolution believe that it provides a practicaî procedure for moving for- ward toward the final settlement of the Kashmir dis- pute by building on the essentials of agreement already reached between India and Pakistan. In putting forward the draft resolution they did not intend that the Coun- cil itself should engage in a mediatory effort or nego- .tiation with the parties on the detailE OY '~he application ~aughton's proposai. One of these principles is that the anned forces on either side of the cease-fire tine should he reduced by withdrawal, disbandment and disarma- Ulent in such stages as not to cause fear at any point of time to the people on either side of the cease-fire line. A second is that the armed forces should be re- duced in this manner to the minimum compatible with the maintenance of security and of locallaw and order. They should be reduced to a leve! sufficiently low, and should be so placed, as not to inhibit the free expression of public opinion in a plebiscite. It follows that the pro- gramme of demilitarization should be dealt with as a whole and accomplished within a single period, leav- ing only the mini:num of forces for final disposaI under tlle resolution of 5 January 1949 [S/1196, para- graph 15] of the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan; that it should embrace aU forces within the States; that it should embrace all the areas of the State, inc1uding the northern area, and that it should be sa designed as to reduce to the minimum the possibility of any recrudescence of fighting or disturbances. As to the question of the temporary administration of the northern area, the co-sponsors believe it to be acorollary of the maintenance of the cease-fire line that the military and civilian authorities on their respective sides of the cease-fire line must be able to co-operate with each other. The sponsors hav::, therefore assumed, as General McNaughton appeared to assume in para- graph 2 of his proposaIs, that there could be no ques- tion of making any change in the civil administration in the nC'rthern area. The sponsors are fortified in this view by the apparent belief of the Commission that any such change would involve the risk of an extension of military activity. If the .United Nations representative should find the assumption l have mentioned unwar- ranted, this draft resolution would not prec1ude him from suggesting other appropriate and equitable ar- rangements. It has been asked whether the provision in sub-para- graph 2 (a) of the joint draft resolution that the United Nations representative should interpret demilitarization agreements, is intended to refer only to future agree- ments. We confirm that this is the intention. In regard to sub-paragraph 2 (b) of "the joint draft resolution, we have been asked to define more exactly the extent of the United Nations representative's au- thority to make suggestions under this sub-paragraph. It will be observed that the wording of the sub-para- ~aph gives the representative a very wide discretion m regard to the kind of suggestions he is empowered 3 When sub-paragraph 2 (b) is read in this context, it should be clear enough that the Council would expect any suggestions which the representative might make to be compatible with the agreed objective. Only if he should find, after investigation on the spot, that the agreed objective was impr:lcticable, would he be ex- pected to make suggestions at variance with this ob- jective. The' mandate is made as extensive as it is in order to ensure that the representative will be duly em- powered to make appropriate suggestions in an con- tingencies, evell such as would today be considered highly improbable. It has also been asked whether the power of the Plebiscite Administrator in regard to the final disposal of armed forces after the demilitarization period would be affected by the present joint draft resolution. The sponsors wish to say that, under sub-paragraph 2 (d), it is anticipated that the Plebiscite Administrator would assume the functions assigned to him "under agreements made between the parties". Therefore, the powers v'~'ich it was agreed, under the Commission's resolutiOl. of 5 January 1949, that the Plebiscite Ad- ministrator should assume, would 'ot be prejudiced by the present joinL draft resolutiOI•. We have also been invited to clarify our intentions in regard to paragraph 5 of the joint draft resolution. It is our intention that the United Nations representa- tive should be in a position to exercise his powers im- mediately upon his appointment by the Security Coun- cil, and that the Commission should remain in existence for a short period in order to ensure continuity. Dur- ing this period the United Nations representative and the Commission would be equipped with identical pow- ers, but it is not anticipated that circumstances would arise in which the Commission would need to exercise its powers.

We sha1l now have an opportunity of hearing the views of the representatives of India and Pakistan, on the draft resolution submitted by the Cuban, Norwegian, United Kingdom and United States delegations. Sir Benegal N. RAu (India): 1 communicated to my Government the text of the four Power joint draft resolution as introduced in this Council on 24 February 1950 [467th meeting] and 1 have now been instructed to make the fo1lowing statement: My Government has given the most careful consideration to the resolution jointly sponsored by the In paragraph 2 of the draft resolution the appointment of one United Nations representative to perform the functions described therein is envisaged. My Government prefers that those functions should be assigned to a group of three, one to be nominated by it, one by the Government of Pakistan, and the third, who would he the Chairman, by the Security Council in consultation with the two Governments. Failing this, my Government desires that the person chosen as representative should be acceptable to it. As regards sub-paragraph 2 (a), my Gove'l'nment assumes that agreements that might be reached hereafter are meant. It also assumes similarly that the agreements referred to in sub-paragraph 2 (d) are agreements on demilitarization that may be reached hereafter between the parties. It is my Government's firm intention to continue to observe the conditions suggested in paragraph 3 of the draft resolution. This conc1udes the statement which my Government has instructed me to make. As l have already said, this statement is based upon the drait resolution as introduced on 24 February 1950. I shaH now telegraph to ,.·y Government the explanatory statement made by Sir Terence Shone on behalf of the sponsoring Powers, and I hope to give the Security Council at our next meeting my Government's views on the draft resolution as now explained. Sir duit est à la cédentes nom un tude des résolution. J'ai mérite d'exprimer. du s'il agir cette 5 Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan): While the Security Council has before it the text of the drait resolution,as explained both in the speeches which were made at previous meetings and in the clarifications which have been offered today on behalf of the sponsors, one is left in considerable doubt, and also in some puzzlement, with regard to the attitude of the Government of India on the specifie proposaIs contained in the drait resolution. I have noted, and l value, the expression of opinion which the representative of India has just given, and of course 1 am not at aH inc1ined to think that he ~as under any obligation to do more if he did not find 1t convenient to do so, or if he was not ready to do so taday. AlI that 1 desire to point out is that, on this score, one is left in a state of considerable uncertainty. So The ",:hole effort has been, and is today, that the actual settlement to be built up between the parties should be such as to ensure that objective: the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite. l venture ta submit thatany proposaI, whether advanced on behalf of either of the parties or suggested by the Security Cot'ncil or by any other organ of the United Nations, must be subjected ta thatacid test. We have been willing throughout, and we are quite willing today, ta have anything that .has ever been suggested on behalf of Pakistan submitted ta that test. If any suggestion put forw?Td hy us, any proposaI made by us, any condition u'Qon which we may insist, has had, in the opinion of 1he Security Council, or should have, in the opinion of the United Nations representative to be appoint~d under the draft resolution, or in the opinion of the During the debates in the Security Council, both in 1948 and now, following the remission of the matter to the Councii. by the Commission, an attempt has been made to import into the discussion of that aspect of the problem considerations of a kind which have no relation to the establishment of conditions which would ensure a free expression of opinion on this question of accession to Pakistan or to India. One has perforce been compelled, ",,,hen those considerations have been put forward, to make a reply with regard ta them, lest it should be assumed that they had some force or that there was no adequate reply. But one recognizes the justice of the comments made by the representative of Norway on 24 February 1950 [467th meeting] to the effect that those matters are really h-relevant to the main probleril before the Security Couneil. For instance, if an argument for the extension cf the military control of India to certain areas in the State of Jammu and Kashmir now under the control of the Azad Kashmir Government is based on legalistic conceptions of sovereignty, then, apart from the inherent weakness of the argument itself in view of what has taken place, the test is: Would such an exten..iion help the people of Kashmir to record their views on this question freely, or would it retard such a development or make it more difficult? This is the aspect of the problem that requires the real attention of the Security Couneil, and again, we note with satisfaction that the main features of the draft resolution before the Security Council are directed toward that aspect. We have already submitted to the Couneil that, at various stages in the consideration of this problem, the sum and substance of these safeguards that would ensure the free expression of the will of the people of Kashmir has been steadily whittled down. The Security Couneil started by plaeing on record its view that the main considerations were to exclude aIl outside military forces and to bring about , 'e SP' :ing up of a neutral and impartial administration in the State of Kashtnir, and that these two factors alone could ensure a free and impartial plebiscite. In the course of negotiations and the efforts of the United Nations Commission to bring about agreement between the two sides as to the conditions of a free and impartial plebiscite, this second main safeguard has had, to a large degree, to be abandoned, as agreement could not he brought about between the parties with regard to it. It is true that there are safeguards embodied in the resolution of the Commission itself which are cal- It is from that point of view that l desire to comment on the following paragraph of the statement read out a short time ago by Sir Terence Shone: "It has been asked whether the provision in subparagraph 2 (a) of the joint draft resolution that the United Nations representative should interpret demilitarization agreements, is intended to refer only to future agreements. We confirm that this is the intention." Of course, we obviously note that this is the intention of the sponsors, but if that is so, a lacuna still remains. What do the sponsors and the Couneil as a whole visualize would happen, or should happen, in the event that the dispute with regard to the agreements already reached should be again revived and presented, almost as a preliminary matter, to the United Nations representative as saon as he took over the discharge of bis duties under this draft resolution? To the extent to wbich the Security Couneil would have expressed its views in the draft resolution, he would have guidance. But would not or could not this paragraph he taken advantage of in support of the attempt to press upon the United Nations representative that he still has to resolve the disputes which necessitated the reference back to the Security Couneil? Sorne clarification at a later stage with regard to this would be very welcome. With regard to the main demilitarization problem, we note particularly the contents of two paragraphs of the statement that has been read out today. While we have no comments on the contents of the first of ~des of the cease-fire line must he able ta co-operate and Ihat, therefore, no disturbance of the civilian administration should take place. If that had been all we should have no comment nor cavil against it. But the paragraph goes on to say: "The sponsors have therefore assumed, as General McNaughton appeared to assume in paragraph 2 of his proposaIs, that there could be no question of making any change in the civil administration in the northern area". 1 do not know exactly what the ultimate dfect of this assumption is. Although it is put in the form of an assumption, it does say that there could be no question of making any change in the civil administration in the northern area, which, again, is complete1y satisfactory to us. 1 may point out in passing, however, that General MeNaughtan does not appear merely to assume. General McNaughton's proposaI in sub-paragraph 2 (b) is: "The 'northern area' should also be inc1uded in the above programme of demilitarization, and its administration should, subject to United Nations supervision, he continued by the existing local autharities". There is neither any assumption here nor merely an appearance. There is as c1ear-cut a statement as could possibly be made by anybody on this matter. That is in passing. The sponsors go on to say that they "are fortified in this view" - that is, their substantive view that there should be no interference with the civil administration -and that they have an additional reason or an additional cause far satisfaction in taking this view in the "apparent belief of the Commission that any such change would involve the risk of an extension of military activity". Now cornes the sentence which is the cause of our perturbation: "If the United Nations representative should find the assumption l have mentioned unwarranted" - 1 should like to know exactly what is meant by "should find the assumption 1 have mentioned unwarranted" - "this draft resolution would not prec1ude hiin from suggesting other appropriate and equitable arrangements". Would the corollary that the military andcivilian authorities on either side must co-operate with each other cease to hold good? Or, a.ssutning again for one moment that there were no JerioUs danger that if the Maharaja's civil authority were reeognized in these areas, there would be disturbances, would the United Nations representative be at liberty Again, with regard to these areas, the fundamental thing is not that the entry of the Indian armed xorces into them would bring about a resumption of fighting, although that is a very important consideration. The fundamental thing is - as l respectfully indicated to the Security Council during my first submissionthat at no time since 20 August 1948, when this question was first raised with the Commission by the Prime Minister of India [Sj1100, paragraph 78], has the military control of the forces of India been exercised or the Maharaja's authority in respect of civil administration been recognized with respect to a single inch of territory within these areas. There is the fundamental thing. If that has been so, then, whether the assumptions made here are found by the United Nations representative to be correct or not, what would be the basis for making any change? As a matter of fact, th~t is one of the principal questions which the Commission referred back to the Security Council. One had hoped and expeded that the c1ear proposaI made by General MeNaughton in respect of the matter would put an end to any further doubt on it, but if the Council does entertain any other possibility of a solution with regard to these areas, it would be only fair to my Govemment to insist that we should know it quite cleé!.rly before we could say whether or not it would be acceptable to us. As regards the paragraphs of the statement which relate to sub-paragraph 2 (b) of the draft resolution now before the Council, the first of these paragraphs and the first sentence of the second make it quite clear that '~the Couneil would expect any suggestions which the representative might make to be compatible with the agreed objective". As l have been at pains to reiterate to the Couneil a few moments ago, the agreed objective is the determination of the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan or ta India through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite. Regarding that. there has been no doubt whatsoever at any stage. 1 hat is the agreement between the parties and that is the agreed objective, so this sentence suros up the position quite r:orrf.'Ctly. But again, there is something in tbis paragraph, namely, the second sentence, which perturbs and disturbs us even more than the matter to which l have already referred. It says: "Only if he should find, after an investigation on the spot, that the agTeed objective was impracticable, would he be expected ta make suggestions at variance with this objective". We should like to know exactly what that means. l am sure that after this statement is communicated ta my Govemment, it will ask me to let it know the exact import of that sentence. l shall try to put to the Council the concrete difficulties that may arise. B:aving raised that, possibly a question of the interpretation of that sentence in the statement would arise and the United Nations representative himself would not be competent to interpret it. This is not an agreement reached between the parties through him afterwards. This question itself might occupy him for sorne weeks: whether he must start the investigation, or whether he is to carry through his duties with regard 10 the agreed objective. Now supposing that difficulty is overcome in sorne manner or other, would it be open for either party, irrespective of the tTnited Nations representative's willingness or unwillingness to undertake this investiganon on the spot, to say: "We undertake to convince you that the agreed objective is impracticable without your investigation on the spot"? The other side might !hen be under the necessity of having to convince mm that it was practicable. Again, the parties and the United Nations representative might get involved in an absolutely fruitless and futile discussion having no reference whatsoever to the agreed objective and to what we have no doubt the Security Council itself aesires should be accomplished. A third concrete question is this. Assume that one of the parties, not desiring to have the question decided by a free and impartial plebiscite, should create condinons which would make the organizing and holding of a free and impartial plebiscite impracticable, would the United Nations representative then be justified in 5aying: "WeIl, l am now faced with these conditions, and the agreed objective has become impracticable"? In his report he would probably not say that one party had made it impracticable, but it might weIl appear 1 that stlch had been the case. Would he then be within his rights to proceed to make suggestions at variance 1 \Vith the agreed objective? . There .are possibilities of all those kinds of mischief in the interpretation of this one senten::e, and we shall be very happy, whenever 1t is convenient to the Security Cauneil, to know, first, what is meant exactly by this Look, for instance, at the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948. It dealt with the cease-fire and it dealt with the truce agreements, but it did not go on ta deal with the establishment of conditions ta ensure a free and impartial plebiscite, and the objection of the Pakistan Government to the resolution was that part III thereof should have been extended so as to deal with that matter also. There was not much objection, apart from discussion of the question of details and clarifications with reg-ard to the resolution as far as it went, but when it stopped short of dealing with that aspect, the Pakistan Government obviously found itself unable ta accept it as.it stood. But when the resolution of 5 January 1949 removed that lack and made the resolution complete - cease-fire, truce terms, conditiOllS for the plebiscite - the Govermnent of Pakistan was not only willing, but ready, to accept the resolution and to do its own part to the fullest to put it into execution. That, by and large, continues to be the attitude vf the Government of Pakistan, but in the determination of those conditions the Pakistan Government, as l have said, has been pushed back from stage to stage to the last ditch. It fee1s that any further modification of what has been agreed upon and what it has already accepted would put in serious jeopardy the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite. We are not convinced that the conditions which already have been agreed upon completely guarantee a free and impartial plebiscite. But to the extent that a risk is involved in the acceptance of those conditions, we have reconciled ourselves to that risk, relying mainly - indeed almost entirely - on the fact that a Plebiscite Administrator of the distinction, calibre, experience and integrity of that gallant and distinguished gentleman, AdmiraI Nimitz, will see to it that, having engaged himself to guarantee that the plebiscite held under his organization and supervision is. free and impartial, it will be as free and impartial as human effort can make it. But as l have said, we have arrived at a stage in les voulu suppose l'Inde que nom les et Royaume-Uni membres commentaires des parole tants chaine

l should like to thank the representatives of the interested parties for their statements. We hope of course that at our next meeting the representative of India will give his views on the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom on behalf of the authors of the draft resolution. Having heard the views of the interested parties and having taken cognizance of the very important statement made on behalf of the sponsors of the joint draft resolution by the representative of the United Kingdom, l wish to ask the members of the Security Council whether anyof them wishes to make any statement or comment at today's meeting with regard to the statements of the interested parties or to the statement made by the representative of the four sponsors of the draft resolution. Two members of the Council have asked to speak at the next meeting. If members of the Council have no objection, we will hold the next meeting on Friday, 10 March, at 3 p.m. la 15