S/PV.695 Security Council

I wish to inform the Council that, in addition to the amendments submitted by the delegation of Israel, in accordance with rule 38 of the rules of procedure, as circulated [SI338]], two more amendments have been submitted by that delegation [S13382 and SI3383]. All these amendments apply to the draft resolution submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States [SI3379]. 2. I should like to call the attention of the Council to the fact that, in accordance with rule 38 of the rules of procedure, a representative on the Council must ask for a vote on these amendments; otherwise, they cannot be voted upon.

Since we last met, a most dis~l'essing incident has occurred in the northern Negev. As the representative of Israel has informed the Council in his letter of 25 March [SI3376], two individuals armed with grenades and Sten guns attacked a peaceful group ofIsraelis gathered in the village of Patish to celebrate a wedding. A woman was killed and over 20 people were wounded. From the findings of the Mixed Armistice Commission, it emerges that the two men responsible for the outrage came from territory under Egyptian control. We must all sympathize with these unfortunate people and with their families-the innocent victims of existing tension in this area. a) Plainte de l'Egypte, an sujet del Agreasion violente et premeditie cammise le 28 femer 1955 par lea forces arm_ illraeIiennes contre lea forees armlies igyptiennes a I'interieur du territeire liOns contrile igyptien pres de Goa, ayant cause de nomhreuses victim!:!!! dont 39 morbi et 32 hlelllill, ainlIi que la destruction de certaines installations militaires, et cela en violation notamment de l'article premier, paragraphe 2, et de l'article II, paragraphe 2, de la Convention d'armistice gen&al igypto.israeIieune (5/3365, 8/3367, 5/3373, 5/3378); b) Plainte d'Israel ClOntrel'Egypt", ansujet de violations repetlies de ~1l Convention d'armistice gen&al et des resolutions dn Consell de securite., violations qui mettenten peril la paix et la securillS int~rnationales, du fait: i) d'attaques de troupes igyptiennes reguIieres et irreguliere. ClOntre les tronpes israeIiennes; ii) de mu dfectu&, • partir dn territoire sons contrile igyptien, ClODtre des persounes et dea hieDII lie trouvsnt en territoire israeIien; ill) de I'attitude dn Gonvernement igyptien, qui n'adopte ni ne fait respecter de mesures effieaces contre les aetell de violence de cette nature; iv) de I'affirmation par I-Egypte de l'eDatence d'un etat de guerre, ClOmme de la politique de beUigenmce active mine par ce pays contre Isnel, notamment le maintien et I'execution de mesures de hlocns; v) de la propagande helIiqueuse et dQ!8 menaces contre l'integme 'aritoriale et l'independanee poHtique d'IsraiHj vi) du refulI par l'Egypte de reehereher, par voie de negociation, un accord en vue d'un pllllllllge eft'ectif de 1'lU'Ii'..istice actuel a I'etat de paix (5!~~ S/3373, 5/3376, 8/3319, 5/3380). 1. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de /'anglais): Je dois signaler au Conseil qu'en plus des amendements qU'elle a presentes conformement a l'arlicle 38 du reglement interieur et qui ont ete distribues [SI338]], la delegation d'lsrael vient de presenter encore deux amendements [S13382 et SI3383]. Tous ces amendements portent sur le projet de resolution presente par les Etats-Unis, la France et le Royaume-Uni [Sj3379]. 2. Je dois rappeler au Conseil qu'aux termes de l'article 38 du reglement interieur, ces amendements ne pourront etre mis aux voix que si un representant au Conseil de securite en fait la demande.

Depuis notre derniere reunion, il s'est produit dans le Neguev septentrional un incident tout a fait deplorable. Comme le representant d'Israell'a annonce au Conseil dans sa lettre du 25 mars [SI3376], deux individus armes de grenades et de pistolets-mitrailleurs Sten ont attaque un groupe d'Israeliens qui s'etaient paisiblement reunis dans le village de Pattish pour assister aune noce. Une femme a ete tuee et plus de 20 personnes ont ete blessees. Il ressort des conclusions de la Commi~sion mixte d'armistice que les deux hommes responsables de ce crime venaient du territoire sous controle egyptien. Nous ne pouvons tous que partager la douleur de ces malheureux et de leurs familIes, victimes innocentes de la tension qui regne actueUement dans cette region. 6. The facts relating to this incident were clearly established by the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission and are not, I think, really in dispute. They were certainly not disputed at the Council's last meeting by the representative of Israel. It was established in the Mixed Armistice Commission that units of the Israel army had crossed the demarcation line, attacked ail outpost in the Gaza strip manned by the Egyptian army, ambushed a lorry bringing up reinforcements a11.d-not, of course, without loss to themselves-caused in all 69 casualties to the other side: 38 dead and 31 wounded. 7. In view of the evidence before the Council. members must, I think, agree with me that this was a deliberate and planned military operation. As such, it is v:ewed by my Government with grave concern indeed. 8. It is nearly seven years since the Security Council, as a culmination of its untiring efforts to bring about a cessation of hostilities in the Holy Land, adopted what has come to be known as the <c cease-fire resolution " of 1948 [8/902]. It is six years since the Governments of Israel and Egypt signed a General Armistice Agreement. Under the Charter, both parties foreswore the use offorce in settling their differences. Yet here we have the Government of Israel using units of its army to carry out a military operation-on a relatively small scale, it is true, but nevertheless a military operation-against the .armed forces of the Egyptian Government, and this in an area where the original inhabitants are outnumbered by more than two to one by Arab refugees living under the supervision ofan agency created by the United Nations itself. 9. That this armed attack should have created a wave of emotion among the refugees is regrettable but very understandable. Great credit, it seems to me, is due to the Egyptian Government for the restraint which it showed in circumstances which might have developed into an alarming situation. All too easily, armed forcemight have been met by armed force, and fighting might have flared up again all along the demarcation line. 10. When I listened to the representative of Israel at our last meeting, I was expecting to hear from him some 11. My Government does not at all accept this view, nor, I think, will the Security Council accept it. When the Security Council in 1953 considered the situation on the Israel-Jordan frontier after the Qibya incident, it most clearly rejected the thesis that retaliatory action was justified. 12. What was perhaps the most shocking aspect of the attack 011 Qibya, the indiscriminate killing of the civilian inhabitants of a whole village-men, women and children-was certainly absent in the present case. On the other hand, we are faced, without deni~l, by a comple[e disregard-and I could use a stronger word-of the Security Council's call to Israel to take steps to prevent all retaliatory action in the future. This is something that must cause us all the gravest concern. 13. If we were right then in censuring such action, we must surely make quite clear, after an attack which has cost the lives of 36 members of the Egyptian army and of 2 civilians, what we think of it now. We must do this in the hope, and indeed the belief, that this expression of view by the international organization primarily charged with the maintenance of international peace and security will, if we speak clearly enough, be heeded this time by those responsible for the policy ofretaliation. 14. My Government. like all the Governments represented on the Security Council, looks forward to the day when the present armistice regime between Israel and its neighbours will be replaced by a permanent peace, as was foreseen in the armistice agreements themselves Nor, of course, as I have made clear in the most recent discussions in this Council on the Suez Canal, does my Government at all accept the thesis of the Egyptian Government that it is still entitled to exercise belligerent rights, all these years after the armistice agreement was signed. But peace cannot be won at the point of the gun. On the contrary, the use of violence not only endangers the armistice regime but prejudices the prospects ofgetting something better, and is therefore doubly to be deplored. IS. These are the considerations which I, with my cosponsors, have sought to reflect in the draft resolution contained in document Sj3378, and these are the reasons for which I commend it .0 the members of the Council. I hope that it will be dealt with quickly. We can then turn to the general problem and discuss, in a positive and helpful spirit, the more congenial question of what can be done to improve conditions along this part of the demarcation line. 11. Mon gouvernement ne partage nuIlement cette facon de voir, et je ne pense pas que le Conseil de securite veuilie y souscrire. Lorsqu'en 1953, apres I'incident de Qibya, le Conseil de securite a examine la situation qui regnait alors sur la frontiere jordano-israelienne, il a tres fermement condamne toute mesure de represaiIIes. 12. Certes, ce qui etait peut-Btre le plus choquant dans l'attaque contre Qibya - le fait qu'on ait tue sans distinction tous les habitants civils d'un village: hommes, femmes et enfants - ne s'est pas produit dans le cas present. D'un autre cote, nous constatons d'une maniere indiscutable qu'Isr.ael n'a fait aucun cas - j'aurais pu employer un terme plus fort - de l'exhortation du Conseil qui le pressait de prendre des mesures pour prevenir, a I'avenir, toute action de represaiIIes. Voila un element qui doit nous preoccuper au plus haut point. 13. ~! nous avons eu raison, alors, de desapprouver une telle action, nous ne saurions manquer, aujourd'hui, de dire hautement ce que, certainement, nous pensons d'une attaque qui a cause la mort de 36 membres de I'armee egyptienne et de deux civils. Nous devons le faire dans I'espoir, et meme avec la conviction, que, cette fois-ci, les auteuIS de cette politique de represaiIIes tiendront compte de l'opinion cIairement exprimee par I'organisation internationale qui porte la responsabilite principale du maintien de la pail!: et de la securite internationales. 14. Au meme titre que tous les autres Etats representes au Conseil de securite, mon gouvernement attend avec impatience le jour OU le present regime d'armistice entre Israel et ses voisins sera remplace par une paix permanente, telle que la prevoyaient les conventions d'armistice. II est certain, d'autre part - et je l'ai dit au cours des d6bats qu'a consacres recemment le Conseil ala question du canal de Suez - que mon gouvernement ne souscrit nullement a la these du Gouvernement egyptien, qui autoriserait ce gouvernement a exercer encore des droits de beIligerant, alors que la Convention d'armistice a ete signee il y a si longtemps. Mais on n'obtient pas la paix sous la menace des armes. Bien au contraire, le recours a la violence ne met pas seulement en peril le regime d'armistice, il compromet la possibiHte de remplacer ce regime par quelque chose de mieux; il est donc doublement a deplorer. 15. Voila les considerations que ma delegation, et celIes qui s'y sont associees, a essaye d'exprimer dans le projet de resolution qui fait I'objet du document Sj3378. Voila les raisons pour lesqueIles je demande aux membres du Conseil de l'adopter. J'espere que cette question sera reglee rapidement. Nous pourrons alors aborder le probleme general et examiner dans un esprit de collaboration constructive, la question, bien plus agreable, de savoir ce qu'il est possible de faire pour ameliorer la situation sur ce tron~on de la ligne de demarcation. 18. The Council will probably wish, according to precedent, to consider these two problems and decide on these two draft resolutions in the order in which they were presented. For the time being, therefore, my remarks will bear only on the first of our two agenda items. 19. Through detailed investigation uudertaken by United Nations observers on the spot, the Mixed Armistice Commission has completely exposed the circumstances of the action taken on the night of 28 February 1955 by Israel armed forces. The observers concluded that Egyptian military and civil installations at Gaza had been subjected at two points to a concerted and premeditated attack by two detachments ofthe Israel regular army, which had resulted in the death of 36 Egyptian soldiers and 2 Egyptian civilians, arriil the wounding of a further 29 soldiers and 2 civilians. The Mixed Armistice Commission did not ascertain that any action had been taken by the Egyptian authorities before the attack which might have justified or excused it. No evidl':nce was found in support of Israel assertions that Egyptian armed forces had been the first to penetrate into Israel territory and had attacked an Israel security patrol. Mr. Eban himself refrained from mentioning this alleged incursion in the statement he made before the Council on 23 March [694ih meeting]. 20. All the official evidence before the Council proves quite clearly that we are dealing with a military action deliberately organized by the Israel authorities and c&rried out by regular forces for the purpose of intimidation and reprisal. Such action is contrary both to the decisions of the Security Council, with which Israel, as a Member of the United Nations, has undertaken to comply, and to the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement, which its Government has undertaken to observe. Apart from the written texts, such action is contrary to the principles and obligations of international law and morality, from which no external circumstance permits nations and individuals to depart; it is profoundly shocking to the conscience of all men of good faith and good will; it particularly grieves all those of us who feel nothing but 21. The Israel representative has tried to justify this attack by relating it to the situation which has prevailed in that region for several months and to represent it to us as a legitimate retaliation for the many provocations for which he claims Egypt is responsible. I shall refer to this situation when we proceed to consider part (b) of the agenda. But even if that situation is as Mr. Eban has described it to us, nothing in the facts he related could serve as an excuse, and still less as a justification, for the act of which the Israel authorities are guilty. 22. There is no common denominator either in law or in fact between acts of brigandage, pillage or armed attack committed by isolated individuals across the demarcation line, even if such acts enjoy the tacit complicity of subordinate Egy'Aian authorities, and a collective act of reprisal such? ·vhich took place on the night of28 February 1955, which was deciGeo upon and ordered at a high level and was executed by well equipped units of the regular army. There is no common denominator between the 4 Israelis killed during the frontier incidents which took place between November 1954 and Februarj 1955, and the 38 Egyptian victims of the Israel attack on Gaza. 23. The Security Council cannot allow Israel to seek satisfaction for its grievances against Egypt, even if legitimate, through a policy of reprisals and revenge. If the Gaza incident, coming on top of the Qibya incident, were the expression of such a policy, Israel would have to be prepared to bear alone the consequences of the censure of that policy. 24. In the draft resolution which France, the United Kingdom and the United States have placed before the Council, they ask the Council to repeat the censure and condemnation it expressed on the Qibya events. This time, again, we felt it unnecessary to do more. We could not do less. 25. The French delegation will n(\t vote for this draft resolution lightheartedly. We find it hard to censure a friendly people whose patriotism and courage we admire, and of whose unIilerited difficulties in their efforts to secure the conditions for a free and peaceful coexistence with their neighbours we are not unaware. From the bottom of our hearts we hope that Israel will appreciate the Council's decision at its full value, as a final warning. 26. We have not been unmoved by the words in which Mr. Eban reaffirmed his Government's peaceful intentions and its desire to establish relations with its neighbours on a basis of mutual respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all parties. We are happy to take note of the undertaking he has given, on his Government's behalf, to give full support to any attempt at stabilization 27. It is in this spirit that the French delegation has joined the United Kingdom and the United States delegations in presenting to the Council the draft resolution [Sj3378] which is now before you. Its adoption by the Council would lay the responsibility for the gra',e incident of 28 February 1955 upon Israel. It would not mean that the Council was unaware ofEgypt's responsibility in other incidents, nor its responsibility in the mounting state of tension in that area. My delegation will express its views on this matter at the appropriate time, with that concern for justice and impartiality which should guide all members of the Council in the fulfilment oftheir task.

On 1 June 1953, the United States Secretary ofState, Mr. Dulles, had just returned from a three weeks' tour of the Middle East and southern Asia. Repor.ting to the nation, he outlined the guiding principles which the Uoited States would follow in dealing with this vast area of such great interest and importance to the rest of the world. 29. In particular, he drew the attention of the American people to the problems of the Middle East which stOG(7. in the way of the well-being and happiness of the .rreat peoples of the area-peoples for whom the United States has a historic friendship and profound respect. Mr. Dulles pointed out that it was obvious that" we cannot ignore the fate of the peoples who have first perceived and then passed on to us the great spiritual truths from which our own society derives its inner strength ". 30. He then commented on the many problems which faced the various countries of the area. He noted the tremendous problems confronting Israel, and the impressive work of the Israel people in building a new nation. He pointed out that, in the aftermath of the Palestine war and the establishment of the new State, there remained, as he said, "closely huddled around Israel, ... most of the over 800,000 Arab refugees ", people who existed mostly in makeshift camps where, if something constructive were not done for them soon, they would rot away, spiritually and physically. He pledged United States determination to avoid such a fate for so many thousands of human beings. 31. Summing up these problems, Mr. Dulles stated: " The United States should seek to allay the deep resentr .", ': against it that has resulted from the creation 28. M. LODGE (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais): Le ler juin 1953, M. Dulles, secretaire d'Etat des Etats-Unis, qui venait de passei' trois semaines dans le Moyen-Orient et l'Asie meridionale, rendait compte de son voyage a la nation, et il a trace les principes directeurs de la politique que les Etats-Unis comptaient suivre a l'egard de cette vaste region, qui presente une teUe importance pour le reste du monde. 29. II a appele en particulier l'attention du peuple des Etats·Unis d'Amerique sur les problemes qui, dans le Moyen-Orient, s'opposaient au bonheur et au bien-etre des grands peuples de cett»~ region - peuples auxquels les Etats-Unis sont lies p.'lr une amitie traditionnelle et pour lesquels ils eprouvent un profond respect. M. DuUes a dit qu'il etait evident que « nous ne pouvons nous desinteresser du sort des peuples qui ont rel;u les premiers, pour nous les transmettre ensuite, les grandes verites spiritueUes qui font la force morale de notre propre societe ». 300 M. Dulles a ensuite evoque les nombreux problemes qui se posent dans les divers pays de cette region. 11 a rappeIe les graves problemes qu'Israel doit resoudre, et l'reuvre impressionnante que la population israelienne doit accomplir pour faire une nation nouvelle. Il a indique qu'a la suite de la guerre de Palestine et de l'etabliss~ment du nouvel Etat, il restait « ...plus de 800.000 refllgies arabes, etablis en rangs serres autour d'Israel » et vivant pour la plupart dans des camps improvises OU ils deperiraient moralement et physiquement si on ne prenait au plus tot des mesures constructives en leur faveur. 11 a affirme que les Etats-Unis etaient resolus a empecher un pareil malheur pour ces milliers d'etres humains. 31. Resumant ces divers problemes, M. DuUcs a declare: «Les Etats-Unis devraient s'efforcer d'apaiser le profond ressentiment dont ils font l'objet depuis la 32. Referring to the Declaration of 25 May 1950 by the United States, the United Kingdom and France, he stated that, should those states find that any of tile States of the Near East " was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, [they] would, consistently with [their] obligations as Members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation." The SecretaryofState added that it must be made clear to all that the United States stood fully behind that declaration. 33. Mr. Dulles went on to say that leaders in Israel themselves agreed that United States policies should be impartial so as to win the respect and regard not only of the Israelis, but also of the Arab people~; and he stated resolutely that the United States would seek such policies. Israel, he said, should become part of the Near Eastern community and cease to look upon itself, or be looked upon by others, as alien to that COMmunity. To achieve it would require concessions on the part of both sides, but the gains to both would far outweigh the concessions required to win those gains. 34. Recognizing that the parties concerned had the primary responsibility for bringing peace to the area, Mr. Dulles stated clearly that the United States would not hesitate by every appropriate means to use its influence to promote a step-by-step reduction of tension in the area and the conclusion of ultimate peace. 35. It is because the present unhappy situation in Palestine must be viewed in its true perspective that I have referred at some length to the outlines of United States policy set out almost two years ago by the Secretary of State. During the two years that have elapsed, the United States, both inside and outside the United Nations, has sought consistently to fonow these objectives, and much progress has been made. We did not' attempt to force an unwanted " blueprint " for peace on the peoples of the area. What we did, in close collaboration with other members of the Security Council and the United Nations, was to lend our assistance to the solution of specific problems which jeopardized the present well-being and, in fact, the happiness and the future of Israelis and Arabs alike. 36. Considerable progress has been made in the development of projects for the improvement of living conditions for the refugees, the tapping of the water resources ofthe Jordan valley to develop new land and new industry, and defence arrangements to which each nation could make its own contribution on a sovereign basis of equality. There was g::,,,,,d reason to believe that, with significant progress already made, the time was not too distant when the intermittent fighting that characterized the situation on the borders of Israel.and the Arab States would have become a thing of the past. 38. Into this comparatively hopeful situation the terrible event at Gaza broke rudely. As a result ofan action found by the Mixed Armistice Commission to have been a prearranged and planned attack ordered by Israel authorities and committed by Israel regular army forces, 38 Egyptians were killed and 30 wounded, with a loss to Israel itself of 8 Israel soldiers killed and 13 wounded. This, as General Bums has stated, was the most serious clash of the two parties since the signing of the General Armistice Agreement, and came at a time, as he has reported, of comparative tranquillity along the armistice demarcation line. Yet Israel caused the loss of twice as many Israel lives in the Gaza incident alone than had been lost • c the previous four months as a result ofborder incidents. 39. New incidents have occurred since the Gaza attack, with additional loss of life. Again, and most recently, at Patish, innocent persons have been the ones to suffer. We express our great sympathy to their bereaved families. One can, for the present, conjecture as to the immediate causa] connexion. As General Burns has pointed out in his report, infiltration from Egyptian-controlled territory, while not the only cause of tension prior to the Gaza incident, has undoubtedly been one of its main causes [S/3373, para. 13]. But the Gaza incident has caused tension to mount on both sides, and is all the more to be deplored because it was deliberate. 40. Yet a careful examination of each incident of infiltration will, I believe, demonstrate the truth of General Burns' statement that, if an honest attempt were made by both parties to work out border controls, along the lines which he has suggested, infiltration could be reduced to an occasional nuisance, which Israel, as he has pointed out, must probably regard as inevitable so long as 200,000 poverty-stricken refugees live in the Gaza strip alone along Israel's borders. One must conclude that the harsh treatment used to repulse infiltrators, whose apparent purposes are sometimes no more criminal than an attempt to gather grass on the other side ofthe border, is typical of the lack of restraint that has been exercised and which should be overcome at all costs. In this connexion, we are impressed with General Burns' conclusion that, if such incidents were presented to the public.in proportion to their intrinsic importance, the unfortunate tendency to demand retaliatory action could be restrained [S/3373, para. 45). 41. We are aware that Israel holds that there are causes for the attack. We are aware that there have been provocations. They are not only always to be regretted; they 42. The conclusion which we draw from the report of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization and from the statements of the parties is that armed attack, planned and directed as it has been in this case, is no answer to the problems which rightly concern and distress the people of Israel. It is no service to them to increase internal tension, to bring the area to the brink ofwar, and to discourage and frustrate honest and sincere efforts to build a constructive Peace. 43. We must, therefore, and with regret, pause in the search for a solution to the serious problems of the area and, in effect, render a judgment on an act which we cannot condone. In so doing, our desire is to prevent a further deterioration in the relations between Egypt and Israel and to restore a needed balance of sanity before efforts can be hopefully renewed to solve the parties' outstanding problems in a spirit of justice and compassion. Such ajudgrnent cannot honestly be looked upon as either punitive or ill-willed, but as a necessary step in restoring perspective. It is for these reasons that the United States has joined with the United Kingdom and France in sponsoring the draft resolution submitted to this Council. 44. We hope that, with the adoption of this resolution, both sides will consider well what it behooves them to do to ensure to themselves a peaceful and prosperous future. We, for our part, will continue our efforts here and in the area to help them achieve those goals.

Before I begin my statement, I should like to say how much the Belgian delegation shares the feelings which have been expressed here with regard te the unfortunate victims ofthe Patish incident. 46. The Security Council has before it two draft resolutions, one of which is general in scope while the other relates more particularly to the Gaza incident. I shall briefly state my delegation's position on both drafts, beginning with the one which is general in scope. 47. The reason why the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization went into the causes of the incident in his outstanding report of 17 March 1955 [8/3373] was in order to obviate their consequences, rather than to establish the responsibility of the parties. The report cites many facts and a chain of actions and reactions. It is not always easy to determine which of the parties is to be blamed for lack of diligence or sense of 45. M. NISOT (Belgique): Je ne veux pas commencer mon expose sans dire a quel point la delegation beIge partage les sentiments qui viennent d'etre exprimes ici a regard des malheureuses victimes de 1'incident de Pattish. 46. Le Conseil de securite est saisi de deux projets de resoiution: run qui est de portee generale, I'autre qui est plus specialement relatifa l'incident de Gaza. J'indiquerai blievement la position de ma delegation a regard de chacun d'eux. Je commencerai par le projet de resolution de portee g6nerale. 47. Si, dans son remarquable rapport du 17 mars 1955 [8/3373], le Chef d'etat-major de l'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la tr8ve s'attache a rechercher les causes, c'est pour obvier it leurs consequences plutot que pour fixer les responsabilites de chacun. Le rapport cite un grand nombre de faits, chaine d'actions ct de reactions. 11 n'est pas toujours aise d'y discerner laquelle les deux parties merite le blAme d'avoir manque de 48. General Burns has thus informed us of a situation; he has not undertaken to establish responsibilities. Having identified what he has found to be a main cause, his first concern is to put an end to it. Being concerned to attain this utilitarian objective, he proposes certain measures intended to prevent people from crossing the demarcation line as easily as they can at present. It seems to the Belgian delegation that these measures are practical and likely to be effective; they do not prejudge the substance of the questions. As the United States representative has recalled, General Bums expresses to us his convictnon that if the two parties could come to an arrangement on the bases thus suggested and honestly sought to abide by it, infiltration could be reduced to an occasional nuisance [ibid., para. 45]. 49. The draft resolution contained in document S/3319 is an appeal to common sense and reason, an invitation to make an effort to agree, if only to meet immediate needs. It accuses nobody; it could not offend the most sensitive. Although it derives from a firm determination, it is couched in terms designed to promote conciliation and understanding. The Belgian delegation endorses it, and hopes that Egypt and Israel will find in it the startingpoint ofa new phase in their mutual relations. 50. In the interests of conciliation, the Security Council may, on occasion, postpone pronouncing on responsibilities. There are cases, however, in which its silence would be tantamount to a denial of the very principles which it is there to defend. The Mixed Armistice Commission has thrown light on the Gaza incident. It has concluded that it was a prearranged and planned attack ordered by the Israel authorities and committed by Israel army forces against Egyptian regular army forces. These acts, which have been duly verified, are particularly serious in view of the nature and the scale of the operations, the extent of the destruction and the number of casualties. The Belgian delegation will therefore vote in favour of the draft resolution [5/3378) which solemnly condemns them as a violation of the obligations resulting from the Security Council resolution of IS July 1948 [8/902], of the General Armistice Agreement and of the United Nations Charter.

When I spoke on 4 March 1955 [692nd meeting), I suggested, with other representatives, that the Security Council should postpone its decision on the incidents of 28 February 1955 until the report of the Mixed Armistice Commission had been received. I expressed the hope that, once responsibility had been established, the Council would not confine itself to a mere condemnation. 52. Since then, we have received General Bums' report, and we know upon whom the heavy responsibility rests for an act of aggression which caused the death of about 40 persons and the wounding of a similar number. 51. M. ENTEZAM (Iran): Dans mon intervention du 4 mars dernier [6928 s~ance], j'avais suggere, avec d'autres collegues, que le Conseil de securite ajournit sa decision sur les incidents du 28 fevrier 1955 jusqu'a reception du rapport de la Commission mixte d'armistice. J'avais exprime l'espoir qu'une fois la responsabilite etablie, le Conseil ne se bornerait pas a une condamnation pure et simple. 52. Depuis lors, nous avons re~u le rapport du general Burns et nous savons sur qui retombt la lourde responsabilite d'une agression qui a cause le. mort d'une quarantaine de' personnes et autant de blesses. 49. Le projet de resolution qui fait l'objet du document S/3319 constitue un appel au bon sens et a la raison, une invitation a s'efforcer de se mettre d'accord, n~ flit-ce que pour parer aux necessites immediates. La resolution n'accuse personne; elle ne saurait porter ombrage au plus susceptible. Quoiqu'elle procede d'une ferme determination, elle a ete con~ue dans le dessein de promouvoir la conciliation et l'entente. La delegation beIge s'y rallie, et elle forme le vc:eu que l'Egypte et Israel puissent y voir le point de depart d'une orientation nouvelle de leurs relations mutuelles. 50. Dans l'interet de la conciliation, it peut etre permis au Conseil de securite de surseoir a s'exprimer sur les responsabilites. nest cependartt d~s cas ou son silence equivaudrait a un reniement des principes dont il est le gardien. La Commission mixte d'armistice a fait la lumiere sur I'incident de Gaza. ElIe a conclu que ce fut une attaque concertee et premeditee, ordonnee par les autorites israeliennes et executee par Ies forces de l'armee isra6Iienne contre les forces de l'armee reguli~re egyptienne. Ces actes, dQment prouves, s'averent particulierement graves si l'on consid~rela nature des operations, leur importance, l'etendue des destructions et le nombre des victimes. Aussi la delegation beIge votera-t-elle pour le projet de resolution [5/3378] qui les condamne solennellement comme une violation des obligations issues de la resolution du Conseil de securite du 15 juillet 1948 [5/902), de la Convention d'armistice general et de la Charte des Nations Unies.

Since members of the Council expressed their preliminary views on this question on 4 March 1955 [692nd meeting] the consideration of the Egyptian complaint by the Mixed Armistice Commission and the Special Committee has been coinpleted. The Council has also had the advantage of a full report from the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, and the parties have presented their views at length. The Council is now, therefore, in a position to reach its own conclusions on the matter. 56. In my delegation's view, the attack which occurred on 28 February 1955, and which is the subject of the Egyptian complaint, was of such a character as to require separate consideration and action by the Council. The Chief of Staff in his report [S13373] has very properly reviewed the background of the attack, and has described the general situation in the border area and his efforts to improve it. The representative of Israel has directed our attention [694th meeting] to events in the area both before and after the events of28 February, and has asked the Council, inter alia, to make far-reaching recommendations directed towards bringing about normal relations between Israel and Egypt. 57. It is certainly appropriate for the Council to consider the general border situation and ways of reducing tension in the Gaza area, but the attack of 28 February was of such gravity that, in our view, its consideration must have priority. On this occasion, therefore, I shall confine my observations to the first draft resolution submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States [SI3378], at the same time expressing my profound regret that since these meetings commenced there has been a shooting in the Negev of peaceful Israelis by persons for whose action the Egyptian Government can scarcely escape responsibility. But, when we turn to the second draft resolution [SI3379), there will be an opportunity for us to consider in a more general way the situation in the Gaza area. 58. In my statement of4 March, on a preliminary examination of the information then available, I expressed the view that if one side was exclusively at fault, it was at fault not as a result of the lawlessness of its citizens, but as a result of a deliberate, planned and disciplined

Depuis qu'a la seance tenue le 4 mars 1955 -[69Je seance] les membres du Conseil ont expose leurs wes a titre preliminaire, la Commission mixte d!armistice et le Comite special ont acheve l'examen de la plainte formulee par I'Egypte. Le Conseil a eu aussi l'occasion d'entendre un rapport detaille du Chef d'etat-major de 1'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve. Enfin, les parties ont expose longuement leurs vues. En consequence, le Conseil est maintenant en mesure de statuer. 56. De l'avis de ma delegation, l'attaque qui s'est produite le 28 fevrier 1955 et qui fait l'objet de la plainte de l'Egypte presente un caractere tel qu'elle exige un examen distinct et une decision separee de la part du ConseiI. Dans son rapport [SI3373), le Chef d'etat-major a rappete, comme it convenait, les antecedents de l'attaque, et il a decrit la situation generale qui regne dans cette region frontiere, ainsi que les efforts qu'il avait deployes pour l'ameliorer. De son cote, le representant d'lsrael a attire notre attention [694e seance] sur certains faits, anterieurs ou posterieurs aux evenements du 28 fevrier, ct it a notamment prie le Conseil de formuler des recommandations de grande portee, propres aretablir des relations normales entre Israel et l'Egypte. 57. 11 est bon, certes; que le ConseiI examine la situation generale qui existe dans la zone frontiere ainsi que les moyens capables d'amener une detente dans la zone de Gaza, mais l'attaque du 28 fevrier presente une telle gravite qu'a notre avis elle doit etre consideree en tout premier lieu. Je me bornerai done a commenter le premier projet de resolution, presente par les Etats-Unis, la France et le Royaume-Uni [SI3378], tout en exprimant mon profond regret du fait que, depuis que nos debats ont commence, de paisibles Israeliens aient ete tues, dans le Neguev, par des personnes dont l'action engage, sans nul doute, la responsabilite du Gouvernement egyptien. Lorsque nous aborderons le deuxieme projet de resolution' [SI3379], nous aurons l'ocession d'examiner, d'une fa~on plus generale, la situation qui s'est creee dans la zone de Gaza. 58. Dans ma declaration du 4 mars, j'ai emis l'avis, apres un premier examen des renseignements que nous possedions a I'epoque, que si une seule des parties etait reconnue coupable, sa Gulpabilite resultait, non pas ~e l'indiscipIine de ses citoyens, mais bien d'un acte delibere, 59. The Israel representative, in his speech of 23 March, did not contest the findings of the Mixed Armistice Commission, but instead charged Egypt with conducting-and I quote his words-a " campaign of h~stility organized in Gaza... between the summer of 1954 and the end of February this year. For the connexion between these events and the Gaza episode is nothing less than the direct and compelling relationship of cause and effect. But for the Egyptian aggressions... there is not the remotest chance that any event would have occurred which would have brought the Security Council into session this week" [694th ~neet;ng, para. 69]. . 60. There are two comments onthose words ofMr. Eban which I feel obliged to make. In the first place, his argument should be considered in the light of the Chief of Staff's statement that " the number of casualties prior to the Gaza incident reflects the comparative tranquillity along the armistice demarcation line during the greater part of the period November 1954-February 1955" [8/3373, para. 11]. The figures submitted by General Bums show that there were almost three times as many fatal casualties on the night of 28 February as there had been on both sides during the previous four months. 61. My second comment relates to Mr. Eban's phrase "the direct and compelling relationship of cause and effect ", which implies-and I think this is a fair implication-that the attack was the inevitable result of Egyptian provocation. 62. This, it seems to me, obscures the fact that the incident of 28 February was a military operation, which could only have occurred as the result of a deliberate decision on the part of the Israel authorities controlling the military units concerned. It was, therefore, not inevitable. At any rate, we have not heard from the representative of Israel that action was taken without authority or contrary to orders, or even that there was an error ofjudgment. There has been no mention of punishment for those responsible. There has been no suggestion by Israel of the possibility of reparations, a claim which Egypt is justified in making in view of the nature of the attack. 63. It must be recorded, also, that this is not the first time in its consideration of the Palestine question that the Council has had to consider actions ofa retaliatory nature carried out by forces of the Israel regular army. 64. In these circumstances, Mr. Eban's statement about " cause and effect " can only mean, I am afraid, "at, so far as Israel is concerned, military retaliation is a justifiable policy. This is a position, surely, which the Security Council cannot accept or condone. Reprisals, if unchecked, may well lead to counter-reprisals, and to hostilities on an ever-widening scale. It is true that incidents such as the attack of 28 February point to the need for a very serious effort to make a transition towards permanent peace; it is unfortunately also true that such 59. Dans sa declaration du 23 mars, le representant d'lsrael n'a pas conteste les conclusions de la Commission mixte d'armistice. n a accuse I'Egypte - je cite ses propres paroles - de s'etre livree a 1.lne «campagne d'hostilite organisee a Gaza et dont Israel a ete 1'0bjet depuis l'ete de 1954 jusqu'a la fin du mois de fevrier de cette annee. En effet, la relation qui existe entre ces 6venements et l'episode de Gaza n'est rien de moins qu'un rapport direct et ineluctable de cause a effet. Sans les agressions egyptiennes... il est extremement probable qu'aucun evenement n'aurait amene le Conseit de s6curite a se reunir cette semaine» [694e seance, par. 69]. 60. Je ne puis m'empeeher de formuler deux observations au sujet de cette declaration de M. Eban: Tout d'abord, it faut rapprocher cet argument de la declaration du Chef d'etat-major selon laquelle «le nombre des pertes subies avant l'incident de Gaza donne une idee de la tranquillite relative qui a regne au voisinage de la ligne de demarcation pendant la plus grande partie de la periode allant de novembre 1954 a fevrier 1955» [8/3373, par. 11]. Les chiffres foumis par le general Burns indiquent que dans la nuit du 28 fevrier, il y a eu au moins trois fois plus de tues qu'au cours des quatre mois precedents. 61. Ma deuxieme observation porte sur l'expression « un rapport direct et ineluctable de cause a effet », dont M. Eban s'est servi. Elle impIique - je ne crois pas en forcer le sens - que l'attaque etait ie resultat inevitable des provocations de 1'Egypte. 62. C'est oublier, me sembIe-t-it, que I'incident du 28 fevrier a ete une operation militaire, qui n'a pu se produire qu'en raison d'une decision prise par les autorites israeliennes dont relevaient les unites militaires en question. L'incident n'etait done pas inevitable. De toute fa~on, le representant d'Israel ne nous a pas dit que ceux qui avaient lance cette operation n'avaient aucune autorite pour le faire, qu'ils avaient desobei a leurs ordres, ou meme qu'its avaient commis une erreur de jugement. 11 n'a pas ete question de sanctions qui auraient frappe les responsables. Israel n'a pas fait mention de la possibilite de reparations, auxqueIle;,; pourtant l'Egypte peut pretendre, 6tant donne la nature de l'attaquel 63. n faut egalement rappeler que ce n'est pas la premiere fois que le Conseil a eu a examiner, apropos de la question de Palestine, des actes de represailles commis par des unites reguIieres de l'armee d'Israel. 64. Dans ces conditions, le seul sens possible des parOles de M. Eban sur «la cause et l'effet» est, j'en ai peur, que les represailles miIitaires constituent, aux yeux d'Israel, une politique justifiable. C'est la une attitude que le Conseil de securite ne peut assurement ni accepter ni excuser. Si 1'0n n'y met bon ordre, une action de repr6- sailles risque de provoquer une riposte et de declencher des hostilites de plus en plus etendues. 11 est exact que des incidents tels que I'attaque du 28 feYrier montrent qu'il est necessaire de faire un effort tres serieux pour

Brazil will vote for the draft resolutions presented by the representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the United States. Speaking frankly, I cannot understand why the two draft resolutions before us are not embodied in one, since our discussions up to now have considered the two complaints presented not separately but together. In fact, the excellent report of General Burns has contributed to this very same objective, and all the speeches made have taken into account both complaints simultaneously and not merely one or the other individually. 67. Of course, since Israel committed a " prearranged and planned attack ordered by Israel authorities" [S/3373, annex Ill] in the Gaza strip, the Security Council should not fail to condemn that action, particularly since the responsibility of Israel has been definitely established in what General Burns calls the most serious clash in the region since the armistice agreement [S/3373, para. 7]. However, the General also advises us that" a study ofthe major inddents alone does not give an adequate picture of the situation " [ibid., para. 13]. 68. Reviewing briefly the intricate problem involved and simplifying it somewhat, we can say that the refugees in the Gaza strip are living under extremely difficult conditions and that, in addition to their predatory excursions, they frequently cross the demarcation line in search of food or to steal, in the prospect of selling the stolen articles. These continuous depredations and incidents provoked in Israel a feeling that a retaliation which was normally not admissible was needed, and hence this major incident took place. General Burns, in paragraph 46 ofhis report, seems to condemn Egypt for failing to provide for the public punishment of the infiltrators. 69. Still trying to speak in simple terms, I believe that what is particularly bad in that unhappy region, and what may be perhaps worse than the infiltrators and marauders, is the lack of determination on both gides of the demarcation line to make an effort to work together and thereby 66. M. DE FREITAS-VALLE (Bresil) (traduit de l'anglais): Le Bresil votera en faveur des projets de resolution presentes par les representants des Etats-Unis, de la France et du Royaume-Uni. Toutefois, je dois avouer en toute franchise que je ne comprends pas pourquoi les deux projets de resolution dont le Conseil est saisi n'ont pas ele fondus en un seul, car, jusqu'a pre.sent, notre discussion a porte a la fois sur les deux plaintes qui nous ont ete soumises. En fait, dans l'exceUent rapport qu'it nous a presente, le general Burns poursuit cette meme fin. De meme, toutes les interventions que nous avons entendues, loin de se limiter a. rune ou a l'autre, ont traite simultanement des deux plaintes. 67. 11 est certain que, puisque Israel a commis, dans la bande de Gaza, une « attaque concertee et premeditee, ordonnee par les autorites israeliennes» [S/3373, annexe Ill], le Conseil de securite ne saurait manquer de condamner cette action, d'autant plus qu'il a ete defini~ tivement etabli qu'lsrael porte la responsabilite de ce que le general Bums appelle I'incident le plus grave qui soit intervenu dans la region depuis la signature de la convention d'armistice [S/3373, par. 7]. Mais, d'autre part, le general Burns a fait ressortir qu' « une etude limitee aux incidents graves ne peut donner une idee precise de la situation» [ibid., par. 13]. 68. Si nous voulions resumer ce probleme delicat en le simplifiant quelque peu, nous pourrions dire que les refugies etablis dans la bande de Gaza vivent dans des conditions extremement penibles et qu'its ne se boment pas a entreprendre des razzias, mais franchissent bien souvent la ligne de demarcation a la recherche d'aliments ou pour voler des objets qu'ils puissent revendre. Ces incursions et incidents continuels ont cree en Israel le sentiment que des mesures de represaiIles - normalement inadmissibles - etaient devenues necessaires, et c'est cela qui a provoque ce grave incident. Au paragraphe 46 de son rapport, le general Bums semble blamer I'Egypte d'avoir omis de chatier publiquement ceux qui se sont infiltres. 69. [;autre part - je cherche toujours a simplifier - je pense qu'il est un fait particulierement regrettable dans cette malheureuse region, un fait qui est peut-etre pire que les mefaits des infiltres et des maraudeurs: c'est que, des deux cates de la ligne de demarcation, it manque la

Brevity, which is always desirable, is essential in this case, since all aspects of the problem have been dealt with exhaustively by the representatives who have spoken before me. I shall therefore try to set forth as succinctly as possible the reasons why Peru will vote in favour of the two draft resolutions before us. 71. The General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel, concluded on 24 February 1949, created a statusjuris which is to continue in force until the signature of a peace treaty fina!ly regulating the relations between the parties. And I have used the expression status juris, which implies negative and positive duties for both parties, in its fullest sense. This status juris is guaranteed by the United Nations. To its intrinsic legal value is added the fact that it was established under the auspices of the United Nations and in implementation of Security Council resolutions. 72. In order to ensure the observance of those resolutions, as well as the implementation of the agreement itself, the General Armistice Agreement established a mixed armistice commission under the chairmauship of a representative of the United'Nations. Article X, which establishes the commission, also provides that, on questions of principle, appeal shall lie to a s~ial cQmmittee. 73. The Security Council is now considering facts which have been established and decisions which have been taken by the organ thus created by the armistice agreement. On account of their seriousness, their scope and their importance, these facts have been submitted to the Council, and it is the Council's duty to consider them within the context of the armistice agreement and in the light of the United Nations Charter. which all Member States are bound scrupulously to observe. 73. Le Conseil de securite examine en ce moment des faits qui ont ete etablis et des decisions qui ont ete prises par 1'0rgane ainsi cree par la convention d'armistice. Ces faits ont ete portes ala connaissance du Conseil en raison de leur gravite, de leur portee et de leur importance, et il incombe done au Conseil de les examiner dans le cadre de la convention d'armistice et conformement aux dispositions de la Charte des Nations Unies, que tous les Etats Membres sont tenus de respecter scrupuleusement. 74. The draft resolution submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States [S/3378] is based on the resolution adopted by the Mixed Armistice Commission on 6 March 1955. It expresses the Council's conviction that permanent peace cannot be established in the area unless there is strict compliance with the General Armistice Agreement. 74. Le prcjet de resolution presente par les Etats-Unis, la France et le Royaume-Uni [S/3378], se fonde sur la resolution adoptee par la Commission rnixte d'armistice le 6 mars 1955. Dans ce projet, le Conseil exprime sa conviction que I'etabIissement d'une paix permanente dans la region ne peut etre accompliamoins que les parties n'observenf'''strictement les clauses de la Convention d'armistice general. 70. M. BELAUNDE (Perou) (traduit de l'espagnol): La concision, toujours souhaitable, s'impose a plus forte raison dans le present cas; en effet, le probleme a ete etudie a fond et sous tous ses <aspects par les differents orateurs qui m'ont precede. C'est pourquoi je m'etrorcerai d'exposer aussi brievement que possible les raisons poUT lesquelles le Perou votera pour les deux projets de reSOlution dont nous sommes saisis. 71. La Convention d'armistice general conclue le 24 feYrier 1949 entre I'Egypte et Israel a cree un etat de droit, destine asubsister jusqu'a la signature du traite de paix qui reglera definitivement les relations entre les parties. J'ai employe le terme « etat de droit» dans toute son aeception profonde; en effet, it en decoule pour les deux partiesala fois des obligations negatives et positives. Cet etat de droit est garanti par l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Sa valeur juridique intrinseque est encore rehaussee par le fait qu'il a ete institue sous les auspices de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, en application de resolutions adoptees par le ConseiI de securite. 72. Pour assurer le respect de ces resolutions et I'appIication de l'accord lui-meme, la Convention d'armistice general a etabli une Commission mixte d'armistice, presidee par un representant de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. L'artic1e X de la convention, qui a cree cette commission, a prevu egalement que les questions de principe pourraient etre portees en appel devant un Comite special. 76. My delegation has given the thorough attention it deserves to the report by General Burns [S/3373] setting forth the facts on which the Mixed .Armistice Commission based its decisioT. of 6 ~~::fcil 1955, the text of which is annexed ~:, thP, report. The report also reviews the situatio:.1 reSUlting from a series of incidents which it enumerates in detail. 77. General Burns, in the exercise ofthe duties devolving upon him under the General Armistice Agreement, has proposed that the parties should adopt certain practical measures which he sets forth in his report [S/3373, para. 40]. Since the measures proposed by General Burns are in keeping with the powers vested in him under the General Armistice Agreement, the Peruvian delegation supports the draft resolution in document S/3378 and the appeal which the Security Council makes to the parties to 'co-operate in giving effect to these measures. This cooperation is necessary to ensure not only the practical, but also the legal efficacy ofthose measures. The measures proposed proceed from an authority set up under an international agreement with the participation and under the supervision ofthe United Nations. They are in accordance with the nature and purpose of the armistice agreement, and therefore presuppose acceptance by the parties. Furthermore, the measures proposed imply no revision of the General Armistice Agreement within the meaning of article XII thereof. 78. To sum up, because it subscribes to the purpose underlying both draft resolutions, which are in keeping with legal standards and with the general object of achieving the implementation of measures which will bring peace between Israel and Egypt, the delegation of Peru will also vote for the second draft resolution [S/3379].

My delegation's remarks at this stage will be limited to the draft resolution contained in document S/3378. When the Security Council takes up the other draft resolution, contained in document S/3379, I may have something more to say, and I may also pay some attention to the important considerations which the representative of Israel put before the Council at its last meeting. 76. La delegation du Perou a examine, avec toute l'attention qu'il merite, le rapport du general Burns [S/3373], qui expose les faits sur lesquels la Commission mixte d'armistice a fonde sa decision du 6 mars 1955, dont le texte est annexe au rapport. Ce document examine en outre la situation creee par un certain nombre d'incidents, qu'it relate en detail. 77. Dans l'exercice des fonctions que lui confere la Convention d'armistice general, le general Burns a propose aux parties l'adoption de certaines mesures d'ordre pratique, qu'il enumere dans son rapport [S/3373, par. 40J. Comme les mesures proposees par le general Burns restent dans le cadre des pouvoirs que lui attribue la Convention d'armistice general, la delegation du Perou approuve le projet de resolution qui fait l'objet du document S/3378, ainsi que l'appel que le Conseil de securite adresse aux parties en leur demandant de collaborer al'application de ces mesures. Cette collaboration est necessaire, non seulement pour assurer l'efficacite pratique de ces mesures, mais encore pour garantir leur efficacite juridique. En effet, les mesures proposees emanent d'une autorite qui a ete instituee par une convention internationale, avec le concours et sous la surveillance de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Elles reSpondent au caractere et au but de la conyention d'armistice et sont, de ce fait, subordonnees al'accord des deux parties. D'un ~mtre cote, les mesures proposees n'impliquent aucune revision de la Convention d'armistice general, au sens de l'artic1e XII de cette convention. 78. En resume, parce qu'elle souscrit aux buts des deux projets de resolution, qui repondent aux normes juridiques et dont l'objet general est d'obtenir la mise en amvre de mesures qui assurent la paix entre Israel et 1'Egypte, la delegation du Perou votera egalement pour le second projet de resolution ~S/3379]. 79. ;·ll. TSIANG (Chine) (traduit de l'anglais): Je me bornerai pour l'instantaparter du projet de resolution qui figure dans le document S/3378. Lorsque le Conseil de securite examinera 1'autre projet de resolution, qui fait l'objet du document S/3379, je demanderai peut-etre a. reprendre la parole pour commenter eventuellement les observations importantes que le representant d'Israel a formutees ala derniere seance du ConseiI. 81. The facts ofthe attack on 28 February were carefully investigated by the members of the Mixed Armistice Commission. They have been personally reported to this Council by General Burns, the Chief of Staffof the Truce Supervision Organization. The facts are not in dispute. r note that the representative of Israel did not make any attempt to dispute the facts. As the matter now stands, all the material points of the Egyptian complaint have been substantiated. The situation dictates the terms of the resolution which the Security Council must adopt. I see no alternative. I realize that the condemnation of a sovereign State by this body is a serious matter. I understand that the patriots and friends ofIsrael will undoubtedly resent this condemnation. So far as I am concerned, however, I find no alternative to the terms of the draft resolution now before the Council. 82. I notice with great interest and appreciation the final paragraph of that draft resolution, which reads, in part: "Expresses its conviction... that no progress towards the return of permanent peace in Palestine can be made unless the parties comply strictly with their obligations under the General Armistice Agreement ". 8j. In his statement to the Security Council [694th meeting], Mr. 3ban complained about the refusal of the Arab States to proceed to a peace settlement. My delegation has considerable sympathy for that complaint. In recent years, the Security Council has dealt more often with what is called here " the Palestine question " than with any other matter. In connexion with every debate on that question, my delegation usually prefaces its remarks with the statement that it hopes that the present armistice agreement may be developed into a peace settlement. I recall that, on a previous occasion, I pleaded with Israel to make a special effort to obtain Israel's acceptance by the Near Eastern community. I also pleaded with the Arab States to make a special effort to accept Israel as a member ofthe Near Eastern community. I stress that phrase" speial effort " because I know that no ordinary effort will suffice. But certainly an attack ofthe kind carried out on 28 February cannot be expected to promote that solution for which we all hope-namely, a permanent peace settlement. 84. I am glad that the draft resolution before us states that conviction in unmistakable terms. It is an obvious conviction, but it should be stated again and again. 85. For those reasons, my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution.

The Security Council has heard the report of the Chief of Staff of the United Nations 81. Les membres de la Commission mixte d'armistice ont effectue une enquete minutieuse sur les faits relatifs a l'attaque du 28 fevrier. Le general Burns, Chef d'etatmajor de I'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve, a expose lui-meme ces faits au Conseil. Personne n'en conteste l'exactitude, et je constate que le representant d'lsrael lui-meme n'a pas tente de le faire. A l'heure actuelle, done, la plainte de I'Egypte se revele justifiee sur tous les points de fait. Ceci dicte au Conseil de securite les termes de la resolution qu'it doit adopter. Je ne vois pas d'autre solution. Je sais bien que la condamnation d'un Etat souverain par cet organe est une chose grave. Je ne doute pas que cette condamnation ne froisse les patriotes israeliens etles amis d'lsrael. Mais, en ce qui me concerne, je ne vois pas d'autre solution que l'adoption du projet de resolution dont le Conseil est saisi. 82. Je souscris tout particUllierement au dernier paragraphe de ce projet de resolution, qui contient la declaration ci-apres: «Exprime sa conviction... qu'aucun progres vers le retour d'une paix permanente en Palestine ne pent etre accompli a moins que les parties ne remplissent strictement leurs obligations au titre de la Convention d'armistice general... » 83. Dans la declaration qu'it a faite au Conseil [694e seance], M. Eban s'est plaint que les Etats arabes se refusent a envisager un reglement pacifique. Je puis I'assurer de la sympathie de ma delegation, a cet egard. Ces dernieres annees, le Conseil de securite s'est occupe de cette «Question de Palestine» plus souvent que de toute autre question. Dans chacun de ces debats, la delegation de la Chine a generalement commence par declarer son espoir de voir la convention d '~rmistice se transformer en traite de paix. Je me se os d'avoir presse, une fois, Israel de faire un effort pc Jlier pour se faire accepter au sein de la communaute dt. .doyen-Orient. J'ai egalement prie instamment les Etats arabes de faire un effort particulier pour accepter Israel dans la communaute du Moyen-Orient. J'insiste sur 1'« effort particulier », sachant bien qu'un effort ordinaire n'y suffira point. 11 est certain, en tout cas, qu'une attaque comme celle qui s'est produite le 28 fevrier ne sanrait nous rapprocher de la solution que nous esperons tous: un reglement de paix definitif. 84. Je suis heureux de voir que le projet de resolution dont nous sommes saisis exprime cette conviction en termes non equivoques. C'est une conviction evidente, mais il est bon de la repeter souvent. 85. Pour ces motifs, la delegation de la Chine votera pour le projet de resolution. 86. M. SOBOLEV (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Le Conseil de securite a entendu le rapport du Chef d'etat-major de l'Organisme 87. General Burns' report to the Security Council [8/3373] has fully confirmed the information previously available to the Security Council, to the effect that Israel armed forces made a clearly premeditated attack on Egyptian armed forces on 28 February 1955 in the Gaza region. It is quite clear from the report that the Israel armed forces in violation of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt, crossed the demarcation line in the Gaza region on 28 February and penetrated 3 kilometres into Egyptian-controlled territory at two points. The Israel military detachments committed an armed attack against an Egyptian military camp in the Gaza district and destroyed a water-pump installation and other buildings in the region, thus causing considerable material losses to the Egyptian authorities. The seriousness of this incident is accentuated by the fact that 38 Egyptians were killed and 31 wounded as a result of the attack by the Israel armed forces. 88. It is obviously impossible to agree with the Israel representative's statement [694th meeting] that the attack by Israel armed forces on Egyptian forces in the Gaza region can be regarded as a retaliatory operation against Egypt. 89.- It cannot be denied that su.;;h acts by the Israel armed forces constitute a serious violation ofthe United Nations Charter and aggravate tension in the region. Obviously the Security Council, which bears the principal responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, cannot ignore such a serious violation of the United Nations Charter and of the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement. The Security Council must censure the Israel action and take appropriate steps to prevent the recurrence of such incidents. 90. I should also like to reiterate, however, that it is impossible to ignore the remarks ofcertain representatives in the Security Council about the tense situation in that region. 91. The draft resolution in document S/3379, which is before the Security Council, touches on only one aspect of the question, the general conditions on the demarcation line between Egypt and Israel, and calls upon the Governments of Egypt and Israel to co-operate with the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in taking steps to preserve security in the area ofthe demarcation line. The Soviet Union delegation will give its views on this draft resolution when the Security Council considers that question. 92. Nevertheless, I consider it necessary at this stage again to draw the attention ofthe members of the Council

All the members of the Security Council have spoken except the representative of Turkey. I should now like to make a statement on the item under consideration in my capacity of representative of TURKEY. 94. In my preliminary remarks [692nd meeting] regarding the Gaza incident, I stressed the concern with which my Government viewed the first reports of this unfortunate incident and expressed our conviction that the facts to be laid before the Council would undoubtedly clarify the situation and show the degree of responsibility which rests on the parties concerned. On that occasion I emphasized the great interest taken by my Government in the establishment and maintenance of stability, peace acd security in the Middle East, and its belief that incidents of this nature could not serve the realization of these aims. 95. The Security Council has now heard the report made by the Chiefof Staffof the Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, as well as the statements ofthe representatives ofEgypt and Israel. These reports show clearly that all the efforts of the Security Council and the Truce Supervision Organization must be co-ordinated to urge on the parties concerned a strict observation of the terms of the General Armistice Agreement and a sincere compliance with the decisions of the Security Council, as well as with the principles embodied in the Charter, in order to achieve stability and security in the interests of all concerned. 96. The importance of the Gaza incident now under consideration arises from the fact that, according to the resolution adopted by the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission on 6 March 1955, it appears to have been a " prearranged and planned attack by the Israeli authorities " and "committed by Israel regular army forces against the Egyptian regular army force" [S/3373, annex Ill]. Itis therefore clear to my delegation that, while being concerned with ways and means for the general improvement of the situation in the area in question, the Security Council cannot overlook the gravity of this particular incident, nor can it withhold its blame for the use offorce in violation ofthe armistice agreement. 97. The statements made thus far by the members of the Security Council on the item under consideration have shown the existence ofan almost unanimous and universal 93. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Tous les membres du Conseil de securite ont pris la parole, a l'exception du representant de la Turquie. Je voudrais maintenant faire une declaration en tant que representant de la TURQUIE. 94. Dans mes observations preliminaires touchant l'incident de Gaza [6926 seance], j'ai exprime l'inquietude que mon gouvernement eprouvait devant les premiers rapports sur ce malheureux incident, et j'ai dit notre conviction que les faits qui seraient exposes au Conseil eclaireraient sans aucun doute la situation et indiqueraient la responsabilite des parties en cause. J'ai rappele que mon gouvernement porte un tres vif interet a I'etablissement et au maintien de la stabilite, de la paix et de la securite dans le Moyen-Orient. J'ai dit egalement qu'a notre avis des incidents de ce genre ne sauraient contribuer a ces fins. 95. Depuis, le Conseil de securite a entendu le rapport du Chefd'etat-major de l'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve en Palestine, ainsi que les declarations des representantsde I'Egypte etd'Israel. Ces rapports montrent clairement que tous les efforts du Conseil de securite et de l'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve doivent tellare a exhorter les parties a observer strictement les termes de la Convention d'armistice general et a respecter sincerement les decisions du Conseil de securite, ain~: :..~" les principes consacres par la Charte, afin d'assurer la stabilite et la securite qui repondent aux interets de toutes les parties en cause. 96. L'importance de eet incident de Gaza vient de ce qu'il apparait, selon les termes de la resolution que la Commission mixte d'armistice egypto-israelienne a adoptee le 6 mars 1955, comme une « attaque concertee et premeditee, ordonnee par les autorites israeliennes» e:" « commise par les forces de l'armee nSguliere israelier 1le co'ntre les forces de l'armee reguli~reegyptienne» [S/3313, annexe Ill]. C'est pourquoi ma delegation estime que, tout en recherchant les moyens d'ameliorer, d'une mamere generale, la situation dans la region en question, le Comeil de securite ne saurait meconnaitre la gravite de cet incident, et qu'il duit done bUimer ce recours a la force effectue en violation de la convention d'armistice. 97. Les declarations que les membres du Conseil de securite ont consacrees a cette question ont montre que l'accord etait a peu pres unanime sur les vues generales 99. Coming back to the statements of the other members of the Council, I repeat that we feel that the views of the great majority reflect an identity of purpose and sentiment as regards the part of the item ofthe agenda under consideration. However, it is our conviction that renewed and sincere efforts for the strict observance of the terms of the General Armistice Agreement would greatly contribute to preventing incidents of this nature, which weaken the progress made towards the strengthening of security and the establishment of stability in the region. 100. My delegation feels that the draft resolution presented by France, the United Kingdom and the United States [8/3378] reflects in a very appropriate way the general concern expressed by the members of the Council, as well as their views on the future course to be adopted by the parties involved. The draft resolution is based on the facts determined by the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission concerning the attack made by Israel forces on 28 February 1955. It" condemns this attack as a violation of the cease-fire provisions of the Security Council resolution of 15 July 1948 tt, and qualifies it "as inconsistent with the obligations of the parties under the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel and under the Charter". My delegation is of the opinion that no matter what arguments may be advanced on the general situation in the frontier area, an attack of this nature should be condemned for the reasons stated in the draft resolution. The draft resolution also calls upon Israel to take all necessary measures to prevent such actions in the future. This invitation again has the whole-hearted support of my delegation. 101. Therefore, in view of the considerations which I have stated above, my delegation will vote in favour ofthe draft resolution contained in document S/3378. 98. La seule cause de la tension qui regne actuellement, non seulement dans le Moyen-Orient, mais dans le monde entier, c'est la constitution du vaste bloc que l'Union sovietique a forme pour etendre sa domination. La propagande dirigee contre de pretendus blocs militaires est une manreuvre destinee a detruire le systeme de securite collective que les nations libres ont dCl instaurer pour sauvegarder leur propre existence et pour renforcer la paix et la securite en decourageant l'agression. En s'effor~nt aillsi d'entraver la formation d'un front de paix et de securite dans le Moyen-Orient, l'Union sovietique mentre clairement qu'elle a interet a empecher le retour de la paix et de la stabilite dans cette region. 99. Pour en revenir aux declarations des autres membres du Conseil,je repete qu'a notre avis les opinions exprimees par la grande majorite refletent une identite d'intention et de sentiment en ce qui concerne le point de l'ordre dujour en discussion. Nous sommes d'ailleurs convaincus qu'en s'efforc;ant sincerement et constamment d'observer strictement les dispositions de la Convention d'armistice general, on contribuerait grandement a empecher le retour de pareils incidents, qui compromettent la poursuite de la securite et de la stabilite dans cette region. 100. Ma delegation estime que le projet de resolution presente par les Etats-Unis, la France et le Royaume-Uni [8/3378] traduit correctement l'inquietude generale des membres du Conseil, ainsi que leurs opinions touchant l'attitude que les deux parties en question devront adopter a l'avenir. Ce projet de resolution s'appuie sur les faits que la Commission mixte d'armistice egypto-israelienne a etablis en ce qui concerne l'attaque declenchee le 28 fevrier 1955 par des troupes israeliennes. Dans ce projet de resolution, le Conseil « condamne cette attaque en tant qu'elle viole les dispositions relatives au cessezle-feu de la resolution du Conseil de securite du 15 juillet 1948 » et considere qu'elle est « incompatible avec les obligations assumees par les parties au titre de la Convention d'armistice general et de la Charte». Ma delegation estime que, malgre tous les arguments que l'on pourrait faire valoir en cc qui concerne la situation generale dans la region frontiere, une attaque de cette nature doit etre condamnee pour les raisons enoncees dans le projet de resolution. Aux termes du projet, le Conseil demanderait egalement a Israel de prendre toutes mesures necessaires pour prevenir de teIles actions. Ma delegation appuie sans reserve cette demande. 101. Pour toutes ces raisons, ma delegation votera en faveur du projet de resolution qui figure dans le document I S/3378. 103. The peaceful nature of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is well known and requires no further explanation. The Soviet Union does not join aggressive blocs and does not organize them. I 104. When I spoke of the organization of aggressive military blocs in the Near and Middle East, I did not name the States which help to organize them. I do not think, however, that either the President or any other representative had any difficulty in understanding which States I was referring to. I can tell you that I had in mind the organization of such blocs as the Turkish- Iraqi bloc or the Turkish-Pakistani bloc, which are not designed for defence or for the maintenance of security in the region, but which are, I should say, subsidiary and supplementary organs of the aggressive Atlantic bloc. As such,. they fully support and carry out the aggressive policy of the Atlantic bloc. That was what I had in mind, and I think that I was correctly understood in this matter.

To my great regret, I feel compelled in my capacity as the representative of TURKEY, for the second time, to answer very briefly the remarks of the Soviet Union representative. 106. I replied to the remarks of the representative of the Soviet Union on the assumption that the insincere and unjustified attacks and criticisms had also been levelled against my country. The further explanation given by the representative of the Soviet Union proves clearly that I was perfectly right and justified in doing so. 107. In his last statement, the representative ofthe Soviet Union said something to the effect that, by his criticism, he had referred to the so-called" aggressive blocs " such as those resulting from the Turkish-Iraqi agreement and the Turkish-Pakistani agreement. And I am very grateful to him for having mentioned, among these agreements, the so-called" aggressive North Atlantic bloc ", because it explains to the Council, a.s well as to everyone else in the world, his meaning when he said that the Turkish-Iraqi and Turkish-Pakistani agreements were aggressive in character. This stale propaganda manreuvre about the so-called •• aggressive North Atlantic bloc " is known to everybody. That part of his statement can be compared with his previous statement about the Turkish-Iraqi and Turkish-Pakistani agreements.

Ofcourse it is crystal clear to the world that the Turkish-Iraqi agreement, the Turkish-Pakistani agreement, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, have no aggressive intent whatever. In fact, one could well say that they have no aggressIve capability. They have been called into existence entirely because of the desire which has been manifested by the Communists time after time to gobble up everything in sight. That is why we have these treaties. They have been created as a reaction, as a response to Communist action. L 103. Le caractere pacifique de la politique etrangere de I'Union sovietique est bien connu et n'a besoin d'aucun developpement. L'Union sovietique n'adbere a aucun bloc agressif et elle n'en organise aucun. 104. En parlant de I'organisation de blocs militaires dans le Proche-Orient et le Moyen-Orient, je me suis abstenu de designer par leur nom les Etats qui y participent. Toutefois, je crois que ni le President, ni les representants des autres Etats ici presents n'ont eu la moindre difficulte it comprendre de qui je parlais. le peux dire que je visais precisement I'organisation de blocs tels que le bloc turcoirakien ou le bloc turco-pakistanais, qui n'ont nullement pour objet la defense ou le maintien de la securite dans cette region, mais qui sont, dirai-je, des organes auxiliaires ou des appendices du bloc agressif de l'Atlantique. En tant que tels, ils appuient sans reserve et its appliquent la politique agressive do bloc atlantique. Voila ce que je voulais dire, et je crois avoir ete compris a cet egard. 105. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): A mon grand regret, je me vois oblige de repondre encore une fois, tres brievement, en tant que representant de la TURQUIE, au representant de l'Union sovietique. 106. I'ai repondu a ses observations dans I'idee que les <'!.ttaques et les critiques peu sinceres et injustifiees qu'il avait formulees etaient dirigees egalement contre mon pays. Les explications qu'it vient de nous donner montrent que j'avais parfaitement raison. 107. Dans sa derniere declaration, le representant de l'URSS a laisse entendre que ses critiques visaient les pretendus «blocs agressifs » tels que ceux qui resultent du pacte turco-irakien et du pacte turco-pakistanais. le lui suis tres reconnaissant d'avoir mentionne, parmi ces accords, ce qu'it appelle le « bloc agressif de l'Atlantique nord ». Cela explique aux membres du Conseil et au monde entier ce qu'it veut dire lorsqu'il affirme que les pactes turco-irakien et turco-pakistanais sont des pactes agressifs. Tout le monde connait cette manreuvre de propagande deja ancienne qui consiste a dire que le Traite de I'Atlantique nord est « agressif}). Il suffira de comparer cette partie de sa declaration a celle qui se rapporte aux pactes turco-irakien et turco-pakistanais. 108. M. LODGE (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais): Il est evidemment clair pour le monde entier que ni le pacte turco-irakien, ni le pacte turco-pakistanais, ni l'Organisation du Traite de I'Atlantique nord n'ont la moindre intention agressive. On pourrait meme dire que ces organismes n'ont aucun potentiel agressif. lIs n'ont ete crees que parce que Ies communistes ont manifeste le desir, a maintes reprises, d'absorber tout ce qui se presentait. Voila pourquoi ces organismes existent; ils sont une reponse, une reaction aux agissements des communistes.

I intervene only to remind the Council that it was the Soviet Union representative who introduced this topic into our discussion. He did that originally by veiled allusions at the Council's first meeting on this item, and he has since made those allusions more precise by referring to certain agreements which have been freely concluded between nations of the free world and which are of great value to the free world. 111. In my view, the President naturally felt constrained to reply as the representative of Turkey, and he has replied very effectively. 112. Now that, as I hope, this topic-quite irrelevant to the matter under discussion-has been disposed of, I trust that we may proceed with the business in hand.

I think that this acrimonious exchange of opinions should stop and that the Council should proceed with its consideration of the item on the agenda. 114. Since all the members of the Security Council have spoken on the draft resolution contained in document S/3378, submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States, and since the parties to the case have expressed their views on the item, I now put that draft resolution to the vote. A vote was taken by show ofhands. The draft resolution was adopted unanimously.

The representative of Egypt has asked to make a statement. Since there is no objection, I now call on him.

I thank the President for allowing me to speak again on the Gaza aggression. 117. In my two previous statements, on 17 and 23 March [693rd and 694th meetings], I discussed the Gaza aggression and the circumstances in which it occurred in some detail. There is no point in doing so again, especially after the pertinent observations made by the members of the Council and the resolution which has just been adopted. In this brief speech I shall confine myself to commenting upon the draft resolution submitted by the representatives of the three great Powers, the United States, France and the United Kingdom, which the Council has just adopted. . 118. Egypt has suffered brutal and premeditated aggression against its armed forces by the regular forces ofIsrael. As you know, the attack lasted three hours and ~usedthe death of an officer, 35 soldiers, a civilian and a child of seven years; a lieutenant, 28 soldiers and a child of nine years were wounded. Despite this atrocious aggression,

le voudrais simplement rappeler au Conseil que c'cst le representant de rUnion sovieiique qui a introduit ce sujet dans nos debats. n a d'abord fait certaines allusions voilees, dans la premiere seance que le Conseil a consacreeacette question, et il a ensuite precise ces allusions en mentionnant ccrtains accords que des nations du monde libre ont conclus librement et qui sont, pour ce monde libre, d'une extreme importance. Ill. n etait done tout naturel que le President ait cru devoir lui repondeeen tant que representantde la Turquie ; ill'a fait d'une maniere tces efficace. 112. Ce sujet - qui n'a rien de con,mun avec la question que nous etudions - etant maintenant, je l'es~re,epuise, je pense que nous pouvons revenir al'ordre du jour. 113. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): J'estime que cet echange de wes acerbes a assez dunS et que le ConseiI doit maintenant poursuivre ]'examen du point inscrital'ordre dujour. 114. Tous les membres du ConseiI de securite ayant pris la parole sur le projet de resolution presente par les Etats- Unis,la France et le Royaume-Uni, et qui figure dans le document S/3378, et les parties en cause ayant expose ]euTs wes sur la question al'examen je vais mettre aux voix ie projet de resolution. 11 est procede au vote amain levee. A I'unanimite, le projet de resolution est adopte. 115. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Le representant de I'Egypte a demande a faire une declaration. Puisqu'iI n'y a pas d'objection, je lui donne la parole. 116. M. LOUTFI (Egypte): Je remercie le President d'avoir bien voulu me donner la parole encore une fois pour discuter I'agression de Gaza. 117. Dans mes deux preeedentes interventions, des 17 et 23 mars [693e et 694e seances], je me suis etendu sur l'agression de Gaza et les circonstances qui I'ont entouree. nest superftu d'y revenir, surtout apres les pertinentes interventions des membres du Conseil et la resolution qui vient d'etre adoptee. le me bornerai, dans cette courte intervention, a commenter seulement le projet de resolution presente par les representants de trois grandes puissances: Etats-Unis d'Amerique, France et Royaume- Uni, que le ConseiI vient d'adopter. 118. L'Egypte a ete l'objet d'une agression brutale premeditee contre ses forces armees par les forces reguli~res israeliennes. Cette attaque, qui a dure trois heurfs, a cause, comme vous le savez, la mort d'un officier, de 35 soldats, d'un civil et d'un enfant de sept ans; un lieutenant, 28 soldats et un enfant de neuf ans ont ete blesses. 119. Israel's guilt has been clearly established by the Mixed Armistice Commission, by the Special Committee, in the report by General Burns and in the resolution the Council hus just udopted. Nor has Israel tried to deny here that it perpetrated a premeditated and organized act of war, committed by order of the Israel authorities, against the regular forces of the Egyptian army. 119. La culpabilite d'Israel a ete etablie clairement par la Commission mixte d'armistice, le Comite special, le rapport du general Burns et la resolution que le Conseil vient d'adopter. Israel n'a d'ailleurs pas essaye de nier iei qu'il avait perpetre un acte de guerre premedite et organise, commis sur l'ordre des autorites israeliennes contre les forces regulieres de 1'armee egyptienne. 120. Les membres du Conseil qui ont presente des projets de resolution et qui ont pris la parole aujourd'hui ont tous declare qu'aucune justification ne pouvait etre trouvee a cette brutale agression et ont tous constate et condamne cet acte de violence. 120. The members of the Council who have proposed draft resolutions and have spoken today have all stated that no justification could be found for this brutal aggression, and have all noted and condemned this act of violence. 121. La delegation de I'Egypte a soumis au Conseil de securite, le 17 mars dernier, les demandes de l'Egypte. que je vais me permettre de vous rappeler: « ... ma delegation espere que le Conseil de securite constate:ra la violation flagrante des dispositions de la Convention d'armistice general egypto-israelienne, de la resolution du Conseil de securite du 24 novembre 1953 et de la Charte des Nations Unies. « Ma delegation est confiante que le Conseil condamnera cette brutale agression, confirmant ainsi la resolution de la Commission m;xte d'armistice et celle du Comite special. « En outre, nous esperons qu'etant donne la gravite de cette situation, creee par l'agression israelienne, le Conseil appliquera le Chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies. En effet, nous sommes en presence d'un acte d'agression qualifie qui a cree une situation qui entraine certainement une serieuse menace contre la paix. « Le Conseil pourrait, conformement a ce chapitre de la Charte, prendre les mesures qu'il jugerait neeessaires pour empecher la repetition d'un tel acte d'agression. n pourrait aussi demander le chatiment des responsables de cette action. I1 pourrait aussi rendre Israel responsable des pertes de vies humaines et des dommages materiels que cette agression a provoques dans la region de Gaza. Mon gouvernement reserve tous ses droits concernant cette question de reparations» [693e seance, par. 79 a82]. 121. The Egyptian delegation submitted Egypt's demands to the Security Council on 17 March last, and I propose now to recall them to your memory: " .. ,my delegation hopes that the Security Council will find that there has been a flagrant violation of the provisions of the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, the Security Council resolution of 24 November 1953, and the United Natiol1s Charter. " My delegation is confident that the Council will condemn this brutal aggression, thereby confirming the resolution of the Mixed Armistice Commission and of the Special Committee. " Furthermore, we hope that, in view of the gravity of this situation created by Israel aggression, the Council will apply Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. We are indeed faced with a serious act of aggression, one which has created a situation certainly involving a grave threat to peace. " The Council could take under that chapter of the Charter such action as it considered necessary to prevent the repetition of such an act of aggression. It .could request the punishment of those responsible for this act. It could hold Israel responsible for the loss of human life and the material damage caused by this aggression in the Gaza area. My Government reserves all its rights with regard to this question ofreparations" [693rd meeting, para. 79 to 82]. 122. Our reason for making all these requests of the Council was that it was not the first time Israel had committed brutal acts of aggression against the Arab countries. Indeed, after the Qibya massacre, the Security Council had already condemned Israel in its resolution of 24 November 1953 [S/3139/Rev.2], and had, in particular, required Israel to take effective steps to prevent any such action in the future. Unfortunately, however, the condemnation had no effect, for a few months after Qibya we had the Nahhalin tragedy, and a few months later tbis horrible aggression against Gaza. 122. Si nous avons soumis toutes ces demandes au Conseil, c'est que ce n'etait pas la premi~re fois qu'Israel commettait des agressions brutales contre les pays arabes. En effet, a la suite du massacre de Qibya, le Conseil de securite a.vait deja condamne Israel par sa resolution du 24 novembre 1953 [S/3139/Rev.2], et avait notamment requis Israel de prendre des mesures efficaces pour prevenir toute action semblable dans l'avenir. Or, malheureusement, la condamnation n'a pas eu d'effets, car quelques mois apres Qibya. nous avons eu le drame de Nahhalin et, quelques mois plus tard, cette horrible agression sur Gaza. 125. I should also like to comment on the last paragraph of the resolution which the Council has just adopted, to the effect that the Council " expresses its conviction that the maintenance of the General Armistice Agreement is threatened by any deliberate violation of that agreement by one of the parties to it ". I should like to stress the fact that Egypt has committed no deliberate violation of the armistice agreement. A deliberate violation is one like the Gaza aggression which, as the resolution states, was deliberate because it was prearranged, planned, and ordered by the Israel authorities. That, we believe, was the reason that this paragraph was included in connexion with the aggression against Gaza. 126. Thisjust condemnation orIsrael reflects the censure of Israel by world public opinion because of the warlike acts which it constantly commits in violation of the armistice agreements with the Arab States, of the resolutions of the Security Council and of the United Nations Charter. We hope that this condemnation of Israel-which we consider insufficient-will give the responsible leaders of Israel food for thought and will move them to put an end to the warlike acts which Israel constantly commits against the Arab States. 125. Je voudrais aussi faire une observation sur le dernier paragraphe de la resolution que le Conseil vient d'adopter. Aux termes de ce paragraphe, le Conseil « exprime sa conviction que le maintien de la Convention d'armistice general est menace par toute violation delib6ree de cette convention commise par une des parties ». Or, je voudrais souligner que 1'Egypte n'a pas commis de violation d6li- Mree de la convention d'armistice. Les violations deli- b6rees sont celles qui sont similaires it l'agression de Gaza qui, comme l'a retenu la resolution, sont deliMrees parce qu'elles sont premeditees et organisees, et commises sur l'ordre des autorites israeliennes. C'est d'ailleurs pour cette raison, a notre avis, que ce paragraphe a ete indus, it propos de l'agression sur Gaza. 126. Cette juste condamnation cl'Israel fait echo it la reprobation de l'opinion publique mondiale contre Israel pour les actes de guerre qu'i1 ne cesse de commettre, en violation des conventions d'armistice conclues avec les pays arabes, des resolutions du Conseil de securite et de la Charte des Nations Unies. Nous esperons que cette condamnation d'Israel - qui, a notre avis, est insuffisame - fera reflechir ses dirigeants responsables et les amenera it cesser les actes de guerre qu'Israel persiste it commettre contre les pays arabes. La seance est levee a 18 h. IS. FlNLAND - FINLANDE : Akatceminen Kirja- kauppa, 2 Kcskuskatu, Helsinki. 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