S/PV.6886 Security Council

Under rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and Ms. Ameerah Haq, Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, to participate in this meeting. On behalf of the Council, I welcome His Excellency Mr. Paulo Portas, Minister of State and Foreign Affairs of Portugal, and His Excellency Mr. Pavan Kapoor, Joint Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs of India, to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I now give the floor to Mr. Ladsous.

Thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on the matter of inter-mission cooperation. I personally thank you, Sir, for taking the initiative of addressing the subject. First, allow me to emphasize that there is no official, agreed definition of inter-mission cooperation. Historically, the concept has taken various forms in various scenarios due to many reasons. In fact, its practical modalities have been defined on a case-by- case basis. In today’s briefing, I plan to focus primarily on those cases of inter-mission cooperation that have involved the temporary transfer or sharing of personnel or equipment that has been made available by Member States among two or more missions that are often located in close proximity to one another. It seems to me that this is one example of inter-mission cooperation that has generated particular interest in the Council, especially in recent months. My colleague, Under- Secretary-General Ameerah Haq, will address those aspects that relate to mission support. That form of cooperation is one of the tools at the disposal of the Council and the troop- and police-contributing countries to support the implementation of peacekeeping mandates. It is not at all a new tool — far from it. Some colleagues will recall that the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina provided 39 uniformed personnel and police to support the launch of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo in 1999. Thirteen years later, several missions also provided military observers to the launch of the United Nations Supervision Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic in the spring of 2012. In both cases, the provision of uniformed personnel happened with the consent of the capitals concerned. It is therefore not exactly a new tool, but it is obvious that this kind of cooperation has become increasingly attractive over the past few years. I believe that four factors in particular have contributed to this development. First, there is the recurring lack of certain critical items of equipment, the so-called “critical enablers” and “force multipliers” — for example, military transport helicopters. This lack has sometimes resulted in missions being unable to implement their mandates, in particular in times of heightened activity, such as during elections or security crises. The tensions that have arisen as a result have led missions to resort to temporarily transferring such equipment from one mission to another, or to two or more missions sharing or jointly owning such equipment or personnel. The second factor is the repeated appeal by the General Assembly and the Security Council for the enhancement of synergies among missions deployed in geographical proximity to each other. The third factor is the economic crisis, which has led us to be even more rigorous in the way that we use our resources. The economic climate has thus pushed us to examine more closely inter-mission cooperation as a tool for a more rational use of resources, which are, we must admit, increasingly rare, be they financial resources or specialized equipment. The fourth, and final, factor is the fact that inter-mission cooperation is, by definition, a flexible tool. (spoke in English) Most members would be are aware of recent examples of such inter-mission cooperation. They include, but are not limited to, the following cases. In January 2006, an infantry company was temporarily transferred from the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) following violent disturbances in Abidjan. In late 2010 and early 2011, three infantry companies and military aviation assets were redeployed in the opposite direction, from UNMIL to UNOCI, in connection with the elections in Côte d’Ivoire and, later, in connection with the ensuing post-electoral crisis. In October 2011, one infantry company and one formed police unit were transferred temporarily from UNOCI to UNMIL in connection with the elections in Liberia. Additional personnel and assets were put on standby. A year ago, in December 2011, two infantry companies and one formed police unit were transferred from UNMIL to UNOCI in connection with the legislative elections in Côte d’Ivoire. In January 2012, two military utility helicopters were transferred from the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to partially fill the helicopter gap during a period of heightened demand on the Mission owing to the crisis that was then unfolding in Jonglei. Last Friday, colleagues from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support briefed a Security Council working group in some detail on those and other examples of inter-mission cooperation. Allow me, therefore, to not dwell on details, but rather try to outline some of the lessons learned. I hope they will contribute to a discussion on the way forward. First, whenever personnel and assets contributed by Member States are involved, inter-mission cooperation requires the consent of the troop- and police-contributing countries, of the host Government and, generally, of the Security Council. Needless to say, delays in obtaining consent can weaken or sometimes cancel out altogether the desired impact of temporary reinforcements. For example, in 2006, owing to delays in receiving formal consent from a troop-contributing country, by the time the temporary reinforcements from UNMIL to UNOCI had arrived in Côte d’Ivoire, the situation in Abidjan had already begun to stabilize. Secondly, inter-mission cooperation has been used as a temporary measure — a quick, temporary fix — to either fill critical gaps or provide for a surge at times when missions were already under extreme stress, including during the start-up phase. Uniformed personnel and assets were transferred between UNOCI and UNMIL in connection with the holding of elections by the host country — a period when there is typically a surge in the security and logistical demands on missions. Similarly, military utility helicopters were transferred from MONUSCO to UNMISS when the latter was facing a crisis in Jonglei state. That transfer was not to provide a surge, but to partially fill a critical gap that UNMISS already had in the field of such assets. Incidentally, I am pleased to report that a first group of three military utility helicopters, contributed by the Government of Rwanda, are expected to be deployed to UNMISS by the end of this year. Thirdly, inter-mission cooperation can occur in connection with either scheduled, predictable events, such as elections, referendums and censuses, or unscheduled, unforeseen events, such as security crises and natural disasters. For scheduled events, inter-mission cooperation, where appropriate, can be planned for well in advance. Preparations can be made ahead of time, and the necessary consent secured in good time. For unforeseen events, however, it is more difficult to plan ahead and obtain the up-front, contingency commitment from troop- and police-contributors, the host Government and, when required, the Council. It is partly a coincidence that, when the post-electoral crisis erupted in Côte d’Ivoire in late 2010 — and obviously that was an unscheduled event — elements of inter-mission cooperation were already in place in connection with a event that was scheduled, namely, the presidential elections in that country. Fourthly, inter-mission cooperation should be a tool not of choice, but of necessity, especially when it is used to fill critical gaps. It should be implemented on a temporary basis only. Inter-mission cooperation cannot and should not be used as a substitute for providing missions with the required military and police capabilities on a dedicated basis. When filling capability gaps, inter-mission cooperation tends simply to move the gap from one mission to the other. In that context, the transfer of helicopters from MONUSCO to UNMISS, which was possible in January, would be hard to conceive at present, when MONUSCO needs all its capabilities owing to the crisis in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Time and space are key considerations when responding to a crisis. It is about the ability to deploy the right resources to the right place, at the right time and with the right capabilities. To face situations of activity surge, missions keep reserves. The redeployment of units from one mission to another usually occurs over and above existing reserves to relieve missions at times of severe distress. Inter-mission cooperation, in other words, fills gaps, if only temporarily and on a relatively limited scale. As I mentioned earlier, this type of cooperation is at times a tool not of choice, but of necessity. In an ideal world, the tool of choice for strategic, over-the-horizon reserves would be the standing up of highly capable, self-contained and dedicated units, which would maintain high readiness to deploy to any peacekeeping crisis theatre at short notice. We can but dream, however. Such arrangements are unavailable at present. In any case, consent of troop- and police-contributing countries, host Governments and the Security Council are and will remain key enabling principles for inter-mission cooperation. We must also preserve the flexible and versatile character of inter-mission cooperation to ensure its continuing relevance. Peacekeeping operations and the Secretariat must plan ahead and, whenever possible, anticipate their needs in terms of inter-mission cooperation, and they must prepare accordingly. (spoke in French) All of the foregoing are lessons learned. (spoke in English) Inter-mission cooperation is increasingly in demand. Instances of such cooperation are becoming increasingly frequent. It behooves us to learn from past difficulties and build on successes to ensure that we tap into the full potential of inter-mission cooperation in support of our missions. In that regard, we should explore the possibility of discussing the setting up of a light, flexible framework for inter-mission cooperation that would allow the Secretariat, the Security Council and the troop- and police-contributing countries to plan for inter-mission cooperation on a contingency basis.

I thank Mr. Ladsous for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ms. Haq. Ms. Haq: Allow me to express my appreciation for this opportunity to address the Council on the subject of inter-mission cooperation. I wish to thank you, Mr. President, for the role you are playing as the Chair of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations. In my remarks to the Security Council today, I will focus on inter-mission cooperation from the perspective of mission support. Inter-mission cooperation in that context is all about ensuring that troops, civilian personnel, and military and other assets can be redeployed to another mission at short notice, sustained while in a temporary site due to a mission start-up or crisis, and ultimately returned to their original location and intended use. Troops that need to be redeployed must also be provided with adequate shelter. For every contingent we send unexpectedly from one mission to another, its life-sustaining requirements must be met. And for every helicopter or fixed wing aircraft effectively shared between missions, logistical support in terms of fuel and maintenance must be anticipated and made available. The past year has provided stark testimony to the diversity of mandates that characterize peacekeeping missions today. Troops and civilian personnel are being deployed in situations where time is truly of the essence. The interval between the approval of a Security Council mandate and the establishment of the mission is increasingly seen as having strategic importance. In that light, delays in establishing a field presence can have a negative effect on the mission’s chances to successfully implement its mandate. In that context, in Syria earlier this year the establishment of the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) provided useful lessons in terms of the potential for inter-mission cooperation to play a critical role in expediting mission start-up. For one, neighbouring missions can play a useful role in providing personnel and assets to ensure timely mission start-up. Support from other missions in the Middle East, including from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), was critical for the rapid build-up of UNSMIS, which reached operational effectiveness within one month of mandate approval. The handling of procurement and banking services and managing the freight forwarding activities of UNSMIS were possible only because of assistance provided by those two missions. Care was taken to ensure that inter-mission cooperation in support of UNSMIS had minimal impact on the capacity of UNIFIL and UNDOF to implement their own mandates. Events in Syria have since tragically eclipsed the timely roll-out of UNSMIS, but the start-up would not have been possible without a rapid infusion of support from nearby missions. With regard to crisis response, the Under- Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations has referred to inter-mission cooperation as a temporary “tool of necessity, not of choice”. I share the view that such cooperation should never be seen as anything more than a stop-gap. It is certainly not meant to serve as the source of long-term solutions. At the same time, it is also true that inter-mission cooperation works best as a short-term reaction to crisis when arrangements are already in place that allow for flexibility and inter-mission exchange. For example, many commercially contracted aircraft in support of United Nations peacekeeping operations today have a contractual provision that allows them to be used for inter-mission support when needed. That is part of the Department of Field Support’s fleet optimization efforts that are designed to consolidate and conserve resources for greater operational efficiency. In response to the Haiti earthquake in 2010, for example, heavy cargo aircraft based in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic People’s Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) ended up providing logistics support to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. Last January, in response to the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, MONUSCO aircraft once again helped transport 300 tons of rations for the troops of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, as well as 100,000 litres of additional fuel from the United Nations Mission in Liberia. Over the past year, the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) has used air assets of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) to support rations delivery. That flexibility in the use of air assets during crisis is reflected in the exchange of civilian personnel as well. After the disaster in Haiti struck, a special recruiting team was deployed from the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad to expedite the arrival in Haiti of qualified personnel who could get to the task of helping the injured, moving essential supplies and restoring stability. The United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste, where I was Special Representative of the Secretary-General, deployed 34 staff members, covering such areas as security, finance and stress counselling. In fact, civilian personnel from virtually every field mission arrived to fill critical staffing shortfalls after the Haiti earthquake. These examples of successful inter-mission cooperation underscore the primary objective of mission support writ large. The aim is to achieve successful mandate implementation through the provision of support to military, police and civilian personnel in the field. Inter-mission cooperation should, in that context, be seen as a means to address the short-term needs of our troops and colleagues in the field. Sometimes that requires overcoming natural obstacles, such as disasters or inhospitable terrain. Collaboration among missions in the Sudan has allowed critical support to reach troops despite long-entrenched customs and visa- related obstacles. The needs of UNISFA, which I observed last month when I visited, are still acute. But progress in meeting them is under way due to inter-mission cooperation with the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and UNMISS. For example, drawing from available assets, UNAMID has provided heavy engineering vehicles to UNISFA on loan for the construction of much-needed and long-overdue accommodation for the Ethiopian troops in Abyei. Decades of experience in peacekeeping have created as yet untapped potential to improve the quality of mission support while simultaneously reaping efficiency gains and savings. The goal of responding to the exigencies of peacekeeping operations in a timely way, with high-quality support and in a cost-effective manner, lies at the heart of the global field support strategy. Its basic premise is that peacekeeping should be seen not as a series of independent missions but as a global enterprise with which the United Nations can leverage its presence and bring about efficiency gains and synergies for the benefit of missions and their personnel. Two core elements of the global field support strategy — the Regional Service Centre at Entebbe and the Global Service Centre at Brindisi — attest to the importance of putting in place the institutional architecture that allows inter-mission cooperating to succeed. Both are important components of a global network of assets and expertise that can be drawn from when necessary in order to fulfill critical mission start- up and sustainment needs. I would like to thank you once again, Sir, for the opportunity to address the Council on the subject of inter-mission cooperation. Supporting the peacekeeping troops and civilian personnel who confront tremendous risk in our shared pursuit of the vision manifested in the United Nations Charter is the ultimate objective of our deliberations. We can never lose sight of the centrality of their wellbeing, a fate that is shaped by the decisions and support of this august forum.

I thank Ms. Haq for her briefing.

I thank you, Sir, for convening this timely debate. I also wish to thank Under- Secretaries- General Hervé Ladsous and Ameerah Haq for their comprehensive statements. Allow me also to congratulate you and your country, Sir, on your very efficient stewardship of the Council during this month. Morocco and Portugal share not only centuries of history and strong and confident neighbourly relations, but also an identical commitment to making our world a more peaceful, secure and prosperous one. It was in that aim that Portugal presented its candidacy to a non-permanent seat on the Council, and it was our sincere commitment to the values of the United Nations and to the fulfilment of the objectives of its Charter that won the confidence of a significant number of its member States. Pursuing those values and reaching those objectives were and are our only aim and agenda as members of the Council. Now, as our mandate draws to its end, I trust that we have lived up to the confidence placed in us two years ago. We have done our utmost in the Council to help settle disputes, promote democracy and human rights; uphold the protection of civilians, especially women and children; contribute to collective peacekeeping; actively engage in peacebuilding efforts; promote dialogue, reconciliation and religious and cultural tolerance; and defend freedom, equality and justice for all. The past two years have been particularly intense, and many of the decisions taken here have been far-reaching indeed. Let me mention the Council’s decisive contribution to the establishment of democratic transitions in Libya and Yemen. Unfortunately, concerning Syria, we must recognize that the Council has been unable to make an effective contribution to the cessation of violence in that country or to help meet the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people. Likewise, a comprehensive peace between Israel and Palestine based on the two-State solution continues to be stalled. We hope that the recognition of Palestine as a non-member observer State of the United Nations will help to relaunch credible negotiations between the parties in order that a comprehensive agreement may be reached between them. In Africa, although we have had to face a renewed crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and new challenges in Mali and the Sahel, the Council played an important role in stabilizing the situation in Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia. The Council’s active support to South Sudan also contributed to the State-building efforts of its people and its ultimate accession to the United Nations. Finally, in the Far East, Timor-Leste became a success story for its people and for the United Nations with respect to active peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Portugal is particularly proud to have participated actively in that endeavour. Allow me to offer a sincere word of thanks and appreciation to all our colleagues in the Council, with whom we have worked closely during these past two years, and our sincere congratulations and best wishes to all those that will be joining the Council. In the light of the tasks ahead and of the old and new challenges facing the world, it is essential for the Council to fully uphold its role as the main international body entrusted with preserving the peace and to act in a prompt, efficient and credible way in meeting those challenges. Our debate today concerns exactly those new challenges and ways to improve our efficiency and capacity to address them. It has to do with how the United Nations can better use the instruments available to it to act in a more expeditious and efficient way and to more effectively address some of the new challenges that confront us. Peacekeeping is today a flagship activity of the United Nations and has to a large extent become the most visible symbol of the United Nations presence in different regions. We currently have 16 peacekeeping operations and a number of special political missions. That amounts to more than 100,000 women and men — military, police and civilian personnel — carrying out the tasks mandated by the Council. They serve our common objectives, often in harsh and dangerous conditions. Very often, they represent the only hope for people who are suffering and threatened with violence. All those who serve the United Nations in the field deserve to be commended, constantly supported, respected and protected. Everyone knows how deeply Portugal is committed to peacekeeping. Over the past decades, 23,000 Portuguese peacekeepers have participated in several United Nations missions, as well as in European Union and NATO operations. They have been rightly commended for their professionalism and their outreach to local populations. Like others, we believe that the growing complexity and diversity of mandated tasks demand an increasingly integrated and coordinated approach to peacekeeping operations. On the other hand, many of the problems that missions must face have an increasingly regional dimension that demands regional approaches and regional answers if our collective action is to have any chance of success. That is the case, for example, in the West Africa region, where inter-mission cooperation has already proved its usefulness, as was the case with the cooperation between the Missions in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. Inter-mission cooperation will certainly be particularly relevant when we discuss an integrated strategy for the Sahel. Indeed, the complex crisis in Mali, and its dangerous impact on the whole region, calls for a concerted effort on the part of the international community, with the United Nations in a leading role. That is obviously also the case where drug trafficking, terrorism and other forms of international crime are concerned. In order to fight them effectively, it is critical to share intelligence, pool resources and closely coordinate action among missions. Similarly, due to the growing capacities of international criminal organizations, we must be particularly careful to ensure that success in fighting international crime in one country does not amount to transferring that threat to its next-door neighbour. A regional approach is therefore paramount. We know from experience the particularly perverse role that international criminal organizations play in effectively undermining legitimate Governments, disrupting democratic electoral processes and promoting to power their protected clients through violent means, as has been the case in Guinea-Bissau, unhappily. In order to prevent such phenomena from becoming widespread, close inter-mission cooperation can be particularly useful in detecting signs of such threats at an early stage and allowing the Security Council to act preventively. But the case for close cooperation and sharing experiences and best practices can also be made in other areas, since many problems’ root causes are very similar in neighbouring countries and often have a cross-border impact. For instance, the fight against the scourge of the Lord’s Resistance Army is inconceivable without a regional strategy involving the missions in the area of the Great Lakes, the Sudan and South Sudan, in close collaboration with all the Governments concerned. Such cooperation between missions has also been decisive in launching new operations, as happened recently with the United Nations Supervision Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic, which benefited from the contributions of other missions in the region. Indeed, closer cooperation between missions in terms of fulfilling surge needs, dealing with capacity gaps and helping in fast mission start-ups is a concept that deserves further development, with a view to applying it more often. Naturally, such inter-mission cooperation can proceed only if troop- and police-contributing countries fully share in and agree to such developments. Portugal believes that this type of cooperation could also be usefully expanded to other areas, such as peacebuilding, through a comprehensive approach that would benefit from regional synergies. In conclusion, inter-mission cooperation is a concept that deserves our increased attention. It should be strengthened and expanded. Obviously, there is no one-size-fits-all solution, and each mission is an individual case. But as we have seen, there are important opportunities and reasons to enhance cooperation and coordination among them, maximizing the available resources. We need that discussion, based on the important lessons learned from recent experiences, in order to explore the opportunities and challenges that this concept brings to the implementation of United Nations missions’ mandates and, beyond them, to make our world more peaceful and secure. It has been an honour to serve with the Council for the past two years. Sooner rather than later, I think, we will be back.

Our delegation welcomes the Minister of Portugal’s personal contribution to our work.

At the outset let me thank you, Mr. President, and the delegation of Morocco, for organizing today’s briefing on peacekeeping operations, a subject of great interest to my country. My thanks are also due to Under-Secretaries-General Hervé Ladsous and Ameerah Haq for their detailed briefings. Today’s debate reflects the enduring relevance of United Nations peacekeeping operations in fulfilling the Organization’s obligations under the Charter towards the maintenance of international peace and security. Peacekeeping has not only withstood the test of time for more than six decades now; it has in fact expanded its mandate and reach. India has partnered with the United Nations in peacekeeping operations since its very inception, in the 1950s. More than 100,000 Indian soldiers have served with distinction in more than 40 peacekeeping missions. Even today, India is one of the largest contributors to such missions, and we remain committed to this global enterprise. The nature of conflict has changed significantly over the past few decades, and so has the mandate of peacekeeping missions. It is no longer restricted to keeping peace between warring parties, but includes peace- and nation-building tasks. Unfortunately, resource allocation has failed to keep pace with the mandate expansion, and peacekeeping missions are called on to do more and more with less and less. It is therefore not surprising that the past few years have been operationally challenging for peacekeeping. An unusually large number of peacekeepers have lost their lives in the service of peace mandates, and the missions are overstretched, due to shortages of personnel and equipment. Our briefers have mentioned some of these challenges. During our two years on the Security Council, we have seen continued efforts to expand the mandates of peacekeeping missions without any concrete measures to bridge the resource gap that should be a real cause for concern to us. The concept of inter-mission cooperation is promoted not to increase the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions, but to cut down the resources available to individual missions. The cross-borrowing of equipment between missions in recent times is part of that trend. My delegation agrees that if several missions are deployed in a region, cooperation among neighbouring missions, including through exchanges of information, coordinated strategies on cross-border illicit trafficking of weapons, drugs and combatants, integrated approaches to disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation, and so forth, can enhance their effectiveness. Similarly, the adoption of regional and subregional strategies can help in delivering humanitarian aid. As the Council has already been doing, resource-management strategies with a cross-border perspective in crisis situations can be continued. Managing weapons collected from demobilized combatants could also be better conducted in regional settings. Such measures, however, should be crafted in consultation with mission leaderships and host countries; they cannot be imposed from Headquarters. However, inter-mission cooperation that is overly focused on resources will diminish its usefulness. Headquarters-driven sharing of critical mission assets will also compromise the ability of field commanders to deliver on their mandates. Moreover, the implementation of inter-mission cooperation faces substantial legal, political, and financial challenges. First, obtaining the collective consent of host nations in a disturbed area is a challenging prospect, with implications for the overall peace process. Secondly, the transfer of troops and equipment across missions would need to address financial issues, since budgetary allocations are mission-specific. Thirdly, such transfers would involve legal complexities pertaining to immunity, privileges and safeguards. Fourthly, troop-contributing countries will have to calibrate their positions on a case-by-case basis. Amending the memorandum of understanding templates may not resolve that matter to the satisfaction of one and all. In conclusion, as a long-standing troop contributor, India is ever ready to shoulder peacekeeping initiatives. We support the potential of inter-mission cooperation as a mechanism to enhance information exchange and integrated strategies in a regional context.

We extend our appreciation to the delegation of Morocco for convening this meeting. We also wish to commend you, Mr. President, for conducting the work of the Security Council’s Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations in an exemplary manner. We thank Under-Secretary- General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Hervé Ladsous, as well as Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, Ms. Ameerah Haq, for their respective briefings on inter-mission cooperation in peacekeeping operations. We appreciate the observations that they have made. As a troop-contributing country, South Africa values open and frank exchanges of views on matters that impact our troops, as well as on the efficacy of the peacekeeping missions themselves. This discussion is therefore most welcome. Allow us to briefly share our views specifically on inter-mission cooperation. Among the possible range of benefits that inter-mission cooperation brings to peacekeeping missions, it provides a useful tool for helping to restore stability in those peacekeeping missions that encounter unforeseen or unexpected challenges. Under such circumstances, inter-mission cooperation becomes a responsive tool but should not become an end in itself. Consequently, in the planning and conception phase, inter-mission cooperation must necessarily be time-bound. If a mission is deficient in any way other than for the reason that the situation is deteriorating on the ground, inter-mission cooperation will not serve as a substitute for addressing mission capacities. Mandates for peacekeeping missions must therefore be realistic and achievable at inception. That would also ensure that missions are adequately resourced in order to fully implement their mandates. Inter-mission cooperation is therefore a temporary or stop-gap measure to be drawn on at critical or substantive phases of peacekeeping missions. Inter-mission cooperation can also serve as appropriate support and enabler for predictable situations, such as bolstering support to election processes, sharing information across borders, enhancing situational awareness and for the purpose of training exercises. In such instances, it would be possible to determine standard operating procedures in order to effectively implement inter-mission cooperation. It is also possible to have a similar standard operating procedure for situations that involve unpredictable needs to enhance mission capacities during crises. Triangular cooperation among the Security Council, the Secretariat and the troop-contributing countries would be but one example of such a standard operating procedure when implementing inter-mission cooperation. That ensures that the relocation of strategic and other assets meets the concerns of all, especially the troop-contributing countries, and that all stakeholders contribute to a viable operation in the field. Inter-mission cooperation must always adhere to the key principles of peacekeeping, that is, first, the consent of the host State; secondly, impartiality; and thirdly, the non-use of force except in defence of the mandate. Information sharing regarding situational awareness in the coordination of joint operations in missions that share borders is a valued addition that support the work of peacekeeping missions. Additionally, inter-mission cooperation for missions in geographic proximity have the added advantage of allowing for joint training programmes, sharing emergency evacuation plans and assets, and joint planning meetings, among other things. Finally, while inter-mission cooperation has traditionally involved United Nations peacekeeping operations, we would also encourage a similar approach in strengthening hybrid and African Union-led peacekeeping missions.

We thank you, Mr. President, for convening this meeting on a very important dimension of United Nations peacekeeping. We also thank Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Hervé Ladsous, and Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, Ms. Ameerah Haq, for their very useful briefings. The management and success of United Nations peacekeeping hinge on partnerships. Partnership entails cooperation among Member States on broader policy framework issues and among the Security Council, the Secretariat and the troop-contributing countries (TCCs) on mandates and operations. Strong partnerships ensure the success of peacekeeping operations. Similarly, partnership and cooperation between missions operating in geographic proximity are important for addressing emergent needs and short- term goals. In many instances, such exchanges have proved decisive in addressing a crisis situation. As a troop-contributing country, Pakistan supports the sharing of human and material resources between neighbouring missions on a case-by-case basis. We have not shied away from committing our personnel and equipment to move from one mission to another. In 2010, when the situation in Côte d’Ivoire deteriorated, Pakistani troops from the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) proceeded to assist the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI). Our internal processes for authorizing that movement were completed expeditiously. We did not delay the transfer of Pakistani troops, despite serious logistical and operational issues. Later events proved that reinforcement from UNMIL was critical to the success of UNOCI operations during the crisis from 2010 to 2011. I would highlight the following five salient aspects of our perspective on inter-mission cooperation. First, inter-mission cooperation is an ad-hoc arrangement to make up for deficiencies in troop strength and critical assets in the wake of a crisis. The stop-gap nature of inter-mission cooperation cannot be overemphasized. The force requirements of every mission are carefully planned, and no mission works with surplus resources. Any transfer of resources should not compromise the donor mission’s operational capacity and safety. Strong linkages between mission efficacy, force requirements and inter-mission cooperation should be paid due attention. Secondly, an important aspect of inter-mission cooperation is the operational and administrative control of the assets being transferred. Questions with regard to operational control of the assets transferred and related administrative issues should be answered adequately. Each mission has its own dynamics that underpin, among other things, the calculation of the costs of contingent-owned equipment. Moving to a different mission entails a change in dynamics, which warrants the application of different financial modalities. One way of going around those complexities may be to consider providing some extra allowances to make up for the hardship and related problems. Similarly, the formulation of standard operating procedures and related drills of inter-mission cooperation is essential. Progress on standard operating procedures is still awaited. Thirdly, missions differ in their nature from one another owing to their particular mandate’s area of operations, politics, demography and trouble spots. There is no concept of a universal peacekeeper. Moreover, specific training is administered to troops as per their mission requirements, which may differ from mission to mission. From the perspective of TCCs, within domestic regulations it is procedurally impossible to seek approval to provide forces to two or three missions. Adequate time should therefore be given to the TCCs to secure the approval of their respective capitals for the requisite transfers. We highlight that point despite having completed our local procedures expeditiously for UNOCI. Fourthly, inter-mission cooperation is a contingency- based exercise. For the most part, it involves infantry units and certain enabling assets, such as helicopters. Due caution is advisable with regard to the transfer of special forces, engineering units and hospitals from one mission to another. If such an exchange is planned, we should come up with more permanent solutions. Finally, inter-mission cooperation does not obviate the need for a constant exchange of information and intelligence between neighbouring missions. We positively view the idea of biannual and triannual meetings between such missions so that the commands and senior leadership of the neighbouring missions are well versed in the challenges that they face. In conclusion, we would like to underscore that inter-mission cooperation should be an exception, not a norm. Such cooperation should be executed on a case-by-case basis to address emerging situations. Long-term remedial measures require permanent solutions based on due processes. Inter-mission cooperation should work around those processes and regulations, not against them.

I would first of all like to thank you, Mr. President, for having convened this briefing. I am also grateful for the comprehensive presentations on peacekeeping operations and inter-mission cooperation provided by Mr. Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and Ms. Ameerah Haq, Under-Secretary-General for Field Support. The situations where there are peacekeeping operations are complex and diverse in nature. While operations must be designed in such a way as to ensure coherence between the established mandates and the resources allocated, at times circumstances arise that exacerbate existing tensions and that present such operations with unexpected constraints in appropriately implementing their mandate. In the current situations, inter-mission cooperation is a tool that, in the short term, facilitates the exchange or joint use of resources between peacekeeping operations and that provides flexibility and timely support at times when critical gaps are identified. As part of a coordinated and coherent strategy in response to shortages or difficulties on the ground, it is important to be able to temporarily turn to inter-mission cooperation, taking into account financial and staff limitations and authorization with regard to assets and services. However, in order to ensure effective operational interaction, cooperation in areas such as exchanging information and experience gained must be sustained and coordinated, taking into account the needs identified by the countries concerned or by the missions in the region. Effective cooperation between missions must therefore be part of the planning and implementation of mandates so as to improve the understanding of the situation on the ground, in particular when facing common challenges in areas with a regional dimension. Activities such as the regular exchange of detailed reports on the military situation, establishing joint analysis centres and convening regular meetings between missions are important in developing integrated subregional strategies to promote regional peace and security. Inter-mission cooperation should take into account financial and staff constraints and should be implemented without undermining the original mandate of each mission. In order to ensure smooth implementation and positive outcomes, a coherent planning strategy must be developed that depends on the coordinated participation of the United Nations system, with contributing countries approving the use of troops and equipment and with the political will of the Governments of the host countries. An example of inter-mission cooperation is the stabilization of the border area between Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia, where the United Nations bodies present there enhanced their cooperation. We welcome the increased deployment of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire’s uniformed troops along the border with Liberia. We also acknowledge the significance of the measures announced by the United Nations Mission in Liberia, such as the increase in joint patrols and aerial reconnaissance missions. Those deployed missions should continue to enhance cooperation, information exchange, coordination and joint efforts so as to improve security in the border area. Institutional coordination and coherence are the bases for ensuring a credible presence and optimal results. In that regard, the coordination processes among the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office must be strengthened still further, if possible. In addition, joint processes among Special Representatives, representatives, Force Commanders, United Nations offices and country teams must also be continued. We also encourage troop- and police-contributing countries to consider using staff and equipment in neighbouring missions or cross-border operations, which should be set up in joint agreements with the United Nations. The continuing exchange of logistical resources, experienced staff and transport, as well as establishing mechanisms such as joint working groups or coordination and storage bases, are cooperation activities that should be carefully considered in order to ascertain the capacity available and its possible impact on each specific region. In conclusion, allow me to point out that in addressing this topic, the Security Council can help to improve the coordination of activities and the efficient use of the logistical and administrative resources available to the various missions so as to control crises and stabilize complex situations more effectively. We underscore the need to carry out an analysis, from the time of drawing up mandates, of possible temporary and unforeseen needs that missions may face. We must continue to promote cooperation between United Nations missions in order to strengthen political consistency and to improve the effectiveness of United Nations operations at the regional level. In that way, we will improve the capacity to provide an agile response without affecting the efficiency of each mission and the fulfilment of their respective mandates.

We thank you, Mr. President, for having convened this timely briefing to promote an exchange of views on cooperation between United Nations peacekeeping missions. We are also grateful for the concept paper that was circulated for this meeting. We note the presentations of Mr. Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary- General for Peacekeeping Operations, and Ms. Ameerah Haq, Under-Secretary-General for Field Support. As we have affirmed on other occasions, Guatemala attaches great importance to United Nations peacekeeping operations as an indispensable instrument for international peace and security. That also explains our desire and resolve to contribute to peacekeeping operations in Africa, the Middle East and Haiti. That participation has given us the opportunity to see how United Nations peacekeeping efforts have evolved both conceptually and in terms of operations. Given the increasing number of complex operations launched in recent years, the Organization faces a growing need for resources and has therefore had to face an unprecedented number of challenges. For my delegation, it is clear that any response to those challenges will require, among other things, the participation of the Security Council, troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat. One of those challenges is how best to improve cooperation between missions. While such cooperation has been carried out on an ad hoc basis for some time, there are still misgivings regarding the timeliness, requirements that must be met, the impact on the two or more participating missions, and its proper implementation. This means that, in spite of the apparent progress and general acceptance of the need for closer cooperation between missions, the progress that has been made in this area is still modest. In that regard, in line with the latest report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/66/19), we encourage the Secretariat to explore, in consultation with troop-contributing countries, all opportunities for and obstacles to inter-mission cooperation and to present them for consideration by the Council. Against the current backdrop, it cannot be denied that there is a need for greater inter-mission cooperation. It is needed as a result, first, of the budget realities in a world facing serious financial constraints, and, secondly, of the changing nature of peacekeeping operations, which are increasingly required to addressing trans-boundary conflicts. Furthermore, inter-mission cooperation must also take into account the preparatory measures that must be taken beforehand with regard to the legal and financial implications that such cooperation may have for troop-contributing countries. In that regard, we believe that standardizing or adopting agreements could be an option worth considering as long as any agreement on cooperation is the outcome of an exercise that takes the interests of all States involved into due account. At the same time, we believe that due attention must be paid to all regional factors in the planning and implementation of mission mandates in order to ensure effective inter-mission cooperation. It is essential to recall the lessons that can be drawn from past experience with regard to inter-mission cooperation. The information provided must be comprehensive and balance so as to ensure that interested Member States are able to take decisions that are based on specific data. In that context, information exchange is of particular relevance in those cases where two or more peacekeeping missions are located in the same region or may even share borders. Finally, we believe that the Security Council must play a leading role in promoting inter-mission cooperation. In any case, that role must be played with caution, respecting the individual mandates of each mission and the memorandums of understanding signed between the troop-contributing countries and the United Nations regarding the operation in question. Guatemala reiterates its support for United Nations peacekeeping operations and stands ready to participate in a creative and constructive manner in future discussions on this matter.

I wish to thank Moroccan presidency for the initiative to convene the this meeting to discuss the question of inter-mission cooperation. I would also like to thank Under-Secretaries-General Ladsous and Haq for their respective briefings. United Nations peacekeeping operations are an important way of maintaining international peace and security. At present, United Nations peacekeeping operations are facing a situation of increasing demand while resources are being put under increasingly heavy strain. The sudden outbreak of issues in hotspots and their interconnectedness have made the situation ever more challenging for United Nations peacekeeping operations. In recent years, United Nations peacekeeping operations, especially those that enjoy geographical proximity and whose mandates are connected in some way, have, as called for by the situation on the ground, cooperated in order to achieve complementarity in the use of resources. Such cooperation has enhanced flexibility in peacekeeping operations and achieved certain positive results. However, at the same time, inter-mission cooperation is also facing some specific issues with regard to establishing mechanisms and operating procedures. In that connection, I wish to make the following four points. First, China is in favour of international cooperation according to the situation on the ground and as required by a specific operation. However, specific authorization should be obtained for such cooperation from the Council beforehand, and it should abide by the fundamental principles governing peacekeeping operations, especially that of the consent of the host country. Secondly, in order to strengthen inter-mission cooperation, it is important first and foremost to ensure that the individual mandates are being effectively implemented. The Secretariat, in preparing for inter-mission cooperation, should first conduct a comprehensive assessment of the situation on the ground and carry out reasonable conceptual and planning activities. The purpose of inter-mission cooperation is to more effectively implement Council mandates. It is therefore necessary to avoid a situation where the capacity of an individual peacekeeping mission is negatively affected as a result of such cooperation. Thirdly, it is important to ensure that each peacekeeping operation receives adequate financial support and, at the same time, efforts should be made to achieve the optimal use of resources through proper cooperation among different missions. China is in favour of the efforts by the Department for Field Support to continue to implement global field support strategy and to consolidate resources among different missions in a timely and effective manner so as to make optimal use of the limited resources for peacekeeping. Fourthly, in the course of inter-mission cooperation, the Secretariat should strengthen integrated coordination so as to ensure that there is a seamless connection and transfer among the various parties and between the various steps. It is equally important to seek the views of troop-contributing countries in a timely manner and to strengthen contacts and communication with them. With regard to specific developments of inter-mission cooperation, the Secretariat should keep the Council informed in a timely manner.

I would like to thank you, Sir, for having given us the opportunity today to debate the important question of inter-mission cooperation in peacekeeping operations. I thank you, Sir, for the concept paper that you kindly circulated to the Council for this debate. Finally, I also thank Mr. Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and Ms. Ameerah Haq, Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, for their very useful briefings. Inter-mission cooperation has assumed greater importance at a time when peacekeeping operations are facing a number of problems, especially financial, due to the difficult global economic situation. United Nations concern about inter-mission cooperation is such that, since 2004, the Council has remained seized of the matter through presidential statements and resolutions. The complexity of establishing a peacekeeping operation has prompted the United Nations to reflect on appropriate measures to address possible emergency situations in a region where a peace mission is already deployed. The merit of such an initiative includes the reduced time and cost of deploying a new mission. The Security Council had recognized the need and the value of inter-mission cooperation when through resolution 1951 (2010), it authorized a temporary transfer from the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI). At the time, there was a need to deal with the deteriorating situation in Côte d’Ivoire, which posed a risk to the peace and security of the region. The two missions then worked together seamlessly to tackle the problem of illicit transboundary trafficking and manage refugee flows. Before that resolution, the Council, in its presidential statement of 25 March 2004 addressed cross-border issues in West Africa and requested the Secretary-General to “encourage the United Nations missions in West Africa to share information and their logistic and administrative resources as far as possible, without impeding the satisfactory execution of their respective mandates, in order to increase their effectiveness and reduce costs” (S/PRST/2004/7, p. 2). While welcoming that cooperation, we reiterate that we must not forget to consider a number of parametres, including operational effectiveness, compliance with initial mandates and the views of the troop-contributing countries. Indeed, a mission should be deployed to another country in a manner that avoids creating or promoting a resurgence of the insecurity that necessitated the mission’s establishment in the first country. The means used and the troops deployed must be identified within a determined time frame, as was fortunately the case with UNMIL and UNOCI. We also believe that greater effectiveness necessitates a judicious distribution and coordination of the required tasks, with a specific identification of responsibilities in the chain of command. Clearly, the desired result is to optimize the peace mission’s potential for success at a reduced cost. Inter-mission cooperation makes sense only if it is carried out within the same region. The temporary transfer of a portion of the equipment and the forces of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon to Syria to the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria was also a rapid response to a situation that required urgent action. It is well established that the cost and scarcity of certain types of equipment, such as aircraft vital to the success of peace missions, requires us to consider pooling them. Inter-mission cooperation can provide a solution to that problem. As in the redeployments in West Africa and the Middle East, we believe that cooperation should exist among missions operating in other parts of the world when there is a need, particularly in Central and East Africa with, of course, the consent of the troop-contributing countries and under a well-defined mandate. The Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support have significant roles to play in that area. In that regard, we welcome the publication of the 2012 United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual, which provides some details on inter-mission cooperation. Inter-mission cooperation should not only involve the redeployment of troops and equipment; it should go further to include the sharing of information and intelligence. Such action is especially useful in combating all forms of cross-border trafficking, which persists with total impunity, for example, on the border between Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. The same applies in combating the Lord’s Resistance Army, which calls for inter-mission cooperation in Central and East Africa among, for example, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic and the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur. My delegation welcomes such cooperation, which makes it possible to follow the movements of that dangerous criminal group and to track down its perpetrators. Beyond the will to accelerate and improve such action, we believe that above all, in redeploying a mission, the risks must be assessed in real time as part of operational planning. In that regard, any Council resolution authorizing the creation of a peacekeeping force must, in our view, take into account the environment in which it will be deployed, and include, if possible, a provision relating to cooperation between the new mission and other missions operating in the region. Such cooperation could then be adapted as the security situation developed. Such a precautionary measure is valuable in providing from the start a clear mandate based on a strategic concept that takes neighbouring missions and areas of cooperation into account, as well as defined responsibilities relating to the chain of command. My country is convinced that if inter-mission cooperation is well organized, it could become an effective tool to contribute to the deployment of a rapid intervention force in cases where it could take several months to put together a mission in normal circumstances.

I thank you, Sir, for the initiative of organizing this debate. I also thank the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support for their analyses. Peacekeeping operations are an emblematic activity of the United Nations and we must work continually to improve their efficacy. France supports the principle of inter-mission cooperation, which is one of the aspects of the consideration of the reform of peacekeeping operations that we launched in 2009, jointly with the United Kingdom. Inter-mission cooperation enhances the efficiency of peacekeeping operations by providing for improved management of available resources and by improving the response of the Organization when tackling crises or other emergencies. First of all, inter-mission cooperation optimizes the use of the means available for peacekeeping operations by facilitating the pooling or temporary redeployment of means, equipment or units belonging to missions that are deployed in the same region. When unforeseen events threaten to destabilize a country, inter-mission cooperation can be an adaptive and effective response that will provide personnel and equipment in a timely manner to missions that require them. Furthermore, inter-mission cooperation allows economy of scale in order to meet the requirements of good management and budgetary constraints. Such cooperation is a flexible mechanism of proven efficacy. I will provide three examples. In West Africa, cooperation between United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) during the post-electoral crisis played a leading role in increasing UNOCI’s level of personnel and attack helicopters at a time when UNOCI most required them. Such mission-cooperation was also used preventatively to support UNOCI during the Ivorian legislative elections of December 2011, and reciprocally to support UNMIL during the general elections in Liberia in November 2011. That cooperation ensured that one of the two missions could always count on the support of the other at a time when the Council was working towards an orderly reduction of the number of Blue Helmets deployed in West Africa. Inter-mission cooperation has also been useful in East Africa, where helicopters of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) were temporarily deployed to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). In the Middle East, the rapid deployment of the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria was made possible only by the logistical support provided by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and the redeployment of military observers, civilian personnel, equipment and vehicles from other missions. In order to make better use of this mechanism and to safeguard its flexibility, progress must be made in two areas. First, we believe that must take due account in our consideration of all the components of missions — military, police and civilian — and all types of resources, including major, unit and specialist equipment. The example of the deployment of helicopters from UNMIL to UNOCI should not obscure the fact that there are untapped opportunities for cooperation in other areas, such as joint planning, information sharing or logistical support. Beyond the necessarily temporary pooling of assets, in particular all-too-scarce aerial assets such as helicopters, inter-mission cooperation must be encouraged and even made systematic in order to pool logistical support structures, which will enable substantial streamlining of mission support, and to share information, which will enable the regional dimension of crises to be taken into account. This is particularly useful when missions are deployed on both sides of a border or when such complex processes as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration are under way. Inter-mission cooperation, along with cooperation between missions and peacebuilding offices or regional organizations, should allow for increased efficacy in the struggle against cross-border threats that could destabilize entire regions. Thus, in order to respond to the threat posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa, MONUSCO, UNMISS and the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur were encouraged to share their information and their experience in the context of the regional strategy developed by the United Nations. The cooperation between UNOCI and UNMIL entered a new phase this year through a closer sharing of information, coordinated operations launched on both sides of the border and the support of the Ivorian and Liberian Governments to strengthen their own security cooperation. This integrated strategy must be sustained and further strengthened in order to make progress in disarming combatants, securing the border zone between Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia, which the Council visited last May, and encouraging Ivorian refugees to return home. In terms of the second area that needs to see progress, we believe there is a need for a clearer legal basis and for inter-mission cooperation to be included in operational planning from the very start of operations. Using standard language in the memorandums of understanding could, for example, facilitate cooperation while respecting the mandates that have been assigned by the Security Council to each mission and, of course, ensuring close coordination with the troop-contributing countries. Inter-mission cooperation can and must still make further progress. It is in our common interest to streamline the means available to peacekeeping. Continuing to enhance the efficacy of peacekeeping is a duty of the Council and one way of paying tribute to the commitment of Blue Helmets of all nationalities, who often give their lives in service to peace.

As the leading voice on United Nations peacekeeping operations and a long-standing troop-contributing country, Morocco is ideally placed to organize this debate. We are grateful that you have taken this initiative during your presidency, Sir. We also appreciate the participation of top troop- and police-contributing countries in this debate today. The successes of peacekeeping rely on the contributions and sacrifices of peacekeepers, to whom the United States takes this opportunity to express our gratitude. We thank Under-Secretaries-General Ladsous and Haq for their briefings and for the tireless efforts of their departments. Turning to the subject before us, the United States supports greater inter-mission cooperation for three main reasons. First, in some cases, the only way for the United Nations to respond rapidly to an unexpected crisis or to establish a critical new mission is by drawing on resources from another existing mission. It is untenable to wait several months to generate fresh forces and procure essential equipment if thousands of lives and the credibility of the United Nations may hang in the balance. Secondly, there are certain threats that affect more than one mission in a subregion. It therefore stands to reason that they should cooperate to tackle that common threat. Thirdly, it simply does not make sense for each mission to create its own administrative and logistics support structure if economies of scale and efficiencies can be achieved through common services across several missions. For all these reasons, the United States is convinced of the need for greater inter-mission cooperation. But this is on the understanding that much work remains to be done to ensure that we do not help one mission by hurting another, we do not commit troop-contributing countries to one task when they had signed up for another, and we do not allow stop-gap measures to become substitutes for long-term planning and preparedness. Fortunately, there are positive examples to build on, but also hard lessons to be learned. The United Nations peacekeeping missions in West Africa have been among its most successful in recent memory. Part of that success stems from the cooperation among them. The missions in Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone have undertaken joint patrols and shared information to address common threats posed by rebel groups freely crossing borders. These missions have reinforced each other in times of crisis. For example, as we have heard, because of rapid reinforcements drawn from the United Nations Mission in Liberia, the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire was able to respond to the extremely precarious security situation that arose following the first round of Côte d’Ivoire’s 2010 presidential elections. The United Nations has made headway in countering the threat posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army because the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa and the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic are working together to address this threat that plagues the entire Great Lakes region. These missions would have made far less progress if they had worked in isolation. The scope and benefits of inter-mission cooperation are plainly evident, but the system is far from perfect, as we saw earlier in this year. UNMISS would not have been able to get to the remote areas of Jonglei, where security was rapidly deteriorating, if not for a reinforcement of helicopters obtained from MONUSCO. But many of those helicopters arrived only after the worst phases of the crisis had passed. The ad hoc nature of the system was not equipped to respond rapidly enough. We appreciate the Secretary-General’s intention to take a more strategic and predictable approach through the provision of common administrative and logistic support to missions through his global field support strategy. The strategy has already dramatically improved the effective and efficient sharing of scarce assets, such as aircraft, and has standardized and streamlined routine administrative functions across missions. We therefore look forward to the full implementation of all aspects of the strategy in coming years. In closing, as inter-mission cooperation becomes an increasingly important tool for United Nations field operations, we strongly urge the Secretariat to explore lessons learned and develop standard practices to enhance the speed of response, improve performance, account for costs in advance and capture efficiencies. Of course, inter-mission cooperation is neither a substitute for ensuring that each and every mission has the resources it needs to carry out its own mandates, nor a solution for addressing long-standing capacity gaps. Indeed, while the United States views inter-mission cooperation as an important mechanism to address the challenges faced by United Nations missions, the Council has a continuing responsibility to ensure that each mission can stand fully on its own. Our challenge then is to uphold that responsibility while also accruing benefits from the types of inter-mission cooperation highlighted here today. Sir Mark Lyall Grant (United Kingdom): I thank you, Mr. President, for convening this afternoon’s briefing on inter-mission cooperation and United Nations peacekeeping, and more generally for your active chairmanship of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations. I would like to thank Under-Secretary- General Hervé Ladsous and Under-Secretary-General Ameerah Haq for their briefings today. Over the past several years, inter-mission cooperation has become an important part of United Nations peacekeeping. We see this most visibly in the sharing of assets, such as helicopters and troops, between missions in response to crises. As many have said, the support that the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire received from its sister mission in Liberia in the aftermath of the contested Ivorian presidential elections is an excellent example of such inter-mission cooperation. Mr. Ladsous and Ms. Haq referred to many other such examples. But inter-mission cooperation is both wider and deeper than an asset surge in times of crisis. A new mission can be bolstered and deployed more quickly by the temporary transfer of resources from neighbouring missions. Often, speed of deployment is politically critical in such missions. We saw this in the example of the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syrian benefiting from staff redeployed from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for an urgent Syrian mission. Peacekeepers operating in the same region can profit immensely from sharing risk analysis, from conducting joint planning and operations against common threats, and from sharing experiences of conflict prevention and peacebuilding work in communities living in border regions. Transferring military assets and personnel, civilian expertise, experience and planning is a natural response to challenges that escalate quickly to crisis point and which may not respect international borders. The Security Council should recognize and welcome that reality. Mr. Kapoor, who spoke on behalf of India, suggested that inter-mission cooperation is promoted not to increase the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions but to cut down the resources available to individual peacekeeping missions. I do not recognize that description. Effective use of resources is, of course, important, but the motivation behind inter-mission cooperation is greater effectiveness. The Security Council saw for itself in West Africa that force commanders on the ground are actually often the driving force behind inter-mission cooperation, and that it is capitals that put a brake on such cooperation. In that context, I pay particular tribute to the flexibility shown by Pakistan, whose troops were involved on that occasion. We have heard several strong examples to illustrate the benefits of inter-mission cooperation this afternoon. The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic People’s Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) and the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa have been working together to tackle the threat posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army, including by establishing a joint radio network for information sharing. MONUSCO helicopters provided critical support to UNMIS during the crisis in Jonglei in January of this year. The United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei, UNMISS and the African Union-United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur are set to begin monthly coordination meetings to support the Joint Border Verification And Monitoring Mechanism. As I mentioned, military observers were redeployed from across the region to ensure rapid deployment of the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria in May earlier this year. The United Kingdom recognizes that some Council members have reservations about inter-mission cooperation. We understand that inter-mission cooperation, while critical to effectiveness, usually offers only temporary solutions and it should not prevent us from addressing more deep-rooted structural deficiencies faced by individual missions; nor should it be used to avoid addressing shortages of critical assets which affect several missions. But we are confident that inter-mission cooperation as currently practiced by the United Nations adheres to peacekeeping principles. Appropriate and necessary consultation with troop-contributing countries will continue, of course, to take place, and final authority will, of course, remain with the Security Council. So while we understand why delegations may wish to express their concerns and set down their constraints, we feel that they should not be overemphasized at the expense of a concept that has led to more effective peacekeeping, which we should all support. We know that armed groups posing a threat to security and stability frequently live and operate in border areas. We have held debates in this Chamber to consider the insecurity caused by the illicit flow of weapons, drugs and people across porous borders that separate countries affected by or at risk from conflict. We know that borders may often be breached by flows of refugees, which can be a cause of greater instability. We must therefore ensure that peacekeeping operations on either side of such borders have greater flexibility to share resources, expertise and planning in developing joint approaches to tackling such challenges. Peacekeeping operations must be able to rapidly surge assets to the point of a crisis. We remain open to proposals to make inter-mission cooperation easier to achieve in order to ensure that peacekeeping missions are more effective and sustainable.

We thank Under-Secretaries-General Hervé Ladsous and Ameerah Haq for their thorough briefings. The theme of inter-mission cooperation remains very topical. We support the desire of the Secretariat to be prepared for the last-minute deployment of missions and negative developments in the field, especially when, in many areas of support to peacekeeping operations, there truly is a shortage of resources. We all remember the Syrian experience, when United Nations observers had to be deployed on short notice. We thank the Secretariat for its promptness and the troop- contributing countries for their flexibility in providing personnel. It is our view that United Nations peacekeeping operations must have enough of their own resources to execute their mandates. In that regard, the relevant United Nations bodies must adopt a responsible approach. The Security Council must give missions realistic mandates; the Secretariat must make balanced proposals on the composition of missions, based on objective assessments and forecasting of developments in the field; and the Fifth Committee must meet resource requirements by approving sufficient but not inflated budgets. Inter-mission cooperation, as a temporary mechanism, has shown its effectiveness in a number of emergency situations. However, broad application of those methods, and especially the standardization of parameters of such cooperation, requires a number of political, legal and financial conditions to be met. Among those, we would include the consent of the receiving country for a change, even a temporary change, of the configuration of an international presence, the preparedness of the troop-contributing countries for troop redeployments to other missions, and the harmonization of existing United Nations administrative and budget procedures. Of great significance is the consent of the Security Council to the transfer of personnel and resources. Strengthening the military component of one mission and weakening another in fact means altering their mandates. The necessary legitimacy for such processes can be granted only by Council decision. Inter-mission cooperation has already been consolidated in existing practices of work in peacekeeping operations. However, in order to move forward, we need a detailed work-up of all general, non-specific parameters of inter-mission cooperation as well as inter-State coordination of them in the main United Nations bodies. From the political and operational standpoints, it is important to calculate all possible scenarios for developments in countries where those missions are deployed. Every peacekeeping operation must be prepared at any time to fully execute its mandate. There should be no threat to the safety of the Blue Helmets. Indeed, in the majority of cases, peacekeepers and equipment will be redeployed into even more tense and dangerous circumstances. With respect to logistical support of missions, relevant reform proposals must not have an impact on the quality of services provided by peacekeeping operations. The desire to optimize the use of resources or to broaden opportunities for their more flexible application must have a reasonable limit.

I thank you, Mr. President, for convening today’s meeting and for bringing this important issue to the Council. I would also like to thank Under-Secretaries-General Ameerah Haq and Hervé Ladsous for their briefings on the matter. Since the deployment of the first operation in 1948, both the concept and reality of United Nations peacekeeping have evolved continuously. One of the relatively new elements is inter-mission cooperation. I would like to make three points today on that topic — first, on the overall concept of inter-mission cooperation and the major opportunities it provides; secondly, on the preconditions and limits the concept is facing; and finally, on inter-mission cooperation beyond the military aspect of peacekeeping. On my first point, United Nations peacekeeping is a joint effort of all Member States, with special responsibilities for the Security Council, the Secretariat, troop- and police-contributing countries and other major stakeholders. In certain circumstances, inter-mission cooperation can be a useful and efficient tool of mutual support for missions that are located in geographical proximity to each other. Inter-mission cooperation can save resources and enhance the efficiency of peacekeeping missions by using and creating synergistic effects. That can be achieved by the temporary shift of critical assets between missions. We welcome recent examples of inter-mission cooperation in the Sudan and South Sudan, especially among the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur and the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei, and also between the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire in West Africa. But inter-mission cooperation is more than sharing assets or supporting other missions with troops. Inter-mission cooperation can also be achieved by sharing information, coordinating activities and developing common concepts and strategies within the scope of missions’ respective mandates. For the future, we should develop creative ideas within that field and expand the functions and areas in which inter-mission cooperation takes place. To focus only on the temporary exchange of helicopters for troops is too narrow. Secondly, inter-mission cooperation can be a tool to enhance the efficiency of a mission or to cope with an unforeseen crisis or shortage. It should not be a permanent substitute for missing assets and capabilities, and it must not be an excuse for understaffing or underfunding a mission. Mutual support with military assets is a complex undertaking that has to be well prepared. In addition to the indispensable consent of the parties, clear command and control arrangements, sufficient logistical and medical support, and knowledge of the terrain are key to the implementation process. Thirdly, we should not limit our understanding of inter-mission cooperation to the military component of a peacekeeping operation. Closer cooperation between the civil components — for instance, in the fields of early peacebuilding, human rights policy, security sector reform or other areas — can also be envisaged. We therefore support an exchange of best practices, not only at Headquarters but also horizontally at different missions. Finally, as suggested by Mr. Ladsous, we would welcome a comprehensive evaluation of inter-mission cooperation by the Secretariat that would enable the Council, troop- and police-contributing countries, and other major stakeholders to further develop the concept and implementation of inter-mission cooperation.

I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for convening this meeting on peacekeeping inter-mission cooperation, as well as for the concept paper on the topic. We are also grateful to Mr. Ladsous and Ms. Haq for their informative presentations. Peacekeeping is a unique mechanism and an indispensable tool for our collective actions to maintain international peace and security. While gradually evolving into a more complex institution with multifaceted mandates, peacekeeping missions constantly encounter a number of challenges that negatively affect the implementation of their primary tasks, especially in the light of the dynamically changing political and security environment in certain parts of the world. Today’s meeting therefore provides a useful opportunity to further deliberate on ways to increase the effectiveness of peacekeeping, with a focus on the notion of inter-mission cooperation. Notwithstanding the nature of conflicts and the challenges they present, peacekeeping operations have a specific geographic scope. They have mandates that guide and provide them with a clear vision of their tasks. Mandates must therefore be realistic and achievable, and they must be tailored and constantly adapted to the realities on the ground. Most importantly, peacekeepers must be fully equipped with all the operational and logistical capabilities necessary to carry out their mandates. Increased coordination and cooperation among missions operating in geographic proximity to one another are an important requirement for making them more efficient and cost-effective in the implementation of their respective mandates, in particular on issues having cross-border or regional dimensions. Many instances of such cooperation have proven to be relevant and useful. However, there are apparent differences and cautiousness among Member States with regard to proposals on elevating the issue to the next level, such as the elaboration of definitions and the standardization and codification of inter-mission cooperation. I would like to share our approach to the issue. All peacekeeping operations are set up to prevent violence and preserve peace. In that sense, coordination and cooperation among neighbouring missions on challenges that transcend the area of their deployment should be regarded as a normal, logical and continuous process. That process includes information exchanges, joint assessment and planning, the development of common strategies, joint patrolling, monitoring and training, and shared border responsibility, and so on. Such a level of inter-mission cooperation should be endorsed by the Council and envisaged in the mandates of the respective peacekeeping operations. Needless to say, joint activities on cross-border challenges can be authorized only upon the agreement of the central authorities of recipient States and must be coordinated with troop-contributing countries. In the context of today’s deliberations, the meaning of the term “inter-mission cooperation” has been narrowed to refer to the process of transferring enabling assets and contingents from one mission to another in order to swiftly respond to a worsening security situation and to fill existing capability gaps. We view such cooperation, however — unlike the cooperation I have just mentioned on cross-border or regional challenges — as a temporary and short-term measure applied on a case-by-case basis. Apart from the Council’s authorization, the consent of both the recipient State and the troop- and asset-contributing country is a prerequisite in each case. One mission’s capabilities must not be used as a permanent substitute for the operational and logistical deficiency of another. As a temporary stop-gap measure, the exchange of assets and contingents is feasible between missions in geographic proximity to one another. Therefore, their mandates can envisage a certain flexibility for larger inter-mission cooperation and rapid operational adjustments in the face of a deteriorating situation on the ground, provided that the legal, financial and procedural implications of such adjustments are calculated in advance. In order to inform the decision of the Security Council in a timely manner, missions should elaborate different scenarios and options based, inter alia, on regular threat assessments and on prognoses of possible political and security developments in the area of their deployment. In conclusion, Mr. President, I would like to express my delegation’s appreciation for your leadership of the Council’s Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations and your efforts to hold focused thematic discussions, involving both Council members and the wider United Nations membership, on different aspects of peacekeeping, including last week’s discussion on inter-mission cooperation.

I shall now make a statement in my national capacity as the representative of Morocco. At the outset, I would like to thank Mr. Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and Ms. Amira Haq, Under-Secretary- General for Field Support, for their comprehensive briefings. I would also like to warmly commend the personnel and the peacekeeping forces for their efforts on the ground. They accomplish their noble mission in circumstances that are often very difficult, often at the cost of their lives. Despite the current international financial crisis, it goes without saying that peacekeeping missions and operations remain an effective and irreplaceable instrument that needs to be developed and maintained on an ongoing basis. The complexity and multifaceted nature of peacekeeping operations require United Nations action on a number of levels, which in turn requires a coordination and cooperation strategy among missions, not to mention the need to develop a rapid- response military reserve that can intervene in urgent crisis situations. Today’s debate seeks to canvass the opinions of Council members regarding inter-mission cooperation with a view to developing the concept of collective ownership of these mechanisms and to reaching an agreement on what concrete measures to take. In the concept paper distributed to Council members, we have tried to highlight a number of aspects of potential cooperation. Through debate in the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, we have also tried to highlight inter-mission cooperation, particularly with respect to the protection of civilians through rapid intervention in emergency and humanitarian crisis situations. The Council’s visit to West Africa in February highlighted the added value and benefits of such cooperation, which is why we thought it necessary to hold this debate today. At its meetings on 23 March and 7 December, the Working Group considered various forms of cooperation. Member States were briefed on inter-mission cooperation by representatives of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS), who emphasized that this useful tool offers some short-term advantages, particularly in emergency situations. In their briefings to the Security Council, the Working Group, the Fourth Committee and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the representatives of the Secretariat underscored the increased use by DPKO and DFS of inter-mission cooperation as an effective mechanism for designing and optimizing the use of available resources. That mechanism has enabled us to temporarily deal with crises and fill the gaps in various peacekeeping operations operating in the same regions. Specific cases, such as in Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, South Sudan, Abyei in the Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, have proved the relevance of the mechanism. Those actions would not have been possible without the cooperation and understanding of the troop- contributing countries (TCCs), which made it possible to rapidly redeploy their personnel, military equipment and supplies, thereby contributing to protecting and saving the lives of many civilians. The cases I mentioned illustrate the usefulness of inter-mission cooperation and the challenges it faces. One of the lessons learned in such situations is the importance of early planning and political consultations for ensuring the effectiveness of inter-mission cooperation. Such planning enables early commitments to be agreed with TCCs, which in turn strengthens the possibility of using this mechanism when it is needed. While inter-mission cooperation can provide a rapid response in boosting capacities that are very under- equipped, it is still an ad hoc mechanism and temporary solution for very specific situations. Such cooperation can be affected by the capacity of missions at both the receiving and the sending ends, since transferring equipment and personnel could lead to a vacuum between the two. Success in such types of cooperation depends on a number of interdependent factors, such as the practicality of the peacekeeping mandates created by the Security Council and the necessary cooperation between the Security Council and the TCCs, the Secretariat and the host countries. We are mindful of the fact that inter-mission cooperation is a work in progress that is driven by day- to-day practice and the specific nature of each particular mission. It is enriched by the mutually beneficial partnership between the TCCs and the United Nations. Today’s debate is one pillar in that process, which we hope will be followed up and contribute, going forward, to strengthening peacekeeping around the world. Morocco will continue to be a traditional partner with the United Nations in order to enrich and develop this debate. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.