S/PV.547 Security Council

The competence of the Security COllncil to dea.l with the substance of this question is beyond question in virtlle of the relevant Articles of the United Nations Charter, of the fact that the armistice between the parties was concluded under the auspices and supervision of the United Nations in pursuance of the Security Council's resolution of 16 November 1948 [S/1079], and of the fact that both States - Israel and Syria - requested the Council to consider the situation which had arisen from the most recent incidents. 2. l think that the SecurÏty Council should examine the incidents in the light of the 1949 General Armistice Agreement. 1 It therefore has the legal authority to take a decision regarcling the interpretation to be placed upon the reciprocal obligations arising from the Agreement and, if it should so decide, to approve the paragraphs of the revised joint draft resolution [S/2152/Rev.l] relating to them. In view of the statements made by the allthors of the draft resolution [546th meeting] l shaH confine myself to commenting upon a few paragraphs at this stage. . 3. "Vith regard to the third, fourth and fifth paragraphs of the draft resolution, my delegation is .confident that the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission will shortly fiud a formula for a settlement which will enable the work of draining the Huleh marshes to proceed without clelay and without obstacles, and will compensate the landowners affected for the damage they have incurred. In theview of my delegatian, the project is beneficial to the entire area andmight 4. Consequently, the Ecuadorean delegation considered that, if the settlement proposed in the joint drait resolution could not be realized, the Councilshould examine what other means could be suggested so that the work would not remain interrupted for a ,long period, while at the same time the real damage it cal1sed others would be compensated. 5. The e1eventh paragraph, as the text states, is based primarily on the United Nations Charter and then on the Armistice Agreement. l therefore feel that our final judgment on the facts should be made after the necessary investigations have been completed. For the tin1.e being, l note that l have heard the Israel de1egation give a satisfactory reply to the Council regarding the incidents arising from an aerial bombardment [542nd 111,eeting] . 6. The twelfth paragraph is based on the Armistice Agreement é!;nd, moreover, is entirely in accord with paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), adoptec1 by the General Assembly at its 186th plenary meeting on Il December 1948. 7. If we consider the cIraft resolution from another point of view, my de1egation feels that it does not prejudice the security ensured in paragraph 2 of article II of the Armistice Agreement, and in no way prejudges or takes any decision regarding rights and territorial and poIitical'claims or positions of either of the parties resl)ecting a final solution of the question. Tt is clear, in my view, that whatever l'ight eiiher of the two parties has, or claims to ha.ve, over the demilitarized zone is at present limited by' the provisions of the Armistice Agreement and by the allthorized interpretation of article V accepted by the parties and quoted in the draft resolution. 8. Thedra~t resolution' i13. well-founc1ed because, as the Armistice Agreement is an international instrument reached after long and 'difficult negotiations, it is absolutely essential that all its provisions should, be respected byboth partiés. If the contrary, were true, there might be another extension of hostilities and we can and must believe that ne.ither Syria nor Israel wishes or seeks that to happen. In· fact, their representatives ,have so assured us: 9. Furthermore, the draft resolution tends to maintain the authority of the United Nations. 111 the view of n1.Y delegation, it is' absolutely essential that that authority should be confirmed not ollly in the Middle East, but everywhere, because, if it were undermined or abolished, the danger of a war extellding through- O\-lt the yvorld would be steadily inçr~élsecl, 11. At our [546th] meeting on 16 May the representative of France told. us that the root cause of the problem, in his opinion, was the fact that a final peace settlement had not yet been achieved. And our President, the representative of Turkey, said, if l understood him rightly, that since an armistice is a provisional measure, ftlrther incidents must always be feared while it continues. 12. Encouraged by these remarks, with which it fully concurs, my delegation wishes to put forward the view that the fourteenth paragraph of the resolution might with advalltage have included some expression of opinion and sorne positive recommendation to the parties to seek, at oncé, by all possible methods envisaged in the Charter, and however difficult the task my prave, final settlement of the dispute which now divides them. 13. The Armistice Agreement, as we all know, is merely a preliminary measure designed to help the parties towards a final settlement, sinee peaceful solutions are difficult to find while the battle is in progress. But the objective which the United Nations has sought, as it was in duty bound to seek, was a filla! peaee settlement. 14. To cite only sOl11e of the relevant decisiolls, let me recall that the Security Council repeated these objectives in a number of resolutions - the reso1ution of 15 July 1948 [5/902], eighthoperative paragraph; the resolution of 16 November 1948 [5/1079J, fourth paragraph; and the resolution of 11 August 1949 [5/1376], second and third paragraphs. 15.. For its part, the General Assembly explicitly called upon the parties, in paragraphs 5 and 6 of its resolutioll 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 to seek a final settlement. . 16. The fourteenth paragraph of the draft resolution express!y reminds the parties of their obligation to settle the dispute by peaceful means and 'expresses concern at their failure to achieve progress to promote a return to permanent peace in Palestine. l well understand the difficulties in the way of a final settlement of this dispute. But it must be asked what international pr~blem involving a t~rritor!al dispute does not, until It lS solved, present dlfficulttes which appear insuperable? 17. Many pr?blems have been settled at once peace- . fully and equltably. However, in other internatiopa,l 18. For this reason, l repeat, my delegation believes that the fourteenth paragraph of the draft resolution might with advantage have urged the parties more forcefully and more positively to begin conversations looking toward a peaceful settlement, or at least tow~rd seeking, in agreement and with the assistance of the United Nations or its representatives, such peaceful methods as they deem most suitable for discussing or achieving such a settlement. 19. The present situation in Palestine appears to be so explosive that it may at any moment degenerate into an armed conflict which will infiame the entire Middle East. The general international situation is grave and a precarious peace reigns in certain areas. l therefore consider that in the sometimes actual and sometimes potential disputes which are capable of spreading to other areas, and which we all observe with anxiety, it is the essential dutY of all States to endeavour with unwavering faith to find peaceful solutions. How many times, in looking back over past events, have we seen that the sacrifices which would have been necessary to avoid a general conflagration would have been very small by comparison with those which would actually have been necessary in order to put an end to a war. 20. We cannot and must not yield the conviction that men should be able to reach agreement if they desire it and seek it tirelessly and in good faith. On behalf of my delegation, therefore, l express the hape that Syria and Israel may reach a final peaceful settlement which will save the lives of their young people and preserve justice and the future harmony of the two States.

The Security Council has so far devoted five meetings to the present confiict, during which it has been able to take note of statements by the parties, reports from the Truce Supervision Organization and the views of Major General Riley. 22. The case before us beurs resemblance to that of last fall when the Council considered Egyptian, Israel and Jordanian complaints of alleged violations of the General Armistice Agreements. On 17 November 1950 [524th meeting] the Council successfully conc1uded its discussions by adopting a resolution [S/1907, 5/1907/Corr.1] which referred the matter back to the local machinery established under the Armistice Agreements. That resolutionhasproved to be a sound one inasmuch as it reinforced the authority of the Truce Super- 23. With the exception of the cease-fire resolution, which the Council decided to adopt on 8 May [5/2130] in order to put an end to the Bare-up of hostilitiesand which l am happy to say has thus far been observed by both parties - the present case in its essentials does not differ greatly from the one l have just recalled. l believe that we should be guided by the same principles that inspired the COt1l1cil to make its decision of last Nove1l1ber, and l therefore welcome the general lines of the draft resolution which is now before us. 24. We should indeed appeal to the parties to settle their dispute through the system which has' been especiaUy designed to solve matters of this kind. General Riley, who has now returned to Palestine, in his valuable statements before the Council has clearly .indicatedand the draft resolution seems to confirm this - that the remedies available to the parties have by no means been exhausted. The General's impartial authority will undoubtedly expedite a solution to the satisfaction of ail parties involved. 25. The draft resolution rightiy caUs upon the parties to bring their complaints before the Mixed Armistice Commission or its Chairman and to abide by the decisions resulting therefrom. The machinery is there. It must be used and respected. It gives wide respons.ibility to the Mixed Armistice Commission and its Chainnan. These responsibilities must be exercised. 26. Since the demilitàrized zone was defined with a view to separating the armed forces of the two parties in such a manner as to minimize the l)ossibility of friction and incident, while providing for the graduai restoration of normal civilian life in the area, without prejudice to the ultimate settlement, it stands to reason, l think, that neither of the parties can exercise sovereign rights in the demilitarized zone during the armistice, as though the situation had already found its ultimate settlement and had been accepted by all the parties concerned. 27.. During our [544th] meeting of 2 May, l had occasion to ask General Riley if he considered the question of the rights involvecl in the concession of the Palestine Land Development Company as falling within the jurisdiction of the Mixecl Armistice Commission. General Riley then answerecl that he had no quarrel with the project itself and that he felt - rightly, l believe - that the United Nations shollld never impede progressive worle. On the other hand, he said that unc1er the Armistice Agreement the United Nations was charged with the restoration of normal civilian ·Iife in the demilitarized zone and that he couId not work on the assumption that it would not affect the Armistice Agreement if certain Arab lands in that zone were expropriated. 28. l think that General Riley's answer was sufficiently clear. None of the parties, his answer seemed 30. l may recal1 that in Mr. Bunche's opinion, the zone must not be a vacuum or waste land. Perhaps the phrase from the draft resolution to which l refer means that, failing agreement between the parties, the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice ConU11ission may then decide what should or should not be done, basing his authority on article V of the Armistice Agreement and on Mr. Bunche's authoritative comment on article V, as agreed to by the parties. Or, again, should some such authority be established or decision rendered by the Security Council itself, to which the issue could he referred under the procedure of article VIII of the Armistice Agreement, which might, however, mean considerable delay? 31. In any event, it is the Chainllan of the Mixed Armistice Commission who has been empowered with special duties and responsibilities in a wide field. That authority should, it seems to me, first of aH, be used ta the full, The parties should abide by that allocation of powe~, ~reely accepted by them when they signed the Anmstlce Agreement. If there should be disagreement concerning the interpretation, article VII, paragraph 8 of the Agreement provides that the Commis- 5ion's interpretation shall prevail. There can be no question of unilateral decision by either of the parties. Much less can there be any justification for aggressive action by one party to force the practical implications of its own interpretation upon the other. 32. Rightly, therefore, aggressive actions by either of. the parties are condemned by the draft resolution. Rlghtly, also, the rights of Arab civilians in the demilitarized zone, who have been removed therefrom against their will, are upheld. 34. General Riley is now back on the scene. l believe that the terms of the present draft resolution, to the general nature of which my Government feels sympathetic, will on the whole clarify his authority as well as the duties and responsibilities of the parties, and will thus facilitate agreement where disagreement now prevails. 35. Tt is my firtn belief that there is still readiness on both sides to find a solution on the spot. Once the Mixed Armistice Commission has been seized of the matter, and as long as the parties respect the terms of their agreement, ways and means will undoubtedly be found to remedy the cause of the present conflict to the benefit of Syria and Israel and, indeed, in the interest of peace and security in the Near East as a whole.

The revised joint draft resolntion presented by the delegations of France, .Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States of America deserves our full support because it is in keeping with the provisions contained in the General Armistice Agreement of 20 July 1949 and cmbodies principles and procedures likely to be conducive to a peaceful settlement of this matter. 37. Article V of the General Armistice Agreement malces the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission responsible for the general supervision of the demilitarized zone, but the recent clashes between the Syrians and Israelis in that area are demanding from the Security Council direct action which may guide the Chairman in the execution of his delicate mission of promoting the return to permanent peace in Palestine. 38.. Tt 1S imperative that the Mixed Armistice Commission should he provided with all effective means for the accomplishment of its duties, and that full guarantees should be assured to its observers and officiais when they exercise their functions in the localities and areas which are the object of complaint. The draft resolution aims at strengthening the mediation machinery set up by the General Armistice Agreement. It does not prejudge any of the outstanding differences prevailing between Syri~ and Israel. We believe it to be fair and equitable to bath parties in so far as it only reasserts a course of action upon which they have agreed ln the past - a course of action, moreover, to which they are committed by the obligations assumed under the Charter of the United Nations. 39. Wewish to express not only the hope but the çertainty that both Syria and Israel will live up to their

If no other member of the Council wishes to speak, l shall call on the parties in the order in which they have asked to speak. 41. Sir Benegal N. RAU (India): Much of what l intended to say has already been said by the representative of Turkey in the very careful speech which he made at the preceding meeting of the Cout1cil. l therefore propose to say nothing more at this stage, but 1 should like to reserve the liberty to speak again, if necessary, after hearing the parties.

It is instructive to compare the present situation of the Syrian-Israel armistice with that which prevailed before this draft resolution was submitted to the Security Council three days ago. 43. On 8 May 1951 the Security Council adopted a cease-fire resolution, and General Riley made arrangements to return to his post. It was our understanding that if the cease-fire were implemented the Council would suspend its deliberation, leaving the parties, in consultation with United N.ations representatives, to adjust those clifferences which were not resolved by the cease-fire. Such an expectation, which l believe many members of the Security Council shared, was in full accord with the Charter and with the Armistice Agreement. Under the Charter the Security Council is responsible for the maintenance of peace and security, while under the Armistice Agreement the signatory Governments are responsible for the solution of other problems in conformity with the treaty which they have signed. 44. In that spirit and on that understanding the Israel delegation made contact with the Syrian de1egatian on Il May on the Syrian frontier, and began a series of conversations which seemed destined to achieve a settlement of ail outstanding questions. In reply to a letter from the Acting Chief of Staff dated 9 May 1951 conveying the tenns of the Security Council ceasefire resolution, the Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs had replied: . "Be assured that you will have the Government of Israel's fullest co-operation in implementing the terms of this resolution, it being naturally assumed that the Syrian Government wîll similarly co-operate." -45. But a cease-fire is not the only requisite of security in this Armistice Agreement. The Security Council had not responded ta my proposaI on 8 May [545t/1 meeting] to reaffirm that ail military and para- " (a) To withdraw any military and para-military forces with their armaments, ammunition and supplies which might be inside the demilitarized zone; "(b) That no aggressive action will be taken across or against the demilitarized zone; "(c) That general supervision for the implementatian of the General Armistice Agreement within the demilitarized zone rests with the United Nations Chairman of the Syrian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission, and in consequence there should be complete liberty of movement of United Nations observers in pursuance of their duties throughout the entire demilitarized zone; "(d) To reaffirm the undertaking to respect the 1etter and spirit of the terms of the General Armistice Agreement." 46. In his cablegram dated 14 May 1951, which is set forth in document S/2148, Colonel De Ridder, conveying the account of this meeting, goes on to say that the senior Syrian delegate accepted these clauses in principle, but stated that he wouId have ta consult his Government before he signed the agreement formally. My Government frankly regretted this equivocation, but had good reason to hope that formai Syrian assent would be secured, a hope which the Acting Chief of Staff strongly supported. His report, however, goes on to state that "At 0800 hours GMT 14 May formai agreement from the Government of Syria had not been received." It is certain that on 14 May an agreement on these lines was imminent as a result of direct negotiations between the parties. 47. Surely this was a situation in which all governments and United Nations agencies might well have shawn absolute reticence, while the prospect of a negotiated settlement, based on the free will of the parties, hung promisingly in the balance. On ·14 May, governments then rtlmoured to be initiating a Security Council resolution were informed by us of the progress of these negotiations, and of our conviction that premature actioi1 by any other organ wouId disturb a situation which showed every promise of advancing towards a settlement. Tt is clear that the formai acceptance of the principles which are outlined in the report of the Acting Chief of Staff would have led inevitably to a joint examination of specific problems affecting the demilitarized zone, including the interests of Arabs affected by the 48. The Council will note that complete peace reigned in a11 sectors. On the ground, there were no echoes of the violence which had convulsed the area for several weeks. At the conference table the bitterness of past disputes had given way to a patient attempt to rebuild the full armistice structure with an eye on the future alone. Across this horizon there appeared this draft resolution, reviving past animosities, imposing selective censures, laying down decisions on matters not yet adjudicated by the Mixed Armistice Commission, and containing as its central theme a hostile and impeding reference to the most inspiring project of social development which i11uminates the life and destiny of the area. We have now received the grave news that Syria has not signed the cease-fire agreement presented to the parties by the Acting Chief of Staff on 9 May and signed by Israel on II May. We cannot doubt that the publication of this draft resolution has had this effect. Syria is not going to sign this agreement free of charge. It is goin~ ta sign it at a price, and it hopes ta collect the pnce here today. My Government cannat conceal its unhappy sentiment that Wednesday's meeting of the Security Council [546th m.eeting] and all that has followed fmm it was a turning point for ill in relation to the prospects of an equitable peace; that it has marked a retrogression from an atmosphere of agreement to an atmosphere of controversy, from impartiality to bias; and that it has encouraged in Damascus a buoyant hope that the desires of the Arab League, if pressed by threats of force and by movements of troops, will fincl fulfilment in the chamber of the Security Council. That this is the mood of the Arab League is recordecl in almost sa many words in all the authoritative dispatches reaching New York from Damascus over the past few days. We are told: "Members of the Arab League seemed prepared to let the Security Council and the United States, Britain and France solve the clemilitarized zone problem if they reached an agreement acceptable to the Arab worlel." 49. This readiness, of course, is noble of the Arab League. Yesterday, reinforced by the Grand Mufti, most renowned of surviving war criminals, this League was still waiting, a little more impatiently, for results. lt now seems to be pleased with them, for this morning members of the Arab' League expressed "thorough satisfaction" with this draft resolution. Presumably, they have assessed it accurately as a complete and uncritieal acceptance of the Syrian viewpoint. But, since it is c1early their belief that the movement of troops has salutary politieal results, more such movements are announced. 50. Damascus is pointing a pistol at your heacls. gentlemen, and asking for appeasement. Israel asks only ta be left alone to drain its swamp. It is a dramatic choiee between the sword and the plOllghshare. How 51. Tt will be seen then that our chief objection to the draft resolution is its gratuitous appearance at this time. It recreates a problem. Tt does not solve one. lt. is disquieting to find that from Il to 16 May, whlle Israel was actively engaged on the scene in co-operation with other parties in formulating principles of conciliation ingood faith, others were secretly drawing up this somewhat sour indictment of Israel, forgetting nothing and forgiving nothing, reviving aIl the acrimony which the cease-fire resolution had dispelled. But the central point, of course, is the proposed recommendation to the Government of Israel to cease the drainage operations in the demilitarized zone which have been in progress since Oetober 1950. 52. l have already explained to the Security Council my Government's views on this projeet and do not wish to go into it fundamentally again. Although a legend has grown up that this drainage is against the Armistice Agreement, not a word in that Agreement· has been quoted to support the legend. l have persistently and vainly invited a quotation of some provision in the Agreement which couId mean, on any reasonable construction of language, that the drainage of this swamp is one of the things which the Agreement limits or forbids. If that were the intention of the Agreement, why did it not say so? It would not have been difficult to. forl1lulate a provision in article V. It could have been written as follows: "N0 work of drainage or irrigation shall be undertaken by Israel in the demilitarized zone except at the order of the Chairman and with the unanimous consent of aIl Arab interests concerned." We should then have known that this particular limitation was added to the other limitations which are specified in the General Armistice Agreement. But no such provision exists. How then can it be enforced? 53. l have explained that the Government of Israel would not have signed - and has not signed - any agreement which gave anybody outside itself a right to veto the normal execution of this projeet. l publicly repeat that my Government obtained assurance before signing the Agreement that the limitations involved in demilitarization did not inc1ude this kind of limitation on its civilian activity. The principle at stake is therefore very grave for us indeed: Was Israel's consent to the demilitarization of this area obtained in good faith? Are \ve now being asked ta accept limitations which, if they had even been hinted at before our signature, would have resulted in our inability to sign? 54. The issue is not in any degree, however slight, the issue of "sovereignty", an issue which may not even be legitimate1y raised in a discussion of the Armistice Agreement. vVe are therefore fully entitled to maintain 55. For if we are now told by the Security Council that the .Armistice Agreement requires Israel and the Palestine Land Development Company to lose control and determination of this Israel project, and transfers that control and c1etermination to Syria or ta the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission and the Arab landowners, then the Armistice Agreement is no longer the agreement which we consciously signed and accepted. It is the normal validity of the Agreement in the eyes of one of its signatories that would be weakened and undennined by this part of the draft resolution. Moreover, the inJ1uence of the Chairman would be profoundly weakened, and not strengthened as is hoped, by attempting to· endow him with an arbitrary authority in place of the very specific powers which he derives from the Agreement entered into by Israel and Syria. 56. It is not sufficiently widely realized that the Agreement of Israel and Syria is the source of the Chairman's functions under the Armistice Agreement. It is they who have set up this organ and it is they who hRve defined his function. This is the most basic fact both about the Armistice and about the Chairman. It is an agreement and not a dil?tat. But it would cease to be an agreement - and especially the Agreement w11ich we signed - under the tenns of a resolution ascribing to the Chairman a' power, not specified in the Agreement, of arbitrary direction over the very governments which have defined his functions in a matter not even covered by the Agreement. 57. Nor is any such dismption or extension of the Agreement necessary. Like so many issues, it can be solved as soon as we leave the reahn of legal generalizations, the realm of "authorities" and "jurisdictions", and come down to face the specific aspects of the political problem. l would like to co-operate earnestly with the Security Council this afternoon in examining and solving the specifie practical problem. It is no longer difficult to define what the problem is. The probh~m is not the drainage work in' Ruleh, either in or outside the demilitarized zone. The problem is exclusive1y how the United Nations should fulfil its obligation to the owners of the seven acres of Arab land who are affected by this worle This emerged very c1early in 58. On 2 May 1951 [544th meeting] the representative of the Netherlancls asked whether the question of the rights involved in the concession of the Palestine Land Development Company was one which might fall within. the jurisdiction of the Armistice Commission; General Riley replied negatively as fo110ws: "Only where itinvolves land within the demilitarized zone which is the property of Arab refugees. That is the only part of that concession with which we have anything to cio." In reality, of course, this is not part of the concession but a consequence of its operation. "H is not the concession itself but the expropriating of land essential to carrying out the project of the Huleh concession. It is regrettable that within the demilitarized zone there should he sèven or eight acres of land so located as to interfere ~vith the project itself. However, r am not involving t,TIyse1f at any time in the Huleh concession as a concession. 1 am only interested in protecting the rights of the refllgee Arabs who are within the demilitarized zone and whose land is expropriated without their consent. " ... 1 have never found fault with the concession at;d 1. never will. However, without deepening and w1denmg the Jordan River within the demilitarized zone, 1 understand that the project cannot be carried ?l.lt. .. Therefore 1 hav.e no quarrel with the project ttself. 1 feel that that 1S not a 111atter which affects either ~yria or the United Nations. 1 am only involved 111 the normal restoration of life within the demilitarized zone which affects the thirty, forty or fifty Arabs that own the approximately seven or eight acres of land within the demilitarized zone." 59. To SU111 up this opinion, the United Nations is not affe.cted at ~ll b~ the drainage work in any part. A U111ted NatlOns mterest or concern arises only in respect of the few owners of a small area of land In that case, is .it ~10t as clear ~s day that United' Nations COm111U11lCatlOns and Secunty Council resolutions should deal with the Cjl1estion of the seven acres which are the cause, of United Nations concern, and' not .with the questlOn of the drainage l)roJ'ect which in General R'l' d ". , 1 ~y S wor s, 1S not a matter which affects either Syna or the United Nations"? 60.. Once it is ag:reed that the only matter of United NatlOns concern 1S that the pursuit of this project affects the.owners of .seven acres, the question arises wl;ether thls ?bstacle 1S so insuperable that it may set aS.1de the proJe~t as a whole. Here we part company >VIth General RIley, for he appears to hold the opinion that the consent of these landowners is an indispensable di~ease is upheld in the 'text of this draft resolution, which would prevent any operations of drainage in the demilitarized zone until such time as an agreement is arranged through the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission. 61. l should like to point out that it is the text which counts, and it is the text of which l am speaking, not the expressions of intention outside the text. Undel' this text the work is he1d up until "an agreement" is arranged. It is immaterial whether the "agreement" has to be sought from Syria or from the landowners themselves. It is a clear political fact that neither of those two parties will ever agree. Therefore the text of the draft resolution, irrespective of the intention of its sponsors, does confer a veto power upon the very interests which are implacably opposed to the drainage ofthe Huleh swamps. Since there will be no agreement, there will be no drainage. Here we reach the astounding conclusion that the only parties which may not give the signal for the work to be resumed are the owners of this concession and their Govermnent. The draft resolution attaches no weight to their positive right to pursue the work; it attaches complete and decisive weight to the negative desire to impede it. 62. l am convinced that after mature refiection the Security Council will have no difficulty in revising this doctrine that the consent of these landowners, whose interests we fully acknowledge and recognize, is indispensable to the continuation of the wor1<. The Security Council cannot really desire to uphold such a farreaching subordination of public interest to private will. l doubt if any country in the world could ever have carried out a project of land development or irrigation if it had not been able to assert the public interest as a higher right than that of unconditional private ownership. How, then, can the United Nations in its collective capacity uphold a backward principle which any progressive Member State wouId reject individually? Let us not forget that this concession for the drainage of the Huleh swamps, now being carried out by the Palestine Land Development Company under the tenns of a financial arrangement with the Export Import Bank of the United States, is the same concession as that which applied during the previous regime. Why should not the same procedures now be applied as would have been valid at any time before 14 May 1948? If the Huleh project had at that time been impeded by the action of these landowners, the Palestine Land Development Company would have exercised its power to arrange fair compensation or exchange. If the individuals concemed continued to resist, they would have become subject to a compulsory procedure undera law 63. This law of the Mandate still exists on Israel, Statute book, and my Government believes that it could appropriately be applied; it has certainly .not be~n.rescinded in the area concemed, and there 1S a pnnclple of international law that private rights are maintained, irrespective of changes of regime. However, if the Security Council believes that the juridical qnestion is sa obscure that it does not wish the relevant Israel legislation ta be applied in this case, then let this positive dutY of surmounting an obstacle to the public we1fare fall upan the shoulders of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission or the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization. This would be a constructive and enlightened use of his good offices. Let him be requirec1 to do what any government in this area, during the past seventeen years during which the concession has been valid, would have been morally obliged to do. Let him lay down fair conditions for the protection of the interests of the affected lalldowners, whether by compensation or by exchange of land or by some combination of the two. Ali parties should then be required to accept that award. This would achieve a swift and constructive settlement of what has been described as the only source of United Nations concern in the Huleh question. It would raise no clash of jurisdiction. It woulcl assume thaï since there is no universal agreement on where the power of expropriation for public pm"poses lies, that power should be exercised as an interim measure by the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission. He would become what was previously the Mandatory Power for the exercise of .this particular prerogative, or he would become, as it were, the residuary of the legislation on Israel's Statute book. Faced by a situation in which a worthy objective confronts an obstacle, the United Nations representa- .tive on the scene should be instructed to overcome the obstacle, not ta sacrifice the objective. 64. l believe that there is general agreement in the Security Council on the supremacy of this objective over the obstacle. The reclamation of 10,000 acres from desolation and 25,000 acres from disease is not a matter thaï can be subordinated in any sense, or for any tÎme, to the disposition of seven acres which stand in its way. The renowned American archeologist Nelson Glueck, in his standard work, The River Jordan, writes as follows: "It is low and hot and feverish in the Huleh section whose waters are gathered into a smal1 Lake Huleh at its southern end. Practically al1 the children born in the swamps in the spring and summer months" _ those to which we are now coming - "die in early infancy with malaria; their eiders are worn by the ravages of this disease." . 66. In the light of this text, my delegation is perplexed by the re1l1arks of some representatives who have dec1ared their positive interest in the Huleh project· but have, nevertheless, seen nothing wrong with the text of the draft resolution. 1 greatly appreciate the eloquent remarks on this subject by the reprcsentative of France [546th meeting], who saiel that it is not the intention of his Government "to delay, and sti11less to prevent, the realization of work for public health designed ta improve land which coulc1 benefit greatly from the operation started. That is, on the contrary, a 1110st praiseworthy task, the prompt acc01l1plishment of which should be encouraged and facilitated." 67. VVe were si1l1ilarly moved by references in .the same sense by the representatives of Ecuador and the NetherJands at this afternoon's meeting. But lilY point is that these observations, which are exemplary, cannot be reconciled even to the slightest degree with the actual wording of the text before us. Anyone who supports this text is effectively, and despite his good intentions, against the project. This text does "de1ay" and does "prevent" the realization of this work. How can it be said that the "prompt accomplishment" of this project is "encouraged and facilitated" by the text of ft resolution v'v'hich, first of ail, stops the project which is now being peacefully pursued and then makes its continuance subj ect ta an al11105t unattainable agreement on the part of its determined opponents? Surely, if any delegation really wishes to encourage and facilitate this project, rather than to delay and prevent it, it could formulate a resolution ta that effect and join with us in an arrangement, such as 1 have suggested, for the "prompt accomplishnlent", the "encouragement and facilitation" of what is accurately described as this "most praiseworthy task". 68. But the text before us has c1early a contrary effect. It takes a wholly negative attitude to the project. It prevents its operation anywhere or at any time. In tenus of time, it involves an indefinite, and perhaps even an eternal postponement. In tenus of space, it does not confine its negative provisions even to the seven acres which are the only source of United Nations interest, It atte1l1pts to hold up the work now 69. There is another aspect of this problem to which l must refer in aU candour, because it detennines the psychological mackground of this problem from the Israel point of·;yiew. One of the worst features of this recommendeel stoppage is that it seems to us to come in direct response to armed force and to a threat of renewed violence. It is because the workers engaged peacefully in draining the swamps since last October were shot at, and on many occasions killed, that the Security Council has this cease-work draft resolution before it. The importance of the international principle here involved can scarcely be exaggerated. Faced by a situation in which one group of people works on the drainage of a swamp and another group of people shoots at them, is it not the dear dutY of the United Nations organs to stop the shooting and not the works? Instead, we have the shooting actively rewarded and its objectives securecl. For, if this ciraft resolution were to be acloptecl, any Arab State might be confident that it could hope to prevent Israel's civilian activity at any point, with the aid of the Security COlmcil, by directing its fire against that activity. The adoption of this veto is thus a serious threat to Israel's physical security. From the moment that this peaceful and legitimate operation became the object of armed attack, it became a matter of strict moral principle for my Government to avoid its suspension, for any other attitude would have signifieel the appeasement of violence and put a premium on aggression. The fact that this illegal ban was so blatantly sought at pistol point was a vital reason for withholding it and for'dealing positively and constrnctively with the specific consequence involved. My Government applauds the valour of the civilian workers and their civil police escort, who have braved the dangers of brutal violence, in acldition to the perils of the swamp, and have thus upheld in the fulfilment of their noble task the principle of resistance to aggression and refusaI of appeasement. 70. In asking the Security Council, then, to support our suggestion for dealing positively with the question of the seven acres and avoiding any negative action against the drainage work, l would summarize the aclvantages of that course in preference to the resolution as now drafted. 71. First, it secures a practical solution by positive ~c~ion, ,înstead of perpetuating a problem by a negative 111JunctlOn. 72. Second.ly,. it does fall within the agreed provisions of the An111sttce Agreement, whereas the draft resolution goes beyond that Agreement and thll:! 1,111dermines its credit and its moral force. . . 74. Fourthly, it would save the United Nations from the invidious position of appearing as a barrier to economic progress and development, whereas the draft resolution would make the United Nations the guardian of a swamp for an indefinite time. 75. Fifthly, it does satisfy the legitimate interests of the individuals concerned, without imperilling for any time a wider public interest. 76. Sixthly, by treating a specific and practical problem on its objective merits, it avoids any appeasement of the threats of force which have been organized so powerfu11y in Damascus during the last week, both through the meetings of the Arab League and through the diplomatic activity of the Syrian Government. 77. vVhy, then, should the Security Conncil turn such a prospect of agreement aside in favour of a resolution advocating the arbitrary imposition of an unjust and pure1y negativeinjunction and thus opening the way for a continuation of the blackmail threats of the Arab League? 78. r have but one final observation to make on the point of the Huleh concession. There may be a sentiment in the Security Council that, whether or not this .drastic directive is justified in itself, it should be upheld because it comes from the ChaÎl'man of the Mixed Armistice Commission. This feeling, if it exists, is based on a wrong impression. of the nature and character of the armistice system. l have already pointed out that the Chainnan of the Mixed Armistice Commission is not an authority appointecl by the United Nations and imposed over the signatories of the Agreement. He is an organ estahlished as a result of their agreement and his functions are precisely those which they have defined. Tf either party had not wished the Chairman ta have certain functions, then he would not have had them. This fact, toget.her with the specific provision that he may not exercise administrative responsibilities anywhere, mIes out any idea that he should operate by mandatory requests directed to the very Governments which have defined his functions and which are presumably, therefore, in a position to know what powers they have conceded to him. The armistice system involves a very unusual experiment under which the United Nations makes representatives available to join with certain States in democratic equality, in the operation of a peace system which they have conceived and established. 79. Thus, for instance, in the Mixed Armistice Commission the Chairman bas an equal vote with his Israel and Arab co11eagues. He has no greater authority than either. He has one vote out of three, and in some cases he has one vote out of five or seven. He is envisaged in the Agreement as a catalytic agent, not as a source of power. One or two illustrations of how this procedure works may be of interest. First, General Riley bimself, having expressed an opinion in his memoranchttn that it was Syria that had a veto right over 80. l tUl'n now to certain other aspects of the cirait resolution before us, and in particular to the. aspect which deals with responsibilities for past disturbances. lt wiU .be seen tl;at in the relevant paragraph the draft resolutlOn, recallmg to the Governments of Syria and Israel their obligations t1l1der Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter, finds that "aerial action taken by the forces of the Government of Israel on 5 April 1951 and any aggressive military actions by either of the parties in or around the demilitarized zone, which further investi&"ation by the Chief of Staff... may establish, constltute a violation of the cease-fire provision in the ?ecuri~y COU1;cil resolution of 15 July 1948 and are 1l1consrstent wlth the terms of the Armistice Agreement and the obligations assumed under the Charter." 81; The Government of Israel instructs me to state that it takes vehement exception to the isolation of a partÎtular episode of recent fighting for a severe censure - l believe almost without precedent in the jurisprudence of the Security CounciL On the nature of that aerial action 1 have already made a statement ta which we fully adhere. 82. l would recall to the Security Council that when five Arab armies engulfed the State of Israel three yea~s ago toda'y, ~ell upon Israel as it lay alone and unarded, and mfhcted more casua1ties on our manpower than United Nations· forces have proportionall:y 83. My Government believes that this definition, quite apart from being interpretable as a rejeCtion of our expressions of regret, takes this single action out of any sense of due proportion and inflicts a stigma which has no relation whatever either ta the antecedents or ta the extenuations of that regrettable ~ct itself. 84-. l should explain that on the occasion when l expressee! my Government's regret that it had been forced to take action which it now realized to be contrary to the Armistice Agreement [542nd meeting], we did not in any sense admit that that act was more heinous than the murderous assau1ts which were committed upon us by Syrian regular and irregular forces, and for which the Syrian Government had not, with similar candour, accepted responsibility or sought redress. Surely there is no moral strength whatever in such a unilateral condemnation of one single act accompanied by a veil of discreet silence over the entire course and sequence of Syrian aggression. We cannat accept any suggestion that Israel responsibility is greater than or even equal ta that of the Syrian forces which began shooting at our workers in the Huleh swamps last February, which began ta shoot at the Ein Gev area from Nuqeib c1uring March, which established a mi1itary post at El Hamma from which they inflicted casualties upon our policemen, which invaded Tel el Mutilla by repeated assal1lt, an area on the territory of Israel outside the demilitarized zone, leaving behind unmistakable and accredited evidence of military occupation by Syria, which refuses to this day ta conclude a cease-fire agreement until such time, presumably, as the political prospect becomes clarified. 85. Not merely, then, is this paragraph one-sided in its disproportionate emphasis of an action for which regret has already been expressed, but also in its complete ref11sal, despite the evidence brought before the Council, ta identify a single act of Syrian violence at any single phase of these events. If it is said that responsibility for the. events at Tel el Mutilla, for the shooting of Israel policemen at El I-Iamma, for repeated attacks on Ein Gev from Nuqeib, cannat here be identified because the Mixed Armistice Commission has 110t met and fixed responsibilities, the same legal fact is true of the bombardment of the Syrian outpost near El Hamma. But it is not legitimate ta discriminate between the two simply by virtue of the fact that one of the parties appears to have penalized itself by the expression of regret. 87. For this reaSOll, my Gavernment wishes to enter aprotest, first, against what this paragraph contains and secondly, against what it omits. It contains a gratuitous reference ta an incident which should by most doctrines of chivalry he regarded as past, and it draws far tao careful a cm'tain over a persistent series of Syrian agg'ressions which the draft resolution refuses to see, refuses to recognize or in any sense to determine. 88. The following paragraph notes a complaint with regard to the evacuation of Arab residents fram the de111ilitarized zone, and presumably goes on to pass judgment on that claim and to decide that Arab civilians who have been removed from the demilitarized zone by the Gavernment of Israelthere is a clear statement that such removals under governmental auspices have taken place by process of duress - should be permitted to return forthwith to their homes, and that the Mixec1 Armistice. Commission should supervise their return and rehabilitatian in a manner ta be determinec1 by the Commission. 89. l think that it will be clear ta the sponsors of this draft resolutioll that this particular paragraph is in complete conflict with article VII, paragraph 7 of the General Armistice Agreement, which lays clown the procedures whereby aIl complaints, including this one, should be investigated and judged. That paragraph . reads: "Claims or complaints presented by either party . relating ta the application of this Agreement shall be referred immediately to the Mixed Armistice Callunission through its Chairman.The· Commission shal1 take such action on aH such claims or complaints by means of its observation and investigation machinery as it may deem appropriate, with a view to equitable and mutually satisfactory settlement." 90. This procedure has not been followed. The Government of Israel denies that there has been any impropel' transfer by duress in a manner inconsistent with the terms of the Armistice Agreement. Until a finc1ing in favour of this complaint is recorded by the Mixed Armistice Commission, it is in our view not proper to <) state, as though it were a fact, that civilians have been removed from the demilitarizfldzone by the Government of Israel. Neither the complaint of the aggrieved 91. If the Mixed Armistice Commission were to sit in judgment on such a complaint and to find it valid in whole or in part, then even the duty of suggesting redress would fall in the first place on the Mixed Armistice Commission. l t seems to me that there is no case, again, .for isolating this complaint for a determination by the Security Council and without going through the procedure of the Mixed Armistice Commission, unless the Security Council is equally ready to short-circuit the Mixed Armistice Commission in respect of the other complaints which my Government and other governments have brought before the Council, and to undertake its own procedures of judgment and investigation. 92. It has been accurately said by i11any representatives that the basic cause of the tension which has brought these problems before the Security Council is the fact that the armistice system has lingered beyond its expected duration and still shows no signs of being developed into a permanent peace settlement. This, however, is not a situation that has arisen, as is suggested in a later paragraph of the draft resolution, because of the equal failure of the Governments of Israel and Syria to achieve progress pursuant to their commitments under the Armistice Agreement to promote the return to permanent peace in Palestine; for this paragraph establishes an artificial equalization between one party which continually affinns its readiness to negotiate for a deve10pment of the armistice system and the establishment of a peace treaty, and another government which refuses eyen to estabish the contacts and procedures of negotiation which might lead ta that result. Surely, no formulation which establishes such an equality is consistent with the facts; and the basic fact is that the refusaI to negotiate, and therefore the impossibility to make progress, is the policy of one of the parties and certainly not of both. 93. The background under which this discussion goes forward is distinguished by far more than the menacing threats which have been heard from Damascus in, recent weeks. This morning the Government of Iraq officially al1nounced its own action in despatching to Syria aircraft and artiL1ery from Iraq, accompanied by announcements of the movement of other' Iraqi troo])s in the same direction. In the view of my Government this movement of troops raises extremely serious issues beyond the purview of this n;solution, bt-\t clirectly affecting .it. .' '. 95. This course of development and these heavy tensions will compel a state of high alertness for Israel, and politically this new alignment of Arab League forces, as the Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs announced this morning, provides an unfortunate background for the draft resolution sponsored by the four Powersin the Security Council. 96. We can on1y suggest with a11 emphasis that appeasel11ent of these t1ueats, whether past or potentia1, cannot be a short-cut to peace and that the draft reso- 1ution which weights the scale against the threatenecl and aggrieved party implies a serions misinterpretation of the Armistice Agreement itself. Thus instead of reinf?rcing the structure of the Agreement so 1aborious1y b1.ult up undcr United Nations auspices, it may on1y strength.en. the hands of those who by force seek to pull the anmstIce system down. 97. There are other aspects of tbis draft reso1ution in which a certain lacl< of balance and a tendency to encroach upon the Armistice Agreement is visible. Thus, for examp1e, the fourth paragraph notes that article V of the General Armistice Agreement gives to the Chairman the. ,reSl?Onsibility for the general supervision of the del11lhtanzed zone. However, if we constl1t article V of the' qe~l~ral Armistice Agreement, we find that the res~onslb111ty of the Chairman is not definec\ in any such wlde tenns. The responsibility of the Chairman of the Armistice Commission, according to article V of the. Agreeme~lt, is simp1y to ensure the imp1emen!~tIOl: of artIcle V. of the Agreement within the demlhtanzed ~one. Artlc.1e. V, in fact, does not in any sense make'h1111 an ac1ml111strator of the demilitarized zone, but t1;e agent .r~sponsible ~or the imp1ementation of.the speclfic prOVISIOns of artIcle V. IVe raise this pOll1t not onl:y .because <;Jf its intrinsic importance, which m~y not l~e ':ls1b1e at th1S moment, but in order to estabbbsh a pnnc1p1e that everytbing that is in the Armistice Agreement cannot be susceptible to change. The de- 98. The powers of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission mnst remain and must be defined in the exact language that the parties have used. If we were to accept any other principle of extensive interpretation, then the aspect of agreement which is the basis and the backbone of the armistice treaty would be lost from sight, and the text upon which the parties have laboriously agreed would be the subject of potential change from outside the parties themselves. 99. Another paragraph of the draft resolution quotes a letter from Ml'. Bunche relating to the interpretation of artic1e V of the Armistice Agreement. lt is not easy at any time to select a quotation from a docnment, every word of which has its particular validity, and to omit any other paragraph without disturbing the balance. \7Ve are, however, c1isquieted by one omission of what was for us the central reassurance of that letter. The parties are called upon to give effect to this excerpt, but that excerpt is quoted as not to inc1ude the crucial assurance that the demilitarization of the zone does not mean that the zone shall be either a vacuum or a wasteland. If there is any sentence in Ml'. Bunche's letter which has a most specific relevance to the subject under discussion, it is this injunction against the maintenance of the desolation of this area. 100. In conclusion, l would only refer again to the vital importance which the Governil1ent and people of Israel attach to the area under discussion. l do not believe that there is any area of similar restricted size which has sa portentous a meaning for the survival and the future of Israel. Referring to the concentration in that area of all the water sources which are necessary to prevent Israel from becoming a wilderness, l said, on a previous occasion [542nd 111,eetillg] , that whoever holds the area of Lake Huleh and its banks, together with the area to its north, clutches Israel at its t1uoat, and commands its very prospect of existence or survival. Some members of the Security Council and other colleagues might have felt that this was pntting too highly the essential and indispensable character of this area from the Israel point of view. But l think a few people will realize the historical fact that when the boundaries between the mandated territories of Syria and Palestine were under discussion, the United Kingdom. announced its refusai to accept the mandate for Palestine unless the area now under discussion were incll.lded within its horders, and that this discussion actually impeded and held up the signature of the peace treaties after the First World vVar for days and for weeks. 101.· In the course of that discussion, the representative of the United Kingdom, as the prospective mandatory Power, announced that Great Britain would not accept a mandate for "a Palestine which would mere1y .include the barren rocks of Judea, and which mightatany moment be relldered a desert through the "The waters of Palestine were essential ta its existence. vVithout those waters, Palestine would be a wilderness; and aU Jews were unanimously agreed that the sources of Hermon and the head-waters of the Jordan were vital to the existence ai the country. On the other hand, those same waters were of no use to anyone holding Syria. They could in effect only be used for the purpose of bargaining or for the purpose of obtaining concessions from Palestine." 102. There is very little distinction between that remark and the statement that for these areas ta fall under Syrian control would place the State of Israel and its development at the mercy of Syria. 103. These were the reasons which animated my Government in refusing to sign any agreement which left a relic or vista of Syrian military control still within the area concerned. It is clear that if it was authoritatively said in 1923 that without this area Palestine would become a wilderness, it is increasingly true - l repeat, increasingly true - that without this area, Israel, with its vastly increasing population, would become a wilderness. Such then are the considerations which explain the devotion of the Government and people of Israel to their interests in this area, and their reluetance to accept limitations other than those which are specifically laid clown in the Armistice Agreement. 104. This is the third anniversary of the original aggression which the Arab States launched against Israel for its destruction. This onslaught by five armies for the purpose of extinguishing a neighbouring State, and with the infliction of bereavement on almost every home in Israel, was not defL11ed very stringently in official documents at that time. RecaUing the moment when they stood alone, first in defence of the State itself and then in defence of its southern regions, whel1 they came under both military and political challenge, the people of Israel 110W feel towards this northern region that same clegree of ardent, concentrated and tenacious devotion which has been their chief attribute throughout the years of their independence. 105. Faris EL-KI-IOURI Bey (Syria): l wish first to thank the representative of Ecuador for calling attention to the fourteenth paragraph in the draft resolution, and emphasizing its meaning, so as ta calI the attention of the parties to achieving progress "pursuant to their commitments under the Armistice Agreement to promote the return to permanent peace in Palestine." In reality this is a very important point ta which the draft resolutiol1 reiers. At the same time l should not like to have this question pass without being com1l1.ented upon clec1.rly to show that Syria is not responsible for the delay in the negotiations for final peace in Palestine. 106. l remind the members of the Security Counci1 of the fact that the General Assembly at its thircl session 107. How can the Arabs accept such a situation and allow the Israeliscontinuously to defy, one year after another, the resolutions of the General Assembly? And they want us to agree with them, to recognize their existence as an independent State in the middle of the Arab world and to leave our Palestinian Arabs scattered in such a fashioll. They refuse to allaw these Arabs to be repatriated to their own homes. Dnc1er the auspices of the United Nations, in this type of civilization where human rights are so applaucled, respected and studied by our Organization, such a large 11tuuber of people are left to look at their properties from a distance and they cannot touch or approach them. vVhy? Because these properties are appropriated by foreigners, by marauders who came from all parts of the world to live there without any right or justification. 108. Now they blame us by asking: \Vhy do you not negotiate and establish peace with them? We are ready to finish this question, but let us take the first step which was ordered by the Security Council, as long as the Israelis are so adamant in their attitude against the resolutions of the General Assembly that they do not want to implement any of them. How can we face our Arab refugees, who are scattered in that way, and tell 109. This is the situation with regard to this paragrap~, and, for thes~ reasons,. l do not think it w,ould be fau" for the Secunty Councll to condemn the fallure of both Govermnents, since it is the Israelis who are placing the obstacles in the path of this work. 110. The second point on which l wish to say a few words concerns the statement of the representative of the N etherIands, who said that it would be impossible to obtain an agreement with regard to the drainage work, if that were dependent upon or subject to an agreement between Syria and Israel. l do not think that the representative of the Netherlands is just in prej udging the situation. The two parties have never met together to study this matter in order to see whether it is possible to do something about it. The Syrians wanted to discuss this matter and ta have it considered by the Mixed Armistice Commission. Perhaps some way might be found by which it would be possible ta mitigate or decrease or eliminate the dangers which the Syrians now foresee with regard to this drainage worIe. 111. It 1S not a matter only of seven acres of land, as the representative of Israel wishes ta make it. Syria is concerned in this drainage and in the results of the work. The results would be dangerous for the interests of Syria. In my first address on 17 April [541st 111,eeting], l submitted several reasons to the Security Council ta show how Syria is interested in this matter and why Syria objected and wished to be consulted and negotiated with on this subject. The six points which l then presented were not challel1ged, and l am ready now to meet with anybody in order to show we are justifiecl in claiming that we should be consulted, since Syria is a co-signatory ta the Armistice Agreement, and the c1el11ilitarized zone was created by a mutual convention between Syria and Israel. 112. l t is not a matter only of draining the swamps. It is a matter of work being done in the demilitarized zone and, further, the demilitarized zone woulcl be affected by the result of the drainage to snch an extent that the interests and position of Syria would be enclangered. Bad this work been outside the demilitarized zone and in Israel territory, no one would have objected. 1t is not a matter of seven acres, it is a matter of the reaction on Syrian interests in the demilitarized zone, and Syria could never accept the ignoring by Israel of the fact that it is a co-signatory to the Armistice Agreement. 113. The worle is being carried on in the demilitarized zone, and the sovereignty of this territoty has yet to be 114. The representative of Israel has said that it is work of sanitation which is being carried out. It may be sanitation work, but there are 111any means, other than drainage, to combat malaria. If we are to escape malaria, then all the water in the world would have to be drained, but there are other 111eans. This concession, upon which the Jews now rely, has been in their hands for seventeen years. Why, since they say they could have done it during the period of the Mandate, did they Dot do it during that period? Now they wish to do it during this critical time, when the situation in the N ear East is far from calm. By doing so, they certainly woulel be affecting the maintenance of peace and security in that area. 115. The Israelis say that the Arab League is meeting in Da111ascus on this subject and is making preparations. l do not see why the meetings of representatives of a regional organization should be prohibited or condemned for any reason. They have a right ta meet and to consult together or any given situation, especially at pr,esent. This is not the only matter which concerns the meeting. There are world difficulties and world dangers. There is danger of serious disturbance of international peace and security. The Arab States should confer and decide among themse1ves as to the attitude they are going to adopt in the present worlel situation, the situation at Huleh and other situations. l assure the Security Council and the world that the Arabs never raise any suggestion of offensive activity against the Jews or anyone else during their consultations. They may discuss defensive matters, but nothing else. Therefore l do not think the Israelis have a right to oppose such meetings or to interpret them in different ways. 116. The representative of Israel referred ta the ceasetire and said that Syria had not adhered to the resolutions of the Assembly calling for a cease-fire. l wish to tell him and ta tell the Council, solemnly, that Syria not only accepts the cease-fire but has accepted it and condemned the fighting from the beginning. The Syrian Army never particijmted in such fighting. 117. l am sorry to say that to the I~raelis any movement among the Arab civilians or Arab peasants represents the Syrian Army. These are not the activities of the Syrian Army. For example, on 16 May, the day before yesterday, l received a cable'1rom my Govern- 118. Furthermore, in his statement today opposing the draft resolution before the Council, the representative of Israel said that that draft resolution condemns not the Arabs but the jews. l would say this: Suppose it were true - which it is not - that the draft reso- 1ution condemns only the Jews and not the Arabs. That would be quite proper. The Jews have at various times violated several stipulations of the Armistice Agreement., If the draft resolution did condemn the Jews, the Security Cotlncil would be basing itself on reports which it has received from its representatives on the scene. It is only in Mr. Eban's speeches and in the declarations of Jewish spokesmen in their Press and radio that Syria is shown to be the aggressor. Have the official observers, the United Nations representatives on the secne, shown Syria to be the aggressor? Have they at any time declared that Syria is committing acts of aggression? No, they have declarec1 that the Israelis have cOl11mitted many acts violating the Armistice Agreement and many acts of aggression. The Security Council could not be hlamed for basing itseH on the authentic reports which are before it. In fact, if anyone can criticize the draft resolution, it is Syria, for that draft resolution is not very clear; it does not name those who deserve to be named, openly and correctly. In many cases, it refers to complaints from both sides. But which complaints have been confirmec1 by reports of the observers? Vvere they Israel violations or Syrian violations? Tt is quite clear that the Israelis have been committing the acts of violation; there is no dispute about that. 119. The withdrawal of military and para-l11ilitarv forces from the c1emilitarized zone is a condition of the Armistice Agreement. AU of the reports of the observers which have been submitted to the Security. Council by the Chief of Staff affirm that no Syrian soldiers have ever been seen in any sector of the demilitarized zone, whereas Israel solc1iers and officers have been seen there and ordered to withdraw. In fad, the Israel soldiers went even further: they occupied, and are so far as l know still occupying, sectors of the demilitarized zone; l have no information as to whether they have witheli-awn since the cease-fire and other recent events. 121. As regards leaving the local inhabitants alone to enjoy their normal civilian life in the demilitarized zone, l would say this: the Syrians have never been accused of interfering with the free life of the inhabitants; it has never been said that the Syrians have l1101ested any of the inhabitants of the demilitarized zone, Jewish or Arab; they have never deported them or massacred them or confiscated their lands or cattle. The reports of the observers to the Chief of Staff are, however, full of incidents in which the Jews have molestecl the Arab inhabitants of the demilitarized zone and have razed their villages to the ground. Tt will be remembered that in the Security Council [544t71 1ueeting] the Chief of Staff namedmany villages which had been razed to the ground by the Israel forces and the inhabitants of which had been expelled and scattered so that they are now nowhere to be found. 122. Since the Israelis are doing these things, should they not be mentioned at all by the Security Council? The ciraft reso1ution now before the Council contains no mention of the razing to the ground of Arab villages. That is an outrageous crime to which the Council makes no reference. Was it easy for the Security Council to hear from its own representative at the last meeting that many Arab villages had been blown up by dynamite, the inhabitants scattered and their whereabouts not known? The Security Council listened to that statement but has made no reference to these events in the draft resolution. 1 had supposed that the representative of Israel would immediate1y express to the Council his appreciation of the fact that no mention was made of those actions. As a matter of fact, he blames the Security Council for mentioning one incident, while ignoring its lack of reference ta other events. 123. Internai security in the demilitarized zone is to he guaranteed by native police, locally recruited and controlled by the United Nations Chief of Staff. The Syrians have never sent Syrian police of either their official or their unofficial force to the demilitarized zone, while, on the other hand, the Israelis flooded the zone with police patrols from their official forces of Israel towns outside the demilitarized zone. They stationed those policemen not only in the Jewish settlements, but also in Arab villages in the demilitarized zone. According to the Agreement, such persons are not permitted to enter the demilîtarized zone in either the Jewish or the Arab settlements. The police were to be recruited locally by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and controlled by him. 124. According to the Agreement, instructions from the Chief of Staff and from the Mixed Armistice Com- 125. The Mixed Armistice Commission is vested with the power of interpreting the articles of the Anllistice Agreement, and the parties are to abide by that interpretation. The Syrians have never contested this interpretation, but the Jews insist on their own false conceptions and reject the interpretation given by the body which is qualified to make it. On many occasions they have insisted on adhering to their own absurd understanding of the articles. 126. Even after the present draft resolution is adopted, if it is adopted, it will be seen that the Jews will create complications and difficulties with regard to its interpretation and will dispute with the Chief of Staff and with the United Nations observers and representatives the meaning of the order, which they will not accept. 127. It is the task of the Mixed Armistice Commis- SlOn to hold meetings continuously in order to settle and solve the problems and disputes between the parties. Syria has always submitted its complaints to that Commission. 'Who was it who refused to attend meetings of the Commission and to assist in that work? It was not Syria but Israel which on several occasions refused to be present and thus paralysed and obstructed the procedure of the Mixed Armistice Commission. In such a situation the Security Council is rightly expected to take steps to see that justice is done and order preserved in that area. 128. The demi1itarized zone should not be changed or remodelled in any way such as to afford political or military advantage to any of the parties during the armistice period. The Syrians have not acted in any way ta awaken the anxiety of the Jews, whereas the Jews have started their gigantic project in spite of being instructed not to begin it before consultation. The Chief of Staff statec1 that such a work should not be undertaken before an agreement had been reached through him between Syria and Israel, and this statement is cited in the draft resolution now before the Security Council. 129. The matter has now to be taken up and l do not wish, therefore, to criticize the draft resolution although it cantains many points which are not considered by the Syrian Government as justified or as maintaining the rights of Syria. 130. If there is good faith, and if the United Nations representatives on the spot act correctly and in a spirit of good will, we hope that the Israe1is may also listen to those United Nations representatives and that the situation may be improved. l do not wish to speak further at this stage, although l reserve my right to do so should it become necessary.

l request that there should be consecutive interpretation into French. 133. Faris EL-KHOURI Bey (Syria): l shouldlike to put to the authors of the draft resolution a question concerning part (b) of the twelfth paragraph which states that "no action involving the transfer of persons across international frontiers, armistice lines or within the demilitarized zone, should be undertaken without prior decision of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission. l should like to know also whether this would mean, according to the authors of the draft resolution, that no transfer of these inhabitants would take place without their own consent, that is to say, that no transfer should be undertaken without their consent and without the prior decision of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission. l should like to know whether the consent of the inhabitants is considered to be a prerequisite to their transfer.

More than one question has been asked, and if one of the authors of the joint draft resolution wishes to answer them, l shall be glad to call on him.

l do not know whether or not l am answering the question, but l should like to make a few remarks on the subject of the drainage system. 136. l must say l was very grateful to the representative of the Netherlands for raising the question of the interpretation to be given to the third, fourth and fifth paragraphs of the draft resolution which deal with the drainage scheme. l \Vas particularly glad because it gives me an opportunity to explain in greater detail, and l think l may sayon behalf of the sponsors of the joint draft resolution, the procedures which we think should be followed to resolve this dispute. 137. Members of the Council will recall that l did make some allusion to this matter in my brief statement on 16 May [546th meeting], and l should like to quote what l said then. What l said then was: "Furthermore, shonld either of the two Governments feel that the provisions of the Annistice Agreement are nnsatisfactory in any particular - and, as l have saic1, we are fully aware that the form of administration provided by the Agreement is by no means ic1ealwe think that they would then be tlnder an obligation to use the procedure defined in article VIII, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Agreement. "If l may illustrate this by a case in point, may l say that if the Government of Israel considers that the Agreement is defective in so far as it enables the landowners of the area near Banat Yakub to hoId up indefinitely the Palestine Land Development Company's Lake Huleh drainage proj eet, their right That is what l said on a previous occasion. 138. The sponsors of this joint ciraft resolution are al! agreed that the Lake Huleh drainage project would undoubtedly promote the general welfare of the area, and on general grounds, therefore, they would like, as at present advised, to see it put into effect as soon as possible. On the other hand, we are conscious of the dutY of the Truce Supervision Organization to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of the Arab landowners. The first objective of the draft resolution is, therefore, to bring about the suspension of the drainage operations in the delùilitarized zone to enable the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to use his good offices in an effort to bring about and negotiate a settlement between the owners of the affected land and the Palestine Land Deve10pment Company. If this effort to obtain a negotiated settlement fails, the sponsors of the draft resolution wouId then look to the parties to the dispute to use the machinery pravided by the General Armistice Agreement to reach a sett1ement. 139. The Israel authorities would thus request the Chainnan of the Mixed Armistice Commission to ad under article V of this Agreement, and we could hope that he would he able to arrange matters in such a way as to enable the drainage project to go forward, while at the same time satisfying all reasonable daims by the owners of the lands affected by it. But it might be that the Mixec1 Armistice Commission would decide that the Chairman was not competent to arrange a settlement in default of the agreement of the Arab landowners concerned, and if that were the case the sponsors of this resolution contemplate that the'Government of Israel would make use - to which it is entitled - of the provisions of article VIII of the General Armistice Agreement and, if necessary, bring this matter hefore the Security Counci1 under paragraph 4 of that article. 140. ~y colleagues and l are fully aware of the need to obt~1l1 a settle~1ent of this question of the drainage op.eratlOns as qll1cldy as possible, and althol1gh we thllü~ ~hat the machinery provided by the General Am11stlce Agreement, which both parties have pledgecl themse~ves to use, shou~d be adopted, we do not believe that thlS neecl necessanly postpone a final decision for more th311, at the most, a few weeks. ' 141. If l may sUll1marize the intentions which the spons~rs of this draft resolution had in mind in clrafting the thlrd, fourth and fifth paragraphs, 1 should like to say that they hope that a negotiated settlement between the Palestine Land Deve10pment Company and the . and ta proceed with the drainage operations, we should 1 not - l speak for the sponsors - be ullsympathetic to this appraach; and it might well be that, as it could, the Security Council would then bestow upon General Riley the necessary authority to this end, provided, in his judgment, such action was desirable in the interest of the maintenance of international peace and secnrity. 142. That is my endeavour to translate the view of the sponsors on that point. 143. Ml'. LACOSTE (France) (tmnslated fl'om French): When l had occasion two days ago [546th meeting] to submit to the Security Councilmy Government's views on the draft resolution put fonvard at the last meeting by the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, Tnrkey and France, l pointed out how strongly my delegation approved the purpose of the work undertaken by the Palestine Land Development Company in connexion with the draining of the Lake Huleh marshes, a public health project which shauld have the most beneficial social and economic consequen~es. l also.said, however, as had General Riley, at a prevlOus meet111g, that the Palcstinc Land Development Company was not entitled, even with the object of. carrying out this work of public utility, to expropnate property in a demilitarized zone and still less, of course, to expropriate arbitrarily land which did not belang to it and to which it was denied access by thc owners. 144. ~t is for this :eason that the sponsors of the draft resolutlOn propose 111 the fifth paragraph of that document that ~he Conneil should endorse the requests made ?y ~he ChIef of Staff of the Truce Supervision OrganlzatlOn and the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Comm!ssion to ~he Israel de1egation to that Commission wlth the obJect, referred to in the third paragraph of t~le draft resolution, of ensuring that the Israel de1egahan took the necessary steps to have the Palestine Land ,Deve1opment Company instructed to cease al1 operatlOns in the demilitarized zone until such time as an agr.eement w~s arranged through the Chairman of the.Mlxed Arnustice Commission for continuing that proJect. l4~. This, however, raises a question which comes ~lI1te naturally to minci and which was raised a short bme ago by, among others, the representative of the Netherlands - understandably enough, in view of the nature of the work in question: vVhat wil1 happen if the..agreement which General Riley is instnlcted to faclhtate does not later materialize? Will this lack of agr.een~ent indefinitely prevent the resumption of work :'1hlch IS of great utility and which the Israel de1egation Justly regards as of great urgency? That is certainly 146. But what we are dealing with here is a territory of a very peculiar nature. In the territory of any State having a modern system of legislation - as is the case both in Syria and in Israelthere is a normal expropriation procedure which makes it impossible for any person to resist, from motives of egotistic and negative obstinacy, the accomplislunent of a project recognized to be in the public interest. But in the very special case of the demilitarized zone the situation is different. Here the exercise of sovereign rights is for the time being suspended, pending the conclusion of a final treaty of peace between Syria and Israel. There must therefore be SOlUe procedure to enable the parties to flnd a way out of the impasse which, as the Netherlands represen- . tative has just said, may arise. 147. The Armistice Agreement is not silent on this point. Hs authors did not fail in their dutY of foreseeing such contingencies or providing for their solution. In the view of the French delegation it is clear that if the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission does not succeed, in spite of the authority conferred on him by the Armistice Agreement and by the drait resolution now before the Council - if as we hope, it is adopted - in arranging an agreement, the procedure provided for in article VIII, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the General Armistice Agreement of 20 July 1949, which the United Kingdom represei.1tative has just mentioned, will, in the natural and necessary course of events, be open to the parties. My delegation, however, sincerely trusts that this procedure, which must inevitably lead to further delays, will not become necessary and that the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission will be successful at an earlv date in securing agreement betvveen the parties. .

l wish to cal1 the attention ofthe members of the Security Council to the fact that there is now a revised version of the joint draft resolution. This will be found in document S/2152/Rev.2. The sponsors of this draft resolution have decided to inc1ude a reference to the Israel expression of regret with regard to the aerial bombing of 5 ApriL That is the only change in the draft resolution. The revised draft has already been circulated, and the addition will he found in the eleventh paragraph in the form of subparagraph (a) a. . 8 For the text of document S/2152/Rev.1, see 546th meeting. Document S/2152 was l'eplaced by document S/2152/Rev.1 befo~e the beginning of that meeting. Hence, in the present meetlllg document S/2152/Rev.l is referred to as "the original draft resolution" and document S/2152/Rev.2 as "the revised draft resolutioll," The text of the eleventh paragraph as set forth in document S/2152/Rev.2 is as follows: "Recalls to the Governments of Syria and Israel their obligations under Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations and their commitments under the Armistice Agreement not ta l'esart ta military force; (a) Takes llote of the statement of the representative of Israel on 25 April. 1951 ?efore the Security Council cxpressing regret for the aenal actlOn taken by Israel forces on 5 April 1951 ; beh~lf of all the sponsors by Sir Glac1wyn J ebb, that the sponsors of the draft resolution are all agreeel that the Lake Huleh drainage project woulel undoubtedly promote the general welfare of the area, anel on general grounds they would like to see it put into effect as soon as possible. 150. l should like to turn to the question raiseel by the representative of Syria, who asked for information in regard to sub-paragraph (b) of the twelfth paragraph of the four Power elraft resolution which reads as follows: 'IHolds that no action invofving the transier of persans across international frontiers, armistice lines or within the demilitarizec1 zone should be undertaken without prior decision of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission." The representative of Syria asks whether this means that no transfers of persons coulc1 be effecteel without the consent of the persons involvec1, as well as the prior decision of the Chainnan of the Mixeel Armistice Commission. 151. The sponsors of the ch'aft resolution, for whol11 1.~ow speak, believe that in decic1ing on the permissibll~ty of transfers of persons the Chairman I11USt be g;uded by the tenus of the Armistice Agreement, spe- ~\ficall~ article IV, paragraph 3 anel article V bath in lts ent1ret3;' and, more precisely, sub-paragraph 5 ({i). In effect, 111 making his c1ecision, the Chairman woulc1 o~ necessity, we think, make a full investigation of the Clrcumstances relating to a proposed transfer of persans and would endeavour to seek an arrangement reaSOllable and satisfactory to aIl concerned. He woulel, of course,. l~ave due regard for his responsibility for general sl~perVlslOn over the c1emilitarized zone anc1 his concern \VIth the graelual restoration of normal civilian life within the zone. The sponsors of the joint draft reso- "(b) Fillds that: "(i) Aerial action taken by the forces of the Government of}s.~ael on 5 April 1951, and . (11) Any aggressive military action by either of the parties III .or aruul1d the demilitarized zone, which fllrther investi- ~atl.on b'y the Chief of Staff of the Trllce Supervision Organl\zatlOn 111to the reports and complaints recently submitted to !te Council may establish, "constitut~ a violation of the cease-fire provision provided in t~e Secllnty Council resolution of 15 July 1948 and are inconsls~ent .with the tenns of the Armistice Agreement and the obhgatlon5 assumed' under the Charter ,"

l merely wish ta express my appreciation for the clarifications with regard ta the questions l raised this afternoon which have been given me by the representatives of the United Kingdom, France and the United States. They have confinned my impression that aIl means for a peaceful settlement are indeed not exhausted and that, so far as the question of drainage is concerned, there might be a succession of settlements by negotiations between the parties, which finally could end up in either of the parties placing the matter before the Seci.trity Council. This, in effect, wouId mean that neither of the parties possesses in practice a veto power over the other in this respect, which l believe is a very sound position.

l wish to make a brief observation on the revision [S/2152/Rev.2] of the original draft resolution [S/2152/Rev.1] which had· been the subject of discussion. First, l wish to state that it was my understanding that l had received an assurance on behalf of the sponsors of this draft resolution that the expression of regret 4 would figure as sub-paragraph (a) in place of and not together with a finding that this action was a violation of the cease-fire and i\lconsistent with the tenns of the Armistice Agreement. l deeply regret that this assurance has not been fulfilled. 154. In so far as the paragraph as now worded, by mentioning Israel and by camouflaging any Syrian participation, gives an impression that the balance of responsibility or guilt for these military actions lies generally with Israel and not at aIl with Syria, l am instructed to express the profound resentment of the Government and people of Israel at this judgment and to declare that they regard it as an insult to our gallant dead who have been the victims of certified Syrian violence, and that my Government attaches no nlOral value or credence to what it regards as an unjust estimate of responsibility.

The statement by the representative of· Israel will appear in the record.

With regard to the statement of the representative of Israel to the effect th~t he understood that the sponsors of the draft resolutlOn had agreed to the change to which he has referred, on behalf of my own delegation - l have. not had an opportunity to consult the other spons<;Jrs - l wish to assure ~he Council and the representatlve of Israel that we dld not understand that we had left any such impression. l should like to say that the fOf.ln in which the suggestion was macle to us led us to helieve that the revised draft resolution was in aè~ordance with the suggestion made by the representatlve of Israel. There woulcl be no objection whatever 4 Reference isto the eleventh paragraph of the revised draft resoll1tion (S/2152/Rev.2). See preceding footnote.

Speaking in my capacity as representative of TURKEY, l wish to state that it was my understancling that the revised form of the cIraft resolution was in accordance with the desire expressed by the delegation of Israel. If the clelegation of Israel does not wish to have the additional subparagraph incorporated in the draft resolution, l woulcl be quite willing, as one of the sponsors, to support the representative of the United States in his agreement ta delete sub-paragraph (a) and to leave the draft resolution as it was before the second revision. We certainly had no intention of hurting the feelings of the Israel delegation in any way, and l am quite willing to delete that sub-paragraph if the other sponsors are of the same opinion. par 1 11

l feel that there must have been a slight misunderstanding. In the draft amendment, which l have in my hand and which, as far as l know, emanated from the delegation of Israel, it is statecl that we should take the wording down to "military force" and, after that, insert: "(a) Tal~(!s note of the statement of the representative of Israel on 25 April expressing regret for the aerial action taken by Israel forces on 5 April 1951; and "Finds that" - and so on. Ivry delegation certainly unc!erstooc! that that substitution would be macle and that then the text would proceed with the words which oCCUl' in the clraft resolution itself. Frankly, it clid not occur to us that what was suggested was the insertion of these words ancl then the additional elill1ination of sub-paragraph (i). The question arises, l think, whether the delegation of Israel would prefer that the words which it has proposecl shoulcl not now be inserted in these circumstances. l think l am speaking for the sponsors - and l am certainly speaking for my own delegation - when l say that l c!o not think that we couIc! agree to eliminate the first finc!ing because, after ail, we do think that in fact the aerial action taken by the Government of Israel was not in accorc!ance with the Armistice Agreement, as is saic! later, and so on. 159. It is quite true that in my original remarks l should, perhaps, have statec! that l welcomed the frank expression of regret which our Israel colleague was 50 good as to give us for this incic!ent, and if l diC! not say it then l hasten to c!o So now. It is very welcome, and a frank statement like that is ahvays a gooc! thing for us to have. But l doubt whether we can agreeand for my part l cannot agree - to the actual e1imination of the implicit conc1emt1ation which is macle in sub-paragraph (i). l feel that this is probably the view of 111Y co-sponsors, although l have not had an opportunity to consult them.

l have no objection to the deletion of subparagraph (a). 162. In the circumstances and in the light of the discussion we feel that the insertion or omission of the new ~ub-paragraph (a) does not affect the issue and that the main question remains unresolved, namely, the condemnation as such. 163. Faris EL-KHOURI Bey (Syria): l wish to refer to one part of the revised draft resolution, namely sub-paragraph (a) of the twe1fth paragraph which reads: "(a) Decides that Arab civilians who have been removed from the demilitarized zone by the Government of Israel should be permitted to return forthwith to their homes..." 164. l wish simply to express my understanding of this sub-paragraph, the conclusion of which reads: H ••• a.nd that the Mixed Armistice Commission should supervise their return and rehabilitation in a manner ta be determined by the Commission." l interpret rehabilitation ta mean to have their destroyed hauses and razed buildings reconstructed and to have the people recompensed for their losses. Tt states "to return forthwith to their homes", but their homes are destroyed. 1'0 where are they to return? That should mean that the Commission will see to it that their homes will be reconstructed and prepared ta receive them. With this understanding l agree to this subparagraph.

As Chairman l shauld like ta state that the understanding of the representative of Syria will go in the record as a statement. However, if he is asldng for an interpretation of the details by the Council, l think that this is neither the right time nor the right place.

On which document are we voting?

My understanding was that we were voting on the second revision of the draft resolution because almost all the sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed their willingness to delete sub-paragraph (a) if the Israel delegation wanted us ta. But in the statement of the representative of Israel, made a few moments aga, l could not get the impression that he was asking us to delete that sub-paragraph.

Perhaps l failed to make the position of my delegation clear, but what l had had in mind was to indicate that we understood that there was ta have been an amendment which apparently was different from the one which was the understanding " of the members of the Security Council. In the light of the fact that that amendment was introduced on our initiative, and since it is not the amendment which we

l shall put an informai qtiestion, especially to the other sponsors of the draft resolution. If they do not object and if the rest of the Council cloes Ilot object, we shall IlOW vote, after that statement just macle by the representative of Israel, on the clraft resolutioll as set forth in document S/2152/Rev.l, without the sub-paragraph Ca) added in the e1eventh paragraph of the second revision. 169. poser autres pas Conseil, faire résolution c'est-à-dire paragraphe 170. As there are no objections we shall vote on the draft resolutioll, and l shall repeat the number of the document: S/2152/Rev.l, dated 16 May 1951. 170. voter S/2152, A vote was tal~en by show of hands. Pays-Bas, gne Yougoslavie. In favou1',' Brazil, China, Ecuador, France, India, Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Yugoslavia. tiques. Abstaining,' Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. , l,' SALES AGENTS FOR UNITED DEPOSITAIRES DES PUBLICATIONS FINLAND - FINLANDE Akateemlnen Kirjakauppa, katu, Helsinki. FRANCE Editions A. Pedone, Paris V. GREECE - GRECE "Eleftheroudakls," nale, Place de la Constitution, GUATEMALA Gouba'ud & Cla. Llda. num. 28, 2 do Plso, HAITI Ma~ Bouchereau, Librairie velle." Boite postale Prince. HONDURAS L1brerla PanamerIcana, Fuente, Tegucigalpa. ICELAND - ISLANDE Bokavenlun Slglusar Austurstretl 18, Reykjavik. ARGENTINA - ARGENnNE Editorial Sudamerlcana S.A., Calle Alslna 500, Buenos Aires. AUSTRALIA - AUSTRALIE , H. A. Goddard (Pty.), Ltd., 255a George Street, Sydney, N.S.W. BELGlUM "-BELGIQUE Agence et Messagerie, de la Presse S.A.. 14·22 rue du Persil, 8ruxelles. W. H. Smith,. Son 71-75 Boulevard Adolphe·Mox, eruxelles. eOLlVIA - BOLIVIE ' lIbrer!a Clentffica y L1terarla, Avenlda 16 de Julio 21E>, Casllla 972, La Paz eRAZIL - BRESIL , L1vrarla Agir, Rua MexIco 98·9, Calxa' Postal 3291, Rio de Janeiro. CANADA - CANADA The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Strèe, West, Toronto, CEYLON - CEVLAN . The Assoclated Néwspapers 01 Ceylo", Ltd., Lake House, Colombo. CHILE - CHILI ' L1brer!a Ivens, Calle Moneda 822, Santiago. CHINA - CHINE The Commercial Press, ltd., 211 H_ Road, Shanghai. COlOMBIA - COLOMBIE Llbrerla Latina Ltda., Aparlado ..Alreo 4011, BogotA. COSTA RiCA - COSTA·RICA Trejos Hermanos, Apartado 1313, Saa José. CUBA La Casa Belga, René de Smedl, O'Rell" 455, La Habana. CZECHOSLOVAKIA - TCHECOSLOVAQUIE Ceskoslovensky ;;plsovatel N'rodnl T'Frda 9, Praha 1. IlENMAllK - DANEMARK Einar Munksgaard, N_rregade 6, K_benhavn. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC- REPUBLIQUE DOMINICAINE lIbrerra Oominlcana, Calle Mercedes No. 49, Apartado &56, Ciudad Trujillo. ECUADOR:- EQUATEUR Mufioz Hermanos " Cla., Plata deI Teatro, Quito. EGYPT - EGYPTE· Librairie "La RenaIssance d'Egypte," 9 SH. Adly l'asha, Calro. EL SALVADOR - SALVADOR Manuel Navas y Cla. "La Casa dei L1bro Barato" la Avenlda sur num. 37, San Salvador. ETHIOPIA - ETHIOPIE Agence Ethiopienne de Publicité, Box S, Addis-Abeba. INDIA~INDE Oxlord Book & Statlonery House, New Delhi. INDONESIA - INDONESIE Jaja..n Pembangunan, 84, Djakarta. IRAQ-IRAK Mackenzie's 800kshop, Statloners, Baghdad, 'RAN Ketab.Khaneh Danesh, Avenue, Teheran. 'RELANO -IRLANDE Hlbernian General Ageney cial Buildings, Dame l'SRAEL Leo Blumsteln, P.O.B. 35 Allenby Road, Tel·Avlv. ITALY - ITALIE Colibri S.A., Via Chlossetto LEBANON -LIBAN Librairie universelle, LIBERIA J. Momolu Kamara, Streets, Monrovia. LUXEMBOURG Librairie J. Schummer, Lu~embourg. MEXICO - MEXIQUE EditorIal Hermes, cal 41, Mexico, D. NETHERLANDS - N.V. Martlnus NIJhoff, 9, 's·Gravenhage. NEW ZEALAND- NOUVELLE'.ZELANDE United Nallons Association land, G.P.0. 1011, NICARAGUA Dr. Ramiro Ramfrez Publicaclones, Managua, United N(ltlons public(ltlons C(ln 'urlbe' be obt(l1MeI ',om the followlng boobelle,,: GERMANY - ALLEMAGNE AUSTRIA - AUTRICHE Buchhandlung Elwert ,. Meurer, Haupt.' B. Wüllerstorll, Waagplatt, strasse, lOI, Berlln·Schoneblrg. Saltburg. W. E., Soarbaoh, Frankenstra"e, 14, KBln·Junkersdorf. JAPAN - JAPON Alexander Horn, Spiegelgasse, 9, Maruten Co., Ltd., Wiesbaden. Nihonbashi, Tokyo Orders and lnquiries lrom countrin where sales agenh have not yet been appointed may be sent to: Sales anel C'rculation Section, United Nations, New York, U.S.A.; or Sales Section, United Nations Office, Palat. dOl Nation., Geneva, Switzerland.