S/PV.578 Security Council

On the list of speakers there are four representatives who wish to speak on the first item of the agenda. Wé shan begin today's procecdings with the interpretation into French of the statement made by the USSR representative at the last meeting. •The Fr~nch interpretation of the last statement of the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the 577th meeting of th.: Security Countil was rcad. 2~ Mr. KYROU (Greece): The l1nusually sober and dispassionate way in whicb 'the Soviet Union proposaI set forth in document S/2663 was introdùced the day before yesterday came as an agreeable, if not wholly uttéXpected, surprise. Our Soviet Union colleague apparently' took so~e pains, while explaining his draft resolution, tokeep above the cross-currents of human passions. His demeanour could indeed have been envied by à Methodist clergyman or a speaker in a Quaker meeting. It ismost utlfortun,~tethat this idyllic settil1g 3. The Soviet Union representative does not, of course, hesitate to lay t.'le blame for this sudden change of atmosphere on the shoulders of Mr. Gross. Mr. Malik argues that the representative of the United States is at fault for having attempted to introduce matters into the debate which are extraneous and irrelevant ta the item under discussion. To those very few, however, to whom he can disclose his innermost thoughts, he will, 1 presume, not conceal that in his opinion the Soviet Union policy has won a tactical victor)" by allegedly luring the United States repre.c;~ntative into raising the temperature in this hall. For heated debate provi<les Mr. Malik with excellent opportunities to launch unwarranted charges, as he already has done, or ta indulge in baseless recriminations - a practice in which he has, by general consent, no match. 4. May l nevertheless respectfully submit that the Soviet Union representative will not be able to deceive any thinking person as to his intentions and the aims pursT.1ed by his innocent-sounding "appeal". The whole devi, :e smacks too uncomfortably of a certain Stockholm Appealand one cannot help hearing the fluttering of the wings of that hapless Picasso dove. 5. The Soviet Union proposaI is not a boIt from the blue. It has long been announced by the rumblings of a mischievous propaganda. That is why if cannot be examined independently of its sources of energy or without regard to. the spirit which pervades it. Only for those ignoring the laws of political gravity· can the draft proposaI remain stlspended in the air. Fo~ us, who have the dutY of going ta the root of the problems, the Soviet Union appeal should be set in its historic background and the real intentions of its authors should he thoroughly expl(}red. The initiative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will then appear in its true perspective. Mr. Malik will accordingly be d~prived of the religious garb and will eventually be credited with the tricks of Brahmin,the celebrated clergyman hero of one of those Krylov fables, the morals .of which Soviet Union diplomats peruse with such delight. 6. Greece is amongthecountries which have acceded to or ratified the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925. It did so without attaching any conditions or qualifying the ratification .by anysort of reservation. In my capacity as representative of Greece 1 cottld therefore have sugges~ed.to the self-appointed and. clamant ad~9.cates of the. Protocpl that. they set a good example by waiving their reservations which void this international instrument of much of itssubstance. 1 shall not, however, be so· naive as to submit such a proposaI. The propaganda din which has preceded the formulation of the appeal and the aIl-toc-apparent designs of its sponsors ..cannot, alas, but confirm the opinion that the Geneva Protocol 1s obsolete.and outstrippedby. subsequent {lv~nts. 1 warfare by the aggressors. Mr. Malik being, as he so often prides himself, a realist, must, however, be con- ! vinced more than any one else in this room that if Hitlerite Germany and aggressive Japan of that time did not resort to bacterial and chemical weapons it was because they were fully aware of the preparations of the democratic Powers in that field. It would indeed be an insult to Mr. Malik's realism to suppose that he ever entertained the slightest illusion about the possibilities of the Geneva ProtocGl. He knows better than any one else around this table that the Soviet Union's defence policy does not rest, on this or any other score, upon paper agreements, but only upon the positive foundatians of large-scale preparations, as it was set forth by the more outspoken Marshal Voroshilov, in Febn:3.ry 1938. 8. At our last meeting the representative of the SGviet Union charged that the United States representative, hy proposing to refer the Soviet Union draft resolution to the Disarmament Commission, was playing football with this question. If, however, the inconsistencies of attitude displayed, in 50 short a time, in two organs of the United Nations are to be termed football playing, 1think that Mr. Malik is the only man to kick the ball from the different positions. 9. As the members of this Council will recall, since the very inception of the work of the Disarmament Commission in New York, Ml'. Malik has endeavoured not to l'aise beforc that pure1y technical body the general problem of the prohibition of bacterial warfare but to bring against the United Nations forces specifie charges, as unwarranted as they are baseless. His sole aim has been to cast, through unsubstantiated calumnies, a shadow of mistrust over our soldiers so valiantly and cbivalrously repelling the aggressor in Korea. la. Over and over again have we tried to explain to Ml'. Malik in the Disarmament Commission that his allegatiOllS could not be heeded unless investigated on the spot by such impartial and high-standing bodies as the International Red Cross or the World Health Ûrganization. Failing agreement on this proposaI, repeatedly made by the Unified Command and the heads of many Governments with forces in Korea, the Union of Soviet Socialist Repttblics would have to bring its charges before a political organ, as creating a "situ;1tion which might lead to international friction or give riile to à dispute". With the astonishing singlene~s of purpose not tn have the right organ do the right t\ung, the Soviet Union representative to the Security Council now asks a pure1y political body to examine a strictly technical question, squarely falling' within the Scope of competence of the Disarmament Commission. ~et, the Soviet Union l-\~presentative ta that Commis- SIon, who happens ta br the same Mr. Malik, at its 7th meeting he1d on 26 March 1952, sj,>eaking of hatterial warfare, categorically declared, and l am Il. In these circumstances, l sincerely regret that Ml'. Malik in his reply to Ml'. Gross's intervention made statements not corresponding to facts. It is 110t true that the majority of the Disarmament Commission impededhim, in any way, from speaking on the question of the prohibition of bacterial warfaœ. The ruling of the Chair which was challenged by the Soviet Union representative at the Commission's 8th meeting held on 28 March, and ultimately upheld by eleven votes in favour to one against, was definite, clear and explicit. Explanations as to its meaning and scope were offered b~fore the voting by many m~bers of the Commission and by its then Chairman, the representative of Canada. Let me cite sorne of Ml'. Johnson's words: "May l interrupt the representative of the Soviet Union. l have to give a ruling on a point of order. l think he has misunderstood me. l did not say bacterial warfare in itself cannot be discussed. The ruling r am giving is simply that this is not the proper forum to consider or debate specific charges of br.cterial'Jv·arfare in one area of the world or, for that . matter, of any kind of illegal warfare." 12. Almost aIl the representatives sitting in the Disarmament Commission stressed, in the explanation of their votes, that the Commission was competent and in fact ready to consider any proposaI aiming at the pro- .hibition·of bacterial and other weapons of mass destruction. They were, however, strongly of the opinion that specifie charges, whatever their degree of truthfulness, had to be taken up by a political organ such as the Security Couitcil. Explaining my delegation's position on Jhis pointat the meeting of 28 March, l declared, and l beg to qttote'my own words: . . '~I, too. .. wOllld like to explain my vote l want todo so in order to try to prevent, if pJssible, a .propaganda abuse of the vote our ComIT.lssion has just taken, or, if that is not possible, as J very much fear, then at least;to protest beforehal1u against such a: propaganda abuse. The vote of my delegation- .and l am quite certain the vote '"lf ten other delegations ~ does not mean that we 3.0 not want our Commission to study, when the time cornes for such study, item II in the-substantive part of the Soviet Vnionplan of work, nor that this Commission should not reconsiderthe question of the violation of the prohibition ofbacteiîal warfare and the banning of theu~e. of. bacterial weapons. What.we do not want ~Qr. COrilmissipn to do. is to study false charges, because itdoesllot have that right." 14. In the last analysis, it is to be hoped that more sober and constructive counsels will prevail at the end, in Soviet Union ruling circles. For, only the referral to the appropriate body of the United Nations of the question of the prohibition of bacterial warfare, after having been immunized by the Security Council, will permit the laying of the groundwork for a comprehensive plan of disarmament. The aims pursued by the Geneva Protocol and the more general cause of international peace and security will thus be better preserved. 15. Ml'. VON BALLUSECK (Netheriands): The question of the use of bacterial weapons has been raised by the Soviet Union delegation in different forms in different organs of the United Nations. The President, in his capacit T as Soviet Union representative, raised it on many o'.:casions in the Disarmament Commission, mostly in the form of violent and unproved accusations against the armed forces of the United States which are now, together with the soldiers of many other countries, engaged in resisting aggression in Korea. 10. On 28 March 1952 the Chairman of the Disal'mament Commission rendered a ruling to the effect that the Disarmament Commission was not the proper forum in which to make or discuss specifie charges with regard ta germ warfare. That ruling did not mean, of course, that the Disarmament Commission should be debarred from discussing the problem of bacterial warfare, since that problem forms part of the larger task assigned bi the General Assembly to the Disal'mament Commission, namely, " ... to prepare proposaIs to be embodied itil. a draft tl'eaty (or treaties) tor the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of aIl armed forces and aIl armaments, for the e1imination of aIl major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for effective international control of atomic energy ta ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purpases only... " 17. This instruction from the General Assembly to the Disarmament Commission is to be found in resolu- ~ion 502 (VI), paragraph 3. It follows that, not only . lS the Disarmament Commission entitled to take up the question of bacterial warfare, which is covered by the expression "major weaponsadaptable to massdestructian", but it has a dutY to do 50. On that point there 18. Now the President has remarked that it looks as though we are playing football with this issue of bacterial warfare, kicking it from the Disarmament Commission to the Sec1.lrity Council and 'Vice 'Versa. But on doser examination that argument holds no water. It \Vas not the question of bacterial warfare as a component part of the disamlament problem as a whole which was ruled out of order in the Disarmament Commission - it could not have been, as l have just now explained. Only the levelling of specifie charges concerning the a1leged use of germ warfare was ruled out, since charges of this ldnd properly belong in other organsof the United Nations; for instance, if they must he raised at all, and especially in the form in which it was done, the Secudty Council. So we are not kicking the same baIl to and fro. -There are two footBalls; one representing chargef J and the other representing the problem of germ warfare as a general problem. If there is to be any l.-icking about, each baIl should be kicked around in its proper field, its proper council or commission, and not arbitrarily in every place that suits the mood or the propaganda needs of the moment. 19. l therefore submit that, if there seems to be some confusion at this moment, it is the Soviet Union delegation which is responsible for it by raising the wrong question in' the wrong United Nations organ. The specific charges which the Soviet Union delegation thought fit to raise did not belong in the Disarmament Commission: the problem of bacterial warfare, which that delegation now is raising and which forms par: of the disarmament problem, does not belong in the Security Council i it belongs in the' Disarmament Commission, which has clear instructions in this respect to prepare a draft treaty, inter alia, "for the elimination of aIl· major we~pons adaptable to mass destruction", including hacterial weapons. 20. l stress the word "elimination". It has a wide scope. It may weIl indude the prohibition of which the Geneva Protocol of 1925 speaks. As regards bacterial warfare, my country has ratified the Geneva Protocol unconditionally. It has no reason whatsoever to regret this,because it still wants to maintain its faith in the sanctity of treaties and pledges. We are, however, equally willing to see whether we can improve on the Protocol. 21. "Elimination", of which the General Assembly resolutionspeaks, goes far beyond "prohibition", in that it aims at eliminating the weapons' themselves so that they cannot he used. 'YVhether such effective elimination .is practically possible l would not at this moment venture to predict.. We must try to find that out in the Disarmament Commission. At any rate, in the matter of·weapons of mass desb'uction the General Assembly wants us togofurther than prohibition - that is to say, 22. In these circumstances, it may weIl be asked whether the Soviet Union draft resolution does not remain below the level of what the General Assembly has instructed the Disarmament Commission to do. That, however, seemS to be a matter which the Disarmament Conmlission must decide. As 1 have already said, the General Assembly has instructed the Disarmament Commission to go a step further - that is, to draw up plans to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, induding bacterial weapons. My country, which, as regards bacterial warfare, unconditionaIly signed and ratified the Geneva Protocol, is, for one, entirely prepared - and even eager - to co-operate in designing effective methods to eliminate this kind of warfare and other kinds of warfare as well. To this end, we earnestly endeavour, in the Disarmament Commission, to contribute our constructive share to the deliberations. To this end, we shaIl be prepared to undertake the study of the problem of bacterial warfare in the Disarmament Commission, where i1.: l.Jelongs, as saon as it is seriously raised there as a component part of what the sixth session of the General Assembly instructed the Commission to do. . 23. In conclusion, 1 wish to state that, for aIl these reasons, my Government supports the United States proposaI to refer the Soviet Union draft resolution ta the Disarmament Commission, which has been assigned the tàsk of preparing proposaIs not merely to prohibit bacterial warfare, but to eliminate bacterial weapons. 24. MT. MUNIZ (Brazil): The Security Council has been somewhat hurriedIy convened at the request of the representative of the Soviet Union and two items have been placed on its agenda. The very fact that rule 8 of our provisional rules of procedure was not strictly foIlowed seems to indicate the existence of extraordin?ry circumstances requiring immediate action by the Council. 25. As far as concerns the second item on the agenda we ail realize that the question of the admission of new Members is of importance and that it faIls within the competence of the Security Council. It is, however, a matter in which the decision is not ours alone. Whatever action we may take here, new Members will not be admitted to the Organization until the General Assembly, which is to meet four months from now, ~as acted upon our recommendation. Consequently, it 15 t.o b~ assumed that the main purpose of the Soviet Dillon 1S to stress the urgent character of the first item on the agenda, namely, the question of an appeal to States to accede to and ratify the Geneva Protocol of 19~5 for the prohibition of the use of bacterial weapons. It IS rather difficult to understand not only whv sucb a proposaI is now presented as an urgent matter, but even why it has been presented at aIl. l ! 27. Under which provision are we now called upon to act on the draft resolution submitted by the representative of the Soviet Union under the title "Appeal to States to accede-; to and ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of the use of bacterial weapons"? VVhy should the Couneil, without further justification,consider a matter which does not seemingly affect the maintenance of international peace and security and issue an appeal for the ratification of a twentyfive year old international c011'yention? The Council is, of course, concerned with the establishment of a system for the regulationof armaments, and any such system will undoubtedly include the prohibition of inhumane means of warfare such as the use of bacterial weapons. 28. Article 29 of the Charter authorizes the Council to establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the"perfonnance of its functions. As far as concerns the regulation of armaments and the banning of weapons of mass destruction, a subsidiary organ has already been set up, namely, the Disarmament Commission. Theuncompromising .attitude of the Soviet Union in that .Commission·.has· thus far prevented any noticeable progress 01\ the vital· question of disarmament. The new move of the. Soviet Union in asking the Council ta appeal, for the ratification of the Geneva Protocol doesnot inoicate that theUSSR is adopting a more constructive approach to the over-all problem of disarmament; 29. 1s itthe intention ofthe Soviet Union ta bring the question of bacterial warfare to the consideration of the Security "Council in arder that the Council should investigate the charges brought by the Soviet Union agail1,st,the United" Natio.ns Command in Korea? The representativeof the Soviet Union has Hatly denied any suçhintention. The representative of the United States, ho\Vever, sh6wed at our last. meeting the .connexion existing, between, the. "charges repeatedly being made against theU1Jited Nations Command in Korea by the Soyiet Unioll ! and the. question of, the appeal for the ratification (Jf the. 1925 Geneva Protocol. 30. .It is not.easily conceiva.ble. that thisappeal should be1111!-de withanurgentcharacter ùnder present circumstances and in •the light of the experience of the Second WorldWar. Tt is a, well~1\nown fact that despite thepledges contained in the Protocol whereby fortytwo States promised,not touse poison gas· and means . oL hacteria!. warfare;alLthe great Powers carried on research' in, thos'e .fields andheldstockpiles· of those weapons.. Uncler the· Protocol suchresearch and stockpil.ing .were not prohibited. 33. 'une dans tous mentales, logues. trouve sées, de que accords Pour La de à la 34. humanitaires important guerre combien tion nos l'appel l'Union voie. tocole sition fausse trument mais plus tienne c~eate a more potent instrument adaptable to present· clrcumstances, taking into consideration the fact' that we are living in a split world in which centuries-old moral values have 10st their influence. 35. Summing up what 1 have said: We are fully aware 35. of the menace which the use of bacterial warfare and of aU other kinds of weapons of mass destruction might r~present for the future of mankind. We are ready to toutes dlSCUSS ways and means for the elimination of such weapons. This can be prop~rly done,as suggested by armes.

The .question now before us is whether or not it would be convenient for the Security Council to make an appeal to States to accede to and ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the prohibItion of the use of bacterial weapons. The question of bacterial weapons itself is not a new one for international conferences and organizations. On the other hand, aIl governments 1hat have expressed an opinion on the substance of tIlis question have clearly made known their abhorrence of the use of sur.h weapons. 38. Acting under the guidance of these considerations, the General Assembly, in formulating the terms of reference of the Disarmament Commission in resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952, laid special stress on the necessity for the Disarmament Commission to study effective means for the elimination of all weapons adaptable to rnass destruction. During the discussions which have taken place in the Disarmament Commission there has been no rnisunderstanding and no difference of opinion as ta the fact that the question of the elimination of bacterial weapons forrns a part of the programme of work of the Commission. Indeed, the working programme of the Commission specifically includes the study of this question among the tasks entrusted' to it. 39. It is in the light of these considerations that my delegation has studied the Soviet Union drait resolution and has arrived at. the conclusions which I shall now briefiy explain.. 40. As is known to the rnembers of the Council, Turkey has acce(i~ed to and ratified the Geneva Protoc,)l of 1925 unconditionally. Turkey continues to maintain itsfaith in the spirit which guided the preparation of 41. On the other hand, although the representative of the Soviet Union stated at the last meeting that, in bringing up his draft resolution, he was not interested in what is going on in Korea, we cannot overJook the fact that this action of his delegation chronologically coincides with a world-wide organized campaign of false and slanderous accusation aiming to discredit the United Nations forces in Korea. This coincidence makes it an the more important to question the value of the appeal which the representative of the Soviet Union demands of the Security CounciI. 42. In conclusion, my delegation attaches the greatest importance to the question of an effectiVt~ elimination of bacterial weapons. Tt is of the opinion that the General Assembly has entrusted this vital task ta a special body created for this purpose, namely, the Disarmament Commission. For these reasons, we support the proposaI made by the representative of the United States to the effect that the question should be referred to the Disarmament Commission in accordance with paragraph 4 of rule 33 of the rules of procedure. 43. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom): We are here concerned with how to deal with the Soviet Union draft resolution, set forth in document S/2663, and we are also in the presence, as l understand it, of a formaI suggestion made by the representative of \'he United States that we should refer the Soviet Union draft resolution as it stands to the Disarmament Commission for investigation. 44. Now since on the face ~f it that draft resolution bears no relation to the campaign on baderial' warfare waged by the Soviet Union and its friends during the last two months, and since the President has ruled that a discussion of che baseless charges made during that campaign would be out of order during a discussion of the present item, l can only say that, having heard the observations of the representative of the United States - which l think largely repeated what had àlready been said by his coneague, Ml'. Cohen, in the Disarmament Commission - there is really nothing more for us to do, :;: suggest, except to take the course suggested the day before yesterday by Ml'. Gross. This is aIl the clearer since it is quite untrue, as the re..presentative of Greece pointed out this morning, that there ha:;; been any attempt in the Disarmament Commission to prevent a discussion of the whole question of the control of bacterial warfare. It should, however, be obvious to the meanest intelligence that the so-called ap:"p~l to States 45. Le;st, thcr.efore, the Soviet Union delegation should .he tempted to think that it has scored any propaganda success by cunnin&ly sep:.rr~:+ing one issue from aIl the other issues, and more especially l.est it should be temf>::ed to think that by such means it can divide the tree WQr1d and make us aIl unfirm of purpose, 1 feel IIPust say a few words on my delegation's views of the r~al significance of the Soviet Union proposaI aS we see it. 46. The suggestion in the statement of therepresenrntive of the Soviet Union was that if only aIl States would aœede to or ratify the Geneva Protocol, we should thus virtually have solved the problem of b:acterial weapons, and, l suppose, of gas and chemical warfare, wbien, as we know, are also covered bv the Geneva Protocol.Mr. Malik said: ,- 'here can be 11;) doubt that this Protocol has been of oudtanding importance in the history of international relations during the last q:1arter of a century. The political, legal, and moral obligations a'5sumed hy States under th:s international agreement have proved an effective restraining influence on the aggressive States, which more than once during that period, resorted to acts of aggression and which in the end precipitated the Second World War." 47. Of course, l do not want to suggest that the Protocol has been of no value. Of course not. But Mt. Malik's staterrent. in my view, greatly exaggerates its;:," ,al influence un evel1ts during the last twenty-five years and particu!arly during th.e Second World War. 48. As evidence of the value, or lack of value, which the Soviet Union leaders attached to the Protocol during the war, l m~ght refer to the exchange of letters betvreen Mr. Churchill and Premier Stalin. In a letter dated 20 March 1952 Mr. Churcl-till said: . "Ambassador Maisky lunched with me last week and m~ntioned sorne evidel1ce that the GHmans m~ty use ga:s uponyou in their attempted spring offensive. After consulting my ~ol1eagues and the Chiefs of Staff, l wish ta assute you that Bis Majesty's Govet'nmel1t will'treat ahy use of this weap0n of poison gas .against Russia exactly as if it were direcfed ag'il.:nst ourselves. l have been building up an immense store ofgas bombs for discharge from aireraft, •and we sha11,not hesitate to use these over all~uitable objectives in Western Germany from the mom?nt •that''your armies a'1d people are ?ssaulted 'fu.this •.way." "1 wish to expre~G ~:.. you the Soviet Government's gratitude for the ",:-'511ro.nce that the British Government will look nI JIl any use by the Germans of 'poison gas ~aainst the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the same way as if this weapon had been used against Great Britain and that the British Air Force wiU immediatdy use against suitable objectives in Germany the large stocks of gas bombs held in England." 50. The members of the Security Council WIll note that Premier Stalin did not suggest that it was at that time a crime for us to possess ~ large stock of gas bombs. Yet l need scarcely say.that these bombs had not been developed purely during the War' but were obviousl)' the resuit of research carried out during the pre-war years. In 1942, Premier Stalin was only too glad, we note, that the United Kingdom had the bombs with which to retaliate against Germany if Hitler had launched poison gas warfare. Now, however, Mf. Malik suggests that it is a most atrocious crime for the United States to be conducting research on bactel'Ïal and other weapons covered by the Geneva Protocol. ReaUy, even the Russians cannot have it both ways. . les 51. It is, l am afraid, only too c1ear that the value of the 'Geneva Protocül, and indeed of any declaration banning or limiting the use of any particular weapon or method of warfare, must rest entirely on the good faith of the governments which are parties to it, so long as the declaratioll is not supported by any system of control which would ensure that its provisions are duly carried out. In a case of aggression, the aggressor is not likely to be over-scrupulous and it would be very foolish to suppose that he would observe any pledges which he might have undertaken if he thought he could profitably violate them. Having violated the principal obligation under the Charter not ta agg:cess, why should he not violate any other obligation? This was surely the case with the Nazi Government during the last war and, as l have shown, Premier Stalin himself obviously did not suppose that Hitler would be restrained by the mere L.et that Germany was a party to the Geneva Protocol. Of course he did not. We must expect that the same thing would be true of any future aggressor, and this leads me to endorse the point made by the United States representative Jast Wednesday, that aggression is reallythe crux of our pl:Oblem and not paperpromises by the Soviet Union or, indeed, papu' promiœs by any other State not to use any particular weapon. 52. In his second statement in the Security Coundl last Wednesday, the representative of the Soviet Union refer:"'ed to a conclusion reached by the League of NatiO'1S Special Committee to the effect that supervision of preparation for bactedal warfare 'could never, in the . opinion of the Committee, be' complete because dan- 53. This was a very important suggestion, and l propose ta rend it. The suggestion put forth by the Soviet Union delegation at that time reads as foUows [A/AC.50/3,p. 43]: ~~Article 1. - AU methods of and appliances for chemical aggression (aU asphyxiating gases used for warlike purposes, as well as· all appliances for their discharge, such as gas-projectors, pulverisers, balloons, flame-throwers and other devices) and for baeteriological warfare, whether in service with troops or in reserve or in process of manufacture, shall be destroyed within three months of the date of the entry into force of the present Convention. '~Article 2. - The industrial undertakings engaged ig the production of the means of chemical aggression or bacteriologica1 warfare indicated in Article 1 shall discontinue production from the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol. "Article 3. - In enterprises capable of being utilized for the manufacture of means of chemical and bGlcteriological· warfare, a permanent labour control shall be. organised by the workers' committees of thefactoriesor by other organs of the trade unions operating in the respective enterprises with a view ta limiting the possibility of bre2c.1les of the corresponding articles of the·. present Protocol." 54. It \Vas a vetyconcrete suggestion. The Soviet Uniondelegatioi'l alsomade it clear, as recorded on page 44 of the ûocument to whîch l referred, that it considered that-tbe 1925 Protocol ought ta be improved. There was a French proposal, and the.report states the follo"ring: "TheFrenchproposalwas supportedby the Soviet ·UhiondelegatÏonwhich consideredthat it was framed for the same pui'pose as the Soviet Union proposal. .Adoption ofparagraphs3and4 of the French propo~al. would, .ÏI1. his opinion,· show.that the Commissib~was~oing a.step furlher than the Protocol. of ··19~5,butifth~Commission decided to include ùn1y theifirsttwoj>aragraphswhi€h Were identical with thei 1925 ProtocoI,theCommission ~would be open . ,;.,1;Q",f;mi~J;l!"&lp.4",WAq~l;tp~,,,Mked .why it had not '-~p-rqve4,ponjt'}'. . .. 5~.This, .1· inaY'pointout,'was.orlythreeyears aiter theoriginal.Rrotocolhadbeen signed.·· The main point, bowever, ·is that. the .. SovietVnion itself proposed a 57. The reservations which we made to the Protocol were, as we a1l know, very similar to the reservations made by the Soviet Union. Mr. Malik amiably suggested that we might perhaps be insulted by the criticisms which, he said, were directed by the United States representative against such reservations. 1 can sayat once that we do not regard ourse1ves at all as insulted by the United States representative, since, 1 think, his remarks were not directed - he will correct me if l &"11 wrong - against the reservations as such, but against the way in which these reservations might be used by an unscrupulous government. 58. The essential reservation made hy the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and by many other States as weIl, was that the Prorocol 5hould cease to be binding on them if it were violated by any other State at enmity with them; that is to say, that if th'ey were attacked by poison gas or bacterial weapons, they would bave the right to use these weapons in 'their own defence and in retaliation. This reservation is obviously logical and reasonable and, indeed is one which must be made 50 long as the prohibition of these weapons depends only on the assurances given by each government. It does, however, result in the situation that any government has only got to accuse its enemies of having used such weapons in order to free itself of the restrictions imposed by the Protocol-:- and how easily and irresponsibly this can be done is weIl illustrated bv the charges about the use of germ warfare in Korea, which, of course, 1 know that 1 am not now in order in discussing in detai1. 59. It follows from what 1 have been saying that what is really. needed to give the world security and ~o remove the fear that these terrible weapons might be looscd upon it is, obviously, a comprehensive disarmament plan which would guard against agl?"lession and thereby minimize thp. risk of any war breaking out, whether it was waged by conventional weapons or. by weapons of mass destruction or, more likely perhaps, by b~oth. The Disarmament Commission has been spe- !:1fieally charged by the General Assembly with the weparation ofsuch plans, and it is therefore the Disarrnamen.t· Commission which shorild'study .the problem 60, During these discussions in the Commission the Soviet Union representative can, of course, if he so desires, urge other States to ratify the Geneva Protocol, but if he does, it will then become immediately absolutely c1ear that there is l'ea11y. not much point in doing fuis and nothing more, and that what is now needed is not merely a declaratior!. of intention, but sorne real guarantee that a11 weapons of mass destruction will be e1iminated by common tonsent and, above all, by common action. 61. In the meantime l do trust that nobody will be tal{en in by this effort to represent the United States as the vi11ain of the piece for the reason that, for technical l'easons alluded to on several occasions by the United. States l'epresentative, Congress has not actually ratified the Protocol of 1925. The Propaganda Bureau of the Kremlin no doubt thought it was a most ingenious move to fasten on to this particular omission as proof that the United States wanted to reserve its l'ight to use the hacteria.! weapon. But l am sure that the bulk of wodd opinion will not be taken in hy this manœuvre, but thatthe sensible people whom it represents will rather concentrate 'on two questions: Who was it who instigated and encouraged the aggression during 1950 in' Korea, and who is now really attempting to work out a plan for international control of weapons of mass destruction? 62. As always, the Soviet Union is pursuing its policy of Realpolitik under a smoke-screen of slogans and emotional appea1s designed to delude the unwary and disarm the innocent. As always, the task is to weaken the 'iVestern wodd and to cause it, if possible, to agree to substantialmeasures of general disarmament on the strength of paper promises which might well,when it cornes to the point, be taken more seriously by those· who do have a strict regard for the truth than by those whose actions have shown that they have no regard for the truth whatever. This attitude of mind on the part .of the Soviet Union Government is typified by the wild accusations· in .which it has been indulging in recent months. If it is possible for a responsible government tot)]ake suchaccusations without a vestige of truth, wo~1diitnotalso be possible for it to ahrogate, whenever .it.sodesired, any· paper engagements into which it·had previously entered? The first thing, therefore,as l see ~t,is,;orthe. Soviet Union Government to prove its sinteffty .not only by its words,but by its actions; to stOp its present policy of favouringaggression; tocall off itshate c~paign.;to agree to reasonable politîcal settlements; and to afiow the.world to.settle clown and . to rec.overas it shou1<1 f1;om the last orgy of slaughter prQvoked.·by. the German Nazis. 64. My colleagues, let us therefore aIl now quickly agree that the question of accession to and ratification of the Geneva Protocol be e..xamined in the forum where it properly belongs, namely, the Disarmament Commission. 65. The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): Before we proceed to plan our business, the delegation of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUB- LICS wouId like to ask the United Kingdom representative a question. He has reproduced yery carefully .- in fact, verbatim - the proposals for the improvement of the Geneva Protocol submitted by the USSR in the organs of the League of Nations in 1929. Does tile United Kingdom representative, who has so assiduously reproduced these excellent proposaIs and is devoting such great attention to them, intend to revive them in this Couneil? 66.. It would be desirable to have this question clarified. It is common knowledge that the United Kingdoni rejec~ed these proposaIs at that time. The close attention which the United Kingdom representative hé/.s devoted to those proposals in this Couneil may give the impression that the United Kingdom is changing its attitude towards them. 67. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom): I shall be very glad to respond to the President's invitation to make my point c1ear. I think the actuai text of what I said was sornething as follows. "The main point, however, is that the Soviet UJ;1ion itself proposed a system of control, although it was not accepted by the majority of delegations, no doubt because this particular proposaI seemed impracticable," I suppose that if it was not accepted by my own delegation - if that is indeed the case, though I have not vefified it - no doubt it was because my delegation at that time thought, in ~?mmon with certain other delegations, that this parocular proposaI was not practicable. They may have been right or wrong, I do not 15:now; but that is app&rently what they thought. 68. The point which I was trying to make is that apparently the Soviet Union thought, at that time at any rate, that it was possible, by one means or another, to control the production of instruments of bacterial warfare and to control,. therefore, the production of hacteria themselves. If that is still the Soviet Union's yie~, and if it believes, as I think the President mdlcated, that the Soviet Union proposaI of 1928 was a,good proposaI, why does not the Soviet Union delegat~on make the proposaI in the Disarmament Commis- SlOn?We shall be delighted to investigate it there and,

Daes the United Kingdom representatîve co:nsider that an appeal by the Security Council to States to accede to and ratify the Geneva Protocol. the importance of which he does not de.tlY. might prevent the United Nations Disarmameut Commission from preparing a more complete international agreement on the suhject? 70. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom) :'1 suggest that that is a question which simply cannot he answered by a simple yes or no. If the President wants my considered answer to his question, it is corttained in my 'whale speech, and 1 imagine he would not wish me ta repeat my whole speech now.

There are manY ways d evading a direct answer ta a direct quest.on. 72. The present position is ~s follows: there are three representatives who wish to speak and there are a further three representatives who have not yet spoken and apparently aIso wish to spea}c The Security Council must therefore decide whether to meet again after lunch today or on Tuesday or Wednesday morning of nex.t weêk. What are the Council's views on this question? 73. Ta be more exact, two representatives are prepared to speak today and a third is not yet ready and would prefer. to speak at our next meeting, to be conve.t1ed ne..xt weel<. 74. MI". GROSS (United States of America): The President announced that there were three speakers on' hi~.Ji~t;."hut -l~did,n-ot,hea-r him indicate -who they were. I~assume that one of the speakers listed is the del~gation of the United States; if not, I wish the United States to be added to the list. 75. In discussing the question atour last meeting as to whe.t1 we should meetagain, 1 would like to remind the President and the members of the Council that l suggestedat the endot our last meeting that we should meet thism()rning "so that. if necessary, we may have an afternoon meeting on the same day". That· matter was put to thePreside.t1tand no objection was voiced to ît. Tmyself yoiced the eamest·hope that there would he noobjectionsJothat course, and I propose that we do ha,ve afueeting thîsafternoon,as IthiIlk was contemplatç~by.the Council 9n·vVednesday. 76.. The .PRESIDENT (translated tram Russian): lcanassurelhe UnitedStatesrepresentative that he isincludedin .the list ofthree. speakersto which l r(~err~d. - . ..... - - i17. AUthe United§tates representative's'observations are correct- Theonlynew~ctoris thatwecannot avoid 1 next meeting. 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