S/PV.559 Security Council

The Govern- .n1ent of the USSR deems it necessary to state that the complaint addressed by the United Kingdom Governrnent to the Security Council regarding the refusaI of the Iranian Government to comply with the me'1sures indicated by the International Court of Justice in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case constitutes interference in the internaI affairs of Iran and an infringe- .n1ent of the sovereign rights of the Iranian people,

The Governll1ent of the USSR deems it necessary to state that the complaint adc1ressed by the United Kingdom Governtuent to the Security Council regarding the refusaI of the Iranian Government to comply with the measures indicated by the International Court of Justice in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case constitutes interference in the internaI affairs of Iran and an infringell1ent of the sovereign rights of the Iranian people. 3. Such questions as the nationalization of the oil industry on the territory of Iran, the activities of foreign industrial c()ncerns and the presence of foreign citizens on the territory of Iran are whol1y within the domestic 2 SOCialistes ner:lent plamte devant nement 2 SOCialistes net;1ent plamte devant nel11el~t Cou~ Iraman affaires souvemins Cou~ Ira:t: affaIres .1I1teneures souverams 3. Such questions as the nationalization of the oil industry on the territory of Iran, the activities of foreign industrial c()ncerns and the presence of foreign citizens on the territory of Iran are whol1y within the domestic ~: ~: ll11du~tne 11l1du~tne d~~ sejour d~~ sejour 4. Since a discussion of that question in the Security Council would constitute interference in the domestic affairs of Iran and a gross violation of the Iranian people's sovereignty, the USSR delegation considers it inadmissible for the Security Council to discuss the United Kingdom complaint against Iran in the Anglo- Iranian Oil Company case and objects to the inclusion of that question in the Council's agenda. 4. Since a discussion of that question in the Security Council would constitute interference in the domestic affairs of Iran and a gross violation of the Iranian people's sovereignty, the USSR delegation considers it inadmissible for the Security Council to discuss the United Kingd01l1 complaint against Iran in the Anglo- Iranian Oil Company case and objects to the inclusion of that question in the Council's agenda.

If a Member of the United Nations submits a complaint regarding a situation or an action which in its view contains an inherent danger and may cOllsequently threaten international peace and seCltrity, l do not see how the Security Council can refuse to include such a complaint in its agenda. Where, as in the present case, it is generally known that a situation actually exists, the consequences of which might result in an increase in the danger to the peace, this argument is all the more valid.

If a Member of the United Nations submits a complaint regarding a situation or an action which in its view contains an inherent danger and may cOllsequently threaten international peace and security, l do not see how the Security Council can refuse to inc1nde such a complaint in its agenda. Where, as in the present case, it is generally known that a situation actually exists, the consequences of which might result in an increase in the danger to the peace, this argument is all the more vaEd. 6. Furthermore, in my opinion, in allowing the inclusion of this item in its agenda the Council would not be prejudging the question of its competence, the merits or demerits of the case, or the substance of the events which have led to that state of affairs; neither would the Council be deciding the actual substance of the problem. 6. Furthermore, in my opinion, in allowing the inclusion of this item in its agenda the Council would 110t be prejudging the question of its competence, the merits or demerits of the case, or the substance of the events which have led to that state of affairs; neither would the COl!ncil be deciding the actual substance of the problem. 7. Consequently, a[ter hearing the parties and devoting due attention and consideration to the problem, the Council could decide whether or not it is competent to settle the complaint, and coulel, if competent, take any decision or adopt any recommendation which it considered to be just, fitting and within its powers. 7. Consequently, aiter hearing the parties and devoting due attention and consideration to the problem, the Council could decide whether or not it is competent to settle the complaint, and could, if competent, take any decision or adopt any recommendation which it considered to be just, fitting and within its powers. 8. Therefore in voting, as l shall vote, in favour of including in our agenda the item set forth in document S/Agenda/559/Rev.1, l shall at the same time reserve for my Government the liberty ta adopt any attitude that it may see fit towards the actual complaint, the dra[t resolution [5/2358], any other motion which may be submitted, and any decision or recommendation whieh the Couneil may make. 8. Therefore in voting, as l shall vote, in favour of inc1uding in our agenda the item set forth in document S/Agenda/559/Rev.1, l shall at the same time reserve for my Government the liberty to adopt any attitude that it may see fit towards the actual complaint, the drait resolution [S/2358], any other motion which may be submitted, and any decision or recommendation which the Council may make.

In the view of the Yugoslav delegation, the complaint against the Iranian Government brought before the Security Council by the Government of the Uniteel Kingdom cannot properly be considerecI as coming within the Council's competence. The action taken or contemplatecI by the Iranian Government with regard to the question of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and referred to in document 8/2357 and, in particular, the intention of the

In the view of the Yugoslav delegation, the complaint against the Iranian Government brought before the Security Council by the Government of the United Kingdom cannot properly be considered as coming within the Council's competence. The action taken or contemplated by the Iranian Government with regard to the question of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and referred ta in document S/2357 and, in particular, the intention of the Ir~nial1 Gov~rnmetl;t to discontinue the residence per- Ir~nial1 Gov~rn1l1etl;t ta discontinue the residence per- ~llt.s of cert~ll: forelgn members of the Company's staff ~llt.s of cert~ll: forelgn members of the Company's staff lS, m our Op1l11011, a matter essentially within the domestic juriscliction of Iran within the meaning of Article 2, t~, 1~1 o.ur .OP.1l11011, a matter e.ssentially within the domestIC JunscltctlOn of Iran Wlth111 the meaning of Article 2, 10. The fact that the Council is heing requested to ~all. for compliance with certain provisional measures 1l1dlca~ed ~y the International ~Ottrt of Justice does not, we th1l1k, 111 any way affect thls aspect of the question. Q~estions involving the applicability or non-applicabIhty of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter to cases brought before us have, 50 far, always been decided by the Council itself in accordance with the generally ac.cepted legal precept that interpretation is coextensive wIth application. The Council is, therefore, not bound by clecisions which other organs of the United Nations have taken with regard to competence. Il. Besides, the Court's order itself of 5 July LS (2.239] Inakes it clear that it was in no way pre- J11?g1l1g the question of the jurisdiction of the Court in t1us matter. That means that the Court itself had grave doubt whether it was competent at all, or not. 12. The Yugoslav de1egation, therefore, objects to the adoption of the substantive item contained in document S(Agenda(5S9jRev.l.

My delegation shares the views expressed by the representative of Ecuador. Consequently, l shall vote for the adoption of the agenda without, however, prejudging the issue of the competence of the Security Council. ln voting in favour of the inclusion of this question in the agenda, l am l ,reserving the freedom of action of my delegation in that respect.

Let me say straight away that of course l entirely agree with 1 what th 1 e rep~esedntabtive of Ecuador has said, and which was su }stanttate' y the representative of Turkey. l think we should all agree that the question of competence can, if necessary, be decicled later and that if any representative shoulcl have doubts on the question of competence - that is ta say, the competence of the SecuTity Council to discuss this question - that need not necessarily in itself be any reason for his voting again.st the il1clusion of this itenl in the agenda. 15. As regards what the representative of the Soviet Union has said, perhaps l neec1 only say the following: In the first place, l should like ta draw attention to the statell1ent of the four sponsoring Governments made at San Francisco on 7 June 19451, that no individual luerllber of the Council can alone prevent the consideration and discussion by the Council of a dispute or situation brought to its attention under what is now Article 3S of the United Nations Charter. 16. Nobody can deny that there is a dispute between the .United Kingdom and Iran which, in conformity 1 Sec DoCW~1ent.r of the United Nations COltfermce on btternatio#al Orgalûsation, San Francisco, 1945, Vol. II, p. 712. 17. l suggest that it is clear that this decîsion of the Court regarding its jurisdiction is binding on aIl Members of the United Nations. Paragraph 6 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court expressly provides that, in the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shaH be settled by a decision of the Court. By Article 93 of the Charter, aH Members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the Court. Furthermore, by Article 94, each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the clecision of the Court in any case to which it is a party. 18. Tt follows, we think, that the finding of the Court on interim measures of itself gives rise to international obligations, obligations under the Charter, which it is theright and duty of the Security Couneil to uphold, and which cannat be regarded as being solely within the domestic jnrisdiction of one of the parties. 19. But in addition to this, the Security Council has special fllnctions in relation to the decisions of the Court, both under Article 94, paragraph 2, of the Charter and under Article 41, paragraph 2, of the Statuteof the Court. Under the latter provision, the ~ourt has already notified [5/2239] the Council of Ihe interim measures it has indicated in this case, and this must clearly imply that the Security Couneil has the power ta deal with matters arising out of such interim measures. 20. Of course, l shaH not at the moment go into the merits of the dispute between my country and Iran. The question before us is whether the item proposed by my delegation should be placed on the agenda. The formaI. basis of the present reference to the Council is that ail Members of the United Nations have the right under Article 35 of the Charter, to appeal to the Secu~ rity COl1ncil in regard to any matter of the nature referred to in Article 34. No one can doubt - or l ShOllld have thought that no one could. doubt - the essentially inflammatory nature of a situation of the kind which now exists in those parts of Iran which are affected (even given goodwill and restraint on the part of the governments concerned, such as has certainly hitherto been exhibited by my Government, at any :ate), or the potent!al t1ueat to peace, which may be ll1volve~l.. In these Clfcu111stances, and quite apart from the declslOll of the Court oninterim meaSl1res, which w~uld alone, we think, justify the Couneil in taking up thls matter, there is a dispute, in our opinion, which ShOllld now receive the Council's urgent consider~tion. 22. The present dispute between the United Kingdom and Iran was brought before the International Court of Justice by the United Kingdom Government. The Court, on 5 July last, acting under Article 41, paragraph 2, of lts ::,tatute, indicated certain provisional me~sures and notdied the Security Council accordingly. In lis arder the Court stated that a number of considerations, among which the fact that the United Kingdom Government was proceeding in virtue of the right of diplomatie prote~tion, were sufficient ta empower the Court ta entertam the British request for interim measures of protection. 23. In a further consideration the Court states that the indication of measures in 'no way prejudges the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the merits of the case; but the fact remains that the COlut has seen fit ta indicate provisional measures and has thereby suggested its competence in the matter so far. T.he Court, of course, is tmdoubtedly the greatest authonty to pronounce on matters of competence. 24. In this respect, l may perhaps remind the Council of the fact that, thus far, the Council has not been asked ta pronounce on the merits of the case and that we are dealing with exactly the same problem which faced the Court. 25. This being the case, there seems to he no doubt about the competence of the Security Council in this matter. As the representative of the United Kingdom has observed, Article 94 of the Charter states that a party may have recourse to the Council in case the other party fails ta perform the obligations incllmbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court. My delegation therefore shares the view that the agenda, as it appears, shol11d he adopted.

Several delegations have already spoken in favour of inc1uding in our agenda the complaint macle by the United Kingdom regarding the failure by the Iranian Governn1ent ta comply with the provisional meast1res il1dicated by the International Court of Justice on 5 July 1951. On the other hand, several other delegations have spoken against the inclusion of this item in the agenda on the ground that the case is not within the Coul1cil's competence. 27. It seems ta my de1egation that this very divergence of views on the subject among the members of the Council c1early indicates the need for a debate. My delegation will therefore: vote in favour of consideration by the Council of the complaint which has just been brollght before it by the United Kingdom Govermnent.

As two delegations have raised objections to the inclttsiotl of the propose~ item in the agenda, l shall put to the vote the adoptIOn of the provisional agenda.

The representative of the Soviet Union has objected ta the 30. As l understand it, the objection raised by the representative of the Soviet Union concerns item 2 of the agenda, which reads: "Complaint of failure by the Iranian Government ta comply with provisional measures indicated by the International Court of Justice in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case". Therefore, if the purpose of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia is to raise the question whether the matter is essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of Iran, snch a matter depends upon a consideration of the very substance of this item. The United Nations does deny itself the right to interfere in esscntially domestic matters. However, such denial follows the adoption of the agenda and consideration of the point raised; it does not precede - unless there are no opposing inferences. The Council cannot immediate1y take à decision on that constitutional question unlessthere are no' opposing inferences as to the subject-matter being essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of aState. 31. In this case the situation is just the reverse. Here, the weight of opinion already expressed shows that far more members of the Security Council believe that this is not a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the State. Certainly if appears that there is a pritna facie case ta be presented to the Security Council; and if the Security Council is going to deny ta the United Nations the right ta consider this item on the agenda, it must be only after studying the item and reaching a decision after thorough consideration. That does not, of course, as has been stated here repeatedly deeide the merits of the case. ' 32. Bere we have a complaint by the United Kingdom of the failure of the Government of Iran ta take certain specified action. C1~arly, i~ is one aspect of a dispute of the nature mentloned 111 the Charter - that is a dispute the continuance of which might lead to international disturbance. 33. ;Mor~ov.er, this que~tion is singularly important and· 15 :-Vl~h111 the purVlew of the Security Couneil bec~use lt lS. also the~ubject of litigation in the Intern!1tlOnal C~urt of ] ustlce. That at once gives the Secunty COlmcll a reason for not accepting the objection t~at. the matter is essentially within the domestic jurisd1ctlon of Iran. It becomes a matter of great public intere?t because it involve5 peace; and we are for peace. That lS why we wish this matter to be considered here. 34. ~y J;ll1tting this. item on its agenda, the Security Councl! glV~S the U11lted Nations its right t9 pass upon the matter 111 a reasonable manner and to reach a deci- 35. Another reason is that where international peace is threatened by a situation such as this which, it is alleged, involves stress and strain, it is highly important for the Security Council, if the subject-matter is brought to its attention, to place the dispute in lis pendens in order ta bring to bear upon the parties concerned those restraints and self-disciplines which have always been regarded as appropriate and necessary to the carrying out of justice while a dispute is in lis pendens. 36. For these reasons, and without at aU committing my Government regarding the merits and the substance of the question, but dealing only with this question in its relation to the agenda, my delegation will vote in favour of the adoption of the provisional agenda. 37. 1 ought to add - because 1 believe it - that my Government has no doubt about the competence of the Security Council to consider on its merits the dispute between the United Kingdom and Iran. l need only recall that it is the Security Council which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and that the very first step towards the exercise of that dutY and the performance of that function is to consider any dispute or situation which may affect the maintenance of international peace and security. J 1 38. In this case, the United Kingdom is a member of the Security Council and the Government of Iran is not, although it is a Member of the United Nations. Presumably, the Government of Iran will he invited to sit at the Security Council table aiter the adoption of the agenda. Therefore, it seems to my Government that a decision on competence should come after the Government of Iran has been invited to the table. 1 r 39. Sir Benegal N. RAU (India): We do not yet know enough of the facts of this case. We have read about it from time ta time in the Press and, of course, there has been circulated ta the members of the Security Cottncil a docttment [S/2239] containing a copy of the arder of the International Court of Justice dated 5 July; but the order itself states that th~ Iranian. Government was not represented at the heanng. Agam, we have heard over the radio and read in the Press that the Premier of Iran intends to be present here in person to put Iran's case before the CounciL We may therefore now expect to have an opportunity of hearing ~Otl1 sides of the matter. After we have heard bath sIdes, we can decide whether the Council is competent to act in this matter and, if so, what action it should take. 40. Even to decide the issue of competence, of ju.risdiction we should have all the facts from both sides before ' us. Therefore, without prejudging any issue, keeping even the question of jurisdiction open, we can proceed to hear the parties.. My ~elegation is there~ore in favour of inc1uding the Item 111 the agenda ma1l11y

After the statement that was made at the beginning of this debate by the representative of Ecuador, and also after the statement just macle by the representative of India, it might appear altogether unnecessary to pnt on record the stand of my delegation in regard to this matter. Nevertheless, l have chosen to pnt my stand on record because l do not wish to have any misunderstanding arising from this discussion. 42, The question of the competency of the Security Council hinges on our judgment in regard to the nature of this matter, on whether or not it is within the domestic jurisdiction of Iran; that is the crux of the matter. If the Council should find that this matter is entirely within the domestic jurisdiction of Iran, then the Council has no business ta put this item on the agenda. 43, l am not sure of alI the facts relating to this questian; l should like to gather more facts to help me to make np my mine1. Therefore, l shouldlike to see some amollnt of discussion here, with the distinct understanding that this Council, as well as any member of it, could at any moment say that this matter is within the domestic jurisdiction of Iran and should, therefore, be removed from the agenda of the Security CounciI. l want ta make that as emphatic as possible so as to leave no misunderstanding in regard to it. 44. There is another point to this discussion. The adoptio.n of the agenda as it stands, it appears to my delega.tl01:, leaves an;>, .meml;er o~ this Council or anybody 1l1vlted to partlclpate 111 tl118 debate free to raise that question of competency again and agaÎ11, along with matters of substance. In spite of the fact that l think that there i.s a question in regard to competency, l will vote fo: tl118 agenda. l have one hope; it is that after some dIscussion the Council, or individual members of the ,Council, might render a service to help the two partl~s to a settlement. If there is any opportunity open to thls body to render a service of that kind, l think we ?hould not al~ow such an opportunity to slip by. That IS what l wlsh to put on record in voting for the adoption of the agenda. 45. There was one remark in the statement of the repre~entative of the United States which attracted my attention. ~f l 1111e~erstood him correctly, he seemed to say t~lat thls questlO.n may be a question of peace and se~unty and th~t,. ~1I1~e the Security Council has the pn~1ary responslbI1~ty 111 mat~ers of pcace and security, theI efore the Secur,lty Councl! must put this matter on the agenda.. That 1111e of argument is not acceptable to my delegatlOn. l do not regard this matter as being one of peace and security. This matter concerns prop- 46. Ml'. BEBLER (Yugoslavia): There is a thesis before the Council that it is not competent to deal with this matter. The main argument of members of the Council against such a thesis was that the Council might decide at a later stage whether it was competent or not. In my opinion, such a position of member States i111plies that they also have doubts whether or not the Council is competent. That is my first point. 47. My second point is that, when listening to the representative of the United Kingdom and his argument that there can be no doubt that there is a dispute, 1 thought that there is also a dispute on the question of our competence to deal with the dispute between the same two States - the United Kingdom and Iran. If we c1ecicle now on our agenda, prejudging to a certain extent our competence ta deal with this dispute by starting our discussion on the merits of the case, we shall take the decision on this aspect of the dispute without having heard one of the two parties, Iran. Besicles, many delegations have argued that "le should listen ta the parties in any case, whether we are competent or not. 48. What is the way out of this contradiction: the desire of the Coundl to listen to the parties, its doubts whether it is competent or not and the dispute on its competency? 1 think that the only way out is to invite the Government of Iran ta participate in our debate not on item 2 of our provisional agenda but on item 1- the adoption of this agenda - we shall thus really have deaIt to a great extent with the question of our competence. 49. l think that this would be in the spirit of our mIes of procedure; under rule 37, any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may be invited, as the result of a decision of the Security Council, to participate without vote in the discus-· sion of any question brought before the Security Council when the Security Council considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected. The statements of the Iranian Government, which are universally known, make clear that it considers that its interests are specially affected by the Security Council or the International Court of Justice being seized of that question. The Iranian Government has contended, too, that those international bodies are not competent. 50. l think that such a procedure would, moreover, be in the spirit of our practice, especially in the General Assel11bly. Hs General Committee hears the representative of a Member State when it debates the question of the inclusion in the agenda of a special item which affects the interests of that Member State. vVe always hear that State and then vote on the agenda; and we always, in the General Assembly at least, consider that

The representative of Yugoslavia has submittecl a formal motion ta the effect that the COlmcil should invite the representative of Iran to participate in the discussion on the adoption of the agenda.

1 think 1 said expressly that it was a feeling or a suggestion. 1 am ready to submit a formal proposal if the Council feels the same way, if there are other delegations which share such an opinion.

1 cannat imagine that the Security Council would in effect approve the suggestion of the representative of Yugoslavia. At least, l should certainly hope that it would not. 1'0 my knowledge the Coullcil never has - and 1 hope if never willcalled UpOll a non-member of the COllncil ta help it make up its mind on what is admittedly a pure question of procedure. 1 should have thought that it would be an extremely bad precedent to create, and 1 am ql1ite confident that my coHeagues will not adopt it. l agree with the President that, if the representative of Yugoslavia really intends to press his suggestion, he shoulcl make a formal motion at once. If not, 1 suggest we proceed to a vote on the substantive question, namely,item l of the agenda.

As there is no formaI motion bèfore the Conl1cil, l shaH put to the vote the adoption of the agenda. In favo-zw: Brazil, China, Eenaclor, France, India, N etherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern IreJandi United States of America. Against: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugo- slavia. The agenda was adopted by 9 votes ta 2. COll1plaint of failure by the Iranian Govermnent to comply with proviBional measures indicated hy the International Court of Justice in the Anglo-Ir8uian OH Company case (5/2357)

Article 32 of the Charter provides as follows: "Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Conl1cil or any State which i8 nota Me1l1ber o[ the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security COllncil, shaH be invited to participate, withollt vote, . in the discussion relating to the dispute." 56. The item under coru;icleration ls· the following: "Complaint of failure by the Iranian Government 57. For the decision of the Security Council, l put the question whether the representative of Iran shaH be invited in accordance with rule 37 of our provisional rules of procedure and Article 32 of the Charter, and also in keeping with previoLls clecisions of the Security Counci!. 58. As l hear no objection, l shaU invite the representative of Iran to take a place at the Security Counen table. At the invitation of the President) Mr. Ardalan) representative of Iran) tooJ~ a place at the Secttrity Council table.

l would suggest that we follow the usual procedure regarding interpretation. Statements by members of the Security Council will be interpreted simultaneously and consecutively. Statements by non-members invited to participate will will be interpreted only simultaneously.

His Majesty's Govermnent in the United Kingdom has decided to bring its dispute with the Iranian Government on the subject of the termination of the Anglo- Iranian ail Company concession to the urgent attention of the Secnrity Council because it believes that, as a good and loyal Member of the United Nations, this is the only course open to the United Kingdom at the present time. The plain bct is that, by a series of insensate actions, the Iranian Government is causing a great enterprise, the proper functioning of which is of immense benefit not only to the United Kingdom and Iran but also to the whole free world, to grind to a stop; unless this process is promptly chec1ced, the whole of the free world will be l11uch poorer and weaker, including the deluc1ed Iranian people themse1ves. 61. The members of the COLlncil will, of course, recol1ect that on 5 July the International Court of Justice, in reply to His Majesty's Government's request for the "indication", as it is ca11ed, of provisional measures of protection, issuec1 an order [5/2239] in which both parties were enjoined intel' aNa to permit the oil industry in Iran to be conducted as it was before 1 May 1951, the clate of the Iranian oil natlonalization law. His Majesty's Government at once signified its full acceptance of the C011l-1's findings and since then has done everything in its power to carry them out. But the Iranian Government, by a series of actions since the Court issued its order, has, to put it blunt1y, fiouted the findings of the Court and made it impossible for effect to be given to the Court's intention. In spite of all the efforts of His Majesty's Government to arrive at a mutually satisfactory arrangement which, as the Council will remember, inc1uded the dispatch of a mission headed by a British Cabinet Minister, the Iranian Goverlllllent on 25 September last announcec1 its intention of requiring the Anglo-Iranian Oïl Company's staff 62. In a nutshell, the view of His lVIajesty's Govemment is that it is intolerable that one party to a matter laid before the Intemational Court should be allowed to Hout the Court's findings and to impose unilaterally its own will in regard to this matter. If this kind of conduct is permitted, a deadly blow will have been struck at the whole system of intemational co-operation which we have been seeking to build up since the last war. In the words of the Charter, indeed, one of the basic principles of the United Nations is to establish conditions unc1er which justice anel respect for the obligations arising fTOm treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained. 63. If therefore Iran - an original signatory of the Charter, let it be remembered - is allowed to continue on this path, a grave step will have been taken towards anarchy in international affairs. The rule of law, as opposed to the rule of force, can obviously only prevail if aIl concerned conform their actions to the decisions and findings of the Court, which is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. Thus, in issuing an arbitrary order expelling 350 members of the staff, the Iranian Government is acting in a manner entirely contrary to the elementary principles of intemational usage. Moreover, it is our contention that, by so doing, it is creating a highly inflammatory situation which may weil be a threat to international peace and security. 64. Whenthis kind of situation arose in the past, it was commonly settled by resort to force. Some would say that, confronted by the present situation, this is what His Majesty's Government ought now to do in the interests of the worlel community as a whole. His Majesty's Government, however, as it has so frequently stated in public, bases its whole policy on the United Nations Charter which, as we allknow, lays down that the solution of intemational problems must, if possible, be solved by peaceful negotiations. This, as l have said, is why His Maj esty's Government has elecided to bring the present dispute urgently before the Security Council, which is the appropriate body to. deal with matters likely to endanger international peace anel security.. 65. ~he draft resolution (S/2358] which the Security COtl1;cil has b~fore it today states ·what everyone must aclmlt are ObVlOUS facts and, in the light of these facts, 66. We further maintain that, in view of the last precipitate step of the Iranian Government to which 1 have referred, it is essential for the Security COl1ncil to aclopt this draft resolution within the next few days, in any case before the expulsion order of the Iranian Govern1l1ent, to which l have referrecl, cornes into effect - that is, on 4 October next. In point of fact, conditions of life for the remaining technicians have now become so intolerable that it has been found necessary to arrange for their evacuation on 3 October. This fact, however, does not, in the view of His Majesty's Government, detract in the slightest from the urgency of the situa~ tion. The Secl1rity Couneil, in our view, onght to inclicate to the Iranian Government that it should not proceed in this arbitrary manner, and that its latest arbitrary action should therefore be reseinded before the ultimatum expires. 67. Of course, we recognize that the justice of what 1 have just said in my introcluctory remarks may not perhaps be so crystal-clear to those who have not had time to study the dispute with the same attention as S01l1e of us have had. For that reason, l shal1now make a historical survey of the dispute and follow that up by a brief investigation of the legal position, to which reference will no doubt be made by the representative of the Government of Iran. 68. The association of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company with Iran began in 1909 when the company then known as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company took over tht> concession, granted by the 1ranian Government in 1901 to Mr. W. K. D'Arcy, to develop the petroleum recently discovered in Iran. Under the terms of this concession. the Iranian Government gave an exclusive right to develop petroleum discoveries for sixtY years in return for certain payments in cash and shares and an annual SU111 equal to 16 pet cent of the Company's net annua1 profits. 69. This latter provision became periodically a source of difference of opinion at to its interpretation and, sincc it 111eant that the Iranian income from the concession was directly tiecl to trading results, the effect was that 1ran's income, like that of the Company incidentally, was much reduced during the. SlU111p of the ear1y thirties. The matter came ta a head in July 1932 when it beca111e known that royalties in respect of 1931 woulcl amount to less than one-quarter of those for 1930. In November 1932, after an organized and abusive press campaign, the Iranian Government dec1ared the concession cancelled. 70. His Majesty's Govern111ent informed the Iranian Government that its action in cance1ling the concession 71. At this point, l might perhaps observe that the 1933 agreement was negotiated personally with His late Imperial Majesty, Reza Shah Pahlevi. The present Iranian Prime Minister is in the habit of alleging that this agreement was concluded under duress. Yet, there is no doubt that Reza Shah was an absolute monarch and that, if the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had not negotiated with him, it would not have concluded any agreement at aH. If, therefore, force was applied by the British it must have been the late Shah whom they coercecl. The present Iranian Government has now apparently discoverecl that the late ruler, whose virtues many of them believed a short while ago to he 50 transcendent that they fonually conferred on him the title of "The Great", was at once a coward and a traitor to his country. This surprising accusation - whieh is of course not levelled by His Majesty's Govermnentdoes not increase confidence either in their judgment or in their motives. 72. In the spring of 1948 the Iranian Prime Minister, without demanding the alteration of the concession as a right, said that there was much criticism of the share which the Iranian Government was receiving from the operations of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which had been greatly expanded during the war. The Company freely agreed to enter into negotiations with the Iranian Government and, in July 1949, the document known as the Supplemental Oil Agreement, which revisecl some of the financial tenus of the 1933 concession in favour of the Iraniall Government, was drawn up and signed by the Irallian Minister of Finance, subject to ratification by the Majlis. This agreement, if it had been ratified, would have meant greatly increased benefits for Iran and an Încome, for the years 1948-1950 inclusive, of no less than &:76.66 million instead of .:f38.67 million. Unfortunately, these highly advantageous terms were never properly explained to 73. His Majesty's Government, which had hitherto confined its intervention in the matter to unofficial representations, felt that in the light of this direct threat to the Company's position it must take steps at least to make its position clear. On 28 Febrllary 1951 it accordingly informed the Iranian Government that in its view the Company's concession agreement, under its Articles 21 and 26, could not legally be tenninated by an act such as nationalization. At the same time, however, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company informed the Iranian Prime Minister that it was ready to negotiate an entirely new agreement based on an equal share in profits. 74. On 7 March, the Prime Minister appeared before the Oil COl11mittee to present reports from Iranian technical, financial and legal experts which were unfavourable to nationalization. Three days later, he was assassinated. After the assassination of General Razmara, the Majlis Oil COl11mittee lost no time in passing its resolution "accepting the proposai that oil should be nationalized throughout Iran", though no further evidence of the practicability or otherwise of the proposed measure was, of course, taken. This resolution was approved oy the Majlis on 15 March and by the Iranian Senate on 20 March, and the mandate of the Oil Committee was extended for two months to consider the principle of nationalization. . 75. On 27 April, the Oil Committee approved the text of a resolution enjoining the implementation "of the decision of the Houses of Parliament for oil nationalization throughout the country" and setting out in nine articles the method of implementation. This resollltion - the so-called nine-point law - was hustled through the J\lajlis and received the approval of both Houses on 30 April. The law was promulgated by the Shah on 1 May. The law provided for the setting up "with a view to arranging the enforcement of the Law" of a mixed Board composed of five Senators and five Deputies and a representative of the Minister of Finance. The establishment of the National Iranian Oil Company followed, and the Iranian Government thereafter persisted in referring to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company as "the former company". 76. Meanwhile, on 26 April, certain proposais had been put to Mr. Ala, who had succeeded General Razmara, which His Majesty's Government hoped might prove the oasis for an equitable settlement. But the second ail resolution, to which l have referred, had 77. The pace of events in Iran now became alarmingly swift. On 2 May, His Majesty's Government had requested the l ranian Government, through its Ambassador in London, to suspend action and allow time for discussion, pointing out that His Majesty's Governl11ent could not accept unilateral action. On 8 May, however, the Iranian Government replied, affirming its determination to proceed with the programme of nationalization but concluding with the statement that the "former oil company would be invited in a few days to discuss the implementation of the law". His Mai esty's Government, in its reply, askec1 the Iranian Governl11ent to agree to negotiations and gave a warning that a refusai to negotiate or any attel11pt to proceed by unilateral action with the implementation of the recent legislation would have the most serious consequences. 78. At the same time, the Company served notice on the Iranian Governl11ent that it wishecl the dispute to be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the tenus of the 1933 concession agreement to which 1 have already referred. The Iranian Governl11ent rejected this request on 20 May and demandecl that the Company's representatives shoulc1 attend meetings for its liquidation. The Company therellpon appliecl, under the tenus of the 1933 agreement, to the President of the International Court of Justice at The Hague to appoint a sole arbitrator between itself and the Iranian Government. At the same time, His Majesty's Government submitted 2 the matter to the Hague Court as a dispute between itself and the Iranian Government. 79. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company then sent out a delegation of directors on Il June to try to convince the Iranian Government of the consequences of its policy of immecliate expropriation of the Company's installations in Iran and to offer an alternative that would give the Iranian Governl11ent money for its present needs, acceptance of the principle of nationalization and a foundation for partnership in the future. 80. After meetings at which the Iranian delegation had proved completely intransigent, and had insisted that aB proposais 111Ust be in accordance with the nationalization law, the Company on 19 June macle an offer which provided for an immediate paYlùent of oE.lO million and a SU111 of ;f3 million a month from J uly onwards during the period necessary to reach an agreement. The offer also provided for the vesting of the Iranian assets of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in theNational Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) on condition that the latter would grant to a new company 2 See I.C.J., 1951, General List, No. 16 (United Kingdom application instituting proceedings transmitted to the Court on 26 May 1951), The 1933 concession agreement, the Iranian Oil Nationalization Act of 1 May 1951, and sorne of the correspol1dence referrcd to in the Jlresent statement are reprodllced, in thcir original tcxt or in translation, as annexes to the application. gl. In the meuntime, the telllporary Board of Directors of the Natiollul IranÎan Oil Company began seriously tn interfere with the Anglo-Iralliall ail Company's operations, and members of the Board delivered a series of intlall111mtnry speeches in the oil-fields and at Abadan. l'v1oreovl'r. they issnec1 instrtlctions that the masters of tankers carrying oil from Abadan 'Nould be required, before sailing", to give a receipt to the National Iranian Oil Company for the cargo loaded. As the oil was c1l'Ur1y the ll'gal property of the Anglo-Iranian ail Company, and in face of the Iranian refnsal to allow a clanse lo he aclded to this receipt reserving the legal rig-hts of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, tanker ll1asters rdused to sigll. The Anglo-Iranian Oil COI11- ptllly'S (;elleral Manager \Vas thereupon accnsed by the Iranianli (lf sahotage and left the conntry, since a hill Imd been presented to the Majlis on 21 Jnne intn Iclucitlg the cleath penalty for sncll an offence. Hnwl'ver. after strong representations by His Majesty's Gm'('nlment and hy the United States Government, l\Ir. Mm;~ac1egh announced that the bill wou1d be withdrawn. X2. On 5 Juiy, the International Court made an order rSI.!23<) 1 calling u]1on the Iranian Government and the i\ngln-l ranian Oil Company to e!o nothing which \Hmld agg-ravatc the dispute, the Anglo-Iranian ail Cnmpany in the meantime to he permittecl to carry on its inclustritl! and commercial operations as it had been clning prinr to 1 May, t1l1der the supervision of an Anglnl nlnian board with one neutral member. On 7 ]ul)', His Majesty's Govertlment informed the Iraniull (;overnment that it accepted the Court's order in fuIL On 9 July, the Iranian Government informed the Sccretary-General of the United Nations that it rejected the Court's order. 83. At this point the President of the United States oiTered tn sellcl his personal representative, Mr. Averell Harrillltlll, to 'l'eheran to discuss the situation with :'Il r. illnssa<1cgh, at the same time drawing attention to t1w orckr of the International Court of Justice and urging' the Iranian Governn~ent to tyeat it with ail possihle attention.Mr. Harnman arnved at Teheran on 15 Jul,. and the Iranian Government was persuadee! to agree to open negotiations \Vith His Majesty's Govcrnll1cnt on the basis of a formula by which His i\Iajesty's Go.vernmel1t, ~or .the purpose of.thes~ ne~otia­ tions, recogulzecl the pnncIl?le of the l~atlOnahzaüon of the oil inc1ustry ia Iran, whde the Iraman Government, [or its part, recogniz:ed the necessity for improving the atmosphere, particularly in south Iran, and agreed to ncgotiate on t.he I?asis of the )aw. of 20 March 1951, without insistmg on the appltcatlOn of the so-.called nine-point law. This formula was confirmed 111 an 84. During this period Iraniall interference with the operations of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had intellsified. The Iranian insistence on receipts in favom of the National Iranian Oil Company for aH oilloaded had brought tanker operations to an end. It became necessary to slow clown production until, on 31 July, when the storage tanks were full, the refinery ceased to operate. 85. During its stay in Teheran, the Lord Privy Seal's mission made every effort to reach an agreement with the Iranian Govermnent. On 13 August, Mr. Stokes put forward proposaIs, subsequently known as the eightpoint proposaIs which, while offering Iranians nationalization and the withdrawal of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company as such from Iran, were designed to ensure the necessary technical efficiency for the production of oil in large quantities and its distribution and sale in world markets. It was essential for these purposes to retain the British technical staff, to ensme a sound operating organization in which the technical staff could have confidence and ta continue to utilize the marketing organizations which already existed. Unfortunately, the Iranian Government refused to discuss these proposaIs on the quite unfounded pretext that they did not conform to the formula agreed with Mr. Harriman, and insisted that the only problems that could be discussed were the purchase of ail to meet the United Kingdom's own requirements, the examination of the compensation to be paid to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the transfer of British technicians to the servie!" of the National Iranian Oil Company. 86. Confining discussion to these three points ignored all the carefuI reasoning which had underlined the vital need to maintain the integration of aIl the industry's manifold activities, from the extraction of crude oil to the sale of refined products in distant markets, inc1uding the branches of shipping, personnel, scientific research, technical training, welfare, and so on. Unless such practical considerations were taken iuto account, there could obviously be no basis for negotiations. Because they had been iguored in the "nine-point law" of 1 May, His Majesty's Government had already made it clear that that law was unacceptable to it. Mr. Stokes made fmther attempts to secure at least the retention of British management; but when it became evident that Mr. Mossadegh was intransigent, Mr. Stokes had no alternative but ta withdraw. his eight-point proposaIs and to return to London, as he did on 23 August. Mr. Harriman left Teheran two days later. 87. "Vith the withdrawal of the Lord Privy Seal's mission, His Majesty's Government let it be known that it regard.ed the negotiations as suspended. It hoped that the Iraman Government, if it wished for a solution toenable the flow of oil to be resumed, would come .sion dl! ihles en ent ira- Jroposi. en huÎt onali5a· lOIn Qil 'assurer :lion de la \'ente Idispcn- :rwllnel le d'Ilne Ille pi'tt Id::.atioll 88. On 12 Septel11ber, MI'. Mossadegh sent MI'. man, for c01111~1Unication ta His Majesty's Government, what he descnbed as new proposais for the settlement the ail dispute which included the ultimatum to the British staff. MI'. Harriman refused to this coml11unication, and pointed out that the proposais were in some respects a retrogression the attitude which MI'. Mossadegh had previously and that the issue of the ultimatum in regard British staff could only aggravate the situation. 1 t 89. On 19 September, His Majesty's Ambassador received further suggestions for a settlement purporting to el11anate from Ml'. Mossadegh, though t11ey received through a direct channel. These suggestions represented little, if any, advance on MI'. Mossadegh's previous offers, and were still wholly unsatisfactory regard to the ail-important question of operational management. When MI'. Mossadegh let it be known that this indirect approach had been made, Majesty's Government was obliged to announce proposaIs were unacceptable as a basis for negotiations. :~ollver' ~l~iti()ns qu'eHes lIe a\'cc i scules l'achat t ~;l~ 1 90. Finally, on 25 September, the Iranian Government announced, without any notification to His Majesty's Government, that the remaining British staff in would be given seven days' notice to quit the This step, l need harelly say, represented a final by MI'. Mossadegh of the interim decision Hague Court. on me- t t dhe· r ~Fi~Ë 1:,.'·. :5 telle> 91. l should now like to say a ward or two on the legal aspects of this matter, because dearly a case in which legal as weil as political considerations figure very prominently. However, it is certainly necessary for the Security Council on the occasion to go into the actual merits of the Kingdom's legal case against Iran. For that is ju,dice before the International COU!?t, which has specified the time-limits within which His Majesty's Government and the Iranian Government must tively present their memorials. 92. No one can deny that there is a dispute the United Kingdom and Iran and, without that dispute is ta a large extent of a legal'character raises important legal issues. His Majesty's Government has therefore acted perfectly, correctly and, indeed, oneot the ways expressly laid down in Articles 36 of the Charter, in going ta the Court. Moreover, the finding on interim measures which the Court s~icnti- ~. ale. etc. 1 Ëratil'n> toi \' avoir r ~.mt éte mai, le lit con· ,tokts a ~n de la , 1 mani· ? Stokes ! tinns, en ' ~fj~u~~ , Il pri"é, rcqu'il ues. Il uh2i!ait .rale, . 93. l now turn to the formaI basis o'f the present reference to the Council. All Members of the United Nations have the right, under Article 35 of the Charter, ta appeal to the Security Council in regard to any matter of the nature referred to in Article 34. No one can doubt the essentially inflammatory nature of a situation of the l<;ind which now exists in those parts of Iran which are affected, even given goodwill and restraint on the parts of the governments concerned, such as has certainly hitherto been exhibited by His Majesty's Gov- erlUllent, or the potential threat to the peaee which may be invalved. But in addition to this, the Council has special functions in relation to decisions of the Court, bath under Article 94, paragraph 2, of the Charter, and under Article 41, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court. Under the latter provision, the Court has already notified the Council of the interim measures it has indicated in the case, and this must dearly imply that the Council has the power to deal with matters arising out of such interim measures. 94. It may of course be argued, and no doubt it will be argued by the Iranian Government, that Article 94, paragraph 2 of the Charter only applies to final judgments of the Court and, consequently, not to decisions on interim measures - just as the I1'anian Government seeks to argue tllat the interim measures indicated by the Court are not binding on the parties and that the Court had no jurisdiction to decree them. l can only point out that the whole objeet of interim measures - as, indeed, Article 41 of the Statute clearly indicates - is to preserve the respective rights of the parties pending the final decision; in other words, to prevent a situation from being created in which the final decision would be renclered inoperative or .impossible of execution because of sorne step taken by one of the parties in the meantil11e with the object of frustrating that decision. Now, it is established that a final judg- ment of the Court is binding on the parties; that, indeed, is expressly stated by Articles 59 and 60 of the Statute and Article 94, paragraph 1, of the Char- ter. But, clearly, there would be no point in making the final binding if one of the parties could frustrate that decision in advance by actions which would render the final judgment nugatory. Tt is, therefore, a necessary consequence, we suggest, of the bindingness of the final decision that the interim measures intended ta preserve its efficacy should equally be binding. 95. As regards the jurisdiction of the Court to indicate interim measures, Article 41, paragraph 1 of the Court's Statute expressly erüpowers it to do so in any· case 96. The u1timate issue of jurisdiction is, therefore, still an open one, and it is open ta Iran in due course to appear before the Court and argue that particular case. Consequently, the Iranian Government is in no way justified in ignoring the interim measures of a conservatory charader which the Court has seen fit to indicate in arder ta regulate the position until the whole case on jurisdiction and merits can be gone into. In any case, it is clearly for the Court itself to decide whether it has j urisdiction or not, and any such decision is . binding on all Members of the United Nations. 97. However, quite apart from these legal points, there is the political factor, which is one the Council cannat fail ta take account of; that is, whether or not the interim measures decreed by the Court are legally binding in the formaI sense of the tenn, they are a clear expression of opinion by the highest international judicial tribunal of what is considered to be necessary to preserve the rights of the parties pending a final decision in a case which has been submitted to it. There arises, therefore, at the least, a very strong moral obligation on every Member of the United Nations which purports to he exercising its membership in good faith to confonn to those measures. Iran has not done sa, and has thereby created a situation which has engendered the maximum of international friction and which may constitute, as l have already said, a potential threat ta peace and security. 98. As a very first step towards the settlement of the dispute, thererore, the Council ought to cal! upon the Iranian Government ta conrorm ta these measures and, in particular, to revoke the recent expulsion orders which constitute the c1earest possible violation of them. It was of the essence of the interim measures that the status quo shoulcl be preserved and, as part of this, that the oil industry in Iran should continue to function under the existing management. That was what the Court intended. Steps which have progressively brought the worlcing of the industry ta a standstill and which have cuhninated in the expulsion of all the exis- ting staff of the Company capable of carrying on the industry, are therefore as c1early con~rary to the letter and spirit of these measures as anythll1g can well be. 99. The Council will, of course, bear in mind the position of the C:0urt as the pri~lcipal judicial organ of the United Nahons; bath Arhcle 92 of the Charter and Article 1 of the Court's Statute establish this. Its position in this capacity has been affinned by the Court itself; l .wouId direct representatives' attention, for 100. Before conc1uding, 1 fee1 that l must dwell shortly on one aspect of the whole affair which has certainly not received the publicity due ta it. The Iranian Governmcnt, for obvious reasons of its own, perpetually represents the Anglo-lranian Oil Company as a gang of unscrupulous blood-suckers whose one idea is to drain the lranian nation of any wealth that it may possess. In fnct, the language employed by the landowning Iranian politicians i5 strongly reminiscent of that employed by the Tudeh, or Russophil party, as regards the landowners. Nevertheless, these wild accusations are siroply not true. 101. 1 have already referred ta royalties, which alone have amounted ta a total of .f.114 million, and ta the additional S1l111S which the Iranian Government would have received under this head if the 1949 agreement had been ratifiecl. Quite apart from such payments, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company has' investec1 large sums of new capital in Iran, amounting in 1949 and 1950 ta .f.17.6 million and .f8.8 million respectively. More- over, a large proportion of the profits derived from the production of ail has been usec1 in the development of the ail-fields and the refinery in Khuzistan. This ploughing back of profi.ts has resulted in very great benefits ta the Iranian people, since only thus has it been possible for the Company ta prodllce, refine and sell the 32 million tons of crude ail which lranian output has now attained. Furthermore, unc1er the 1933 conces- sion the whole of the Company's assets in Iran will antomatically become the property of the Iranian Government when the concession ends in 1993. 102. In addition ta these direct payments and benents, the Iranian Government has received year by year from the Company fmther sums, all110st as large in them- selves as the royalties, elerived from customs duties, local direct and indirect taxation, profits on the exchange rates, and so on. It was largely on the strength of its revenues from the Company that the Iranian Gov- ernment could contemplate a seven-year programme of . development, which at the time received great sympathy and sUP1)ort bath fr0111 His Majesty's Government and from the rest of the Western world. 103. Quite apart from its financial contributions ta the Iranian economy, the record of the Company in Iran bas been one which must aronse the greatest admira- tion from the social point of view and should be taken " li See Interpretation of Peaea Treatias, Advi.sory Opinion: l.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 71. 104. The result has been not ouly a much greater knowledge and skill and many more well qualified Iranians within the organization but also, by reason of those who have left the Company's service and taken up employment elsewhere in Iran, a permanent contribu- tion has been made to the raising of standards, par- ticularly in technical occupations, throughout the country. In the same way, the influence of the medical work for which the Company bas been responsible has extended far beyond the Company's organization. It is thanks to the Company that tens of thousands of Iran- ian workmen at present enjoy housing conditions, educational facilities and health and other social ser- vices on a scale which the working people of Iran enjoy in no other part of the country. These àre facts which are attested to in the report of the International Labour Office entitled Labour Conditions in the Oil Ind1fstry in Iran, published last year in Geneva. To ignore entirely these activities and to put forth that the Company is responsible for oppression, corruption and treachery could be described as base ingratitude if it were not simply ridiculous. 105. l am sure that what l have said will convince all fair-minded people that we are right in asking the Security Council to insist that the Iranian Government should await the decision of the International Court of Justice and more particularly act in accordance with the provisionalmeasures indicated by the Court, before proceeding to a rash act of expropriation which, if persisted in, could have the most sinister consequences not only for the richer nations but also for the poorer ones, in the forefront of which stands Iran itself. After aIl, what we have been trying to establish here in New York during the last six years is a free world; that is to say, a world in which the big and powerful nations f 106. Much has been written in connexion with this dispute, especially l regret to sayon the Iranian side, about the dangers of "imperialism". It is not for me to excuse any excesses of aso-calleel imperialistic nature which may have happened in the pasto So far as my country is concerned, we do not believe that the part we playeel in the diffusion throughout the wor1d of the technical achievements of the industrial revolution was, on balance, in the least discreditable. It is indeed obvious that, though this process may have been dislikecl some- times, it brought many benefits in its train. But whatever may be thought of wha.t was called imperialism in the past, the faet does remain that, since 1945, we have been - and when l sa.y "we", l mean aIl of us in the free wodel - employed in trying to construct a new wodel arder, the essential basis of ... which will be the e1aboration of some synthesis whereby the industrially more-developed countries and the industrially less- developed can co-operate to the benefit of aIl. If the pursuit of such a policy demands restraint and sacrifices on the part of the larger and richer countries, it a1so demands some restraint on the part of the poorer ones. 107. If one thing can be said to have emerged from the period of economic chaos in the thirties which endeel in Hitler's war, it was that self-sufficiency is an idle dream. Consequently, it is useless to think that the new emergent nationalities, in Asia, for instance, can lay the foundations for their own prosperity, or even for their own continued existence, on nationalism aJone. The new nationalism which is there apparent is in many ways an excellent phenomenon but, like all excellent things, it prejudices itse1f if it is pushed too fast and too far. JLlSt as the industrially older-established nations must adapt themselves to it, so must it, in its own interests, at least attempt to co-operate with the industrially older-established nations. 108. In short we must all try, if we can, to act in a responsible manner. One of the tragedies of intemperate action such as that recently taken by the Iranian Gov- ernment is that it may well frustrate all the efforts recently made llnder the aegis of this great Organization to help the economically weaker States along the path of economic progress. 109. Let us therefore try to rid ollrselves of the fatal legacy, the da111,nosa hcreditas, of suspicions bequeathed to us as a reslllt of the diffusion of Western techniques during the last hundred years by those who at one time had a monopoly of them. Let us above all rid ourselves· of the Marxist conception that, in the free wodd, the only relations between nations can he those of exploiters and exploited, and that the only solution to our difficul- ties is the imposition of an iron and all-embracing di~culties is to assume that, as things are and probably wlil be for some ti1l1e to come, there must be intelligent co-operation between inc1ustrialized and the non- industrialized or partially industrialized States, and that, as the process of industrialization spreads so will the '~on-industr~alized States.be. able to play a more promment part 111 the econ01111C Ide of the whole wortd community. 110. Indeed, if the word "exploiters" has any signifi- cance in such a connexion, it may weil be thought to apply to those elements in the non-industrialized countries, and notahly in Iran itself, which use the heady wine of nationalîs1l1 for their own selfish ends. Realizillg in fact that refonns are due if the condition of the people is not to become too intolerable, they seek to inflame those people against the foreigner in a desperate effort either to extract more money from the latter which would otherwise have to come out of their own pockets, or by expropriation to seize and realize assets to which they have no legal or moral right, and which they cannot in any circumstances properly develop. Such reactionaries, l fear, are their own worst enemies. For there comes a point at which the foreign goose will not lay any more golden eggs, while their own goose will not Jay any eggs at ail. To put it bluntly, the goose will be cooked, and though everybody will suffer from this process those who have provoked it are likely to suffer the most. 111. It is surely not much that we are asking of the Security Coundl in the present draft resolution [S12358]. The essential thing is that some reasonable arrangement should be come to between the Iranian Gûvernment and the Government which l have the honour to represent. Al! reasonable 'people will agree that, sa far, the Iranian Government has simply not put [orward any proposaIs which could possibly be willingly accepted by our side. How could we be expectec1 simply ta hand over property which represents a vast labour and outlay on the part of the British people in return for a vague suggestion of compensation which in practice, and ail too probably, may well amount to nothing at al!? Tt is quite true that this vast out1ay has up to now not been unprofitable for us; but neither, as l have shown, has it been unprofitable for the Iranians. Tt is quÎte true that the Iranians have not hitherto played a very great part in what should in principle be a joint undertaking. But their part has nevertheless been becoming increasingly great and, under our latest proposaIs moreover, they would enter into full and genuine partnership whi1e direct Irallian represen- tation in the operating concem would be very con- siderable. vVhen more really competent Iranian 112. Givcn a minimum of goodwill, there is absolutely no reason why an arrangement entirely satisfactory ta bath sides should not be worked out, and worked out quickly. But it cannot be worked out at aU if the Iranian Governl11ent continues to rush madly down a steep hill in pursuit of an illusory objective; and it therefore seems essential, to us at least, for the Security Council to do something to arrest this apparently suicidaI process. By adopting the draft resolution which we have before us, the Security Council wi11make it plain that it is deter1l1ined to uphold the rule of law in international affairs, ta say nothing of the prevalence of reason; it will assert its authority not on behalf of the powerful against the weak but on behalf of intelligent progress as against blind and uninteUigent reaction. Final1y, it will create a landmark in that vast process of peaceful adjustment between the ancÎent East and the industrialized vVest the successful accomplishment of which is admittedly the major problem of our generation. 113. MI'. ARDALAN (Iran) (translated from French): First, l should like to thank the members of the Security Cotmcil for inviting me to spealc. 114. l must say l am very surprised that the United Kingdom Government should have brought before the Security Council a complaint against the Iranian Gov- ernment based on the provisional measures indicated by the International Court of Justice. The Iranian Government has contested the Court's competence in the matter and has consequently withdrawn its dec1ara- tion accepting the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, and has comml1nicated its decision to all the Members of the Unitec1 Nations through the Secretary-General. 115. l am aH the more surprised because the United Kingdol11 Government has recognized the principle of the nationalization of the oil industry in Iran according to a formula accepted by both parties, and in fact did so after the Court had indicated the provisionalmeasures on which this complaint is based. 116. My Government believes, therefore, that there is no ground for discussion of this question in the Council. 117. However, should the Council decide ta examine this question, the Iranian Government is determined to appear before the Council to show cause why the complaint should be rejected. At least ten days would be required to enable the representatives of Iran ta reach New York from Teheran to take part in the discussion. Consequently, l woulc1 ask the members of the Council ta adjourn discussion on this question for ten days.

The representative of Iran has requested that the discussion of this item be postponed for ten days, until Il October, when the Government of Iran would be in a position to set forth its views on the matter unc1er consideration. l 120. That being so, we shou1d normally press for this debate to be continued without de1ay; and, having heard what the representative of Iran has said, l am not sure whether it wou1d not be in order for me still to press that. However, before making up my mind whether l shou1d press it or not, l shou1d be very gratefu1 for the views of my colleagues as to what, in the circumstances and in the light of what the representative of Iran has said, wou1d be the right period of de1ay. Everybody admits that there must be some de1ay; the question is how much de1ay there shou1d be, l shou1d really prefer to have a very short delay. l do not quite see why Mr. Arda1an shou1d not be empowered to present the case, but he now tells us that his Prime Minister is coming here. In those circumstances, a new situation may have arisen to some extent. l shou1d therefore prefer, as l have said, to hear the views of my colleagues before pronouncing myself.

We have before us two points of view in regard to the date of our next meeting on this question. The representative of Iran proposes that the discussion be postponed for ten days, that is, unti1 11 October; the representative of the United Kingdom desires a briefer postponement. l put the matter before the Security Counci1 for its consideration. 122. Ml'. SARPER (Turkey): l am sure that most of the members of the Council desire, if possible, a solution acceptable to both parties and backed by a large majority in the Council. l think it would be wise to take into consideration the time necessary for instructions to be received from the capita1s of many of the countries represented at this table. There are many representatives here, l think - and l am one of them - who have not yet received instructions and whose governments have not yet studied the matter as it has been put to the Security Council today. 123. Therefore, l hope that my proposaI will be considered as a compromise. It is to 1eave the date of the next Security Counci1 meeting to the decision of the President of the Council. l think that it wou1d be wise to do this. The President of the Counci1 may communicate with the parties, and as soon as the representative of Iran is prepared to begin, the President may call the next meeting. l hope that l am not further complicating a situation which is a1ready complicated. 124. Ml'. GROSS (United States of America): l think that the suggestion which has just been made by the representative of Turkey perhaps does rnerit the 125. l do believe, along \Vith the representative of the United Kingdom, that it woulcl be ctesirable to resume the consideration of this question as saon as that might be possible. At the sa1l1e time, l feel also that, if there are the reasons existing which have heen brought out by the represelltative of Iran, my delegatian would not abject to the c1elay of ten clavs which has been requested. On balance, however, l am inclinec1 to agree .to the suggestion of the representative of Turkey, if it meets with the approval of the other members of the Council and, in particular, with that of the President.

The representative of the United States suggests a compromise between the postponement of fttrther discussion tlntil Il Octoller, as proposed by the representative of Iran, and the Turkish representative's proposai to leave the matter to the discretion of the President. l understand that the idea is ta postpone discussion until Il October but that, if the Prime Minister of Iran shou1d he in New York before that date, the Security Council, ut the request of the President, shoulcl meet at an earlier date. 127, Mr. GROSS (United States of America): l had not intended to put forward a proposaI but l shall do so now, May l take the liberty of stating it in a SOl1lewhat clifferent form but, l believc, with the same substance? My proposai is that the Council shoI11c1u(lw decide ta postpone discttssion for ten days, aS suggested by the representative of Iran, provided, however. that if the President of the Coullcil ascertail1s, by menns of communication which he woulel he <l.uthorizecl by the Coullcil to have with the Government of Iran, that an earlier meeting is practicable, the COt1l1cil would meet on a date ta be fixed by the President. 128. Mr, LACOSTE (France) (tral1slated from French): A moment ago the representative of the United Kingdom emphasizecl how urgent it was for us ta take up this matter again - or rather, to continue the discussion. On the other hand, the representative of Iran has annoullced that his Premier wishes ta come himself ta take part in our cUscussions here, 129. Ten days is obviously a long time in a case which the United Kingdom representative has declared to be ex:tremely urgent. The Iranian Premier lllight perhaps fincl it possible to rcach New York a little sooner. Instead of speaking at this stage of adjourning for ten duys, we might perhaps agree on Monday next as the date on which we ought to be ahle ta reStlll1e our discussion. Should circumstances prevent the Iranian Premier from reaching New York by then, we could dOl1btless postpone the discussion again, at the discretion of the President and in the light of the information he would have received from Teheran. Otherwise, l think we should be able ta agree on Monday nex:t at the date of Otlr nex:t meeting,

As between the two suggestions, of course l myself prefer the latter. Even a meeting on Monday would be very late, from our point of view. vVe had hoped that we should go on tomorrow or the next day. 132. There is 110 particular reason why other people should not expound their points of view if they so c1esire. If we meet even as late as Monday, that might mean that, despite the absence of the Iranian Prime ~Iinister, our c1ebate could be continued. I do ask the members of the Council to see if they cannot agree to my suggestion that we shoulcl meet this week. If not, they shoulc1 at least agree to the suggestion of the representative of France that, in principle, we should meet on Monday next. 133. Ml'. TSIANG (China): Tt appears to me that the United States and French proposais do not differ greatly. The United States proposai is that we start \Vith an adjournment of ten days and grant discretion to the President to shorten that period. The French proposai is that we start with a delay of a week and grant discretion ta the President to extend it to ten c1ays. l hope the President could resolve this matter by saying that he will try ta arrange a meeting within n. maximum period of ten days.

Does the Security Council accept the interpretation just given by our colleague, the representative of China, ta the effect that a de1ay of ten days should be granted, subject to convocation of the Security Council at an earEer date if the circumstances should permit?

l sho111d like to withdraw my proposai in favour of that made by the representative of China. I believe that the latter proposai accomplishes the result I had in mind, and l assume that it would be interpreted as meaning that we would meet not later than ten days from now, and earlier if that could be arranged by the President.

l do not want to continue to make a nuisance of myself, but l think that the proposaI which has just been n;ade by the representative of China represents ~hat mlght be said to be the general will of th.e Councl!. We. should have preferred an ear1ier meetmg; but I. th111k the COllncil is clearly in favour, generally speakll1g, of the proposai of the representative of China. ,I would urge, and in fact l assume that, if the proposai ?f the Chinese representative is adopted, we shou~d 111 ~my case meet in ten days' time even if the Iraman Pnme Minister is not here, and that we might meet before

1 think we have reached agreement on this matter. We establish a target date of Il October for the postponement of the meeting, and the President will exercise all diligence in order to convoke the Council at an earlier date if possible.

1 should like to thank the Council for granting my request for a postponement until 11 October. 139. There is just one remark l should like to maIce. Members of the Council, in referring to my' statement, have spoken of the presence of our Premier. l have just re-read the text of the statement. 1 said nothing to that effect. l hope that our Premier will come, but 1 said nothing ahout it in my statement.

Does that not rather change the situation? If we have no guarantee that the Iranian Prime Minister will he here, what is the point of waiting at all? Why cannat Mr. :Ardalan present the Iranian case?

During our deliberations, the Security Council was under the impression that the Iranian Prime Minister would be here on the target date.

1 hope so too. I-Iowever, since reference has been made to my statement, 1 wanted to make this small correction.

1 assume that if Mr. Mossadegh announces his intention of being here on 10 October we shall meet on the lOth; but if he informs us that he is not coming, then l see no reason why we should not meet on Monday at least and continue the debate with the co-operation of the present representative of Iran.

In that case, the President will u~e the discretion ~ranted to him by the Secttrity Counctl and calI a meet1l1g at an earlier date. The meeting ro;e at 7 p.m.