S/PV.665 Security Council

Before assuming the duties as President of the Security Council, which it is my tum to discharge, 1 think 1 should paya tribute to my predecessor, Mr. Sarper, for the able and masterly way in which he carried out the duties of President, thus makingit considerably easier for us aIl to accomplish the far from easy tasks with which the Security Council is faced. 1 thjnk aIl the other members of the Security Council are in agreement with what 1 have said. 2. In taking over the Presidency, 1 at the same time venture to express the conviction that 1 shall have the courteous attention and necessary support which the President needs from aIl members of the Security Council. 3:Mr. SARPER (Ttll"key): 1 wish to thank the President. for the very generous remarks he made abopt my term as President. 1 simply tried, in aIl humility, to perform my duties in an impartial and unbiased manner. 1 am sure that the efforts of Mr. Vyshinsky in the same direction will be more successful than were mine. In thanking the· President again, l wish him much success and goocl luck in his term as President. Adoption of the agenda

1 propose for your consideration the question of the adoption of the agenda for today's meeting of the Security Council. The provisional agenda appears in document S/Agenda/665. If there are no observations, or objections, 1 shaH consider it adopted. 5. Mr. RIZK (Lebanon): 1 apologize for interrupting, but before the agenda is adopted, 1 should like to ask howthe Council proposes to proceed. 1 be1ieve it is the intention - at least, 1 hope it isthe intention -of the Council to deal with the agenda as it did in the case of the Suez Canal question,. that is, ·first of aH to dèal with item 2 (a), to conclude discussion of that item, and then to proceed with item 2 (b) of the agenda.

Normal1y, aH items are discussed in the order in which they appear on the agenda. Item 2·of the agenda of our present meeting, of course, is the Palestine question, consisting of a "Complaint by Lebanon on behalf of the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan", followed by the matters to which the complaint 7. Accordingly, -the point raised by the representative of Lebanon appears to he unnecessarytor the moment, since it is c1ear, there being no other proposaIs of any kind, that the matters raised must be discussed in the order in which they appear in the provisional agenda. 8. l asked the members of the Security Couneil if they had any observations to make in connexion with the adoption of the agenda, and as l heard no proPQsals for amendments to the agenda, or for any alteration of the arder of discussion of the various questions, l assume that there are no objections to the adoption of the agenda or, accordingly; to the consideraiion of this item in the order in which it is set forth in the provisional agenda S/Agenda/665. 9. As l again hear no observations, l take it that the agenda is approved in the order in which it appears in docu~nt S/Agenda/665, the provisional agenda. 10. That being so, l suggést that the Council take up the question of inviting the parties to participate in our debate. 11. Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom): l was prepared to agree that the provisional agenda. before. us should be adopted, on the assumption that, since the tw'o items were inter-re1ated, the Couneil would consider them as a whole. l should, perhaps, make it clear why my Government considers that it would be desirable to pr-oceed in that way. 12. Last autumn, the Security Council had a very full discussion of the situation on the borders of Israel and Jordan and adopted a resolution [S/3139/Rev.2] which, it hoped, would 1ead ta an improvement in the area. Members of the Council will remember that that resolution reminded the Governments of Israel and Jordan' of tileir ~bligations to prevent all acts of •violence on· either side of the demarcation line and called upon them to ensure the effective co-operation of local security forces. In another section, the resolution requested the Government of Jordan to continue and strengthen the measures which it wa,; already . taking to prevent crossing of ,the demarcation line by ~nauthorized persons, which often led to acts of violence. 13. Right in the forefront of the resolution, hOWiever, the Security Couneil put itself solemnly on record as ~pposed to' thè policy of retaliation. l should like to read out that part of the resolution: "The security Co-uncil ... "Pinds that the retaliatory actions at Qibya taken by armed forces of Israel on· 14-15 October 1953 and aU such actions tonstitute a violation of the ceasefire provisions of the Security Cour.cil resolution of 15 July 1948 and are inconsistent w1ith the parties' obligations under the General Armistice Agreem\ent and the Charter; ((Expresses the strongest censure of that action, which 'cau only prejugjçe 'th~ çha.nçes Qf that peace- 15. General Bennike has sent in the report [S/3183 and Corr.i] for which the Couneil asked in the last part of its resolution, and has been able to strengthen in certain respects the machinery at his disposaI. That is on the credit side, and is something which wc can aIl welcome. Unfortunately, much has taken place which we must all sincerely deplore. On the one hand, the efforts of the Government of Israel to secure a conference with the Government of Jordan under article XII of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan 1, have not been successful, in spite of the patient efforts of the Secretary-General to ensure that the conference would take place :mder conditions acceptable to both sides. On the other hand, acts of violence - sorne of them very serious indeed - have continued and have had alarming repercussions. 16. I would recall two of these incidents which are of an exceptionally serious nature. On 17 March a. bus in a lonely part of the Negeb was 'Yaylaid and eleven Israelis were mUl"dered. This \ViaS a hOïrible crime, anq the Couneil will understand that it aroused a wave of emotion in Israel. The Mixed Armistice Commission was, of course, at once seized of the matter and an urgent inquiry was set on foot in which the Jordan autl,;orities co-operated fully. Hàwever, for lack of conclusive evidence the Mixed Armistice Commission was unable to establish who the perpetrators of this outrage were.

Excuse me, Sir Pierson, but i think ~ arerather getting away from the task before us. It is a purely procedural question which is at issue; but I gather from your statement that you consider it necessary and possible to deal also with matters of substance, the description of events, their appraisal and the like. 18. 1 should like to ask you - and I think I am right in doing so - to keep clo~er to the subject of the discussion with which we are now concerned, and as far as possible to cl,nfine yourself to questions of a purely procedural nature. 19. Please continue. 20. Sir Pierson DIXON ("United Kingdom): We are all in the hands of the President of the Security Couneil, and I must be guided by him in this matter. What 1 w0uld submit to him is that it is often very difficult to distinguish substance from procedure, and what I am addressing myself to is essentielly a point of proc€dure, that is, explaining why, in my vieW',it is

Please continue, Sir Pierson. 22. Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom): Thank you, Mr. President. 23. I now come to a part of my statement which I should like to treat fairly fully; that is a reference to the orga.'lized attack which took place against the village of Nahhalin, in Jordan, with considerable loss of life on the night of 28-29 March. The point I should like to make is that the Mixed Armistice Commission found Israel guilty of this attack, and we well understand the indignation caused in Jordan by the attack. We consider that the Jordan Government has acted with a due sense of its international responsibilities in bringing this attack to the notice of the Security Council. 24. I most sincerely hope that no further incidents or attacks will occur while we here in the Security Couneil are considering the 1-- . J. The situation is grave enough without that. But my Govemment, which has a treaty of alliance with Jordan and which desires to preserve good relations with Israel, is very seriously concerned indeed with the situation which has developed on the borders between them. That is why my Government attaches such impor1:ance to a general consideration nf the two items before us. It was, in met, itself, as was announced by Mr. Eden in the House of Commons, considering, in conjunction with the French and United States Governments, the desirability of an early meeting . of the Security Couneil to discuss the situation. It has proved, 1 think, unnecessary for the three Governments ta take the initiative in this matter in view of the two sets of complaints which We have before us. So long as the general situation is brought before the Couneil we are content, and 1 myself can see no possible objection to the inscription of the two complaints on the Council's agenda, provicied that the Couneil can have a thorough discussion of the whole problem. 25. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): I do not relish the prospect of a procedural wrangle; I should like to avoid it, but, if I am forced into it, r shaH enter it with all the power at my disposaI and fight to the end. At this point, therefore, I shall only say that I disagree with the thesis put forward by the representative of the United Kingdom, and I hope that the Couneil will not agree wiith that thesis. 25. l'anglais): et d'y et bornerai représentant j'espère nOll 26. le sent.ant, tement jour leur Royaume-Uni une trQi§i~m'e 29. At this point, 1 can only say in passing that was none other than the representative of the United Kingdom himself, the predecessor of the present represeutative, who insisted not very long ago, in the memory of. all of us here, that another item which wau put forward by Israel should he debated separately without any reference to the larger issues. This was an item which did not entai110ss of life anr~ in w.hich there was no aggression involved. It can be shown that at the time the representative of the United Kingdom did this, he did it more or less out of order. However, was he more than anyone else who insisted then and, in fact, succeeded in getting a ruling from the President that if anydoby were to trespass on the absolutely restricted area of the item put forward by Israel, that person wouM at least be admon1shed; and it actually happened. . 30. Therefore, 1 do not think it is good form - would not speak of good politics - to act with one set of rules in February when Israel is putting forwa.rd complaint and then to make a complete about-face in April when the opposing party is putting forward complaint. 31. As 1 said a little earlier, 1 am saying aU this anly in passing. 1 am addressing myself now to item 1 of document S/Agenda/665. 1 oppose the position of the representative of the United ~ingdotnl and 1 ask the Cotincil very respectfully to accept the document such as it is and proceed in an orderly manner to the disposai of these two parts of the agenda before us.

ln the procedural debate which has just opened, the French delegation feels compelled to express its complete agreement with the views just set f"~'t!, by the United Kingdom representative. ' 34. The French delegation considers that these subdivisions (a) an.u (b) are part of the more general item, IlThe Palestine question", and that it would be wrong to prevent any delegation from dealing with either of these sub-divisions in whatever arder and nt whatever time it considers appropriate in the context of the general theme of our discussion, which is, I repeat, "The Palestine question". 35. I venture ta remind the Council that during the discussion last February on a case which is not absolutely comparable - I must differ from the Lebanese representative on that point - Ml'. Malik himself said [657thmeeting] : "Since we will treat that particular Israeli- Egyptian problem in sorne form, it is eminent1y reasonable to treat it flot from one side only, but from the side of the other party, Egypt, as weil." c1:~ qu'elle de de 35. discussion pas sentant M. En l'expression M. s'applique, actuelle. 36. Vychinsky, déclaré: M. aujourd'hui: à Jordanie 37. faisait quelques Je à quelques If we replace the words "Israeli-Egyptian" by the words "Israeli-Jordanian", Ml'. Malilc's observation of last February will apply exactly, in my view, to the present situation. 36. May I also point out that Ml'. Vysbinsky, in his statement in the same discussion, said: IlThere is therefore every justification for consideration of the question raised by Egypt simultaneously with the question raised by Israel." Ml'. Vyshinsky might similarly observe today that: "There is every justification for consideration of the question raised by Jordan simultaneously with the question raised by Israel." 37. At the same meeting, as I said a few mom'ents ago, Ml'. Vyshinsky made the fol1owing observation: "Today's agenda includes 'The Palestine question'. I ask you, does not Egypt's complaint against Israel, the details of which are given in the tw'o letters of 2 and 6 October and in the present request for inclusion of the question in the agenda, in fact form part of this same 'Palestine question' of which Israel's is another part?" 1 111ight quote Ml'. Vyshinsky again - and it is a pleasure for me to support my reasoning by his - and recall what he said a few mo~nts later: "We have before us two parties involved in one and the same dispute, although the urst party advances one set of facts and the second party another. But this is always the case with any dispute; one party puts forward his faets to substantiate bis complaint, while the other party advances other facts t0 substantiate his complaint. Why cannot we consider both at the same time?" 40. For these reasons the French delegation supports the views put forward by the United Kingdom delegation, and hopes that th~ Council and the President will agree and will permit the development of a free discussion among ail members. 41. Mr. LODGE (United States of America): The present situation in Palestine is one that must be taken very seriously. It should not he treated in a narrow procedural way which would obscure the necessity for measures not only to prevent the continuance of the disturbances but also ta look for more far-reaching solutions. 42, It seems to me that anyone who has been foIlowing recent events in Palestine, whether he is an expert on the Security Council or whether he is private citizen, would be immediately aware that there is more involyed here than findings under indlvidual complaints of violations of the Armistice Agreements. The complaints listed on the agenda cannat, in our opinion, be 'separated into airtight compartments. Let me make clear at once that the United States seriously concerned when any govern:ment, especially ar..y Member of the United Nations, bound by agree- 111ents approved by the Security Council and by its obligations under the Charter, presumes to take the law into its own hands in a policy of reprisaI and retaliatio!l. 43. We made this perfectly clear when we discussed the Qibya incident in this Coundl, and l wish ta state now that we continue ta hold this view. This repeated resort to the poiicy of reprisaI and retaliation must stop. 44. Reference has been made by severai speakers the finding of the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission concerning the attack on the village Nahhalin, which 1S in our opinion a matter of the utmost gravity, of a type clearly deserving of condemnation. But also, it 'is not enough in an affair of this kind have discussions, ta make findings and ta issue 45. It was in this connexion that the Council recognized the necessity of strengthening the Truce Supervision Organization and of considering such additional measures as might he necessary to carry out the objectives of the resolution on Qibya. 46. In our opinion it has become abundantly clear that complaints such as those included in our provisional agenda are inter-related. If we are to take constructive action whichwill be helpful to the parties themse1ves and conducive to peace in the area, We must treat them as inter-re1ated in our consideration here. This is not only a matter of principle, but it is l'eally the only practica1 way of dealing with the present situation, if the Secur~~;r Couneil is to continue to play a useful role in the mairtenance of international peace and 'Security as regards this problem. \iVhile we need not, in our opinion, be bound by precedent in snch matters as these, and while l think we should fit our procedure to the problem before us, the course of action which l propose is based on sound precedent. 47. Members of the Council will recaIl that at the 514th meeting of the Security Couneil, on 20 October 1950, the provisional agenda hea.ded "The Palestine question" had six sub-items iilVolving alleged violations of two different Armistice Agreements, and it was decided that when the Council began its debate, it would be permissible to refer to each of the sub~ items while dealing with the first. It is in that spirit that the United States approaches this debate.

As a matter of principle, l am very re1uctant to jmrticipate in a procedural debate, and l always hope that such proccdural debates will be reduced to the minimum. 49. In the present case, l am not sure what substantial advantagë can be gained by adopting one or the other procedure. As far as the precedents of the Security Council are concerned, they are mixed. Prior to the month of February 1954, there was no objection to the simu1taneous discussion of various parts of the Palestine question. During the month of February, l found myself in the minority. The majority insisted that various aspects of the Palestine question should be kept in water-tight compartments. 50. I feit that during the month of February we had set a, bad precedent. However, that is the most recent precedent, and l can understand w'hy members of the Couneil may insist that it should be foIlowed. 49. l'une tage seil le men Palestine. trouvé que soient 50. créé Cependant, peux seil 51. adopter séance, 51. Concerning our procedure on today's agenda, l am not so sure what the· difference really amounts to. l understand, furthermore, that the agenda is adopted. 52. After the adoption of the agenda, we begin the consideration of item 2(a). At the conclusion of the discussion of this item, someone may submit a draft resolu'tion on item 2(a). Another O1,Iember may say that the vote on such a draft resolution should be postponed until the con. :deration of sorne other part of the whole question. I would say that such a motion to postpone the voting on a draft resolution on one part of the question would be perfectly in order. I am not aware of any rule that would prevent such procedure. Therefore, as we proceed, we may have draft resolutions covering one part or another of the question. It is open to any member to say that the consideration of and voting on any draft resolution should be postponed to a later date. I can anticipate that there will be draft resolutions covering one point or another. I can also anticipate that there will be draft resolutions covering, let us say, item 2(œ) ii, and item 2(b) iii, or sorne such combination. I can also anticipate resolutions that will cover, let us say, points i, ii, and iii of 2(a) and points i, H, iii and iv of 2(b). AlI such draft resolutions, would be perfectly in order. 53. 1 do not know what the Chair will do on this point, and I shall not anticipate what he may do. However, 1 believe that we should get on with the question an'd start with the discussion of item 2 (a). 1 think that the various practical needs can be taken care of by our existing mIes of procedure. 54. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): 1 would still oppose the suggested procedure very strenuously. 1 do not believe that the representatives who have spoken have sufficiently taken into account the possible repereussions of such a procedure. I have no doubt that they are actuated by the best of motives; 1 have no doubt of their intentions for our part of the ·wbrld. But 1 think it would be conducive to the very result they have in mind ~ the promotion of, an atmosphere conducive to a really lasting peaceful arrangement in our part of the world - if they were to do the precise opposite of what they seem to have set their hearts upon. 55. 1 should like to make only a few remarks now. In general, 1 might say that 1 hope that all of us, now and in the immediate future, will speak calmly, dispassionaldy, reasonably, and with a sense of objectivity and justice, and, if any ouher members of the United Nations are invited to the Council table, I hope that the sarne spirit wîll prevail, 1 think that as members of the Council we can help ta create that atmosphere of peace and quiet and serenity which we aIl seek to establish in the Near East, if here, among ourselves, we at least set an example by talking with aM the se1f-restraint and reasonablemiss at our commando 57. It has been said this afternoon by Oile member of the Council that, at the time of the complaint by Israel concerning the Slllez Canal, l said that the matter had deeper and larger and broader bases and therefore should be placed within that context. That is perfectly true: l said that, and l still say it. And l do not at aIl doubt the connexion between 2(œ) and 2(b) of our present agenda. But the difficulty facing those who wish to base their arguments or what l said a month and a half ago, and who \VQnt ta adduce an analogy therefrom with respect ta the present situation, is twofold, and l would request them very sinœ- l'ely ta think about this difficulty. 58. First of aU, when l appealed ta them a month and a haH agJ they did not acquiesce in my appeal. Consequently it does not seem consistent for any member who opposed the larger context within which the Suez Canal dispute ought ta have been placed to say now: "WeIl, l was free then to oppose it, but noV\" l am free also to change my mind." Either we are aIl consistent and what we did then we do now, or certainly it cannat be argued at aIl from my request then, which was turned down, that l ought now to make the same request or that l ought now to accept a similar request made by other rnembers. 59. But that is not the only difficulty - that they then refused this request and that therefore they cannat now appeal to it to prove that l should go along with them. There is something deeper than that, and it is simply this: we are dealing now, as sorne of the representatives have said, with an act of aggression which has been committed and which has been condemned by the competent organ of the United Nations. We were not dealing with such an act at the time of the Suez Canal dispute. There was no loss of life then; there Wias no gun pointed at anybody. 60. We may therefore say, in connexion with th~s argument as a whole - and l think it would be weIl for aIl of us to weigh the matter, for this is a principle which l may have occasion ta repeat and stress severa! times in the coming days - that you cannot, .at the point of a gun, either force the Arabs into a general debate or force them ta gather around the conference table. You cannat do it. First remove the gun and the threat of the gun, and then you may, wiûh perfect grace, ask them ta do what you want them to do. As soon as Qibya occurred, there was a movement ta bring them around the table ta discuss the I$.tter. Now another Qibya has occurred, and again there is the sa1lle movement to bring them to the table to discuss the incident. You cannot - without blushing - try to force the Arabs either to enter intQ ;;\. general debate

l hope, Mr. Malik will e.'{cuse me; but it seems to me that he aIsa is departing somewhat from the real subject of our discussion. May l ask him, as l did Sir Pierson Dixon, ta keep more closely ta the procedural question? 63. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): l certainly will abide by the President's wish. l do not want to depart from the point under discussion. l shall therefore ,::onclude by saying that, in view of what l have stated and in view of the situation which exists at present in the Near East, it WlOuld be far better to dispose first of item 2(a) on our agenda, dispose of methodically and expeditiously, and then turn ta any other items that you may want ta examine, whether they are items put forward by Israel or new items that other representatives may wish to have placed on the agenda. 64. l therefore stick to my point that it would not be at all helpful for the very pûrposes that the members around this table have in mlind - l am sure they have in mind the same purposes that l have - ta adopt the procedure that has been suggested. In my humble judgment, we should dispose of item 2(a) in a quick and orderly manner, withouf any ambiguity, and then tum to the other items on the agenda. Therefore, l once again ask the Council not to adopt the thesis put forward by the representatives of the United Kingdom, France and the United States, but to adopt this agenda and proceed in the order in which these two items appear on the agenda. l assure the Council that would be the best way of handHng this question. 65. Mr. GaUTHIER (Brazil): Once again the Security Council is considering, under the general heading "The Palestine question", particular issues dealing with the violation of the Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan. l do not wish to minimize the importance of the complaints lodged by the conflicting pa:rdes, but may l point out that the consideration of cases of this kind is unfortunately becoming a kind of routine, a very sad routine indeed? As each incident is brought to the attention of the Council, one or the other of the parties concerned becom~s a defendant 66. l would even contend that the political situation and the unrest in the Middle East w:ill not he c1arified by tackling the individual cases instead of approaching the problem as a whole. l wonder whether now' is not the time to revise our aproach to the bas;': e1ements responsible for such conflicts. 67. With regard to the agenda under consideration, we have heard the opinions of several representatives concerning the best way of conducting the debate. As we understand it, there are two different points of view. Sorne memhers would prefer an over-all discussion of the matters contained in items 2(a) and 2(b) of document S/Agenda/66S, with the memhers picking and choosing as they please in the course of the discussion. The representative of Lebanon, on the other hand, wishes his complaint on behalf of the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan to be discussed first and separJ:tely, because he considers that it is an entire1y different matter. 68. Our attitude on this question is based on a desire, shared, l am sure, by aIl the members of the Council, to be as impartial as possible, since we know that sometimes even the procedure for the adoption of the agenda has been the subject of insinuations concerning the outlook of the Council. If, however, an agreement cannot be reached on the way in which the discussions should proceed, and if, indeed, the incompatibility of views between the representative of Lebanon and the other representatives persists, perhaps we might try another approach, besides the one suggested by the representative of China. 69. Logkally viewing the agenda, we might divide the issues before us into two main gro'ups - frontier conflicts and armed incidents on the one hand, and implementation of the machinery of the Armistice Agreement on the other. The First group would include the Jordanian and Israeli complaints of the infringement of the General Armistice Agreement. It would deal with acts of hostility, attacks, retaliation, killings and property damage on one side or the other of the demarcation line, since they are c1early the result of the unfortunate sequence of incidents which are taking place with increasing frequency in that region, and some of them have the character· of reprisaIs. The conflicts referred to in points i and iv of the Israel complaint could be inc1uded in the second group. Point i refers to Jordan's refusaI to attend the conference convoked by the Secretary-General, and point iv refers to Jordan's refusaI to co-operate in the establishment of a: special committee composed of representatives of Jordan and Israel, for the purpose of enlarging the sc~pe of the General Armistice Agreement and effecting an improvement in the application of that Agreement. Those cases are simila.r in nature. 71. If the Council were to group subjects for discussion, it would perhaps be desirable if no member of the Council or rep' ~sentative of the parties involved were preduded from referring in their explanations to sorne aspects of the whole Palestine question. 72. l submit those ideas only as suggestions. My desire is to explore the possibility of narrowing the gap between the conflicting views on the way in which the discussion should proceed. 73. Mr. MUNRO (New Zealand): There has been sorne reference to the events of February, and l think, therefore, {hat l should intervene briefly in this procedural debate. 74. l have re-read the record of the discussion which the Security Council hélid on 4 February [657th meeting] concerning the adoption of the provisional agenda, which included Israel's complaint of restrictions on shipping in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba and Egypt's complaint regarding certain events at El Auja. l cannot find in that record, nor can l recall, any statement in which l, as representative of New Zealand, took a position on the procedural question tht::.tt under discussion. At that time, l w'as President of the Security Council, and it will be recalled that the Council was conside,ring the inclusion of two complaints contained in the provisional agenda, not. the simultaneot!s discussion of those two complaints. 75. The United States representatives proposed that the two complaints should be included in the agenda but that they should be discussed in turn, not simultaneously. At the request of certain members of the Council, l gave an indication of the position which l, as President, should take if the United States proposaI were adopted and representatives indulged in a simultaneous discussion of the two complaints. At a subsequent meeting, l interrupted both the representative of Israel and the representative of Egypt to question the relevance of certain remarks; l did that in accordance with what l understood had been accepted at the previous meeting as the proper procedure. On no occasion, however, did l express an opinion on the desirabilityor undesirability of discussing the two complaints simultaneously. 76. My delegation favours the proposaI made by the United Kingdom representative for the simultaneous discussion of items 2(a) and 2(b) of the provisional agenda for this meeting. This procedure will provide the opportunity for a timely examination of the functioning of the machinery established under the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan. 77. l know that the representative of Lebanon has insisted that that procedure has not always been adopted. 79. Tt is now a matter of common knowledge that a state of tension exists along the demarc~tion line between Israel and Jordan, and the complain1:s before the Council reflect that state of affairs. In my opinion the situatic, caUs for a careful and, may l say, a balanced study by the Council, and the joint discussion of the two complaints will permit of this. 80. Nothing l have said has been meant to imply, or can fairly be interpreted as implying, a lack of concem over the issues raised in the complaints submitted by Lebanon. On the contrary, the positior. which my delegation takes on the question of procedure reflects our very genuine concem over the occurrence of the events which form bhe basis of the <:omplaints on the provisional agenda. As we see it, the objective of this Council must be, if we are to be effective, to seek to avoid the recurrence of such events. Vife are no longe... dealing with a single, isolated incident or, for that matter, with two or three incidents, but, rather, with a state of affairs holding the possibility of serious developments. 81. To meet this situation the Council must, in our opinion, l repeat, examine the situation disclosed by these events as a whole and, in particular, examine the functioning of the Armistice Agreement, and it is for aIl these reasons that my delegation favours the general discussion of the two complaints.

l think that our past experience durillg the discussion of the item on the Palestine question has clearly shown that it is not always possible for a speaker ta remain '" 'thin the narrow limits of an agenda sub-item. The representative of New Zealand has called our attention to the fact that as President of the Coundl he had on two occasions, to interrupt the representative of Israel, and the representative of Egypt who simply could not remain within the narrow limits of the agenda sub-item. The then President had to do that because there was a decision of the Council to that effect. 83. During my term as President in March l, too, had to perform the unpleasant duty of interrupting and calling to order the representative of Lebanon. He, tao, could not remain within the strictly narrow limits of the agenda sub-item. Those are fads. 84. l do not think that it is neœssary to rnake a formaI motion that these two sub-items should be discussed generaUy. My delegation favours a joint discussion out, as l have just said, l do not think that it is necessary ta make a forma! motion and to take a vote on it, l ~omplete agreement. There is nothing in the premise of either the representative of Brazil, the representative of New Zealand, or the representative of Turkey - or even of the representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the United States - with which I do Dot thoroughly agree. But I do not agree with their conclusions in this particular instance. I do not agree that, for the sake of promoting peace in that particular area, the premises which they advance are proper ones. 87. I should like to repeat nif arguments, and I should !ike ta hear them refuted objectively. I appeal to reason. I think that ~ position is reasonable. If it is not, 1 should like it to he shown to be unreasonablè hefore the Council makes a decision. It is all very well to come here and say: this is our national poliey; take it or leave it. But the very idea of the Council is that we SMuId argue, that we should try to conVÏnce each other. There should be sorne give and take; there should he flexibility in our positions. Otherwise, why do we not just meet and vote on these questions immediately? 88. l put forward certain arguments wl1ich have not been refuted. :L argued that we were dealing hcre with the Nahhalin incident, an incident which has been acted uponby the competent organ of the Uriited Nations. Our complaint was presented in due order and in the proper manner. Everyone. a.t this table k-nows that the complaints which Israel submitted five days later were submitted as an afterthought. Everyone knows that the idea was to drown the Nahhalin incident. l can quote passage after passage from Israeli newspapers about t1:-.J8 point, passage a.fter passage Îrom the words of friends and sympathizers outside of Israel. There can he no doubt - and l put this fra.nkly to all of us - in the mind of anyone on this Council that the batch of complaints which Israel brought forward on 5 April, and all the manœuvres since that date, wei'e designed precisely to drown the NahhaJ.in incident. It was not possible to drown Qibya, but an atterilpt is now being m.:tde directly from the highest policy-makers of Israel to drown this ne'lJ" incident. It would not be fair for the Çouneil to go along with that attempt. Tt is not _fair to drown l'- Nahhalin in all these other c{Jmplaints which, as l say, can he taken up at the appropriate time by the Couneil. -==:::=:i::::~~=:~""œ a~' a matter of f(tet, when the opinion of the representative of Egypt was being discussed it was 1 who asked for a general debate, but my request was refused for reasons that are still beyond my understauding. It is a11 very weU to have a general debate, but let us not have it at the wrong t~me on the wrong topic. We are dealing now with a gun whicb has been pointed and which has brought about the death of a number of people, and concernbg which one of the two parties ta the dispute has been condemned by the appropriate organ of the United Nations. If, at this point, VITe wake up and say, now let us discuss this whole thing, its causes and the general situation, and let us see whether we cannot arrive at far-reaching solutions, as one representative said this afternoon, if such a course is taken when sucb an assault has occurred, what are we to conclude other than that the whole thing was intended precisely to bring about this very result and that the l'est of us have quite innocently fallen in with that intention? Is that not the most elementary conclusion which car. he drawn from this conduct? 90. Therefore, it is not a question of what is to be discussed in the general debate; ft is a question of the discussion at this particular point on this particular incident, which must first be disposed of by the Council before it can with propriety taIre up these other matters, inc1uding the general debate. 91. 1 said furthermore - and 1 repeat this - that it was impossible to force anybody with any selfrespect into a general debate, or to the conference table, at the point of a gun. lt is impossible to do that. 92. Finally, 1 would say that, if a general debate is begun on this matter, it would mean, embarking on something whose beginning may he fathomed but whose end may not be foreseen. How can anyone know that we do not have our own additional items that we should like to place on the agenda in tbis general debate? Has anyone said that we ourselves do not have a list? Let me mention one item on that list, one that it is important for aU of us to think about. It is an item which must appear whenever the question of a general debate is mentioned, especially if it should take place at this point: the matter of the economic and other assistance which one party to this dispute is. receiving tram the outside. 93. This is pan of the general debate if you reaUy want ta press it and force it now because this is certainly as important a point in the total picture. You want to see the total picture and 1 we1come seei.::.lg the total picture at the appropriate time. However, once you begin that, how do you know that Vl'e will not submit a question on the economic and other help which one party to this dispute is receiving from outside? 94. 1 have given these as reasons and l W(l'lt them to he refuted. For aIl these reasons, l still believe it is 95. In conclnsion, sinct this is a l:uarp issue concerning which a number of new points have been put forward, unless the Council is absolutely prepared to take a decision in this connexion, it may be the wisest thing for all concerned not ta be too hasty about it and to allow a little more time for reflection, so that we might meet and talœ it up after we have îreshly reconsidered it, aIl of us, in our own minds and consciences. l leave this last point entirely in the hands of the President. But t think that this is an issue of such importance that it cannot be decided too hastily by the Council. 96. Ml'. BORBERG (Denmark) : l am not a man of Iaw and l have a very primitive mind. l start my reasoning in this matter on the basis of the Charter which authorizes the Security Council to deal with matters with respect to the maintenance of peace and the re-establishment of peace if war has broken out. Therefore, when l look upon a question even of procedure, l have at the back of my mind this fundamental idea and princip!e. 97. l have come to the conclusion that the deterioration of conditions between Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan is such that we should not confine ourselves to the very regrettable cases brought here, but that we should have the, possibility of examining the problem in its wider aspect. l am therefore iq favour of the way of approach suggested by the representative of the United Kingdom. 98. The PRESIDENT (translated from R-ussia.n): May l ask the Lebanese representadve whether his last statement, in which he asked the Security Council not ta be too precipitate and to consider carefuIly the proposaIs which have been submitted - or at least mentioned - before taking any decision, is to be understood as a proposaI that the Council should adjourn its proceedings at this point and postpone further consideration of this item and the decision on it uiltil our ne:t meeting? 1 18 99. Does the Turkish representative wish to speak on a point of order or on the substance of the item?

l wish to speak on a point of order. l think we should at least adopt the provisional agenda. 101. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): l think that the representative of Turkey is right. l think aIl of us can agree on and adopt the agenda. With respect to this other point which the President has put to mewhether it is my intention to request the Council not to take a decision on this issue now - l will make this request if the President does not construe it to mean that he should put it to the vote im!mediately. The menlbers of the Security Council should be aIlowed to expres~ their opinion on it.

The representative of France wishes to speak. Before I call upon him, however, may I draw the Lehanese representative's attention to the rules of procedure by which we are hound to he guided? 104. Rule 33 of the rùles of procedure, as representatives know, is the rule governing proposals concerning the order of discussion and the consideration of such proopsals. The Lebanese representative is not making a formaI proposaI, but he has submitted to the Security Couneil a request which, while it is not a formai request, is nevertheless essentially a proposaI. If such a proposaI has been made, I shall be bound to put it to the vote without further debate on the point raised by the Lebanese representative. We are bound ta aet in accordance with rule 33 of the rules of procedure. 105. If the Lebanese representative says that he is making not a proposaI, but a request, I sha11 not apply rule 33 of the rules of procedure. If he says that he is making a proposaI in the farm of a request to the members of the Security Couneil, I shall be bound to apply rule 33 of the rules of procedure. 106. May I therefore ask the Lebanese representative to clarify his position? 107. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): I would be .;2ry happy to hear other members who want to speak on this point. I can only repeat what I have l;!.lreaqy said, that the Security Couneil will be putting me in a difficult position because the only item that I am prepared to consider is the first item which my delegation submitted. I am only asking the Couneil to postpone until our next meetIng a deeision on the arder or the mode of consideration of this agenda. I base my request on the argument which I have raised a..l1d which nobody has refuted. These are very important questions and it would be better ta begin '!Vith a semblance of agreement rather than with this serious disagreement which has deve1oped. Therefore, it is only a normal request that I am making of the CouneiI. 108. The reason I did not put it in the form of a formaI motion is becéi.use I thought that sorne members of the Security Couneil might at least wish to express some opinion on t.llls POi:dt. But if no other members desire to express an opinion, I will, at the appropriate moment, put it in the form of a motion. I shaH then have one or two other statements to make. 109. Mr. HOPPENOT (France) (translated fro'1n French): I had asked to speak immediately after the Turkish representative in arder ta say that I associated myself fully with the sentiment he had expressed, namely 111. Mr. Malik tells us that he would not he able ta vote if the Council were called upon ta adopt this agenda today. That is a statement - 1 do not wish ta cali it a threat - whose precise implications 1 do not understand. We have met here, at the request and in response to the urgent appeal of Lebanon, ta discuss a question. For nearly two and a half hours we have been considering the inclusion of that question in our agenda. 1 think our minds are made up. If that were not the case, it would be for: one of us, and not for the originator of the complaint, ta request an adjournment. 1t seems normal ta me - ta use ~ term the meaning of which we have sometimes discussed with Mr. Malik - that the Council should vote today on placing on the agenda items 2 (a) and 2 (b) of the provisional agenda which has been circulated to us.

Perhaps it would help to simplify the situation to sorne extent if l tried to sum up the practicai ,proposaIs at present before the Security Counci1 in connexion with the consideration of the question of thé agenda. l shall try t? be very brief. 113. The first proposaI on the provisional agenda was made by the United Kingdom representative, who suggested that items 2 (a) and 2 (b) should he considered simu1taneously in conjunction, or as he put it, as a generai question. The Lebanese representative opposed this suggestion and urged that the agenda should be adopted in the order in which it stands as the provisionai agenda, that is, that item 2 (QI), with its points i, H, and iii and item 2 (b), with its points i, ii, iii, and iv should be considered separately. 114. A third proposaI was made: that the Council should simply proceed to consider the second item and should Ieave the remaining points - that is, the scope of the discussion on the question and its possible extension beyond the bounds of the particular confict to which the item relates - to be decided by further developments. This would probably have involved a rather difficult course of action, though a course of action which in any event would have been quite pleasing to ~he President of the Security Council, who would have had ta control these discussions, a task which l would not refuse. 115. A fourth proposaI was advanced by the representative of Brazil, who suggested that th~ discussion shüuld be conducted according to the arder of .the sub-items, but after they had been rearranged. In other words, he suggested the possibility of removing from item (b) those points which relate to item (QI), the whole of which has to do with the various conflicts 121. 1 have ventured to take up the Council's time in order to try to define our position in relation ta the discussion on this procedural question. The procedural question, in my view, is an important question, since in sorne degree it defines the direction of the entire ensuing discussion. Accordingly, the Council should not approach the question as though it were one of no importance. 122. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): It is important, as 1 suggested earlier this afternoon, that none of us be, provoked in any way by anything or by anybody. 1 shaH do my utmust to abide by that simple 119. Surprise has been expressed that, after a twohour debate, an item which was submitted by one of .the members of the Security Council as a. matter of urgency may remain undecided, even so far as it relates to the adoption of the agenda. In my view there is nothing extraordinary or supernaturaI about that;. for the views that have been expressed have been so varied that 1 frankly think we need to think them over. In particular, 1 shou1d like to reserve the right as representative of the USSR, not as President of the Security Council, to think more carefully and more fully over the proposaIs which have been made at this meeting. 120. In view of the fact that even the sponsor of the complaint, who emphasizes its urgency, believes that the matter will not he decided in a couple of days, it seems to me that the Council has no jusHfication for refusing to give consideration to the Lebanese representative's request. In any event, the Council will not be able to decide this question finally until it is sufficiently clear on the situation at present before us. 123. FurtherlI'ore, two statement were made: that what l had said was "surprising", and that l had issued a threat. l issued no threat, and nothing that l said can reasonably be considered "surprising". 124. What did l really say? l said l was fully prepared to embark upon the urgent examination of the item that we had submitted for the agenda. Let me repeat that: l am absolutely prepared right now to start the debate on the item that we placed on the agenda of the Security Council. But nowhere did l say that l requested urgently the drowlling and the suffocation of that item by the CounciI. It is that which is surprising: the move to drown ~nd suffocate what we are fully prepared to examine immediately and urgently. 125. Therefol'e, when l hear this afternoon from certain members of the Council that we are to embark on a debate on "the whole problem", that we ought to seek "far-reaching solutions" of the problem - when l am faced with this new point by representatives around this table - l have every right'to say that this is an entirely new point of departure and that l am not prepared to take a decision on a point, which we heard about only after three o'clock this afternoon. l am fully prepared to have this document, which has been in my hands for a few days, adopted as our agenda. But what l am not prepared for today - and members of the Council should certainly sympathize with me on this - is to discuss "the whole problëm" and seek "far-reaching solutions", 126. l cannot take part in a debate on this entire1y new question of procedure, and, since this entirely new approach alters altogether our preparations for and our expectations of this debate, l can only humbly and sincerely request the Councilsince it is the Council or, rather, certain members of the Council who have suggested this new approach - that in all fairness l be given, and the Council be given, some time to think about this new point which has arisen only his afternoon, the point that in this debate - and l am quoting what sorne of the members have said - we 3hould discuss the whole problem and we should seek far-reaching solutions. 127. Neither Inor any of my colleagues who are interested in this issue are prepared or attthorized to even accept this - ::I:lld that is quite understandableand thus to commit ourse1ves to take part in a discussion on a point which was brought to our attention only this afternoon, a point entitled "the whole problem 129. 1 am being asked ta make a decision here and now to alter the whole perspective of the debate, the presuppositions of the debate, the whole end-in-view of the debate, a decision by which far-reaching solt'lll:ions would be sought for what has been called "the whole problem of Palestine". This, obviously, l am not prepared to do, and unless any member of the Couneil came to this meeting with an absolute assurance that this was going to he the fact, l doubt whether any member of this Council is prepared to embark upon this question in these terms. 130. To summarize, l am in favour of the suggestion of the representative of Turkey concerning the adoption of the agenda which appears in SIAgenda/665, but 1 think that, in all fairness, the Council should not take any step beyond the mere adoption of the agenda.

May 1 point out that at the very beginning of today's meeting of the Security Council, when 1 raised the qùestion of the adoption of the agenda, 1 asked the members of the Council whether they had ariy objections or observations to make on that very 'question: th~ adoption of the agenda of today's meeting. As there were no observations, 1 was on the peint of announcing it as a decision of the Security Couneil that the agenda of the meeting was adopted. 132. However, a number of representatives took the floor and proceeded to speak on the second item, on the order of discussion of the questions set forth in the agenda. 133. 1 feel that that ta some extent complicated the position; but the last statement made by the Lebanese representative, who is the sponsor of item 2 (Œ) of the' agenda, "Complaint by Lebanon on behalf of the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordom", has to some extent clarified the situation. Accordingly 1 suggest that the two questions -- the question of the adoption of the agenda and the question of the adoption of an' order of discussion of the various points in the agenda - should be dealt with separately. 134. The Lebanese representative's request to the Couucil ta refrain from considering the second item today, althoughhe refuses to put it in official form as a formaI proposaI, constitutes a' proposaI on his part, a proposaI to postpone the question until the next 137. There are no objections. 138. Accordingly, 1 caII upon the Couneil ta deeide the first point; ta approve the agenda as it stands in document S/Agenda/665. Are there any objections ta that proposaI? 139. There are no objections; the matter is therefore settled. 140. 1 took it for granted, of course, that the consecutive interpretation would he given; that is our general rule. However, l repeat what 1 have already said, and 1 ask the interpreters ta interpret that observation also. Hence there is absolutely no room for any misunderstanding on the point. 1 am not adjourning the meeting. 141. 1 again note that there are no objections to the adoption of the agenda. Accordingly, the agenda is adopted. 1 ask that that he interpreted. Before the consecutive interprefQltWn 01 the above t"entarks W(lJS given the fol~owing discwssion look place: 142. Mr. HOPPENOT (France) (Dran;$lat~d from Frt#tch) : The President cannot announce that there are no objections ta the agenda before his speech has had a consecutive interpretation. 143. The PRESIDENT (DransliÙed from Rwssian): 1 merely wish ta point out that the interpretation has been given. We have aIl heard il. Only the consecutive interpretation has not heen made. If the Council wishes, we shall hear the consecutive interpretation. The consecutive interpretation was then given. 144. Mr. HOPPENOT (France) (trOlnslated from French) : 1 understand from what the President bas just said, that the adoption of the provisio>lal agenda does not in any way prejudge either the aider in which the items on that agenda will he discussed or the possibility of dealing with items 2 (a) and 2 (b) in the same speech 01'. the same discussion, and that these :!:wo points will he left for deeision at our next meeting. Subject to this reseryation 1 am pre,pared to vote this eve7.1ing for the adoption - whieh seems ta me rather theoretical, but the President has himself reca1led tha.t it is a compromise - of document S/Agenda/665.

Since Mr. Hoppenot's question is addressed to me, l may say that my understanding of the matter is as follows: if it is decided today to postpone consideration of the question of the order in which the items should he taken until the Council's next meeting, then one or another decision will he taken at that meeting after due discuS'sion.

My understanding of the matter is that when the agenda is adopted, the order in which the items stand on that agenda is also adopted. If at the same time a decision is made - to consider the question of the arder of the items separately - the Security Couneil is of course free to consider that question and make another decision which may either confirm or change the order in which the items appear. In that respect the Security Council is of course free. 148. Mr. HOPPENOT (France) (frOAM1(J)ted from Fren'ch): 1 am afraid that 1 3..tï1 still not making myself understood. Tt is not a question of priority. 1 shall try to put the question in another way. Will the Council, after the vote we are going ta take today, still he completely free at the next meeting ta combine the two parts of this agenda, as has been proposed by various speakers, inc1uding my United Kingdom colleague? In other words, shaIl we be free? Will the first item we consider at the next meeting be precisely our United Kingdom colleague's proposa! or, perhaps, that of our Braûlian colleague?

1 must repeat, Mr. Hoppenot, that 1 think 1 understood you correctly, and 1 should he very glad if our relations in that respect were mutuaIif you understood me just as well and just as correctly. 150. Two proposaIs are advanced. One of them is to adopt the agenda. The second proposalperhaps 1 have misunderstood the Lebanese representative's proposaI, but this is my understanding of it - is that we should postpone till the next meeting the question whether these items should if ;:>cussed in connexion with the Palestine question a:, " w; ole. That, of course, is a proposaI affecting only the l' .,x~durefor discussion. dre 151. If that is so, then it also implies an answer to the question whether the Security Council is free to take any other decision - a decision that these questiom: should be combined, bl'Oken up or divided in some other way. AlI that will depend on the Security Council's decision. 152. Consequently, if this question is postponed, the agenda for the next meeting will he ta consider that very matter of the order or method of dealing with the points included in the agenda as it stands. ]56. The Lebanese representative, then said that he agreed with representatives who had supported the adoption of the agenda, but with the proviso that the question of the order, the method. the manner in which t-he discussion should take placeshould he deferred to the next meeting. 157. In accordance with my dutY as President, 1 submitted the two alternatives to the Security Council for its decision. 158. The United Kingdom representative, if 1 uoderstood him rightly, has just said that, since it is now past 6 p.m. and the Council's normal time-limit has accordingly been\, overstepped, 'and since' in addition he now has sorne doubt whether the. question of the adoption of the agenda can he decided today; the entire question should be postponed to the next meeting. 162. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): There is to he a meeting tomorrow Qfth~Disarmament Commission, 159. If 1 have uilderstood the position correctly, 1 ask the Council vl'hether there are any objections to not adopting the agenda today, and whether it is agreed that that questio!,', together with the question of the order of discussion of the item, should be postponed to our next meeting. 160: If there are no obsel,rations, 1 shaH consider the decision adopted. 1t was so decided. 161. 'rhe PRESIDENT (trarnslaJted from RusSÙJJnI) : Now the question of the date of our next meeting arises. Are there any proposaIs? l caIl first upon the member. of the Couneil who submitted item 2 (a).

We can meet either on Saturday or on Monday. That depends on the Security Council. I take it that the last proposaI is that the meeting should he adjourned until Monday, 12 April, at 3 p.m. l t was so decided. The meeting rose a~ 6.20 p.m.