S/PV.765 Security Council

The statement ofthe representative of India is highly tendentious, full of inaccuracies, and altogether misleading. I will, with the permission of the Council. try to answer all these points that he has raised at a subsequent stage of the debate on this dispute. We are at present concerned with the urgent consideration of an interim measure on which we have requested action by a particular date. As soon as the Council is pleased to take a decision on this measure and debate on the dispute is resumed, I shall seek the permission of the President to make -my submission.

It is a matter of very deep regret to my Government that the Security CouncU-should have to be dealing once more with the Kashmir dispute. There is the closest relationship between my country and all the peoples of the sub-contInent-if I may use a term which, I agree with the representative of India, is not a very elegant one. Ties of history, of sentiment and, as we firmly believe, of interest also, link our small island kingdom with every part of that vast section of, Asia~ Pr~sents: Les +epr~sentantsdes pays suivants: Aus- Pr~sents: Les repr~sentantsdes pays suivants: Australie, Chine, Colombie, Cuba, France, Irak, Philippines, SuMe, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nqrd, Etats-Unis d'Am~rique. Ordre du jour provisolre (S/Agenda/765) 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour. 2. Question Inde-Pakistan: lettre, en date du 2 janvier 1957, adressee au Pr~sident du Conseil de securit~ par le Ministre des affaires etrang~res du Pakistan. Adoption de I'ordre du jour L'ordre du jour est adopM. Question Inde-Paklstan: lettre. en date du 2 janvier 1957. gdressee au President du Conseil de securite par le Ministre des affaires etrI,Jngeres du Pakistan (S/3767. 5/3778) [suite] Sur l'invitation du Pr~sident, M. V. K. -Krishna Menon, representant de l'Inde. et M. Firoz Khan Noon, repr~sentant du Pakistan, prennent place a la table du Conseil. 1. M. NOON (Pakistan) [traduit de l'anglais]: La declaration du repr~sentant de l'lnde est tres tendancieuse, pleine d'inexactitudes, et de nature a induire en erreur. Si le Conseil me le permet, je repondrai, a un stade ulterieur du debat, a toutes les questions que le representant de l'Inde a soulev~es a propos de ce differend. Ce que nous demandons niaintenant, c'est que le. ConseU examine d'urgence les mesures provisoires que nous lui avons demande de prendre avant une certaine date. D~s que-le Conseilaura decide de ces mesures et que le d~bat sur le differend aura repris, je demailderai au President de m'autoriser a faire ma declaration. 2. Sir Pierson DIXON (Royaume-Uni) [traduit de l'anglais]: Mon gouvernement regrette vivement que le Conseil de s~curite soit appel~ une fois de plus a discuter de la question du Cachemire. Des liens etroits unissent mon pays aux peuples du sous-continent - si je puis employer ce terme qUi, j'en conviens, n'est pas tr~s ~Iegant,ainsi que 1'afait observer le representant de l'Inde. Des Hens historiques, sentimentaux et aussi, j'en suis convaincu, des interets communs unissent notre petit royaume insulaire ;l tous les pays de cette vaste region d'Asie.. 4. In the past, as the present, our constitutional relations with the various parts of this area have differed, but our good will to every part of it remains the same. 5. I should like to take this opportunity of expressing my gratification at the generous remarks that have been made in the course of this debate about the attitude of my Government and of the role played by many of my countrymen during the difficult and anxious period of travail that gave birth to the India and Pakistan of .today. Only the voice of envy would, I think, deny that the Englishmen, the Scots, the Welsh and the'Irish-for, on a small scale, we too have our diversity-all those who served the Crown in the old imperial India and in the transitional period came to feel a deep devotion to the peoples among whom they passed their lives and gave of their best. 6. In the altered circumstances ')ftodaythosefeelings persist. From the bottom of our hea..ts we wish well to the peoples,of India and Pakistan. They are partners with us, and with many others, in a community which rises above differences of race or creed and which is, I think, unique not only in the present world, but in world history. Everything that unites these two countries gives us deep satisfaction; anything that divides them causes us deep concern. 7. Unhappily, today the Security Council is dealing with a problem that does deeply divide these two countries. That the difference is a deep one and that it has caused the strongest emotional reactions on both sides, it would be 'useless to deny. It is, therefore, the det~ire of my' Government, as it is certainly the duty of the Security Council, to proceed in this matter with the greatest prudence and foresight. Under the United Nations Charter, the Security Council is charged with primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security on behalf of the Members of the United Nations as a whole. I am sure that the Council will do its best to act in the spirit of the great responsibilities which it bears. 8. I shall have more to say at a later stage of the proceedings about many of the matters of substance touched upon in the statements of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan and the representative of India. At this stage, however, I propose to limit myself to the subject matter covered by the draft resolution which my delegation has joined in sponsoring [8/3778]. This particular matter has, of course, been considered by the Council before. 9. The Constituent Assembly was established in 8rinagar in 1951. As Mr. Krishna Menon pointed out yesterday, its primary task was to promote the processes of self-government in Kashmir territory. That is not a matter which in itself comes within the juris- 4. Dans le passe comme dans le present, nos relations constitutionnelles avec les divers pays de r.ette region n'ant pas toujours ete harmonieuses, mais notre amitie a 1'egard de tous ces pays demeure. 5. Je voudrais saisir cette occasion POl.' l' remercier les membres du Conseil qui ant, au cours de ce debat rendu hommage a l'attitude de mon gouvernement et au role joue par un grand nombre de mes compatriotes au cours de la periode difficUe et angoissante qui a vu naitre l'Inde et le Pakistan de I).os jours. Si ce n'est la voix de l'envie, qui pourrait contester le profond attachement qu'eprouvent, pour les peuples au millieu desqu~ls Us ont vecu et auxquels ils ont donne le mE:illeur d't~ux-memes, taus les Anglais, les Ecossais, les GaUots et les Irlandais - car, sur une petite echelle, nous at\:ssi avons notre diversite - qui ont servi la Couronne daus l'ancienne Inde imperiale et pendant la periode transitoire. 6. Dans les conditions nouvelles du monde d'aujourd'hui, ces sentiments restent les mames. Du fond de notre creur, nous souhaitons prosperite auxpeuples de l'Inde et du Pakistan. Ils sont, comme tant d'autres, nos associes dans une communaute qui s'l~!leve audessus des differences de race et de croyance et qui, je crois, est un exemple unique non seulement dans le monde moderne, mais encore clans toute l'histoire du monde. Tout ce qui unit ces deux pays nous eause une profonde satisfaction; tout ce qui les divise nou8 affecte vivement. 7. Malheureusement, le ConseU de seeurite examine aujourd'hui une question qui, effectivement, divise ces deux pays. On ne peut nier que cette division soit profonde et q'.l'elle souleve de vives passions dans les deux camps. Mon gouvernement estime done que le devoir du ConseU de securite est d'examiner cette question avec beaucoup de prudence et de sagesse. Aux termes de la Charte des Nations Unies, c'est au Conseil de securite, agissant au nom detousles Etats Membres des Nations Unies, qu'll appartient au premier chef de maintenir la paix etla securite internationales. Je suis convaiIicu que le Conseil de securite agira de son mieux pour faire face aux lourdes responsabilites qui lui incombent. 8. Je me reserve d'intervenir a nouveau a un stade ultel'ieur du debat a propos des nombreuses questions de fond soulevees par le Ministre des affaires etrangares du Pakistan et par le representant de l'Inde. Pour l'instant, je voudrais me limiter a. la question qui fait l'objetduprojetde resolutiondontle Royaume- Uni est l'un des auteurs [8/3778]. Cette question a deja, bien entendu, ete examinee par le Conseil. 9. L'Assemblee cons'titl,lante a ete instituee a Srinagar en 1951. Comme M. Krishna Menon l'a fait observer hier, son rOle essentiel etait de faciliter leprocessus par lequel le Cachemire parviendrait a l'autonomie. Il ne s'agit pas la d'une question relevant de la com- 10. The Council was naturally concerned that nothing done in Kashmir 'should prejudice a settlement of the whole issue in accordance with the principle that had been the basis' of its consideration of the matter since 1948, that is to say, that the final disposition of the state of Jammu and Kashmir should be made in accordance with the wish of the people expressedthrough the democratic method of a free and impartialplebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. 11. What action did the Council tht::n take? It did not seek to. interfere with the processes of democratic development in Kashmir, but it affirmed a quite simple proposition that the conveniIig of the Constituent Assembly and any action that it might take would not constitute a disposition of the State in accordance with the princip.1e 'to which i have just referred. 12. The Council was assisted in its task at that time by the explicit assurances at various stages of the proceedings by the representatives of the Government of India. In particular, on 9 March 1951, Sir Benegal Rau had this to say: "Will that assembly decide the question of accession? My Government's viewis that, while the constitu.ent assembly may, if it so desires, express an op!Jrlon on this question, it can take no decision on it." [536th meeting, para. 23.] 13. Then, after the resolutions had been passed, Mr. Dayal on 29 May 1951 reiterated this assurance and said something else, which I should also like to quote: "...1 reaffirm 1;Jlat so far as the Government of India is concerned, the constituent assembly for Kashmir is not intended to prejudice the issue before the Security Council or to come in its way." [548th meeting, para. 40.] 14. The position thus was quite clear, and I now turn very briefly to what has happened since. If I understood Mr. Menon correctly when he spoke yesterday, [763rd meeting, paras. 135 ff.], he said that the Constituent Assembly for Kashmir had passedaConstitution, some of the clauses of which came into effect automatically on 17 November 1956, and others will come into effect on 26 January next. In particular, Mr. Menon referred to section 3 of the Constitution as already being in effect, and that section, I believe, states that the "State of Jammu and Kashmir is and shall be an integralpartofthe Union of India". In these circumstances it is surely quite natural that the Government of Pakistan should seek some reassurance as to the views of the Security Council. 10. Le Conseil tenait naturellement a ce qu'aucune mesure prise au Cachemire'ne piit pr~juger le regIe... ment de toute la question, selon le principe qui a toujours r~gi les dlibats du Conseil sur cette question depuis 1948, a savoir que le r~glement d~finitif du sort de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire devait etre conforme a la volont~ de la population exprim~e par la m~thod.c d~mocratique d'un pIebiscite libre et impartial tenu SOus les auspices des Nations Dnies. 11. Qu'a fait alors le Conse11? n n'a pas .!'!ssay~ d'intervenir dans le developpement d~mocratiquedu Cachemire, mais il a d~clar~ tr~s simplenient que la convocation de l'Assembl~e constituante ou toute d~cision ~ve::J.tuelle de cette assembl~e ne pourrait permettre de d~terminer le sort de l'Etat d'une mani~re conforme au principe auquel je viens de me refere;r. 12. A l'epoque, le Conseil a ete aide clans sa tache par les assurances explicites que les representants du Gouvernement indien ant donn~esddivers moments du d~bat. En particulier, le 9 mars 1951, sir Benegal Rau a d~clare: "Cette assemblee decidera-t-elle de la question du rattachement? Mon gouvernement estime qu'elle peut, si elle juge bon, exprimer un avis a de sujet, mais qu'elle ne saurait prendre de decision." [536~me seance, par. 23.] 13. Apres 1'adoption des r~solutions, M. Dayalle 29 mai 1951, renouvela cette assurance en ajoutant une phrase, que je voudrais egalement citer: "Mon gouvernement continue (.•.) a declarer a nouveau qu'en ce qui concerne le Gouvernement de 1'Inde, 1'AssembIee constituante du Cachemiren'est pas destinee d pr~juger la question soumiseauConseil de securite ni a porter atteinte a ce dernier." [548eme seance, par. 40.] 14. La situation etait donc tr~s claire, et jevoudrais maintenant parler tres bri~vementdes~venementsqui se sont produits depuis lors. Si j'ai bien compris ce que M. Menon a dit hier [763eme s~ance, par. 135 et suiv.], l'Assembl~econstituante du Cachemire a adopte une constitution dont certaines dispositions sont entrees automatiquement en vigueur le 17 novembre 1956 et dont d'autres doivent entrer envigueur le 26 janvier prochain. En particulier, M. Menon a declare que 1'article 3 de la Constitution etait d~ja en vigueur et que, aux termes de cet article, si je ne me trompe, l' "Etat de Jammu et Cachemire est et sera partie int~grante de l'Union indienne". Dans ces conditions, il est certainement naturel que le Gouvernement pakistanais cherche 11·obtenir des assurances au sujet de 1'ppinion du Conseil de s~curite. 16. This, then, appears to be the position today, as it was in 1951. The Security Council, in dealing with this limited question, has before it therefore the same considerations as it had in 1951. In these circumstances there appears to be no reason at all to modify the simple proposition set out in certain parts of the Security Council resolution of 30 March 1951 [S/2017/Rev.l] to which I have previously referred. 17. In view of the expressed anxiety of the Pakistan representative onthis score, itseems to me reasonable for the Security Council to consider a short draft resolution which reaffirms the clear stand it took in 1951. It is for that reason that the United Kingdom joined in sponsoring the draft resolution before the Security Council. 18. My colleague from India complainedthis morning that the draft resolution had been circulated before he had completed his speech. Perhaps I should say, as one of the sponsors, that I had taken the statement we listened to yesterday afternoon as a clear exposition of the Indian position on the particular aspect of the Kashmir problem with wpich the draft resolution deals, that is, the point relating to this constitutional issue. There is, ofcourse, a special reasonfor expedition in connexion with this particular point, since the other party to the dispute, the GovernmentofPakistan, has expressed concern lest some step might be taken in the very near future, that is, on 26 January. For the practical purposes of our discussions here in New York, this date may in fact partially be considered as 25 January, since New York is eleven to twelve hours behind Delhi and Karachi in time. It is evident, therefore, that time is very short if some reassurance is to be given. 19. There are,ofcourse,othermattersofthegreatest importance referred to in the speeches of the representatives of Pakistan and India. These matters are before the Security Council, and they are matters which require full and most careful consideration. It is for this reason that it seems wise to include operative paragraph 2 in the draft resolution, and I would Wish to return to these questions at that later stage.

It is not my intention today to enter at any length at all into the substance of the difficult and long-standing problem ofKashmir, but I thought I .should say a few words immediately regarding the draft resolution which, together with several other representatives here, we are submitting to the CounCil. We think that itis necessary to present this draft resolution now and to comment briefly on it just because of the march of the calendar and the references which have been made to the date of 26 January, which, together with Indi.a, we share as a national festival. s~quent, quIll nous reste tres peu'de temps si nous voulons donner l'assurance demandee. 19. II Y a, bien entendu, dans les interventions des repr~sentants du Pakistan et de l'lnde d'autres questions de la plus grande importance. Ce sontdes questions dont le Consell de s~curite est saisi et qui exigent l'examen le plus complet et le plus attentif. C'est a. nos yeux la raison d'etre du paragraphe 2 du dispositif du projet de r~solution, et je demanderai a. y revenir par, la suite. 20. M. WALKER (Australie) [hJ.duit de l'anglais]: Je n'ai nullement l'intention de traiter en d~tai1 aujourd'hui du fond du probleme d~licat et d6jllancien du Cachemire, mais je voudrais pr~senter .des :l present quelques observations sur le projet de resolution que, de concert avec d'autres d~l~gations, nouS soumettons au Conseil de securit6: Nous jugeons n6cessaire de deposer maintenant ce projet de resolution et de le commenter brievement, en raison du temps qui s'6coule et de la proximit~ de la date du 26 janvier - qui est, pour l'Inde comme pour nous, une fete nationale. 22. The Kashmir problem is one that has occupied the attention of the Security Council for a number of years, and I think it will be recognized that if a solution satisfactory to both India and Pakistan has not been put into effect, it is not through any lack of effort on the'part of the Councilorthrough any failure by the members of the Council to study the complexities of the problem in a spirit of good will towards both parties. Indeed, the Council has, in its past resolutions, laid down cel'tain basic steps that should be taken towards a solution, steps which were firmly founded upon the principles ofthe Charter ofthe United Nations. 23. The first step wasto establishandpolice a ceasefire, which happily is still in force. In an attempt to move ahead towards a constructive solution, theCounen has declared the rights of the people of Kashmir to determine their own political future and has placp.d faith in the recognized democratic method of~plebis­ cite, to be conducted in conditions that would ensure a free vote without any coercion. However, the Councn',s efforts, through its Commission and its succes~ sive Representatives, to bring this about have not yet been successful, and we are again requested, thistime by Pakistan, to take up the matter. 24. The Australian delegation enters upon this discussion with a deep sense of responsibility, for the people of Australiahavefollowed this problemofKashmir with' great anxiety and concern. One of the most remarkable results of the United Kingdom's policy in terminating imperial rule in India was that it paved the way for a new relationship between Australia, on the one hand, and India and Pakistan, on the oth,er. The growing sense of our partnership with India and Pakistan in the Commonwealth has been a prominent factor in the minds of Australians in recent years, and today the Australian people are Widely conscious of their close ties with India and Pakistan, ties that have been strengthened by personalcontact, especially with the many young men and woinen who have come to study in our universities and colleges 25. This conflict over Kashmir has grieved us, and, as is usual when one's close friends qUarrel, we have not been eager to take sides. Butwe have endeavoured to understand sympathetically the issues at stake and to encourage an amicable setUement. The efforts of the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Menzies, in this direction are well known, as is the work of Sir Owen Dixon, the United Nations Representative in 1950, and of General Nimmo, the present Uriited Nations Chief Military Observer in Kashmir. 22. La question du Cachemire retient l'attention du Consen de s6curit6 depuis de nombreuses ann6es. On reconnaitra, je pense, que, si une solution satisfaisant a. la fois l'Inde et le Pakistan n'a pas 6t6 appliqu6e, ce n'est pas pa.rce que le Consen de s6- curit6 a manqu6 d'in,itiative.ou que ses membres ont n~glig6 d'6tudier les difficult~s du probl~me dans un esprit de bonne volont~ a l'6gard des deux parties. En fait, dans ses r6s01utions anMrieures, le Conseil avait ~nonc~ un certain nombre de mesures essentielles qui auraient du conduire verS une solution et qui s'inspb>aient directement de la Charte des Nations Unies. 23. La premi~re mesure a consit~ a conclure et a surveiller un cessez-le-feu, qui, heureusement, est toujours en vigueur. Anim.6 par le souci de resoudre le probl~me d'une fa~on constructive, le Conseil a proclam6 le droit du peuple duCachemireded6terminer lui~meme son avenir politique et a exprim6 sa confiance daus une m6thode d~mocratique reconnue, c'est-a-dire dans un pl~biscite organis6 dans des conditions qui garantiraient m1 scrutin libre, exempt de toute pression. Pourtant, les efforts que le Conseil a d~ploy~s, par l'intermMiaire de sa Commission et de ses repr6sentants successifs, pour arriver a ce resultat n'ont pas encore 6t6 couronn6s de succ~s et nous sommes de nouveau pri~s, cette fois par le Pakistan, d'examiner la question. 24. La d~16gation australienne aborde cette discussion avec le sens profond de de ses responsabilit6s, car le peuple australien a suivi la question du Cachemire avec beaucoup de crainte et d'inqui6tude. L'un des r6sultatSlles plus notables qu'ait eulad6cision du Royaume-Uni de mettre fin a l'administration imp6- riale dans l'Inde a ~M, l'~tablissement de relations nouvelles entre l'Australie, d'une part, et l'Inde et le Pakistan, de l'autre. Ces derni~res ann~es, les Australiens ant eu de plus en plus le sentiment d'etre associ6s avec 1'Inde et le Pakistan dans le cadre du Commonwealth, et il s'est agi la d'un fait tr~s important. Aujourd'hui, le peuple australien est pleinement conscient des liens 6troits qui l'unissent aces deux pays et qu'ont renforc6 des contacts personnels, notamment avec de nombreux jeunes gens et jeunes flies venus suivre les cours de nos universiMs et de nos coll~ges. 25. Le conflit provoqu6 par le Cachemire nous a attrist6s; comme toujours lorsqu'il s'agitd'undiff6rend qui met auxprises des pays qui vous sont tr~s proches, nous n'avons pas 6t~ tr~s enclins a prendre parti. Nous avons chercM :1 comprendre dans un esprit amicalles questions en jeu et :1 encourager un r~gle­ ment a. l'amiable. Les efforts accomplis dans ce sens par M. Menzies, premier ministre d'Australie, sont bien connus, de meme que ceux de sir Owen Dixon, repr~sentant des Nations Unies en 1950,et du g~n~ral Nimmo, l'actuel chef dugroupe des ob'servateurs militaires des Nations Upies au Cachemire. 29. I am not at allconvincedthatitwould be desirable for the Council to take up indetail roany of the particular questions of past history that have been ventilated by the representatives of Pakistan and India. The charges and counter-charges of conspiracy and aggression have been considered at great length by the Council in the past. It seems to me most important at the present stage to concentrate our attention upon the fundamental principles already r,ecognized by the Council. 30. There is no doubt in my mind that whatever varying interpretations may have been placed by India or Pakistan at various times on the'conditions to be fulfilled before a plebiscite should be undertaken, and whatever the course of action of these parties at various stages of the dispute, the Security Council has committed itself to the principle that the wishes of the Kashmiri people regarding their future should be established through a plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations. As I see it, this is the view of the Security Council, as ex:pressed in several resolutions, and it is my impression that the Council has in the past considered India and Pakistan as having accepted this principle. 31. Perhaps I should say in passing that Mr. Menon's statement, interesting and powerfully argued thoughit 29. Je ne suis pas du tout certain que le Conse.il ait interet a. examiner en detail un grand nombre des faits precis sur lesquels les representants du Pakistan et de l'Inde sont revenus, et qui appartiennent au passe. Le Conseil a d~ja. eu l'occasion d'examiner longuem(mt les accusations et contre-accusations de complot et d'agression; A mon avis, ce qui importe le plus a l'heure actuelle, c'est de nous attacher aux principes fondamentaux d~ja reconnus par le Ccnseil. 30. Je suls certain que, de quelque fac;on que l'Inde et le Pakistan aient interprete a. divers moments les conditions qui devraient etre remplies avant qu'un pl~biscite ne soit organise, et independamment de la ligne de conduite que lesparties ontadoptee auX divers stades du conflit, le Conseil de securite a pose en principe que les aspirations du peuple cachemirien concernant son avenir devraient etre determinees au moyen d'un plebiscite tenu sous les auspices des Nations Unies. Telle est, a. mon avis, l'opinion du Conseil de securite, ex:primee dans plusieurs resolu... tions, et je crois que, dans le passe, le Conseil avait estime que l'Inde et le Pakistan avaient accepte ce principe. 31.. Peut-etre devrais-je dil'e. en passant que la declaration de M. Menon, pour interessante et solidement 32. The Security Council also consideredit necessary almost five years ago to record its view that any action taken in a Constituent Assembly in Kashmir to determine the political future of the people of Kashmir would not constitute a disposition of the State in accordance with this principle. 33. What view is to be taken, therefore, by the Security Council as to the significance of the deliberations of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly? I confess that it is not· altogether clear to me just what is expected to happen in Kashmir from a constitutional viewpoint on 26 January. I understand that the Consti~ tuent As~embly has adopted a Constitution for Kashmir, some.of whose provisions were operative from 17 November 1956, and the remainder were to come into effect on 26 January. Whatisnotcompletely clear is to what extent'this represents any new step purporting to determine the future affiliations of the State of Kashmir and whether it is regarded bythe Government of India as raising a new barrier in the way of a plebiscite in accordance with the Security Council's past resolutions. 34. I do not know whether the Government of India itself proposes to take any formal step to accept such changes as are purported to be made through this Constitution drawn up by the Constituent Assembly. It would seem to us that any suchformal action would be in conflict with the past resolutions of the COllacil. If, on the other hand, the Constituent Assembly is merely going to dissolve itself on 26 January and celebrate the completion of its activities, the question remains 'as to whether those activities are regarded by the Government of India as having any bearing on the disposition of Kashmir and the question of taking a future plebiscite. If so, they would seem to us to be equally inimical to the Council's past resolutions on this subject. 35. In these Circumstances, it does seem desirable to us that the Council, before going any further with its examination of this difficult and importantproblem, should draw the attention of allconcernedtothe Council's earlier decisions. Forthis reason, the Australian delegation has joined in sponsoringthe draft resolution which is before us, and it expresses the hope that the Council will adopt it without undue delay. 36. Mr. NuNEZ PORTUONDO (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): The delegation of Cuba wishes to pay a tribute to the magnificent oratorical efforts of the MirJster for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan ~d the Ambassador of. India, whose statements wiH undoubtedly be of greatvalue when we come to discuss and consider the substance of this problem. 37. The proposal wlU~h we have presented in our draft resolution and ' '!-' .:h is now before you is what might be -called a pr£. .,.1tive measure, that is to say, a measure which is to a certain extent provisional. In passing, I might say that the delegation of Cuba qu'~ quel poiD.t il s'agit 13. d'une nouvelle mesure destin~e ~ d~terminerle futur rattachement de I'Etat de Cachemire, et nous ne savons pas si le Gouvernement iIidien estime qu'lm nouvel obstacle s'opposera ainsi ~ r org-a.nisation du plebiscite recommand~dans les r~solutionsanterieures du Conseil de sEicurite. 34. Je ne sals pas si le Gouvernement indien a luimeme l'intention de sanctionner sous une forme quelconque les modifications que doit entrainer laConstitution adoptee par l'Assembl~e constituante. n me semble que, en agissant de la sorte, il irait ~ l'encontre des r~solutiQns anterieures du Conseil. Si, d'autre part, l'Assembl~e constituante se borne a se dissoudre le 26 janvier et II mettre fin a son activit~, il reste a. savoir si le Gouvernement Indian estime que cette activit~ dolt influer sur l'avenir c!.u Cachemire et sur 1'0rganisation d'un pl~biscite. Dans l'affirmative, il me semble que, 1:1 aussi, on s'~car­ terait des r~solutionsdu Conseil. 35. Dans ces conditions, il nous semble souhaitable que le Conseil, avant de poursuivre l'examen de cette importante et difficile question, attire l'attention de tous les interesses sur ses r~solutionsprecedentes. C'est pourquoi la d~Mgationaustralienne s'est jointe aux auteurs du projet de r~solution dont le Conseil est salsi, et elle exprime l'espoir que le Conseil adopter-et ce texte sans delai superflu. 36. M. NUNEZ PORTUONDO (CUba) [traduit de l'espagnol]: La delegation de Cuba tienta rendre hommage au Ministre des affaires ~trang~resdu Pa.ltistan et ~ l'Ambassadeur de I'Inde pour leurs brillants expos~s, qui, sans aucun doute, nous seront tr~sutiles lorsque nous en viendrons a examiner le fond du pro~ bl~me. 37. Nous sommes acutellement appel~s a nous prononcer sur une mesur,e que nous pourrions qualifier de preventive, d'une mesure qui a, jusqu'a un certain point,: un caract~re provisoire et qui est celle que nous proposons clans le projet de r~solution que nous "It will thus be seen that our proposals which we have repeatedly stated are (1) that the Government of Pakistan should publicly undertake to do its utmost to compel the raiders to withdraw from Kashmir; (2) that the Government of India should repeat its declaration that it will withdraw its troops from Kashmir soil as soon as raiders have withdrawn and law and order are restored; (3) that the Governments of India and Pakistan should make a joint request to the United Nations to undertake a plebiscite in Kashmir at the earliest possible date." 38. This statement by the Prime Minister of India, which does him very great honour and is fully in accordance with the principles of the Charter a..'1d with the right of peoples to self-determination, is exactly what we propose in the first part of our draft resolution when we say that "the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in .accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartialplebis-· cite under the auspices of the United Nations". 39. Our draft resolution therefore introduces nothing new but simply reaffirms the earlier resolutions ofthe Council and accepts that which, at one time, was also accepted by the representatives of both Pakistan and India. 40. I ijkewise seeno reason why the secondpart of the resolution cannot be accepted by the Indian delegation, because the representative of India has repeatedly stated that the recent decisions of the Constituent Assembly in regard to Kashmir could not affect the final disposition of Kashmir since in his view Kashmir formed part of India as a result of actions prior to the establishment of that Assembly. If, therefore, he really believes that that is the situation in regard to Kashmir-a view which is not shared by many members of the Security Council-then the second part of the draft resolution should likewise not affect that situation in any way. 41. The delegation of Cuba therefore considers that the draft resolution is a reaffirmation of the Council's position; of the'clear and binding provisions of the Charter, and of the right of peoples to self-determination. At a later stage, of course, the Council shall have to consider the time and circumstances of this plebiscite, which must be held-and here I agree, of course, with the representative of In(li.a-once the proper conditions have been met, that is to say when it can be held in such a way that the people will be freely able to express their choice and their will and decide whether to join Pakistan or India. "On constatera donc que nous avons propos~ aplusieurs reprises; 1) que le Gouvernement du Pakistan s'engage publiquement a faire tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour forcer les envahisseurs a se retirer du Cachemire; 2) que le Gouvernement de 1'Inde se d~clare de nouveau pret a rappeler ses troupes du Cachemire des que les envahisseurs se seront retir~s et que l'ordre public aura ~t~ retabli; 3) que les Gouvernements de l'lnde etdu Pakistan' demandent conjointement a l'Organisation des Nations Unies d'organiser aussitot que possible un pMbiscite au Cachemire." 38..C'est de cette declaration du Premier MiIrlstre de l'Inde - qui fait grand honnfmr a son auteur et qui est entierement conforme aux principes de la Charte ainsi qu'au droit des peuples a disposer librement d'eux-memes - que s'inspire la premiere partie de notre projet de rl§solution, ou 11 est dit que "le sort d~finitif de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire doit etre dl§cidl§ conform~ment a la volont~ des populatlons, exprim~e au moyen de laproc~duredemocratiqued'un pl~biscite libre et impartial tenu sous l'egide de l'Organisation des Nations Unies". 39. Notre projet de resolution ne contient done aucun element nouveau: il ne fait, en definitive, que sanctionner les decisions anterieures du Conseil, ·et reprendre des dispositions auxquelles ont souscrit, aun moment donnl§, les representants du P,akistan et c'eux de l'Inde. 4,0. Pour ce qui est de la deuxieme partie de notre projet, je ne vois rien nonplus quipuisse empecher le representant de l'Inde de l'accepter, puisqu'il a d~clare :l maintes reprises que les dernieres d~ci­ sions de I'AssembMe constituante relatives auCachemire ne pouvaient affecter la situation definitive de ce territoi1"e, le Cachemire, selon lui, ayant ~t~ rattach~ a l'lnde par des actes ant~rieurs :l la pr~sente Constitution. Si c'est vraiment la sa maniere de comprendre la situationduCachemire - maniere qui n'est pas celle de nombreux membres du Conseil - il n'y a rien encore, dans la deuxieme partie de notre projet de r~solution qui doive l'emouvoir. 41. La delegation de Cuba estime que le projet de rl§solution ne fait que reaffirmer la PQsition du Conseil. Il reaffirme des prl§ceptes clairs et formels anonces dans la Charte et respecte le droit des peuples a. disposer d'eux-memes. Il va sans dire que le Conseil devra, ulterieurement, examiner aque1 moment et daus quelles conditions il conviendra d'organiser le plebiscite qui devra avoir lieu - sur ce point, je suis naturellement entierement d'accord avec le repr~sentant de l'Inde - lorsque les conditions requises seront r~alisl§es, c'est-a-dire lorsque lapopulation sera en mesure d'exprimer librement ses aspi- 43. As regards the substance of th~ problem, the delegation of Cuba will naturally require more time to study all the facts and all that has been said by the representatives of Pakistan and ofIndia. These representatives have made long statements with many references to authorities, documents, rules of international law and so on, which will have to be weighed and analysed before any final conclusion can be reached. 44. The delegation of Cuba will express its views in the course of the general discussion.

In considering the India-Pakistan item the Security Council faces an unfortunate difference of opinion between two nations, whose friendship and esteem is highly valued by the United States. We desire to help them to find a solution to this problem and we approach the question in that spirit. Itis regrettable that this dispute has lasted more than nine years, despite the earnest efforts of the Security Council and of its representatives, the individual efforts of certain members ofthe Council, and the attempts of.the parties concerned. 46. It is a tribute to the Council and to the parties that a cease-fire was achieved on 1 January 1949 [8/1196, para. 14] as part of an agreement by India and Pakistan for demilitarization and for a United Nations sponsored plebiscite. Unfortunately, however, and despite the best efforts of the Council and its representatives, the parties have failed to agree on carrying out the next two steps. It is understandable that strong emotion should be involved on both sides of this problem. 47. One of the first concerns of the Council has always been that nothing should be done which might aggravate the situation. This was made clear and explicit in the Council's first resolution on the case adopted on 17 January 1948.11 We trust that both parties will do their utmost to continue to approach this question with restraint and that they will take such measures as are within their power to assure the maintenance of a peaceful atmosphere. 43. En ce qui concerne le fond de la question, la delegation de Cuba a bien entendu besoin de davantage de temps pour etudier les faits anterieurs ainsi que les declarations faites par les representants du Pakistan et de l'Inde. Au cours de leurs longs exposes, ces representants ont cite de si nombreux ouvrages et documents et se sont si abondamment rereres aux r~gles du droit international qu'il nous fautsoumettre leurs interventiolis a une analyse approfondie pour aboutir a. une conclusion definitive. 44. La d~legationde Cuba se reserved'exprimerses vues ulterieurement, lorsque la question sera pleinement debattue. 45. M. LODGE (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) [traduit de l'anglais]: Lorsqufil examine la g.uestion Inde-Pakistan, le Conseil de securite est en presence d'une divergence d'opinion regrettable entre deux pays dont les Etats-Unis apprecient hauteroent l'estime et l'amitie. Nous desirons les aider a resoudre ce probl~me, et c'est daus cet esprit que nous abordons la question. Il faut deplorer que ce differend dure depuis plus de neuf ans, en depit de tous les efforts du Conseil de securite et de ses representants, des effo~s personnels de certains membres du Conseil, et des tentatives de r~glement faites par les parties inM-' tessees. 46. Il faut rendre hommage au Conseil et auxparties pour la conclusion d'une suspension d'armes, le ler janvier 1949 [S/1196, par. 14], dans le cadre d'un accoret entre l'Inde et le Pakistan surla d~mllitarisation et sur le principe d'un plebiscite qui serait organise sous l'egide des Nations Unies. Malheureusement, et malgre tout ce qu'ont fait le Conseilde securite et ses representants, les parties n'ont pu parvenir a un accord sur l'accomplissement des deux etapes suivantes. ~ c;omprend que, de chaque cote, les sentiments soients vifs. 47. Un des premiers soucis du Conseil a toujours ete d'eviter tout ce qui pourrait aggraver la situation. Cela ressort clairement de la p:remi~re resolution sur la questicn, adoptee par le Conseil le 17 janvier 19481J. Nous sommes surs que les deux parties feront tout pour garder la moderation dont eUes ont fait preuve et qu'eUesnenegligerontrienpourassurer le maintien d'une atmosph~re pacifique. 48. Nous sommes reconnaissants au representant de l'Inde, qui a bien voulu modifier le plan de son intervention afin d'exposer hier apr~s-midi[763~meseance] la question de l'Assemblee constituante. Je ne m'occuperai que de cette question, qui faitl'objetdu projet de resolution. Vu l'importance de la question du Cachemire consideree dans son ensemble, nous etudierons 1/ Documents officiels de I'Assemblee generale. troisieme session. Supplement No 2, chap. 5, sect. C. 50. Differing interpretations have been put on the meaning and effect of this and other actions relating to the connexiOIi between Kashmir and India, extending back to the accession instrument by the Maharaja of 26 October 1947. But one thing is clear,. The Constitution approved by the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir deals, among other things, with the affiliation of the State. This represents an important new element in the situation, and the Security Council is bound, in view of its previous stand, to take note of this. The position taken by the Security Council in 1951, in our opinion, remains valid, and we have adhered to it in this new draft resolution. 51. Finally, the United States lays stress on the final paragraph of the draft resolution before us. In the absence of a direct mutually acceptable agreement between the parties, the Council has an obligation to continue its efforts, as it has in the past, to seek and to support any fruitful suggestion in this difficult case.

In co-sponsoring the draft resolution before the Council, my delegation is maintaining the stand it has taken on earlier occasions in the Security Council. By a happy coincidence Colombia was a member of the Council in 1948 when this question was first brought before us. We then took the position we are taking today: it was and is our intention to co-operate to the best of our ability with the majority of the Council members with a view to securing a peaceful solution of this dispute between those two great nations, Pakistan and India. 53. I might perhaps add that our 1nterestinthe India- Pakistan question to some extent reflects Latin America's understanding of this type of problem; we remember that when we gained our independence from our respective mother countries, we also had similar problems among ourselves. Experience has taught us that lasting solutions can only be obtained by peaceful means. 54. As the majority of representatives who ~tave form~ment au principe admis d'un p16biscite libre et impartial [S/2017/Rev.1]. Le projet de r~solution que nous examinons aujourd'hui consiste essentiellement en une r~affirmation de ce principe par le Conseil. Il fait suite II la plainte d'une des parties, qui soutient que l'Assembl~e mentionn~edans la r6solution du 30 mars 1951, non seulement a 6t6 convoqu6e, mais encore a ~labor6 et promulgu6 une Constitution, OU il est notamment question du rattachement de l'Etat:U'Inde. 50. On a donn~ diff~rentes interpr~tat1ons quant au sens et aux cons~quences de cette mesure et d'autres d~cisions touchant les relations entre le Cachemire et l'Inde, en remontant jusqu'lll'instrument d'accession de l'Etat, sign6 par le maharajah le 26 octobre 1947. Toutefois, un point est clair. La Constitution approuv~e par I'Assembl~e constituante du Cachemire tI-aite, notamment, du rattachement de l'Etat. C'est III un ~16ment nouveau et important et le Conseil de s6curit~ est oblig6, 6tant donn6 son attitude pass~e, d'en tenir compte. A notre avis, la position adopt6e par le Conseil de s6curit~ en 1951 est toujours valable, et nous nous y sommes tenus dans le nouveau projet de r~solution. 51. En conclusion, la d~l~gation des Etats-Unis d6sire soullgner la port~e du dernier alin6a du projet de r~solution qui nous est soumis. En l'absence d'un accord direct acceptable pour les deux parties, le Conseil doit, comme 11 l'a fait dans le pass~, poursuivre ses efforts afin de rechercher et d'appuyer toute suggestion pouvant permettre d~ r~gler cette d~licate question. 52. M. VESGA DUARTE (Colombie) [traduit de l'espagnol]: En s'associant aux auteurs du projetde r~so­ lution, la d~l~gation colombienne est rest6e fid~le II la ligne de conduite qu'elle a toujours suivie au Conseil de s~curite. Par une heureuse coincidence, la Colombie 6tait membre" du Conseil en 1948, lorsque celui-ci a ~M saisi de la question pour la premi~re fois. Depuis cette date, notre position n'a pas vari6: alors, comme aUjourd'hui, nous avons cherch~ a collaborer avec la majorit~ des membres du Conseil, dans toute la mesure du possible, en vue de mettre fin par des moyens pacifiques II cette controverse entre deux pays si importants, le Pakistan et l'Inde. 53. Qu'il me soit permis d'ajouter que l'interet que porte la Colombie a la question Inde-Pakistan reflete dans une certaine mesure la comprehension des pays de I'Am6rique latine 11 l'~gard de ce genre de probleme, car nous n'oublions pas que lorsque nous avons accede II l'ind~pendance, nous avons eu a faire face l les uns comme les autres, ~ des difficult~sanalogues, L'exp~rience nous a appris que l'on ne parvient a des solutions durables que par des voies pacifiques. 54. Comme 1'0nt expli4u~ les representants qui ont 55. Lilce the representative of Cuba) I wishto express my admiration for the remarkable statement by the representative of India) who) for over eight hours, was able to hold the Council's attention) thanks to his amaZing dialectic ability, and I was happy to note that at the end of 'his statement he expressed a desirewhich I believe to be a sincere one-that a peaceful) permanent and 'lasting solution may be found to this problem. 56. In co-sponsoring this draft resolution) Colombia hopes that that V?ish, which is shared by all, may be fulfilled as rapidly as possible.

The Kashmir question is in a way unique among the questions which have come before the Security Council. Usually, questions of this kind concern, on the one Side, a country in Asia or Africa and, on the other side, some European country. Here is a dispute between two Asian countries, 58. When India asked that the Kashmir question be put on the agenda of the Security Council at the beginning of 1948, I was in my own country. My Government instructed me to return to the Headquarters of the United Nations immediately and to do my utmost to promote a peaceful settlement of this question. My Government did that not because it made any difference to China whether Kashmir acceded to India or to Pakistan. My Government had a special reason for its active interest in this question. 59. We in China felt that, at the end of the Second World War, there emerged in fact a new Asia-in other words, for the first time in our history, the possibility of a community ofAsian nations. Ofcourse, in the old centuries, there were many Asian nations but, because of the lack of means of co~munication, there was little of a community. In the nineteenth century the sense of a community grew, but it was not a community of independent nations. It was only at the end of the Second World War thatwe in Asia faced the reality of the possibility of a community of nations. My Government fondly hoped that we in Asia might even do better than the European nations had done in the past. In China we did not know too much about European history, but even school ch!Jdren knew something about Alsace-Lorraine. The Chinese newspapers, at the beginning of 1948, frequently expressed the hope that Kashmir might not become an Asian Alsace-Lorraine to poison this new hopeful community of Asian nations. It was from that angle that my Government instructed me to return to my post as soon 55. Apres le representant de Cuba, j'aimerais amon tour exprimer mon admiration pour les remarquables exposes du representant de l'Inde, dont la puissance oratoire a ,retenu l'attention du Conseil pendant plus de hutt heu'res. J'ai eM heureuxde noter que le representant de 1'Inde a termine son discou:cs en exprimant le voou - sincere, semble-t-il - que la question qui nous occupe regoive finalement une solution pacifique, permanent et durable. 56. En se joignant aux auteurs du projet de resolution, la delegation colombienne a voulu contribuer a la realisation la plus rapprocMe possible de ce voou, que nous formons tous. 57. M. 'TSIANG (Chine) [traduit de l'anglais]: En un sens, la question du Cachemire n'a, parmi celles dont le Conseil de securite a ete saisi, aucun equivalent. En general, les questions de cette nature interessent d'une part un pays d'Asie ou d'Afrique et, d'autre part, un pays europeen. Or, il s'agit icid'un differend entre deux pays asiatiques. 58. Lorsque l'Inde a demande que la question du Cachemire soit inscr~te It l'ordre du jour du Conseil de securite au debut de 1948, je me trouvais dans mon pays. Mon gouvernement m'a donnepourinstructions de regagner imml!diatement le Siege de l'Organisation des Nations Unies et ne ne negligeI' aucun effort pour favoriser un reglement pacifique de cette question: ce n'etait pas parce qu'il tenait It ce que le Cachemire flit rattacM soit a l'Inde, soit au Pakistan, mais parce qu'il ayait une raison speciale de s'interesser activement a la question. 59. En fait, la Chine pensait qu'une Asie nouvelle etait nee a la fin de la deuxieme guerre mondiale; en d'autres termes, pour la premiere fois dans notre histoire, on entrevoyait la possibilite de constituer une communaute des nations asiatiques. Autrefois, les pays asiatiques etaient nombreux mais, en raison du manque de moyens de communication, ils ne formaient pas une veritable communaute. Au XIXeme siecle, la notion de communaute s'est developpee, mais il ne s'agissait pas d'une communautedenations independantes. Ce n'est qu'a la fin de la deuxieme guerre mondiale que l'Asie a pu envisager concretement la possibilite d'une communaute de nations. Mon gouvernement avait meme le ferme espoir que nous pourrions faire mieux a cet egard que les nations europeennes dans le passe. La Chine ne connaissait guere l'histoire europeenne, mais meme les enfants de nos ecoles avaient entendu parler de l'Alsace- Lorraine. Au debut de 1948, les journaux chinois exprimaient frequemment l'espoir que le Cachemire ne deviendrait pas une Alsace-Lorraine asiatique qui 60. When I joined the debate I found that the interest in promoting a 'peaceful settlement of the Kashmir problem was general. I have never seen the members of the Security Council sharing the burdens of discussion and proposal so equally as on this Kashmir question. Every delegation was working actively towards a peaceful solution. During the month of January 1948, the Council was presided over by Mr. van Langenhove, the representative of Belgium. In addition to presiding over this body, he was in daily consultation with the delegations of Pakistan and India and tried, through private conversations, to bring before the Council some solution that would be agreed upon. In February General McNaughton of Canada did the same thing. In March it was my turn to preside and I tried to do somethiIlg. Then, of course, there was the representative ofColombia, whom I remember very well, Mr. L6pez, who, I was told, had once been the President of his country. He did his level best to contribute towards a peaceful solution. Then, as I recall, there was Mr. Philip Noel-Baker. Everybody worked hard on this. 61. Now I should like to recall another feature of the Security Council of that time. I think I can honestly say that no question has ever been considered by members of this Council in such an objective, unprejudiced, unbiased way as this Kashmir question. Ordinarily, in the United Nations, we know that delegation A might be pro-X and anti-Y. In the Kashmir debate, in spite of many private and public discussions, we were all puzzled as to who was for A and against B and who was against A and for B. Especially do I remember Mr. Noel-Baker. I have never seen a man watch his words in public and in private so carefully as Mr. Noel-Baker watched his in this matter. This objectivity of the Council of that time would, I think, be manifest to anybody who would read the records of the Council of 1948, 1949, 1950 and 1951. 62. I should like to call the attention of this Council to another feature. At that time there was no SEATO; there was no Baghdad Pact; and Pakistan, I think, did not have a single military ally. Whether, atthe present time, the military alliances and friendships of Pakistan could influence the ·.members of the Council or not, I could not presume to judge, but that kind of prejudice certainly did not exist in the Council in 1948, 1949 or 1950~ 63. Since this debate is in fact the renewal of the debate of that period, 1 thought that this brief report of the atmosphere of that time might be useful to my colleagues today. 64. The representative of India repeated bothyesterday and today that the question before the Council is not a territorial dispu~e. He says it is the aggression of Pakistan against India. The letter in which India 12 60. Lorsque j'ai pris part au d~bat, j'ai constat~ que tout le monde souhaitait un r~glement pacifique de la question du Cachemire. Je n'aijamaisvulesmembres du Conseil de s~curit~ se partager aussi ~galement la tache que dans la question du Cachemire. Toutes les d~l~gations s'efforc;aient de trouver une solution pacifique. Pendant le mois de janvier 1948, c'est M. van Langenhove, repr~sentant de la Belgique, qui pr~sidait le Conseil de s~curit~. Non seulement 11 dirigeait les d~bats de cet organe, mais, en outre, il avait des consultations quotidiennes avec les d~l~­ gations pakistanaise et indienne et 11 s'efforc;ait, au cours d'entretiens priv~s, detrouverune solutionpouvant faire l'objet d'un accord. En f~vrier, le g~n~ral McNaughton, repr~sentant du Canada, a suivilameme ligne de conduite. En mars, j'ai, ;l mon tour, assum~ la pr~sidence et je me suis efforc~ de parvenir ;l un r~sultat. Ensuite, les travaux du Conse11 ont ~t~ dirig~s par M. L6pez, repr~sentant de la Colombie et ancien pr~sident de ce pays, dont je me souviens tr~s bien. n a fait toutce qui ~tait en son pouvoir pour faciliter un r~glementpacifique. Puis ily a eu M. Philip Noel-Baker. Aucun de nous n'a ~pargn~ ses efforts. 61. Je voudrais souligner un autreaspectdestravaux du Conse~l de s~curit~ ;l 1'~poque. Je crois pouvoir dire en toute sinc~rit~ qu'aucune question n'a jamais ~M examin~e avec aUtant d'objectivit~ par les membres du Conseil, ni d'une mani~re aussi impartiale, aussi d~sinMress~e. A 1'Organisation des Nations Unies, on sait g~n~ralement que telle d~Iegationest favorable ;l X et oppos~e a Y. Or, pendant le d~bat sur la question du Cachemire, malgr~ de nonibreux ~changes de vues publics et priv~s, nul ne savait au juste qui ~tait pour A et contre B, ou ",ice versa. J'ai ~t~ particuli~rement frapp~, a cet ~gard, par 1'attitude de M. Noel-Baker. Je n'ai jamais vu personne faire preuve d'autant de circonspection dans des d~clarations publiques ou dans des entretiens priv~s. Je ne pense pas que, si 1'on prend la peine de lire les comptes rendus des seances consacr~es ;l la question en 1948, 1949, 1950 et 1951, on puisse contester'l'objectivit~du Conseil. 62. Je tiens ~galementa appeler l'attention du Conseil sur le fait qu'a l'~poque l'OTASE et le Pacte de Bagdad n'existaient pas, et le Pakistan n'avait pas, je crois, un seul alli~ militaire. Je ne puis dire Si, a l'heure actuelle, les alliances militaires et les relations du Pakistan pourraient exercer une influence sur les membres du Conseil, mais ilestcertain qu'en 1948, 1959 ou 1950, ce genre de consid~rations ~tait enti~rement ~tranger au Consei!. 63. Etant donn~ que la pr~sente discussion est une reprise des d~bats de cette p~riode, j'ai pens~ qu'il pouvait etre utile d'~voquer l'atomosph~re dans laquelle ils se sont d~rouIes. 64. Le repr~sentant de 1'Inde a soutenu hier, et aujourd'hui encore, que ce n'~tait pas un diff~rend territorial que le Conseil ~tait appel~;l.examiner. Selon lui, il s'agit de l'agression que le Pakistan a Assistance in that phrase meant, of course, a complaint of military assistance to"Azad" Kashmir and to tribesmen, and, in the course ofthe presentation of the Indian case by Mr. Ayyangar, that charge was repeated a number of times. 65. Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, representative of Pakistan at that time, made a counter-charge of acts of aggression by India against Pakistan. So we faced these rival charges: aggression by Pakistan against Indiaj aggression by India against Pakistan. 66. I hope that members of this Council today will take the time to read the records of those years. No member of the Council ever gave serious consideration to either charge, the chargeoflndiaor the charge of Pakistan. There never was a proposal made dealing specifically with aggression. In fact, there was no systematic or serious consideration ofthat charge and of the counter-charge of aggression. The members of the Council, without consultation, all came to the same conclusion, that the charge of aggression should be bypassed. That charge was never taken up, never sifted, never even given serious considerationj I believe it was very wise of the Council to by-pass that charge. 67. Now it is said that this is not a dispute with regard to territory. However, I cannot understand why anybody should say that this is not a dispute with regard to territory. The basic question is whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir should become a part of India or a part of Pakistan. That is what is in dispute. Is that not a dispute with regard to territory? 68. This dispute has another peculiar feature. From the very beginning, the Council began with an agreement between two parties. In fact, before the two parties directly concerned ever appeared before the Council, the two parties agreed that the plebiscite should be the answer. What did the Council do? The Council tried to build a solution on this prior agreement that the two parties had before they came to this CounCil. So the idea of a plebiscite was not imposed by the Council on the two parties. 69. In their public statements the statesmen of both countries, India and Pakistan, have stated that they would be willing to let the wishes of the peopl~ of Kashmir decide the future of that State. In this Coun- Cil, in his very first statement in January 1948, the representative of India, Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, had this to say: "The question of the future status of Kashmir vis- ~ -vis her neighbours and the world at large, and a further question, namely, whether she shouJd with- Il s'agissait, bien entendu, de l'assistance militaire que le Pakistan aurait donnee au Cachemire "azad" et aux membres des tribusj en exposant le these de l'lnde, M. Ayyangar a repete plusieurs fois cette accusation. 65. Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, qui representait alors le Pakistan, a retourne l'aecusation eta declare que l'lnde avait commis des actes d'agression contre le Pakistan. Nous etions done saisis, d'unepart, d'une accusation d'agression pakistanaise contre l'lnde, et, d'autre part, d'une accusation d'agression indienne contre le Pakistan. 66. J'espere que les membres du Conseil consacreront quelque temps aujourd'hui a la lecture des proces-verbaux des seances de cette epoque. Ils constateront que les membres du Conseil n'ont jamais pris au serieux nil'accusation de l'lnde ni celle du Pakistan. Aucune proposition n'a traite expressement d'agression. En fait, il n'ya eu aucun examen systematique ou approfondi de l'accusation ou de la contre-accusation d'agression. Sans se consulter, les membres du Conseil sont tous parvenus a. la meme conclusion, a. savoir qu'il ne fallait pas tenir compte de l'accusation d~agression. Cette accusation n'a jamais ete prise en consideration, ni approfondie; elle n'a meme jamais fait l'objet d'un examen serieux, et je pense que le Conseil a ete tres sage de n'en tenir aucun compte. 67. On nous dit maintenant qu'il ne s'agit pas d'un differend relatif a un territoire. Je ne pui£ comprendre certe affirmation. La question essentielle qui se pose est celle de savoir si l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire doit faire partie de l'Inde ou du Pakistan. Tel est l'objet de la controverse. N'est-ce pas la. un conflit territorial? 68. Ce differend a un autre caractere particulier. A l'orgine meme, le Conseil a pu tableI' sur un accord entre les parties: en fait, avant meme que les deux parties directement interessees ne s'adressent au Conseil, elles avaient reconnu qu'il fallait resoudre le probleme par un plebiscite. Qu'a fait le Conseil? Il a essaye de trouver une solutionfondee sur l'accord qui s'etait fait entre les deuxpartiesavantque cellesci ne viennent devant le Conseil. Ce n'est done pas lui qui leur a impose l'idee d'un plebiscite. 69. Dans leurs declarations publiques, les hommes 'Etat des deux pays, Inde et Pakistan, ont dit qu'ils seraient disposes a. laisser a la population du Cachemire le soin de decider de l'avenir de ce territoire. Dans la toute premiere declaration qU'il a faite au Conseil, en janvier 1948, le representant de l'lnde. M. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, a dit: . "La question du statut futur du Cachemire vis-avis des Etats voisins et du monde en gel1l3ral, et, autre question, celle de savoir s'il ne devrait pas 70. This feature of tile discussion is rather rare. We here have known cases when weeks and months of debate have failed to find any elementof agreement, but in connexion WitIl the Kashmir dispute we began with a major agreement that the final decision as to the future of Kashmir should be left to the people of Kashmir. 7'1. In spite of that good start, we have not had much success. The problem of a plebiscite was boggeddown under the conditions for a plebiscite. The COWlcil has spent many hours trying to solve that problem. Our Commissions and our representatives sent to India and Pakistan have spent many weeks in trying t«;> solve that problem. 72. What the COWlcil and the Commission and the representatives tried to do was ills. If we could secure agreement between the two parties with regard to some particular condition, we were happy, and we put that down on paper immediately as a condition to which both parties agreed. But when we met with some point on which the two parties fell apart we were all patient to listen to the viewpoints of both and in all fairness we tried to draw a middle line and reach a compromise which we knew that neither party would entirely like but which we thought might be fair enough so that both parties would, after all, accept it. 73. That has not occurred. It is not necessary-and I would not presume to try-to assign blame and responsibility in regard to these conditions. However, I should like to say that a plebiscite was not only agreed on before the two parties came to this COWlcil; it was the Wlanimous belief of the members of the COWlcil that a plebiscite was the solution. 74. Furthermore, what is a plebiscite? A plebiscite, in terms of the Charter, would mean the self-determi- .nation of a people. Self-determination is expressed through a plebiscUe. I would l?ay that all Members of the United Nations, by becoming Members, by subscribing to the Charter, would have to accept the principle of plebiscite. If we accept a plebiscite we mean, of course, a fair and impartial plebiscite. In regard to ills point, that a plebiscite must be fair and impartial, I remember very well a sentence that Mr. Noel-Baker said to the COWlcilduringthatperiod. He told us that the plebiscite not only must be fair and impartial in reality but it must be fair and impartial even in appearance. This fairness and impartiality could sway the passions of peoples. It could decide the question of peace or war. 75. If we honestly' and seriously believe that the future of Kashmir should be decided by a plebiscite, 14 7(1. C'est la un fait plut6t rare. Nousavonsconnu des cas ou, apres des semaines et des mois de discussions, on n'arrivait ~ trouver aucun point d'accord. Or, dans le conflit relatif au Cachemire nous sommes d'accord sur un point capital: le soin de d~cider de l'avenir du Cachemire devrait etre laiss~au peuple du Cachemire. 71. Malgr~ ce d~but favorable, nous n'avons pas fait beaucoup de progres. Les conditions pos~es ont fait que la question du pHibiscite s'est enHs~e. LeConseil a pass~ de nombreuses heures ~ tenter de r~soudre ce probleme. Les commissions et les repr~sentants que nous avons envoy~s dans l'lnde et au Pakistan ont ~galement consacr~ de nombreuses semaines ~ la recherche d'une solution. 72. Voici ce que le Conseil, la Commission et nos repr~sentants ont tent~ de faire. Des que nous avons pu r~aliser un accord entre les deux parties touchant telle ou telle condition, nous nous sommes empress~s d'en prendre note en sp~cifiant qu'il s'agissait d'une condition a laquelle les deux parties souscrivaient. Mais lorsque nous nous sommes heurt~s a des points sur lesquels il y avait divergence d'opinions entreles parties, nous avonstousprisleplusgrandsoin d'~cou­ ter les deux theses. Par souci d'~quit~, nous nous sommes efforces de discerner un juste milieu et d'aboutir a un compromis dont nous savions qu'il ne satisferait pleinement aucune des parties mais qui, pensions-nous, pourrait etre assez juste pour que, en fin de compte, elles l'acceptent. 73. Cela ne s'est pas produit. 11 n'est pas n~ces­ saire - et c'est une tache que je n'a~sumeraipas - de r~partir blames et responsabilit~s au sujet des conditions pos~es touchant le plebiscite. Cependant, je tiens ~ dire non seulement que les deux parties st~taient mises d'accord sur un pl~biscite avant de ~!adresser au Conseil, mais encore que le Conseil ~tait unanime a penser que telle ~tait bienla solution. 74. Au surplus, qu'est-ce qu'un pl~biscite? Un pMbiscite, pour reprendre les termes de la Charte, permet a un peuple de disposer de IUi-meme, en exprimant son opinion. J.ajouterai que tous les Etats Membres, du fait qu'ils ont adh~r~ a 1'0rganisation des Nations Unies et qu'ils ont sign~ la Charte, sont tenus d'accepter le principe d'un pMbiscite. Si nous acceptons un pl~biscite, cela signifie evidemment un pMbiscite juste et impartial. Je rappellerai a ce sujet une phrase que M. Noel-Baker a prononc~e devant le Conseil ~ cette ~poque, lorsqu'il a dit que le pMbiscite devrait etre juste et impartial non seulement dans la r~alite, mais aussi dans lesapparences. Cette ~quit~ et cette impartialite pourraient influer sur les passions nationales. Elles pourraient decider de la paix ou de la guerre. 75. Si nous croyon:;; honnetement etserieusementque l'avenir du Cachemire doit etre r~gle par un pMbis- 76. We were told this morning that much has changed. Indeed, some things have changed, but as I listened to the 1:'.'10 opening speeches in this debate, I confess, I did not see much change. I was afraid that the representatives from other parts of the world might say that, after all, the old European belief about the unchanging East was accurate. Certain things have changed, but the basic features of the problem have not changed. I believe the principle of a solution should not change and cannot change. 77. The draft resolution before the COWlcil is a simple and modest one. It really reafHrms the stand that the COWlcil has taken in regard to this dispute, and therefore my delegation will support it.

As a newly elected membel' of the Security Council, Sweden is now called upon for the first time to pronOWlce itself on the India- Pakistan question, whereas other members have taken part in previous deliberations on the subject. Hence, now that the question has once again been submitted to the COWlcil, my Government does not consider itself committed to any particular way of dealing with this matter. 79. In accordance with our obvious duty, we have studied the various aspects of the problemwith a view to forming an opinion of what solution should be sought and what procedure should be followed. Aprimary requirement .must be that both parties should refrain from Wlilateral measures which would alter the status quo. Thus, for the time being the presentdemarcation line must be respected. This implies that the use of force aimed at changing the status quo must be excluded. It also implies that the parties should desist from taking internal legislative measures by which the state of Jammu and Kashmir would be considered definitely incorporated in the territory of one of the two parties and which would prejudice the Security COWlcil's continued deliberations on this matter. 80.. It follows from what I have said that my delegation is prepared to vote in favour of the draft resolution now before the COWlcil. Our affirmative vote, however, should not be construed to mean thatwe have taken a definite stand on the previous Council resolutions enumerated in the present draft resolution. In my Government's opinion, the legal issues involved in this matter require further and thorough study, particularly in the light of the statements made by the representatives of India and Pakistan. I therefore reserve my right to revert to this matter at a later stage of the COWlcil's discussions.

The Security COWlcil is once again discussing what is called the 76. On nous a dit ce matin que beaucoup de choses avaient change. En effet, il y a eu certains changements, mais j'avoue qu'en ecoutant les deux discours prononces au debut de cette serie de seances, je n'ai pas constate beaucoup de changements. Je cralgnais que les representants des autres parties du monde ne disent qu'apr~s tout, la vieille croyance europeenne en un Orient immuable etait justifiee. Certaines choses ont change, mais les elements essentiels du probleme restent ce qu'ils etaient. Je pense qu'il ne doit et qu'il ne peut y avoir aucun changement en ce qui concerne le principe de la solution a. adopter. 77. Le projet de resolution dont le Conseil est saisi n'est ni complique ni trop ambitieux. Il reaffirme, en fait, la position que le Conseil a prise au. sujet de ce differend, et c'est pourquoi ma delegation l'appuiera. 78. M. JARRING (SuMe) [traduit de l'anglais]: En tant que membre nouvellement elu du Conseil, la SuMe est appelee pour la premiere fois a se prononcer sur la question Inde-Pakistan, alors que d'autres membres du Conseil ont deja. pris part aux precedents debats sur cette question. Celle-ci etantdenouveau soumise au Conseil, mon gouvernement ne se considere pas comme tenu d'aborder le probleme d'une mani~re donnee. 79. Comme il est de notre devoir de le faire, nous avons examine les divers aspects de ce probleme, afin de nous faire une opinion sur lasolutionqu'il convient de lui apporter et sur la procedure a. suivre a cette fin. La premiere condition a remplir, c'est d'obtenir que les deux parties s'abstiennent de prendre unilateralement des mesures qui modifieraient le statu quo. Le Gouvernement suedois estime donc que, pour l'instant, il convient de maintenir ractuelle ligne de demarcation. Cela exclut 1'emploi de la force en vue de modifier l~ statu quo et. implique, en outre, que les parties doivent s'abstenir d'adopter des lois qui auraient pour effet diincorporer definitivement 1'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire dans leur territoire et d'empecher ainsi le Conseil de securiM de poursuivre l'examen de la question. 80. Il s'ensuit que ma delegation est prete a voter pour le projet de resolutiondont le Conseil est sais!. Notre vote affirmatif ne devra toutefois pas etre interprete comme signifiant que nous avons pris Wle position definitive a 1'egard des resolutions anterieures du Conseil qui sont enumerees dans ce projet. De l'avis de mon gouvernement, les questions juridiques qui se posent appellent un nouvel examen approfondi, etant donne notamment les declarations faites par le representant de I'Inde et le representant du Pakistan. Je reserve donc le droit de ma delegation de revenir sur cette question a. Wl stade ulterieur des debats. 81. M. SOBOLEV (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) [traduit du russe]: Une fois de plus, le Conseil de securite examine ce que 1'on appelle la 82. Subsequently during the discussion ofthe Kashmir question in the Security Council the original intention had ceased to be stressed. The attention ofthe Security Council was, unfortunately, later focused, not onfinding a solution of the Kashmir questionthrough a direct agreement hetween the parties, but on the organization of a plebiscite, with supervision and interference from outside. 83. The Soviet Union has always maintained and still maintains an impartial and objective attitude to the Kashmir question, bearing in mind the principles of democracy and the need to strengthen friendly relations between the peoples of that area. The Kashmir question did not arise among the Kashmir people themselves. It was created nearly nine years ago, by certain Powers which are using every means in their endeavour to foment discord between countries striving for their national freedom and independence. The position of these Powers on the Kashmir issue was determined, not by any desire to settle that question in a manner corresponding to the interests of the Kashmir people themselves and of the peoples ofIndia and Pakistan. These Powers were guided primarily by their own interests which were aimed at penetration into this region as one of great strategic importance. Such a policy is, of course, in complete contradiction to the real interests of the Kashmir people who are striving towards a peaceful and constructive eXistence and have no desire to be the plaything of imperialist States. 84. It was natural that~ in an effort to put an end to the uncertainty of their position and to stabilize the political situation, the Kashmir people ~hould, in 1951, have elected a Constituent Assembly which adopted a series of important laws 'including that of February 1954 confirming the union of the State of Jammu and Kashmir with India. On 17 November 1956, the Kashmir Constituent Assembly adopted the State Constitution according to which the state would enjoy the right of self-government within the Republic of India. The Kashmir question was thus settled by the Kashmir people themselves who consider themselves to be an inalienable part of the Republic of India. The Security Council cannot disregard these facts. 85. The delegation of the SovietUnionfeels compelled to observe that the draft resolution submitted by the delegations of the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Colombia and Cuba actually fails to take account of the real situation in Kashmir and to some extent casts doubt on the fact that the Kashmir question has already been settled in accordance with the expressed wishes of the Kashmir people themselves. 86. The draft resolution before us is based on the Security Council resolution ,_'f 3,0 March 1951. You may remember that, even t,. .>'\., the Soviet Union opr~glement de la question du Cachemire grace a. un accoz:d direct entre les parties, mais sur la pr~para­ tion d'un pl~biscite comportant une surveillance etune ing~rence ext~rieures. 83. Dans la questionduCachemire, l'Unionsovi~tique ne s'est jamais d~partie de son attitude impartiale et objective, conforme aux principes de lad~mocratie et du renforcement des relations amicales entre les peuples de la r~gion. La question du Cachemire n'a pas ~t~ soulev~e par le peuplecachemirienlui-meme. EUe a ~M pos~e, il y apr~s de neuf ans, par certaines puissances qui font tout pour semer la discorde entre les p'ays qui luttent pour leur ind~pendancenationale et. leur libert~. A l'~gard de la question du Cachemire, l'attitude de ces puissances n'«:!tait nullement dict~e par le souci de r~soudre ce probl~me conform~ment aux int~rets du peuple cachemirien et des peuples de l'lnde et du Pakistan. Ces puissances songaient avant tout a. leurs inMrets propres, qui les pousstmt a. pen~trer dans cette region de grande importance strategique. 11 est ~vident qu'une telle politique est absolument contraire aux interets veritables du peuple cachemirien, qui aspire a. mener une vie paisible et constructive et n'a nul d~sir d'etre un pion sur l'echiquier des Etats imperialistes. 84. Souhaitant, tout naturellement, mettre fin a. l'indetermination de son statut et stabiliser la situation politique, le peuple cachemirien a ~lu, en 1951, une Assemblee constituante, laquelle a adopM une serie de lois importantes, notamment celle de fevrier 1954, qui a confirme le rattachement de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire a. l'lnde. Le 17 novembre 1956, l'Assemblee constituante du Cachemire a adopM une Constitution qui doit permettre a. cet Etat de jouir de l'autonomie dans le cadre de la Republique indienne. Ainsi, la question du Cachemire a eM resolue par le peuple cachemirien lui-meme, qui se considere comme partie inh~grante de la Republique indienne. Le Conseil de securite ne saurait manquerde tenir compte de ces faits. 85. En ce qui concerne le projet de resolution presente par les delegations du Royaume-Uni, des Etats- Unis d'Amerique, de l'Australie, de l;l. Colombie et de CUba, la d~Iegation de l'Union sovi~tique doit relever que ce projet ne tient pas compte de la situation reelle au Cachemire et que, dans une certaine mesure, 11 met en doute le fait que la question du Cachemire a deja. et~ regIee conformement a. la volonte exprimee par le peuple cachemirienlui-meme. 86. Le projet s'inspire de la resolution du Conseil de securite en date du 30 mars 1951. On sait qu'a. l'epoque l'Union sovietique etait deja. defavorable a 87. The delegation of the Soviet Union sees no particular use in adopting a further resolution to which one of the parties to the dispute is opposed. It is this consideration which is determining the Soviet Union delegation's attitude to the draft resolution before the Council. 88. With regard to the disagreements still existing between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir question, they should, in our view, finally be settled by peaceful negotiation between the two sides, without outside interference. The Security Council, for'its part, should facilitate the conclusion of a peaceful settlement of this question and should urge the two sides to settle outstanding disagreements through bilateral negotiations.

For several reasons my delegation would have liked to make on this occasion a statement on the substance of the matter, to express our position regarding the Kashmir dispute. We believe that such a statement is necessary because of the special position of Iraq in relation to India and Pakistan, two countries with whom we have close and friendly ties, past and present, ties of a historical, economic and religious character. Furthermore, Iraq is taking part for the first time in a discussion on the Kashmir question, which has been pending for the last nine years, and for this reason we thought it would be appropriate to make our opinionknown to the two countries concerned and to otherswho have special interests in the future of Kashmir. 90. In view of the recent developments in connexion with the step taken by the Srinagar Constituent Assembly regarding the integration ofKashmir into India on 26 January 1957, however, we have decided to postpone our statement to a future meeting, as we feel that it is extremely essential for certain preliminary decisions to be arrived at today to reaffirmthe Council's previous decisions regarding the basis and methods for deciding the future of the people of Kashmir. 91. We consider that the previous decisions of the Council were in conformity with the principles of the Charter. After hearing the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan, we are inclined to believe that the issue remains basically the same as it was when it was dealt with for the last time in 1952. We find that the draft resolution submitted by the five Powers meets the immediate requirem.ents of the present situation, as the last paragraph of that resolution keeps the question under consideration by the Council and we feel sure that this will assist the Council to find a peaceful and lasting solution of the dispute. 87. La delegation de l'Union sovietique ne voit guere a. quoi pourrait servir l'adoption d'une nouvelIe resolution qui est repoussee par l'une des parties. C'est en fonction de ces considerations que la delegation sovietique se prononcera sur le projet de resolution soumis au Conseil. 88. A notre avis, les divergences de vues qui subsistent entre l'Ind,e et le Pakistan au sujet du Cachemire doivent etre reglees definitivement etpacifiquement, par voie de negociations entre les deux parties et sans intervention etrangere. De son cote le Conseil de securite doit faciliter le reglement pacifique de cette question; il devrait donc recommander aux parties de regler leurs divergences grace's a des negociations bilaterales. 89. M. JAWAD (Irak) [traduit de l'anglais]: Ma del~~ gation aurait voulu, pour plusieurs raisons, faire une declaration sur le fond du probleme et fixer sa position concernant le Cachemire. Nous estimons necessaire de faire cette declaration en raison de la position particuliere de l'Irak vis-a.-vis de l'Inde et du Pakistan, deux pays avec lesquels nous toujour entretenu des relations etroites d'amitie et auxquels nous rattachent des liens historiques, economiques et religieux. D'autre part, l'Irak participe pour la premiere f<;>is a la discussion de la question du Cachemire, qui est pendante depuis neuf ans, Pour cette r~ison, nous avons pense qu'll serait approprie de faire connaitre notre opinion aux deux parties en cause et aux autres pays qu'interesse particulierement le sort du Cach,emire. 90. Toutefois, etant donne les mesures recantes prises par l'AssembMe constituante de Srinagar au sujet du rattachement du Cachemire a l'Inde, le 26 janvier 1957, nous avons decide de remettre a une seance ulterieure la declaration que nous nous proposions de faire, car nous jugeons indispensable, en vue des decisions preliminaires qui doivent etre prises aujourd'hui, de reaffirmer les precedentes decisions du Conseil sur les principes a adopter et la methode a suivre pour decider de l'avenir des populations du Cachemire. 91. Nous considerons que les precMentes decisions du Conseil sont conformes aux principes delaCharte. Apres avoir entendu le representant de l'Inde et le representant du Pakistan, nous sommes portes a croire que la question en est a peu pres au meme point que lorsque le Conseill'a examinee la derniere fois, en 1952. Nous pensons que le projet de resolution des cinq puissances prevoit les mesures immediates qu'appelle la situation, puisque, selon le dernier alinea de ce projet, le Conseil reste saisi de la question. Nous sommes certains que cette mesure permettra au Conseil de trouver une solution pacifique et durable au differend. 94. In that spirit the French delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by Australia, Colombia, Cuba, the United Kingdom and the United states, while reserving the right to speak again later on the substance of the question. 95. The PRESIDENT: I shall now speak astherepresentative of the PHILIPPINES. 96. My Government has approached the question now before the Security Council with the utmost sympathy towards the two nations, for which we entertain the friendliest of feelings. The Philippines is notdeciding this matter in favour of one nation against another. We are not taking sides. We are not, in fact, sitting as if in judgement of a case. We have not the least desire to see the matter aggravated by an exa~erba­ tion of misgivings which can but lead to a possible breach of the peace. 97. We have noted at the outset of the negotiations between India and Pakistan a commendable disposition on the part of both to make things easier for them to come to terms. We have hoped sincerely, and will continue, to hope, that the original spirit of mutual concession would preVail throughout the negotiations in the interests of the peace and welfare of both nations, towards which, I reiterate, the Philippines has nothing but the utmost good will. My Government believes with the United Nations representative for India and Pakistan that direct negotiations may pave the way towards the definitive solution of the nineyear-old dispute between the two countries. 98. This is not to belittle the achievement of Mr. Frank Graham and his predecessors, whose efforts at mediation have considerably narrowed down the area of disagreement between the parties on the question of demilitarization. As a matter of fact, the last resolution adopted by the Security Council on 23December 1952 [S/2883] urged the parties to enter into immediate negotiations in order to agree on the remaining issue, namely the specific number of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line. The fifth report of Mr. Graham, dated 27 March 1953 [S/2967], would seem to imply that perhaps agreement wouldbe forthcoming if one or the other of the parties were Willing to make greater concessions than he would be entitled to ask objectively in his capacity as mediator. 94. La del~gation fran~aise votera donc, dans cet esprit, en faveur du projet de resolution presente par l'Australie, la Colombie, Cuba, les Etats-Unis et le Royaume-Uni, en se reservant d'intervenir sur le fond de la question dans la suite du debate 95. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je prends mairitenant la parole en qualite de representant des PHILIPPINES. 96. Mon gouvernement aborde la question actuellement soumise au Conseil de securite avec laplus vive sympathie pour les deux pays interesses, avec lesquels nous entretenons des relations tr~s amicales. Le Gouvernement des Phillippines n'entendpas donner raison al'un ou al'autre. Nousnevoulons pas prendre partie. Nous ne sommes pas ici pour rendre un verdict et nous n'avons nulle envie de voir la question envenimee par une m~fiance exacerbee qui ne pourrait que faire craindre une rupture de la paix. 97. Nous constatons que lorsque les negociations se sont engagees entre l'Inde et le Pakistan, les deux parties se sont montrees disposees a faciliter le r~glement de leur differend, ce dont il convient de les feliciter. Nous avons espere sinc~rementet c'est toujours notre espoir - que ce desir de ,concessions mutuelles prevaudrait au cours des negociations, dans Pinteret de la paix et du bien-etre des deux pays, a Pegard desquels, je le rep~te,les Philippines n'eprouvent que de l'amitie. Mon gouvernement estime, comme le repr~sentant des Nations Unies pour PInde et le Pakistan, que des negociations directes peuvent ouvrir la voie a une solution definitive du conflit qui oppose les deux pays depuis neuf ans. 98. Je ne voudrais pas minimiser les resultats obtenus par M. Frank Graham et ses predecesseurs, dont les efforts de mMiation ontpermis de restreindre considerablement le champ du desaccord 'entre les deux parties sur la question de la demilitarisation. En fait, dans la derni~re resolution qu'il a adoptee au sujet du Cachemire, le 23 decembre 1952 [8/2883], le Conseil de securit~ a invite instamment les parties a. entamer immMiatement des negociations afin de parvenir a. un accord sur la question encore en suspens, a. savoir les effectifs precis des forces armees a maintenir des deux cote de la ligne de suspension d'armes. Selon le cinquieme rapport de M. Graham, du 27 mars 1953 [S/2967], il semblait qu'un accord flit possible si Pune ou l'autre des parties se montrait disposee a faire des concessions plus larges 100. My Government is at a loss to accept either conclusion in the face of the claimputforward by each party that it has done~ is doing, or will do, its best to achieve agreement. 101. Incidentally, may I say at this juncture that the distinguished representatives ofIndia and Pakistan who addressed the Council have given a good account of themselves in the presentation of their respective sides. Th~ Foreign Minister of Pakistan, with his sobriety and moderation, has shown himself to be an able spokesman of his country. Mr. V. K. Krishna Menon, whom I have known for many years, has once more demonstrated his keen mind, his dialectic skill and his unsurpassed argumentative power. 102. The joint· communiqu~ issued by the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan' at the end of their meeting in Delhi on 20 August 1953 was a distinct step forward, not merely in its reiteration of the principle of ascertaining the wishes of the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir through a fair and impartial plebiscite and in the decision to have the Plebiscite Administrator appointed by the end ofApril 1954, but in the common determination to resolve before that date the preliminary issues that had hitherto blocked progress towards the holding of aplebiscite. .That the promise ofthis auspicious agreement between the two Prime Ministers was not fulfilled is to be regretted. It is not for me to say which party is to blame, as I have already stated that the Philippines is not deciding this issue in favour of one nation against another. Rather it is for me to express the hope that the good will and the spirit ofconciliationthat brought about the agreement-and indeed that brought about previous agreements-could again be invoked. 103. It is worthwhile to recall that the basic resolution of the United Nations Commission of 5 January 1949 [8/1196, para. 15] merely incorporated the proposals governing the cessation of hostilities which were explored in conversations betweenthe representatives of India and Pakistan, and later accepted by their respective Gove;~nments. Perhaps another attempt at direct conversations on the ministerial level between the two parties is in order. Or perhaps the experts committees brought into being by the joint communiqu~ of 20 August 1953, which had covered considerable ground in studying the thorny problem of demilitarization, could be reactivated, 104. It is gratifying to note from the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan that their cot~, le repr~sentantde l'lnde parait laisser entendre qu'll n'est plus possible d' envisager un accord de treve, les conditions n~cessaires ne pouvant d~sormais plus etre remplies. 100. Mon gouvernement a vraiment de la peine a choisir entre ces deux theses, chaque partie affirmant qu'elle a fait, fait et fera tous ses efforts pour arriver II une entente. 101. Me sera-t-ll permis de dire II cette occasion que les distingues repr~sentants de l'lnde et du Pakistan qui ont pris la parole devant le Conseil ont present~ leur these respective avec un talent remarquable. Par sa sobriete et sa mod~ratlon, le Ministre des affaires ~trangeres du Pakistan s'est montre le digne porte-parole de son pays. M. V. K. Krishna Menon, que je connais depuis de nombreuses annees, a montr~ une fois de plus sa vivacite d'esprit, Son habilete dialectique et son extraordinaire don d'argumentation. 102. .Le communiqu~ publie conjointement par les Premiers Ministres de l'Inde et du Pakistan llla fin de leur entrevue de Delhi, le 20 aoiit 1953, marquait un net progres: non seulement il posait de nouveau le principe qu'il fallait d~terminerles aspirations de la population de 1'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire au moyen d'un plebiscite loyal et impartial et annon~ait que l'Adminstrateur du plebiscite devrait etrenomm~ avant la fin d'avril 1954, mais encore il affirmait la volonte commune aux deux parties de resoudre avant cette date les questions pr~liminaires qui avaient jusque-lll empecM l'organisation d'''l"\ plebiscite. 11 faut deplorer que cet accord de bon augure entre ies deux Premiers Ministres n'ait pas tenu ses promesses. n ne m'appartient pas de dire sur quelle partie il convient d'en rejeter le blame, car, je l'ai dejll dit, les Philippines n'entendent pas donner raison a Pun des deux pays aux d~pens de 1'.autre. n m1appartient plutot d'exprimer l'espoir que 1'on peut encore faire appel II la bonne volonte et II l'esprit de conciliation qui avaient permis d'arriver audit accord - et qui, II vrai dire, ~taient II l'origine des accords precedents. 103. n n'es pas inutile de rappeler que la r~solution essentielle adoptee par la Commission des Nations le 5 janvier 1949 [8/1196, par. 15] se bor 1ait II reprendre les propositions, concernant la cessation des hostilit~s, qui avaient lite etudiees au cours de conversations entre les representants de l'lnde et du Pakistan et ensuite acceptees par leurs gouvernements respectifs. Peut-etre y aurait-illieu d'essayer de reprendre les conversations directes, lll'~chelon des ministres, entre les deux parties. Dubien encore, peut-etre pourrait-on ressusciter les comites d'expertscrees II la suite du communique commun du 20 aoiit 1953 et qui avaientbeaucoup fait pour resoudre le delicat probleme de la demilitarisation. 104. n est r~confortantde noter, d'apres les d~cla­ rations des representants de l'lnde et du Pakistan, 105. Under the Circumstances, my Government entertains the hope that continued and persistent attempts at negotiation between India and Pakistan on the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir cannot but be crowned with eventual success. The recent trade agreement signed by the two countries, so aptly underscored here by the representative of India, is an encouraging sign that they could come together and agree on a satisfactory solution of commOll problems. 106. It may have been the original intention of India to seize the Security Council not of a dispute but of a situation which might, by its continuance, endanger the maintenance of peace and security. However, the subsequent filing of a counter-complaint by Pakistan has converted the situation into a dispute within the meaning of the Charter. This is affirmed in the resolution of the Council of 21 April 1948 [S/726], in which it is stated "that the continuation of the dispute is likely to endanger international peace and security". 107. There is, however, a. disturbing element that has been drawn into the picture which may wreck all prospects of peaceful negotiation or peaceful settlement of the dispute. I refer to the allegation of Pakistan that on Saturday, 26 January, the constitutional step will be taken to integrate the State of Jammu and Kashmir formally into India. The representative of India, on the other hand, states that nothing of the sort is going to happen on 26 January, and that the critical date, if there was one, was 17 November 1956 when certain provisions of the State Constitution took effect, among them, section 3, which states that "The State of Jammu and Kashmir is and shall be an integral part of the Union of India". In view of these two conflicting statements, we have the draft resolution sponsored by five Powers before the Council [S/3778]. 108. Ever since the Security Council was seized of the dispute, it has repeatedly called upon the parties to refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation or which would likely prejudice a just and peaceful settlement of the dispute. 109. On the particular question of the convening of a Constituent Assembly as recommended by the All- Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, which was the subject of a previous complaint by Pakistan, the representative of India gave his solemn assu"rance that the Constituent Assembly was not intended to prejudice the issues before the Security Council or to come in its way, and that while the Constituent Assembly might, if it so desired, express an opinion on the question of accession, it could take no decision on it. 105. Dans ces conditions, mon gouvernement garde l'espoir que, si l'Inde et le Pakistan continuent inlassablement a. essayer de regler par des negociations l'avenir de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire, leurs efforts ne peuvent manquer d'etre finalement couronnes de succ~s. Comme l'a si justement souligne le representant de 1'Inde, le fait que les deux pays ont recemment" conclu un accord commercial est encourageant et montre qu'ils peuvent fort bien s'entendre pour apporter une solution satisfaisante aux probl~mes qui leur sont communs. 106. Il se peut que l'Inde ait eu primitivement l'intention de saisir le Conseil de securite non pas d'un differend, mais d'une situation qui, si elIe se prolongerait risquait de porteratteinteUapaixet a. la securite. Toutefois, le Pakistan ayant ensuitepresenteune contre-accusation, il s'est dorenavant agi d'un differend au sens oil l'entend la Charte. C'est ce que souligne la resolution du Conseil en date du 21 avrll 1948 [8/726], oil il est dit "que la continuation du differend risque de mettre endanger lapaix etla securite internationales". 107. Notre attention a toutefois ete attiree sur un nouvel et inquietant element qui peut compromettre toutes les perspectives de negociation ou de r~gle­ ment pacifique du differend. Je veux parler de l'allegation du Pakistan selon laquelle, le samedi 26 janvier, l'Assemblee constituante proclamerait le rattachement a l'Inde de l'Etat de Jammu. et Cachemire. Le representant de l'Inde declare, d'autre part, que rien de ce genre ne va se passeI' le 26 jil.l\vier, et que la date critique - a supposeI' qu'il y en ait une - serait le 17 novembre 1956, Oll certaines dispositions de la Constitution de l'Etat sont entrees en vigueur, par exemple l'article 3, aux termes duquel "l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire est et sera partie integrante de l'Union indienne". En raison de ces deux declarations contradictoires, le Conseil est saisi du projet de resolution des cinq puissances [8/3778]. 108. Depuis que le Conseil de securite a ete saisi du differend, il n'a cesse de dem~mder a chaque partie de s'abstenir de toute action qui pourrait aggraver la situation ou qui serait de nature a faire obstacle a un r~glement juste et pacifique du differend. 109. Quant a la reunion d'une Assemblee constituante, recommandee par la Conference nationale de l'ensemble de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire, qui a precedemment provoque une plainte du Pakistan, le representant de l'Inde a solennellement assure que l'objet de l'Assemblee constituante n'etait pas de placer le Conseil de securite devant un fait accompli ou de gener en rien son action, et que, s'iI etait exact que J.'Assemblee constituante pourrait, si bon lui semblait, exprimer une opinion sur la question du rattachement "...the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations." [S/2017/ Rev.1.] 111. Again, on 29 May 1951, at its 548thmeeting, the Council approved a message to India and Pakistan which noted with satisfaction the assurances given by the representative of India and stated that it was the sense of the Council that the reports contained in the communications from Pakistan, if correct, would involve procedures in conflict with the commitments of the parties to determine the future accession of Jammu and Kashmir by a fair and impartial plebiscite con" ducted under the auspices of the United Nations [548th meeting, para. 89]. 112. I am sure that it would be well to reiterate the considered view of the Security Council on the matter so that there may be no misunderstanding as to its position. That view remains valid even if it is found that the Constituent Assembly had its origins much earlier than the request for its convocation by the General Council of the All-Jammu and Kashmir National Conference. It is for this reason thatthe Philippines supports and will vote in favour of the five- Power draft resolution. 113. I do not consider a vote in favour of the draft resolution as a vote against India for the simple reason that it is merely a reiteration of previous resohtions of the Security Council. And I have the highest respect for this august body so that I would not accuse it of bias whenever it approved any resolution which a party might consider adverse to its interests. 114. In all earnestness I would urge the parties to respect the standing resolutions of the Council, which have not been repe'aled or modified and are, therefore, as valid today as when they were adopted many years ago. 115. Those are the views of the Philippines on this question which has been before this body for quite a time. They have been, I submit, delivered here in the hope that they will help clarify the doubts over the facts of the issue and help this Council arrive at a clear appraisal of the dispute for the sake of a permanent settlement. l It ••• le sort d~finitif de l'Etat de Jammu etCache" mire dolt atre decide conformement a la volonte des populations, exprimee au moyen de laprocedure del.'l'.0cratique d'un plebiscite libre et impartial tenu sous l'egide des Nations Uniest!. [S/2017/Rev.1.] 111. A nouveau, le 29 mal 1951, a. sa548~me seance, le Conseil de securiM a approuve le texte d'un message a l'lnde et au Pakistan aux termes duquel il notait avec satisfaction les assurances donnees par le rePresentant de l'lnde et estimait qu'il ressortait des informations contenues dans les communications du Pakistan, si elles etaient exacte's, que les mesures prevues etaient en contradiction ayec l'engagement pris par les parties de determiner le rattachement futur de Jammu et Cachemire au moyen d'un plebiscite equitable et impartial, sous les auspices des Nations ynies [548~me seance, par. 89]. 112. Je suis certain qu'il seraitban de reit~rerl'opinion Iilurement reflechie du Conseil de s~curite en la mati~re, afin qu'il n'y ait aucun malentendu quant a sa position. Cette opinion reste valable mame s'il est ~tabli que l'origine de l'Assemblee constituante est bien anterieure a la demande de convocation par le Conseil general de la, Conference nationale de l'ensemble de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire. C'est pour cette raison que les Philippines appuient le projet de resolution des cinq puissances et voteront en sa faveur. 113. Je n'estime pas qu'en votant pour ce projet de resolution on vote contre l'Inde, et la raison en est simple: ce texte ne fait que reprendre des resolutions anterieures du Conseil de securiM. J'ai le plus grand respect pour le Conseil, de sorte que je ne l'accuserai pas de partialite lorsqu'il adopte une resolution que l'une des parties peut considerer comme contraire a. ses interets. 114. J'invite instamment les parties a respecter les resolutions anterieures du Conseil, qui, n'ayant eM ni annulees ni modifiees, sont aussi valables aujourd'hui qu'elles l'etaient au moment de leur adoption, il y a de nombreuses annees. 115. Telle est l'opinion de la delegation philippine sur cette question, dont le Conseil de securite est saisi depuis assez longtemps. Je viens de l'exprimer avec l'espoir qu'elle contribuera a. bien preciser les faits et qu'elle aidera le Conseil a. se faire une idee claire du differend, en vue d'un r~glement durable.

The representative of India has asked to speak. 118. Mr. Krishna MENON (India): In conformity with previous practice of the representatives of my Government before this CounCil, I ask for permission, as I am entitled to do Imder the Charter, to offer my observations on the present state of proceedings before this Council. 119. I would like to preface my remarks by saying tilat one would consider that tile purpose of speaking in an assembly of this kind is twofold. Sometimes tile two purposes work togetiler, sometimes one alone is possible. One purpose is to try and persuade your listeners in order tilat they might come to a judgement that is in conformity with tile facts as one sees them. The other is for tile purpose of registering a position so that at least at some future time, when considerations of a different character appear, the position will have been stated for the record. In the past my Government has not paid adequate attention to tllis because, as has been repeatedly Said, our overwhelming consideration at that time was, without being punctilious, to find a settlement. Obviously, in this hard world that kind of tlling has its penalties. 120. So far as the present situation is concerned, we have no right to pronounce on the draft resolution before the CounCil. It is the Council's resolution. It does not bind us. In fact, I suppose some day it will be communicated to the Government of India, which will in turn, in the normal course of business, communicate it to the Government of Kashmir and to the newspapers in India, because it is not a resolution in which we have participated. The Security Council invited us to present our views, and in the normal cou,rse of business one would have thought that a resohtion on tllis subject would take into account the presentation that has to be made by the parties which are called before the Security Council. That was the intention of the Charter. 121. I have no desire to raise unnecessary controversies, but the first draft of the draft resolution was in my hands before I had not only not finished speaking, but in the forenoon of yesterday. The alterations that have been made are alterations which are more convenient and suitable to the other side. Therefore, any suggestion that I had stated my case on the Constituent Assembly and all they wanted to know had been made known, has not been borne out by facts. 122. I will not refer to private discussions, but I ~ ce diff6rend font preuve de tol~rance, mon gouvernement est certain qu'elles ne pourront manquer d'arriver a une solution qui leur donne mutuellement satisfaction et soit conforme a l'int6ret v6rltable de la population du Jammu et Cachemire. 117. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je donne la parole au repr6sentant de l'lnde. 118. M. Krishna MENON (Inde) [traduit del'anglais]: Comme les pr6c6dents repr6sentants de l'lnde au Conseil, je demande l'autorisation, en vertu de la Charte, de presenter mes observations sur l'etat actuel des d6liMrations du Consei!. 119. Je voudrais d'abord dire que les raisons d'une intervention devant un organe comme le Conseil peuvent etre de delL't ordres, et ne jouent pas toujours simultanement. Dans un cas, il s'agit d'essayer de convaincre ses auditeurs afin qu'ils portent un jugement conforme aux faits tels qu'on les voit sOi-meme. Dans l'autre cas, il s'agit de bien faire connaitre'sa position, de fa<;on du moins qu'ult~rieurement,10rsque surgissent des consid~rationsd'un ordre diff6rent, on puisse se reporter II un texte oil. cette position est consignee. Par le pass~, mon gouvernement n'a pas accord~a ce fait une attention suffisante, car, comme cela a ~t~ dit II plusieurs reprises, notre preoccupation dominante ~tait alors de trouver un mode de r~glement, sans nous occuper des d6tails. Evidemment, ceUe attitude, dans un monde si duI', n'est pas sans inconv~nient. 120. Pour ce qui est de la situation actuelle, nous n'avons pas le droit de nous pro"mcer sur le projet de r~solution dont le Conseil est ,saisi. C'est une r~solution du Consei!. Elle ne nous lie pas. En fait, je suppose qu'un jour elle sera communiquee au Gouvernement indien, qui la communiqnera a SOn tour, suivant la procedure normale, au Gouvernement du Cachemire et a la presse indiemle, car il ne s'agit pas d'une r~solution II la mise au point de laquelle nous ayons particip~. Le Conseil de securit~ nous a invit~s a exposer notre opinion, et on aurait pu penser que, normalement, une resolution sur cette question aurait tenu compte des observations que doivent presenter les parties appe16es a comparaitre devant le Conseil de securite. Tel ~tait l'esprit de la Charte. 121. Je n'ai aucun d~sirdesouleverdesconttoverses superflues, mais je tiens a signaler que la premi~re version du projet de r6s01ution ~tait entre mes mains non seulement avant que j'aie fini de parler, mais des hier matin. Les modifications qui y ont eM apportees sont toutes favorableslll'autrepartie. Parcons~quent, les faits ne permeUent pas de dire que j'avais expos,~ mon point de vue sur l'Assemblee constituante et donn~ toutes les pr~cisions souhait~es. 122. Sans vouloir me r6f~rer II des discussions pri- "I must confess that the atmosphere of crisis has been created, or some sort of D-Day or zero hour, for 26 January. But whatever may be the background which we are able to wlderstand, we have the duty to point out what the facts are, and I have therefore decided to change the arrangement of my presentation" [763rd meeting, para. 79]-in order to show that there was not any kind of crisis or anything of that kind. Then I said the following at the end of the meeting, which the Council may well remember: "I do not think I would be able to finish my statement in another hour. It will probably take two to two and a half hours, even if I condense everything. The whole of the argument in this case remains." [Ibid., para. 205.] 123. No one can possibly comfort his conscience in i.Ms matter by thinking that the first paragraph of this resolution represents the facts when it says: "Having heard statements from representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan concerning the dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir". 124. While we are not in a position, nor do we desire, to move any amendments, alterations or anything of that kind, I would not want itto be thought in my country that I have not pointed out when this resolution was hatched and when it came out. 125. Before I go further, I should also like to enter the objections of my Government to certain statements in the Australian submission before the Security Council. I have already elaborated them in my previous statements and I do not wish to take the time of the Council any further with them. This also applies to one other statement made in the Council: we are unable to agree to the two last sentences of the penultimate paragraph of the statement made by the representative of the United States [para. 50 above]. Those are specific matters to which I want to draw attention. 126. It has been put out that we are only reaffirming something and therefore are not doing anything new. With all respect, I should like to ask: since the whole burden of this argument was the reaffirmation, was a new decision-ignoring all those facts which had been presented during the eight hours-necessary? If you come to a decision then you must reaffirm, you have decided on merits. 127. Therefore, while the Security Council, or those who sponsored this resolution or support it, can take that View, I submit that I am unable to take it. What is more, I have the responsibility to let the people and Government of India lmow that I have said in this Council that this resolution only takes care to remind us of those resolutions of the Security Council which ph~re de crise autour du 26 janvier, dont on a fait une sorte de jour J, d'heure H. Mais, quelque id~e que nous ayons sur l'origine de cet ~tat de choses, nous avons le devoir d'exposer les faits, etj'ai donc decide de modifier l'ordre de mon intervention" [763~me seance, par. 79] - pour montrer qu'il n'existe aucune crise de ce genre. Puis, a. la fin de la seance, j'ai dit ceci, dont le Conseil se souviendra peut-etre: "Je ne crois pas que je puisse terminer Ula d~cla­ ration en une heure. Il me faudra probablement encore deux heures on deux heures et demie, meme si je resume au maximum. Toute l'argumentation reste a. exposer." [Ibid., par. 205.] 123. Personne ne peut tranquilliser sa conscience dans cette affaire en pensant que le premier alin~a de ce projet de r~solutiontraduit fidi'Hement les faits quand il dit: "Ayant entendu des exposes des representants des Gouvernements de l'lnde et du Pakistan au sujet du differend concernantl'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire". 124. Nous ne sommes pas en mesure, et nous ne desirons d'ailleurs pas le faire, de presenter des amendements ou des modifications quelconques, mais je ne voudrais pas que l'on pense dans mon pays que je n'ai pas souligne le moment ou ce projet de resolution a ete elabore et le moment OU il a ete publie. 125. Avant de poursuivre, je voudrais egalement signaler que le Gouvernement indien n'approuve pas certains passages de l'intervention que le repr~sen­ tant de l'AustralieafaitedevantleConseilde s~curite. J'ai deja precise ces objections dans mes precedentes interventions et je ne voudrais pas, enm'etendant davantage, retarder les travaux du Conseil. Il en est de meme en ce qui concerne une autre intervention: nous ne pouvons pas accepter les deux derniE)res phrases de l'avant-dernier alinea de la declaration qu'a faite le repr~sentantdes Etats-Unis [par. 50 ci-dessus]. Ce sont la des points pr~cis sur lesquels je desire appeler l'attention du Consei!. 126. On a dit que le Conseil se bornait a reaffirmer, et par consequent n'innovait en rien. Mais alors je pose la question suivante: puisqu'il ne s'agissait que de reaffirmer, fallait-il prendre une nouvelle decision, se prononcer en somme sur le fond, sans tenir compte des faits exposes dans un discours qui a dure hutt heures? 127. Les membres du Conseil de securite, ou les auteurs de ce projet de resolution, ou encore ceux qui lui donnent leur adhesion, peuvent adopter cette attitude, mais il n'en est pas de meme pour moi. Responsable devant le peuple et le gouvernement de 1'Inde, je dois leur faire savoir que j'aibien dit devant le Conseil que ce projet de resolution se borne a 128. There are people who are likely to ask: has the Security Council no concern about the other principles it affirmed-that there should be no aggressions, there should be no changing of the conditions that existed in the country, of annexations, of affiliations? The Security Council appears to be willing to sit long hours, even at night, in order to register its objections to what may appear in a Constitution, on the ground that ;t changes the eXisting status. But my people would enquire: why not at least equal anxiety in regard to other matters that change the status? Why was not the Security Council concerned about the incorporation of a part of Kashmir into Pakistan by the Pakistan Constitution'l Why is the Security Council not equally concerned about the annexation of these territories, about the militarization of them, about the threats of war made in this room? 129. I say all this not because you will change the resolution, because it was quite obvious that, long before you had even called upon me to speak, on 16 January, the representatives of the United Kingdom and Australia had expressed their views as to what they would do. I referred to that i.. my opening statement yesterday. 130. These situations do produce some strange spectacles, on which I am entitled to comment because they are political matters. Here we have the representative of Her Britannic Majesty challenging an act of a legislature which has received the royal assent. This is a very unusual procedure. And we are acting in terms of an act of the legislature which received at that time-fortunately for us-the royal assent, and not after the termination of monarchy inIndia. Therefore, in doing what is being done, those people who are connected with those matters are not only challenging. us but challenging their common law-because they have no constitutional law-their statutes, their tradition, and the power of the royal seal on a bill. 131. Now we go further and look at what the Commission says-and I am not going to make a long statement. The Commission said (and I did not say this)-but why the resolution passed eight years ago should have such significance, whilethe investigations bl~me. Le repr~sentantde l'Australie nous a dit qu'il n'avait pas 61ucid~ un certain nombre de questions,. mais cela ne l'a pas empech~ d'aboutir a. une conclusion. A ce propos, on se demandera vralsemblablement dans l'Inde s'il est n6cessaire de r~affirmer ce qui est consid~r6, du moins implicitement dans certaines des d~clarations qui ont et6 faites - Anotre avis, de faC$0n erron~e - comme un principe reconnu. 128. On entendra sans doute poser les questions suivantes: le Conseil de s6curite ne se soucie-t-il pas des autres principes qu'il a affirm~s - a savoir qu'i~ ne doit V avoir aucune agression, qu'il ne doit y avoir aucune modification de la situation existant dans un pays, qu'il ne doit y avoir aucune annexion ou affiliation? Le Conseil de s~curit~ semble tout dispos~ a si~ger de longues heures, et mame la nuit, pour faire connaitre ses objections a certaines dispositions d'une Constitution, auxquelles il reproche de modifier le statut existant. Mais le peuple indien voudra savoir pourquoi le Conseil de s~curite ne se pr~occupepas au moins autant des autres facteurs qui sont de nature a. modifier ledit statuto nvoudra savoir pourquoi-le Conseil de securit~ ne s'est pas soucie de 1'incorporation d'une partie duCachemire au Pakistan, qui a eu lieu aux termes de la Constitution pakistanaise, ou pourquoi le Conseil de s~curit~ ne s'est pas ~galement pr~occupe de l'annexion de ces territoires, de leur militarisation, et des menaces de guerre qui ont ~t~ prof~r~es dans cette salle. 129. Je ne dis pas cela en vue de vous faire modifier ce projet de r~solution, car il est ~vident que, longtemps avant que vous m'ayez donne la parole, le 16 janvier, les representants du Royaume-Uni et de l'Australie avalent exprim~ leurs intentions. J'ai mentionne le fait dans ma premi~re intervention d'hier. 130. On assiste ainsi a. d'etranges spectacles, que je peux me permettre de commenter, car il s'agit de questions politiques: voici le representant de Sa MajesM britannique qui conteste un acte legislatif qui a reC$u l'approbation royale. La chose est vraiment inhabituelle! Le Gouvernement indien se fonde sur un acte l~gislatif qui a reC$u l'approbation royale, a. l'~poque on le r~gimemonarchique ~tait en vigueur dans l'Inde et, heureusement pour nous, non apres la fin de ce regime dans notre pays. Par consequent, le representant du Royaume-Uni, en ~gissant comme il le fait, conteste non seulement le bien-fonde de notre action, mals aussi son "commonlaw" - puisque le Royaume-Uni n'a pas dedroitconstit'ltionnel - ses 101s, ses traditions, et l'autorite du sceau royal appose sur un document. 131.. Examinons maintenant ce que dit la Commission - et ici je serais bref. Apr~s tout, pourquoi la r~solution adoptee il y a huit ans devrait-elle avoir une telle importance, alo-rs que les conciusions reflechies des enquates (j.'une commission qui a 6te "In essence, the problem of the withdrawals lies in the fact that the sequence for the demilitarization of the State, as contained in the Commission's resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, is not adequate to solve the present situation. The situation in the State has changedj the resolutions remain unchanged." Y 132. And you gentlementoday have thrown to the winds the caution that is in this: the situation in the state has changedj the resolutions remainunchanged. With great respect, I say you go a step further and you make sure that your resolutions remain fossilized, because you reaffirm them, preserved for posterity. 133. Now I must go to the position in the second paragraph. I want to say to you again, for the purposes of the record: this paragraph lacks propriety in respect to the Head of the State of Kashmir, a member of the former ruling house. And I am again surprised that the representative of the United Kingdom should have put his name to it, because the Constituent Assembly in Kashmir did not emanate from the Jammu and Kashmir Conference. The Security Council is a body of the representatives of Sta.tes in the world and not of private organizations. The representative of the Government of India has placed before it the constitutional document that deals with the questionj then to affirm in the resolution that the ConstituentAssembly proceeds from some resolution passed by however important a body it is, which has no place either in the Constitution of India or in its constituent unit in Kashmir, is, I submit, a piece of impropriety. But we have no remedy, because you have the votes-I mean, the Council has the votes. 134. Therefore, I submit that this paragraph, in normal circumstances, is one that would not be passed by an assembly charged with this amount of dignity and this amount of deference to protocol. The Head of the State of Kashmir is entitled, in any case, to consideration as the Head of that State in the normal way. 135. Reference has been made to what my predeces- SOl', Sir Benegal Rau, said in this Council, and I should have thought that his statement was sufficient to prevent the Security Council from repeating its previous action because, while it may be purposeless to say so-because I have said it before-it is not the Constitution of Kashmir and the ConstituentAssemb1y of Kashmir that make Kashmir integrated, as you call it, that make it a part of India. It is the act of accession under the act of a legislature which received the royal assent in 1947. Therefore, this Constitution is not what makes any difference, and if the Council is not prepared to accept the statement of the Government of India in regard to this matter about which pr~voient les r~solutions de la Commission en date des 13 aoiit 1948 et 5 janvier 1949, n'est pas de nature aapporter une solution ll.la situationactuelle. La situation de l'Etat s'est modifi~ejles r~solutions demeurent inchang~esg;." 132. Le Conseil semble avoir oubli~ la prudence qui devait d~couler de ce fait: alol's que la situation dans l'Etat n'est plus ce qu'elle ~tait, ses r~solutions demeurent inchang~es. Je me permettrai d'ajouter que le Con8e11 semble aller plus loin: en reprenant ses propres r~solutions, il entend les faire passeI' a la post~rit~ sous leur forme surann~e. 133. Qilant au second alin~a, je tiens a souligner a nouveau qu'il ne t~moigne pas d'un respect suffisant ll. 1'~gard du chef de l'Etat du Cachemire, qui est membre de 1'ancienne famille r~gnante. Et, une fois encore, je m'~tonne que le repr~sentantdu Royaume- Uni soit 1'un des auteurs de ce texte. En effet, l'AssembMe constituante du Cachemire n'a pas dii son existence a la Conf~rence du Jammu et Cachemire. Le Conseil de s~curit~ groupe des repr~sentants d'Etats, et non pas d'organisations priv~es. Le repi-l~­ sentant du Gouvernement indien lui a communiqu§ le document constitutionnel qui a trait a la question. Et ensuite le Conseil va affirmer dans une r~solution que l'AssembMe constituante doit se r~Mrer a une r~solution adopt~e par un organe qui, si important soit-il, est enti~rement ~tranger a la Constitution' indienne comme au corps constituant au Cachemire: a mon avis, le proc~d~ est vraiment sigulier. Mais nous n'y pouvons rien: ~videmment, ce sont les membres du Conseil de s~curit~ qui votent. 134. Je pr~tends donc que, dans des circonstances normales, cet alin~a n'aurait pas ~M adopt~ par un organe aussi tenu de faire preuve de dignit~ et de respecter le protocole. Le chef de l'Etat de Cachemire a droit, en tout cas, aux ~gardsdus normalement aun chef d'Etat. 135. On a fait allusion ll. ce que mon pr~c~cesseur, sir Benegal Rau, a d~clar~ devant le Conseil, et j'aurais pens~ que sa declaration suffisaitpourempecher le Conseil de s~curit~ de r~affirmer ses r~so­ lutions pr~cMentes. Encore une fois - je ne sais s'il est utile de le r~p~ter - ce n'est ni la Constitution du Cachemire ni l'AssembMe constituante qui rattachent le Cachemire al'lnde. C'est l'instrument d'accession a l'Union indienne, qui a ~t~ adopt~ par un organe l~gislatifet qui a re~u 1'agr~ment royal en 1947. Par cons~quent, cette Constitution ne change rien, et, si le Conseil n'est pas pret a accepter 1'opinion du Gouvernement indien selon laquelle l'action de l'AssembMe cOllstituante d~coule de l'accession, c'est 2/ Proci~s-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securite. uatrieme annee. Supplement special No 7. document S 1430. par. 249. 137. I have heard a great many arguments in this building about domestic jurisdiction. I have myself on many occasions, on behalf of my Government, taken the view that very few people can take shelter under domestic jurisdiction. But that the Security Council intends to give instructions about the Constitution of another country is the meaning of this declaration, for if the Constitution of Kashmir has tobe interfered With, so has the Constitution of India. 138. Finally, I submit that the Constituent Assembly Act is what in law is called a declaratory act. It does not create anything; it simply affirms the existing state of affairs. And that is what Sir Benegal Rau told the Council. In fact, the ConstituentAssembly ofKashmir could not bind the Union of India. If the Constituent Assembly passed some provision which was inconsistent with the Act of the Union, then that would be ultra vires, and no question of binding the Security Council by a resolution passed by a subordinate legislature, '01' even a national legislature, would arise. 139. I should like to read what Sir Benegal Rau said" in 1951, which was six years ago, and my Government takes the view that in this case particularly, six years have changed a lot of things. At that time Sir Benegal Rau said: "In effect, therefore, the revised draft resolution continues to ignore the basic facts of the situation in Kashmir, and it includes provisionswhichwe have all along made amply clear that we cannot accept. For a peaceful settlement of the problem it is essential that a peaceful atmosphere should be created. The continuous and intensive propaganda in Pakistan for 'jehad', and the levelling of wild and baseless charges againstIndia, hardly provide a suitable background. Nor is the periodic re-agitation ofthe matter and the constant reopening of closed issues calculated to promote a peaceful settlement ofthe question. India desires peace above everything-peace for the world and peace with all its neighbours. But there can be no lasting peace which is not based on fairness and justice." [538th meeting, para. 22] r~solution vise non seulemenl l'Assembl~e constituante du Cachemire, mais aussi l'Etatindien, attendu que les dispositions prises par l'AssembH~e et contre lesquelles le Conseil met formellement en garde font partie de la Constitution indienne, a. laquelle elles ont ~t~ incorpor~es en 1954 envertud'unordre pr~si­ dentiel. Par cons~quent, le projet de r~solution dont le Conseil est saisi ne vise pas seulement la Constitution du Cachemire. Le Conseil de s~curiM indique a 1'Inde quelIe peut etre la teneur de sa Constitution et, si nous voulons respecter et appliquer ce projet de r~solution, nous serons surement oblig~s d'amendel' la Constitution indienne, le Conseil de s~curit~ nous l'a.yant demand~. 137. J'ai souvent entendu parler ici de juridiction interne. En maintes occasions, au nom de mon gouvernement, j'ai :r;noi-meme fait observer que tr~s rares sont les cas ou l'on peut s'abriter derri~re I'argument de la juridiction interne. Toutefois, en l'occurrence, le Conseil de s~curite entend donner ll. un pays des directives touchant sa Constitution; en effet, se meler de la Constitution du Cachemire, c'est aussi, n~cessairement,se meler de celle de l'lnde. 138. Enfin, je tiens que la 10isurl'Asssembl~econs­ tituante est ce qu'on appelle en droit un acte d~clara­ toire. Cette 101 ne cree rien, elie se borne a constater l'etat de choses existant. C'est ce qu'avait d~clar~ sir Benegal Rau au Conseil de securite. En fait, l'Assemblee constituante du Cachemire ne peut engager PUnion indienne. Si l'Assemblee constituante prenait des dispositions incompatibles avec l'acte constitutionnel de l'Union, elie outrepasserait ses pouvoirs, et il ne pourrait etre que!?tion de liar le Conseil de securite par une resolutio:p.adopt~eparune Assembl~e legislative secondaire ou meme par une Assembl~e nationale. 139. Je voudrais donner lecture d'un passage de la declaration faite en 1951 par sir Benegal Rau - et mon gouvernement estime au demeurant qu'en six ans, sp~cialement dans ce cas, bien des chases ont change. A cette epoque, sir BenegalRauavaitdeclare: "Ainsi, le .projet de resolution remanie ne tient toujours pas compte des elements essentiels de la situation au Cachemire, et il renferme des dispositions que nous ne saurions accepter, pour les raisons que nous avons amplement expos~es deja. Pour aboutir a un r~glement pacifique de la question, il est essentiel de Creel' une atmosph~re pacifique. La propagande intensive que le Pakistan m~ne de fac;on continue en faveur de la guerre et les accusations absolument d~nu~es de fondement que ce pays porte contre Plnde ne contribuent gu~re a cr~er un climat favorable. De meme, ce n'est pa~ en rouvrant p~riodiquementle d~bat et en revenant constamment sur des questions d~ja regl~es que lIon peut favoriser un r~glement pacifique de l'affaire. L'lnde d~sire par-dessus tout la paix, la paix pour le monde, la paix avec tous ses voisins. Mais il ne peut y avoir de paix durable si elie n'est fon- 141. I have no doubt that those who submitted this draft resolution were moved by the highest motives. I have no doubt that they believe this to be a step towards what they think is a settlement. But my Government has not merely to look at the sentiment involved in this matter; it must also look at its implications and its consequenc~s.I therefore wish to state that our attitude towards this draft resolution is the same as our attitude towards previous resolutions.

I have before metwopictures of Mr. Nehru and his Government: one painted by his representative here, and the otherwhichI shall put to the Council. 143. According to Mr. Krishna Menon, Mr. Nehruand his Government have already gone back on their international agreements, have already annexed the State of Kashmir to India; it is already a fait accompli. 144. According to the picture of Mr. Nehru in my mind, I think that he is an honourable man representing an honourable people, and, although he and his Government have not yet implemented the agreement to hold a free and fair plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations, not once has Mr. Nehru made a public statement that he will not honour that agreement. In every statement of Mr. Nehru, which one reads in the papers, in Parliament, he has always said that he would honour that agreement and that he would hold a free and fair plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations. 145. Now, it is for the people of India to decide whether the picture of Mr. Nehru as painted by his representative here, or the picture that I have in my mind of Mr. Nehru as a gentleman, shouldbe accepted by that great nation. Perhaps it will be a second occasion when Mr. Nehru will have an opportunity to disown what his representative has said here. r~affirme quelque chose que l'une des parties a rejet~ et qui comirme un grand nombre de r~solutions que nous avons rejetees et qui sont devenues caduques ou n'ont plus d'existence propre du fait des r~solu­ tions du 13 aoiit 1948 et du 5 janvier, 1949, ce n'est, a. notra' avis, gu~re servir les fins de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, ni faciliter l'accomplissement des taches qui ont eM confiees auConseilde securite. 141. .Te suis certain que les delegations qui ont presente ce projet de resolution etaient animees des meilleurel;l intentions. Je suis persuade qu'elles y ont vu un pas dans la voie de ce qu'elles croient etre un r~glement. Cependant, mon gouvernement ne dolt pas seulement tenir compte des preoccupations en jeu, mais encore des diverses donnees du probl~me etdes consequences. Je dois donc declarer que notre attitude touchant ce projet de resolution est lamemeque celle que nous avons adoptee en presenc'e des resolutions anterieures. 142. M. NOON (Pakistan) [traduit de l'anglais]: On, peut se faire deux idees differentes de M. Nehru et de son gouvernement: maintenant que M. Menon a donne la premi~re interpretation, je voudra... donner la seconde. 143. Selon M. Krishna Menein, M. Nehru et son gouvernement sont deja. revenus sur leurs engagements internationaux et ont deja. annexe a l'Inde l'Etat de Cachemire; c'est la un fait accompli. 144. Selon l'idee que je me fais de lui, M. Nehru est un homme honorable, representant un peuple honorable et, bien que son gouvernement et lui-meme n'aient pas donne suite a. l'accord tendant a. organiser un plebiscite libre et equitable sous les auspices de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, jamais M. Nehru n'a declare publiquement qu'll ne respecterait pas cet accord. Dans chacune de ses declarations devant le Parlement, que nous pouvons lire dans la presse, M. Nehru a toujours dit qU'll respecterait cet accord et organiserait un plebiscite libre et equitable sous l'egide des Nations Unies. 145. n appartient maintenantau peuple indiende decider laquelle des deux images de M. Nehru, celle que nous donne de lui son representant, oul'ideeque je me fais de lui, c'est-a.-dire d'un gentleman, dolt etre adopMe par cette grande nation. Ce sera peut-etre la une deuxi~me occasion pour M. Nehrudedesavouerce que son representant a declare ici. 147. I am sorry, Mr. President, that you permitted this impropriety but, so far as we are concerned, there is not one word ~ the statements that I have made in this Council which can be interpretedto mean that we will not honour our international obligations. In fact, I requested this Council to act in accordance with the Charter in these matters. But each State Government is entitled to its own interpretation and, what is more, to draw the attention of the Council to all the circumstances and all the surrounding matters in connexion with it. 148. If this debate is going to go on in the way in which it has gone on in the lastthree or four minutes, then we are not proceeding in the way that we proceeded on the previous day. 149. I want to say for the purposes ofthe record that there is nothing that has been said on behalf of the Government of India which in the slightest degree indicates that the Government of India or the Union of India will dishonour any international obligations it has undertaken. 150. The PRESIDENT: Is the Council ready to vote? A vote will now be .taken on the draft resolution in document S/3778. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Australia, China, Colombia, Cuba, France, Iraq, Philippines, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and NorthernIreland, United StatesofAmerica. Abstaining: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The draft resolution was adoptedby 10votesto none, with 1 abstention. The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m. interpr~ter comme signifiant que nous ne ferions pas honneur a nos obligations internationales. En fait, j'ai demand~ au Conseil d'agir en ces mati~resconform~­ ment alaCharte. N~anmoins,chaque gouvernement a le droit d'avoir sa propre interpr6tation et, qui plus est, d'attirer l'attention du Conse11 sur tous les aspects et toutes les cons~quencesdes questions dont nous discutons. 148. Si ce d6bat doit sepoursuivredelamani~redont 11 vient de sed6rouleraucoursdestr.ois ou des quatre derni~res minutes, nous discuterons de ces questions daIls une atmospMre diff~rente de celle d'hier. 149. Je tiens a d~clarer pour le proc~s-verbalque rien n'a ~t6 dit au nom du Gouvernement indien qui soit de nature a indiquer que ledit gouvernement ou 1'Union indienne manquera, en quoi que ce soit, aux obligations internationales qu'll a assum6es. 150. Le PRESIDENT (traduit del'anglais): Lesmembres du ConseU sont-ils prets a passerauvote? Nous allons voter. sur le projet de r~solutionquifigure dans le document S/3778. nest proclid6 au vote a main lev~e. Votent pour: Australie, Chine, Colombie, Cuba, Etats-Unis d'Am6rique, France, Irak, Philippines, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne etd'Irlande du Nord, SuMe. S'abstient: l'Uniondes R6publiques socialistes sovi~­ tiques. Par 10 voix contre z6ro, avec une abstention, le projet de r~solution est adopt~. La s~ance est lev~e a 18 h. 35. ~eskoslovensky Spisovatel, N6rodni Trlda 9, p'raha 1. DENMARK·DANEMARK Einar Munksgaard, Lld., Nllrregade 6, Kllbenhavn, K. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. REPUBLlQUE DOMINICAINE Libreria Dominicana, Mercedes 49, Ciu· dad Trujillo. ECUADOR.EQUAnUR Librerfa Cientffica, Guayaquil and Qulta. EL SALVADOR·SALVADOR Manuel Navas·y Cfa., la. Avenlda sur 37, San Salvadar. FINLAND·FINLANDE Akateemlnen Klrjakauppa, 2 Keskuskcllu, Helsln'lcl. Orders and inquiries from countries where sales agents have not yet been appointed may be sent to: Soles and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York, U.S.A.; or Sales Section, 'United Nations Office, Palais des Notions, Geneva, Switzerland.