S/PV.691 Security Council

Nothing could be more pleasant than to start one's public duties by performing an act ofcourtesy. 1wish to discharge that dutY by paying a full and sincere tribute to my distinguished predecessor Sir Leslie Knox Munro, the representative of New Zealand, who, true to the briHiant traditions of that young and progressive state and to the part it has played in the United Nations since the Conference at San Francisco, has presided over our debates with judicial wisdom, consummate diplomacy and tact, and irreproachable impartiality. 2. Fate decreed that he should end his term of office as President by proposing the item which appears on our agenda and which reflects the deep concern of mankind at the present time. 3. The authority of the United Nations and the Security Council in particular, which performs its duties under the terms ofthe Charter and in the name of the Organization, is a sure pledge that nothing shaH disturb our equanimity in the performance of our work for peace. 1 shall discharge my office in the knowledge of this fact and in the confidence that 1 shaH be able to rely on the co-ope-

Mr. President, 1 wish to thank you sincerely for the remarks which you have made about my country and about me, remarks which you have delivered with your customary generosity and eloquence. May 1 also say how much 1 welcome you as President, and inyourcapacity as representative ofyour great country, Peru, which is an ancient State and a State of2reat interest to New Zealand since it is a countrv whose coasts are also washed by the waters of the great Pacific Ocean. Accordingly, 1 welcome you to the presidency, which 1 know you will occupy with much distinction. Adoption of the agenda S. The PRESIDENT (translatedJrom Spanish): We will DOW proceed with the adoption of the agenda.

1 request the President that a separate vote be taken on each item, that is to say a vote on the inclusion of item 2, and a vote on item 3 of the provisional agenda.

Voting by division is permissible under the rules of procedure. 8. If no representative objects to the adoption of the first. item, 1 shall regard it as adopted.

Mr. President, item 1 on our pTovisional agenda is entitled .. Adoption ofthe agenda". y ou said that there are no objections to this item. 1 was not able to say anything on this question. 1 request that separate votes he taken on the adoption of items 2 and 3.

The request for a vote item by item is granted. 1 therefore put to the vote the adoption of item 2 of the provisional agenda. A vote was taken by show oJ hands. InJavour: Belgium, Brazil, France, Iran, New Zealand, Peru, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America. Against: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Abstaining: China. Item 2 was adopted by 9 votes to J with J abstention. Il. Sir LesUe MUNRO (New Zealand): Point of order. 1take it that in adopting item 2 ofthe provisional agenda, the intent ofthe Security Council is the same as that ofits ast meeting, namely, that we shall not proceed to item 3, 13. We will DOW vote on the adoption of item 3 of the provisional agenda. A vote was taken by show of hands. Infavour.. Belgium, Brazil, France, Iran, New Zealand, Peru, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. Against.. China. Item 3 was adopted by 10 votes to 1. The agenda was adopted.

Under the heading of explanation of vote, 1 should like to say that the United States voted to inscribe agenda item 3 in spite of the fact that, as 1 said previously, it is a preposterous cold war fraud without the slightest basis in facto We voted to inscribe it because we welcome a discussion of it, and we believe that a discussion of it will throw a very revealing and somewhat ghastly light on the motives of those who make such a proposition. 15. Mr. SARPER (Turkey) 1 shaH be extremely brief in explaining my vote. 1 want to repeat the proviso in my statement at our meeting on 31 January [690th meeting, para. 57] - namely, that our affirmative vote on item 3 should not be construed as approvaI of the wording of paragraph 3 of the agenda. vement,

1 explained at the last meeting ofthe Security Council the reasons why the Soviet Union delegation voted against the inclusion in the agenda of the item proposed by the New Zealand representative. Those reasons can be briefly summarized as follows. 17. The New Zealand proposaI reduces the whole question to a mere cease-fire confined to a smaH group of Chïnese coastal islands; but the problem to be considered by the Security Council is much more complicated. Since the New Zealand proposaI avoids the more important problem of eliminating the causes which have led to the Far Eastern tension, the Soviet Union delegation does not consider that any useful purpose will be served by debating this item. de la côte, alors que la question que le Conseil de sécurité doit tante la ce 18. For these reasons, the Soviet delegation has at this meeting also voted against inclusion of this item in the agenda. question

1 must refer to the decision that the Council took at its 690th meeting on the item proposed by New Zealand, under which the representative ofthe People's Republic ofChina \Vas invited to take part in our discussion. :W. The Secretariat has circulated among representatives of the Security Council document S/3358, containing the text of the Secretary-General's cablegram transmitting the Council's invitation as weil as the reply from the Government of the People's Republic of China declining that invitation. 21. Sir Leslie MUNRO (New Zealand): My Government profoundly deplores the reply of the Central People's Government to the invitation extended by this Council. Her Majesty's Government in New Zealand attaches high importance to the powers and the functions of this Council. In commencing and continuing our present initiative, we shaH not let ourselves be discouraged by the present situation. We are confident that in inscribing the present item on the Council's agenda, we have conformed to the purposes and principies of the Charter, whose fuifilment and observance mean so much to mankind and to a1l States. great and small. 22. The initiative taken in this Council has focused the attention of the world on the situation in the off-shore islands, and on the consequences attendant on a continuance of hostilities. 1 am confident that a1l those with responsibility in this matter will pause and consider in the light of what has been said in this CounciI. Indeed, they have aIready paused and considered. It is unbelievable that this should not continue to be their attitude until a solution is achieved. 23. It is rather to the reply of the Central People's Government, than to the subject matter of the item itself, that l ,\cish to direct my present remarks. Mr. Chou En-lai's communication must, however, be considered in the context of the declared -:,ojective of the New Zealand item. This objective could not, 1think, have been made more clear than it was by me, and by other representatives who supported the New Zealand initiative, during the debate on the adoption of the agenda at the 6891h and 690th meetings of the Council. 24. As 1 stated then, our objective is simply to bring about a cessation of hostilities in the offshore islands. The representative of Brazil rightly described our initiative as" conciliatory" [690th Meeting, para. 41]. "There is no question," in the words of the representative of the 25. In its reply [S/3358], the Central People's Government has ignored these careful explanations of our intentions. It has done so despite the faet, which is accepted by aIl members of the Council, and indeed by the Central People's Government as weil, that international peace and se(:urity in the area are in danger. It can scarcely be disputed that a cessation of hostilities in the offshore islands would bring about a substantial lessening of this tension. In these circumstances my Government deeply regrets the negative attitude of the Central People's Government to the invitation extended by the Security CounciI. 26. The unqualified encouragement given us by a large majority of members of this Council has confirmed my Government in its view that our initiative was timely and that it was necessary. Our objective is still a cessation of hostilitie5 in the offshore islands. It would be idle to pretend that the attitude of the Central People's Government has not made the attainment of that objective more difficult. At the same time, Mr. Chou En-lai's reply has underscored the danger that, if the present hostilities are not brought to an end, they may spread into a wider conflagration. 27. There are, of course, many ways in which our objective might be secured. 1 am confident that until a solution is reached, all Governments which, like my own, are concerned to ensure the maintenance of peace in the Pacifie area, will work actively towards this end. 28. Following their recent meeting, the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth expressed their conviction that incidents should be avûided while means were sought for a peaceful outcome. As long as the present tension continues, the utmost restraint is essentiaI. At the same time, it remains the firm belief of my Government that a termination of the hostilities in the offshûre islands is an indispensable step towards the reduction of international tension and should continue to be our first objective. A solution of this difficult problem will require the unremitting application of patient diplomacy and wise statesmanship. 29. My Government, for its part, will keep this question under constant examination. We shall not relax our efforts to end a situation whose dangers are now obvious to aIl. The President of the United States, who has demonstiated in word and deed that he is a man of peace, has summed up our aims in a sentence. "The purpose," as he said a few days ago, "is honestly and hopefully to prevent war." ~ 31. From the speeches of aIl those who voted in favour of the invitation to the Government of the People's Republic of China to be represented at our further discussion of the New Zealand item, it emerged quite clearly, 1 think, how sincere was the desire here in the Council to help bring about a cessation of hostilities, not only because it was something desirabie in itself but because we felt, as Sir Leslie Munro has just recailed, that the use of force could settle none of the problems that beset that part of the world. 32. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom therefore deeply regrets the response of the Chinese People's Government to the invitation of the Security Couneil. This invitation was reasonable in itself and laudable in its objective. It was designed, as 1 have said, to bring about the stopping of the fighting and that, in the view of Her Majesty's Government and, 1 believe, of the world at large, must be the primary objective. If the Chinese People's Government had accepted the Security Council's invitation, it would certainly have increased the prospects of fA peaceful solution of the problem now before the Council, and its reply is, to say the least, unhelpful. 33. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom is in close and constant touch about the situation with other interested Governments. The Commonwealth as a whole has recently had the situation under close review. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom stands ready to consider seriously any concrete propoi>a!s which may provide a possibility of composing differences. But the immediate aim, as 1 have said many times before, and it bas been said many times round this table, is to stop the fighting before it can spread any further. 34. Urgent as this task is, it is clear to me that there is no use in our trying to rush matters here. We must proceed with care and allow Governments due time for study and consultation. Equaily, it is mcumbent on aIl concerned to do aU they can to see that the fighting is stopped and the risk of incidents is reduced. 35. To the extent that our proceedings here succeed in raising this question to the level of calmness and serenity, we shall, 1 suggest, be helping to achieve our objectives -the objectives of the Security Council-which are the composition of differences and the reduction of threats to the peace. It seems to me, therefore, that the Council

During this Council's meeting on 31 Januaryl955 [690th meeting], the aim of my delegation, in voting in favour ofthe inscription on the agenda of the item proposed by the New Zealand delegation, was to co-operate with other members of the Council in trying to seek a peaceful and practical way of eliminating the dangerous situation existing in the area of certain islands off the coast of the mainland of China. With this in view, we shared the opinion of the New Zealand delegation, as weil as that of the great majority of the members of this Council, to the effect that the situation, the continuance of which was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, should be eliminated promptly and effectively. 37. 1 think it would be correct to add that, regardless of the ditferent positions adopted by the different delegations on this matter, the fact that a troubled situation does exist in the area in question has not been disputed. The enthusiastic support given to the New Zealand proposai, and the speeches made after its adoption by the rnajority of the delegations represented ,on the Council, were undoubtedly a dear expression of our hopes for an early airing of the situation with a view to seeking constructive solutions. 38. We have now been informed by the Secretary- General that the authorities of the People's Republic of China did not see fit to cornply with the views expressed by the overwhelming majority of the Security Council. 39. In view ofthe concern which we feel in the dangerous situation which unfortunately continues to exist in the area in question and in view of the hopes which we had placed in the course adopted by the Security Council, this negative attitude has been a cause of disappointment to my delegation. In taking note of the communication of the Secretary-General relative to the negative answer of the authorities of the People's Republic of China to the views ofthe Security Council, 1feel it necessary to express the regret which this action has caused to my Government. 40. Having thus summed up the views of my delegation, 1 wish to state that in the present circumstances the troubled situation in the area in question continues to he considered by us as a cause of concern and that my delegation shares the views of those who, within the spirit of the New Zealartd proposai, aim at an early cessation of hostilities in this region as a major contribution towards the lessening of the existing tension and the maintenance of peace and security. 41. Mr. De BARROS (Brazil) (translatedfrom French): Two weeks ago when the Soviet Union delegation requested that the Security Council be summoned urgently to consider the alleged aggression of the United States against the People's Republic of China, the Brazilian delegation thought that this sudden move was designed 43. The document [8/3358] which contains tht reply refl~tR the strong feelings raised by the conftict to which we are trying to put an end, contains sorne improper and contradictory statements which we must not pass over in silence. In considering them, however, we shall not let ourselves be led astray by unjustifiable sentiments; nor shaU we depart from the moderation necessary in diplomatic negotiation and imposed upon us by the dignity of our offi.ce. The only desire of the Brazilian delegation is to contribute, so far as it is able, to a solution likely to ease the grave tension in the Far East. What we say here is dictated by the sole desire to restore peace and avert the threat of a new w('lr!d conflict. 44. The Prime Minister of the Peking Government has replied to us that it is the desire of his Government '.' to ease the tension in the Far East, eliminate the threat to the security of China ", and put an end to what he caUs "the United States aggression". However, the way he has chosen to achieve those purposes is not our way but that of the Soviet Union. He supports" fully " the USSR draft resolution, and at the same time rejects the New Zealand proposaI. The aim of that proposai, however, was to secure the .:essation of hostilities in the Formosa Straits, the effect of which would have been, to use the expression actually employed by Foreign Minister Chou En-lai, to ease the tension in the Far East. 45. To accuse the United Nations of seeking to intervene in the domestic affairs of China would be to misrepresent an effort which merely attempts to relieve international tension. We were convinced that the scope and moral force of the proposaI were such that it would not arouse any objection. It amounted to a conciliatory invitation which was to precede a broad and pacific gesture, the significance of which made it the most important in the whole long Far Eastern conflict: a representative of the People's Republic of China was invited to come and sit down with us to discuss the cessation of hostilities in the Formosa Straits. No shorter, surer or quicker way could be found ofputting an end to a dangerous situation which threatens world peace and may lead us to a new war with aIl its accompanying horrors. 46. The State 1 represent recognizes the Government of the Republic of China and maintains diplomatic relations with it. There can be no doubt concerning the Brazilian Government's stand in the conftiet between the two Chinas. However, we do not shut our eyes to the 47. In order to prevent such a disaster, though we are leaving it to time and to the natural course of politieal events to bring a final solution to these basic conflicts, we are now searching for a compromise solution which at the worst would not tend to exacerbate them. If Communist China and Nationalist China accepted this solution, both would be assured that they would not be threatened by armed attack in the future. Neither side would be able to use armed force to attain its ends. The door would be left open for political negotiation to reach final agreement. 48. Past experience should encourage us to follow this course. In Indonesia, in Palestine, particularly in Greece and Kashmir, and in other parts of the world, the United Nations has been able by its efforts and decisions to achieve an armistice as a first step towards the restoration of peace. This is our task. We must not widen the chasm but must bridge it as often as we can, however deep it may seem. 49. At any rate we must not delude ourselves. The situation in the Far East is unquestionably serious. Once again in this tormented century the threat of war hangs over the world. We must therefore make a new effort to maintain peace and security in international relations, and we are already fully aware of our responsibilities. 50. Throughout the hard tests to which it has been put since its creation the United Nations has maintained its moral authority and its integrity of principle. It is to the United Nations that mankind looks with hope in hours of stress. Through its inspiration and by virtue of the principles of the Charter, partial conflicts have been .contained before they became general. 51. These past experiences should inspire us to make new and brave attempts. The dividing line which separates us from Communist China has now been established along a determined longitude. This is a line which cannot be broken. Wars are all the more tragic when caused by false stands, misunderstandings and ambiguity. False stands, misunderstandings, miscalculations and ambiguity led to the wars of 1914 and 1939, to mention this century alone. The peoples paid wi~h their lives for the mistakes of tyrants. 52. We are faced with a situation which requires determination and caution. The New Zealand representative's views have lost none of their force, and we are still prepared to support them. In view of the situation created by the People's Republic of China, the members of the

1 marvel at the mildness of the statement made by the representative ofNew Zealand. 1 single out his statement for comment because he has taken the lead in this matter and has in fact set the tone of this debate. Hitherto 1 have been under the impression that New Zealanders can calI a spade a spade. The representative of New Zealand has tried to lead this Security Council out of the world of hard facts. He has tried to lead us to escape into the soft atmosphere of Alice in Wonderland. 55. The reply of the Soviet puppets of Peking to this Council has nothing in common with the noble traditions of the Chinese people or with the high ideals of the United Nations. It is brutal in substance and barbarous in language. It is an insult to the Security Council. 1 believe it should be expurgated from the records of the United Nations. 56. During the two weeks which have elapsed since we last met, my Government has withdrawn its garrison from sorne of these off-shore islands, namely, the Tachens. What is the result? The result is this: Peking threatens to use the Tachens for the military invasion and conquest of Taiwan. Appetite grows with eating. ft should be c1ear to the peoples of the free world that in the face of the aggression of international communism, retreat only invites further aggression. 1 urge the Security Council again today as 1 did on 31 January [690th meeting] to muster enough courage to face the basic and monstrous fact of the aggression of international communism in the Far East.

The French delegation has noted with regret the refusaI of the Government of the People's Republic of China to send a representativeto take part in the Security Council's discussions on the situation in the Strait of Formosa. Our invitation was extended unconditionally and in entire good faith. Its acceptance by the Peking Government would have implied no renunciation, whether explicit or tacit, of either its legal or polhical position. The Security Council, being rightly concerned over the threat which the situation prevailing in that area of the world might constitute to international peace and security, had felt that that situation could not be usefully examined without the participation of aIl the parties most interested in its peaceful settlement. We were not summoning the Peking Government before our tribunal, but trying to secure its participation in the joint effort to find the most effective means of putting an end to a dangerous tension, an effort in which the first step would have been the suspension ofhostiiities on both sides of the Strait. In the calmer atmosphere thus established, the way would have been open to seek an arrangement more lasting and more satisfactory to all. 62. The representative of New Zealand has reminded us that this aim can be achieved in more than one way. The Charter procedure does not exc1ude diplomatie action. The two must, on the contrary, complement and support ,each other. If the free play of the one is prevented by a temporary obstacle. the function of the other is to try to circumvent that obstacle. 63. Our public discussions, with all their temptations to indulge in propaganda. do not always provide the oost setting for a useful consideration of problems. It has been past experience that discreeter methods have proved more effective. There are situations which traditional diplomacy is better equipped to deal with than we are. Its results require final United Nations sanction. but we must do nothing which might make the task of those engaged in it more difficult. The time demands prudence and patience. and these must guide an our steps in the persevering search for peace.

When the Security Council decided at its last meeting to consider the New Zealand proposai for a cessation of hostilities in 65. Now, the Chinese Communists have declined. The United States shares the disappointment of the free world because of this action. It is bound to hamper the achievement of a cessation of hostilities in the area. The rejection of the invitation by the Chinese Communist regime is not only rude; it also wilfully distorts the meaning and purpose of the New Zealand item. Hs allegations of aggressive and interventionist action by the United States are, to put it mildly, contrary to facto Even the least optimistic of us was entitled to expect something better in the way of response from Peking. Once again, the Chinese Communists show their contempt for the principles and the authority of the United Nations. 66. The United States supports the initiative of the representative of New Zealand because we sincerely desire to eliminate a situation which clearly endangers international peace and security. We are convinced that the Security Coulllcil must continue to seek the objective proposed at our last meeting by the representative of New Zealand. The importance of stopping the fighting is as great as it ever was, regardless of Communist vituperation. We shall continue our consultations with the members of the Council in an effort to bring about a cessation of hostilities. Until those are cQmpleted, therefore, we can adjourn this meeting, subject to the call of the President.

1 should like to understand more clearly what the Security Council proposes to do. Does it propose to adjourn this meeting until 3 p.m., or are we going to continue now? 1am prepared to continue, of course, if that is the wish of the members of the Council.

If the representative of the Soviet Union wishes to continue, he may do so.

The Security Council has heard statements by the representatives ofa number ofcountries. They have al1 in different ways expressed their dissatisfaction with the reply of the Government of the People's Republic of China to the Security Council's invitation to take part in the discussion ofthe agenda item proposed by New Zealand. 70. Yet it is difficult to take these expressions ofdissatisfaction and even of regret seriously, since hardly any one 71. Let us consider the circumstances in which the Security Council decided to issue the invitation and the reason why a representative of the People's Republic of China was invited. 72. As everyone is aware, the Security Council at its last meeting included two items in its agenda: tirst, the item proposed by New Zealand-" Question ofhostilities in the area of certain islands off the coast of the mainland of China "-and second, the item proposed by the Soviet Union-cc Acts of aggression by the United States of America against the People's Republic of China in the area of Taiwan (Formosa) and other islands of China ". The majority of the Security Council decided to examine the New Zealanà proposaI tirst, although that decision clearly failed to take full account of the complexity of the situation in the Far East. 73. We have already pointed out that the New Zealand proposaI to consider the question of hostilities in the area of certain islands off the coast of the mainland of Chin~, bypasses the basic causes of the tension which has arisen' in the Far East. It is characteristic that the representatives who have spoken today also recognized the existence of a threat to the peace in the Far East, but that not one of them referred to the causes which are producing that threat. Yet, the situation which has arisen there is due to the fact that the United States with the help of Chiang Kai-shek, seized the Chinese island of Taiwan, the Pescadores and certain other Chinese islands sorne years ago and are holding them by force. 74. We have also pointed out that the request for a cease-tire in the area of the Chinese coastal islands is really nothing but a manœuvre designed to compel the feople's Republic of China to renounce its sovereign rights to what is Chinese national territory, Taiwan and the Pescadores, and to contirm the illegal seizure of those islands by the United States. In these circumstances, discussion of the New Zealand item is futile, it could not and cannot lead to a solution of the problem before the Security Council, the problem of removing the causes of tension in the Far East and averting the threat of war in that area. 75. The reply of the Government of the People's Republic of China fully contirms this appraisal of the situation. The reply contains the following statement [S/3358]: .. The United States aggression against China's territory of Taiwan has aIl along been the source of tension in the Far East. Recently, after it concluded the socalled 'Mutual Security Treaty' with the traitorous 76. It is not surprising that in these circumstances the Government of the People's Republic of China has interpreted the New Zealand proposaI for the consideration by the Security Council ofthe question ofhostilities in the area of certain islands of China as a flagrant intervention in the internaI affairs of China and as an attempt to cover up the acts of aggression by the United States against China. This proposaI is at the same time a violation of the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter. 77. The Chinese people's exercise oftheir own sovereign right in liherating their own territory is entirely a matter of China's internai affairs; it has never caused international tension and cannot threaten international peace and security. 78. The real source of tension in the Far East, as we have pointed out before, and the reason for the emergence of a threat to international peace in this area is United States intervention in the internai affairs of China. This is why the Soviet delegation has been stressing from the first that the Security Council must examine as a matter of urgency the draft resolution [S/3355], submitted by the Soviet Union which provides that the United States Govemment should take steps to put an end to its acts of aggression and to intervention in the internai affairs of China. This proposai is warmly supported by the Government of the People's Republic of China, as can he seen from its reply. 79. The Soviet draft resolution is also designed to obtain an immediate cease-fire, since it stipulates that no military action should be permitted in the Taiwan area by either side, so that the evacuatio~ from the islands in this area ofall armed forces not controlled by the People's Republic of China may he facilitated. 80. There is a basic difference hetween this Soviet proposai and the New Zealand proposai for a cease-fire on the islands off the coast of China. The authors of the New Zealand proposai are endeavouring to maintain the present unsatisfactory situation in the area of Taiwan and the coastal islands, and do not intend to remove the causes ofthe tension existing in this area. On the contrary, they are trying to cover up those causes. The Soviet delegation, on the other hand, by proposing that no military action should be permitted in the Taiwan area byeither side, deats with the question not only of a cease-fire but also of removing the causes of the dangerous tension in internationai relations in the Far East, in other words, ~1. What in fact is behind the New Zealand proposai for a cease-fire in the area of Taiwan? This is Got difficult to see, if we consider the statements by such authoritative persons as the President of the United States whose message to Congress of 24 January made it perfectly clear that the United States wishes to perpetuate the separation of Taiwan and the Pescadores from the People's Republic of China and is disguising this pOl'pose as an act of peace, allegedly designed to relax the tension in this area and to bring about a cease-fire there. 82. Was it not for these purposes that the United States brought into this area not only its Seventh Fleet but also a number of other powerful units of its armed forces, the number of which is daily increasing? It is s·.:arcely possible seriously to assert that the United States is sincerely seeking a relaxation of tension in this area, when at the same time it is constantly increasing its armed forces there. Surely it is obvious that the propaganda campaign for a cease-fire in this area is necessary to the United States only for the purpose of concealing its aggressive schemes to seize territories in this area which from time immemorial have belonged to China. What is inadmissible, however, are the attempts of certain representatives in the Security Council to bring the United Nations into this propaganda campaign an ~ make its name and flag available for covering up United States acts of aggression in this area. 83. It is not surprising that on 27 January, a British Foreign Office spokesman declared that if the Peking Government was prepared to cease hostilities on such a basis-the renunciation by the People's Republic of China of the national Chinese territories of Taiwan and the Pescadores-the United Kingdom would support the claims of the People's Republic of China to the coastal islands of the Tachens, Matsu and Quemoy, islands which have belonged to China for centuries. 84. Surely ihis statement shows that ail this propaganda campaign for a "cease-fire in the Formosa Straits" has nothing whatever to do with the restoration of peace in the Far East and is designed merely to conceal flagrant intervention in the affairs of China, and to veil the demand that the People's Republic of China should renounce its sovereign rights to Taiwan and other Chinese territories. The actions of the United States, however, completely expose the deceitful nature of their "pacific proposais ", which in fact give not the slightest indication of any desire to settle the dangerous situation that has arisen in the Far East. 85. The Soviet proposai that no military action should be permitted in the Taiwan area, a proposai designed to secure the immediate relaxation of the dangerous tension that has arisen in the Far East, is becoming more and 87. For what purpose were the Chiang Kai-shek forces redeployed? Disregarding the fog of words in which the operation was wrapped, its significance has been perfectly and unequivocally revealed by Chiang Kai-shek himself, who stated outright on 7 February that the purpose of the redeployment of the Kuomintang forces was to prepare for the invasion of the Chinese mainland. Can it he suggested that the movements of the United States armed forces which covered that operation did not constitute an act ofaggression against the People's Republic of China? There can only be one answer: tbis is a further provocative act of war against the Chinese people. 88. Nor is it possible to ignore that the danger of military acts of provocation by United States armed forces is constantly increasing. American officers are openly boasting that they have orders to attack aircraft of the People's Republic of China anywhere, even over Chinese territory or Chinese aerodromes, on the pretext of " hot pursuit ". 89. The real danger to peace of such acts of provocation was demonstrated on 9 February, when an American military aircraft encroached upon the air space of China and was shot down over Chinese territory by fire from the anti-aircraft defences of the People's Republic of China. Even President Eisenhower was compelled to acknowledge that the American military aircraft was flying unlawfully over Chinese territory. 90. In this connexion, it is necessary also to consider the attack of a group of American fighters against patrol aircraft of the Democratie People's Republic of Korea over Korean territory on 5 February. These cases clearly provide convincing evidence of the growing threat of provocative acts against the People's Republic of China involving air and naval forces ofthe United States. 91. In these circumstances it is difficult to overestimate the significance and importance of the Soviet draft resolution of 30 January [5/3355], that no military action should he permitted in the Taiwan area by either side. The resolution is intended to ensure the evacuation from the islands in this area of aIl forces not controlled by the People's Republic of China. 93. In our view the Security Council should immediately proceed to consider the question raised by the Soviet delegation concenùng the acts of aggression by the United States of America against the People's Republic of China. At the same time the Security Council should invite the People's Republic of China to take its rightful seat in the Security Council, after firs! removing from the Council the Kuomintang representative, who is unlawfully occupying that seat in violation of the United Nations Charter. 94. J should remind the Council that, when the question of the aets of aggression by the United States of America against the People's Republic of China was first placed before the Security Council, the Soviet Union proposed that the representative of the Chiang Kai-shek clique should be removed from membership of the Security Council and that a representative ofthe People's Republic of China should join the Security Council as the representative of China. For that same reason l, as Soviet representative, fully support the just proposai of the People's Republic of China that the representative of Chiang Kai-shek should he removed from the SeclUrity Council and that the representative of the People's Republic of China should take his rightful place. 95. It is impossible not to agree with the Government of the People's Republic of China when it states [8/3358]: "What is especially intolerable is the fact that the People's Republic of China, representing the 600 million Chinese people, is up to now still deprived of its legitimate position and rights in the United Nations, while the representatives ofa small handful of remnants of the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek clique, repudiated long ago by the Chinese people, continue to usurp the position of representing China in the United Nations. " To this we might add that international problems cannot be solved, much less Far 2astern problems, without China. 96. There can be no doubt that when the Security Council ventures to take steps to put an end to United States intervention in the domestic affairs of China and to liquidate the flagrant injustice by which the People's Republic of China is still ôeprived of its legal place in the United Nations, it will then he easy enough to relax inter- 91. For these reasons, the Soviet Union delegation submits a motion that the Security Cowlcil shall decide to pass to the consideration of the following agenda item entitled: .. The question of acts of aggression by the United States of America against the People's Republic of China in the area of Taiwan (Formosa) and other islands of China ".

Before defining the attitude of the Chair regarding the motion proposed by the Soviet Union representative, 1 will call upon the United States representative. 99. Mr. LODGE (United States of America): 1 shaU take only a minute because 1 think that there is no use in discussing in detail the Soviet Union speech, which is the same trumped-up Communist mythology that the world has become accustomed to over the years, and which do not think is believed by many people, and probably not by those who formulate il. 100. 1 do, however, enter a blanket denial of ail the charges made against the United States, none of which can he proved, and 1 do call attention to the fact that the speech showed a complete disregard ofand indifference to the idea ofa cessation ofhostilities. That isjust not in the picture at aU. 101. Then 1 should like to correct one rnisstatement which is new. That is the statement that the Soviet Union representative made that orders have been given to United States aviators to attack Communist aircraft when they are fiying over areas now held by the Communist3. That is not true. The truth is that, after many wanton attacks on our own aircraft, we have given them protection; but no orders have been given to shoot down any aircraft over any territory in that manner.

ln connexion with the explanationjust given by the United States representative that United States aircraft are under orders to pursue and to shoot down in such cases only aircraft belonging to the People's Republic of China, 1 sltould like to ask Mr. Lodge what aircraft the United Statesplane was pursuing when it fiew over Chinese territory on 9 February, and was shot down by anti-aircraft fire.

The Soviet Union representative is trying tl' put words in my mouth and make it appear that 1 said thingr. which 1 have not said. 1never rnention~d the word " pursue ". We can read the verbatim record and find that the word" pursue " does not appear in my staternent. What 1 said was that: "after many wanton attacks on our own aircraft, we have given them protection". T'hat is what 1 said, and that staternent stands. 106. Such being the Council's decision, and it is a firm decision with the force ofares judicata, 1 am in a difficult position with regard to the motion, if such it he, proposed in the course ofthe Soviet r~presentative's statement. 107. If the Soviet representative does not consider it necessary to vote on the matter, since a vote has already been taken and the only course open would be to request a reconsideration of the matter, then, 1 think he will he content with what 1 have said. In order, however, that we may conclude this discussion in the most effective manner, 1 would ask him whether he wishes his words, which include the expression " motion ", to he considered by the Chair as a formaI motion. If so, we shall proceed to a vote without discussion, since the discussion has already taken place. 108. Mf. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The President said that the question of which of the two items should be taken first was decided at the last meeting. i am not asking for a reversaI of this decision; neither am 1 asking that the item submitted by the Soviet Union should be examined first. 109. My motion is based on the premise that the first item has been completed. Several representatives have stated here that they would make no further proposaIs and ,that tl'iey' considered it necessary for the Security Couneil not to take any further decision or any step to settle the serious and <langerous situation that bas arisen in the Far East. Since that is the wish of the other members of the Council, 1 have put forward my proposaI. 1 consider that the Security Couneil cannot remain inactive, and that it must take the necessary action to remove the threat of war that has arisen in the Far East and is growing ever more menacing. 110. The action 1 have in rnind would be to examine the measures proposed by the Soviet Union: that is to say, that the Security Conncil should examine the next item on its agenda. This is the item proposed by the Soviet Union. 1 would ask the~resident to consider this as a formaI motion. Ill. Sir Leslie MUNRO (New Zealand): It is incumhent upon me to reply to the observations of the representative ofthe Soviet Union. The point which 1wish to make, and 113. We have not concluded our discussion. 1 have suggested respectfully that we should consider the present situation with restraint, that we should look toward a solution of the present unhappy situation by proper means. 1 have listened to the words of Sir Pierson Dixon, who p\"oposes that we should now, or shortly, adjourn. 1 completely agree with the representative of the United Kingdom. But the fact that he has proposed an adjournment on the present New Zealand item presupposes that we have not concluded our discussion and our consideration of that item. 1i4. Under those circumstances, the motion of the representative ofthe Soviet Union, that we should proceed to the discussion of the item submitted in the name of his country, is, in fact, out of order. 1 merely say it is out of order. If the President, in his wisdom, decides to put it to the vote, l, ofcourse, willloyally accept that decision. But 1 repeat that we have not reached the end of the consideration ofthe New Zealand item.

1 should like to comment on the remarks made by the New Zealand representative. 1have listened very carefully both to his first statement .:md to the statement he has just made. 116. The New Zealand representative says that the discussion ofthe first item ofthe agenda is not completed; yet he does not say what we should do next, or rather, he says that we should continue to do nothing. This, essentially, is the meaning of the action that the New Zealand representative proposes that the Security Council should take, namely that the Security Council should do nothing. This is what his proposai actually amounts to. 117. If this were ail that is expected of the Security Council, and if it could he said in the circumstances that the consideration ofthe item had not been completed, then of COl!rse the matter could be stated in that way. 1 prefer to take a different view. 1 believe that action by the Security Council means that the Security Council takes decisions facilitating the settlem(:nt of the question before it ; but to resolve to do nothin!t does not help to settle that question.

Like Many people, [ have long been interested in logic. 1 remember being tal.lght logic in school. 1 hope the representative of the USSR will not take it amiss if 1 say that 1 detect in his logic what 1 think we used to calI Cl an undistributed middle". Il is a very technical term but 1 will try to explain it. 120. The representative of the Soviet Union begins by saying very carefully that he does not want to upset the decision of the Council, which was that priority should be given to the New Zealand item and, that we have to complete the examination of that item hefore we pass on to the next one, the Soviet item. He then goes to try to prove that we have completed our féxamination of the New Zealand item. And why'1 Because, he says, we cannot remain inactive. It folloW8 from that, that if we cannot remain inactive, we have to do something else immediately. 121. Butwhatdoeshemean by "inactive "'? He assumes that inaction means that you are not doing something positive, that you are not taking sorne decision. However, that is not true, cettainly not in international affairs, and 1 do not believe it is true in the ordinary relationships'of human beings. Where would we be if we were constantly, moment from moment, plunged from one moment of action into another? 122. We have already heard from the representative of France that there is a great virtue in allowing the complementary interaction of diplomacy and Security Council action ta play its part. 1 said something in my earlier intervention this morning to the effect that by the mere faet of having raised this question here and .having started people thinking-and we hope that all interested countries will do their best to stop the fighting -we are in fact taking action. 123. Therefore, 1 cannot think of anything more inappropriate and more impolitic than to plunge suddenly into the violent action that would he caused by proceeding to the Soviet item on our agenda, even if it were in order, which 1 think it is not. My strong feeling is that we should proceed in an orderly manner, as we have been doing, and that it would be quite out of order if we were to proœed now, on th~s false basis of .logic, to consider the Soviet item.

1 should like to state the opinion of the Chair on the position of the debate. 1 am always inclined to accept the point of view of the majority. 1 will assume that the motion of the representative of the'USSR is different 126. Moreover, nearly ail the delegations have indicated that the topic which will continue to claim the interest and attention of their Governments is the one submitted by New Zealand. 127. Since, therefore, the grounds for the motion of the Soviet delegation are not supported by the Council, 1 venture to ask the representative of the USSR whether he insists for his formal motion to he put to the vote, or whether he is satisfied by noting that an opinion contrary to that motion exists.

With all due respect to your authority as President 1 cannot accept your interpretation of my motion. 129. Sir Pierson Dixon said that the transition to considr;ration of the Soviet proposaI would he a "sudden plunge", or a transition to the consideration of certain violent action which the Security Council would have to adelpt. He used the expression "violent action". What h the violent action proposed by the Soviet Union? Among these "violent action" is, for example, the following motion [S/3355]: .. Urges that no military action should he permitted in the Taiwan area by either side, so that the evacuation from the islands in this area of all armed forces not controlled by the People's Republic of China may he facilitated... 130. 1 do not think that this proposai can he classified as a particularly violent action on the part of the Security Council. If the Security Council could adopt such a proposai, it would, 1 think, he a step forward towards a solution of the confiict. 131. 1 accordingly ask the President to put my motion to the vote.

1 shall he very pleased to accede to the request cf the representative of the Soviet Union, but first 1 should like to define the position of my delegation. 133. In my capacity as representative of PERU, l consider that the jurisdiction of the Council has been established and cannot he revoked. Faced with this acute and urgent problem, the Couneil must give it its whole attention, and maintain its watchfulness. No one will deny the CounciI's competence to adopt a Against: Belgium, Brazil, China, France, Iran, New Zealand, Peru, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. The motion was rejected by JO votes to J. The meeting rose at 2.45 p.rn. FlNLANI> - FINLANDE: kauppa, 2 Keskuskatu, AUSTRALIA - AUSTRALIE : H. A. Goddard Pty., Lld.• 2S5a George SIRet, Sydney. N.S.W. Melbourne University Press, Carlton N. 3 (Victoria). FRANCE: Editions A. Paris V·. AUSTIUA - AUTRICHE: Gerold &: Co., 1. Graben 31. Wlcn 1. B. WülIerstorff', Book Import and Subscrlption Agcncy. Markus Slttlkusstrassc 10, Sablburg. GERMANY - ALLEMAGNE: Elwert &: Meurcr. Hauptstrasse Schllneborg, W. E. Saarbach, G.m,b.r:., handel, Gerconstrassc, Ale"andcr Hom, SpicgelgBSSe BELGIUM - BELGIQUE : Agence ct Messageries de la Presse S. A., 14-22 rue du Persil, BI'IIX~lles. W. H. Smith &: Son, 71-75 bd Adolphe-Ma", Brmr.ellel. GREECE - GRtCE : Stadion Street, Atbens. BOUVIA - BOLIVIE: Li(.rcria Selccclones, EmpRlSll Editora .. La Raz/ln ". Casllla 972, LaPa. HAm : Ma" Bouchereau, velle ". Boite postale I11B, HONDURAS: Librerla Fucnte, Tegucigalpa. BRAZIL - BRisIL : Livraria Agir, Rua MelÛco 98-8. Cailla Postal 3291, Rio de Janeiro. D.F. HONG KONG : Swindon Road. Kowloon. CAM&ODlA - CAMBODGE : Papeterie-Librairie nouvelle. Albert Portail, 14 av. Boulloche, P!Iom.Penb. ICELAND - ISLANDE: Eym'Jndsonnar. Austurstreti CANADA : The Rycrson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Tor"'lto, Ontario. Pcrlodica, 5112 av. Papineau, Montréal 34. INDIA - INDE: O"ford Company, Scindia House, P. Varadachary & Co.. Madras 1. CEYLON- CEYLAN: The Associated Newspapers of Ceylon, Lld., Lake House, Colombo. INDONESIA - INDONÉSm gunan, Gununs Sahari 84, CJm.E - CHILI : Libreria Ivens, Calle Moneda 822, Sutiqo. Editorial dei Paclfico, Ahumada 57, Santiqo. IRAN : Ketab Khaneh Danesh, Teberan. CHINA - CHINE : Tbe World Book Co., Lld., 99, Cbuns Kina Road, ht Section. Taipeh. Taiwan. The Commercial Press, Lld.• 170 Liu Li Chang, PeIdDg. IRAQ - IRAK: Mackenzie's sellers and Stationers, ISRAEL: Blumstein's Bookstores, Road. P.O.B. 4154, Tel COLOMBIA - COLOMBm : Librerla Nacional, Ltda., 20 de Julio. San Juan·Jesus. Baraoquilla. Librcrla Buebholz Galeria, Av. Jimenez de Quesada 8-40, 8osotâ. Librcrla América, Sr. Jaime Navarro R.. 49-58 Calle 51, Medellin. lTALY - ITALIE: Sansoni, Via Gino Capponi JAPAN - JAPON: Marllzcn Nichome, Nihonbashi, P.O.B. 605, Tokyo Central. LEBANON - iLIBAN: Beyroutb. COSTA RICA: Trejos Hermanos, Apartado 1313, SlID JOlIé. UBERlA: Mr. Jacob and Front Streets, Monro'ria. CUBA : La Casa Bella, René de Sr.ledt, O'Reilly 455, La Habaoa: LUXEMBOURG: Librairie Guillaume, Luxembourg. CZECHOSLOVAKIA - TCHiCOSU)VAQUm : Ceskoslovensky Spisovatel, Nfirodnl Trida 9, Praba 1. MEXICO - MEXIQUE Ignacio Mariscal41, Mexico, NETHERLANDS - PAYS-BAS: Nijhoff, Lange Voorhout DENMARK - DANEMARK: Messrs. Einar Munkspard, LId., Nllrrcsade 6, Klibemuma. OOMINICAN REPUBLIC - RÉPUBLIQUE DOMINICAINE: Librerla Dominicana, Calle Mcrccdcs 49, Apartado 656, Cindad Trujillo. NEW ZEALAND - NOUVELLE-z&.ANDE: The United Nations Association G.P.O. 1011, Wellington. NICARAGUA: Dr. Ramiro de Publicacion~s, MBUagu& ECUADOR - ËQUATEUR : Librerla Cientlfica Bruno Moritz, Casllla 362, Guayaqui!. EGYPT - WYPTE : Librairie .. La Renaissance d'BlYPte ", 9 Sharia AdIy Pub&, Cairo. NORWAY - NORVtGE Forlag, Kr Augustsgt 7a, O,dersf,om CO/Ultr~swhere sale, agmts lune IlOt yet been appolnted may be sent to Sni. SKtiaa, EllfOiIUIl 0lIlce of tle United Nations, PallÙl dei NaâoDl, GENEYA (Switzerlaod) or SaJ. Gd Cln:alatioa SectiDn, United NatiODl, NEW YORK (U,S.A.)