S/PV.571 Security Council

Members of the Council will note that the question of the dissolution of the Commission for Conventional Armaments has been placed at the head of the provisional agenda for this meeting. I understand that this action has to be taken immediately. No protracted discussion should be necessary, and 1 therefore have placed the item on our agenda before the Illdia-Pakistan question. Lelter dated 12 January 1952 addressed to the ?resident of. 'Wc .. SecurÏty· Council from the .Beereiary.General, transmitting theresolution adopted by the General Assembly at its 358th plenary meeting held on Il J2l1uary 1952 (S/2478) ,

In connexion with item 2 of the agenda for this meeting 1 would remind members of the Council that the resolution adopted on 11 January 1952. by the General ' Assembly recommellded to the Security Council that it dissolve the Commission for Conventional Armaments. l tion "The Security Co~ncil, "In view of the recommendation contained in paragraph 2 of the resolution adopted on 11 January 1952 by the General Assembly, "Dissolves the Commission for Conventional Armaments." The India·Pakiatan question (continued) At the invitation of the Presidcr!t, Mr. Setabad, 'representative of India, and Mr. Frank P. Graham, Unitp.d Nations Representative for It~dia and Pakistan, .. look places at the Security C01l.ncïl table.

The Kashmir question has been before the Security Council since 1 January 1948. During these four years every aspect of the question has been examined. On-thespot inquiries have been made by the United Nations Commission hr India and Pakistan (UNCIP), by Sir Owen Dixon and now by Mr. Frank P. Grahiun. The fullest information has therefore already been made available to the Security Council on this question. The representatives of India and Pakistan have also stated their 'views at great lengt~ before the United Nations Commission, the United Nations representatives and the Security Council itse1f. The official correspondence on the subject runs into hundreds of pages, while the verbatim records of the Security Council are even more voluminous. It is thus not for want of factual information with regard to the various aspects of the problem, nor for lack of knowledge of the views of the parties, that .the dispute has not sa far been settled. The deadlock that has unfortunately been reached with regard to the matter is also not due to the absence of an agreemènt. 6. After hearing bath sides at length and ascertaining their views in detail and taking aIl relevant factors into account, the United Nations Commission abtained the agreement of India and Pakistan to which the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 apply. 2 These two resolutions together constitute the international agreement with regard.to Kashmir· and cover aIl the stages from th'ë cease-fire to the holding of 7. AdmiraI Chester W. Nimitz of the United States Navy was designated as Plebiscite Administrator, with the agreement o{ India and Pakistan, on 22 March 1949. Since January 1949 Pakistan has bee,n striving to secure the implementation of the remaining terms of the agreement. There has at no time been any question of anything being imposed from outside on either party. The efforts of the Security Coundl have been directed solely towards securing an implementation of the agreement existing between th(~ parties. The deadlock that is now almost three yt:ars old is related ta the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir preparatory to the holding of the plebiscite and the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator. 8. When the cease-fire was agreed, the anned forces engaged in Jammu and Kashmir feIl into the following categories. On the Pakistan side there were the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting, and also regular troops of the Pakistan Army and the Asad Kashmir.forces. On the Indian side of the cease-fire line the forces consisted of regular Indian armed forces and State armed forces, which include the State army and State militia. 9. The resolution cf the Commission envisaged demilitarization in two stages. Th~ first stage provided for withd.rawal of tribesmen, of Pakistan volunteers and Paldstan troops, on the one side, and of the bulk 9fthe . Indian forces on the· otherside. (Vide· partI! of the . resolution of 13 August 1948.) The second stage provided for the final disposaI of the remaining forces in the State, namely, the Azad Kashmir forces on the one side and the Indian forces rel11aining after the ~'Ïth­ drawal of the bulk of the Indian forces and the State forces and militia on the other side.. (Vide pal'agraph 4 of theresolution.of $January .1949.) The obligation on Paki$tan to perst!a,de the tribesmen and volunteers to withdraw, in the ~a:nguage of the resolution, arises only dter the. signing of the truce agreement which .has not yetbeen reached or signed, butas proof of good intentions and of. its anxiety to proceed with the implementation of the resolution, Pakista!' discharged its obligation without waiting for the conclusion of the truce agreement. Pakistanhas also been prepared to withdraw the Pakistan forc~s of the regular army and to agree to large-scale-disbandment of the Asad Kashmir forces, proviqed that India would car::y out its commitment regarding withdra.wal· of Indian forces and the large scaledisbandment of the State army and militia. 10 l . . 96),. . t lS not necessaryJ() go over thehistory of.the - re~olutions which he considered must be resolvecl ta enable such demilitarization to be implemented. Il. After visiting Jammu and Kashmir and holding a number of meetings with representatives of India ancl Pakistan, Mr. Graham put forward, on 7 September 1951, twelve proposaIs for a comprehensive programme of demilitarization preparatory to the holding of a plebiscite. (Vide annex 2 of document S/2375 s.) Ml'. Graham informecl the Securitv Council in this report that he had been able to secllre agreement only on the first four of his twelve proposaIs, na111ely, those relating to the observance of the cease-fire agreement and the cessation of warlike propaganda ancl the reaffi.rmation of the undertaking that the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be clecided in a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the Unitecl Nations. 12. The Security COlmcil considered Mr. Graham's report of 15 October 1951 ancl his personal statement of 18 October 1951 [564th meeting], and adopted a resolution [S/2392] on 10 November 1951 [566th meeting] noting the basis for a programme of demilitarization which cauld be carriecl out in conformity with the previous undertakings of the parties, put forwarcl by the United Nations Representative in his com111unication of 7 September 1951 to the Prime Ministers of Inclia and Pakistan l5/2375, anne.v 2J. The Council instructed the Unitecl Nations Representative to continue his efforts to obtain agreement on the demilitarization plan, and r~quested him to report concernîng his efforts and his Vlews on the problems conficled to him. 13. 'fhe second re~ort of the United Nations Representative was submltted to the Security Council on 18 December 1951 [5/2448]. On 17 January 1952 Mr. Graham made a personal statement before the Sec~lrity Council [57qth meeting]. Since then the United NatIOns. ~e~res~ntatlve has released the tentative plan on clemllttanzatlon proposed by his lVIi1ital'Y Adviser, General Devers [5/24~5]. Mr. G~aham has pointed out that, as a result of I11S second effort he had obtained agreement on points 8, 9, II and 12 of Îlis truce proposaIs 14. These four proposaIs relate to the scope and extent of demilitarization, the period within which the demilitarization programme should be carried out, the quantum of forces which should remain at the end of demilitarization, and the date on which the Plebiscite Administrator should be formally appointed tooffice. After taking inta accoutit the views of both parties, , Mr. Graham came to the folloVl'ing conclusions on the four basic proposaIs concerning which he had not succeeded in obtaining the agreement of India and Pakistan [Sj2448, para. 32]. 15. First, he pointed l'ut that the proposaI for a demilitarization programme ~n a single continuons process implied, in his opinion, dle implementation as a whole of part II of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948 and of sub-paragraphs 4 Ca) and Cb), of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949. The demilitarization programme should, therefore, be in accord w,th paragraph 7 of his . proposaIs. In other words, the demilitarization programme shou1d embrace an the fighting forces within the State, namely, tribesmen, Paldstan volunteers and troops and Asad Kashmir forces, on the one hand, and the Indian forces, the State army and militia, qn the ~ther. 16. Second1y, Mr. Graham récommended that the demilitarization programme should he completed bv 15 July 1952 unless another date is agreed upon bv the representatives of l ndia and Pakistan. . . 17. Thirdly, Mr. Graham recommended that at the end of the programme of demilitarization there should remain "on each side of the cease-fire line the lowest possible number of armed forces based in proportion on the nümber of armed forcés existing on each side of the cease-fire line on 1 January 1949". Mr. Graham explained to the Security Council on 17 Jimua..ry, in his address, that he didndt have the expert knowledge to suggest what the exact figures shou1d be,but he .had suggest~d the afore-melitioned principles as a basis for an approach to the problem. He said [570th meeting] : ,"42. Conceming the first point,the reasons are obvious: both parties have agreed to the demilita- ..,. ,don oUhe State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Security Council has ïecomm~ndeci that the demilitarization should he effected. "50. Conceming the second point,it is the view of the United Nations Representative that the way to 18. Fourthly, Mr. Graham recommended that the Government of India "sha11 cause the Plebiscite Aettr'inistrator ta be formaIly appointed to office not later than the last day of the demilitarization periodu • that is, 15 July 1952. 19. Mr. Graham attaches importance ta this part of his truce proposais. He told the Security Coundl on 17 January 1952: "54. It is theview of the United Nations Representative that an agreement for a specified time for the induction inio office of the Plebi:>cite Administrator would ~ontribüteto the further development of a more friend1y atmosphere. One of the main keys to the complex problems of delllilitarization, the possible linchpin which would integrate the twelve-point programme, the c1earest .symbol both of thenecessary and ultimat",: demilitarization in the promised plebiscite, would be the fixing of a definite day for the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator. "55. The United Nations Representative holds the view that the bent clay for the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator is not at the beginning or midway. but thè l3,'>t day ot the contemplated period, which is not later than15 July 1952.u 2.0. l may recall to the memory of the _u~mbers of the COŒ.1cil that the two .UNCIP resolutions contemplate that the Plebiscite Administrator would be formally appointed to office at the beginning of the second stage Of ~he demilitarization, the stage that is set out in subparagraph 4 (a) and (b) of the resolution of 5 January 1949; that is t, say, very müch earlier than contemplated by Mr. Graham. Pakistan's views regarding Mr. Graham's truce proposaIs of 7 September 1951 are set out in the late Prime Minister's letter dated 12 September 1951 [Sj2375, annez 4] and in my letter -dated 11 December 1?51 [Sj2448, annez 5]. Pal:istan isequally f'(~dy tv carry out a programme of demilitarization in tWIJ stages as enVisaged in the UNCIP resolutions, or a demi1itari7'ltion programme in one sii')gle continuous prQcess, as r~oposed by Mr. Graham. )3ut Pakistan.c0111d not possibly be expected to agree to any one-sided demilitad:.;ation arrangement. For us, demilitarization ts not an end in itself; it is an essenti:tl preliminary to. the holding of. a free und impart~al plebiscite. 2;1. Wealso agreeto Mr. Graha.r:u's proposaI that the Plebiscite Administrator should be inducted into office not later thari the last day of the demilitarization progré).mme,name1y, 15 Jllly 1952, although, as l have said, .that would.postpone his formaI appointmcnt to a later ~eriod thanthat contemplated in the UNCIP resolutions. 23. At the 570th meeting of the Security Council held lIU 17 January 1952, the represt'ntativc of the USSR referred to certain Press reports relating to the granting of military bases in Kashmir to the United States. l wish to state c1early and \Vith authority that these reports upon which he relied for his statement are utterly false and without any foundation whatsoever. vVe have neither been asked for, nar have we offered, any miHtarv or ather bases to the V nited States or anv other Power: l trust that an)' misapprehension tbat migilt have been raised in the mind of the representative of the USSR on the basis of the reports to which he refers will now be set at rest. 24. The USSR representative has abo observed that the sett1ement of the Kashlllir dispute shoùld be "inspired by the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peop1es proclaimed in the United Nation:> Charter", and that the people of Janmm and Kashmir should deterllline their future through a delllocratically elected representative constituent asselllblv. l have since understood that his reference \Vas nDf to the constituent assembly convened in Indian-occupied Kashmir, but to a new constituent asselllbly for the wholc of Jalllll1U and Kashmir elected undcr conditions of ah 'Jlute freedom and impartiality and free from aIl pressure and interference. 25. The difference between what '. USSR representative suggestcd and what the ~, .dty Council has sought to achieve with the agreel lent of India and Pakistan is one of method, not of principle. Throughout this controversy, ~ndia, Pakistan and the Security Council have been agreed that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan or India should he decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite. This fundanlental principle is embodied in the preamble ta the Security Council resolutian of 21 April 1948 [S/726] and in paragraph 1 of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949. Pakistan fully subscribes to this principle. It not only agrees, but is i1]sistent and eager, that conditions should be created as speedily as possible to enable the people of Jammu and Kashmir freely t6 recorci tln:ll" view on this question. . Every measure that the Security Council can devise to achieve this end will have the fullest and unqualified support of Pakistan. 26. Mr. Graham described the Kashmir dispute as a running sore which is poisoning the relations between India and Pakistan and draining away the resources and energies of both countries. The dispute has been before the United Nations for over four years. AIl effortsat negotiation, mediation and conciliation have faHed. The 27. Sir Glaùwyn jl:ŒB (United Kingdon1): l have listened .vith great attention to the speech made by my friend, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan. 'vVe are aU, l am sure, very grateful to him for the rt3s11mé which he has given us of the negotiations conducted by Mr. Graham since the Security Council resolution of 30 March 1951, and \ve shaU aU doubtless wish to stuc1y the conclusions which he has drawn. 28. Sir Mohammad ZafruUa Khpn has also, if l muy say sa, dealt most effectively witl'. the al1egations made by the representative of the Soviet Union in his intervention on 17 January with which, as the Council will recoUect, l also dealt at the thne. l do most sincerely hope that these extraordinary red herrings will not continue ta be drawn across the trail and that the Council will retum ta the atmosphere of objectivity which, until the USSR representative made his last intervention, had always, l think l am right in saying, characterized its consideration of the Kashmir problem. 29. The representative of India will pres"mably, at sorne stage in our discussion, wish to comment on the views c...'Cpressed by che Foreign Minister of Pakistan and ta put forward the views of the Government of India on the points immediately at issue. In the belief that both p~rties will seek, so far as possible, to avoid controversy - which l know is the intention - l have asked the President's permission to speak before the representative of India, in the hape that, by putting before the Council certain proposais - constructive as we believe .- we may be able to confine 0ur discussion to a quite brief examination of the sttpS likely to carry this problem further forward towards a solution. In our long and painful consideration of the Kashmir question, we have - as it were - inched our way slowly forward, one ~tep at a time. Now, however, seems to be the time to take one final step. 30. We have now had time ta give proper study to Ml'. Graham's second report and to the text of the important and helpful oral statement which he made to the CouncU on 17 January 1952. The United Kingdom Government had hoped, of course, that Ml'. Graham, during the further period of six weeks in which he continued his negotiations with the two parties here in Paris, wouM succeed in resolving the outstanding points of difference between them. We had hoped that, with the points of difference so c1early defined, the way would dl~militarization; and, 8ec(lndlv, the fixin':; of the definite timl' when the Government 'of India \\~m.Id cause the Plebiscite Administrator to he inducted into office. 31. Agreement between the parties must c1early be reached under these two heads before wc CD'I hope to go forward to the plebiscite and to the Hnal goal to which bath the parties have plcdged themselves: namely, a decision by the people of Kashmir whether the aCl'ession of their State should be to India or to p~k18tan. How s\1ch agreement can best he brought about. is, 1 submit, the matter which requires our immediate attention. 32. 1 do not wish to suggest to the Council that because these basic differences continue no progress has been made during :Mr. Graham's tenure of office as United Nations Representative. On the contrary, l bdieve tho.t there has been significant progress and that we are aIl greatly indebted to Mr. Graham for clearing a good deal of the ground towards a final seulement of the dispute. In the first place, it has been a considerable gain, in our view, for Mr. Graham to formulate the main points on which agreement between the two Cvernments is requil'ed, in the form of his t"dve-point proposaI. This .has introduced clarity into the consideration of the dispute and has disposed of a number of uncertainties and ambiguities which tended to cloud the earlier negodations. Also, we must by no means overlook the importance of the eight points in Mr. Graham's proposaIs to which the two Governments have exprc5sed their agreement. 33. Tt is because of the success which Mr. Graham has J1~(t i~l '.lia;rfying his·negetiation5 forward that the Gov- .er~ment of the United Kingdom now belieyes that he ,sl:to~ld p.ay afurther visit to the sub-continent-to make 'Clllefinalattempt to .bringabout a solution :Qf the two oqtstandhtg points of. difference which 1 mentioned ~arlier. After all, we must admit that the circumstances fpr MT. Graham's last round of negotiations were perhaps not entirely propitious. The Government of India was already preoccupied \Vith the arrang~ments for its general election, which, as we 0.11 know, on accoun.t of 1)oth the size of the country and the great e.,"{tension of the franchise, has presented many difficult problems. The United Kingdom Govcrnment therefore hùpes that, now that the Ir..dian elections are, as 1 beliele, virtually over, and now that both the Govermnent of India and the Government of Pakistan are ready - and we believe ·indeed anxious - to give their full attention to the task of worldng out an agreement on outstanding points, ~Qn!inued .negotiatiQUs by Mr. Gra,ham. will be fully :,)ustdied. . . 35. It is scarcely necessary, 1 suppose, for me to say that the United Kingdom Government is fully aware of the urgent need for a settlement of this dispute and for som~ early and taI?-gible proof that the Secnrity Council and Its representattve, Mr. Graham, are carrying matters forward towards a settlement. I would therefore suggest that, if the procedure which I have just put before the Coundl is adopted, Mr. Graham should report back to the Council on the results of his further negotiations by the end of M:lrch. I think it is most ialportant - and I am sure that Mr. Graham himself would agree - to set some time limit in this way for any further round of negotiations. . 36. There is no need to speak of terms of reference, I think, for the negotiations which I have suggested. In a long series of resolutions, the Council has already clearly defined the path along which a seulement has to be approached. The two parties, by their acceptance of the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, are themselves pledged to a progranune for achieving a seulement. Mr. Graham himself, by the twelve-point proposaIs which he has submitted to the parties in furtherance of the principles contained in the resolutioll of 30 March 1951, has already set the course 'which he will follow. 37. Throughout his negotiations, Mr. Graham has clearly been guided by two main principles, with which the United Kingdom Government - and, l have no doubt, the govemments cf most other 111embers of the Security Councilis in complete agreement. The first is that, in order that the plebiscite shaU be demonstrably fair and free from any external pressure, the number of troops on both sides of the ce~ "e-fire line should be reduced to the absolute I1liniI1ltll~oI1lpatible with the need to' preserve law and order and internaI security, and that both parties should co-operate to this end in a spirit of mutual trust and goodwill. The second is that once theprocess of demilitarization and preparation for .a plebiscite has. started, the 1110mentum should be maintained until the whole operation is completed. 38. The twelve proposaIs which Mr. Graham put ta the two parties last September, and has since been dis- 39. In paragral?h 32 of his second report, Mr. Graham has expressed Vlews on the four outstanding points of difference. Vve have no doubt that these views, coming from such a source, will be taken fully into account by the two parties. vVe also greatly hope that, with the object of setting themselves a target, the parties will, as suggested by Mr. Graham, aim at 15 July 1952 as the date by which the process of demilitari7.ation should be completed and the Plebiscite Administrator inducted. 40. As 1 see the position, Mr. Graham can now return to the sub-continent in pursuance of the existing mandate, no new resolution being nece!>sary. May 1 refresh the memory of·the Council by reading paragraph 2 of the Council's resolution of 14 Ma' 'h 1950 (S/1461]. l'hat part reads as foUows: "The Security COlmcil. .. "2. Decides to appoint a United Nations Rep~'e­ sentative for the following purposes who shaH have authority to perform his functions in such place or places as he may deem appropriate: " (a) To assist in the preparation and to supervise the implementation of the programme of demilitarization referred to above and to interpret the agreements reached by the parties for demilitarization; "(b) To place himself at the disposaI of the Governments of India and Pakistan and ta place before those Govermnents or the Security Council any suggestions which, in his opinion, are likely to contribute to the expeditious and enduring solution of the. dispute which has arisen between the two Governments in regard to the State of Jammu and Kashmir ; "(c) To exercise aU of the powers and responsibilîties devolving upon the United Nations Commission by" reasonof existing resolutions of the Security Council and by reason of the agreement of the parties embodied in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949; "(d) To arrange at the appropriate stage of demili- !arization fOl: the assumption by the Plebiscite Admin.- lstratot' of the functions assigned to. the latter under agreements,made between the parties; "(e) Ta report to the Security Council as he may considernecessary submitting hi.. conclusions and any recommendations which he may desire to make." 41. Mr. Graham, of course, "in succeeding Sir Owen Dixon to this appointment under the resolution of 30 March 1951, hasalsoinherited aIl the powers and 42. To sum up, 1 earnest.ly hope that my colleagues in the Councii will feel able to concur in our view lhat Mr. Graham should, as part of his continuing function as United Nations Rel?resentative for Iudia and Pakistan. make a further vislt to the sub-continent to continue his negotiations with the two Governments and that he should report the result of these negotiations to the Council by the end of March 1952. 43. If this is the çeneral sense of the Council. 1 hope that the representatlves of India and Pakistan will agree that these further negotiations should be undertaken and that they will he able to offer the full co-operation of their Governments to Mr. Graham in bringing them ta a successful conclusion. Clearly the less controversy between the parties in the Council at this stage. the greater will be ~tJr. Graham's chances of fin;!ing a readiness in the sub-continent ta conc1ude the settlement which we have aIl sa long and earnestly awaited. May 1 therefore appeal ta our colleagues from India and Pakistan ta hammer out their differences round the conference table with Mr. Graham rather than at the Security Council table. 44. This time we must aIl hope that·the hammeringout process will produce agreèment rather than new lacerations. \\Te must all try ta Ahow the world that the United Nations \vay, long and arduous though it be, is the right way to solve our mutual conflicts. \\Te must aIl, by our help and our enconragement, do our best ta preserve faith in our democratic institutions. 1 think that it is the privilege of India and Pakistan to be able to point theway. ta the happier world cornmunity of .the future. 45.. Mr. VON BALLU5ECK (Netherlartds): On 17 January 1952 we listened ta the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan present to us his second report, set forth in document 5/2448. It will be remembered that the Security Council, in the resolution {S/2392] itadopted on 10 November 1951 by 9 votes in favour and 2 abstentions - one of which was the Soviet Union -noted with approval the basis for a programme of demilitarization which the United.Nations Representative put forward ta the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan on 7 September 1951 [S/2375, annex 2]. The Council furthernoted with gratification the dec1ared agreement of the two parties to four points contained in Mr. Grahan1's proposals. and it instructed the United Nations Representative tocontiutle his efforts to·ùbtain·further agreement orthe parties and, not later than six weeks after the reso1ution carne into effect, ta give the Cuuncil a report and statement of his views conceming the problern confided to him. 46.We have now beel1'able to acqll~lnt ourselves with .MT. Grahain's second report and with his own views coneernîng .the problem confided to him. From this report l note with satisfaction that. Mr. Graham bas teached agreement on fOUf more points of the proposal$ -17. In my intervention during the Council's meeting of 10 November 1951 [566th tnt'efitl.q] , 1 stated that, notwithstanding the fact th:1t the then remaining points of difft.'rence were of major importance, ina~ mnch as they \Vere concerned with the actual implement.'l.tion of the principles for demilitarization, it nevertheless looked as though Mr. Graham had been able to narrow down the conflict to a rfduced number of points at issue. 1 -considered that iu itself a matter of considerable merit and of definite improvement compared ta what the situation had been before Mr. Graham went ta work on his mission. 48. l o.lso said that 1 trttsted the parties would realize that, under the circumstances, they bore an increased responsibility for overcoming the final ohstacles that were still obstru~ting the way towards a solution, now that the gap seemed ta have become less ",ide. 49. Mr. Graham himself came to the conclusion that. although he did not underestimate the remaining difficulties, "the possibility of arriving at a ·basis of agreement between the two Governments i5 not excluded". On the basis af that confidence my Government was able to agree to the recommendation ofMr. Graham ta allow him to continue the negotiations with the two parties in arder ta obtain a further meeting of minds. 50. Sinc~ in his second report, as l recalled just now, Mr. Grahanl was able ta point to agreement on four more of his original proposaIs, the points at issue, which remain for the moment, are those contained in proposal~. S, 6, 7 and 10. 51. l realiz~ that these last four proposals are the most 'basic ones, and we also agree with Mr. Graham that agreement on those four proposaIs i5 most essential for carrying out the plan of demilitarization he rightlv wants to envisage as an integrated whole. • 52. The Security Council would perhaps now be entitled to consider whether, in the face of these continuing disagreements on certain basic points which must be resolved to ·eml.ble demilitarization to be carried out, paragraph 6 of the resolution of 30 March 1951 [512017/Rev.1] ·sliould not at this tinle be implemented. .l t seèrns to me that as long as there is' a rèasonable chance of further· agreemerit throùgh'negotiation - and l anIl not yet prepared to give up all hope of this - we should give priority tà· the method of negotiation over the mèthod of arbitration. On the· other hand, the patience shown sa far by the Security Coùncil should not be misconstrued as lightening in any way the moral and political responsibilitks of êheparties themselves for the fulfi1ment of their definite commitrnents regarding the creation of fair. conditions for a free and impartial .plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir. 53. These four rema.ining'R9mts are concernec1with the implementation .of the demilitadzation plan as ·a sir:g1e continuous pr()c~ss ~h~:h. ~s tQ be ~ompleted, in 54. The final point at issue concerns the armed forces which will remain on each side of the cease-fire line on 15 July 1952. Mr. Graham has suggested a scheme for withdrawal, reduction, disbandment and disarmament of the various ~roups of armed forces on both sides, as a result of whtch on 15 JuIl 1952 "there will remain on each side of the cease-fire hne the lowest possible number of armed forces based in proportion on the number of anned forces existing on each side of the cease-fire line on 1 January 1949"-that is to say, the moment when the cease-fire agr~ement came into force. 55. Since then wc have becn acquainted with the tentative plan for the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir based on the original proposaIs of Mr. Graham and worked out in more detail by General Jacob L. Devers, Military Adviser to Mr. Graham. This tentative plan was, 1 believe, turned over as a suggestion to both t>arties, or at least released 50 that both parties could take cognizance of it. It follows the lines of Mr. Graham's original proposal but it has made an effort to fill in certain figures in proposaI 7 of the Graham plan where the United Nations Representative refers to the Iowest possible number of troops on each side of the cease-fire Une at the I~nd of the demilitarization period. From the figures suggested by General Devers 1 gather that the total numbers of armed forces remaining on ea,ch side of the cease-fire line would then present a ratio of about 5 on the Pakistan side to 7 on the Indian side. At the same time General Devers has suggested a mote detailed scheme for a reduction in stages of armed forces on both sicles of the cease-fire Hne G:1 the basis of the generàl ideas outlined by Mr. Graham and for which he has endeavoured to calculate exact figures and periods. 56. It is not my intention ta pass a judgment on each suggestion. I believe that the members of this Council are hardI)' in a position to he able to judgc the military situation and the mîlitary possibilities which prevail on th~ sI?0t. However, these st'ggestions are from an authorttative source and are weIl worth o::r earnest con, sideration, as well as that of the partiesoncerned; and I submit that the material p!"~J.uced by Mr. Graham and his advisers might well ~orm useful ground-work for further negotiations, this time perhaps on the very highestlevel. 57. 1 know that the parties hold divergent views on the' security needs in and arottnd the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.. Notwithstanding the acceptance by bothparties of point 1 of Mr. Graham's original proposaIs in which the Govèrnments of India and Pakistan "reaffirm their determination not to resort to force and to adhere to peaceful procedures, and specifica11y pledge themselves that they will not commit aggression or make war, the one aga.i~$tthe other, with ·régard .to the, question of J&mrnu .and Kashmir"- 58. l may recall in this connexion that both parties stand committed to the implementation of the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. Those resolutions constitute a framework which must now he definitely filled in. Both parties have repeatedly accepted the prindple that the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, either to India or to Pakistan, shaH be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted Hnder the auspices of the United Nations after the cease-fire and truce arrangements will have been carried out. Therefore the freely expressed wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir must in the end prevail over the wishes and daims cf the two bordering States. . 59. It seems to me that it would be difficult to admit the right of either party for reasons of their own security ta curtail the full freedom of choice by the people of Jammu and Kashmir. On the othe, hand we must not for a moment underestimate the responsibility which the United Nations has undertaken in connexion with the peaceful solution of this matter. 60. Through the efforts of the United Nations both parties have accepted abasisfor a solution. Through the efforts of the United Nations Representative, Ml'. Graham, both parties have reaffirmed their determination not to resort to force. For that reason any party which would break the solemn pledges would load upon itself a terrible guilt. There seems to be no reason ta envisage such an eventuality for the moment. Therefore we should. continue ta place before every other consideration the conditions· which must enable the people of Jan1mu and Kashmir to express themselves, free from any kind of intimidation or pressure. 61. My country has no direct interest in this matter except that it wants to see a conflict, which might in the long fun jeopardize peace in the sub-continent, solved on a just and equitable basis. We have 110 particular reason to be foi: or against an accession of J a1l1mU and Kashmir either to India or to Pakistan. Our only interest in this matter is one of principle, namely, that the right of self-determination forthe people of JaJ11I,,11 and Kashmir must be respected and implemented. We are therefore willing and eager to explore every avenue that may lead to full agreement between the two parties to make that self-determination possible. Ml'. Graham thus far ha.s b.een able to secure agreement on eight points out·of twelve. We would therefore consider it wise if he went o~ ""ith his workfor a further period of rime. to . endeavour to bring the parties together on the remaining .points, and we associa.te ourselves with what was said 63. In conclusion, l wish to make a brief obser;ration in connexion with what was said during our meetmg of 17 January 1952 by the repres~ntati.ve oF the Soviet Union. The USSR representatIve, lU hls statement, interpreted the intentions of the efforts which the .Security Council has S? f~r made to prOl!'10te a ,solution of the Kashmir questlOn m a manner whlch l fail to understand. l may recaU that up to a few weeks ago the' representative of the Soviet Union had taken very little part in the debates in the Security Council on this question. On the resolntions appointing Mr. Graham and approving his proposaIs, the representative of the Soviet Union abstainecl when the vote was taken. 'YVhen Mr. Graham was appointed last year and when the USSR representative questioned the wisdom of fiUing this post by an American citizen, it was explained to him that every member of the Council had complete liberty to propose other candic1ates.' The Soviet Union representative refrainec1 from proposing any other canc1idate and did not vote against the appointment. It is therefore a little surprising, to say the least of it, to find the USSR representative now accnsing Mr. Graham anc1 his assistants of being something like agents of the Pentagon. l do not propose to go further into this matter now, but merely wish to recall the conclusion of the USSR representative in his speech on 17 January 1952 when he saic1 that "the USSR Government considers that the Kashmir question can be resolved successfully only by giving the people of Kashmir an opportunity to decide the question of Kashmir's constitutional status by themselves without ontside interference". But l submit that this is exactly what we are trying to do and wltat we have been trying to c10 for years. The demilitarization of Jammu and Kashmir is exactly meant to prevent partial and biased outside interference with the free choice of the people of that territory. It is to that end precise1y that 111y Government would like to see Mr. Graham continue his efforts. 64. Mr. MUN.I~ (Brazil): In the first place, l wish t~ thank the M1l11ster for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, Sir Mohal11mad Zafrulla Khan for his very able ancl impartial exposé of the question'of demilitarization from its origin until its present stage after the intervention of Mr. Graham. 6~. The Brazilian delegation. wishes aIsa to paya warm tnbute ta M,r. Graham for hl? earnest and painstaking eff01~t? to. br~ng about a solutlOn of the dispute on the de1111htanzatlon of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a 'precondition of a plebiscite to decide the future of the cltsPlfted area. NC?t only during his stay in the sub. cont1l1ent, but also 111 New York and afterwards in Paris Mr. Graham exertec1 hltnself, through long negotiation~ 66. Although the diligence and great wisdom with which he endeavoured to fulfil his difficult mission were not crowned with immediate success, we cannot say that his efforts were in vain or that they met with failure. In a matter such as this, :nvolving old antagonism and exacerbated nationalism, the task of conciliation is a hard and long-protracted one. It requires patience, forebearance, constant application and the intervention of time with· its healing qualities in order to bring the par.ê;:.:; to see, above the passions of the hour, their real and pern1anent interest, and to produce the necessary adjustments leading to finai settlement. 67. For the reasons which l have stated the Brazilian delegation does not believe· that the Security Council ought to consider Mr. Graham's mission aB terminated. Nor does it consider that his past endeavours were fruitless. On the contrary, his twelve-point proposaI has greatlydarified the issue. We agree, therefore, with the suggestio~ of the United Kingdom reptesentative that Mr. Graham, in fulfilment of the mission entrusted to him, should proceed. again to the sub-continent and report to the Security Council at the end of March 1952 in order to seek to expand the area of agreement which has been enlarged through his intervention. 68. Another important consideration prompts my delegation to accept that suggestion. Within a few days the complete results of the Indian general elections will be-known, and this fact is likely to exercise some influence on the issue and establish a favourable c1imate for the task of conciliation. 69. The Brazilian delegation is, therefore, of the opinion that a renewed effort to achieve conciliation at this juncture may greatly facilitate the settlement of th,: issue of demilitarization.

This is the 11rst opportunity t.~e Chilean delegation has' had in· the United Nations to intervene in tne dispute between India and Pal<:istan over Kashmir. l should therefore like to iIldicate briefly the spirit in which my country and its Government. propose toparticipate in the efforts to settle this' dispute. . 71. In our opinion the entry of Pakistan and India into contemporary international life as fully independent and sovereign nations is one of .th~ outstanding historical events of receht times. It marks a particularly significant stage ill· the renaissance· whi<:h the Far and Middle Ea~tern countries are accotriplishing with ever inci;;:"siug speed; India and Paldstan have needed· but little time ta take a decisive part in international affairs. We have all been witnesses of the growing influence exercised by their ideas and views in the various organs and activities ofthë United Nations. .. •-c~ ~a,~ ':-,~-.--- high~~" interdependent. 'Vith their eXllerience, India and Pakistan will be ab\e ta guide this headlong upsurge of huudreds of mUlions of lmman beings towardl:l peaceful co-operation, and at the same time hc1p to persuade those who, from a distant geographical, politieal and ideo- 10gical standpoint, have hitherto refused ta comprehend the power, justice, and illevitabiHty of the quickened process of evolution, and even revolution, of thesp. historie tîmes. 73. India and Pakistan are also needed to guide by (heir example and assistance the inescapable task of ecorlomic and social development in the East, and to assist in the difficult process of adapting tu the inevitable technical revolution of the vVt:'st a society based principally on great spiritual values and fettered by an ageold 'backward·economy. 74. vVealso believe that India and Pakistan, in the interests of thei!" 400 million inhabitants and of the intertionlli tommunity as a whole, must devote aU their material and moral resources to the consolidation of their promising hut youngpolitical institutions and to the :;trengther.Îng and mode!'nization of theheeonomic and social structure in order to raise their inadequate stan.dards of living. The gigantic national and international task l have outlined caUs imperiously for astate of peace: Thes:';. countries cannot, as l see it, afford the luxury of' dive~ting the econumic resources which are urgently·reqü:l.ed i:' increase agricultural production and to buildfactories and industries to the maintenance of armies whïch may one day wage a war èhat will have aU ....•.f!r~characte...ristics of a frattici~a! conflict. They cannot c>.3.J.J,d they must net waste the Sp1r1tttal energy needed for domestic progress and the great part whîch together they mightplay in strengthening worid peacp-. 75. In short, wehelieve that, apart from the o1)ligation ofeverx g.j rernmenttoits own people and to the community of nations to do aIl t.'-1at can be donE; to maintainpeace, tha<; ob1igatiouls Oti<O which these coun- :t:!ies cannQt.P9ssibly evade.. It follow.: that in our view 76. 'l'Ill' St'l'll ouncil, in successive rl.'sulutions a\x't~pted by thr. t' ••ie~ concern~d,.ha:' laid the foundation, Î1~ accordunœ \VIth the prmclples of the Charter, on which such a settlement sIumId he based, namdy, the dt'lUtlcratic method of a fr~e and impartial plebiscite carricd out under the auspices of th~ United Nat~ons. It rcsts with the Governments of lndia and Pakistan to sec that the llecessary atmosphere is created for the success of that process. For this, it is essential that there should be mutual p'()od faith and above a11, the deterll'ination to make certain sacrifices which will entail in pa. ~:"'ular the rtlDning of \Vhat they believe to be certain ,risks, since most unfortunately they are still parted by fears and suspicions that l'ml be easily understood. 1repeat that hl my delegatioù's opinion it is the imperative dutY of the Governments of India and Pakistan to proceed along those lines. 77. We also believe that the United Nations should continue to doeverything possible to assist in the conclusion of a settlement. We have read with great interest and attention the reports of Ml'. Graham, First, we should like to make it clear that in spite of the accusations made against him by the representative of the Soviet Union at the last meeting, we agree with other delegations in believing that Mr Graham deserves the full confidence of the United n atiolls. The stage alread) traversed towards agreement, the progress in clarifying the points of disagre::m ~nt mentioned, and the spirit of true understanding of the problem which Ml'. Grahan1 has shown in his reports and in his statements ta the Council, give firm ground for hoping that the United Nations will make an important contribution to the final settlement of these disputes. . 78. The last part of Mr. Grahan~'sspeech at our 570tb meeting gave, l think, a clear pieture of the very correct attitude he has taken in the difficult task entrusted to him by the Security CoundI. 79. Therefore, unless the parties concerned express disagreement with the action taken by the United Nations Representative, our delegation is ready to support the continuation of his work for a reasonahle period. Mr. Graham has succeeded in isolating and limiting the points of dispute. Like other speakers who have preceded me, l believe that the new conciliation efforts can concentrate on seeking a settlement of these points of difference. 80. ' For our part, we offer India and Pakistan our cordial co-operation in the Security Council in any action which they feel is likely to help in composing their differences. The countries of Latin America, by reason of their politiea! and spiritual tradition, their racial composition,·the similarity of their economic and soc:al problems, their identical conceptiDIl (If human dignity, an of which have so often found common expression in the lTnited .Nations, are well qltaiified to understand the 81. As? country. we arl' (~ntird)" di~Î1ltl'rt'stcd in this matter ::'.lld our attitude towards it is ha~cd :\o}{'lv on our preoccupation for the futnre llf pl'opk's wlw:;e i)rogr('~::; we ferventlv <ksirl'. and on our CllllCl'rtl for the maintenance of inl('rnutÎoual pŒCl~. 82. Lastlv, we ::;hould like te. e-xprt'::;s Ottr appreciation - dnd we' belieVl' the Indian repr('lK'utntive will share our sentiments - for the \"isdolU and :::ense of respon~ sibility showu by the represelltative of Pakistan in resist111g the attempts which we have witnc::;sed hcre reeentIj' to transfer this quite specific and local Kashmir dispute to the eontroversial and almost impassable ground of the great international pclitical dispute to which the USSR is one of the parties. 83. This is Olle more demonstration of the fact that nowù.days there are no local disputes. Every dispute, past or future, will be macle use oi in the cold war and the struggle for strategie positions. Any one of these disputes may be the starting point of the great conflagration which we aU desire to avoid. Therein lies another, and a decisive, reason why the G9vernments of India and Pakistan should spare no effort Qr sacrifice to reach a solution satisfactory ta aIl and conducive to peace.

When the Security Counetl cOl1sidered the report of the United Nations Representative during the 570th meeting, the United States representative observed that the practice of mediation is one of the greatest of arts and in our country Mr. Graham is one of its most distinguished practitioners. This faet is more apparent today than ever. The United Nations Representative h?s been pàtient, tolerant, accurate and dispassionate His aim continues to be as it has been, to build agrfiCment brick by brick to form the stmcture of a settlement between two sovereign States. This is a purpose as simple to state as it is difficuit to accomplish in the tensions of the world in which we live and of which we are all a part. 85. Mr. Graham's second report and his oral presentation of itto the Security Council on 17 January ~952 are monuinents, if one requires them, tu this art of mediation willch Mr. Graham so skillfuIly practices. His report .is outstanding for one thing alone: it carefuIly states the issue. '.l'he issue is to find an agreed - and l emphasize the word "agreed" -- and not an imposed solut;ionfor three questions: ~'first, a definite period for d~n1Îijtarization; secondly, 'the scope of demilitarization and quantum of forces that will remain auhe end of the period o~ demilitarization; thirdly, the day for the formaI irrductioninto office of the Plebiscite Administrator". 86. , Mr. Graham goes beyond statingthe.issue.· He has _.put before the Security.Council the principles on which it can be resolved. First there must be agreement of the péU'ties. itthe settlement is to belasting and, naturally, 87. The second principle implicit in Mr. Graham's \1'ork is that this dispute must not he deadlocked but must show movement along the road to settlement. Time in our opinion is running agaim;t both parties. One side or the other might feel that delay will somehow favour its cause. But delay and frustration are not allies of either side; they are the mortal enemies of both. The forces of chaos work internally and also from the outside. Time is not a luxury to uny of us whose objectives and principles are fundamentally similar. yVhoever would suggest in seriousness that aH of the structure built so patiently brick by brick should now be abandoned? Again l would let the United Nations Representative speak for himself. He told us two weeks ago that "the dme is past when society can safely take slow decades and centuri~s to muddle through... adjustments". He said: "Social drift and unsettled disputes" - and he mentioned specificaHy the Kashmir disputecan "now involve mankind", if aHowed to go unchecked, "in the swift and tùtal tragedy of global war... " 88. The United Nations Representative has put before the parties a t',velve-point programme. It l'l'ovides a logical and well-balanced framework in which to carry out the demilitarization upan which the parties themselves have agreed and which they have also agreed is a necessary prelude to the holding of Cl. plebiscite, Through that plebiscite, the parties have also agreed that the people of the State can exercise their right of selfdetermination. ' , 89: My Government fee1s today, as itdid when the United States representative addressed the Council on 10 November 1951, that these twe1ve points form a solid basis on which the parties can reach agreement. Since last November, Ml'. Graham has made progress. It hasbeen slow, but progress there nas been.He has formulated the outstanding issues which l stated a minute ago and which are now all that st!lnd between the parties and a completely operative agreement. In one way or another, he tells us, solutions can be ,found for these problems. ., •.. 90. .We were struck by what he said·on the fixing of a day for the induction into office of the Plebiscite AJministrator. He has called this a linchpin that would integrate his programme. My Government agrees. As one looks around the Cott11cil table and sees the two ,parties to this dispute sitting here with the United 91 If we look back ta Mr. Graham's report. of 15' October 1951, there was agreement on fou~ of thbcs: l " l 'fhen ill his report of 19 Novem el twe ve pnnClp es. , f 1951 [566th meeting], there was ~gree111ent on lt~r more, thus reducÎng the issues ta thetr bare bones. 1 11~ is the progress which has be~l1 made. up ta llOW towards the settlement of the Kashnllr questIOn. 92. My Government feels that this pro~ress ha: not been and shou1d not be haltec1. In the commg weeks we shall look for clear evidence of 1110v~ment towards sett1ement of the basic issues. The U?lted S,tates feels that none of the remaining issues IS an 1l1surmou~1t<l.b1e barrier between the parties and, a peacefu,l solutlOl1, a Charter solution, an agreed solutIOn. Not lJg:htly should the parties, or any of us, cast away the fabnc of agreement as it now exists. 93. The Security Council gave its representative a heavy task by its resolution of 30 Marc.h 1951 [S/~0171 Rev.1], which in paragraphs 3 and 5 I~structe~ h1l11 to effect demilitarization and analyse the pomts of dlfference between the parties, The Security COt11~cil has further instruded him, on 10 November 1951, 111 paragral~h 2 of its resolution [S/2392] of that date: 01", ta cont1l1Ue his efforts to obtain agreement of the parties on a plan for effecting the clemilitarization of the State of Janl1~1U and Kashmir". This is precisely the task upon wluch Ml'. Graham is now engagecl. 94, Mr. Graham has narrowed the issues to two critical ones, and the emphasis, we feel, must now be put on resolving these two issues. The efforts of the next weeks will either see these issues resolved, or we shall know that patience, persistence and wisclol11 have once again been unrewardecl, except perhaps by frustrations and dilatory manoeuvres. In this sense, :Mr. Graham's continuecl effort might just1y be described as a final one, 95, We agree that MT. Graham ·needs .nofurther directive from the Security Couucil, andwe feel that his continuecl effort will Î1ecessarily involve his retL1rn ta the sub-continent of India and Pakistan, and it will alsa involve a final report, which l should expect by the end of March, as various representatives have indicated this afternoon. 9,6.. 01.1 17. January Mr. Grahal,11 told us that negotmtlO1J IS still the w~y ta a SOlution of the unresolved issues. He also expressed the view that the time has met with the place and the opportunity ta settle this dispute. We agree with this view. 97. W~ would also v~nture, to express the hope that leader~h1p by the. parties - 1l1deed,. real statesmanship on the1r part-Will open the way to.a successfulllego-

Since no further representatives wish ta speak, l shall . dec1are the meeting adjourned. 99. l understand from the Secretariat that we shaH be able ta meet tomorrow afternoon at 3 o'clock. If there are no objections, the Council will next meet at 3 p.m. on Thursday, 31 January 1952. The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m. FINUND - FINLANlll Alcatttmlnlll Klr,lalcauppl, ketu, Helsinki. FRANéE EdtU- A. ~ Paris V. GREEe! - CRECE "IUeltheroudakls," LibraIrie 1111.. PIICI: de 1. ConstitutIon, GUATEMALA GoubaUd & C~. Ltdll. num. as. 2 do P~ .Gullttmllla flAm· Max Bouchtreau, llbralrlt Vllll.." llotte postall Prince. HONDURAS Llbtvfa Panlmtl'Icana, Fuent.. Tegucllllipa. ICELAND - ISLAW!)E 80kavenlun Sigfusar Austurstrell 18, ~kJavtlc. INDIA"':'INDE OXford Book & StatlOntry lIouse, New DelhI. INDONESIA- INIlONESIE JlJtsan Pembangunal9 84, Djalcarta. IRAQ-IRAK Mackanzle's Boo1cshop, StatiOntrs, Baghdad. IRAN Ketab-Khaneh Danes'" Avenue, Teheran. IRELAND -IRLANDE Hlbernlan General Agency cial Buildings, Dame ISRAEl Leo Blumsteln, P.O.B. 35 Allenby Raad, Tel-Aviv. ll'ALY-ITALIE COlibri S.A., Via Chlo$etlo LEbANON - LIBAN Llb!'lirle unlvers~lIe, LIBERIA J. Momolu Kamara, Streets, MonrovIa.. iUXEMBOURr. Librairie- .J. Schummer, Luxembourg. MEXICO - MEXIQUE Editorial HerMes, S.A., cal 41, Mexico, D. F. NE1'lIERlANDS- PAYS·BAS N.V. Martlnus Nijhoff. 9, 's-Gr..venhage. NEW ZEALAND- NOOVE~LE·ZELANDE United Nations Association land, G.P.0. Ion, Wellington. NICARAGUA Dr_ Ramiro Ram[rez Publlc;\ciones, Managu~. ARUNTtNA - ARGMlN! IidltoNl SudImerIclma S.A., calll AIIlM soo. lIuItlOI AII'IS. AUSTRAl.lA - AUSTRALIE 8. A. 6Gddllrd (P1,y.l, Ltd.. usa QIQI'IIl Stmt, Syd'nty, N.5.W. IIMIUM - 8E1.GlQUE A8tIlC\\ It MtsAQtI'ilS dt '- P.... s.A." 1442 rut du Plrsll. Bruxelles. W. H. Smith &. Son 71-75 BouIMl'd Adolpllt-Max, IlrWctlltlS. IOUVIA- BOUVIE llbtviR Cltntl1lca y Llterarla, A~lcIa 16 dt Julio 216, Casllla 971. La Paz WZlL-BRESlL LMarla. "olr, Rua Mexico 98-8, cabca l'œtal 3291, Rio dt Jantlro. eANADA- CANADA The Ryerson Press, 299 Quetn Stml Wast, Toronto. ClVLIlN-- CEYLAN . The Assoçlated Nawspapers of CeYlon, Ltd., Lake Hluse, Colombo. millE- CHILI . llbrerfa Ivens, cali. Montda Ba"!, SantIAgo. GHINA-CHl!lE The CO':4lmercial Press, Ltd., :2n HOlllll Raad, Shanghai. COlOMBIA- COLOMBIE Llbrer!a Latina Ltda., Apartado AEreo 4011, P-ogoti. COstA ~ICA - COSTA-IUCA Trel' ; Hermanos, Apartado 1313, san JosE. CllBA La Casa Belga, RenE d. Smedt. O'Rellly 455, La Habana. tzECHOSI.OVAKlA- TCHECOSLOVAQUIE CeSkoslovenstcY splsovatel H4rodnl Tricia 'l, Praha 1_ IlENMARK- DANEMARK Einar Mun1csgaaru, N;rregade 6, K;btnhavn. IlOMINICAN REPUBLIC- REPUBLIQUE DOMINICAINE Librerfa Domlnlcana, Calle Mercedes No. 49, ApaJ:tado 656, Ciudad Trujillo. ECUADO~.,- ECtUATEUR Muiioz Hel'M,,:llls 1 Cia., PlaIa deI Teatro, ((ulto. . EGYJ>T- EGYPTE· librairie "ta Renall;!ance d'Egypte," 9 SH. Adly flasha, Caira. EL SALV.41ll!R-SALVADOR Manuel Navas y Cla. "LaGasa dei Librn Barato" la Avenlda sur num. 31, San Salvador. ETHIOPIA - ETHiOPIE Agence Ethiopienne de Publicité, Box 8, Addis-Abeba. {urlA., be obtalned AUSiRIA - AUTRICHE B. Wüllerstorfl', Waagplatz. Salzburg. United Natiollspublicatlons can tram the 10110wTng boobellers: GERMANY- ALLEMAGNE 8uchhandlung Elwert &. Meurer, Haupt.· strasse, lOI, Berlln-Schiineberg. W. E•.Saarbach, Frankenstrasse, 14, kiiln-Junkersdorf. . JAl'AN -JAPiJN Alexandèr Horn, Splegelgesse, 9. Maruzen Co., Ltd., 6 WlesbadelT.· Nihonbashl, Tokyo Central. Orderr llnd inquirles trom countries wMre sales agants "~ve not yet been appointllCl may bl lient ta: Sales and Circillation Section, Ihited .Nations, tle'" Yorle, U.S.A.; or Sales Section, United Nations Office, Palais des Nations!c.~~n~ya.l. Switzerland. . -------- 5.~~;~~!~ .!Cana.da