S/PV.696 Security Council

The Council has dealt severely but not, I think, unfairly with the worst and most dangerous infraction of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt that has occurred since that agreement was signed six years ago. We must now consider what we can do to ease the situation along this section of the demarcation Hne between Israel and the Egyptian-controlled territory of the Gaza strip. 2. In an earlier intervention [695th meeting] I have already said how deeply distressed I was at the most recent incident at Pattish, when two armed men, coming from Egyptian-controlled territory, attacked a wedding party, killing 2.n Israel girl and wounding more than 20 other Israeli~-an outrage of a particularly macabre and poignant character. 3. Violence breeds violence, and it is the clear duty ofthe Governments of both Egypt and Israel to take effective steps to prevent acts of VI\..~ence along the demarcation line, even when committed by irresponsible individuals. This is the aim of the draft resolution [Sj3379] which my delegation is sponsoring jointly with the delegations of France and the United States. 4. Since this is my delegation's aim-since we are looking forward rather than towards the past-I shall try to avoid a polemical discussion so far as I can. In all honesty, I must record myself as in disagreement with the picture which the representative of Israel has drawn a) Plainte de I'Egypte, au sujet de: Agression violente et premeditec commise le 28 femer 1955 par les forces armees israeIiennes contre les forces armies egypliennes a I'interieur dn territoire sous controle egyptien pres de Gaza, ayant cause de nomhreuses victimes donl 39 mom et 32 hlesses, ainsi que la destruction de certaines installations militaires, et cela en violadon notamment de I'article premier, paragraphe 2, et de I'article 11, paragraphe 2, de la Convention d'armistice general. egypto-israeiienne (8/3365, 8/3367, 8/3373, 8/3378); b) Plainte d'IsraeI contre I'Egypte, aD sujet de violations repetw 0." la Convention d'armislice ge!:.eral et des resolutions du Conseil de securite, violations qui mettent en peril la pm et la securite internationales, du fait: i) d'attaques de troupes egyptiennes regwieres et irregulieres contre les troupes israeiicnncs; ii) de raids effectues, apartir du territoire sous controle egyptien, contre des personnes et des hiens se trouvant en territoire israwen; ill) de I'attitude dn Gouvemement egyptien, qui n'adopte ni ne fait respectu de mesures effi.caces contre lea actes de violence de cette nature; iv) de l'affirmation par I'Egypte de l'enstence d'nn etat de guerre, comme de la pcilltique de helIigerance active suivie par cc pays contre Israel, notamment le maintien et I'execution de mesures de hlocus; -) de la propagande he1Iiqueuse et des menaces contre I'integri.e territoriale et I'independance poliiique d'IsraeI; vi) du refus par l'Egypte de rechercher, par voie de negociation, nn accord en vile d'nn passage efl'ectif de l'armistice actuel aI'etat de pm (8/3368, 813373, 8/3376, 8/3379, 8/3380). Sur ['invitation du President, M. Loutji, representant de l'Egypte, M. Eban, representant d'IsraiH, et le general Burns, Chef d'etat-major de l'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve, prennent placeala table du Conseil.

Le Conseil a pris une decision severe mais, me semble-t-il, equitable, en condamnant la violation la plus flagrante et la plus dangereuse dont la Convention d'armistice general egypto-israelienne ait fait l'objet depuis sa signature, voici six ans. Nous devons voir, a present, ce que le Conseil peut faire pour amener unr. detente sur ce tronr;on de la ligne de demarcation qui separe Israel de la bande de Gaza, placee sous I'autorite de I'Egypte. 2. J'ai dit precedemment [695e seance] l'horreur que m'inspirait le dernier incident qui s'est produit a Pattish, oil deux hommes armes venant du territoire sous controle egyptien ont attaque une noce, tuant une jeune fiUe israelienne et blessant plus de 20 Israeliens, ce qui constitue un attentat d'un caractere particulierement macabre et atroce. 3. La violence engendre la violence. Les Gouvernements de l'Egypte et d'Israel ont donc manifestement le devoir de prendre des mesures efficaces destinees a empecher tous actes de violence - meme ceux qui sont commis par des elements irresponsables-le long de la ligne de demarcation. Voila precisement le but du projet de resolution [Sj3379] que ma delegation presente conjointement avec les delegations des Etats-Unis et de la France. .~. Puisque tel est le but que vise ma delegation - en se tournant vers l'avenir plutot que vers le passe - je chercherai, dans toute la mesure du possible, a. eviter des poIemiques. En toute franchise, je dois declarer que je Il'approuve pas la fa~on dont le representant d'lsrael 5. We hardly, however, needed the latest tragic incident at Pattish to convince us that conditions on the borders of the Gaza strip were a matter of real concern and that infiltration, only too often accompanied by violence, had gravely contributed to the-state of insecurity there. I can well understand that the families and villages in the area must be living in a constant state of anxiety and apprehension. If violence breeds violence, insecurity in its turn breeds des~ration-and when desperation leads to further violence, the vicious circle is complete. 5. Neanmoins, nous n'avons guere eu besoin de ce dernier incident tragique de Pattish pour nous rendre compte que la situation sur les frontieres de la bande de Gaza est reellement inquietante, et que les infiltrations, qui s'accompagnent trop souvent d'actes de violence, ont grandement contribue a l'insecurite qui regne dans cette zone. Je comprends parfaitement que les familles qui habitent la region et les populations des villages qui y sont situes connaissent une anxiete et des apprehensions ccnstantes. S'il est vrai que la violence engendre la violence, il n'est pas moins vrai que l'insecutite engendre le desespoir; comme le desespoir provoque de nouvelles violences, nOllS avons la un cercle vicieux. 6. Although nothing can excuse the resort to planned violence represented by the Israel attack on 28 February 1955-and the Security Council has condemned both the attack in itself and the principle of retaliation-all concerned should help to ensure that there is no temptation to commit such acts of violence. We shall not, in the Council, achieve our ends simply by saying that retali~ ation is wrong and that it must not occtll' again. We must try, all of us, to remove the causes of the tension that sets up strains which snap into violence. 6. Si rien ne peut excuser un recours a la violence premeditee, comme dans I'attaque israeIienne du 28 fevrier 1955 - le Conseil de securite a d'ailleurs condamne a la fois l'attaque elle-meme et le principe des represaiIles -, encore faut-il que tous les interesses contribuent a ecarter toute tentation de commettre de tels actes de violence. Le Conseil n'aurait pas atteint son but s'il se bornait a declarer que les represailles sent inadmissibles et qu'il ne doit plus y en avoir. Nous devons tous nous attacher a eIiminer les causes qui provoquent une situation si tendue qu'elle finit par eclater. 7. My Government, as I have already made plain, looks forward eagerly to the day when peace will be established between Israel and its neighbours. Untillb.at time comes, it must be our constant concern to ensure that the present armistice regime is strictly observed and brings with it the greatest benefits possible under such an interim arrangement. Indeed, as time goes by, we are surely entitled to expect that conditions will progressively improve, and that is why my Government learned with particular interest of the proposals which the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization made to the Israel and Egyptian Governments last November [8/3319, and Corr.l, para. 13J. If~ as I understand, the demarcation line is in many places marked only with a ploughed furrow, and no contact exists between the authorities on either side, there is clearly wide scope for practical arrangements to improve the position. 7. Mon gouvernement, je l'ai deja dit, attend avec impatienc~ le jour oil la paix sera etablie entre Israel et ses voisins. D'ici la, nous devons veiller constamment a ce que le regime institue par la convention d'armistice soit strictement observe et qu'il produise tous les fruits que peut donner un tel accord provisoire. A vrai dire, avec le temps, nous avons le droit de compter que la situation s'ameliorera peu a peu; c'est bien pourquoi mon gouvernement a pris cOllnaissance, avec le plus grand interet, des propositions que le Chef d'etat-major de l'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve a soumises en novembre dernier aux Gouvernements d'Israel et de I'Egypte [8/3319 et corr.1, par. 13J. Je crois savoir qu'a beaucoup d'endroits, la Iigne de demarcation est indiql.lee au moyen d'un simple SillOll et qu'it n'y a aucun· contact entre les autorites etablies de part et d'autre de cette Iigne; s'il en est vraiment ainsi, it doit certainement etre possible de prendre des mesures pratiques pour ameIiorer la situation. 8. My Government attaches very real importance to this initiative on the part of General Burns, and shares the conviction, stated in his new report to the Security Council, dated 17 March 1955, that" if an agreement were effected between the two parties on the lines I have suggested, and if an honest attempt to fulfil the conditions were made by both parties, infiltration could be reduced to an occasional nuisance" [8/3373, para. 45]. The ultimate objective, of course, must be the elimination of iIlegaIities on the border altogether. 8. Mon gouvernement attache une J;'eelIe importance a cette initiative du general Burns et fait sienne l'opinion qu'it a exprimee en ces termes dans son nouveau rapport au Conseil de securite, date du 17 mars 1955: « si les deux parties concluaient un accord en s'inspirant des principes que j'ai suggeres et si l'une et l'autre s'effor~ienthonn~­ tement d'en rempIir les clauses, les actes d'infiltration pourraient ne plus etre que des ennuis occasionnels» [8/3373, par. 45]. Notre but linal doit etre, bien entendu, I'eIimination de tout acte illegal sur la fronHere. 9. There is certainly nothing immutable in the Chief of Staff's proposals. I am sure that General Burns would be the first to say that they could be improved by 9. Les propositions du Chef d'etat-major n'ont certainement rien d'immuable. Je suis persuade que le general Burns serait le premier a dire qu'it est possib!e de les 10. There is one further point the..t I should like to make, arising out of our present discussions in the Council. UntiI the goal of permanent peace has been reached, it would seem to me plainly desirable that both parties should use the greatest restraint in their language and in announcements of their policy. 11. We have heard General Burns explain [694th meeting] that, except when the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission can persuade the parties to modify their draft resolutions, he is obliged to vote for them as they stand, and that he cannot present drafts of his own. This does seem to me to be a flaw in the armistice machi4 nery. All of us must well understand that the parties, when they consider themselves to be in the right, will be under constant temptation to exaggerate the extent of the wrong which they have suffered. A recital by either party of resolutions dealing with its own complaints is thus bound, in its cumulative effect, to give an over-dramatized picture ofthe situation, and this, in turn, tends to heighten tension. It seems to me that this question of Mixed Armistice Commission resolutions is a manageable problem and one which the parties would be well advised to consider with General Burns, whose impartiality and good will are beyond dispute. 12. This is, as I have said, one reflection which has occurred to me in the course of this debate. It s~ems to me of gome real importance. But our main purpose must be to ask the two Governments to make a genuine effort to co-operate with General Burns in the control of the border. 13. As Members of the United Nations, Israel and Egypt may, I feel sure, be relied upon to pay the closest attention to the wishes of the Security Council in this grave matter. That is why I ask my fellow representatives to vote for the draft resolution in document Sj3379.

Today the Security Council is to consider part (b) of the item on our agenda and to examine the general situation in the Gaza area, with special reference to the request submitted to us by the delagation of Israel. 15. While, as I said yesterday [695th meeting], that situation cannot on any account justify the act of reprisal carried out on 28 February 1955 by the Israel forces, it is nevertheless a subject ofgrave concern to my delegation, and doubtless to the Council as a whole. General Burns' remarkably 0bjective report has given us a clear and full picture of that situation and of the growing tension in the area. 16. General Burns states that one of the main causes of that tension is without doubt the infiltration of elements from the territory under Egyptian control. In the majo- 10. Il y a un autre point auquel nos debats anterieurs me font penser. Tant que nous n'aurons pas reussi cl. etablir une paix definitive, il me semble hautement souhaitable que les deux parties mode-rent leur langage en annoncant la politique qu'elles se proposent de suivre. 11. Le general Burns nous a dit [694e seance] que si le President de la Commission mixte d'armistice ne peut persuader les parties de modifier le texte de leurs projets de resolution, it doit voter Slir ces projets de resolution, sans pouvoir presenter lui-meme aucun amendement ni aucun projet de resolution. Ceci me semble etre Ulle imperfection du systeme de I'armistice. Nous devons tous admettre que si les parties estiment qu'eUes ont raison, eUes seront toujours tentees d'exagerer l'importance des torts qu'elles ont subis. Quand chacune des parties recapitule les resolutions qui portent sur ses propres plaintes, il ne peut manquer d'en.resulter un tableau exagere, lequel ac~roit a son tour, la tension. Il me semble que ce probleme des resolutions de la Commission mixte d'armistice peut etre resolu et que les parties auraient interet a l'etudier avec le general Burns, dont l'impartialite ni la bonne volonte ne sont contestees par personne. 12. C'est la, je le repete, une reflexion qui m'est venue au cours du debat et qui me se':1ble importante. Mais notre principal but doit etre de demander aux deux gouvernements de faire un effort sincere pour cooperer avec le general Burns ala surveillance de la zone frontiere. 13. Il est permis d'esperer qu'en tant que Membres des Nations Unies, Israel et l'Egypte ne manqueront pas d'accorder la plus' grande attention aux desirs que le Conseil de securite exprime dans cette grave affaire. C'est pourquoi je demande atous mes coUegues de voter pour le projet de resolution qui figure dans le document Sj3379. 14. M. HOPPENOT (France): Le Conseil de securite doit proceder aUjourd'hui a l'examen de la partie b de la question inscrite a notre ordre du jour et etudier la situation generale existant dans la region de Gaza, en relation notamment avec la requete dont la delegation d'Israel nous a saisis. 15. Si cette situation ne saurait aaucun titre - comme je le disais hier [695e seance] - justifier I'action de represailles entreprise le 28 fevrier 1955 par les forces israeliennes, elle n'en est pas moins, pour ma delegation, et sans doute pour le Conseil, un sujet de grave preoccupation. Le rapport du general Burns, si remarquable par son objectivite, nous a presente un tableau clair et complet de cette situation et de la tension croissante qui la caracterise. 16. Le general Burns declare que l'une des causes principales de cette tension est indubitablement l'infiltration d'elements venus du territoire sous controle egyptien. La conti~mning Israel. During the same period, according to annex V of the .eport, the Commission was seized of 98 complaints by Israel, resulting in the condemnation of Egypt on 7 occasions. 18. A detailed analysis of these figures would add nothing essential to the general conclusions to be drawn from them. The mere statement of them shows that a greater responsibility rests with Egypt as regards the number of these incidents, which maintain a permanent state of insecurity in the area, and that Egypt also bears a lesser responsibility, though greater than that of Israel, for the incidents which are sufficiently serious and flagrant to call for censure by the Mixed Armistice Commission and which still further increase the existing tension. 19. Since 28 February 1955, 13 further cases of infiltration have been reported to the Commission, which has condemned Egypt twice. To those condemnations must be added that which the Commission has just expressed in connexion with the incident of 24 March 1955, which it describes as" a brutal and murderous act ofaggression ". The circumstances in which this attack took place, the number of victims, and the fact that its perpetrators had to go, armed, 20 kilometres inside Israel territory in order to commit those murders, account for the emotion which it has aroused in Israel and for its condemnation by all men of good faith. 20. The French delegation is well aware of all the elements which go to form the background of this tension and provide, as it were, a dangerous breeding-ground for it. 21. We do not fail to appreciate the problems which face the Egyptian authorities through the presence of 200,000 refugees on the Gaza strip, the great majority of whom live aimlessly, in a state of anxiety and in wretched living conditions, a fe~' miles from their ancestral homes. 22. It is not an easy task to impose order and discipline upon them, and respect for the frontier line which separates them from their former homes; yet it is the duty of the responsible authorities to leave nothing undone in fulfilling it. While isolated cases of infiltration by marauders or crop thieves cannot be completely prevented, it does seem that more active and closer supervision and more vigorous repression would prevent armed attacks and the laying of mines-an operation which 18. Une analyse detaill6e de ces chiffres n'ajouterait rien d'essentiel aux conclusions generales qui s'en degagent. Leur simple enonce permet de constater qu'une responsabilite majeure incombe a I'Egypte quant au nombre de ces incidents, qui entretiennent dans la region un etat permanent d'insecurite; que l'Egypte porte egalement une responsabilite, moindre, mais superieure cependant acelle d'Israel, dans les-incidents suffisamment graves et flagrants pour entrainer une condamnation par la Commission mixte d'armistice et qui contribuent plus grandement encore a accroitre la tension existante. 19. Depuis le 28 fevrier 1955, 13 nouveaux cas d'infiltration ont ete denonces ala Commission mixte d'armistice, et 2condamnations ont ete prononcees par elle contre 1'Egypte. Aces condamnations s'ajoute celle dont la Com:nission vient de sanctionner 1'incident du 24 mars 1955, qualifie par eUe d' « acte d'agression brutal et meurtrier ». Les circonstances dans lesquelles cet attentat s'est produit, le nombre des victimes qu'il a cause, le fait que ses auteurs, pour perpetrer ces meurtres, ont dO penetrer, en armes, a 20 kilometres al'interieur du territoire israeIien, expIiquent I'emotion qu'il a suscitee en Israel et sa reprobation par tous les hommes de benne foi. 20. La delegation francaise n'ignore aucun des elements qui existent aI'arriere-plan de cette tension et qui creent, en quelque sorte, le terrain sur lequel elle s'accroit dangereusement. 21. Nous ne meconnaissons pas les problemes que pose aux autorites egyptiennes la presence, sur la bande de terre de Gaza, de 200.000 refugies dont la grande majorite vegetent, dans I'anxiete et dans des conditions de vie mediocrefl, aquelques kilometres de leur terre ancestrale. 22. Leur imposer ordre, discipline 'et respect de la ligne frontiere qui les separe de leurs anciens foyers n'est pas une tache facile: le devoir des autorites responsables est cependant de ne rien negliger pour le remplir. Si des infiltrations isolees de maraudeurs ou de pilleurs de recoltes ne peuvent etre totalement empeeh6es, il semble qu'une surveillance plus active et plus etroite, une repression plus vigoureuse, previendraient les attaques amain armee et les poses de mines qui supposent la possession, par 24. The Council cannot ignore the sense of insecurity and anxiety that is felt by all living in the neighbourhood of the demarcation 'tne as a result of the repeated infiltrations. When r:. ~. 1tion is forced to live constantly on its guard, with its finger on the trigger, it is not surprising that shots should be fired from time to time. Individual acts of retaliation which initiate chain reactions of incidents cannot be placed on the same footing as collective acts of organized reprisal such as the action we condemned yesterday. The Council is not required to consider incidents direct responsibility for which is borne solely by individuals; such incidents are a matter for the Mixed Armistice Commission. But the state of tension which is created by these incidents and which leads to still more incidents is, as I have already said, a matter of grave concern to us, and it is the right and the duty of the Council to seek ways of putting an end to it. 25. That is the purpose of the draft resolution [8/3379] which the delegations of France, the United Kingdom and the United States have submitted to the Council for its approval. 26. The text begins by taking note of the report of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Suoervision Orl!anization. It takes note of the statements inthat report concerning the general conditions on the armistice demarcation line and the causes of the present tension, one of the most important being infiltrations from Egyptian-controlled territory. It also notes the concrete proposals which General Burns has made to the two parties [8/3319 and Corr.l, para. 13] and the adoption of which would, in his opinion, reduce infiltration to such an extent as to diminish the present tension considerably. Lastly, it calls upon the Governments of Egypt and Israel to co-operate with the Chief of Staff in seeking and adopting joint measures to this end. 27. It is not for the Council to express an opinion regarding the nature of these measures. Nevertheless, my delegation was struck by the reasonable and constructive nature of General Burns' proposals: a delimitation of gacheU~, il n'est pas surprenant que des coups de feu soient parfois tires. Les ripostes individuelles, qui engendrent des reactions en chaine d'incidents, ne sauraient etre muses sur le meme pied que les actions collectives de represailles organisees, comme celle que nous avons condamnee hier. Le Conseil n'a pas a connaitre d'incidents qui ne mettent directement en cause que des responsabiIites individuelles: c'est a la Commission mixte d'armistice qu'il appa,rtient de s'en saisir. Mais l'etat de tension cree par ces incidents, et qui en favorise en meme temps la multiplication, est pour nous, comme je 1'ai deja dit, un grave sujet de preoccupation, et il est de la competence et du devoir du Conseil Ge rechercher les moyens d'y mettre fin. 25. C'est la l'objet du projet de resolution [8/3379] que les delegations des' Etats-Unis, de la France et du Royaume-Uni soumettent a votre app:-obation. 26. Ce texte prend comme point de depart le rapport du Chef d'etat-maior de l'Orl!anisme charge de la surveillance de la treve. Il prend note de ses-declarations traitant des conditions generales sur la ligne de demarcation ainsi que des causes de la presente tension, causes dont l'une des principales est l'infiltration en provenance du territoire place sous controle egyptien. Il prend note egalement des propositions concretes presentees aux deux parties par le general Burns [8/3319, et Corr.l, par. 13] et dont I'adoption, a son avis, reduirait les actes d'infiltration dans une proportion teIle que la tension actueIle en serait tres largement dirninuee. Enfin, iI requiert les Gouvernements de l'Egypte et d'lsrael de cooperer avec le Chef d'etat-major dans la recherche et l'adoption des mesures communes destinees a atteindre cet objectif. 27. Il n'est pas dans le role du Conseil de se prononcer sur la nature meme de ces mesures. Ma delegation a ete frappee cependant par le caractere raisonnable et cons.- tructif de ceIles que le general Burns envisage: une cer- 29. There is a final comment that I should like to make. The penultimate paragraph of our draft resolution reads as follows: " Calls upon the Governments of Egypt and Israel to co-operate with the Chief of Staff with regard to his proposals, bearing in mind that, in the opinion of the Chief of Staff, infiltration could be reduced to an occasional nuisance if an agreement were effected between the parties on the lines he has proposed." 30. This paragraph has perhaps been drafted in realistic, rather than legalistic, terms. I wish to make it clear that it must not be construed as meaning that the Council accepts the existence of a certain amount of infiltration provided that it constitutes only an occasional nui~anee. It is, ofcourse, the Council's desire that all acts ofinfIltration in violation of the provisions of the armistice agreement should be completely stopped. By its reference to General Burns' opinion that infiltration" could be reduced to an occasional nuisance ", the draft resolution clearly implies that at present infiltration is on a much more serious scale, and that if infiltration could be reduced, the tension it gives rise to would be reduced accordingly. From a realistic viewpoint, we must admit that, in the circumstances existing along the demarcation line, isolated acts of infiltration are inevitable. 31. It would be a first step towards the re-establishment, first, of security and, later, of peace in this area if, as a result of the measures proposed by General Burns and adopted by both parties, the number and seriousness of these acts of infiltration could be so reduced as to cease to be, in themselves, an element of tension between the two peoples. 32. J hope that the Governments ofEgypt and Israel will give the closest attention to the conclusion.s that emerge from. - discussions and will, in a new spirit, follow the path ;~> suggest. We are not asking them to go beyond 28. I1 nous paraitrait souhaitable egalement que la procedure prevue pour le fonctionnement de la Commission mixte d'armistice rut appliquee de telle manil~re qu'elle laissat ason President une part pIllS grande dans le libelle de ses decisions. La Commission ne devraifpas se trouver placee dans l'alternative d'adopter ou de reJeter purement et simplement les projets de resolution de la partie plaignante dans If! forme meme oil ils lui sont presentes. Ses decisions ne devraient pas etre redigees dans un esprit de propagande, mais bien dans un esprit de justice, et elles devraient l'etre dans des termes proportionnes aux actes qu'el1es sanctionnent. Il est a souhaiter que les ,~eux parties se pretent aux suggestions que le general Burns et ses collaborateurs pourront leur faire aeet effet. 29. Il est l.lne derniere observation que je souhaiterais soumettre au Conseil. L'avant-dernier paragraphe de notre projet de resolution se lit comme sui~: « Requiert les Gouvernements d'Egypte et d'Israel de cooperer avec le Chef d'etat-major en cc qui concerne ses propositions, ayant present it l'esprit que, de I'opinion du Chef d'etat-majoi, Ies actes d'infiltration pourraient ne plus etre que des ennuis occasionnels si un ac,;ord etait conclu par les deux parties dans le sens qu'il a indique. » 30. Cette redaction est peut-etre con9ue dans un esprit plus realiste que juridique. Je tiens a preciser qu'elle ne doit pas etre interpretee comme signifiant que le Conseil accepte l'existence d'une certaine infiltration acondition que celle-ci ne cause que des ennuis occasionnels. Le desir du Conseil est naturellement de vouloir mettre completement fin a tous actes Cl'infiltration commis en violation des dispositions de la convention d'armistice. En citant l'opinion du general Burns, d'apres laquelle ces actes d'infiltration « pourraient ne plus etre que des ennuis occasionnels », le projet de resolution indique clairement qu'actuellement l'6chelle a laquelle se produit cette infiltration presente un caractere beaucoup plus grave, et que la tension qui en resuite diminueraii proportionnellement a l'importance de cette infiltration si celle-ci pouvait tout au moins etre reduite. D'un point de vue realiste, i1 nous faut bien admettre que des actes isoIes d'infiltration sont, dans les conditions qui regnent le long de la ligne de demarcation, inevitables. 31. Un premier pas serait fait vel'S le retablissemellt de la securite d'abord, de la paix ensuite, dans cette region du monde si, par suite des mesures envisagees par le general Burns et adoptees par les deux parties, le nombre et la gravite de ces infiltrations pouvaient etre rerluits dans une proportion telle qu'ils ne soient plus en eux-memes un element de tension entre les populations. 32. Je souhaite que les Gouvernemerts d'Egypte et d'Israel pretent la plus serieuse attention aux conclusions qui se degageront de nos debats et entrent avec un esprit nouveau dans la voie oil nous les invitons. Nous ne leur

The draft resolution sponsored by France, the United Kingdom and the United States [8/3379], which is the pending question today, represents an earnest desire on the part of our three Governments-and, we believe, on the part of the majority of this Council-to give every possible encouragement and assistance in preventing the recurrence of the unfortunate events which have so alarmed us all. 34. We believe that the machinery exists in the Truce Supervision Organization, under the authority of the Sec'urity Council, to reduce border incidents to a manageable minimum, provided that the parties, with whom ultimate responsibility lies, make an earnest endeavour to use this machinery to the full. After what has happened in the past few weeks, any further reluctance on the part of either of the parties to give the Truce Supervision Organization an honest chance to prevent further disorders would to us be unthinkable. Such reluctance would in fact call into question their whole attitude towards the problems of border security. It would be against their own interests and against the interests of peace and security for which we are all responsible. 35. We do not believe that the Truce Supervision Organization has been given a fair chance to prove that the troubles which have occurred in the past can be prevented. The parties have not, in our opinion, always shown their readiness to take all necessary measures and to co-operate fully with the Chief of Staff and the military observers. The time has come when they must make a far greater effort. 36. It seems to us that the opportunity for this exists in the proposals which the Chief of Staff has already made, and that this should be the first order of business in the area when this debate has concluded. 37. The draft resolution therefore calls upon the Governments of Egypt and Israel to co-operate with the Chief of Staff with regard to his proposals. In his opinion, they can reduce the serious problem of infiltration-which he considers to be one of the causes of tension and which, as we have said several times already, we wish to see completely eliminated-to an occasional nuisance. Members of the Security Council will recall that General Burns' proposals were: (a) that joint patrols of Egyptian and Israel forces should be instituted along sensitive sections of the demarcation line; (b) that the parties should negotiate. a local commanders' agreement for immediately dealing on the spot with border problems; (c) that a barbed wire obstacle should be placed along certain portions of the demarcation line; and (d) that all 33. M. LODGE (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais): Le projet de resolution presente par les Etats- Unis, la France et le Royaume-Uni [8/3379], que nous examinons aujourd'hui, reftete le desir sincere de ces trois gouvernements - et, je crois, de la majorite du Conseild'encourager, autant qu'il est possible, et d'aider les pays interesses a eviter le retour des evenements regrettables qui nous ont tous si vivement a:armes. 34. Nous estimons que l'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve, subordonne au Conseil de securite, offre les moyens de reduire les incidents de frontiere a un minimum supportable, a condition que les parties, qui sont responsables en dernier ressort, fassent un effort sincere pour employer ces moyens au maximum. Apres ce qui s'est produit ces dernieres semaines, il nous semblerait inconcevable que l'une ou l'autre des parties hesite encore a donner sans arriere-pensee a I'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve la possibilite de prevenir de nouveaux desordres. Une teIle hesitation mettrait en cause I'attitude generale des parties au regard des problemes que pose la securite de la frontiere. Elle serait contraire a leurs interets propres comme aux interets de la paix et de la securite, que nous devons tous defendre ici. 35. Nous ne croyons pas que les parties aient loyalement menage a I'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve l'occasion de prouver qu'il est possible d'eviter le .retour des incidents passes. A notre avis, les parties ne se sont pas toujours montrees disposees a prendre toutes les mesures neeessaires et a coIlaborer pleinement avec le Chef d'etat-major et les observateurs rnilitaires. L'heure est venue pour eJ:es de faire un effort beaucoup plus grand a cet egard. 36. 11 nous semble que les propositions que le Chef d'etat-major a deja faites offrent precisement cette possibitite et que ce devrait Stre la premiere question a regler sur place, une fois le present debat termine. 37. C'est pourquoi le projet de resolution invite les Gouvernements d'Egypte et d'Israel a cooperer avec le Chef d'etat-major en ce qui concerne ses propositions. Le Chef d'etat-rnajor estime que, grace a eHes, les actes d'infiltration - qu'it tient pour I'une des causes de tension et que nous voulons completernent eliminer, cornme nous l'avons dit plusieurs fois deja - pourraient ne plus Stre que des ennuis occasionnels. Les membres du Conseit de securite se souviendront que les propositions du general Burns etaient les suivantes: a) formation de patrouilles mixtes composees de forces egyptiennes et israeliennes, dans les secteurs delicats de la ligne de demarcation; b) negociation d'un accord entre les commandants locaux en vue de regler immediatemeni. wC sur place les problemes de la frontiere; c) implantation d'une Iigne de barbeles le 39. The Chief of Staff will be returning shortly to the area, and we hope that no time will be lost in working out his proposals so that they can be put into effect immediately, and in consulting further with respect to add~­ tional practical measures. The draft resolution requests the Chiefof Staffto continue his consultations with Egypt and Israel with a view to working out such addit~::;~al practical measures. 40. These are the purposes of the draft resolution that we have joined in introducing. They are based on the conviction that what the ChiefofStaffhas said concerning the probable effectiveness of his suggestions is true, if an earnest effort is made to work them out. They are based on the conclusion that there should be no hesitation on either side in getting to work with the Chief of Staff to produce this result. 41. Wc commend this approach to the members of the Security Council and to the parties, and trust that their response will be prompt and effective.

Yesterday, the Security Council completed its consideration of the grave incident which was the initial focus of the present series of meetings. It is now incumbent on the Council, in my delegation's view, to consider ways and means ofbringing about an improvement of the border situation in the vicinity of Gaza and a lessening of the too evident tension arising from that situation. 43. The Council's action in condemning Israel for the attack oJ 28 February 1955 [695th meetiIlJs-~ does not, in our view, imply that the tension in the Gaza area is exclusively Israel's responsibility. A balanced picture is presented by the Chief of Staff in his report [S/3373]. General Burns has very properly laid emphasis on the need for preventive measures. The willingness of the parties to co-operate effectively in such measures as guarding and patrolling the demarcation line, he has pointed out, could indicate whether they really desired to keep the border area quiet. There is, therefore, a question which deserves as careful consideration by the Council as the act of judgment which it rendered yesterday. 44. It is clear from General Burns' report that the Gaza strip presents special problems. A large majority of its present population consists not of permanent inhabitants but ofrefugees from territory now occupied by Israel. 45. This fact helps to explain why General Burns' survey of the months preceding the Israel attack of 28 February 41. Telle est la methode que nous recommandons aux membres du Conseil de securite et aux parties interessees, et nous sommes convaincus qu'ils lui feront bon accueil. 42. M. PERRY (Nouvelle-zelande) (traduit de l'anglais): Hier, le Conseil a termine l'examen du grave incident qui etait le point central des presents debats. De l'avis de ma delegation, it incombe maintenant au Conseil de trouver les moyens d'ameliorer la situation qui s'est creee sur la frontiere, pres de Gaza, et de reduire la tension qui en est la consequence manifeste. 43. A notre avis, la decision par laquelle le Conseil a blame Israel d'avoir entrepris l'attaque du 28 feYrier 1955 [695e seance] n'implique nullement qu'Israel soit seul responsable de la tension qui regne dans la region de Gaza. Le rapport du Chef d'etat-major [8/3373] nous a donne une vue objective de la situation. Le general Burns a insiste, ajuste titre, sur la ileeessite de prendre des mesures preventives. A son avis, c'est en acceptant de collaborer efficacement dans l'application de mesures telles que le service de garde et de patrouille, le long de la ligne de demarcation, que les parties pouITont montrer si elles souhaitent vraiment maintenir le calme dans la zone frontiere. Il y a done la une question que le Conseil doit peser avec le meme soin que le jugement qu'il a emis hier. 44. Il ressort clairement du rapport du general Burns que la bande de Gaza presente un probleme particulier. La vaste majorite de sa population actuelle se compose, non d'habitants permanents, mais de refugies venus du terntoke occupe presentement par Israel. 45. On comprend mieux, ainsi, que le bilan etabli par le general Burns ait revele, pendant les mois anterieurs 46. I have noted from statements by the representative ofEgypt and by General Bums that the question whether, under the terms of the armistice agreement, Governments can be held responsible for acts of infiltration by individuals, has been appealed to the Special Committee and has not yet been decided by that body. But, leaving aside the question of legal responsibility for acts already committed, it would appear that, from a practical point of view, primary responsibility for preventing infiltration, and particularly for preventing acts of violence, rests with the party from whose territory the infiltrators operate. I say "primary responsibility" but not, as the Israel authorities said in their communication of 19 January 1955, to the Chief of Staff [S/3373, para. 42], sole responsibility. 47. This primary responsibility is accentuated when infiltration is accompanied by acts of sabotage and murder. It is particularly disturbing to find infiltrators armed with high explosives and with military weapons such as Sten guns and hand grenades. As General Bums has pointed out, there is a special responsibility on Egypt to take the necessary measures to ensure that no arms or explosives are in the hands of unstable elements. On the other hand, we cannot ignore the fact that, to use General Bums' language [ibid., para. 45], there are" vast numbers of poverty-stricken refugees " in the Gaza strip, refugees whose former homes are now in Israel territory. Still less can we pass over General Burns' clear view that effective measures against infiltration require the cooperation of both parties. The practical proposals made by General Burns and the reactions of the parties are set out in paragraphs 40 and 41 of his report. General Bums' initiative is a valuable one, and it is encouraging that some prcgress has been made. 48. Recent incidents have shown the dangers of leaving matters as they are. It is for this reason that my delegation trusts that there will be no further delay in the conclusion of the area commanders' agreement proposed by General Bums. We endorse also the recommendation that Egypt should •strictly apply its laws against infiltration, and we welcome Mr. Loutfi's assurances in this respect [694th meeting]. 49. It is evident, however, that infiltration continues despite the measures so far taken by Egypt, and that serious consideration must be given to further measures designed to seal off the demarcation line against this kind of activity. The Chief of Staff has already proposed such practical measures as the institution of joint patrols and the construction of a physical obstacle. In the view of my 46. Le general Bums et le representant de l'Eg-ypte nous ont dit que le Comite special etait saisi de la question de savoir si, aux termes de la convention d'armistice, les gouvernements pouvaient etre tenus responsables des actes d'infiltration commis par des particuliers. Le Comite n'a pas encore statue. Mais, sans parler de la responsabilite juridique encourue peur des actes deja commis, il scmblerait que, dans la pratique, c'est avant tout au pays d'oll partent les infiltres qu'il appartient d'empecher les infiltrations, et surtout de prevenir les actes de violence. Je dis « avant tout », car je n'accepte pas la these que les autorites israeliennes ont defendue dans la communication qu'elles ont adressee au Chef d'etat-m~jor le 19 janvier dernier [S/3373, par. 42], et selon laquelle il s'agirait la d'une responsabilite exclusive. 47. La responsabilite du pays d'origine des infiltres s'aggrave lorsque les incursions s'accompagnent d'actes de sabotage et de meurtres. Il est particulierement inquietant de voir des infiltres armes d'explosifs puissants et d'armes de guerre comme les pistolets-mitrailleurs Sten Oil les grenades a main. Comme le general Bums l'a fait observer, il incombe tout specialement a l'Egypte de s'assurer qu'aucune arme et qu'aucun explosif ne sont detenus par des elements instables. D'autre part, on ne saurait negliger le fait que, pour reprendre les termes du general Bums [ibid., par. 45], la bande de Gaza abrite « un grand nombre de refugies miserables » et dont les anciens foyers se trouvent en territoire israelien. Encore moins devons-nous negliger le fait, signale par le general Bums, que, pour etre efficaces, les mesures destinees a prevenir les infiltrations necessitent la collaboration des deux parties. Les propositions concretes du general Burns et l'accueil que leur ont fait les parties sont exposes aux paragraphes 40 et 41 de son rapport. eette initiative du general Burns est excellente, et il est encourageant de voir qu'il y a eu progres a eet egard. 48. Les incidents recents ont montre a quel point il etait dangereux de laisser alIer les choses. Aussi ma delegation espere-t-elle fermement que l'accord que le general Burns propose de conclure entre les commandants locaux ne tardera plus. Nous souscrivons ega.lement a la recommandation qui invite l'Egypte a appliquer strictement ses lois d~rigees contre l'infiltration, et nous sommes fort satisfaits des assurances que M. Loutfi a donnees a ce sujet [6946 seance]. 49. Il est clair, toutefois, que les infiltrations se poursuivent malgre les mesures prises par l'Egypte, et qu'it faut examiner serieusement de nouvelles mesures prop!es a. proteger la ligne de demarcation contre ces activites. Le Chef d'etat-major a deja propose des mesures pratiques telles que la creation de patrouilles mixtes et l'implantation d'un obstacle materiel. De l'avis de ma delegation, 52. The Council will, I am sur\;, await with keen interest the further reports of the Chief of Staff. It will expect them to reflect the active co-operation with him of both Egypt and Israel, and the improvement in the border situation which is bound to follow.

I wish to make ~ very brief statement in my capacity as the representative of TURKEY. 54. In my statement yesterday [695th meetingJ, I had the occasion to explain my Government's views in connexion with the contents of the joint draft resolution contained in document S/3379. J shall therefore not take the time of the Council to repeat the same views. My delegation will, however, vote in favour of the draft resolution in question presented by France, the United Kingdom and the United States. 55. Mr TSIANG (China): I am very grateful to General Burns for making available to us the body of information which is contained in his report [S/3373J. I make particular reference to the section of the report which deals with border incidents, apart from the attack of 28 February !955. That part of the report is almost a soci ological document. I read that part with a great deal of care. 56. As I analysed these various complaints made by Egypt against Israel and by Israel against Egypt, I gained the impression that the vast majority of these border incidents could be classified into two categories. 57. One category I would characterize as being in the nature of feuds. J think the members of the Council may have observed that kind of feud which involves family against family, village against village, or tribe against tribe. I understand that, in certain remote parts of a civilized country, such feuds may take place even today. In my lifetime I have seen such feuds take place in my home district. Sometimes, when you ask the people who 50. Il est tres clair, en tout cas, qu'il faut avant tout que l'une et l'autre partie fassent un reel effort pour collaborer. le sais bien que les mesures proposees n'offrent, par elles-memes, qu'une solution partielle aux problemes qui affiigent Israel et ses voisins. Une solution exigerait un changement de politique radical: les uns devraient renoncer a la politique de represailles dont le Conseil a condamne les resultats a l'unanimite; les autres devraient cesser d'invoquer des droits de belligerance active qu'aucune des parties ne peut raisonnablement revendiquer, comme le Conseill'a affirme dans sa resolution du 1er septembre 1951 [S/2322J. Il faudra aussi retablir un regime de legalite, d'ordre, de paix et de tranquillite dans les regions frontieres. 51. Pour cette raison, ma delegation appuie vivement le projet de resolution presente par trois puissances et qui figure au document S/3379. I'ai le ferme espoir non seulement que le Conseil adoptera ce texte, mais aussi que les parties s'emploieront a le mettre en (Euvre. 52. Le Conseil attendra avec un vif interet, j'en suis sur, les prochains rapports du Chef d'etat-major. Il s'attend a ce que le Chef d'etat-major y annonce que l'Egypte et Israel lui pretent activement leur concours et qu'ainsi la situation s'ameliore dans la zone frontiere. 53. Le PRESIDENT (trad~it de l'anglais): le voudrais faire une tres breve declaration en qualite de representant de la TURQUIE. 54. Dans la declaration que j'ai faite hier [695e seance], j'ai deja eu l'occasion d'exposer les vues de mon gouvernement sur le projet de resolution commun qui figure dans le document S/3379. le ne ferai done pas perdre de temps au Conseil en lui exposant ces vues de nouveau. Ma delegation votera pour le projet de resolution presente par la France, le Royaume-Uni et les Etats-Unis. 55. M. TSIANG (Chine) (traduit de l'anglais): le suis tres reconnaissant au general Burns d'avoir mis a notre disposition tous les renseignements qui figurent dans son rapport [S/3373], et surtout la partie du rapport qui traite des incidents de frontiere autres que l'incident du 28 fevrier 1955. Cette partie du rapport est un document pour ainsi dire sociologique. le l'ai lue tres attentivement. 56. A mesure que j'analysais les differentes plaintes formulees par l'Egypte contre Israel et vice versa, j'ai pense qu'on pouvait classer la grande majOl"ite de ces incidents de frontiere en deux categories. 57. le qualifierais de « vendettas» les incidents de la premiere categorie. Les membres du Conseil connaissent sans doute ces conflits oil une famiIle se dresse contre une autre famille, un village contre un autre village ou une tribu cOiltre une autre tribu. Si je ne m'abuse, il arrive que de tels conflits se deroulent eJ1·:ore de nos jours dans les regions eloignees de pays civilises. I'en ai moi-meme vu autrefois dans mon propre pays. Il arrive que, 58. Then we have a larger number of so-called border conflicts which are really nothing more than trespassing or, one might say, thievery committed across the demarcation line. We have a large number of those incidents. I am interested in the list of objects given in the report by General Burns' staff. The following is stated in the report: .. The list of items reported stolen or damaged by both sides, but especially on the Israel side, in connexion with the 135 complaints received during the four-month period, includes clothing and sacks of potatoes and corn, farm tools, timber, barbed wire, plants "-that is, saplings of olive trees and other kinds of trees- " water pipes, animals and cattle, and other necessities of rural life " [8/3373, annex VI]. 59. After reading this report, I feel that the problem before us is both more hopeful and at the same time almost hopeless. It is hopeful in the sense that these border violations have no political, still less national, objectives. I cannot conceive of the Government of Egypt or the Government of Israel instigating these people to cross the boundary line and to steal, say, 20 metres of pipe or to bring back a cow or 10 olive saplings. This is not a political expedition or a military expedition. Such things cannot have any national objective. Therefore, for that reason, when we study it from that angle, our problem is simpler. 60. Then, after reading the report, I feel not so optimistic because the problem is sociological. It is in the nature of the passions and the economic necessities of the people. Ifwe do not take care ofthe economic necessities, I think more of the cows and sheep and more of the pipe will somehow get across the demarcation line. I am glad that I have this information because before I read this report I had an exaggerated, almost a fantastic, idea. I had the impression that somehow, wherever the people of Egypt and the people ofIsrael were fighting each other, the armies of these two countries had nothing else to do but to send a platoon or two to fight against each other. That is not the case, and the world would gain if both Governments would announce these incidents as they really are: that somebody stole a cow and some pipes, instead of magnifying them into some act of aggression 58. Il y en a ensuite d'autres, plus nombreux, qui ne sont en realite que des bris de cloture ou des vols commis a travers la ligne de demarcation. J'ai lu avec interet la liste des objets voles qui figure dans le rapport du general Burns. La voici: « La liste des articles signaIes par les deux parties, mais particulierement par Israel, comme voles ou endommages, dans les 135 plaintes re~ues au COUlS de eette periode de quatre moist comprend des vetements et des sacs de pommes de terre et de ble, de l'outillage agricole, du bois de charpente, des fils de fer barbeles, des plantes» - c'est-a-dire des plants d'oliviers et d'autres espeees d'arbres - « des conduites d'eau, des animaux et du betail, et d'autres articles indispensables a la vie rurale » [8/3373, annexe VI]. 59. La lecture du rapport rn'a donne I'impression a la fois que le probleme offre des chances de succes et qu'il est presque sans espoir. Il offre des chances de sucees en ce sens que ces violations de frontiere ne visent pas un but politique, et encore moins un but national. Je ne vois pas tres bien le Gouvernement de I'Egypte ou le Gouvernement d'Israel inCitant les coupables a franchir la ligne de demarcation, par exemple, pour voler 20 metres de tuyaux ou pour ramener une vache ou 10 plants d'olivier. Il ne s'agit ni d'une expedition politique ni d'une expedition militaire. Il ne peut s'agir d'un objeetifnational. Le probleme nous apparait donc plus simple lorsque nollS I'etudions sous eet angle. 60. Mais d'un autre cote, apres avoir lu le rapport, je ne ressens pas trop d'optimisme. En effet, nous nous trouvons en presence d'un prohleme d'ordre sociologique qui met en jeu les passions humaines et les besoins eeonomiques des populations. Si nous ne faisons pas face aces besoins economiques, je crains que, d'une maniere ou d'une autre, un plus grand nombre de vaches et de moutons et une plus grande quantite de tuyauterie ne passent la ligne de demarcation. Je suis heureux d'avoir obtenu ees renseignements car, avant de lire le rapport, je me faisais une idee exageree, pour ne pas dire fantaisiste, de la situation. J'avais un peu l'impression que, chaque fois que des Egyptiens se trouvaient aux prises avec des Israeliens, les armees des deux pays se devaient d'envoyer un ou deux detachements combattre l'autre pays. En fait, il n'en est pas ainsi. Le monde aurait beaucoup ~ gagner 61. Having said that, I will state simply that I support this draft resolution [8/3779] which is aimed at taking care of this aspect of the trouble. 62. I like this draft resolution, first of all, because it does not incorporate any controversial points or policies. It is a businesslike document. It blames nobody; it condemns nobody. It just says: let us see whether we can do something for the better. I think that since the nature of the problem is such as I have reported to the Council, it is this type of resolution that we should have. 63. Secondlv, I like this draft resolution because it calls upon the Governments of Egypt and Israel to co-operate with the Chief of Staff. A problem of this nature could not be solved by a command issued by this body, by a hard and fast rule that we would lay down. These things are lamentable. It is not very honourabh to have these things going on across the boundary. However, even the most civilized country, with the best administration, cannot guarantee that some day or some night one of it!, citizens will not go across the frontier and steal something from the people living on the other side. 64. If we are going to make progress in this kind of business, the first essential is the willing co-operation of the two Governments. That is our aim. Since that is the aim, I think the sponsors did the right thing in purging, I might say, this draft resolution of all controversy, of all politics, and in concentrating simply and entirely on the problem of diminishing these border incidents. I am glad that the sponsors are realistic enough to include in this draft resolution the phraseology that " infiltration could be reduced to an occasional nuisance ", because I am afraid that with all the co-operation and all the energy of our Truce Supervision Organization there might still be occasional nuisances ofthis kind. 65. For these reasons, my delegation will vote for this draft resolution.

The draft resolution now before the Security Council [8/3379] deals with the causes of tension On the fromier between Israel and Egypt. The people of Israel, and especially its frontier population in the Gaza area, are the constant victims of this tension, whose unwanted shadow hangs over their daily lives and obscures all their vision of future progress. 67. The population in question in the area confronting the Gaza strip is engaged in the most vital of Israel's national objectives, the close settlement of the northern Negev and the extension of such close settlement to the southern Negev, in order that the whole of this Negev area, which in our resolve is to be totally and eternally a part of the State of Israel, shall be rescued from its present aridity. The main themes of this effort are agricultural settlement, irrigation, the beginnings of urban 63. J'approuve egalement ce projet de resolution parce qu'it fait appel aux Gouvernements de l'Egypte et d'Israel en leur demandant de collaborer avec le Chef d'etatmajor. Un probleme de cette nature ne peut etre resolu par un mot d'ordre du Conseil, par une consigne rigide que nous formulerions. L'etat de choses actuel est deplorable. On ne peut guere tolerer ces infiltrations a travers la frontil~re. Cependant, meme le pays le plus civilise, le mieux gouverne, ne saurait garantir qu'un jour ou une nuit, I'un de ses citoyens ne franchira la frontiere pour voler quelque choseades personnes vivant de l'autre cote. 64. Si nous voulons aller de I'avant, it nous faut avant tout la collaboration des deux gouvernements. Voila notre but. Et, puisqu'il en est ainsi, je pense que les auteurs du projet de resolution ont bien fait d'en ecarter toute controverse et toute consideration politique, et de s'occuper exclusivement du probleme de la diminution des incidents de frontiere. Je suis heureux de constater qu'ils se sont montres assez realistes pour dire, dans ce projet de resolution, que «les actes d'infiltration pourraient ne plus etre que des ennuis occasionnels »; en effet, j'ai bien peur que, malgre toute la volonte et l'energie de notre Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve, des ennuis occasionnels de ce genre ne se produisent encore. 65. Pour ces raisons, ma delegation votera en faveur du projet de resolution dont nous sommes saisis. 66. M. EBAN (Israel) (traduit de l'anglais): Le projet de resolution dont le Conseil de securite est aujourd'hui saisi [8/3379] a pour objet les causes de la tension qui regne a la frontiere egypto-israelienne. Les israeliens, et surtout la population frontaliere de la region de Gaza, sont les victimes perpetuelles de cette tension, qui plane sur leur vie de tous les jours et compromet tous leurs espoirs de voir leur situation s'ameliorer. 67. La population de la region qui horde la bande de Gaza travaille al'un des objectifs essentiels d'Israel: coloQ niser a fond la partie nord du Neguev, puis la partie sud, afin de rendre fertile l'ensemble de cette region, qui, a nos yeux, est atout jamais partie integrante de I'Etat d'Israel. Cet effort portera surtout sur la colonisation agricole, l'irrigation, un debut d'urbanisme et la prospection des ressources minerales. Tel est l'ideal, le but, la raison d'etre de nos colons du Neguev. MalheureusemeDt, l'exe- 69. Now what are the main causes of the tension which is the subject of the present draft resoln~:011? I suggest that there are two main factors in that tension: one deriving from a general political international situation, and the other based upon more immediate local conditions. 70. The border between Israel and Egypt in the Gaza area divides two countries between which there prevails an abnormal system of international relations. 71. On the Egyptian side of that frontier there is enter- 71. Du cote egyptien de la frolltiere, on,fait de l'etat de tained the juridical and spiritualconcept of a state ofwar. guerre une notion juridique et morale. L'Egypte estime There is assumed to be a right on Egjpt's part to practise qu'elle a le droit de se livrer a certains actes d'hostilite certain acts of hostility against Israel. No affirmative contre Israel. Les relations commerciales, culturelles, influences of trade, of culture, of diplomacy or of diplomatiques ou economiques sont pratiquement economic intercourse flow across that embattled border. inexistantes dans cette region frontaliere, qui voit se - derouler tant de combats. 72. The Government of Israel, and indeed the majority ofthe Members ofthe United Nations, reject this concept of belligerency and state of war, and deny the theory that Egypt is immune in its relations with Israel from the general principles established under our Charter to govern the relationship between sovereign States. 73. There is up to this date a refusal by Egypt to articulate in respect ofIsrael the basic concepts ofthe Charter in favour of the settlement of disputes by peaceful means and the abstention from the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. Nothing that has been said by the representative ofEgypt in his speeches, to which I have listened with great interest and attention, marks any progress whatever to the acceptance of the idea that Egyptian-Israeli relations should be assimilated to the general pattern of relationships which should apply to all Members of the United Nations. 74. This, then, is the general cause of the tensions on this frontier. This hostility communicates itselfinevitably to that area across which these two peoples confront each other with their closely settled populations. In that sense, the frontier tensions between Israel and Egypt are not an independent subject in themselves. They are derivatives, they are symptoms, of a general state of international tension. 75. There has probably never been in history a peaceful frontier between two countries whose relationships with each other were so hostile as to take expression in a complete lack of recognition, of relationships, of trade, of commerce, or of cultural intercourse, between whom there is a unilateral concept of belligerency, the theory of a state of war and a reluctance on the part of one country to accept the existence, the political independence and identity, the territorial integrity, of the other. 69. Quelles sont donc les principales causes de cette tension qui fait l'objet du projet de resolution dont le Conseil est saisi? Je pense qu'il y en a deux: l'une s'explique par la situation politique internationale, et l'autre par la situation locale. 70. La frontiere egypto-israelienne, dans la zone de Gaza, separe deux pays entre lesquels existent des relations internationales toutafait anormales. 72. Le Gouvernement d'Israe)- et d'ailleurs la majorite des Membres des Nations Unies - rejettent cette notion de belligerance et d'etat de guerre et n'acceptent pa~ la theorie selon laquelle l'Egypte pourrait se soustraire, dans ses rapports avec Israel, aux principes generaux qui doivent, en vertu de notre Charte, regir les relations entre Etats souverains. 73. L'Egypte a refuse jusqu'ici d'appliquer a ses relations avec Israel les notions fondamentales de la Charte: reglement pacifique des differends et renonciation a l'emploi de la force contre l'integrite territoriale ou l'independance politique d'un Etat. Dans les declarations du representant de l'Egypte, que j'ai ecoutees avec beaucoup d'jnteret et d'attention, rien n'indique que I'Egypte soit desormais prete a admettre que ses relations avec Israel doivent etre soumises, elles aussi, aux principes qui regissent les rapports entre tous les Membres des Nations Unies. 74. C'est done la la cause generale de la tension qui regne sur cette frontiere. Cette hostilite s'etend inevitablement a la zone de peuplement dense ou ces deux Etats se font face. Des lors, ces tensions qui regnent sur la frontiere israelo-egyptienne ne sont pas un fait independant. Elles sont le resultat et le symptome d'un etat general de tension internationale. 75. L'histoire n'a sans doute jamais connu, en temps de paix, une frontiere entre deux pays dont les rapports sonta ce point hostiles qu'ils refusent de se reconnaitre, d'entretenir des relations quelconques, d'avoir des echanges commerciaux ou culturels; it n'y a pas d'autre exemple de cette notion unilaterale de belligerance, en vertu de laquelle I'un des deux Etats en presence se pretend en etat de guerre, et se refuse a accepter l'existence, l'independance et 1'identite politiques Oll 1'integrite territoriale de l'autre. . In the conclusion to this report, the word "tension " is used in the following context of a recommendation to the Egyptian authorities to apply severe penalties against infiltrators, because " it is understandable that, seeing no news of infiltrators being punished, the Israelis refuse to believe that a serious attempt is being made to prevent the depredations which eventually build up tension to a dangerous point " [ibid., para. 46]. 79. These, then, are the particularized items in the report before the Security Council which specify and determine the causes of present tension. The Security Council will notice the important place occupied in that sombre catalogue of tension by this process which is sometimes called infiltration, sometimes incursion or marauding, but which comes under the general heading of illegal crossings of the demarcation line. 78. Les causes de la-presente tension, comme il ressort de ce rapport, ce sont avant tout les franchissements illegaux de la ligne de demarcation du territoire egyptien vers Israel. Autant que nous le sachions d'apres nos ~ossiers, il y a eu 1.006 franchissements non autorises, d'aout 1954 a la fin de fevrier 1955, et beaucoup d'entre eux, sinon la totalite, se sont accompagnes d'actes de violence. A ce sujet, le rapport declare: « ... une etude limitee aux incidents graves ne peut donner une idee precise de la situation; en effet, des incidents mineurs repetes contribuent acreer un etat de tension. Si elle n'a pas ete la cause unique de la tension actuelle, l'infiltration a partir du territoire sous controle egyptien ell est indubitablement une des causes principales» [8/3373, par. 13]. Dans un autre passage du rapport, nous lisons ce qui suit: « La repetition, a intervalles plus ou moins frequents, d'incidents comportant l'echange de coups de feu le long de la ligne de demarcation, et le cas bien plus frequent de maraudeurs franchissant la ligne de demarcation pour se livrer a leurs activites en Israel, ont contribue a entretenir un etat de plus ou moins grande tension, qui a ete aggrave par l'emotion creee en Israel par l'affaire du Bat Galim, ainsi que par lejugement, all Caire, en janvier, de Juifs accuses d'espionnage et par la condamnation a mort de deux des prevenus » [ibid., par. 27]. Dans la conclusion du rapport, le mot «tension» est utilise apropos d'une recommandation invitant les autorites egyptiennes a punir severement les infiltres, car «il est comprehensible que, ne voyant jamais prononcer de peines contre ceux qui se sont infiltres, les Israeliens se refusent a croire qu'on s'efforce serieusement d'empecher des pillages qui finissent par porter la tension au point critique» [ibid., par. 46]. 79. Tels sont les passages caracteristiques du rapport oil sont indiquees avec precision les causes de la tension actuelle. Le Conseil de securite remarquera qu'une place importante est reservee, dans ce sombre enonre des faits, aux actes que l'on appelle tantot actes d'infiltration, tantot incursions ou maraudages, mais qui constituent tous une meme infraction: le franchissement illegal de la ligne de demarcation. 81. The issue upon which we base our warnings of the effect of this infiltratipn is, of course, not so much the cutting of grass ,,1' ::.",~h 1""ltters as that, but the persistent toll of humar. life, and to a lesser extent of property, whicl"_ reSb:~s from this purposeful, constant and mounting tide of illegal crossings of the demarcation line. The people of Israel are still weighed down by the recent memories of the thousands of young graveref those who were killed in the war of independence by an inva"ion described at the time by the representative of the United States, and others, as an aggression of international character. But we are also weighed down by the dozens -indeed, the hundreds-of other graves which have mounted, one by one and two by two, across the years as a result of illegal crossings of the armistice demarcation line-a hazard against which we have every right to claim immunity in accordance with the agreement by which Egypt and Israel are bound. 82. Some consolation has been taken by members ofthe Security Council, and recommended to Israel, on the grounds ofthe relatively small number ofcasualties which have been inflicted upon the people of Israel within the period under review. Naturally, we rejoice at the grace of fortune which has resulted in the relatively limited character ofthat casualty list. I should say, however, that within that very period, that brief period, during which the Security Council has had this subject under discussion, three more fatalities have been added to the list: one through the outrage at Pattish, and two more who died this morning as a result of the mining, two days ago, of the road at Nirim, near the Egyptian-Israel frontier. 83. It should, I think, be frankly recognized, however, that the relatively limited character of this casualty list rebounds, not to the credit ofthe attackers, but sometimes to the vigilance of the defenders, and perhaps more often to the inscrutable judgments of fortune. To take one example: those who cast high explosives into a crowded wedding ceremony at Pattish are not entitled to any felicitation if only one fatality was caused, instead of the dozens which might have been caused as the logical outcome of such an attack. I have referred to the two casualties which we mourn today as a result ofthe mining of the road to Nirim. But at a recent meeting General 1 See OjJi,,\,:' 'Records 0/ the Security Council, Fourth Year, 1 Voir Proc~s·verbaux ojJiciels du Conseil de securite, qUQtri~me Special SUppl'.:':',"lIt No. 3. awe, Supplement special nO 3. 81. Si nous mettons en garde contre les consequences de ces infiltrations, ce n'est pas, bien s6r, parce que les infiltres vont couper de l'herbe ou font d'autre choses de ce genre, mais parce que ces fr;mchissements deliberes et toujours plus nombreux de la ligne de demarcation prelevent un tribut constant de vies humaines et, dans une moindre mesure, de biens materiels. Le peuple d'Israel n'a pas oublie les milliers de tombes qu'il a d6 creuser recemment pour ceux qui sont tombes dans la guerre d'independance, en repoussant une invasion que le representant des Etats-Unis et d'autres ont qualifiee d'agression internationale. Mais nous avons aussi la dc'::;leur de voir des douzaines et meme des centaines Q'autres tombes s'aligner, une par une Oll deux par deux, au cours de ces dernieres annees, du fait de ces franchissements illegaux de la ligne de demarcation. 11 y a un danger et une menace dont nous avons le droit de reclamer la cessation en vertu de la convention qui oblige egalement I'Egypte et Israel. 82. Le fait que pen d'lsraeliens soient ainsi tombes au cours de la periode consideree a rassure quelque pen certains membres du Conseil, et ils ont voulu faire partager ce sentiment a Israel. Nous nous rejouissons, bien s6r, qu'un destin favorable ait limite le nombre des victimes. Je dois dire cependant qu'au cours de la breve pcSriode qui s'est ecoulee depuis que le Conseil est saisi de l'affaire, nous avons eu trois autres victimes: une personne tuee dans l'attentat de Pattish, et deux autres qui sont decedees, ce matin meme, ala suite de 1'attaque effectuee it y a deux jours sur la route de Nirim, pres de la frontiere egypto-israelienne. ' 83. Reconnaissons d'ailleurs en toute franchise que si la liste des victimes n'est pas plus longue, le merite en revient non pas au:;:. attaquants, mais a la vigilance des defenseurs et, plus souvent peut-etre, aux decrets insondables du sort. C'est ainsi qu'on ne doit pas feliciter ceux qui ont lance des explosifs pllissants au milieu de la noce de Pattish, de n'avoir fait qu'une victime et non des donzaines, comme cela aurait pu se produire logiquement. Je viens de mentionner les deux personnes decedees, aujourd'hui meme, a la suite d'une explosion de mines sur la route de Nirim. Or, le general Burns nous a lu reeemment le texte de deux blames infliges a I'Egypte 84. My point is that the tensions, the anxieties, the indignation caused by this constant stream of attacks and incursions cannot be adequately measured by the fortuitous, though happy, circumstance that the casualty list was not as great as those who carried out the attacks must have intended, and as their activities might in the normal course of events have brought about. 85. So much, then, for the causes of tension, defined ~onspicuously in the report as deriving, more than from any other single cause mentioned in the report, from unlawful crossings ofthe demarcation line from Egyptiancontrolled into Israel-controlled territory. 86. The first question that we ask ourselves as this debate comes to an end is whether the Government of Egypt recognizes its responsibility in this matter. The speech of the representative of Egypt [695th meeting] leaves us no room for anything but a regretfully negative conclusion. The whole of his address, if it is studied carefully, will be found to be constructed with the objective of underestimating, of dismissing' the importance and the gravity of these infiltrations; of underestimating their purport and their psychological and political effect. 87. Not all the crossings of the demarcation line mentioned in the ChiefofStaff's report are ofthe non-military or non-governmental character ascribed to them by the representative of Egypt. There are several, as a study ofthe table will show, which resulted from shooting across the demarcation line by Egyptian armed forces. This is a relatively new development in the Gaza area, where, until a few months ago, nearly all the Israel complaints against Egypt were confined to illegal crossings by civilians. Many of these violations, then, are avowedly military in character,. At one of the Security Council's previous meetings [694th meeting], I read out a typical resolution ofthe Mixed Armistice Commission, which drew attention to a violation which had occurred through shooting by an Egyptian armed unit commanded by an officer. In addition, many of the other penetrations deep into our territory-notably the penetrations at Pattish and the murder at Rehovot-could not have been carried out except on the assumption both of military training and of a specialized backgro~nd in military intelligence operations. Again, it was confirmed, in reply to a question, that the United Nations observers had evidence in their possession of the direction of some of these incursions into Israel territory by officers of the intelligence branch of the Egyptian headquarters in Gaza. 88. The character of the recent outrage in Pattish emerges quite clearly from the resolution of the Mixed Armistice Commission, which, after detailing the facts of the case and after giving an account of what it calls 84. Ainsi done, on ne peut pas bien apprecier la tension, l'anxiete et I'indignation qu'engendre ce flot constant d'attaques et d'incursions, si l'on se borne a faire la constatation, bienvenue encore que fortuite, que le nombre des victimes n'a pas ete aussi eleve que l'auraient voulu les agresseurs ou qu'il n'eut ete normal, etant donne lenrs actes. 85. J'en ai assez dit sur les causes de tension, qui sont, de toute evidence, d'apres le rapport, principalement imputables aux franchissements illegaux de la ligne de demarcation dont se rendent coupables des personnes venant du territoire sous controle egyptien et se dirigeant vers le territoire sous controle israelien. 86. La premiere question que nous nous posons,a l'issue de ce debat, est de savoir si le Gouvernement egyptien reconnait sa responsabilite a eet egard. L'intervention du representant de l'Egypte [695e seance] nous oblige malheureusement a conclure a la negative. Tout son discours, vu de pres, tend a sou~-estimer, a nier l'importance et la gravite de ces infiltrations, a en reduire la portee et les effets psychologiques et politiques. 87. Les franchissements de la ligne de demarcation que mentionne le rapport du Chef d'etat-major n'ont pas tous le caractere non militaire ou non gouvernemental que leur attribue le representant de l'Egypte. Comme l'indique la liste des incidents, plusieurs d'entre eux resultent de coups de feu tires par des troupes egyptiennes pardessus la ligne de demarcation. C'est la un fait relativement nouveau dans la region de Gaza, oll, jusqu'a ces derniers mois, presque toutes les plaintes formulees par Israel contre l'Egypte se limitaient a des franchissements illegaux de civils. Ainsi, un grand nombre de ces violations sont d'ordre militaire. J'ai lu, a l'une des demieres seances du Coriseil [694e seance], une resolution typique de la Commission mixte d'armistice, qui signalait une violation de l'armistice, sous la forme de coups de feu tires par une unite de l'armee egyptienne commandee par un officier. En outre, d'autres cas de penetration profonde en territoire israelien - notamment les incursions de Pattish et le meurtre commis a Rehovot - ne s'expliquent que parce que les auteurs ont une formation de soldat et d'agent des services de renseignements. Enfin - une reponse du general Burns l'a confirme - des observateurs des Nations Unies possMent la preuve que certaines de ces incursions en territoire israelien etaient dirigees par des officiers des renseignements du quartier general egyptien de Gaza. 88. Le caractere du recent attentat de Pattish ressort tres clairement de la resolution adoptee par la Commission mixte d'armistice, dans laquelle la Commission, apres avair expose les circonstances de l'affaire et dcScrit ce "4. Notes with grave concern that these acts of aggression against Israel have not yet been terminated; " S. Decides that the acts described in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this resolution constitute a flagrant violation ofthe General Armistice Agreement by Egypt; "6. Notes with extremely grave concern the aggravation to the serious situation prevailing along the armistice demarcation line." 89. The Government and people of Israel will have read with appreciation of the expressions of horror and sympathy made by many representatives around this table in connexion with this attack. 90. I must, however, take issue with those representatives who have sought to underestimate the substantive importance of the language used by the Mixed Armistice Commission in some of its resolutions. Referring presumably to a list of extremely grave and drastic formulations which I made at a previous meeting, some representatives have sought to diminish the weight and the importance ofthose pronouncements by pointing out that they were fonnulated by the interested and aggrieved party. 91. I should like first to point out that these resolutions cannot be adopted unless th"y secure the affirmative vote ofthe United Nations Chairman-and, once he has voted for a resolution, he is morally just as identified with every word and every comma in the resolution as is any other representative who has voted for it. In the second place, it is a fact that, if the United Nations representative had any reason for believing that the language of any resolution was either exaggerated or inaccurate, he would not vote for the resolution at all, and the parties who formulate their resolutions know perfectly well that they must secure the concurrence of the United Nations representative for the text if they wish to have any chance of its adoption. 92. Only a few days ago, in the case of the attack at Sharsheret, the Israel delegation failed to have its draft resolution adopted because there was one formulation which the Chairman thought to be too specific a definition ofEgyptian responsibility. . 93. This matter was discussed in the Special Committee at its meeting as recently as 11 March, when the Israel representative objected to the drastic character of the language used in an Egyptian resolution. Thereupon, the Chairman ofthe Special Committee, General Burns, made the following statement, according to the official transcript: " I think that terms that are exaggerated would carry their own penalty in that the Chairman would not vote for a portion of the resolution or a clause drafted in such terms as to be clearly out ofline with the facts. " 89. Le Gouvernement et le peuple d'Israel auront lu avec satisfaction que de nombreux membres du Conseil de securite ont marque Ieur indignation et exprime leurs condoIeances a l'occasion de cette attaque. 90. Je dois toutefois m'inscrire en faux contre ceux des representants qui ont cherche asous-estimer I~ force des termes employes par la Commission mixte d'armistice dans certaines de ses resolutions. Songeant sans doute it. certaines formules tres energiques que j'ai employees a une reeente seance, its ont cherche a minimiser le poids de ces declarations en signalant qu'elles etaient faites par la partie interessee, par la partie victime. 91. Je voudrais tout d'abord souligner que les resolutions de la Commission ne peuvent etre adoptees que si elles recueiIlent le vote de son President - representant 1'0rganisation des Nations Unies - et, une fois que celui-ci a vote pour une resolution, it est moralement tout aussi tenu par chaque mot, par chaque virgule du texte que tout autre membre qui a emis un vote affirmatif. Ensuite, it est bien evident que si le representant des Nations Unies a la moindre raison ,de croire que les termes d'une resolution sont soit exageres, soit inexacts, il ne votera pas en faveur de ce texte, et les parties, lorsqu'elles presentent une resolution, savent pertinemrnent qu'itleur faut obtenir la voix du representant des Nations Unies pour que le texte ait une chance d'etre adopte. 92. Il y a quelques jours a peine, ala suite de l'attaque de Sharsheret, la delegation israelienne n'a pu faire adopter son projet de resolution, parce qu'il contenait une clause dans laquelle le President a vu une definition trop precise de la responsabilite egyptienne. 93. La question a ete etudiee tout dernierement par le Comite specialasa seance du 11 mars, au cours de laquelle le representant d'Israel a proteste contre les termes tres energiques utilises dans une resolution egyptienne. Le general Burns, President du Comite special, a fait a ce propos la declaration suivante - et je cite le texte officiel: « A mon avis, des termes trop energiques portent en eux-memes la cause de l'<§chec d'une resolution, en ce sens que le President ne votera pas en faveur d'une partie de resolution, ou d'une clause, redigee en termes qui ne correspondent manifestement pas aux faits.» 95. In any case, we strongly hope that the Security Council will not abandon its tradition of impartial, objective and universal support for the resolutions of the Mixed Armistice Commission. If the resolution of the Mixed Armistice Commission was considered by the Security Council to be an adequate basis for its findings and its formulations on the Gaza incident, then we cailnot ascribe a lesser authority to the resolutions of the Mixed Armistice Commission in cases where they have been in Israel's favour. 96. Another reason which impels my Government to believe that Egyptian consciousness of the importance of this infiltration problem is not sufficiently deep-rooted arises from the recent reiteration ofa territorial claim. As I said at a previous meeting [694th meeting], Israel has no intention of renouncing its inheritance or patrimony in the Negev. But, as has been stated at this table, the very proclamation of such a claim is bound to increase tension in the area which comes under reference. And it is a fact that, in addition to all the local conditions for tension in the Gaza area, we have the special sensitivity which belongs to any territory which is the subject of irridentist or revisionist claims. 97. I now come to discuss quite frankly the question of whether the draft resolution now before the Security Council sufficiently expresses the international concern with the main causes of tension on the Israel-Egyptian frontier,.and I must, in all candour, assert my delegation's view that this draft resolution is not sufficiently incisive or strong in its expressions of concern at this tension. 98. There is in the draft resolution, and still more in the speeches by which it was introduced, the beginnings of a collective international understanding of the gravity of this problem of marauding and incursion and of the necessity to find measures for its more effective prevention. There is the seed of a comprehension of the fact that this is not a mere local inconvenience but a primary source of reg:olial and international tension. But there is a diffidence and a lack of incisiveness and clarity in the text which must appear to us in sombre contrast to the vigour and clarity of language with which members of the Security Council ha.ve expressed themselves on the Gaza incident. It does require, as I said at the 694th meeting, a special effort of imagination to understand the full impact and effect upon Israel of this constant war of attrition. Few ot!ler countries have had the experience recently of having their water supplies blown up by the armed 95. En tout etat de cause, nous esperons fermement que le Conseil de securite, fidele a sa tradition, appuiera de fa~on impartiale et objective toutes les resolutions de la Commission mixte d'armistice. Puisque le Conseil a estime que la resolution de la Commission mixte d'armistice lui fournissait une base valable pour ses conclusions et ses decisions a propos de l'incident de Gaza, il se doit d'accorder le meme poids aux resolutions de la Commission lorsqu'elles sont en faveur d'Israel. 96. Il est une autre raison qui amene mon gouvernement a penser que 1'Egypte 1.1'a pas suffisamment conscience de l'importance du probleme des infiltrations; je veux parler de la recente reapparition d'une revendication territoriale. Comme je l'ai dit a l'une de nos dernieres seances [694e seance], Israel n'a nuIlement l'intention de renoncer ases droits sur le Neguev. Mais - et cela a ete dit ici meme - le fait meme que 1'01.1 ait reitere cette revendication ne peut qu'accroitre la tension dans la region qui nous occupc. n est en outre certain qu'independamment de tout ce qui, localement, concourt aereer un etat de tension dans la zone de Gaza, nous devons tenir compte de cette sensitivite propre a tout territoire qui est l'objet de revendications irredentistes ou revisionnistes. 97. Le projet de resolution dont le Conseil est saisi traduit-il suffisamment les preoccupations que font naitre, sur le plan international, les principales causes de tension le long de la frontiere egypto-israC!i';l.lnc? Je dois, en toute franchise, dire que de l'avis de ma deie~ gation, il ne le fait pas avec suffisamment de force. 98. Le projet de resolution, et plus encore les discours de ceux qui 1'0nt presente, marquent un premier pas: on commence a se rendre compte, sur le plan international, que le probleme du maraudage et des incursions est un probleme grave et qu'iI faut trouver des mesures plus efficaces pour y faire face. On commence aentre-v lir qu'il ne s'agit pas de quelques troubles 1ocaux, mais d'une source de tensions regionales et internationales. Ceci dH, le projet de resolution temoigne d'une reticenc-.e, d'un manque de fermete et de cIarte qu'iI nous faut, L:1alheureusement, opposer ala vigueur et ala clarte des termes que les membres du Conseil de securite o~t employes a propos de l'incident de Gaza. 11 faut - je l'ai dit a la 694e seance - faire un gros effort d'imagination pour se rendre compte de tout l'effet qu'a sur Israel cette guerre d'usure constante. Rares sont les pays qui ont vu, au cours des dernieres annees, leurs canalisations d'eau 101. The first condition is to say quite openly and directly that it is wrong, that it is to be condemned; to define and to oppose this tendency of illegal crossings of the demarcation line, so amply brought out in the resolutions of the Mixed Armistice Commission and in the report of the Chief of Staff. It is a violation of the armistice agreement in some ofits central features, and although the sponsors of the draft resolution have shown welcome consciousness of that fact in their addresses, the fact is that the language of this draft resolution does not, with sufficient incisiveness, either define or condemn these incursions. Especially does my delegation deplore any statement or any inadvertence offormulation which might give the impression that these illegal crossings are not unconditionally illegal. 102. The representative of France has anticipated an apprehension which my delegation has strongly felt concerning the phrase "occasional nuisance", which occurs as a description of infiltration in one of the operative paragraphs of the draft resolution. It is one thing tor the Chief of Staff's report to estimate, on grounds of realism, that it may not be possible immediately and totally to put an end to these infiltrations, but the law of the Security Council can surely identify itself only with the concept of total observance, strict compliance, with the relevant articles of the General Armistice Agreement. 103. There cannot be a desire, I am sure, to indicate that illegal crossings of the demarcation line are not to be condemned so long as they take place only occasionally. The Security Council cannot possibly wish to give its approval to violations of the armistice provided they are quantitatively infrequent. For that reason we welcome the interpretation of the draft resolution given on behalf of the sponsors, to the effect that there is no intention of identifying the Security Council with anything but a complete and unconditional opposition to illegal infiltration, but we think that it would have been far more satisfactory if that concept had been directly embodied in the text. 104. Similarly, and even more substantively, we return to the fact that in this draft resolution the Security Council does not sufficiently criticize Egyptian incursions. There is a hint of such criticism. The text sometimes approaches the brink of saying it, but it does not say it. At the previous meeting of the Security Council, the draft was accurately described as accusing nobody and as being 101. Tout d'abord, it faut declarer ouvertement et sans ambages que ces franchissements sont illegaux et appellent un bHime; il faut definir cette tendance aux franchissements illegaux de la ligne de demarcation, dont les resolutions de la Commission mixte d'armistice et le rapport du Chef d'etat-major donnent tant d'exemples, et it faut s'y opposer. Ces franchissements portent atteinte a certaines des dispositions fondamentales de la convention d'armistice, et si les auteurs du projet de resolution ont indique, dans leurs declarations, qu'ils s'en rendaient bien compte, le texte meme de leur projet ne definit ni ne condamne ces incursions de fa<;on suffisamment energique. Ma delegation deplore tout particulierement toute clause, toute formule, utiIisee par inadvertance et qui risquerait de donner 1'impression que ces incursions ne sont pas inconditionnellement illegales. 102. Le representant de la France a anticipe les apprehensions qu'allait inspirer a ma delegation I'expression «ennuis occasionnels» dont on se sert, dans un des paragraphes du dispositif, pour decrire ces infiltrations. 11 est loisible au Chef d'etat-major de dire, dans son rapport, par souci de realisme, qu'il est peut-etre impossible de mettre immediatement et totalement fin aces infiltrations. Mais le Conseil, lui, se doit de s'en tenir a l'observation stricte et au respect scrupuleux des clauses de la Convention d'armistice general. 103. Nul ne songe a dire, j'en 8uis sur, que les franchissements illegaux de la ligne de demarcation sont tolerabIes lorsqu'its ne se produisent qu'occasionnellement. 11 est impensable que le Conseil de securite veuille approuver les violations de la convention d'armistice sous pretexte qu'elles sont peu frequentes. Nous sommes done fort satisfaits de l'interpretation que les auteurs ont donnee de leur projet de resolution, et d'oil il ressort qu'ils n'entendent nullement faire adopter au Conseil autre chose qu'une resolution marquant une opposition absolue a toute infiltration illegale. Toutefois, nous serions bien plus satisfaits si cette idee etait explicitement exprimee dans le texte. 104. D'autre part - et c'est la une objection plus grave - nous revenons sur le fait que, dans ce projet de resolution, le Conseil de securite ne critique pas avec assez d'energie les incursions egyptiennes. Ces critiques sont a peine esquissees. Parfois, les auteurs du projet de resolution s'en approchent, mais ils ne les formulent nulle part dans leur texte. A la precedente seance du Conseil, 105. The Mixed Armistice Commission has not refrained on such occasions from accusing, or from offending sensitivities, and we deeply regret that nothing of the indignation and moral resistance which the resolutions of the Mixed Armistice Commission have expressed about these consta!lt infiltrations has found its way into the text of the draft resolution now before the Se.;urity Council, although we welcome the far more incisive expressions which have been given in the speeches of the sponsors. 106. It is our final reservation, in respect of this draft resolution, that it does not establish the frontier tensions in the Ga~a area within their total political context. We still hope that there will be positive and affirmative response, on behalf of the Government of Egypt, to the questions which my delegation has directed to it with respect to the necessity for affirming a certain minimal code of relationships based upon pacific settlement and mutual respect for political and territorial integrity. We are strongly convinced that the Security Council would have been well advised, in summarizing its work on this question, to advocate to the parties the acceptance of such a code ofconduct, to recall to them their obligations to settle their disputes by peaceful means and to abstain from the use or threat of force against the political independence or territorial integrity of any State. 107. The question is sometimes asked what value there is in the mere abstract affirmation of principles. But the point is that we are dealing here with an area in which those principles do not govern the general or the specific relationships of Egypt and Israel with each other, an area in which it would be fatal for an impression to be created that the' international community regards Egyptian- Israel relations as coming within a lesser orbit of obligations than those which should apply to the relations of all Members of the United Nations. 108. The draft resolution deals in its operative part with the need for consultations between the Governments of Egypt and Israel on practical measures for eliminating causes of tension. I am authorized to repeat that the Government of Israel will give its full co-operation to any process..es of consultation which have that end in view. 109. We have noted with interest some of the specific recommendations which the Chief of Staff embodies in his report. Amongst the most substantive ofthose recommendations is the proposal for establishing a barrier and a recognizable demarcation along the armistice demarcation line between Israel and Egypt. This is a course which we have supported and advocated for a considerable time. 105. La Commission mixte d'armistice n'a pourtant pas h6site a le faire en pareilles occasions. et nous regrettons profondement que le texte du projet de resolution qu'examine actuellement le Conseil ne contienne rien de l'indignation et du bHime moral que les resolutions de la Commission mixte d'armistice ont exprimes au sujet de ces infiltrations constantes. Nous nous felicitons cependant des termes beaucoup plus energiques qui ont ete utilises par les auteurs du projet de resolution dans leurs interventions. 106. Void notre derniere reserve au sujet de ce projet de resolution: il ne place pas dans son veritable contexte politique la tension qui regne sur la frontiere dans la zone de Gaza. Nous voulons encore esperer que le Gouvernement egyptien repondra d'une maniere positive et affirmative aux questions que lui a pos6es ma delegation au sujet de la necessite de soumettre les rapports de nos deux pays it un certain minimum de principes fondes sur le reglement pacifique des differends et sur le respect mutuel de l'integrite politique et territoriale. Nous avons la ferme conviction que le Conseil de securit6 aurait agi judicieusement s'il avait, en resumant ses travaux sur la question, encourage les parties a accepter un tel code de conduite, s'illeur avait rappele qu'elles doivent regler leurs differends par des moyens pacifiques, et s'abstenir de recourir a la menace ou a l'emploi de la force contre l'integrite telntoriale ou l'independance politique d'aucun Etat. 107. On demande parfois quel interet il y a a affirmer des principes dans l'abstrait. Mais l'important est qu'il s'agit ici d'une zone oil ces principes, actuellement, ne regissent pas les rapports d'ordre general ou particulier entre l'Egypte et Israel, d'une zone oil il serait impardonnable de donner l'impression que, pour la communaute internationale. les relations entre I'Egypte et Israel ne sont pas soumises ades obligations aussi rigoureuses que les relations entre les autres Membres des Nations Unies. 108. Le dispositif du projet de resolution parte de la necessite de conversations entre les Gouvemements de l'Egypte et d'Israel en vue d'arreter certaines mesures pratiques destin6es a eliminer les causes de tension. Le Gouvernement d'Israel m'a autorise a declarer une fois de plus qu'il pretera son concours le plus entier a toutes consultations auxquelles it pourrait etre pr0c6de a cet effet. 109. Nous avons note avec interet certaines des recommandations que le Chef d'etat-major a fait figurer dans son rapport. L'une des recommandations les plus impoi'- tantes tend a jalonner la ligne de demarcation israeloegyptienne de fa~on apparente, et meme a y eriger des obstacles. Voila une these que nous ne cessons de preconiser et d'appuyer depuis bien longtemps. 113. In the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission, judgments have been adopted, under several succeeding chairmen, in favour of ascribing to the Governments concerned the responsibility for all unauthorized crossings, whether individual or coilective, whether civilian or military. In the Syrian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission and in the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission, which operate under an identical legal system to that prevailing between Egypt and Israel, there is a firmly established and final jurispru<,lence in favour of ascribing to the Governments concerned the responsibility for all acts of violence or all illegal crossings emanating from the t~rritory under their control. 114. It is obvious that if this principle were to be compromised, diluted or weakened, the way would be open to unlimited abuses, and the position would be established that the parties concerned could conduct unlimited hostilities against each other as long as they were successful in giving to those hostilities a non-eollective or an individual aspect. There is therefore much wisdom in strengthening and not weakening the already strong jurisprudence in favour of governmental responsibility for all incursions, whether military or civilian. 115. In conclusion, I should like to sum up the views of my Government on this draft resolution. 116. In so far as the draft resolution is oriented and directed towards measures for reducing tensions, especially those tensions described in the Chief of Staff's report, we shall co-operate with the Chief of Staff in an 112. Ma seule autre remarque de detail aura trait aux observations que les membres du Conseil de securite ont presentees au sujet du probleme juridique de la responsabilite des gouvernements en cas d'actes d'infiltration commis par des particuliers. A mon avis, le Conseil doit s'abstenir de toute mesure qui risquerait d'affai.blir le principe fondamental sur lequel repose le regime d'armistice, et qui attribue aux gouvernements la responsabilite directe des incursions et autres actes illicites que commettent les personnes placees sous leur juridiction. Cette question n'est pas aussi simple qu'on pourrait le croire d'apres certaines des observations faites au cours du debat. 113. La Commission mixte d'armistice egypto-israelienne s'est prononcee plusieurs fois, sous des presidents differents, en ce sens que les gouvernements interesses sont responsables de tout franchissement non autorise de la ligne de demarcatic"1, que ce soit par des personnes seules ou par des groupes de personnes, par des civils ou par des soldats. La Commission mixte d'armistice syro-israelienne et la' Commission mixte d'armistice jordano-israelienne, dont le regime est identique a celui de l'organe egypto-israelien, ont cree une jurisprudence ferme, qui tient les gouvernements interesses pour responsables de tout acte de violence ou de tout franchissement illegal de la frontiere effectues apartir du territoire qui est place sous leur autorite. 114. Il est evident que tout compromis qui affaiblirait ce principe ou qui s'en ecarterait ouvrirait la voie a des abus sans nombre; les parties interessees seraient alors en droit d'exercer I'une contre l'autre les pires hostilites, pourvu Que celles-ci revetent la forme d'actes individuels et non collectifs. 11 parait donc sage de renforcer plutot que d'affaiblir cette jurisprudence, deja bien etablie, qui tient les gouvernements pour responsables de toute incursion, qu'elle soit le fait de militaires ou de civils. 115. Je voudrais, pour conclure, resumer les vues de mon gouvernement sur le projet de resolution. 116. Parce que ce projet de resolution viseafaire adopter des mesures tendant a reduire la tension actuelle et, . notamment, la tension dont il est question dans le rapport du Chef d'etat-major, nous cooplSrerons avec le Chef 118. We note that the Government of Egypt has today been authoritatively addressed around this table on the subject of its part in the responsibility for eliminating the tensions in the area. We can only hope that these exhortations, together with the conclusions in the report of the Chief of Staff, will have their effect. The present position is grave, the frequency of incursion has mounted and the toll of Israel casualties increases day by day and week by week. 119. My delegation will not press now for any amendment of this draft resolution. Should, however, the hopes which have been expressed for an improved situation not materialize, and especially should the current cycle of intensified attacks, minings, sabotage activities and penetrations into Israel territory continue, then we shall certainly reserve our right to seize this Council of an appropriate item and to secure both a specific definition and a condemnation of these incursions.

Should we understand that the representative of Israel has withdrawn the four amendments which he has presented?

Yes.

I thank the Chair for allowing me to speak, and I also thank the members of the Council for the attention they have paid me and for the patience they have shown in considering this question. 123. I shall now confine myself mainly to discussing the draft resolution proposed by the delegations of the United States, France and the UD:ited Kingdom [5/3379] concerning, in particular, the steps that should be taken to preserve security on the armistice demarcation line between Egypt and Israel, within the framework of the General Armistice Agreement signed at Rhodes on 24 February 1949.2 These steps are based on the proposals made by General Burns in his report of 16 November 1954 [5/3319 and COTT.I, para. 13]. 124. The draft resolution requests General Burns also to continue his consultations with Egypt and Israel with a view to the introduction of further measures to that end; lastly, it calls upon Egypt and Israel to co-operate with the ChiefofStaffwith regard to the specific proposals made by him. 120. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Devonsnous comprendre que le representant d'Israel retire les quatre amendements qu'il avait presentes? 121. M. EBAN (Israel) (traduit de l'anglais): Oui. 122. M. LOUTFI (Egypte): Je remercie le President d'avoir bien voulu me donner la parole, de meme que je remercie les membres du Conseil pour l'attention qu'its nous ont accordee et la patience dont iIs ont fait preuve au cours de l'examen de cette question. 123. Je me bornerai, dans cette intervention, a discuter surtout le projet de resolution presente par les delegations des Etats-Unis, de la France et du Royaume-Uni [5/3379], qui concerne particulierement les mesures qu'il y a lieu de prendre afin de preserver la securite sur la ligne de demarcation de l'armistice entre I'Egypte et Israel et ce, dans le cadre de la Convention d'armistice ge.neral signee a Rhodes le 24 feYrier 1949 2• Ces mesures ont pour base les propositions du general Burns qui sont contenues dans son rapport du 16 novembre 1954 [5/3319 et Corr.I, par. 13]. 124. Le projet de resolution demande au general Bums de poursuivre ses conversations avec I'Egypte et Israel en vue d'etablir de nouvelles mesures a cet effet. I1 requiert enfin I'Egypte et Israel de cooperer avec le Chef d'6tatmajor en ce qui concerne les propositions concretes qu'il a deja formulees. 126. I wish to stress that the Egyptian delegation to the Mixed Armistice Commission has given, and will continue to give, favourable consideration to any proposals likely to preserve security in this area. In that connexion, I should like to emphasize that the Egyptian delegation to the Mixed Armistice Commission had already proposed, at a sub-committee meeting on 12 May 1952, that joint patrols should be set up along the demarcation line. Similarly, General Burns states in his report that the Mixed Armistice Commission is often criticized for dividing the responsibility between the two parties when shots have been exchanged on the demarcation line. He says in particular: " By adopting the draft resolution moved by Egypt, then the draft resolution moved by Israel, the Mixed Armistice Commission divided responsibility between lhe two parties. The Commission is often criticized for such judgments. It has been argued that it should state which side started the shooting. However, in the absence of a neutral eye-witness observer in the immediate vicinity, the contradictory evidence collected from the two sides rarely permits responsibility for the first shot to be assessed " [ibid., paras. 22 and 23]. 127. On 31 May 1954, the Egyptian delegation to the Mixed Armistice Commission requested through its chief that United Nations observers should patrol the demarcation line close to the Egyptian positions during the day in order to determine who was responsible for such exchanges of fire and which side had fired first. Similarly, in a letter of 22 February 1955 to General Burns, the Director of Palestinian Affairs in the Ministry ofWar asked that United Nations observers should patrol the demarcation lines on the Egyptian side during the day so that they could see and hear which side fired first if any shots were fired. 128. We made these proposals because, in my delegation's view, the system of holding both sides responsible, which the Mixed Armistice Commission has adopted, is not such as to prevent exchanges of fire, as it is impossible to determine which side is responsible. Our armed forces have never been the first to fire in these exchanges; that is why our delegation requested the cooperation of observers. In this connexion I would point out that there have been eight exchanges of fire since 1 March 1955. 129. I would also point out that the question of the Bedouins of the Azazme tribe must be settled ic order to preserve security in this area within the framework of the General Armistice Agreement. The Israelis drove the 126. Je tiens a souligner que la delegation egyptienne pres la Commission mixte 4'armistice a examine et examinera favorablement toutes les propositions de nature a preserver la securite dans cette region. Dans cet ordre d'idees, je voudrais souligner que la delegation egyptienne a la Commission mixte d'armistice avait deja propose, au cours de la reunion d'une sous-commission le 12 mai 1952, que des patrouilles mixtes soient creees sur la ligne de demarcation. De meme, le general Burns a retenu dans son rapport que la Commission mixte d'armistice etait souvent critiquee parce qu'elle divisait la responsabilite entre les deux parties lorsque des coups de feu etaient echanges sur la ligne de demarcation. Il a notamment dit: « En adoptant successivement le projet de resolution presente par l'Egypte, puis le projet de resolution presente par Israel, la Commission mixte d'armistice a partage les responsabilites entre les deux parties. On a souvent critique la Commission pour des jugements de ce genre. On a affirme qu'elle devait declarer de quel cote etaient partis les premiers coups de feu. Toutefois, en l'absence, dans le voisinage immediat, d'un temoin oculaire qui flit un observateur neutre, les temoignages contradictoires recueillis de part et d'autre permettent rarement de determiner a qui i1 faut imputer la responsabilite d'avoir tire le premier» [ibid., par. 22 et 23]. 127. La delegation de I'Egypte a la Commission mixte d'armistice a, par l'entremise de son chef, le 31 mai 1954, demande que des observateurs des Nations Unies patrouiHent durant le jour, sur la ligne de demarcation, pres des positions egyptiennes, pour constater qui ctait le responsable de ces echanges de coups de feu et, par consequent, de quel cote etaient partis les premiers coups de feu. De meme, dans une lettre adressee au general Burns le 22 fevrier 1955, le Directeur du Departement des affaires palestiniennes du Ministere de la guerre demandait que des observateurs des Nations Unies patrouillent sur les lignes de demarcation, du cote egyptien, durant le jour, pour voir et entendre, le cas echeant, de quel cote partaient les premiers coups de feu. 128. Le motif des propositions que nous avons faites est que, de l'avis de ma delegation, le systeme adopte par la Commission mixte d'armistice de rendre les deux parties responsables n'est pas susceptible de prevenir ces echanges de coups de feu, la partie qui en est responsable ne pouvant etre determinee. Nos forces armees n'ont jamais pris l'initiative de ces coups de feu; c'est pourquoi notre delegation a demande la cooperation des observateurs. A ce propos, nous tenons a signaler que les echanges de coups de feu se sont eleves ahuit depuis le ler mars 1955. 129. Je voudrais signaler aussi qu'afin de preserver la securite dans cette region dans le cadre de la Convention d'armistice general, il y a lieu de regler la question des Bedouins de la tribu Azazme. En effet, les Israeliens oot 130. You will remember that in the resolution regarding the Bedouin question which it adopted at its 524th meeting on 17 November 1950, the Security Council adopted the following provisions: "Requests the Israel-Egyptian Mixed Armistice Commission to give urgent attention to the Egyptian complaintofexpulsion ofthousands ofPalestine Arabs; " Calls upon both parties to give effect to any finding of the Israel-Egyptian Mixed Armistice Commission regarding the repatriation of any such Arabs who in the Commission's opinion are entitled to return" [SIIfJu7 and COTT.I]. 130. Vous vous souvenez que le Conseil de securite, dans la resolution qu'iI a adoptee a sa 524e seance, le 17 novembre 1950, au sujet de ces Bedouins, avait deja decide ce qui suit: «Prie la Commission mixte d'armistice egyptoisraeIienne d'examiner d'urgence la plainte de l'Egypte relative cl I'expulsion de milliers d'Arabes de Palestine; «Invite les deux parties a mettre en reuvre toute conclusion que formulerait la Commission mixte d'armistice egypto-israelienne au sujet du rapatriement des Arabes qui, de l'avis de la Commission, devraient etre rapatries» [SII907]. 131. The Commission decided on repatriation, and the Special Committee endorsed the decision last October. The Egyptian delegation to the Mixed Armistice Commission asked that effect should be given to the resolution and to the decision of the Mixed Armistice Commission endorsed by the Special Committee. 131. La Commission mixte d'armistice a pris une decision de rapatriement et le Comite special a enterine cette decision au mois d'octobre dernier. La delegation egyptienne aupres de la Commission mixte d'armistice a demande la mise en reuvre de cette resolution, ainsi que des decisions de la Commission mixte d'armistice confirmees par le Comite special. 132. It is clear from what I have said that, through its representatives on the Mixed Armistice Commission and within the framework of the General Armistice Agreement, Egypt has consistently sought to take the necessary steps to preserve security in the Gaza area. 132. De tout ce qui precede, it resulte que, par I'entremise de ses representants a la Commission mixte d'armistice et dans le cadre de la Convention d'armistice general, l'Egypte a toujours cherche aprendre les mesures necessaires pour preserver la securite dans la region de Gaza. 133. In my statement on 23 March 1955 [694th meeting], I had occasion to discuss the problem of infiltration at some length. I then said that the Egyptian authorities were having the demarcation line patrolled to prevent infiltration, and that a severe law had been promulgated which provided very heavy penalties, of up to five years' imprisonment, for infiltrators, a law which had been strictly enforced since 1950. I also pointed out that a large number of infiltrators were captured by the Israel authorities and given heavy sentences. Many other infiltrators are killed by the Israelis while attempting to cross the demarcation line. 133. Quant au probleme de l'infiltration, j'ai eu roccasion, dans mon intervention du 23 mars 1955 [694e seance], de m'etendre sur cette question. Je vous ai declare que les autorites egyptiennes font circuler des patrouilles sur la ligne de demarcation pour empecher les infiltrations et qu'une loi tres severe a ete promulguee qui prevoit des peines tres lourdes, alIant jusqu'8o cinq ans de prison, pour les infiltres; cette loi est rigoureusement mise en reuvre depuis 1950. J'avais aussi signale qu'un tres grand nombre d'infiltres etaient captures par les autorites israeliennes et condamnes a des peines severes; d'autres sont tues par les Israeliens lorsqu'ils essaient de franchir la ligne de demarcation. 134. It was in the light of this situatioll that General Bennike said in the report which he submitted to the Council at its 630th meeting: " The Egyptian authorities have taken measures to cope with the problem of infiltration. The presence of200,000 Palestine refugees in the Gaza strip, however, renders their task particularly difficult " [630th meeting, para. 47]. 134. C'est ce qui a amene le general Bennike, dans le rapport qu'il a presente a la 630e seance du Conseil de securite, adeclarer: « Les autorites egyptiennes ont pris des mesures pour faire face au probleme de l'infiltration, mais la presence, dans la bande de Gaza, de 200.000 refugies palestiniens rend leur tache particulierement ardue » [63oe seance, par. 47]. 135. We will do our utmost to co-operate with General Burns so that, as he puts it, infiltration can be reduced to an occasional nuisance, a kind of thieving which Israel must probably regard as inevitable so long as there are 135. Nous nous efforcerons de cooperer avec le general Burns, pour que, comme it l'a retenu, les actes d'infiltration puissent ne plus etre que des ennuis occasionnels, une sorte de maraudage qu'Israel doit sans doute tenir 137. At the meeting of the Council held on 29 March 1955, the representative of Belgium, speaking of the section of General Burns' report concerning infiltration, said: " General Burns has thus informed us ofa situation; he has not undertaken to establish responsibilities" [695th meeting, para. 48]. 138. The question of responsibility in this matter has still to be decided by the Special Committee, as the New Zealand representative reminded us this afternoon in his excellent speech. I could have wished that Mr. Eban had not raised the question today, as it is still before the Special Committee of which General Burns is Chairman. 139. It must not be forgotten that the refugee problem was also created by Israel, which drove the refugees from their homes. . 140. I wish to emphasize that the Egyptian Government is determined to continue to apply the General Armistice Agreement which it concluded with Israel. Our relations with Israel are governed by the provisions of that agreement. 141. As usual, the representative of Israel proclaimed his desire for peace. He did so for propaganda purposes, but peace is not a matter of words. It implies a certain type of behaviour, a certain attitude of mind. Unfortunately the behaviour and misdeeds of Israel completely belie its desire for peace. Israel perhaps imagines that it can impose peace by force. As I have already said before the Council, it was probably in the hope that the Arabs might be induced to enter into peace neg<?tiations that incidents like those which took place at Qibya, Nahhalin and Gaza were deliberately provoked. 142. However, during the discussion in the Council regarding the Nahhalin incident, and more particularly at the meeting of 4 May 1954, the representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan clearly explained that no Arab country would consent to an agreement with Israel under the threat of and following acts of aggression like the Nahhalin incident [670th meeting]. 143. The representative of Lebanon, Mr. Malik, also emphasized that fact at the same meeting, and was astonished that Mr. Eban should really have thought that Jordan or any other Arab State would be prepared to undertake any negotiations, revision or modification following the Nahhalin and Qibya incidents. 144. There is talk of peace, but at the same time bloody acts of aggression are committed which are likely to impair peace and security in this part ofthe world. Would it not have been wiser in the circumstances to give effect to the United Nations resolutions on refugees? The 145. Instead, we are faced with a concerted and premeditated attack ordered by the Israel authorities and committed by units of the Israel regular army against units of the Egyptian regular army, as was found by the Mixed Armistice Commission in its decision of 6 March 1955, which has been confirmed by the resolution which the COlmcil adopted at its 695th meeting. 146. My delegation regrets the incident at the village of Pattish, just as it deeply regrets the incident that occurred near Sheikh Nabhan on 18 March, when four women were killed by fire from an Israel patrol near the demarcation line. We also deplore the incident, to which I have already referred, which occurred on the same day and resulted in the deaths of a boy of 13 and a girl of 12 who had been collecting grass and had crossed the demarcation line by mistake. Complaints have been lodged with the Mixed Armistice Commission. 147. I also have a comment to make regarding the regrettable incident at the village of Pattish. I would point out that it is by no means established that the two armed individuals believed to have committed the crime came from the Gaza area. The Egyptian delegation to the Mixed Commission has appealed to the Special Committee from the decision. The question ofprinciple which the Special Committee will have to decide can be summarized in these words: can the Chairman of the Mixed Commission blame Egypt for this incident if it is not established that the criminals came from the Gaza area, from Egyptian-controlled territory, and that they crossed the demarcation line? The decision of the Mixed Armistice Commission is thus not yet final, in accordance with article X, paragraph 4, of the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel signed on 24 February 1949. 148. Egypt, which signed the General Armistice Agreement, has undertaken to give effect to that agreement. It will continue to apply jt.

Yesterday the Security Council unanimously adopted an important resolution dealing with the Gaza incident of 28 February last. 150. Today, we are considering a second draft resolution [Sj3379], sponsored by the delegations of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, which deals with the general conditions on the armistice demarcation line between Egypt and Israel and points out the need to study measures for eliminating the causes of the present tension in this area. 145. Au contraire, nous sommes en presence d'une attaque concertee et premedit6e, ordonnee par les autorites israeliennes et commise par les forces de l'armee reguliere israelienne contre les forces de l'armee reguliere egyptienne, comme l'a retenu la Commission mixte d'armistice dans sa decision du 6 mars 1955, qui a ete enterinee notamment par la resolution que le Conseil a adoptee asa 695e seance. 146. Ma delegation regrette l'incident du village de Pattish, comme elle regrette profondement 1'incident survenu pres de Sheikh Nabhan le 18 de ce IDois, Oll quatre femmes trouverent la mort sous le feu d'une patrouille israelienne pres de la ligne de demarcation. De meme, nous regrettons l'incident dont je VOllS ai parIe, survenu le meme jour, et au cours duquel un gar~on de 13 ans et une fillette de 12 ans qui ramassaient de l'herbe et qui avaient, par erreur, franchi la ligne de demarcation, ont trouve la mort. Des plaintes ont ete presentees ala Commission mixte d'armistice. 147. J'ai aussi une observation aformuler sur le regrettable incident du village de Pattish. Je voudrais signaler qu'il n'est nullement etabli que les deux individus armes qui sont censes avoir commis ce crime veriaient de la region de Gaza. La delegation egyptienne aupres de la Commission mixte a interjete appel de la decision aupres du Comite special. La question de principe que devra resoudre le Comite special peut se resumer en ces mots: est-ce que le President de la Commission mixte d'armistice peut blamer l'Egypte au sujet de cet incident s'il n'est pas etabli que les criminels sont venus de la region de Gaza, du territoire sous controle egyptien, et qu'ils ont franchi la ligne de demarcation? Par consequent, la decision de la Commission mixte d'armistice n'est pas encore definitive, conformement a l'article X, paragraphe 4, de ia Convention d'armistice general signee entre l'Egypte et Israel le 24 fevrier 1949. 148. L'Egypte, qui a signe la Convention d'armistice general s'est ohligee amettre en reuvre cette convention. Elle continuera de l'appliquer. 149. M. SOBOLEV (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): A sa seance d'hier, le Conseil de securite a adopte, a1'unanimite une importante resolution touchant I'incident qui s'est produit, le 28 fevrier dernier, dans la zone de Gaza. 150. Aujourd'hui, nous sommes saisis d'tin autre projet de resolution [Sj3379] presente par les delegations des Etats-Unis, de la France et du Royaume-Uni; ce document a trait aux conditions generales sur la ligne de demarcation de l'armistice entre l'Egypte et Israel, et conc1ut a la neeessite d'etudier les moyens d'eliminer les causes de la tension qui regne actuellement dans cette zone. 153. In their statements, members of the Security Council have drawn attention to a number of such causes. We feel that the Council should study them in a thoroughly objective and unbiased manner. In so doing, it should not overlook the considerations, already put forward in the Council, that one of the principal causes of this tension is the policy of forging military blocs pursued by certain Stales in the Near East. 154. The facts show that this policy greatly aggravates the situation. To support that statement I should like to cite one example: pressure on a number of countries in this area that do not wish to be drawn into aggressive military blocs has assumed such forms and such proportions as to constitute a direct threat to peace in the area. The members of the Security Council...

May I interrupt the representative of the Soviet Union. The President of the Security Council at this moment happens to be the representative of Turkey, otherwise any President would have ruled the representative of the Soviet Union out of order. However, since this unpleasant debate, which was started by the representative ofthe Soviet Union, has taken place between him and me, I have no other choice but to let him speak. The representative of Turkey, of course, is entitled to make use of his right of reply, should he so desire.

I cannot agree at all with the President's observation that the ideas I am expressing are not relevant to the item on the agenda. Every member of the Security Council is fully entitled to voice considerations that relate to the question on the agenda, and what I am about to say has, in the view ofthe USSR delegation, a direct bearing on the agenda item under consideration. What I have said thus far, and what I am about to say, is by no means intended exclusively for the representative of Turkey in this Council. My statement is addressed not to the representative ofTurkey bufto-all the members of the Security Council,'including of course the representative ofTurkey. 157. I shall continue. The members of the Security Council must be aware from Press reports that Turkish armed forces were recently concentrated in strength at the Syrian-Turkish border; that manreuvre was directly connected with Turkey's attempts to force Syria to become a party to the Turkish-Iraqi treaty. 158. The members of the Security Council must also be aware of the official communique issued by the Syrian 153. Dans leurs interventions, les membres du Conseil de securite ont indique un certain nomore de facleufs qui ont provoque cette situation tendue. Nous estimons que le Conseil de securite doit etudier ces diverses causes en toute objectivite et sans parti pris. Ce faisant, le Conseil de securite ne doit pas ecarter les considerations, exprimees ici, selon lesquelles l'une des principales causes de cette tension reside dans la politique suivie par certains Etats, dans le Proche-Orient. en vue de former des blocs militaires. 154. Les faits attestent que cette politique tend a aggraver beaucoup la situation. Je ne citerai, a l'appui de cette these, qu'un seul exemple: la pression exercee sur plusieurs pays de cette region, qui ne desirent nullement etre entraines dans des alliances militaires agressives, a pris des formes et des proportions telles qu'elle risque de produire une menace directe contre la paix dans cette region. Les membres du Conseil de securite... 155. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Puis-je interrompre le representant de l'Union sovietique? C'est le representant de la Turquie qui exerce en ce moment les fonctions de President du Conseil de securite. Tout autre President aurait deja rappe16 al'ordre le representant de l'URSS. Cependant, puisque ce debat penible, que le representant de l'Union sovietique a commence, se deroule entre lui et moi, je n'ai d'autre recours que de le laisscr parler. Quant au representant de la Turquie, il pourra, bien entendu, user de son droit de reponse si tel est son desir. 156. M. SOBOLEV (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) (traduit du russe): Je ne puis souscrire a l'observation du President selon laquelle les considerations que j'exprime en ce moment ne se rapporteraient pas ala question figurant al'ordre du jour. Chacun des membres du Conseil de securite a parfaitement le droit de presenter des observations sur la question inscrite a l'ordre dujour. Or, ce quej'ai a dire porte directement, de l'avis de la delegation de l'Union sovietique, sur la question a l'etude. Les declarations que je viens de faire ou que je vais faire ne sont nullement destinees au seul representant de la Turquie, ici present. Je m'adresse non pas au representant de la Turquie, mais a tous les membres du Conseil de securite, y compris bien entendu, le representant de la Turquie. 157. Je reprends mon expose. Les membres du Conseil de securite savent, pour avoir lu la presse, que laTurquie vient de concentrer des troupes nombreuses sur la frontiere syro-turque. L'operation est directement liee aux efforts que deploie la Turquie pour contraindre la Syrie a adherer au Traite turco-irakien. 158. Les membres du Conseil n'ignorent pas non plus, sans doute, le communique officiel du Gouvernement 159. The Lebanese newspaper Telegraph states in connexion with the events which are taking place in the Near East that the Syrian Government has never before been subjected to such cruel pressure from abroad. 160. Clearly Turkey could not exert such pressure on the Arab countries ifit was not encouraged to do so by the Powers which support it. 161. I mention these facts in order to remind the members of the Security Council that, when we consider the tense situation in the Near East, we cannot pass over in silence the real causes ofsuch tension. As I have already pointed out, these causes are the following: a certain group of countries, instead of basing their policy in that area on the interests of peace and security, are basing it on their own military and strategic interests, and endeavouring to use the area for the establishment of new war bases for their armed forces. Such a policy cannot possibly be in accordance with the national interests of the countries in this area. 162. It is our conviction that the abandonment of the policy of forming military blocs and fomenting hostility between the countries in this area is a primary condition for reducing tension in the Near East. 163. The Soviet delegation approves the proposal that the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization should continue his consultations with the Governments concerned with a view to adopting all necessary measures for the preservation of security in the area of the demarcation line. It is our understanding that the important considerations which I have just put forward will be taken into account in these consultations. This is the construction which we place on the amendment submitted by Israel, which refers to the obligation of the parties "to settle their disputes by peaceful means ", and to " refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State" [S/3381, amendment 2]. 164. The Soviet delegation will support the draft resolution contained in document S/3379, considering that it is basically acceptable to Egypt and Israel, the two parties directly concerned.

As the representative of TURKEY, I should like to make the following brief statement for the record. 166. I sincerely and honestly regret the behaviour of the Soviet Union representative, who, by taking up today, for the third time, a question which is completely irrelevant to the item under consideration, forces me-so to speak-to make use of my right ofreply. 159. Le journal libanais Telegraph ecrit, au sujet des evenements qui se deroulent actuellem~nt dans le Proche- Orient, que jamais encore le Gouvernement de la Syrie n'a fait l'objet d'une pression exterieure aussi brutale que celle qui s'exerce sur lui a l'heure actuelle. 160. Il est evident que la Turquie ne pourrait pas exercer cette pression sur les Etats arabes si les puissances qui l'appuient ne l'y encourageaient pas. 161. J'evoque ces faits pour rappeler aux membres du Conseil qu'en examinant la situation tendue que nous trouvons actuellement dans le Proche-Orient, il ne faudrait pas en negliger les causes veritables. Ces causes, je l'ai deja dit, sont les suivantes: loin de s'inspirer des intl~rets de la paix et de la securite, un certain groupe de puissances menent dans cette region une politique qui ne sert que leurs propres interets militaires et strategiques, et cherchent a y crecr de nouvelles basf:3 pour leurs forces armecs. Une telle politique ne -aurait evidemment coincider avec les interets nationaux des pays de cette region. 162. Nous sommes convaincus que, pour attenuer la tension qui regne actuellement dans le Proche-Orient, il faut avant tout renoncer a la creation de blocs militaires et cesser d'attiser la haine entre les pays de cette region. 163. La delegation de I'Union sovietique approuve la proposition qui invite le Chefd'etat-major de l'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve a poursuivre ses conversations avec les gouvernements interesses en vue de prendre les mesures propres a maintenir la securite le long de la ligne de demarcation. Nous pensons qlll'en procedant it ces consultations, on tiendra compte des importantes considerations que je viens d'exposer. C'est ainsi d'ailleurs que nous interpretons l'amendement presente par la delegation d'Israel, qui rappelle aux parties leur engagement de «regler leurs differends par des moyens pacifiques» et de «s'abstenir de recourir a la menace ou aI'emploi de la force contre l'integrite territoriale ou l'independance politique de tout Etat » [S/3381, point 2]. 164. La delegation de l'Union sovietique est prete it appuyer le projet de resolution qui figure au document S/3379, car, pour l'essentiel, ce texte peut etre accepte tant par l'Egypte que par Israel, qui sont les parties directement interessees. 165. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): En tant que representant de la TURQUIE, je voudrais faire une br~ve declaration pour mettre les choses au point. 166. Je deplore sincerement la conduite du representant de l'Union sovietique, qui, en soulevant, pour la troisieme fois, une question sans aucun rapport avec la question dont le Conseil est saisi, me force, si j'ose dire, auser de mon droit de reponse. 169. I should like to make another comparison: between the political and military agreements to which the Soviet Union is a party and the agreements concluded by the Western Powers and my country, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Turkish-Pakistani and Turkish-Iraqi treaties. This comparison will to a great extent clarify the situation. 170. The military agreement between the Soviet Union and the Communist Chinese regime, for instance, has entailed, or has had as a result, the most detestable Communist Chinese aggression in Korea and Indo- China. The aggression in Korea cost hundreds of thousands of lives and was committed with Chinese as cannon fodder and Soviet arms and material as the implements of aggression. 171. On our side of the fence, NATO, for example, has been and is today the only major deterrent to a major war. The defence of the Middle East will, exactly like NATO, further the cause of peace. 172. That is the difference between the agreements entered into by the USSR and the agreements, like those I have mentioned, subscribed to by the Western Powers and my country.

To repeat the gist of what I said yesterday, it is common knowledge that there'is no aggressive element whatever involved in Turkey's participation in agreements with either Iraq or Pakistan. I am sure the Soviet representative knows this. He makes this charge against Turkey in order to muddy the waters and not because he really thinks there is any offensive intent.

I am really sorry that the Soviet Union representative has returned at the end of our debate to his allegation that the real cause of tension in the Middle East is the policy of certain States of trying to create so-called military blocs. r need not, I think, add to what I said on that subject yesterday, except this: any member of the Security Council can find reasons to maintain that he is in order in introducing some topic which, strictly speaking, is irrelevant to the subject under discussion but which it suits him to consider relevant for propaganda or other reasons. But I cannot 168. Tout d'abord les allegations du representant de l'URSS concernant la pretendue pression que la Turquie aurait exercee sur la Syrie ne font que deformer la reaIit6 - et je m'abstiens d'employer un terme plus energique. L'intervention dans les affaires interieures d'autres pays est une maladie dangereuse, mais eUe n'est pas contagieuse. C'est la politique etrangere de l'Union sovietique, et non celle de la Turquie, qui en souffre. 169. Je voudrais faire une autre comparaison. EIle porte sur les ententes poIitiques et miIitaires auxquelles l'Union sovietique est partie, d'une part, et sur les accords conclus par les puissances occidentales et par mon pays, comme par exemple l'Organisation du Traite de l'Atlantique Nord, le Traite turco-pakistanais et le Traite turcoirakien, d'autre part. Cette comparaison contribuera grandement aeclaircir la situation. 170. L'accord militaire conclu entre l'Union sovietique et le regime de la Chine communiste, par exemple, a eu pour resuItat l'odieuse agression que les Chinois communistes ont commise en Coree,et en Indochine. L'agression en Coree a emporte des centaines de milliers de vies humaines. Les Chinois y ont joue le role de chair a canon, alors que l'Union sovietique a fourni les armes et le materieI. 171. De notre cote, l'OTAN, par exemple, a ete et demeure le principal obstacle a une grande guerre. Tout comme I'OTAN, la d6fense du Moyen-Orient servira la cause de la paix. 172. Voila la difference qu'il y a entre les ententes conclues par I'URSS et les accords, comme ceux que je viens de mentionner, qui ont ete signes par les puissances occidentales et mon propre pays. 173. M. LODGE (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) (traduit de l'anglais): Je me bornerai a resumer I'essentiel de mon discours d'hier. Tout le monde sait que les accords conclus par la Turquie avec l'Irak et le Pakistan n'ont absolument rien d'agressif. Le representant de I'Union sovietique le sait egalement, j'en suis persuade. S'il a lance son attaque contre la Turquie, c'est parce qu'it veut pecher en eau trouble, et non pas parce qu'it pense vraiment que ce pays a des visees agressives. 174. Sir Pierson DrXON (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): Je regrette profondement qu'a la fin de notre debat, le representant de l'Union sovietique ait juge utile de pretendre une fois de plus que la veritable cause de tension dans le Moyen-Orient est la politique de certains Etats qui chercheraient a creer ce qu'il a appele des blocs militaires. Je pense n'avoir rien a ajouter aee que j'ai dit hier a ce sujet, sauf peut-etre la simple remarque que voici: il est facile a tout membre du Conseit de seeurite de trouver des arguments pour se justifier lorsqu'il souleve, au cours du debat, un point sans rapport avec la

I deeply regret that the representative of the Soviet Union should have raised the question in the manner in which he did. I do not think that the fact that we have been discussing the problem ofinfiltration entitles him to infiltrate into our debate a topic that is so completely extraneous to it. Overwork my imagination as I may, I find it difficult to view the Gaza incident as a manifestation, a consequence or an episode of the cold war, just as I have difficulty in believing that there is any connexion whatever between the tension that has existed for years in the Middle East and diplomatic activity in recent months. 176. I remember reading some years ago a short story about a colonel in the Indian army who, within five minutes, brought every conversation round to elephanthunting. The North Atlantic Treaty and aggressive blocs are by way of being our Soviet colleague's elephant, but I do not think we should encourage the frolics of that elephant in our debates. 177. For my own part, being desirous of keeping our discussion free of propaganda, I shall note only this in the Soviet representative's statement, that for once he has recognized that this " aggressive bloc " may have some peaceful intentions, since he has stated his intention of voting for the draft resolution which three of its members have placed before the Security Council. 178. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I feel that I must reply very briefly to what has been said here in connexion with my statement. 179. First of all I must disillusion the United States representative. I do, in fact, still hold the view that the military blocs which are being organized in the Near East are aggressive blocs. 180. With regard to the statement made by the representative of Turkey, it was no refutation of the facts I had stated here-and I had based my statement on facts, in particular on the official communique of the Syrian Government. 181. The Turkish representative, moreover, referred to Korea and other matters which had really nothing to do with the question before us. The matters he raised were quite irrelevant. But I understand why he took the position he did on the question of the aggression in Korea, because Mr. Sarper is the representative of a country which participated in that aggression. Hence we could hardly expect him to take any other position on the Korean question.

We have heard the speeches of the Israel and Egyptian representatives. It is natural and perhaps inevitable that both ofthem should have gone over much controversial ground. But the resolution which the Council has adopted looks forward towards the future and is aimed at easing the situation. 189. As President, I should like to express my fervent hope that the parties will receive the resolution in the spirit in which it was adopted, that they will consider again with the greatest of care the proposals that the Chief of ~hJf has made to them and that they will in all waysco-operate fully with GeneralBurns in his endeavours. 190. This is the last day this year on which I shall sit as President. It has been a great honour for me. I have done my best to serve the Security Council. r thank all the members of the Security Council without exception, including the representative of the Soviet Union and the representatives of the parties to the dispute. 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