S/PV.611 Security Council

l haVé asked leave tü speak again on this item chiefly because there are a few points arising out of the debate about which we feel we must put' on record the views of our .delegation. Of cours'e, l do not !":eed to emphasize the . great importance which the United Kingdom Government attaches to a settlement of the India-Pakistan question. l am sure that all of my colle~oues in the Secnrity Council fed the same sense of urgency and will share our hope that negotiations between the parties will be resumed as soon as possible. There could 'he few better begi1111ings for the year 1953 than·an agreement between the Governments of India and Pakistan on the differences that hav~ sa far prevented demilitarization and the holding of the plebiscite. l therefore hope that the Conncil will vote on the ciraft resolution before Christmas, and indeed, if possible, before the end of the present meeting. 32. A great dea! has been ~aid by both parties in tbis debate about aggression and. accession. As l Iistened ta the points of view which have been urged before us, l Ihave been strengthened in the conviction which we have always held that the Security Council has in ithe past shawn great wisdom in concentrating its 34. It was precise1y because of the importance which we attach to determining how we cau best give effect to the agreement contailled in these two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, therefore, that l was concerned to hear it suggested that the !;)roposals contained in the drait resclution were inconsistent with, and indeed l think it waf: even suggested that they were contrary to, the principles in the two resolutiûns of the United Nations Commission for India. and Pakistan. ----.--~-. - li 35. Here is the essential point, l suggest, to which we. in the Security Council must give our most careful attention. Jf we have in our drait resolution been inconsistent with the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, Wê must surely consider hoW' we can put tbat right. But l am not at all persuaded that there is in fact any such inconsistency, Let us examine what we have proposed in the Iight of the principles contained in the two resolutions on which the parties have agreed. 36.1t is quite true that the learned Foreign Minister of Pakistan, in bis speech during this morning's meeting, examined the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan with special refer,ence ta the proposai whichhe made towards the end of his speech on 16 December [609th meeting] . But I think it would be desirable to ask my colleagues to bear with me while l again examine the two resalutiol1S of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan with special reference~ in my case, to the proposals in. the dra{t. resolution· which the representativeof the United States and I have put }~fore the Seëurity Council [S/2839]. 37. l shall turn first to part II of the resolution of 13 AugustlQ48,.which pravîdes. as we know. that the Governments of India and Pakistan should negotiate a.D. ~agr~111ent -on t.he foHowing lines. First1 the troops ofPakistan, the. tribesmen and Pakistan nationa1s who have entered the State for the purposeof fighting sh()u1d. be completely· withdrawn. That is the first principle on which the . . ~entative's proposaI of 4 September 1952. The first two c1atl~N~ of st'l:'tion A of that paragraph set out \Vith the greatest clarity the very principles 1 have ml.'ntioned ahnve. 38, Now let us examine the re~ohttion of 13 August 1948 a Httle further. Paragraph A (3) of part II says: CCPending a final solution, the territory evacuated hy the Paldstan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission." 39. As my United States colleague pointed out in his speech on 5 Decembel', the co-sponsors of the resolution tRke it as already agreed between the parties that the forces ren1aining on the Asaà Kashmir side of the cease-fire Hne will be separated from i-he administrative and operational control of the Pakistan Blgh Command and "'ill be under the surveillance of the United Nations. This is placed on record in Dr. Graham's fourth report, and I do not think that there should be any fear thai the proposals contained in the drait resolution are inconsistent with the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948 on this point. 40, Continuing our examination of the resolution of 13 August 1948, we now come to the principles which should be b~me in mind by the two Governments in negotiating agreement in r(;spect of the Indian forces. The first of these is that the Government of India will begin to withdraw the bulk of its fon~es from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission - and we must now, of cou:se, understand this to mean agreement with the United Nations Represent",tive-as saon as the Representative shaH have noti'fied the Gover,nmellt of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals have been withdrawn and that the Pakistan armed forces are being: withdrawn. The ser:ond principle is that the Govermm;nt of India will maintain on its side of the ceaSl~-!i.re line those Indian armed forces which, in agre~ment with the United Nations Representative, are considered necessary to assist the. local authorities in the observance of law and order. Now tet us look again at our draft resolution. In the fourth paragraph of the operative part, as I have pointed out, the parties are asked to reach agreement on the specifie number of forces, bearing in mind paragraph 7 of Dr. Graham's proposals of 4 September. Paragraph 7, in effect, says that the final figure for the number of forces on the Indian side of the cease-fireline should be fi...."{ed at the minimum number of Indian forces and State armed forces required for the maintenance of law and arder and of the cease-firr agreement, with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the pleb;scite. Is there any inconsistency here? l, myself, do not think that there is. 42. Now we must look at the resolution of 5 January 1949. In this resolution the parties agreed that a Plebiscite Administrator, after having been formally appointed to offiœ and given the powers which he considers necessary for con1ucting the plebiscite, should have authority to dispose of the forces r~.maining on the other "ide of the cease-fire line. On the Indian side, the final disposaI is to he determined in consultation with the Govemment of India and with due regard to the security of the State and the freedor..l of the plebiscité. The words "in consultation with", and the faet that the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite are linked together as two criteria which the Plebiscite Administrator is to bear in mind, are notvdthout signific~nce, If we look back to paragraph 7 of Dr. Graham's proposaIs of 4 September, which we haVé incorporated roto our draft resolutioI!, we shaH find that these two principles - the sec'.1rity of the State and the freedom of the p].ebiscite - are there. The only extra element which has been introduced into Dr. Graham's proposaIs of 4 September, and therefore into our draft resolution, is that the number of forces should be determined with due regard to the maintenance of the cease-fire agreement. But this does no more than reflect the agreement alre1.dy reached in paragraph 8 of Dr. Graham's proposaIs that demilitarization shaIl be carried out in such a way as to involve no threat to the œase-fire agreement. 1 believe 1 have said enough to show that so far, ;-' ,y rate, the pritJciples contained in the two UNCIP ,lutions and faiLnfully reflected in our present draft resolution. 43. 1t remains for us ta consider paragraph 4 (h) of the resolution of 5 January 1949, which pmvides br the final disposaI of the armed forces on the Azad Kas:b.mir side of the cease-fire lime. by the Commission -that is to say, now by Mr. Graham-and the Plebiscite Ldministrator in consultation with the local authorities. What are those armed forces? The Pakistan Army and the tribesmen, when this stage is reached, will already have been withdrawn. When the United Nations Commission was negotiating with the Govemment _of India on these two resolutions, the problem of the Azad Kashmir forces was very much in its mind. Is it not clear, therefore, that the final disposaI of the ~,rmed forces referred ta in the resolution of 5 January 1949 must relatein part, at any rateto the Azad forces? If this is not true, it would presumably mean that the parties had agreed to negotiate a demilitarization agreement within a framework which contained no provision for the disarming aud disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces. l do not think that this CQuld he the Ç?§~I ?,l1Q-I t4~r~iore submit 4.J.. Mr. Gmham has covercd this part of the resolution of 5 January 1949 by providing, in paragraph 7 of his proposaIs of 4 September, Ior the large~scale disbanding and disarming of the ...J:t~ad Kashnùr forces. His propo:ml therefot'C ls that, at the ('nd of the period of demilitarization, there sha11 he the minimum mtmber of forces on the Asad aide of thé cease-fire line required for the maintenance of law and arder and of the ceaselire agreement with ùue regard ta the freedom of the plebiscite. With regard ta the Indian side of the ceasefire line, his proposaI i8 that there sha11 be the minimum of for;;.es required for the maintenance of law and arder and of the cease-fire agreement, with due regard ta the SCl:urity of 'the State and the freedom of the plébiscite. In the case of the Asad Kashmir side., final disposaI of the armed forces is ta be decided on in consultation with the local authorities. Dr. Graham believes this to mean, l think, that the forces shall be reduced to the minimum reçuired for the maintenance of law and order - which, under the resolution of t3 August 1948, was the responsibility of the local authorities acting under the surveillance of the Com- O1,'ssion - and also of the cease-fire agreement with dUt ~ regard to the freedom of the plebiscite. 45. As l have mentioned above, the condition that demilitarization should be carried out in such a way as to .involve no threat to the cease-fire agreement has bee'1 accepted by the two Governments, and l suggest that Mr. Graham is therefore entirely logical in inc1t...:ling, in paragraph 7 of his proposaIs, maintenance of the cease-fire agreement as one of the requirements ta the borne in mind in fixing the final number of forces on each side of the cease-fire line. On the Asad side the forces are to be separated from the administrative and operational ~ontrol of the Pakistan High Command - as l have already exphined, we understand that the Government of Pakistan has already agreed to this - whereas, on the Indian side, the Indian and State armed forces wi11 be under the direction and control of the Government of India. 46. l have spoken at some length on this rather complicated and involved question because it is a cardinal element in our poli~y ta preserve and build on the agreement aIready reached between the parties, and any suggestion that we are departing from or weakening this agreement i5 thus one which caUs for most searching exar:!ÏnatiJn by us. 1 , 47. l hope that 'I have said enough to show that a11 the essential elements in the demilitarization provisions of the two UNCIP resolutions are faithfully reproduced in the proposaI which my United States co11eague and t have put before the Council. il8.The next point on which doubts have been expressed is, l think, in respect of the specified limits ' .. within which we have asked the paroles to ag!'ee ana figure for the forces to remain on each side of the cease,.. 'fire .line' at the. end of the period of 'demilitarization. As my United States colleague pointed out in his 49. It has been said, I know, that the sponsors of the draft resolution are in error in combining the two alternative apptoaches mentioned by Mr. Graham in paragraph 38 of his fourth report [S/2783]. It is of course true that what were alternatives in Mr. Graham's report are combined in the :first operative paragraph of our draft resolution. That is obvious. However, this was not done inadvertently at all but only after the most careful thought. The United Kingdom Government, for its part, thought it wise to avoid the possibility that one of the parties might choose to negotiate in accordance with one of Mr. Grc:Ù1am's alternatives and the other party in accordance with the oth~r. This might weIl have happened, in which case the real negotiations would probably never have begun. We therefore bclieved that it would provide a more solid basis for negotiation if th{lse alternatives were made complementary to each other. If the alternatives were i any way incompatible, this would not of course have leen possible.• But l hope l have shown that there is no reason for believing that there is any such incompatibility. At any rate, the sponsors themselves believe that no such inccmpatibility exists. 50. Again, some doubt has been raised whether the United Nations Representative is competent to assess the strength of military forees to be left behind in the State at the end of the demilitarization process. On this point I believe that paragraph 4 of the resolution of 5 January 1949, to which I have already referred, is quite dear. It provides that the United Nations Representative, as the successor of the Commission, together with the Plebiscite Administrator, shall be responsible for determining the final disposal of the armed forces, in consultation with the Govemment of India, such disposaI to be "with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite". It is therefore surely clear that under the terms of this resolutionthe primary responsibiIity in this matter rests with the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator, and that the freedom of the plebiscite and the security of the State are both matters to which considerable weight must be atlached , and in regard to which some kind of balance may have to be struck. It· goes without saying, of course, that the United Nations Represent?-tiy~ ~çJ the Plebiscite 51. Then there ;.vas a suggestion that the draft resolution ignored the charader of the forces to !Je left on each side of the cease-fire line. As my United States colleague pointed out in his speech of 5 December, the draft resolution does in faet deal with this aspect in the c1earest possible way by incorporating by reference the provisions of paragraph 7 of Mr. Graham's twelve proposaIs of 4 September 1952'. In other words, our draft resolution says that on the Indian side of the cease-fire line there should be the Indian forces - these presumably will consist of battalions of the regular Indian army - the State armed forces and the Kashmir State Militia. On the Azad side of the cease-fire Hne there should be those forces which remain after large-seale disbanding and disarming of the Asad Kashmir forces have taken place, and the Gilgit Scouts. It will be remembered that in my statehient of 6 November [606th nu:eting] l said that the forces on ead1 side of the cease-fi.re line should be, broadly speaking - I repeat, broadly spealdng - of the same kind. l believe this ta be entirely consistent with the two UNCIP resolutions and, of course, it does not in any way conflict with the agreement betweèn the parties that forces on the Asadside should be separated from the Pakistan High Command and placed under United Nations surveillance, whereas on the Indian side the forces would be, of course, under the command of the Govemment of India. I hope that there is no longer wy doubt about the way in which our present draft resolution. deals \Vith this question of the character of the forces. I also hope, after the analysis I made earlier in my speech today, that it will be generally agreed that these present proposaIs of ours, bath as, regards charaeter and number, are in no way inconsistent with the principles which both Governments have pledged themselves to follow in arranging the demilitarization of the State as a preparation for the plebiscite.. 52. I have not yet rderred to the demilitarization proposaI which the representative of Pakistan made at the end of his speech in the Counciî on 16 December, and ta which he referred again in his speech this !l1orning [61Oth meeting]. It rèpresents, I think, a slightly different approach from that which we have suggested in our own draft resolution. As 1 understand it, it is entirely in accordance with the first of the two UNCIP resolutions, and would in faet produce a truce agreement in the farm originally intended in that resolution. If it is considered together '\'\"Ïth ' MT. "ZafTüYa ·Khan'a undertal9,ng to accept whatever decision the United Nations Representative and. the Plebiscite Administrator may jointly,take under paragraph 4 'of the resolution of 5 January 1949, regarding 1 '. 53. My delegation would indeed we1come any agreement which might be worked out by the parties as a consequence of the Pakistan proposaI. We think it would be better if it were dealt with by the parties in the negotiations which we hope they will resume early in the new year, and 1 shall not, therefore, express any view myse1f on the merits of the details of the proposaI in the Security Coundl at this tinle. 54. These, 1 think, are the main points that have arisen during our recent debates on which 1 felt it necessary to place the views of the United Kingdom Government on reccrd. It only remains for me to express the hope thai: further consideration will be given to the proposals contained in the draft resolution in the Hght of the explanations which have been made concerning them and that they may be acceptt:d by the Council and, indeed, we would still hope, eVf:ntually by the two parties. At this point, may 1 say chat the suggestions thrown out by the representat1':e of the Netherlands regarding the place for the negotiations and the exact role of the United Nations Representative are entirely acceptaL:e to my delegation, and 1 think also to the delegation of the United States. 'lVe also accept his interpretation of the meaning of the last paragraph of the draft resolution. 55. As regards the place whe~e the further negotia~ . tions could take place, we think it would be most suitable for this to be left entirely to the discretion of Mr. Graham, after appropriate consultation with the parties. We consequently hope that Mr. von Balluseck will agree to circulate his suggestions at once, in the form of specifie amendments. ' 56. 1 trust that other representatives on the Security Council will find themselves in agreement with the co-sponsors that the proposaIs in the draft resolution, as so amended, are a faithful interpretation of the principles contained in the two UNCIP resolutions and those· paragraphs of Mr. Graham's twelve-point proposaI which have already been accepted by the Governments of India and Pakistan. 57. In conclusion, 1 should like to give expression to one further thought. 1 cannot emphasize too much that, for its part, the United Kingdom Government believes that a settlement of this dispute can ·be brought about only through agreement between the Government of India and the Government of Paldstan.. Th~re is, therefore, in our view, absolutely no question oÎ anyone's imposing a settlement. Nevertheless, we sincerely believe that it is the Seeurity Council's duty, at this stage of the long consideration of this matter, to indicate to the parties what approach the Council, at any rate, believes is most like1y to lead to a just and lasting settlement. It isalso, in our view, the Security Cou.ncil's dutY to give its full support to the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, Mr. Graham, and to show its confidence in the proposais

1 npologize to the Security Couneil for speaking at this relatively late hour, but may l repeat the view of my Government that any agreement of the parties on a just bnsis, which would settle this dispute, whether reached directly t")1" under the auspices of the United Nat:.ons Representative, would be welcomed by the United States. We, together with the United Kingdom, as co-sponsors, have put before the Security Couneil a draft resolution which we feel co-ordinates some of the suggestions of the United Nations Representative on t'lJe issue wc consider to be basic, that is, the question of demilitarization. 60. The United Nations Representative has toId the parties that he will at all times welcome suggestions from either Government which are aimed at settling the main differences between them, and therefore aimèd at solvinr the dispute. Therefore, as we see it, nothing contained in the draft resolution stands in the way of either one or both of the parties coming forward with suggestions of their own. Nothing in the resolution alters or reduces in any way the powers of the United Nations Representative under the previous resolutions. pr~ncipales conséquence, pourquoi, résolution deux propres. ne 61. l do not think it wouM be considered desirable, or necessary, or constructive, ta go back into the history of this case and re-examine the basis of the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. Therefore, l for my part do not propose to discuss the charge of aggression. To my Government the important political fact is that the parties have agreed that the accession of Kashmir will be decided through a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. That is the agreement and the principle which we are attempting to help the parties to implement. 62. In the opinion of my GovernP."lent the draft resolu- 'Hon before the Security Oouncil rests four-square on the agreement embodied in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and PakHan. On this point l think l have nothing to add to the statement made a few moments ago by the representative of the l!nited Kingùom. It seems to me that we must not lose slght of the view which the United Nations Representative has expressed that an early agreement on demilitarization would have as one immediate practical result the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator, who could then proceed with the study he must make of the entire problem of a plebiscite. 63. l should now like ta add a word about the amendment suggested by the representative of the Nether- I~nds dealing with the procedures under which negotiatlOns would be conducted. The representative of the Netherlands is quite correct in recalling the view of ~ Government that the draft resolution is not lUtended in any way to impair or limit the authority of the United that he will continue ta exercise his 64. In accordance with his authority and responsibility, it is fitting that the decision as ta the place where the negoti<\tions should talœ place should he left to the United Nations Representative, presumably in consultation with the parties. We should not ex.pect him, in the time at his disposal and after the months of effort which he has put into this case, to travel back and forth considerable distances to confer first with one party and th(~ with the other. vVithout in any sense attempting to make a decision, it occurs to me that at this stage the United Nations facilities in Geneva might bl:! particularly useful and appropriate for these negotiations. The draft resolution calls upon the parties ta report, and authorities the United Nations Representative ta report, on the progress made. We have no preconceived idea of the nature of the reports which the parties and the United Nations Representative will consider it appropriate to make. It may well he that the parties will ask the United Nations Representative to synthesize their views and put them before us as a part of his report, but that is a procedural matter in regard to which we agree with the representative of"the Netherlands that the parties and the United Nations Representative should have a considerable degree of flex.ibility, in order that they may decide such. questions among themselves. 65. My Government regrets that both parties to this dispute have not found it possible to accept the draft resolution. However, we believe that the draft resolution has meaning and importance because it represents the careful study and the appreciation of the United Nations Representative's suggestions which it is proper for the Security Council to make. l thereforé join my United Kingdom colleague in recommending this draft resolution ta the Security Counci1. 66. ~r. MUNIZ (Brazil): At this late hour l will state very briefly the position of my delegation in regard to the draft resolution put forward by the United Kingdom and the United States of .A..merica on the India-Pakistan question. We have stated on several occasions that no permanent and fair solution to this problem will be achieved without the full and unrestricted cO-Qperamon of the two parties concerned, with due emphasis on safeguarding the free expression of the will of the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It is most gratifying to note that the United Nations Representative has secured the agreement of both parties to all but two of the points of these twelve proposaIs. In spite of the remaining difficultiesand we do not wish to minimize their significancemuch has already been achieved through the noble endeavour of MI'. Graham, who has succeeded in bringing the two parties to a discussion on the basis of equal rights and mutual confidence. We are satisfied that the broad lines of a plan of demilitarization have already been agreed upon and that the main point which remains to be settled, namely, the deter'- 67. We have so often seen India and Pakistan on the same side of the fence in the debates on so many problems in the United Hations that we find it bard ta believe tha: those two great nations, united by h:storical, cultural and political ties, will be unable peacefully to settle their present differences on a question of paramount importance to peace and security on the Asian continent. 68. For those reasons m}' delegation believes that a new effort should now be made to reach agreement on the question of demilitarization, and the logical step for the Security Council to take is to urge the Governments of India ~'1.d Pakistan to enter into immediate negotiations tmder the auspices of the United Nations Representative for India and Paldstan, as proposed by the representative of the Netherlands, in order to reach agreement on the specifie numbcr of forces to remain on each side of the ce.ase-fire line at the end of the demilitarization period. 69. Shouid the resolution be adopted by the Security Council, we a're confident that our appeai will meet with a constructive response from the two Govemments, which ought to have every possible interest in removing the disquieting factors from their mutuai relations, 70. For these reasons, the Brazilian delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution which is now before the Counci1. . 71. Mr. VON BALLUSECK (Netherlands): l should like to express my delegation's appreciation for the favourabie consideration which the sponsors of this draft resolution have given to the suggestions which l have made and which l have now formalized as an amendment [5/2881], which has been distributed. . 72. As can be seell, the amendment which l have in view is a very simple one. My suggestion is that in the fourth operative paragraph of the resoiution- 110t the first operative paragraph, as is erroneously stated in the text of our amendment which has been distributed - the words "under the auspices of the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan" he arlded after the word "negotiations", and that the words "at the Headquarters of the United Nations" he deieted, The fourth operative paragraph would then read: "Urges the Govemments of India and Pakistan to enter into immediate negotiations, under the auspices of the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, in order to reaeh agreement ... " 73. l believe that, by adding the phrase "under the auspices of the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan", sufficient scope for initiative is left to Mr. Graham, and that, by deleting the words "at the Headquarters of the United Nations", a flexible position is obtained as to the place.where the meeting tould be convened. At the same time, the phrase "under 74. .J ,believe l have nothing more ta add to this short explanation except to express the hope that this amendment will perhaps be voted upon this afternoon. 75. Ml'. TSIANG (China): l very much regretted that, in her statement two weeks ago, the representative of India gave sa much emphasis to the question of aggression. l also regretted that the representative of Palàstan found it necessary ta devote such a large portion of his reply to answering the charge of aggression and ta proferring a counter-charge. 76. At the begi11rlÎng of the debate on the Kashmir problem in the Security Council, in January 1948, many hours were devoted to the discussion of the question of aggression. The representative of Indiaat that time Ml'. Ayyangar - charged Pakistan with aggression in the State of Kashmir, and Ml'. Zafru1la I<han made the counter-charge of Indian aggression in the State of Junagadh. Hours and hours were devoted to these charges and counter-charges in January and February 1948. 77. The remarkable element in that situation is that not a single member of the Security Council, apart from the parnes directly concerned, ever discussed the charge and counter-charge of aggression. The members of the Council, without consultation among themselves and, still less, any public discussion here, tacitlyalmost instinctively - agreed ta by-pass the question of aggression. There was good reason for that procedure. . 78. The circumstances on the sub-continent of India in the early post-war years were quite unique. A large country and people suddenly came to enjoy full freedùm. We werL suddenly faced with the fact that not one but two nations were to be established. l do not think that that unique event was in the minds of those who framed the Charter. It is doubtful whether the Charter covers that peculiar &ituation. l do not mean to say that the principles of the Charter do not apply. l do not 111ean to say that at all. The application of the principles of the Charter to this peculiar situation in India, however, would have required considerable interpretation, and we might. have found ourselves in profound disagreement as to which interpretation should be put on this or that article. Furthermore, after all our labour in fixing responsibility for past events, we might have found that we could not contribute much to the solution of this problem. 79. There was another remarkabJe feature of tllis debate early in 1948. The debate started with agreement on one central po!nt -- name1y, that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir ta India or to Pakistan should be decided by a fair and impartial ': '. . .. / .' .' ~ \- 80. The debate, in fact, has been concentrated on the conditions of a plebiscite. That is very, very important, in view of the big interests at stake and the passions of the people involved. The plebiscite must œ fair and free in fact, and it must be fair and free in appearance. l remember very well the deep impression made upon me by the statement which the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Noel Baker, made to the Council some time in February 1948, to the effect that the plebiscite must, be made to appear fair and free to the population of Kashmir; oL'1erwise, we should not have ~ achieved a solution. AH our efforts since the beginning of 1948 have been devoted to bringing about a plebiscite, fair and free Lll fact and in appearance. . 81. In those days, five years ago, most members of the Security Council were optimists. 1 t11ink they oversimplified the question. Sorne members went so far as ta calI for what they termed an interim administration .- that is, setting aside the existing State Government and starting aIl over again by organizing a special government for the State of Jammu and Kashmir before' and during the period of the plebiscite. 82. The purpose was obvious - to guarantee that there would be no administrative or politieal pressure on thEvoters. It was thought wise and necessary to have a neutral administration during the period of the plebiscite. But that proposal met with opposition from India because India contended that it was a denial of its rights; and the Council abandoned it. My delegation advised the Council not to pursue such a perfectionist policy. We wanted the Administration not to exercise undue pressure on the voters in the plebiscite, but, 'after aH, aState government is a manysided affair, with many departments, not aIl O'f which can exercise an influence on the voters, and there is no Teason why, just hecause a plebis,. is being held, the whole government should have to he reorganized. 83. Then there was another suggestion in those early days in 1948 that, during the period of the plebiscite, the State of Kashmir should be totally demilitanzed; not taat it should be partially demilitarized - we were not interested in how many troops were left on this side or that - but that aIl of the troops should he withdrawn. That, again, me with strong opposition. My delegation again advised the Conncil not to pursue such a perfectionist lîne. 84. So, the 100uncil, sinœ that time, has been more realistic; it has been trying to work to hring about çonditions in Kashmir that would make possible the holding of a free plebiscîte at a certain time" not calling into question any existing rights a..lld :principles. 90. The policy of the United States and the United Kingdom on Jammu and Kashmir bears a c1early imperialistic character. These countries, which have set out on the path of expansion, are unceremoniously intervening in the internal affair:. of Kashmir under cover of the United Nations fiag. Taldng on the. noble raIe of "peacemakers", the Unite( States and th... United Kingdom for almost five long years have done almost everything in their power to spin out the settlement of this question, to aggravate the situation in the subcontinent and to create such conditions as would justify the introduction of so-called neutral, that is, foreign, troops, into the territory of Jammu and Kashmir and thus turn the area into their strategie base. 91. What Mr. Graham meant when he referred, not by acrident, to "the junction of the forces of strategie g~ography" was recently made dear by the Commander of the United States Fleet in the Pacific, AdmiraI Arthur Radford, after his visit to Karachi on 12 November 1952. As reported in the Pakistani semi-official publication Dawn, Admiral Radford said that "Pakistan accupies ari;rategic position and is bound ta play an importanc raIe in the world-wide struggle against communism". 92. COlnmenting on the results of AdmiraI Radford's visit to Paldstan, that same publication, Dawn, said on 11 November - and l quote further from this paper - that the American military plan for this area "consists of setting up air bases in Pakistani territory within ninety minutes flying time of important industrial areas in the Soviet Union". This, it seems, is the true meaning of "strategic geography". 93. Why then, to borrow the words of the United Kingdom representative, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, work out methods and procedures that would enable the people of Jammu and Kashmir freely ta state their will as regards accession? Is not the falsity of such talk obvious ta aIl? 94. 1n his statement ta the Security Council on 17 January 1952, the representative of the Soviet Union pointed O"lt the abnormality of a situation in which the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, without being sa authorized by the Security Couneil, asked India and Pakistan whether they were ready to agree to the United Nations making armed forces available, under the plausible pretext of ensuring security and the maintenance of law and arder. These questions were raised bv Mr. Graham on 7 December 51; and appear in thè annex 3 to bis second report 96. The United States and the United Kingdom, following the course of intervention in the internaI affairs not only of Kasmir, but also of India and Paldstan, are trying to impose their own plans and wills of them, using the (l~e3tion of so-called United Nations troops as a weapon of blaclanail and intimidation. The joint draft resolution submitted ta the Security Council by the United States and the United Kingdom on 6 November and the e::planatory statements by the United Kingdom representative, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, and the United States representative, Mr. Gross, are eloquent on this point. . 97. The draft resolution is very much like an ultimatum requiring the parties to reach an agreement on the number of troops as proposed in the draft resolution, and the Governments of India and Pakistan "immediate1y" to start' negotiations in New York, as stated in one of the paragraphs of the draft, and to submit to the Security Council the necessary reports within thirty days of the adoption of the draft resolution, as tbe last paragraph oi the draft resolution says. Apparently the authors of this resolution have no great hopes of its "success" and have had to reso't to their favourite method, intimidation, using in tÎ:ris case the proposaI to send United Nations troops into the territory of Kashmir. The representative of the United Kingdom said on 6 November [606th meeting]: "Tt may be remembered that ... a neutral force might be used to facilitate demilitarization. If demilitarization on the Hnes suggested by Dr. Graham and by our own draft resolution can be brought about, I do not believe that the devÏce of a neutral force would in any sense be neœssary ... But, should the fear that demilitarization may lead to a renewaI of confIict in Kasbmir still exist, perhaps we might, with respect, urge whichever of the parties feels this fear to reconsider the proposaI that a neutral force might then he made available." 98. Consequently the United Kingdom representative says : either you agree to our proposaI as to the number of troops, or "neutral troops" will have to be used to "facilitate demilitarization". The United States representative, Mr. Gross, on 5 December [607th 101. For those reasons, the Soviet Union delegation ~annot support the solution of the question proposed m the draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom.

1 feel that 1 must say, with reference to what has fallen from the lips of our Soviet Union colleague, that if in fact the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the Un.ited States during the last five years have been achv~ly engaged in trying to establish an aggressive base 1~ ~ashmir,. they have.been singularly unsuccessfu1. ~or 1.S It, 1 think, anythmg but a reflection on the mtegnty of the Governments of both India and Pakistan to suggest that they would be likely to agree to any such prop~s~. In ~y case, 1 suggest that if the Council ever had It m mmd to recommend the establishment of such a neutral force in Kashmir - still more' if it ever contemplated actual!y organizing one - it would 103. In any case, l wottld just say this: 1 thi11k there is reallv no need nt aU for our Soviet Union colle~e to he the least bit nervOltS about the transformatlon of Kashmir into a kind of nrmed camp for the purpose of encirc1ing the Soviet Union. It must be obvious, 1 think, that any such suggestion would be completely opposed ta the known policies ox both parties to tl\e present dispute. 104. Finally, let me just say as a concJuding remark that 1 was relieved, distinctly relieved, to h~ar that the policy of the Soviet Union Government, it seems, is to aUow the people ùf Kashmir to decide it:o own fate. Perhaps Mr. Zorin, as a newcI,}mer ta this particular debate, is unaware that this i5 what my Governmeut, for its part, has for no less than five ye~rs been consistently advocating. lOS<. Mr. MENüN (India): 1 ask the Security Council's indulgence to make a brief intervention in order to clarify and restate the position of the Government of India in the light 0: what Sir Gldwyn Jebb and others have said. 106. Sir Gladwyn Jebb said there could be no qu~stion of imposing a settlement. We agree. We have l;\. aIl times sought a peaceful settl~ment by negotiation. 107. The Security Council has before it a draft resolution and an amendmen~ theteto. Some of the statements which Have been made, white purporting to be in support of the draft resolution, ha.ve expresRed some variance with it on points which we consider material and have sought to suggest that the next stage in this matter is the continuance of negotiations by the parties, under the auspices of the United Nations Representative. But the terms of thë draft resolution are different in words, and even more sa in emphasis. The draft resolution is what we have before us. Its terms hold the field in the debate, irrespective of the speeches. It is on this draft resolution, therefore, that we have to state our position, in a way which leaves no room for inisunderstanding. 108. MI'. Graham has reported that, as a result of the negotiations held in Geneva, only one half of paragraph 7 of his twelve proposaIs remains to be agreed upon. In paragraph 38 of his report, he has made specifie recommendations as to how, in his view, efforts could be made to achieve a seulement on this one remaining point, which no doubt is' the hard core of the. j:)roblem now before the Security Council. 109. We, for our part, have expressed no reluctance ta. contintùng negotiations with MI'. Graham from that point and on the basis suggeste:d by him. The present draft resolution, however, in our opinion, points in a different direction. We regret this and fear that it offers no promise of leading to any hopeful result. As has already been stated before the Security Council and as has been fully borne outby oui .role and conduct in the history of this matter, we are prepared, ashitherto, to explore aU avenues for a 110. The Government of India has a1ready stated that it is unable to acceet the draft resolution now before the Security Counctl. The Government of India is not prepared to be a party to any talks on the basis suggested in paragraph 7 of the draft resolution. With these explicit u-eservations, however, the Government of India would, in line with its readiness to explore aIl avenues leading towards a peaceful settlement, be prep<'ued to join and continue in any talks in connexion with this dispute. If the Council, it." lts wisdom, still considers it useful or necessary to proceed with the draft resolution, we can only profoundly regret its decision.

l Nquest the Council to take a decision on the draft resolution [S/2839] submitted jointly by the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom on 6 November last, as completed by the Netherlands amendment, which has been accepted by t\1,e sponsors. A vote was taken by show of hands. ln favottr: Brazil, ChUe, China, France, Greece, Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom ot Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. Against: None. Abstaimng: Union of Soviet Socialist Reptlblics. Prèsent and not vO'ting: Pakistan. The riraft resolution was ad,opteà b'}' 9 ~'/otes ta none, with 1 abstention. l1Z. This is probably the last meeting - unless sorne unforeseen event oœurs, and everybody hupes it will not-- which we shall have this year. l should not like us to part from one another without saying au revoir to those of our colleagues whose countries will no longer be represented on the Council next yea.r and whom, to our regret, we are therefore seeing amongst us for the last time. 113. To aIl three, the representatives of Brazil, Turkey and the Netherlands, l should like to express, on behalf of the Council, our feelings of friendship and our appreciation for their collaboration in the Council's work for the past two years. It is a comforting thought for us that they will continue, less direci:)y pey haps but equally effectively, to assist the Security Council, by their vaIuable co-operation in the common task within the United Nations. The meeung rose, at 7 p.nt. SALES AGENTS FOR UNITED DEPOSIrAIRES DES PUBliCAriONS FRAIlŒ Edition. II. Pari. V. ARGINTINA _ AI'INTIIt' Editorial Sudamericonl, SA. Alsina 500, Buenol Airel. • "U$TRAlI"- AUSTRAlIE H.II. Goddard. ;o~5a Georgo Sf~ Sydney. "fEeE-GlEeE "Elefthoroudokis," tian, AthllnlU. BUIIUM- BUllQUE Agence at Messa~eriude la Presse SA, 14-22 rua. du Pers,l. Bruxoll... W. H. Smith & Son. 71·75. boulevard 811ATEMAll Gouboud & Cla. 28, Guatomala. Adolphe.Mo~, BrulOlle.. HAin Librairia "A 111.B, Port·ou·Pri.-.,. BOLIVIA- BOliVIE • Librerta Soloccionos. COlillil> 972. l.ll paz. aWIL-!lIIElIL Livrorio Agir, Rua Moxico 911-B. Rie) da Janeiro; S50 Paulo, Bolo Horizonte. NONDURAS Librorla Panamoricona. Calle T~~ucigalpa. CANADA Rverson Press, 299 Quoeb St. Wast. Toronto. IflQlA-'INDE Oxford Book Housa, Naw Colcutle. P. Varodochory SI., Madras 1. p~lodico, 4234 dola Racho, Montraol. (EnON- CEYlAN Tho Associotod Nowspoper. oF Coylon Ltd.. Loko Houso. Colombo. INDONESIA -IIlDONElIE Jojoson Pembangunon. Djakarta. CHILE _ CHili Librerlo ' Ivons,· Monedo 822. Santiago. Editorial dei Paclfico, Ahu.\floda 57, Santiago. IlIAH- Kelab-Khoneh nue, Te~ran: ClIIHA':"CHINE The World Book Co. ltd., 99 Chung King Rood, Ist Soction. Taipoh. Taiwan•. Commorciol Prass. 211 Honon Rd~ Shang· hoi. IRA0-IRAK Mocken.ie's Boobhop, ISRAEL Blumstein·. Booblores Raad. Tel Aviv. (OL~MlI". - (010NIE Librerla totino. Corroro 60~ 13·05. Bogot6. . lll:irerla Am6rico. Medem". Librerlo Nocionol l~do.. Barranquilla. !!!!.Y-1':AtU; Colibri S.A., lElANON -IIIAM librairie Universello. (oSTA RICA- COSTA.RICA Troio. Hormonas, Aportodo 1313. Son Jos4. UBEIIA J. Momolu Komoro, (1lI( . ta Case Belge. O'Roillv 455. ln Hobono. LUXEMBOIIRfi Librairie J. Schu~mor. UECIIOSLOVAIIA - TCHE(OSLOVAQUIE Coskostovor,sky Spisovotal. N6rodnl Tl'ldo 9. Praha 1. MEXI(o - MEXIQUt Editorial Herme. 4'. M6xico, D.F. DENMARK-DANEMùI • Einar Munksgeord. ltd., N.rregodo 6. K.benhavn. 11:. NETHERLANDS- N.V. Mortinus 's..Grcvenhage. DOMINICAM.IEPUllIC-lIEPUI. DOMINICAINE librerta Dominicono. Mertsdes 49. Ciu. dad Trujillo. NEW ZEALAND - 'United Nations land. C.P.O. EtOADOI- EQUA1EUll • • librerl. CientlFico, Guayaquil anif Quito. NORWAY - NORVEGE Johan Grundt gumgt. 7A, Oslo. EGyPT- EGYPIE Librairitt "la Renlllissan..ce. d'Egypfe." 9 sh. Adly Posho. Coiro. PAKISUM Thom". & Thomas, Raad. Karachi, PubUshérs United Lahore•. El SALVADOR-SALVADOR Monuel Nova. V·Clo•• la. Avenlda sur 37, ~on Salvador. ' E1HIOPIA - E1HIOPIE Agence Ethiopienne de Publiclt6. Box 128. Ar.ldis Ab.bo. PANAMA Jos6 Men6ndez, "NLAND - f1NLANDE Akatee'minon Kirjo~ouppo, 2. Kes~us~atu. Helsinki. PARAGUAY Morsno Hermanos. Orders and inquiries from.C9\1ntrles whera sales agellfS have not yet been a~pointl!d may. be se~t ro, Sales Circulation Section, Uitited Nalions, New York, U.S.A.; or Saies Section, United Nalions Office. PalaIs ~~IiOlls, ~enèV;; Swltzerland. Priee: $U.S. 0.25; (or equivalent Printed fu' CaÎla<la