S/PV.700 Security Council

proceeding to deal with the agenda, I should own behalf and on behalf of the members of to extend to Ambassador Hervé Alphand congratulations on bis appointment as penmment sentative of France on the Security Council, cordial welcome. 9. It is with great pleasure that 1 we1come to the Council Ambassador Alphand, whose briHiant career and statesman has for many years been closely associated with the destinies of his great country. I wish success in his new and important task. 1 should to ask him, on my own behalf and on beha!f bers of the Council, to convey to Ambassador Hoppenot, his eminent predecessor, the expression of esteem and friendship. 11 1 .1 ': .,;} .; 10. Mr. ALPHAND (France) (translatedfrom I wish to say, Mr. President, how deeply touched me and how grateful 1 am for them. fail to convey your message and good wishes to and predecessor, Ml'. Henri Hoppenot. 11. In taking my place among you for the today, 1 am aware of the seriousness and importance our common task; 1 am aware of the number and tude ofthe problems which we have to deaJ with together; 1am aware ofthe responsibility which the United Nations, and particularJy the Security Council, bears the nations of the world. 1 am glad of the coincidence which 1 am beginning my duties at a time when, aH hope, an era of conciliation and tolerance in the world is beginning to take shape. The United Nations tainly contributed a great deal to this happy development, and 1 am sure that, ofaIl existing human organizations, will be the fust to benefit from il. Vou may therefore l'est assured that my delegation and 1 myselfwiIJ do everything in our power, with open eyes and minds, to contribution to our work, in this new atmosphere, you are aIl entitled to expect from France.

Before the Council proceeds with a discussion of the question on the agenda, 1 should like to caU the attention of aIl participants in this debate to the specific nature of this item. It is concerned with the cessation of hostilities and with measures to prevent further incidents in the Gaza area. lt envisages the present and the future. It does not include in its scope past evellts or the assignment ofresponsibility for past events. 1 hope the discussion will be confined to the scope intended in this item.

Members of the Council will, 1 think, readily understand why the Governments which Mr. Alphand, Mr. Lodge and 1 have the honour to represent have decided to bring once again to the attention of the Council the situation in the area of the Gaza strip. On 4 September 1955, the United Nations Chief of Staff, General Burns, was successful in arranging an unconditional cease-fire with the Governments of Egypt and Israel. The foIlowing night there was an incident on the armistice demarcation Hne for which the Government whose forces were responsible promptly expressed regret and, according to the latest news, there is quiet on both sides of the Hne. 14. It must, of course, be our first aim to say and do nothing to disturb the prevailing conditions of calm or to upset the cease-fire which is fortunately now in operation. 1 do not therefore propose to examine the regrettable and even tragic incidents that took place between 22 August and 4 September on both sides of the line-a renewed outbreak of violence which has shocked us aIl deeply. Nor shaU 1 go into the question of responsibility. We have before us a full report from the ChiefofStaff [S/3430 and Add. land Corr. 1], in whom we aIl have great confidence. We also have vurious letters from the representatives ofEgypt and Israel, giving their Governments' points of view on these deplorable events. To go into the substance of these letters would inevitably provoke a controversy at this table. It might even have repercussions on the spot which could start a chain of events of the very kind that it must be the primary purpose of this C01Jllcil to avoid. 15. Our eyes at this table should, 1 submit, be fixed on a constructive future and not look backwards on an unfortunate past. Our objective is not to strike a balance-sheet of responsibilities. but to help in the pacification of one of the trouble spots of the free world. t· !~ t:;.. ':,.- 19. The resolution of30 March accordingly asked General Burns to continue his consultations with ments of Egypt and Israel and called upon Governments to co-operate with him in regard to his proposais. As we know from his present report, uDtil the end of June, two months later, that Staffwas able to get the talks started with representatives of the parties, and by 24 August no final any of the measures which he had proposed reached. On that day, the talks were broken 1 should like to think, were interrupted, because of the incident on the demarcation 22 August which set offthe whole chain ofevents set forth in General Burns' report-an incident the responsibility for which the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission has, as 1see from a report now before us [S/3430/Add. said that it is impossible to determine. .~ 20. 1think that my colleagues will share my ment at the slowness in the progress of these the failure to reach final agreement on any they were interrupted. Events have proved in a clear way that the Council's diagnosis ofthe situation correct: namely, that if incidents, and indeed the whole structure of the armistice in this sector, were to he avoided, better practical arrangements along the demarcation line would have to be worked out with the parties. 21. It seems to me that if that diagnosis was March of this year it is just as correct in Indeed, the renewed outbreak of violence in 24. It is this thought which animates the proposais in the draft resolution [S/3932] which my delegation, together with the delegations of France and the United States, has the honour to present to the Council. 25. As a first essential element we have the maintenance ofthe cease-fire, accepted unconditionally by both parties. The first need is that the c.ease-fire shall be scrupulously observed and continued in full force and effeet. We must also look to the parties to exercise the most rigid control over their troops. So long as armed men are in close contiguity with one another across this sensitive border there must he a constant risk of mistakes, and 1 would appeal to the parties to exercise the greatest restraint on such occasions, hearing in mind the imperative need to keep the cease-fire agreement intact, and also the known view of the Security Council that retaliatory action is unjustified. 26. The second element is to be found in the recommendation of General Burns that the armed forces of both parties should be clearly and effectively separated. My Government supports that recommendation. Its object is, by the most practical method of all, to minimize the risk of forther outbreaks of violence. My Government believes that the parties should make the most determined efforts to work out with General Burns a m":!tually satisfactory arrangement on these lines. 27. The Chief of Staff, in paragraph 19 of his report [S/34301, recommends that the forces of the opposing sides should be separated by an effective physical barrier along the demarcation line and that, in addition, defensive positions and motorized patrols should be kept at least 500 metres from the demarcation line on either side. 1 believe that hitherto each of these measures has failed to find favour with one or other of the parties. But if the Council adopts the draft resolution before it, 1 would hope that both Governments would reconsider their objections in order to make some useful arrangement possible. 28. When once sorne such arrangement has been reached, the point will, 1 believe, have come when the other practical ideas suggested by General Burns at an earlier stage can he usefuUy pursued. 29. We need only glance back at the two serious outbreaks of violence that have occurred within six months to realize how extremely important it is that praetical 32. 1 hope 1 have said enough to show in the Gaza area is such as to merit both the Council for the recommendations draft resolution and the fuUest co-operation in working out these recommendations Staff. 33. Our warmest thanks are ôue to General his unremitting efforts, whü"h we hope with success. 34. If we have been gravely distUibed in connexion with the Israel-Egypt border, least the fact ofan uncondition8.l acceptance ofa cease-fire. With the exercise ofrestraint and with a realistic approach to the problem-a which they face in common-we may hope that order and tranquillity may be maintained in this troubled 35. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) from French): Let me say first of aU that 1 wholehcartedly associate myself with the remarks the addressed to Mr. Hoppenot. 36. 1 should like to wish a cordial welcome to Alphand, the new representative of France. both as a friend and as the representative French Republic, with which my country has associated since the earliest days ofour national existence. 1 am sure that Mr. Alphand wiIl make an worthy contribution to our work, and he has come to join us. :.' l', .; Mr. Lodge continued in English: 37. The United States has once again Governments of France and the United requesting a meeting of the Security Council mitting a draft resolution on the Palestine question for the '·1··'· "'i Council~s consideration. Our present sioned, much to our regret, by the fact that discussions between Egypt and Israel caUed Security Council's ummimous resolution 1955 have not materialized. 38. At that lime we made plain our belief that ties' discussion with the Chief of Staff on for putting an end to border disturbances their good faith and their adherence to the Charter. His proposaIs, we thought, and worthy of support. Unhappily, although they had the endorsement of tbis 40. The agenda item before the Council IS entitled: " The Palestine question: cessation of hostilities and measures to prevent further incidents in the Gaza area ". submitting this item and the attached draft resolution, the Governments of France, the Unitèd Kingdom and United States are proposing that the Council direct immediate efforts to two essential objectives for the maintenance of peace in the Near East: first, the establishment and maintenance, without interruption, of an effective cease-fire in the Gaza area; and, second, the undertaking of immediate concrete measures by Egypt and Israel, co-operation with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, to ensure that further acts of violence not occur. 41. We do not propose ta difcuss particular incidents to assess blame. We wish to look ahead and to set down !'ur firm conviction that the parties must begin to ahead and that the time for them to do so is now. situation calls for immediate efforts and not recrimination about past events. 42. The Chief of Staff has appealed formally on different occasions in the past 10 days to Egypt and Israel for an immediate cease-fire. Both parties have announced their unconditional acceptance of General Burns' appeal. This, of course, merits our full approval. We must make clear, however, that the Security Council of the United Nations-and both these countries members of the United Nations-expects that the ceasefire will this time be maintained. The draft resolution submitted by the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and the United States accordingly calls upon parties to take all-I emphasize " aIl ..-steps necessary to bring about order and tranquillity in the area. 43. We hope that in taking such steps the parties will considerably beyond their past efforts. The draft resolution endorses the view ofthe Chief of Staff that the armed forces of both parties should be clearly and effectively separated. There are various methods of accompIishing this, and the details must be left to the Chief of Staff. it is a cardinal feature of this draft resolution, and emerges clearly from our reports on the discussions in the past months, that the separation of the armed forces both sides is of paramount importance. 45. The parties urgently need an agreement in their own interest, and we propose that the Council calI upon to appoint representatives to meet with at once, and to co-operate fully with no exception to the proposaIs which made. They are in the best tradition operation for peace, and in no way derogate from the sovereignty of the completely consonant with the solemn sumed by the parties under their particular General Armistice Agreement. 46. AIl of the troubles which have beset the inhabitants of both sides of the Gaza demarcation line opinion, be eliminated by the kind volved in agreement to the proposaIs made. Co-operation of such a kind effect to the announced intentions of blish and maintain a cease-fire in the ters so important as this, we believe afford. to hold back from an early agreement. and expect that the next communication ofStaff to the Security Council will report that agreement has been reached.

1 fust old friend Mr. Lodge for the very kind a moment ago about myself and my proud indeed, and it is a great privilege with him and with aIl my colleagues this Council. . Mr. Alphand continued in French: 48. The joint draft resclution circulated yesterday which the United States, the United Kingdom today submitting to the Security CouDeil ration has most certainly enabled our colleagues to realize the purpose which motivated our when they requested this meeting ofthe Council. 49. Following the discussion in this of March and in pursuance of our resolution 1955, conversations carried on under General Burns, the ChiefofStaffofthe Truce Supervision Organization, between the Egyptian and Israel authorities gave rise to the hope that there would be a real relaxation of tension in the difficult Gaza sector. SO. We were still optimistic concerning that prospect up to the recent abrupt break:ing off of l- Ie li Ir 53. In the circumstances prevailing in that area amidst the tense atmosphere and painful memories left by the recent fighting, that is undoubtedly a difficult tive to achieve. We are very much aware that discussion there is here concerning the past events have divided the parties, the greater will be the chances for the truce which has just been established to be maintained and strengthened. IS s. le [, :é i- :S 54. In the draft resolution before us, care has been taken not to refer to the recent outburst of violence other than to deplore it in the MOSt general terms and not to attempt to fix responsibilities or to condemn or censure. IS n s ~. s :t 55. My colleagues and l have decioed to observe discipline in what we say in this matter, and we appeal both parties to follow our example by observing the same reticence, for it would be tragic if the words spoken here were to have undesirable repercussions in the area. must therefore be very careful of what we say here. Council must concentrate today solely on the future. cease-fire must be effective. i. :i S 1 56. General Burns, in the report circulated among us the Secretary-General, states that in bis opinion the surest means of reducing incidents to the minimum is to excessively close contact between the armed forces tioned along the demarcation line, and thus to avoid friction. He considers, as he has done for several months, various ways of achieving that result. It may be whether the Israel and Egyptian troops should be rated by barbed wire, demilitarized zones, mine fields, in some other way. In my opinion it is not for the Security Council to answer these questions, and the draft tion before the Council should not he interpreted imposing, or even recommending, one procedure ference to any other. The parties themselves, brought together by the Chief of Staff, must make a choice-a choice wbich. incldentally, may not necessarily same everywhere along the line. 57. -We -therefore ask the parties to appoint their sentatives to negotiatewith each other and with General "The speed with which a solution depend entirely on the sense of urgency and Israel bring to their talks with Neither of the parties can afford [498th meeting, para. 140]. 60. Events have borne out this warning, only too clearly. The negotiations which with such energy and patience, sougbt to end dragged on instead untiI 24 August, when Egypt broke them off. On 22 August, foIIowing a time in the area of the border, there was, in an incident which, in the words of General report, started a chain of violence. According Burns, the latest and most serious of word which does not conceal the gravity the Israel attack on Khan Yunis of 31 short interval of nine days, fifty-four soIdiers and civilians were killed and thirty-nine were wounded. surely cannot IightIy pass over these deaths in such a concatenation of violent events in an area where tranquillity is so important to the peace 61. There is no doubt in my mind that heeded the Security Council's injunction of30 March this tragic series of happenings would not goes without saying, therefore, that my gether shares the regret of General Burns the parties to agree finally on the measures bis report of 17 March 1955 [S/3373]. 62~ .Beyorid aU question the"work of General bis corps of advisers during tbis difficult 63. My Government supports the other objectives draft resolution. In particular, we trust that we an assurance from the two parties that steps will be taken to put promptly into effect the safety measures by General Burns. We hope there will be resumption of the negotiations interrupted so nately last month and the ultimate restoration and order in this troubled and alI-important weIcome the cease-fire which, for the moment, end to bloodshed; but if the cease-fire is to be to prevent the lighting ofthe smallest fiame must be taken at once. We cannot afford any delay because weIl exact a further price in human life and This is a price wbich this Council must not allow paid. '1duit lvril, t sur n de Ition ntre- : des :pré- :n il plus c le que ence Ni 64. Mr. ABDOH (Iran) (translated jrom On 30 March 1955, when the Security Council the resolution in document 8/3379, which caUs the Governments of Egypt and Israel to co-operate with General Burns, Chief of Staff of the Truce vision Organizatïon, in applying his proposaIs, Iranian delegation entertained the hope that the incidents in the Gaza area would come to an end and that peace and tranquillity would prevail in that area. sequently, we noted with satisfaction that months the demarcation line was relatively calm and that contacts which might have produced very favourable results had been established under the auspices Chief of Staff. Unfortunately, our satisfaction short-lived, and incidents occurred of such character that, if the Chief of Staff of the Truce vision Organization in Palestine had not intervened in good time, and if Egypt had not displayed liatory attitude which is apparent from the Staff's report, they might easily have degenerated large-scale hostilities. ~ttre clai- Les une lans date une l'est un é[ç~ .éral mot han leuf ont gère mie t la Ide. , si [de mts que les live son 65. 1 should like to take tbis opportunity to· to the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision zation my delegation's appreciation of his impartiality and watchfulness in endeavouring to ensure observance of the cease-fire. ses vail 66. In dealing with the report? 1 wish to refrain, accordance with the wise advice th;'},t has been 67. 1 should like to try to believe that this committed without the knowledge of the Government of Israel. 1 hope that that Government will to punish those responsible and that aets of will not recur in future. 68. In the opinion of the !ranian delegation, means of preventing the repetition of such would be the strict observance of the General Agreement by the two parties and full implementation of the measures proposed by General Burns, of Staff, in his previous report and in the report before us. It is in that spirit that we are fully to support the draft resolution prc,osed by gatio~s of France, the United Kingdom and the States of America, a resolution which, we think, the general feeling of the Security Council and requirements of the situation. 69. In conclusion, we wish to express the hope under the auspices of the United Nations, lasting and complete tranquillity will prevail in the region. is what is wanted by the world at large and by in particular, for my country is in this region. why we attach such importance to the re-establishment of a lasting and just peace in the region. 70. Mr. BELAUNDE (peru) (trans/ated/rom May l, before very briefly explaining why my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted France, the United Kingdom and the United of America, offer my mast cordial greetings representative of France. The cultural ties France and Latin America are so strong that it my duty to offer this greeting and to express that the work of the new representative of France be commensurate with his own brilliance and role which aIl citizens of Latin America believe be played by France in the defence of our civilization and of worId peace. 71. In my opinion the draft resolution submitted France, the United Kingdom and the United States America meets the needs of this serious problem 72. As varicus speakers have properly said, it is not our dutYat this time to apportion responsibilities. Our main duty is to take steps to ensure peace. Moreover, as General Burns' report states, tranquillity has been restored and we must preserve it by aIl means, taking care that no word on our part or unnecessary discussion helps to disturb it. Although we are obliged to foUow this policy oÏ prudence, it is nevertheless necessary toreaffirm the interest, compptence and authority of the Council with regard to thi!l problem. The fact that it has set up a Truce ~upervision Organization, with terms of refeience which are being carried out to our satisfaction, does not mean that the Council has for a moment ceased to have full jurisdiction nor can it cease to concern itself with the implementation of the measures which were so wisely adopted last March. Hence, the fust part of the draft resolution is fully justified, in that it states the concern and confirms the authority of the Council, at the same time placing its feelings on record-without expressing a judgment-and deploring the incidents which have occurred. 73. The Security Council has great moral authority and exercises it, when conflict arises, by appealing to the parties. Little by little, however, we are passing over to a stage in which the Couneil, besides exercising its moral authority, with world feeling and public opinion behind it, is beginning to take steps of a pract1ëàl nature. 1 have no.doubt of the value of measures of a moral nature or of the ever-increasing effectiveness of these appeals to the conscience of the States Mer,tbers of the Organization, but it is deat that in the favourable atmosphere which these appeals and the working of the United Nations itself are building up, there is a tendency towards practical measures which reBect in what we might caU an objective and pragmatic way the peaceful purposes of the United Nations. 74. The Council carried out its duty in this respect by setting up the Truce Supervision Organization and creating the office of Chief of Staff. This organization has been functioning and is functioning with success, and has taken certain measures. Its report gives us an account of the measures already taken and of other proposed measures. Nothing could be more natural than that these should be clearly and finaIly confirmed at this time, as is done in paragraph 3 which reads: " Endorses the view of the Chief of Staff that the armed forces of both parties should be clearly and efftctively separated by measures' such as those which he has proposed ". 77. In short, the Peruvian delegation considers draft resolution satisfies not only the high ofthe Council but also the practical needs of and will firmly support it by its vote. 78. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) from French): l should like very briefly to Belgian delegation's support of the draft submitted to us. l shall refrain, for the cogent that have already been mentioned, from at this time the question of responsibility. however, l wish, like several of my coIleagues, a tribute to General Burns for the efforts in extremely difficult circumstances to obtain tance of an unconditional cease-fire by the Governments of Egypt and Israel. We are gratified that have been finally crowned with success and cease-fire came into force on 4 September. tranquillity have thus been restored in the The problem now is to ensure that they are and l need not say that my Government any action that will contribute to that end. 79. Our first dutY is to ask both parties force and effect to the cease-fire and to seek means of eIiminating the principal causes i:tllÇidents. In the resolution unanimously on 30 March, the Security Council called Governments of Egypt and Israel to co-operate Chief of Staff so that further steps could preserve security in the Gaza area. The which followed unfortunately showed that of Staff had not obtained aIl the necessary co-operation from both parties. As has been pointed out, of extreme violence which began on 22 August doubtless have been avoided if the measures by General Burns had been adopted. In any acts of violence afford further proof of the need arrangements. It is hard to see how the thorny of the Gaza frontier can be solved except by the negotiations that were broken off on If dther party pcrsisted in rejecting the practical reafJonable arrangements which th? Chief of thl::m to accept, it would assume li grave rel\ponsibility. The Security Council must remitld the partties,

1 shall now speak, simplyand briefly, as representative of CHINA. 81. My delegation supports the draft resolution proposed by the delegations of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, first of aIl because it is a constructive resolution and, secondly, because tbis draft resolution presents to the Security Council the essential minimum programme. When we remember the obligations, the duties and the functions wbich the Charter assigns to this body, 1 believe that the Security Council cannot do less than what is represented in this draft resolution. 82. 1 would îuriher add that if the parties concerned remember their obligations under the Armistice Agreement and, in fact, under the Charter of the United Nations, they cannot do less than what this draft resolution asks of them. Therefore, my delegation is happy to join with the many other delegations in giving its hearty support to this draft resolution. 83. 1 add, in my capacity as PRESIDENT, that if no other member of the Council wishes to speak at this moment, 1 shall cali on the representatives of the two parties concerned in the order in which their names are inseribed on the list of speakers.

The Security Council has assembled today in an effort to remedy a situation wbich has threatened peace in the Gaza area for the past three weeks. The people of Israel have never lived in freedom from the pressures of neighbouring hostility, but we have seldom been beset by such acute violence as that which was carried out against us deep into our country during the past thirty days. 85. From 5.30 in the morning of 22 August, when an Israel patrol was attacked from an Egyptian position, as is now made clear by the most essential addendum to the Chief of Staff's report [Sj3430jAdd.l], throughout the regrettable discontinuance ofthe talks and throughout the campaign, vividly described by General Burns, of admitted attacks deep into the territory .of Israel, the peace ofthe region has hung on a siender thread, sustained for many days and nights by an Israel patience which had its natural and even its prudent limits. 86. 1 understand that the Security Couneil does not wish, on this occasion, to linger on the origins of these sombre events, sorne of which have been described in the Chief of Staff's report as supplemented by the addendum thereto. Accordingly, the draft resolution does not seek to emphasize Egypt's responsibility' for instituting a major campaign of' violence going far beyond the dimensions of a single incident and described in the 88. The Israel Government is in agreement objectives of consolidating the cease-me, agreed methods to prevent further incidents, renewing the interrupted conversations. emphasis placed by the representatives Peru on the need for genuinely agreed measures. 89. In conclusion, while we hope for of practical measures to prevent violence, by the draft resolution, we cannot avoid international conclusion. The real solution problem before us, wbich recurs at tbis disturbing frequency, lies not alone in practical measures and in technical devices, useful and essential as It lies in the mutual interpretation of Agreement as a transition to peace and in regulated hostility. It lies in the abandonment antagonistic attitudes, of belligerent doctrines hostile acts. It lies in a mutual readiness to settle disputes by negotiation and pacific settlement. in the adaptation of inter-State relations East to the ideals of the Charter and mood and spirit of peace-loving mankind. 90. Mr. LOUTFI (Egypt) (translated 1 should like to thank the President for floor to explain my delegation's position on before the Council today. 1 shall, at this discuss the question as it appears in the comment on General Burns' report and resolution submitted by the United States, the United Kingdom. In order to comply with the wishes expressed by various representatives, 1 shaH effort to avoid dwelling on the points at 91. In bis report of 17 March 1955 [SI3373], General Burns, referring to the Gaza 28 February 1955, 'stated that " the character of the operations, the damage done and, heavy casualties, wbich must be a subject regret, make tbis the most serious clash two parties since the signing of the General Agreement ". 94. Thus, the origin of the situation existing in the Gaza strip was the Israel attack against Gaza which you condemned. 95... Subsequent to the discussion of the general situation in the Gaza area, the Security Council, on 30 March 1955, adopted the resolution in document S/3379 relating particular to the steps that should be taken to preser.-:: security along the armistice demarcation line between Egypt and Israel as established under the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel. 96. In that resolution Egypt and Israel were specifically asked to co-operate with the Chief of Staff with regard to the proposaIs made by him for reducing tension along the demarcation line. 97. Egypt had in its SL.Ltements to the Security Council already indicated its willingness to give favourable consideration to any proposaI or suggestion by General Burns to put an end to tension along the d~marcation tine. 98. At the 698th meeting of the Security Council, we announced our general acceptance of General Burns' suggestions and more particularly of the most urgent of the measures he proposed-the setting up of mixed patrols. We even requested that those patrols should be set up immediately so that future incidents might be avoided. 99. We made known our willingness to place barbed wire along certain parts of the demarcation line in the territory under Egyptian control. 100. We also requested that United Nations observers should be assigned to established positions on the Egyptian side of the demarcation line where they would be better able to determine which party was guilty of firing the fust shot or of crossing the demarcation line. 101. We also stated that Egypt was prepared to conclude an agreement for the avoidance of incidents in the Gaza area. 102. Our acceptance of a11 those suggestions is clear and tangible evidence of our goodwill and our spirit of co-operation in desiring to eliminate so far as possible the tension existing along the demarcation line. 103. With a view to giving effect to the Security Council resolution of 30 March 1955, General Burns invited 105. The implementation of these have prevented the Egyptian and approaching the demarcation line, General Burns it was their appr6ach was the chief cause of the exchanges so often occurred aIong it. . 106. Mter laborious discussions between in which, under the chairmanship the conclusion of an agreement between manding officers was debated at great"length,' it appeared that Isra,el was pursuing aims other tation of the resolutivn of 30 March to excludr. the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, for it refused to agree that Generai sign the agreement between the two telephone calls should go through the services or that a United Nations present at meetings of the local commanding 107. General Burns was to go to Cairo to confer with the Egyptian Government on points which still had to be settled before the the local commanding officers could Unfortunately, on 22 August, twenty-four General Burns was to confer with the rities, Israel armed forces attacked in the Gaza strip. According to General incident took place in the following period of violence began with the incident in which an Egyptian post at Hill 79, cation line and 5 kilomefres due east attacked by Israel forces. This incident, Egyptian officer and two soldiers were others wounded, started off the chain [/),3430 and corr. 1, para. 2]. ' 108. The purpose of this behaviour was to force the Egyptian Government's perhaps oblige it to accept Israel's these matters. This method is not a new had occasion severa! times to draw the Security Council's attention tv it. That is why my delegation it futile to continue these conversations, for while Israel's aim was to achieve political objectives gains it could, Egypt's aim was to implement the Security Council's resolution of 30 March 1955 dance with the General Armistice Agreement Rhodes on 24 February 1949, by which relations between 112. The serious feature of this act of aggression that it was committed after General Burns has asked the Egyptian authorities to agree to a strict cease-fire. It is clear from the report before the Council that General Burns had addressed an appeal for a cease-fire to parties on 30 August 1955. The Egyptian authorities replied by informing General Burns that they accepted the cease-fire but pointed out that if Israel committed any aggressive action after the time stated General Burns it would have to bear the consequences of such aggression. On the other hand, Israel invited General Burns to obtain the Egyptian Government's acceptance of responsibility for the incidents which had taken place on the frontier, declaring itself ready, on this condition, to give the necessary guarantees a cease-fire. General Burns pointed out that this dition was unreasonable and that in any case it unacceptable for a cease-fire; meanwhile, he strongly urged Israel to accept the cease-fire immediately. 113. The report goes on to say that on 31 August General Burns learned that six United Nations observers and three other United Nations personnel were being detained by the senior Israel delegate to the Mixed Armistice Commission. This action by Israel, which prevented the mo'Vement of United Nations observers 118. 1 should like to state that are prepared to consider any Burns wbich might make it possible purpose. 119. In closing, 1 should like to vations on the draft resolution gations of France, the United Kingdcm States of America. 120. With regard to the third paragraph 1 hàve just stated at length the reasons why my delegation did not continue the talks started It was because of Israel's behaviour could not he continued. 121. As for paragraphs 1 and 2 Egypt has accepted the cease-fire; cease-fire on General Burns' first apparent from the report presented paragraph 10 of whîch gives the General's appeal for a cease-fire. ambiguity that the Egyptian military give orders for the observance of by General Burns as from 4 p.m. 122. 1 should like to say here that continue observing the cease-fire. 123. With regard to paragraph our position on that matter. In particular, 1 said that the Egyptian authorities had already blishment of a neutral zone on both cation line. 124. Paragraph 4 does not concern never detained United Nations observers That is not an Egyptian practice. 125. With regard to paragraph stated that the Egyptian authorities to co-operate with General Burns in accordance une :ntre Ines. s et étiel ~ives IS à ion. ême lant mes .' éral ~ 128. The delegation of the Soviet Union expresses sincere condolences at the losses sustained by and Israel as a result of these incidents. ~ves , les e et 129. One of the most serious incidents was the on the Egyptian police post at Khan Yunis by armed forces on the night of 31 August to 1 Septemher. As stated in General Burns' report, this attack was by an Israel armoured unit in half-tracks which machinegunned the police station and destroyed it by explosive charges. In addition, it is reported that hospital was partly destroyed and that other buildings in the neighbouring village ofBani Suheila were machine- .gunned. As a result of this attack, the casualties Egyptian side were 36 dead and 13 wounded. shows how serious the incident was. , je lené ons 'ont 'aël. itif, !me fait par 10, ion ités our 130. As may he seen· from General Burns" incidents have a1so occurred recently as the result Egyptian intrusions into Israel territory. AIl this tise to natural concem at the situation of tension bas been created in the Gaza area, a situation is fraught with the possibility of complications future. The situation is made more serious still fact that the negotiations hetween Israel and which were conducted from 28 June to 24 August pursuant to the Security Council's resolution of 30 March been interrupted and have not led to any final agreement by both parties on measures to he taken to put an to the tense situation in the area of the Egyptian-Israel frontier. ~ns, (à .tre lmlisé la lUS la ms 131. The Security Council cannot stand aside: it express its attitude towards these events and take concrete measures to plevent the recurrence of such incidents future. In particuIar, -we consider it essential that Security Council should call on both parties-to take· ué à la Printed in France 1 1