S/PV.6737 Security Council

I have the honour to present the 90-day report of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), in accordance with paragraph 18 (h) of the same resolution. The report covers the period from 21 December 2011 to 20 March 2012. During the reporting period, the Committee held one informal consultation, on 29 February 2012. The Committee also continued to perform its duties through informal contacts and exchanges and the no-objection procedure envisioned by paragraph 15 of the guidelines for the conduct of its work. During the informal consultations of 29 February, the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts briefed the Committee on the Panel’s activities since December 2011. The Panel conducted visits and held a series of consultations, listed in the annex, and submitted three reports regarding reported incidents, as well as a fourth quarterly assessment of Member States’ implementation reports. Committee members exchanged views on a number of issues, including on the three reports submitted by the Panel, the publication of the Panel’s 2011 final report, the need for an effective and diligent response of the Committee to sanctions violations, and the open briefing of the Chair to be held soon, with the participation of the Panel. Some Member States expressed concern regarding the illicit transfers of arms between Iran and Syria, documented by the reports notified to the Committee. A Member State drew the attention of the Committee to a public statement of the Secretary- General of Hizbullah dated 7 February, in which he acknowledged that his movement had received material support in all possible and available forms from Iran since 1982, while recognizing that in the past his movement had remained silent when asked about financial and military support. With respect to the implementation assistance notices previously drafted by the Panel at the request of the Committee, some Committee members expressed hope that the notices could be soon finalized. A Member State raised the issue of the Panel’s travel arrangements. Members also heard a briefing from the delegation of France on the similarities between ballistic and space technologies. During the reporting period, the Committee continued its consideration of the draft annual report for 2011. During the reporting period, the Committee received a communication about a reported violation of paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), which imposes a ban on the export and procurement of all arms and related materiel from the Islamic Republic of Iran. In a note verbale dated 9 January 2012, a Member State provided information on the results of inspections carried out on material confiscated from a truck on 15 February 2011 at a border gate with Syria. In a letter dated 28 February 2012, four Member States submitted a report regarding a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1929 (2010) on the launch of the Navid satellite into space using Iran’s Safir space launch vehicle as announced by Iran on 3 February 2012. In a letter dated 22 February, a Member State provided information on interdictions of three consignments. The Committee also received a letter dated 3 January from a Member State, providing information on the inspection of the Panel of Experts in that State on 18 and 19 November 2011 regarding a previously reported incident. On 27 December 2011, the Committee received a note verbale from a Member State containing a notification with reference to paragraph 5 of resolution 1737 (2006) concerning the transfer to Iran of items “intended for nuclear power plants with a light-water reactor”. The Committee also received a note verbale dated 1 March 2012 from a Member State transmitting a notification in accordance with paragraph 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) and paragraph 4 of resolution 1747 (2007). Furthermore, the Committee received from a Member State a note verbale dated 22 February 2012, indicating that its citizens and residents, as well as entities based in that Member State, should address their de-listing requests to the Committee directly through the focal points. The Committee also received a letter dated 6 March in which a Member State proposed, in accordance with paragraph 26 of resolution 1929 (2010), the designation of two Iranian individuals and an Iranian entity identified following a violation previously reported to the Committee. On 6 March 2012, responding to a query from the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the Committee sent a letter providing clarifications regarding the sanctions regime imposed on Iran under resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1929 (2010) and humanitarian activities. On 30 January 2012, the Committee responded to the note verbale dated 9 January 2012, which reported a violation of paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), as I referred to earlier. The Committee continued its consideration of a reported inspection and seizure, on 28 August 2010, of a container onboard the vessel MS Finland, with a view to sending letters to six Member States. In relation to the issue of national implementation, I would like to note that on 30 January 2012, the Panel of Experts transmitted to the Committee, in accordance with paragraph 1 (b) (i) of the Committee’s work programme, a quarterly assessment of the implementation reports submitted by Member States pursuant of paragraph 31 of resolution 1929 (2010), for the period from 1 November 2011 to 31 January 2012. On the same issue, I am happy to note that during the reporting period the Committee received communications from Turkmenistan and Armenia transmitting their respective reports on the implementation of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1929 (2010). That concludes my report on the work of the Committee.

I thank Ambassador Osorio for his briefing this morning. I shall now give the floor to the members of the Council.

I would like to thank Ambassador Osorio for his report. Iran’s illicit nuclear programme presents a grave threat to international peace and security. Today we are confronted with an unsustainable and dangerous status quo. Without swift and serious progress to resolve the international community’s doubts about Iran’s nuclear programme, there will be further instability in an already tense region. Since our last meeting (see S/PV.6607), the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has released yet another report that once again affirms that Iran is not complying with its international nuclear obligations and is not cooperating fully with the IAEA. The Director General reports that Iran is continuing to make progress on its nuclear programme. Iran has begun to enrich uranium to the near 20 per cent level at the previously covert Fordo fuel-enrichment plant, which is buried in a hardened bunker underground near Qom. Iran has tripled its capacity to produce such uranium, which is much closer to being weapons-grade. In spite of good-faith outreach by the IAEA, Iran has chosen to stonewall it, rather than to offer any real cooperation. Iran twice denied IAEA requests to visit a nuclear facility at Parchin, where the Director General reported that Iran may have conducted high-explosive tests related to the development of a nuclear weapon. We all know what full cooperation with the IAEA looks like. This is not even minimal cooperation. The Director General’s latest report illustrates Iran’s continued disregard for the Council’s clear demands, most notably that it suspend all enrichment- related and reprocessing activities and heavy-water related activities. The Security Council must therefore take the necessary steps to hold Iran accountable. The Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and its Panel of Experts are critically important to this effort. Both the Committee and the Panel must fully and robustly carry out their mandates, including by implementing the Panel’s recommendations and responding to reported sanctions violations. Better implementation of existing sanctions can help to slow down Iran’s nuclear progress, affording the world more time to resolve our concerns. We therefore welcome the 1737 Committee’s meeting last month to discuss sanctions violations and to receive a briefing on certain Iranian ballistic missile- related activities that are being conducted in violation of resolution 1929 (2010). We are pleased to see that there has been some progress on the Committee’s response to reported sanctions violations over the past 90 days, although more needs to be done. We are alarmed that a majority of the violations reported to the Committee involved illicit transfers of arms and related material from Iran to Syria, where the Al-Assad regime is using them to violently repress the Syrian people. We urge the Committee to impose targeted sanctions on individuals and entities found to be involved in sanctions violations. We appreciate the Panel’s ongoing efforts and look forward to its upcoming final report and recommendations. My Government remains seriously concerned that the Panel’s 2011 final report has not yet been released to the full membership of the United Nations. Ten months have passed since the report was submitted. There is simply no excuse for members to continue to delay and obstruct its release. We strongly urge that this issue be resolved before our next meeting. The United States remains determined to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, and we remain committed to doing so through a comprehensive diplomatic approach that includes substantive engagement and unprecedented pressure. As part of that strategy, on 6 March the European Union High Representative, on behalf of the P5+1, offered to resume talks with Iran as part of a sustained process that leads to real progress in resolving our longstanding concerns with Iran’s nuclear programme. Political directors of the P5+1 held a preparatory meeting in Brussels yesterday, and efforts are under way to schedule the next round soon. It is our firm view that resolving this issue will require Iran to come to the table quickly and seriously to discuss, in a forthright way, how to establish that the intentions of its nuclear programme are, as it claims, peaceful. There are verifiable steps that Iran can take to be in compliance with its obligations. Such steps would provide the world assurance that Iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapon. The question is whether, in the upcoming negotiations, Iran shows itself to be moving clearly and credibly in that direction. We and our partners remain ready to engage with Iran on the basis of the framework proposed by the P5+1. We will continue to work closely with our partners in the international community, including on the Council and the 1737 Committee, on this critical issue.

I would like to thank Ambassador Osorio for his quarterly briefing and for his effective chairmanship of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006). The Security Council has once again taken up a very worrying report from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The report underscores that Iran is continuing to refuse to honour its international commitments and to meet the demands of the Security Council and of the IAEA Board of Governors. The Agency also points out once again that it is not possible for it to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is intended for peaceful purposes. Iran is continuing its uranium enrichment activities, at 3.5 and 20 per cent, as well as its heavy- water-related project, in violation of its obligations under resolutions adopted by the Council and in the absence of credible civilian purpose. Iran has begun to produce uranium enriched to 20 per cent at its underground facility at Fordo, which, let us remember, had been concealed for many years. That is an alarming development to which we, along with our German, British and American partners, drew the Council’s attention in January. Iran’s increased capacity to produce enriched uranium beyond 3.5 per cent clearly brings it very close to military levels. The IAEA also expresses great concern about the possible military dimension of Iran’s nuclear programme. In its report of 8 November 2011, it details Iran’s activities specifically tied to nuclear arms. We regret that, despite two visits by the Agency, Iran has refused to give it access to all necessary documents, people and sites. That refusal is contrary to the demands formulated by the IAEA Board of Governors in November. We especially regret that IAEA inspectors were not authorized to visit the military site in Parchin. We are also concerned by reports from the Agency that several kilos of natural uranium metal may have been diverted. Beyond nuclear issues, other Iranian actions in violation of Council resolutions compound our concern. Iran is improving its ballistic capacities, including under cover of its space programme. France, along with the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany, notified the Committee of a satellite launched on a Safir rocket on 3 February — yet another Iranian violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1929 (2010). We are also deeply concerned about the weapons that Iran continues to distribute in violation of Council resolutions, threatening the security of its neighbours and of an already unstable region. I am particularly concerned about Syria. New arms transfers between Iran and Syria have been reported to the Committee since our last meeting (see S/PV.6697), compounding the numerous confirmed cases already reported to the Committee by several Member States. The high number of those instances confirms a deliberate and ongoing policy of illicit transfer of arms and related material between Iran and Syria. In Lebanon, too, Hizbullah continues to claim Iran’s material support, in violation of resolutions 1747 (2007) and 1701 (2006). In the face of this challenge, the international community has demonstrated its unity and determination. Measures taken by the Security Council are not ends in themselves; they are meant to convince Iran to negotiate. And they have an effect. We must therefore continue to implement them rigorously. That will require first of all a firm response to reported violations. The Committee must in particular identify individuals and entities accused of violations, in accordance with its mandate. We must also improve the implementation of sanctions wherever they are necessary. We call yet again for the final report of the Panel of Experts to be published, in accordance with sanctions committees practice. What we call for — and what the Council has demanded numerous times — is that Iran convince us of the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. Our goal remains a negotiated solution. We are ready for dialogue, in keeping with the dual approach that we have always advocated, but Iran must demonstrate its willingness for serious negotiations. Ms. Ashton, on behalf of the six parties, has proposed to Iran to restart talks about nuclear issues. She has noted their willingness to embark on a policy of re-establishing trust, leading to a comprehensive solution, whereby Iran would fully implement its obligations under resolutions of the Security Council and of the IAEA Board of Governors. For the six parties, it is essential that discussions be focused on the concerns raised by Iran’s nuclear programme. We therefore call on Iran to seriously engage in that process. We call on it to seize this opportunity to emerge from the international isolation caused by its military nuclear programme.

I would like to join my colleagues in thanking Ambassador Néstor Osorio for presenting the 90-day report of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006). We commend his stewardship of the Committee and the professionalism with which the Committee has been implementing its mandate. The Panel of Experts is mandated to assist the Committee in the implementation of the relevant resolutions, and has to work under the direction of the Committee. We appreciate the work, including outreach activities, that the Panel has been doing, and we encourage it to continue its work in strict compliance with the relevant resolutions in an independent, objective, transparent and impartial manner. The Panel should also brief the Committee regularly on all its activities. During the reporting period, the Panel submitted several reports, including a quarterly update on the implementation reports of the Member States submitted during the period from 1 November 2011 to 31 January 2012. We thank the Panel for those reports, which we are carefully studying. In January this year, three members of the Panel visited India. They had a useful exchange of views with the authorities concerned in New Delhi. India has consistently supported the right of all nations to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in accordance with relevant international treaties to which they are parties. Iran should fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to restore confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. In that connection, we welcome the recent exchanges between Iran and the IAEA. We hope that the outstanding technical issues concerning the Iranian nuclear programme will be resolved peacefully through Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA. We also welcome the decision to resume talks between the P5+1 group and Iran. Those talks should serve as an important confidence-building measure and help avoid an escalation of the situation. India supports the full implementation of relevant resolutions of the Security Council concerning the Iranian nuclear issue. While implementing those resolutions, it is necessary that all efforts be made to ensure that legitimate trade and economic activities do not suffer. In conclusion, we support the Chair’s intention to hold an open briefing, along with the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts, in April 2012 for interested Member States on implementation procedures. That briefing will also serve as a useful opportunity for the members of the Committee and the Panel to get the views of the wider United Nations membership.

I would like to thank the Permanent Representative of Colombia for his briefing on the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) over the past 90 days. I commend his efforts in advancing the work of the Committee. I hope that the Committee will continue to carry out its mandate in a prudent, pragmatic and balanced way. China has always attached importance to and will continue to actively participate in the work of the Committee. The situation in the Middle East is now undergoing profound changes. Safeguarding regional peace and stability and avoiding greater turbulence in the region is in the common interests of all parties. It is also in line with the shared aspirations of the international community. Against that backdrop, it is of more pragmatic importance to be firmly committed to dialogue and negotiation in order to promptly resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. Thanks to the joint efforts of all parties, the P5+1 group and Iran have expressed their willingness to engage in sincere dialogue. The process of resolving the Iranian nuclear issue through dialogue has shown positive momentum. China hopes that parties will narrow differences and take constructive measures so as to launch sustainable dialogue at an early date and actively explore a comprehensive, long-term and appropriate settlement to the Iranian nuclear issue. As a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Iran enjoys the right to the peaceful use of nuclear power. It should also honour its international obligations. China hopes that Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will further strengthen dialogue and cooperation on the current basis and resolve the pending issues as soon as possible. China also looks forward to a constructive role being played by the IAEA in that regard. China always believes that relevant resolutions of the Security Council should be implemented in a conscientious, comprehensive and accurate manner. However, sanctions are by no means an end in themselves. The Iranian nuclear issue can be appropriately addressed only through dialogue and cooperation. All members of the Committee and the Panel of Experts, under the leadership of the Committee, should further advance their work based on the foregoing understanding and in strict accordance with the mandate of the resolution.

I thank Ambassador Osorio for his briefing and for his work as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006). The E3+3 and Iran have expressed their willingness to engage in talks. We acknowledge that Iran has finally responded to the European Union High Representative’s letter of 21 October 2011. We call on Iran to engage seriously in meaningful discussions on concrete steps aimed at restoring confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. The early resumption of nuclear talks offers an important opportunity. It is now up to Iran to seize the moment, return to the negotiating table in a constructive spirit and be ready to cooperate. Last week, Minister for Foreign Affairs Westerwelle reiterated our concern that the Iranian nuclear programme challenged the stability of the Middle East region and the international non-proliferation regime. In the debate on the situation in the Middle East (S/PV.6734), Minister Westerwelle made clear that a nuclear-armed Iran was not acceptable. We are concerned that, despite the efforts made so far, access to Parchin was not granted to the most recent missions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We also regret that Iran recently increased its uranium enrichment activities at the Fordo and Natanz facilities, as reported by the IAEA. It remains essential that Iran intensify its cooperation with the Agency in order to resolve all outstanding substantive issues, in particular those having possible military dimensions. We repeat our call on Iran to finally comply in full and without delay with all its international obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Council and the IAEA Board of Governors. We urge Iran to apply the modified Code 3.1 and implement the Additional Protocol. It is unfortunate that Iran continues to be in violation of its international obligations. As we were told during today’s briefing, more cases of sanctions violations have been reported. We reiterate our concern over the weapons exports from Iran to other countries, especially to Syria, and to Hizbullah. Likewise, we notified, together with France, the United Kingdom and the United States, yet another violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1929 (2010) — the launch of the Navid satellite into space in early February, using Iran’s Safir space launch vehicle. These incidents underline the importance of properly implementing the existing sanctions regime. The 1737 Committee and its Panel of Experts have a vital role to play in that regard. We believe that, pending a final solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, the international community should make the best use of the tools at its disposal. We welcome the forthcoming briefing by the Committee’s Chair in early April to inform the broader United Nations membership about how to implement the Iran resolutions. On 7 May 2011, the Panel of Experts presented its final report. We reiterate our call for that useful report to finally be released. The report of the Panel of Experts is an important tool for all Member States, which are themselves requested to report on the implementation of the sanctions measures. That makes it all the more urgent to release the report of the Panel of Experts. We will continue to support the independence of the Panel. We hold that its travel plans must remain unimpeded. The Panel must be in a position to investigate incidents wherever and whenever deemed necessary. Additional designations under the Council’s sanctions regime are an important element in our toolkit. Germany welcomes the Committee’s ability to designate sanctions violators, as stipulated in paragraph 26 of resolution 1929 (2010). We support the listing of sanctions violators to demonstrate to all individuals who disrespect the Council’s resolutions that they will be confronted by harsh measures for their bad conduct. Finally, let me reiterate our determination to find a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. We remain prepared to restart dialogue with Iran aimed at restoring international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme.

I thank Ambassador Néstor Osorio for his work as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and for his comprehensive briefing on the activities of that Committee. It is essential that the Committee continue to solicit national implementation reports from Member States and, with the support of the Panel of Experts working constructively with them, to increase the number of such reports. Azerbaijan welcomes the fourth quarterly assessment of Member States’ implementation reports. We note the work done so far by the Panel of Experts in drafting the implementation assistance notices, and hope that that work can be finalized in a timely manner. The Republic of Azerbaijan attaches the utmost importance to preventing the use of its territory as a transit route for the illicit trafficking of items and materials related to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons technology. In our view, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is the most important security challenge that the international community is currently confronting. But in pursuing that goal, we cannot deny the right of any country to develop its nuclear industry for exclusively peaceful purposes, under strict international control. Finally, I would also like to note that the requirements of resolution 1737 (2006) and international norms of non-proliferation, including combating illicit trafficking, cannot be applied to the almost 20 per cent of the internationally recognized territory of Azerbaijan that is currently occupied by neighbouring Armenia, as a consequence of which Azerbaijan does not control 132 kilometres of its southern border.

I, too, wish to thank Ambassador Osorio for his briefing to the Council today on the 90-day report of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006). South Africa continues to support the resolution of the issues involved with Iran’s nuclear programme through peaceful means and dialogue between the parties concerned, including between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Islamic Republic of Iran. South Africa does not believe that sanctions are an end in themselves and therefore wishes to emphasize that they should be aimed at encouraging progress towards a peaceful resolution of the concerns about Iran’s nuclear activities. In that regard, South Africa notes from the latest report of the Director General of the IAEA that the Agency continues to be able to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material declared by Iran, but also that it remains unable to provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. The IAEA remains the sole competent technical authority to verify the nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. We are therefore pleased to note the recent negotiations between Iran and the Agency, and look forward to their resumption culminating in a structured approach to address all outstanding issues consistent with the Agency’s verification practices. South Africa once again encourages all parties concerned to avoid any actions that could derail progress towards finding a sustainable solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. To that end, we trust that the Security Council will work in good faith to encourage constructive dialogue between the parties concerned. We call upon Iran to comply with the relevant decisions of the IAEA and with its obligation and other relevant Security Council resolutions. We wish to reiterate that South Africa believes that we should not tire in seeking, in a cooperative manner, a long-term solution that restores international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, while respecting Iran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, consistent with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

We thank Ambassador Néstor Osorio for his briefing to the Council this morning. Allow me to take this first opportunity as a new Council member to offer our perspective on the various Security Council resolutions relating to Iran and on the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and its Panel of Experts. Pakistan fully supports the internationally agreed non-proliferation goals. Pakistan is an active partner in the several global platforms and processes that are aimed at advancing disarmament and non-proliferation. It is important for all States to implement in good faith Security Council resolutions, including those relating to the Iranian nuclear issue. On our part, we have complied fully with the provisions of resolution 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1929 (2010), and have filed the requisite reports with the 1737 Committee. Over the past several years, the 1737 Committee has undertaken several activities, including, inter alia, the adoption of guidelines for the conduct of its work, the preparation of implementation assistance notices and several reports and briefings to the Member States. Similarly, the Panel of Experts has carried out a number of tasks to assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate. The scope of activities undertaken by the Committee and its Panel is vast and requires careful examination, especially by new members of the Security Council. We are reviewing the documentation that has been made available to the new members recently, and will contribute to the proceedings of the Committee in the months ahead. The briefings by the Committee to the Council serve useful outreach and awareness purposes for the larger United Nations membership. They are designed to sensitize the larger membership about the mandate of the Committee and the activities carried out by it and its Panel of Experts. We take this opportunity to underscore the need for the Council to evolve an institutionalized mechanism to ease the transition of new Council members into the work not only of this body, but also of all its subsidiary bodies. We propose that structured briefings be offered and documentation made available in a timely manner to the new members in order to enable them to participate meaningfully in the proceedings and decision-making processes of the Council and its committees. We trust that the Council and its committees shall pursue activities in a balanced, inclusive and consensus-based manner. We assure you, Mr. President, and Ambassador Osorio of our delegation’s full support in those endeavours. We have noted the views expressed by other Council members on the need for the publication of the Panel’s final report. We are in the process of examining that and other reports, and shall express our views subsequently. At this stage, we would like to note that the Panel has an important job in carrying out its work consistent with its mandate and under the direction of the Committee. As a matter of general principle, the Panel’s reports should conform to the parameters set by the Council’s resolutions and facilitate an effective and balanced implementation of the sanctions regime. The composition of the Panel also needs to reflect a broader and more equitable geographic representation than is currently the case. We hope that those considerations will be taken into account when future reports are prepared by them and the experts are appointed. Sanctions regimes created by the Security Council are, at best, a tool or a means to achieve a larger objective. There are different perspectives on the rationale, scope and efficacy of those regimes. Today’s briefing is, however, not the forum to debate on what the sanctions can or cannot achieve. As far as Pakistan is concerned, we believe that sanctions should not become an end in themselves. They should instead be aligned with the broader objectives of facilitating dialogue, negotiations and the resolution of outstanding issues. We have taken note of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) safeguards in Iran. While noting the programme of work between Iran and the Agency, we trust that they will remain constructively engaged with a view to resolving all outstanding issues. Pakistan welcomes the recent announcement of the resumption of talks between Iran and the P5+1 group. That is a positive sign and a step in the right direction. In our view, dialogue and cooperation are the best means to resolve all outstanding matters relating to the Iranian nuclear issue. Pakistan, as a neighbouring country, does not wish any escalation of tension in an already volatile region. Iran is a party to the NPT and a member of the IAEA. Accordingly, it has rights and obligations alike. We believe that Iran should fulfil its legal obligations while Iran’s rights should also be respected. We hope that the Committee and Panel’s work moves in the direction of facilitating a peaceful, amicable and fair resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue.

We thank the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), Permanent Representative of Colombia Néstor Osorio, for his briefing on the Committee’s work. In the reporting period, the Committee pursued its active work addressing the tasks facing it. In view of the heightened sensitivity of the problem of sanctions, it is particularly important for the Committee to act in a balanced, objective manner and not breach the terms of its mandate. That needs to continue in the future, and also applies to the Committee’s Panel of Experts, working under its leadership and giving this body practical assistance. It is important for the activities of the experts to be built on an impartial and independent basis, using only credible sources and reliable information. Russia fully complies with all Security Council sanctions against Iran. In that context, we believe that the effectiveness of the sanctions regime and the overall integrality and unity of the international community’s actions on outstanding issues related to the Iranian nuclear programme are undermined by introducing further unilateral restrictions. In a number of cases, they have an extraterritorial effect. That is categorically unacceptable from an international legal point of view. The members of the international community must scrupulously fulfil the relevant Security Council resolutions and not exceed their remit. We do not deny the gravity of the problem of restoring trust in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. We share the concerns in that regard. At the same time, we oppose attempts to artificially inflame the atmosphere around that subject. After two rounds, the talks between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Iran should continue. We expect a speedy resumption of dialogue between the six international mediators with Iran, at which the Iranian nuclear programme will be one of the key topics of discussion. For our part, we are doing our utmost to achieve a comprehensive, long-term settlement to the situation concerning the Iranian nuclear programme, using exclusively political diplomatic means through dialogue between the P5+1 group and Iran in a spirit of mutual respect and on the basis of phased mutual principles. It is important that the resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors in November and the 8 March statement by the Chinese representative to the Board of Governors on behalf of the P5+1 both refer to those principles and confirm the resolve of the international community to find a comprehensive political diplomatic settlement.

Like our colleagues, I thank Ambassador Néstor Osorio for his leadership of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), for the work accomplished under his direction, and for the informative report he just presented on the activities carried out in the past three months. Some of the issues raised in that report are indeed particularly worrying, and we encourage the Committee to pursue its investigations on all those matters. Increasing tensions in an already unstable region reinforce our concerns. Let me reiterate once again the importance that we attach to the publication of the Panel of Experts final report, which was submitted in May 2011. That report should already have been made available to all United Nations Member States as a measure not only of transparency, but also of accountability for the tasks undertaken by the Committee last year. Moreover, we need to raise awareness among Member States of the importance of fully and adequately implementing resolution 1929 (2010), and information sharing is crucial in that regard. The report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), dated 24 February (S/2012/114, annex), established again the continued absence of progress in Iran’s cooperation with the Agency and confirmed that its enrichment activities and heavy water-related projects were not suspended. A number of outstanding cases that demand urgent clarification were not answered, and access to nuclear sites, in particular the Parchin site, continue to be denied. The possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed nuclear activities involving a military dimension, including the development of ballistic missile capabilities, significantly increases our general concern and suspicion over the true nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. At this point in time, it is essential for Iran to urgently restore international confidence concerning the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, in accordance with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Safeguards Agreement, as well as the relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions. As we have stated before, the IAEA is the only international body of ascertaining the true nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. It is imperative that Iran respond positively and through concrete actions to the requests of the Agency and engage seriously in the resumption of negotiations for a comprehensive and long-term settlement of the nuclear issue. Portugal continues to stand by its long-standing commitment to support and work for a diplomatic solution and is encouraged by the prospect in the near future of substantive talks to be held in the framework of the E3+3. We sincerely hope that Iran will now enter into meaningful discussions without preconditions and cooperate with the IAEA to clarify all outstanding issues, in particular those that give rise to the international community’s deep concerns about possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme.

At the outset, I would like to thank Mr. Néstor Osorio for his briefing this morning and his work as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006). (spoke in French) I also wish to extend my thanks to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1929 (2010) for the level its expertise made available to the Committee. We encourage the Panel to continue its monitoring action of the Committee and its participation in the various conferences and meetings pursuant to the Committee’s mandate, in particular its dialogue with Member States, especially through visits organized to countries at their request. The Committee continues to consider the cases of which it has been notified, and we hope that it will enjoy all the necessary support of Member States, just as we remain confident that it can continue to count on the professionalism and impartiality of the Panel of Experts. We also hope that the Committee will continue its consideration of the Panel of Experts’ final report of 2011 in a constructive spirit that will enable it to reach a consensus on the publication of that report as soon as possible. In the same spirit, my delegation supports the intention of the Chair to organize a briefing for all States Members of the United Nations in the very near future in order to provide greater transparency to the work of the Council and its subsidiary bodies. The latest report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (S/2012/114, annex) shows that outstanding issues of the Iranian nuclear programme have still not been resolved. It is crucial that the dialogue between Iran and the P5+1 group resume as soon as possible. We remain convinced that dialogue and the diplomatic channel are the only way to find a solution to the issue. The success of such a dialogue requires a clear and sustained commitment in good faith and the avoidance of any action that could complicate the situation. We also believe that resolving the issue means compliance with Security Council resolutions and the requests of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the context of Iran meeting its international obligations. We remain convinced of the impartiality and integrity of the IAEA as the sole competent body in that area and that, as a result, it should enjoy all necessary cooperation, including the required information and access. Here, we reiterate that the non-proliferation regime should not be weakened and that all States should scrupulously respect their safeguards obligations. The goal of nuclear disarmament, which my country values, continues to be put to the test if freely undertaken non-proliferation commitments are not respected. At the same time, we wish to underscore that that regime is based on a fundamental balance between the rights and obligations of States that no State may avoid. In conclusion, allow me to express the hope that the intended dialogue will take place and that Iran and the P5+1 swiftly return to the negotiating table.

We wish to thank Ambassador Néstor Osorio for his informative briefing and the leadership that he has shown in guiding the activities of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006). We are particularly grateful for the assistance provided by his team, the Chair of the Committee and the Panel of Experts to the new Council members to better understand the functioning of the Committee. Since the adoption of resolution 1737 (2006), Guatemala has adopted practical measures to ensure the full implementation of the resolution in our country. We do not possess or intend to possess weapons of mass destruction of any kind. As a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and a signatory to all main international instruments and agreements on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Guatemala reaffirms the importance of a balanced implementation of the three fundamental pillars of the NPT: non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Of course, we believe that that last pillar includes the right of all States parties to the NPT to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy as long as it has established that it is for peaceful purposes. Allow me to underscore some points of the report. First, our primary focus in the Committee should be the effective implementation of resolution 1737 (2006), adopted by the Council, which includes the consideration of all its reports. Second, it is of concern to note that the Islamic Republic of Iran has ignored the provisions of resolution 1737 (2006) and subsequent resolutions. That is completely unacceptable and jeopardizes the effectiveness of joint decisions of the Council. Third, applying sanctions is a process that requires the ongoing and resolute efforts of the international community. Much has been done to implement resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1929 (2010). However, it is not enough and we must continue our action. We commend the outreach activities carried out by the Panel of Experts through visits, inspections and participation in seminars. Such activities have facilitated understanding not only of the work of the Committee, but also of the role of States in implementing the relevant resolutions. We believe that those activities should be continued. Further strengthening of outreach activities in developing countries is necessary to consolidate the improvements. Fourth, Guatemala is grateful for the work of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1929 (2010) as summarized in the mid-term review report published in 2011. It is important that the Committee continue actively to provide its guidance and leadership. The mandate of the Panel of Experts has been clearly defined in paragraph 29 of the resolution, and remains the sole reference for the Committee to continue to follow up the various activities of the group. Fifth, viewed from a broader political perspective, the issue of the Iranian nuclear situation is not encouraging. As yet there has been no progress in negotiations; on the contrary, the current confrontational tendency is a source of great concern. The lack of confidence combined with the recent alarming events both within and outside the Islamic Republic of Iran risk generating a dangerous situation, which we must strenuously avoid. To ensure that the situation does not deteriorate even further, we must seek worthy and credible alternatives aimed at establishing an environment conducive to dialogue and genuine commitment. New endeavours are necessary to strengthen the foundation of a negotiated solution. Sixth, Iran’s implementation of the provisions of the relevant Council resolutions and its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency must also be considered a step in the right direction. The suspension of all activities linked to enrichment and processing is a legally binding requirement under resolution 1737 (2006), and crucial to establishing confidence. Seventh, we note that during the reporting period the Committee received notifications from Member States through reports of alleged violations. We commend the Committee, which, with the support of the Group of Experts, has responded to those reports while at the same time intensifying its public opinion outreach activities aimed at avoiding future sanctions violations. Lastly, my country supports the work of the Committee and its Panel of Experts and remains ready to participate creatively and constructively in considering outstanding issues, as agreed at the Committee’s recent meeting on 29 February. We shall continue to follow the matter very closely.

I would first like to associate myself with previous speakers in thanking Mr. Osorio for his excellent work at the head of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006). In the past three months, the Committee, supported by its Panel of Experts, has participated further in the implementation of Security Council resolutions related to the Iranian nuclear programme, in particular by promoting a better understanding of the sanctions regime, pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and others, and in reminding States of their obligations stemming from those resolutions. We welcome that work and encourage the Committee to continue along those lines. The quarterly report presented to the Council by the Committee again highlights alarming violations of the resolutions associated with the Iranian nuclear programme, despite the many appeals from the international community for those commitments to be respected. Togo has always advocated the principle of general and complete disarmament in all its aspects. We express our grave concern about those serious violations and urge States to fully honour all commitments undertaken. While Iran cannot be denied the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, that right should not extend to permission to acquire nuclear weapons. As Iran is a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in our opinion it should respect its commitments and work to reassure the international community of its willingness to cooperate and, above all, to engage in direct negotiations with the P5+1. To date, the attitude of the Iranian authorities, as represented by their public statements, has had little effect in allaying suspicions as to the real nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. Moreover, the latest report of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of 24 February, notes serious concerns with respect to the Iranian nuclear programme. That information suggests that Iran has undertaken activities towards the development of a nuclear explosive device. Such a situation, lest we forget, jeopardizes regional and international peace and security. Military activities linked to the so-called civil programme should not include nuclear-related activities. We believe that the only guarantee of reassuring the international community today as to the true intentions of Iran is for that country to allow access to all sites, equipment and documents associated with its nuclear programme. In paragraph 29 of resolution 1929 (2010), the Panel of Experts is requested to make recommendations on actions that the Council, the Committee or Member States could consider taking to improve the implementation of the measures under consideration. It goes without saying that the implementation of the sanctions regime requires good knowledge of best practices in the field. In that respect, it is troubling that the final report of the Panel of Experts has yet to be communicated to the Council due to objections raised by certain Member States, at a time when it is meant to convey information and best practices aimed at helping States in their efforts to implement resolutions on the Iranian nuclear programme. The international community, and the Security Council in particular, must prevent nuclear energy from being diverted from peaceful uses towards the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. In that context, it is important to redouble our efforts to ensure more efficient and effective measures, such as sanctions, and to remain vigilant in confronting violations of Security Council resolutions.

I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the United Kingdom. I join others in thanking Ambassador Osorio for today’s briefing to the Council and for his report on the work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and its Panel of Experts. As his report makes clear, the Committee continues to do important work. During the reporting period it has in particular received a violation report following the launch by Iran of a Safir rocket, a clear contravention of the Council’s decision that Iran should not undertake activity related to ballistic missile technology. It has heard a useful briefing from the delegation of France explaining why space-launch and ballistic-missile technologies are essentially identical. It has received notifications from several States that show that Iran continues both to proliferate weapons and import nuclear-related material, in violation of Security Council resolutions. Of those violation reports, we are seriously concerned by evidence of systematic Iranian activity to provide weapons illegally to the Syrian Government — weapons that, as we speak, are being used to violently suppress the people of Syria. The United Kingdom looks forward to the open meeting of the Committee being planned by Ambassador Osorio. This is an important opportunity to discuss the Committee’s work with the wider United Nations membership. We thank the 1737 Panel of Experts for their ongoing support for the Committee. We welcome their efforts to raise awareness of those steps that Member States need to take to implement sanctions and to promote knowledge-sharing and collaboration between States. We continue to be frustrated by the blockage of the publication of the Panel of Experts’ independent report. We urge the Committee to act on the recommendations in the Panel’s report by designating individuals and entities that have violated sanctions and by publishing implementation assistance notices. Iran’s nuclear programme continues to develop, in contravention of the Council’s resolutions and of Iran’s obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The latest International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report provides further detailed evidence of this. In particular, the report found that Iran continues to increase both production of higher-grade 20 per cent enriched uranium and enrichment to 3.5 per cent. Iran has failed to give a convincing explanation about how a quantity of its uranium has gone missing. Two IAEA missions to Tehran within less than a month have failed to convince Iran to engage constructively with the Agency. The Iranian Government has again refused the IAEA access to key sites, relevant documents and individuals associated with its nuclear programme. And let us not forget that in its last report, the IAEA said unequivocally that Iran had carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device, that some of its nuclear activities were specific to nuclear weapons and that some of these may still be ongoing. Iran has time and time again had the opportunity to convince the IAEA otherwise by providing unhindered access to its nuclear facilities and behaving in a transparent manner, but it has failed to do so. No one following these issues could be in any doubt that Iran’s clear objective is to develop the technology required for a nuclear weapon. Despite this, we remain committed to engaging Iran on the international community’s genuine concerns regarding its nuclear programme. We continue to seek a peaceful, negotiated solution and are applying pressure on Iran to bring one about. The twin- track approach is working. Iran is feeling the pressure of sanctions and its growing international isolation. We are ready to talk, but Iran must negotiate seriously and without preconditions. It must match our good faith. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I give the floor to Ambassador Osorio to respond to comments.

I shall be brief. I should first like to thank Council members for their responses to and comments on the report that was presented, which overall reflects the work of the members of the Committee, whom I thank for their contributions and guidance. I should like also to highlight the work of the Panel of Experts, carried out under difficult conditions and with complete commitment and dedication. It deserves commendation, as does the Secretariat, which has provided guidance and assistance in a very serious- minded and professional manner. I welcome the fact that the initiative of members to convene a briefing open to Member States has received the support that has been evident here. I suggest that such a meeting be convened during the first two weeks of April, if possible. We are working with the Secretariat to determine the availability of rooms, and we trust that we will be able to settle on a date, which will then be duly made known to Council members.

I thank Ambassador Osorio for the clarifications he has provided. There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. The Security Council has thus concluded the present state of its consideration of the item on its agenda.