S/PV.803 Security Council

Mr. Menon, I understood from what transpired at the last meeting that you were going to answer the speech delivered to the Council by the representative of Pakistan. I note that you are now speaking about a draft resolution which has not yet been introduced by any member of the Council. I wish to draw your attention to the fact that unless a resolution is introduced, I cannot unfortunately allow anybody to comment on it. For that reason, I wish that you now proceed with the statement which you promised to make in that respect. 14. Mr. Krishna MENON (India): I am familiar with the procedure of the Security Council. I am entitled to speak on a draft resolution that has been publicly circulated. I am not referring to its contents. I am only referring to the tabling of a draft resolution by the United Kingdom. This draft resolution was circulated to the members of the Security Council. This document is not marked "secret" or "confidential "; it was distributed all over the place. I read it in the press first and I asked for a copy of it. In view of the fact that there is a document of this character, I do not see how you can object to my statement. It makes no difference. It is no use my labouring this point. We all know the votes of this Council. Often it does not matter what one says. This matter, however, cannot be decided by votes alone. It will be decided by the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir. They know where 1hey want to go; they know where they want to be. I shall not go into the substance of the draft « Si les methodes pacifiques ne permettent pas. de resoudre le probleme, le peuple du Pakistan sera fonde a rechercher d'autres moyens d'assurer a ses freres le droit de disposer d'eux-memes. » 11. Puis, M. Chundrigar, maintenant premier ministre du Pakistan, qui depuis longtemps ne faisait pas partie du gouvernement et qui a ete precedemment Ministre du commerce, a declare le 15 novembre : «Je peux assurer mon peuple qu'a cet egard nous n'epargnerons aucun effort et ne reculerons devant aucun sacrifice pour assurer aux populations du Cachemire l'exercice de leurs droits. L'esprit de liberte ne peut etre enchaine. }) Ce ne sont la que des extraits de ces declarations - nous ne pouvons nous permettre de faire envoyer par tl~le­ gramme le texte complet des discours - qui nous sont parvenus au moment meme OU je me rendais a la seance. 12. Nous regrettons profondement que le Royaume- Uni ait pris ]'initiative du projet de resolution dont le Conseil est saisi. La crainte l'a empeche de presenter cette resolution il y a un mois. Il y a toujours, au Royaume-Uni, une trace de liberalisme. Vous pouvez m'arreter, Monsieur le President, si je dis quoi que ce soit de deplace, mais je n'emploie aucune expression qui ne soit du langage parlementaire. Le Royaume-Uni a craint qu'en raison... 13. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Monsieur Menon, je pensais, d'apres ce qu'on a pu comprendre a la precectente seance, que vous alliez repondre· it la declaration faite devant le Conseil par le representant du Pakistan. J e constate que vous parlez maintenant d'un projet de resolution qui n'a encore ete presente par aucun membre du Conseil. J e me permets de vous faire remarquer qu'il ne m'est malheureusement pas possible de laisser presenter des observations sur une resolution avant qu'elle ait ete presentee. C'est pourquoi je vons prie de vous en tenir a la declaration que vous aviez promis de faire. 14. M. Krishna MENON (Inde) [traduit de l'anglais] ~ J e n'ignore pas la procedure du Conseil de securite. J'ai le droit de parler d'un projet de resolution qui a ete distribue publiquement. Je ne discute pas de son contenu. J e mentionne seulement le fait qu'il est presente par le Royaume-Uni. Ce projet de resolution a ete distribue aux membres du Conseil de securite. Il n'est pas marque « secret J) ou « confidentiel }); il a ete remis a tout le monde. J'en ai d'abord lu le texte dans la presse, et j'en ai demande un exemplaire. Etant donne que ce document existe, je ne vois pas comment vous pouvez trouver aredire a ma declaration. Cela ne change rien. Il est inutile d'insister la-dessus. Nous savons tous comment le Conseil votera. Souvent, ce que l'on dit importe peu. Pourtant, la question ne peut etre reglee seulement par des votes. Elle le sera par les habitants du J ammu et Cachemire, qui savent ce qu'ils veulent et de quel cote ils desirent se ranger. Je n'entrerai pas dans les details du projet de resolu- 15. Therefore, the continuing process of sabotage, the continuing process of subversion, the continuing phases of the new war, enjoin upon the Security Council a different action. We have spoken very mildly on tltis matter, both publicly and privately, in the hope that if there are difficulties they may be smoothed 'over, or that they will not be aggravated, but we have .apparently been fooled in this matter. 16. In obedience to your ruling, I do not refer to the contents of the draft resolution. If you say that the appearance of the draft resolution itself means nothing, then I am prepared to withdraw what I have said. But the document is here. Why was it put before me on my table? Was it a mistake on the part of the Secretariat? Apparently not. It is a public document; it is numbered S/3911. All I say is that the main sponsor of the draft resolution-that is, the United Kingdom-should have waited at least until it had heard out reply before this was published. I know it will be said that this has been going on for a long time. It has been going on for ten years; it will go on for a long time presumably. What is more, I pointed out to you, Sir, both as President of the Security Council here and outside the Security Council, that acts of sabotage are going on. I forgot to say that we arrested a Pakistan havildar who has come over the cease-fire line-a non-commissioned officer.

I consider that the representative of India has finished his statement. I call on the representative of the United States.

I have listened carefully to the remarks of the representative of India. I should like to reserve the right to comment after I have seen the text, although I must confess that my delegation regrets the tone he has seen fit to adopt.1 At this point I should like simply to introduce the draft resolution. 19. The Council is now coming to the completion of an extensive new debate on the Kashmir problem. The representatives of India and Pakistan have presented their respective cases. The members of the Council have expressed themselves on the issues and on the type of action they thought the Council should take. The representatives of India and Pakistan have had a further opportunity to comment subsequent to the observations of the members of the Council. 1 On the initiative of the representative of India, changes were sUbseqnently made in the text of his speech and are incorporated in the present record. 15. Nous estimons done que la poursuite du sabotage, la poursuite de la subversion, et la poursuite de la guerre par des moyens differents, obligent le Conseil de securite a. agir autrement. Nous avons adopte une attitude tres moderee en la mutiere, tant en public qu'en prive, dans l'espoir que certaines diJficultes pourraient etre aplanies, ou en tout cas pourraient ne pas s'aggraver, mais on s'est manifestement joue de nous. 16. Conformement a. votre decision, Monsieur le President, je ne parlerai pas de la teneur du projet de resolution. Si vous jugez que la distribution du projet ne signifie rien en elle-meme, je suis dispose a retirer ce que j'ai dit. Mais ce document, je l'ai devant moL Pourquoi me l'a-t-on distribue ? Est-ce une erreur de la part du Secretariat? Apparemment non. C'est un document officiel ; il porte la cote S/391l. le pretends simplement que le principal auteur du projet de resolution - c'est-a.-dire le Royaume-Uni - aurait dil au moins attendre que j'aie repondu avant de publier le document. On me dira peut-etre que l'affaire se prolonge. le le sais. EIle dure depuis 10 ans, et eIle durera sans doute longtemps encore. D'autre part, je vous ai fait observer, Monsieur, tant ici en votre qualite de President du Conseil qu'en dehors du Conseil que le sabotage se poursuit. l'ai oublie de dire que nous avons arrete un havildar (sous-officier) pakistanais qui avait traverse la ligne de suspension d'armes. 17. Le PRESIDENT (lraduit de l'anglais): le pense que le representant de l'Iude a termine sa declaration. le donne la parole au representant des Etats-Unis. 18. M. WADSWORTH (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) [traduit de l'anglais]: l'ai eeoute attentivement les observations du representant de l'Inde. le me reserve le droit de faire connaitre mon point de vue a. leur sujet des que ren aurai vu le texte, mais je voudrais dire d'ores et deja. que ma delegation en regrette le ton 1. A present, je voudrais seulement presenter le projet de resolution. 19. Le nouveau long debat qui vient de se derouler sur le probleme du Cachemire approche de son terme. Les representants de l'Inde et du Pakistan ont expose leurs theses respectives. Les membres du COIlseil ont fait connaitre leur opinion sur les problemes et sur les mesures qu'a leur avis le Conseil devrait prendre. Apres les membres ,du Conseil, les representants de I' Inde et du Pakistan ont eu la possibilite d'intervenir une seconde fois. 1 Sur l'initiative du representant de 1'rnde, des modifications ont ete ulterieurement apportees au texte de sa declaration, lesquelles sont incorporees dans le present compte rendu. 21. The draft resolution begins with an expression of thanks and appreciation to Ambassador Jarring for his report [8/3821] and his helpful service to the Council in undertaking the missions we entrusted to him on 21 February. Members of the Council, as well as the representatives of India and Pakistan, have reflected their confidence in him during the course of the discussion, and it is proper that he should be given recognition in the resolution. 22. The draft resolution then notes that the representatives of India and Pakistan have again indicated their willingness to co-operate with the United Nations in finding a peaceful solution to this problem. Ambassador Jarring informed us of this in his report, and both countries have reiterated it before the Council. This is an important fact. The differences between Pakistan and India over Kashmir were brought to the United Nations shortly after they first arose. The willingness to seek a solution through peaceful means, whether such peaceful means are agreed upon in this Council or between the parties - utilizing the conciliatory processes of the United Nations -- is still a matter of encouragement. It reflects the political maturity and sense of international community and responsibility of both States. 23. The next paragraph reflects an important element that has emerged from the discussions in the Council tbis year - the fact that both India and Pakistan continue to accept the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 [8/1100, para. 75J and 5 January 1949 [8/1196, para. 15J. This position was stated by both of them in our discussions in January and February. Ambassador Jarring noted this fact and undertook to find a solution to the problems that had arisen in connexion with their implementation. As we have stated before in this Council, the fact that Ambassador Jarring was not able to find such a solution should not be any reflection on his desire or on his ability to do so. 24. The representatives of the two Governments have reaffirmed that acceptance at this series of Council meetings and have expressed a desire to see progress made under them. I have been struck, in fact, by the great degree to which the speeches of both of them turned on problems of implementing these resolutions rather than on the substance of the resolutions themselves. Thus, even though there has been a passage of time, even though the attitude has been expressed that conditions have changed, and even though we have heard about difficulties which have appeared in the past on implementation, this " area of agreement" which I mentioned in my first intervention does remain. 25. I made the following statement during that first intervention: 21. Le projet commence par remercier M. Jarring de son rapport [8/3821] et de l'aide qu'il a apportee au Conseil en s'acquittant de la mission qui lui avait ete confiee le 21 fevrier. Les membres du Conseil, de meme que les representants de I'Inde et du Pakistan, ant declare au cours de la discussion qu'ils avaient pleine et entiere confiance en M. Jarring; il convient de le dire officiellement dans la resolution. 22. Le Conseil note ensuite que les representants de l'Inde et du Pakistan ont a nouveau exprime le desir sincere de cooperer avec l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour rechercher une solution pacifique du probleme. M. Jarring nous en a informes dans son rapport, et les deux pays 1'ont repete devant le Conseil. C'est la un fait important. Le litige entre le Pakistan et l'Inde au sujet du Cachemire a ete parte a l'attention des Nations Unies peu de temps apres qu'il a surgi. Il est encourageant de voir les parties desirenses de parvenir a une solution par des moyens pacifiques, que ces moyens soient determines au sein du Conseil ou entre les parties, grace aux procedures de conciliation des Nations Unies. Un tel desir temoigne de la maturite politique et du sens des responsabilites internationales des deux Etats. 23. Le paragraphe suivant traite d'un element important qui s'est degage des discussions du Conseil cette annee. J e veux parler du fait que l'Inde et le Pakistan continuent tous deux a accepter les resolutions de la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'lnde et le Pakistan en date du 13 ao11t 1948 [8/1100, par. 75] et du 5 janvier 1949 [8/1196, par. 15J. Les deux parties se sont exprimees en ce sens lors de nos debats de janvier et fevrier. M. Jarring en a pris acte et a essaye de trouver une solution aux problemes que lenr application a souleves. Comme nous l'avons deja declare devant le Conseil, le fait que M. Jarring n'est pas parvenu it trouver cette solution ne met pas en cause son desir d'y parvenir ou son aptitude it le faire. 24. A la presente serie de seances du Conseil, les representants des deux gouvernements ont reaffirme qu'ils acceptaient ces resolutions et se sont declares prets it faire progresser leur mise en reuvre. En fait, j'ai ete tres frappe de voir que les deux representants se sont plus etendus sur les difficultes d'appliquer ces resolutions que sur la teneur meme des resolutions. Ainsi, bien que beaucoup de temps ait passe, que la situation, nous a-t-on dit, ait change, et bien que I'on nous ait parle des difficultes eprouvees dans la mise en ceuvre de ces resolutions, la «zone d'accord») dont j'ai parle dans ma premiere intervention demeure. 25. J'avais alors declare: I believe that the debate has borne out this opinion. 26. Nous reconnaissons tous, fen suis sur, qu'un reglement definitif du probleme du Cachemire ne pent resulter que d'un accord a I'amiable acceptable pour les deux parties. Le Conseil ne peut absolument pas contraindre une nation souveraine a des actes auxquels elle se refuse. A defaut de toute autre solution acceptable pour les deux pays, le Conseil de securite a manifestement le devoir d'aider les parties it traduire dans les faits les resolutions de la Commission. Les parties, je ne le conteste pas, sont loin de s'accorder sur I'aspect des resolutions qui suscite le plus de difficultes, mais elles doivent convenir, etant donne les engagements qu'elles ont contractes, qu'il faut s'efforcer de les appliquer. 26. I am sure we all recognize that no final settlement of the Kashmir problem can be reached except on an amicable basis acceptable to both parties. It is quite impossible for this Council to push any sovereign nation into an action which it refuses to take. In the absence of some other mutually acceptable solution, the Security Council's clear responsibility, in our view, is to help the parties make the Commission's resolutions a reality. While there may be strong differences of opinion - and there are - over which aspect of the resolutions is causing the most difficulties, those concerned certainly must, in the light of their engagements, agree that every effort should be made to make them effective. 27. II est de fait que les progres en ce sens ont et6 lents, pour ne pas dire presque inexistants. L'alinea suivant du projet de resolution indique combien le Conseil s'inquiete de cette situation. Dans ses resolutions du 14 mars 1950 [8/1469], du 30 mars 1951 [SJ2017JRev. 1], du 10 novembre 1951 [8/2392], du 23 decembre 1952 [8J2883] et du 21 fevrier 1957 [S/3793], le Conseil a toujours exprime l'avis que la demilitarisation etait un objectif important qui favoriserait une solution; cette opinion est donc reaflirmee dans le considerant suivant du projet de resolution. Nous estimons toujours, en effet, qu'une reduction des forces stationnees dans la region serait une des mesures propres a ameliorer les relations entre les parties. 27. The fact, of course, is that progress in this direction has been slow - one might say almost nonexistent. The next paragraph of the draft resolution refers to the Council's concern about this. The consistent view of the Council, expressed in its resolutions of 14 March 1950 [8/1469], 30 March 1951 [S/2017/ Rev.l], 10 November 1951 [8J2392], 23 December 1952 [8/2883] and 21 February 1957 [8/3793], that demilitarization is an important goal that would help towards a resettlement, is then restated in the draft resolution. For we are still confident that a reduction in the number of troops in the area would in itself be a forward step in improving relationships. 28. The final paragraph of the preamble recalls previous resolutions adopted by the Security Council 28. Le dernier considerant rappelle les resolutions adoptees anterieurement par le Conseil de securite et 30. Operative paragraph 1 expresses a sentiment common to the resolutions which the Council adopts on many issues. The actual language here comes from the first resolution of the Security Council on Kashmir (17 January 1948 2) and from the first resolution of the Commission (13 August 1948). Both of these resolutions, as has been repeatedly said, were accepted by the parties. India and Pakistan have reiterated their intention to seek a peaceful solution and to adhere to a pacific approach. This request in the draft resolution before you accords with their own expressions of intentions. It is made with the earnest desire that both parties do their utmost to assure the most favourable conditions for friendly relations between them and for reaching a solution to this problem. 3!. Operative paragraph 2 embodies concrete action that the Council should take to help bring about implementation of these resolutions which have been agreed to. It calls upon the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan to renew his efforts. It authorizes him, for one thing, to make any recommendation to the parties for further action which he considers desirable in connexion with part I of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, having regard to his third and fifth reports [5/2611 and 5/2967J and having regard to Mr. Jarring's report [5/3821]. We hope that through this means the questions which have been raised about the status of implementation of the "cease-fire order" can be resolved. This paragraph goes on to request the United Nations Representative to enter into negotiations with India and Pakistan in order to implement part n. In particular he is asked to seek agreement on a reduction of forces on each side of the cease-fire line to a specific number, arrived at on the basis of the relevant Security Council resolutions and having regard to his fifth report. 32. There is nothing new about having the Council ask the United Nations Representative to make an attempt to implement part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948. Over the past years there have been extensive efforts to implement part n. Both India and Pakistan have previously consulted with the United Nations Representative to bring this about, or to achieve "demilitarization", as it has most often been referred to recently. Most of the United Nations Representative's work has been concentrated on this problem. It is clearly important for the Council to continue to lay stress on bringing this about. Agreement on a reduction of forces on each side of the ceasefire line would, we believe, help to reduce the tensions which have been reflected there, help bring about an "atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations", and help bring us nearer to a final solution of the Kashmir problem. a Documents officiels de I' Assemblee generale, troisieme session, Supplement nO 2, chap. 5, sect. C. 34. Finally, we have not attempted to specify too narrowly or in too much detail how the United Nations Representative should carry out his mission. The draft resolution asks him to report " as soon as possible ". It leaves him discretion in the manner in which he approaches his task. Dr. Graham has demonstrated his wisdom and ability in the past, and he can be relied upon to do an effective job now. In this he has the firm support of the United States Government. 35. In conclusion, I would like to repeat one paragraph of my statement of 25 October: " We believe that a final solution to this problem can only be of benefit to both parties. It is in this spirit that I have spoken. We have concentrated on the most favourable aspects of the issue in the hope that we may encourage progress towards its solution and an improvement in relations between these two great Asian countries." [797th meeting, para. 41.]

I call on the United Kingdom representative.

I notice, Mr. President, that the representative of India is not in his place at the Security Council table. I wonder whether we should not send word outside, in case the representative of India wishes to join the meeting.

I see that the representative of India is now in his seat, and I presume that that answers the United Kingdom representative's question. 39. Mr. Krishna MENON (India): May I speak, Mr. President?

I have already called on the United Kingdom representative, and I ask him to proceed with his statement.

If the representative of India wishes to speak, I should be perfectly prepared to give way to him. It was because he was not in the room when you called on me, Mr. President, that I suggested that we might send word to him.

In accordance with the desire of the United Kingdom representative, I call on the representative of India. 43. Mr. Krishna MENON (India): For reasons of security, it is not possible for us to place before the Council large numbers of facts at our disposal. For 34. Enfin, nous n'avons pas essaye d'illdiquer avec trop de precision et de details comment le representant des Nations Unies devra executer sa mission. Le projet de resolution lui demande de presenter (( aussitOt que possible» un rapport sur son activite. I1 lui appartient done de choisir la maniere dont il s'acquittera de sa tache. M. Graham a deja prouve sa sagesse et sa competence dans le passe, et nous pouvons ctre certuins que son action sera efficace. Il a donc I'appui total du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis. 35. Je voudrais terminer en relisant un paragraphe de ma declaration du 25 octobre : (( Nous crayons qu'une solution definitive ne pourrait que servir l'interet des deux parties en cause. C'est dans cet esprit que je suis intervcnu. Nous nous sommes attaches aux aspects les plus favorables de cette question dans l'espoir que nous pourrions ainsi encourager les intCresses a progresser dans la voie d'une solution et d'une amelioration des relations entre ces deux grands pays d'Asie.) [797e seance, par. 41.] 36. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'angCais) : Je donne la parole au representant du Royaume-Uni. 37. Sir Pierson DIXON (Royaume-Uni) [traduit de l'anglais] : J e remarque, Monsieur le President, que le representant de l'Inde n'occupe pas sa place ala table du Conseil de securite. Ne conviendrait-il pas de le faire prevenir, pour le cas 011 il desirerait continuer a prendre part au debat ? 38. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l' anglais) : Le representant de l'Inde a maintenant repris sa place a la table du Conseil. Je presume que cela repond it la question du representant du Royaume-Uni. 39. M. Krishna MENON (Inde) [traduil de l'angCais] : Puis-je avoir la parole, Monsieur le President? 40. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : J'ai deja donne la parole au representant du Royaume-Uni, que j'invite it faire sa declaration. 41. Sir Pierson DIXON (Royaume-Uni) [traduit de I'anglais] : Si le representant de l'Inde desire prendre la parole, je suis tout dispose a la lui ceder. C'etait parce qu'il n'etait pas present dans la saIle lorsque vous m'avez donne la parole, Monsieur le President, que j'ai suggere de le faire prevenir. 42. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de C'anglais) : SeIon le dcsir du representant du Royaume-Uni, je donne la parole au representant de I'lnde. 43. M. Krishna MENON (Inde) [traduit de l'anglais] : Pour des raisons de securite, il ne nous est pas possible de devoiler au Conseil de nombreux faits dont nous 45. If the United Kingdom representative agrees, we are prepared to expunge from the record any statements which might have hurt him in any way. Sir Pierson Dixon is one of the most amiable gentlemen who ever walked these floors, and we have no desire to hurt him or his country in any way. 46. The feelings I expressed related to what has been happening in India in the last few days, and also to other circumstances. -17. The PRESIDENT: Before calling on the United Kingdom representative to proceed with his statement, I should like to address a word to the public. It is in the interest of everyone that silence should be main~ tained in this hall. If tnat cannot be done, I shall have to take certain measures which will not be in accordance with my desire to have meetings of the Security Council open to the public at all times. 48. I now caU on the United Kingdom representative.

Before I begin my statement on the present draft resolution, I should like, with the President's permission, to address one more question to the representative of India. I am very glad to see that the representative of India is in a withdrawing mood. I feel that I must now say a word about his remark concerning the attitude of my delegation, his suggestion that we were partisan and had hatched a draft resolution directed against India. That, of course, is completely untrue, as was the latter part of his statement. I hope that, when I make my statement on the draft resolution, it will appear that we have been far from actuated by partisan motives. I am not clear whether it is intended that that part of Mr. Krishna Menon's remarks should be stricken from the record.3 50. Mr. Krishna MENON (India): I have not been able completely to follow; it is very difficult. I am quite agreeable to having any words taken out if they offend Sir Pierson Dixon, but I cannot, in all conscience, put in the word "non-partisan". I can take out the word" partisan ", and I have no objection to doing so.

In my last statement to the Council on 25 October [791th meeting1 I indicated the direction in which Her Majesty's Government considered that the Council should proceed in this matter. We have now had the benefit of a second speech by the representative of India and by the representative of Pakistan. Having considered these speeches, together with Mr. Jarring's report, 8 On the initiative of the representative of India, the remarks referred to, as well as some other remarks, were deleted from the final record of Mr. Krishna Menon's statement. 45. Si le representant du Royaume-Uni est d'accord avec moi, je suis pret a supprimer du compte rendu toute declaration qui aurait pu le froisser. Sir Pierson Dixon est run des gentlemen les plus courtois qui aient jamais frequente ces lieux, et je n'ai nulle intention de le froisser, ou de froisser son pays. 46. Les sentiments que j'ai exprimes se rapportent a ce qui s'est passe dans I'lnde ces jours-ci, et aussi a d'autres circonstances. 47. Le PRESIDENT (iraduit de l'anglais) : Avant de donner la parole au representant du Royaume-Uni, je voudrais m'adresser au public. Il est de l'interet de tous que le public observe le silence dans cette salle. Si je ne puis l'obtenir, je serai dans I'obligation de prendre certaines mesures qui ne concorderaient pas avec mon desir que toutes les seances du Conseil de secu rite soient publiques. 48. J e donne maintenant la parole au representant du Royaume-Uni. 49. Sir Pierson DIXON (Royaume-Uni) [traduit de l'anglais] : Avant de parler du projet de resolution, je voudrais, avec votre permission, Monsieur le President, poser encore une question au representant de I'Inde. J e suis heureux de constater que le representant de I'lnde est en veine de rectification, mais je crois devoir relever ce qu'il a dit concernant l'attitude de mn delegation, a laquelle il a reproche d'avoir fait preuve de parti pris et d'avoir ourdi un projet de resolution dirige contre I'Inde. Cela est, bien entendu, inexact, comme la derniere partie de sa declaration. J'espere que lorsque j'aurai presente mes observations sur le projet de resolution, 1'0n verra que nous n'avons pas ete pousses par la partialite. Je n'ai pas bien compris s'il est dans les intentions de M. Krishna Menon de supprimer du compte rendu cette partie de sa declaration 3. 50. M. Krishna MENON (lnde) [traduit de l'anglais] : J'ai quelque peine a suivre. Cela m'est tres difHcile. J e suis pret it supprimer du compte rendu tout ce qui peut offenser sir Pierson Dixon, mais, en toute conscience, je ne puis dire que sir Pierson a fait preuve d'impartialite. J e ne me refuse pas a retirer les mots « parti pris n. 51. Sir Pierson DIXON (Royaume-Uni) [iraduit de l'anglais]: Dans mon intervention du 25 octobre [797e seance], j'ai indique dans queUe voie le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste considere que, dans cette affaire, le Conseil de securite devrait s'engager. Nous avons eu l'avantage d'un deuxieme discours du representant de l' Inde et du representant du Pakistan. Tenant compte de ces discours et du rapport de M. Jarring, et ayant a 8 Sur l'initiative du representant de l'Inde, les remarques auxquelles il est fait allusion, ainsi que d'autres remarques, ont et6 supprimees daus le compte rendu definitif de la declaration de M. Krishna Menon. 52. First of all I should make it plain that we realize that this draft cannot give full satisfaction to either of the parties. It contains elements which we know both parties will consider incompatible with some of their contentions. That is clear, both from the speeches of Mr. Khan Noon and Mr. Krishna Menon and from the long past history of the question. We regret this; but we feel it may be inevitable at this stage. The wideness of the difference which separates the parties is such that obviously the Security Council cannot satisfy both parties in full; neither can it satisfy either one in full so long as it makes a serious attempt towards progress. But we can at least hope to make proposals which will assist the parties in attaining a solution of this intractable-problem. That is our purpose and our hope. 53. Some of the points I propose now to make in dealing with the draft resolution will bear upon the criticisms of the United Kingdom attitude made by the representative of Pakistan in his speech of 15 November [802nd meeting] and by the representative of India in his speeches delivered on 5, 11, and 13 November [799tJl, 800th and 801st meetings]. I will not, however, attempt today to deal with these criticisms in full as I believe it is the general wish of the Council to make progress as rapidly as possible. I would, however, like to make one general observation. 54. During his recent statements in this Council on this subject, the representative of India has often complained that the United Kingdom attitude is misguided and that I have been badly advised as to the true facts of the situation. I may be misguided, but I take responsibility, under directions from my Government, for all the statements I make here. 55. La question du Cachemire a depuis 10 ans provoque un flot de documents, de declarations et de rapports. Je ne pretends pas avoir lu mot par mot tous les documents qui ont ete publies. J'imagine qu'il arrive parfois a d'autres de se trouver dans mon cas. Je me suis efforce toutefois, comme d'autres membres du Conseil 1'0nt fait, j'en suis sur, de me familiariser avec les vues des deux parties et avec la position prise par le Conseil de securite au cours des nombreux debats qu'il a consacres a la question depuis plusieurs annees. 55. The Kashmir problem has in ten years produced a great weight of documents, a vast complex of statements and reports. I will not pretend that I have read every word of every document that has been printed. I imagine that others occasionally find themselves in a similar position. I have, however, as I am sure have other members of the Council, attempted to acquaint myself fully with the views of the two parties and with the position taken by the Security Council during its many discussions of the problem over the past years. 56. J'ai recemment rafraichi ma memoire en relisant les rapports de la Commission des Nations Dnies pour I'lnde et le Pakistan et les rapports de M. Graham. notamment ceux dont on a cite des extraits au cours des recents debats. J'ai 6te frappe par le soin et l'impartialite avec lesquels ces rapports ont ete rectiges. CiteI', a l'appui d'une affirmation contestee, des phrases ou des paragraphes de ces rapports en dehors de leur 56. I have recently refreshed my memory by reading again the reports of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and of Mr. Grallam, including some of those from which quotation has been made in our recent discussions. I have been impressed by the careful and balanced drafting of these reports. I am convinced that it is unhelpful for either side to quote individual sentences or paragraphs from these 52. J e voudrais tout d'abord declarer que nous nous rendons parfaitement compte que ce projet ne peut pas donner entiere satisfaction al'une et l'autre des parties. Il contient certains ehlments que les deux parties, nous le savons, considereront comme incompatibles avec certaines de leurs theses. Cela est evident, etant donm~ le discours de M. Khan Noon, celui de M. Krishna Menon, et aussi le long historique de la question. Nous le regrettons, mais nous pensons que cela est peut-etre inevitable au stade actuel du debat. L'ecart qui separe les parties est tel qu'il est evident que le Conseil de securite ne peut donner entiere satisfaction aux deux parties. Il ne peut pas non plus donner entiere satisfaction a l'une ou l'autre des parties s'il vent tenter serieusement de progresser vel'S la solution du probleme. Mais nous pouvons tout au mains presenter des propositions qui aideront les parties a resoudre ce probleme difficile. Tel est notre but et notre espoir•. 53. Quelques-unes des observations que je veux faire maintenant apropos du projet de resolution constitueront une reponse aux critiques adressees au Royaume-Uni par le representant du Pakistan dans son intervention du 15 novembre [80Ze seance] et par le representant de l'Inde dans ses interventions des 5, 11 et 13 novembre [79ge, SOOe et 80le seances]. Je ne m'etendrai cependant pas aujourd'hui sur ces critiques, car je crois que le Conseil desire aller de l'avant le plus rapidement possible, et je me bornerai a faire une observation d'ordre general. 54. Dans les declarations que le representant de l'Inde a faites recemment devant le Conseilt il a dit it. plusieurs reprises que le Royaume-Uni s'est laisse egarer et que je suis mal informe des faits. Il se peut que je sois egare, mais, sur les instructions de mon gouvernement, je prends la responsabilite de toutes les declarations que je fais ici. 58. To come now to the draft resolution which is before the Council [8(3911]: The preamble seeks to put our proposals in their proper setting, that is, the setting of the previous decisions of the Council, the resolutions of the Commission for India and Pakistan and Mr. Jarring's report. 59. The fourth preambular paragraph observes that the Governments of India and Pakistan recognize and accept the commitments undertaken by them in the Commission's resolutions. This language is carefully drafted; it takes full account of the statements made .by the representatives of India and Pakistan. 60. I am fully aware of the importance which the Government of India has attached to the assurances given to India by the Commission for India and Pakistan in the exchange of correspondence in August and again in December 1948. I am aware also of the importance which the Government of Pakistan attaches to the assurances received from the Commission. This paragraph is so drafted as to detract in no way from the importance to be attached to those assurances. This language prejudices no position. 61. The representative of the Soviet Union suggested that because the resolutions were adopted a number of years ago, they had lost their force and meaning [799th meeting, para. 4]. That was a surprising suggestion. One of the most encouraging features of the debate during the renewed consideration of the Kashmir problem this year has been the repeated reiteration by both sides that they stood by their engagements, commitments and obligations - all three words have been used - as contained in the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. 62. Mr. Jarring's terms of reference wcre based on those resolutions. His report [5(3821] makes quite clear that his efforts were directed to exploring what impeded their full implementation. There are those who argue - but neither the representative of India nor the representative of Pakistan is among themthat the Commission's resolutions should be disregarded, that some other approach should be tried. The simple 58. J'en viens maintenant au projet de resolution dont le Conseil est saisi [8(3911]. Le but du preambllle du projet de resolution est de situer nos propositions dans le cadre qui convient, c'est-a.-dire les decisions precedentes du Conseil, les resolutions de la Commission pour l'Inde et le Pakistan, et le rapport de M. Jarring. 59. Dans le quatrieme considerant, le Conseil de securite note que les Gouvernements de l'Inde et du Pakistan reconnaissent et acceptent les engagements qu'ils ont pris dans les resolutions de la Commission. Le texte de cet alinea a ete soigneusement redige ; il tient pleinement compte des declarations des representants de l'Inde et du Pakistan. 60. J e n'ignore pas l'importance que le Gouvernement de l'Inde attache aux assurances qui lui ont ete donnees par la Commission pour l'Inde et le Pakistan dans les lettres echangees en aoftt et, a nouveau, en decembre 1948. J'ai conscience egalement de l'importance que le Gouvernement du Pakistan attache aux assurances qu'il a re<;ues de la Commission. Le texte de cet alinea est redige de teUe sorte qu'il ne minimise en aucune fa<;on 1'importance qui doit etre attachee a ces assurances. Il ne prejudicie aucune des positions adoptees. 61. Le representant de 1'Union sovietique a pretendu que les resolutions, ayant ete adoptees il y a plusieurs annees, ont perdu leur force et leur sens [7'9ge seance, parA]. C'est la. une affirmation surprenante. L'un des traits les plus encourageants du debat, lors de la reprise, cette annee, de l'examen de la question du Cachemire, c'est que les deux parties ont reaffirme qu'elles respecteraient les engagements et les obligations - ces deux mots ont ete employes - qui decoulent des deux resolutions de la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Inde et le Pakistan. 62. Le mandat de M. Jarring etait fonde sur ces resolutions. Son rapport [5(3821] indique clairement qu'il s'est efforce de rechercher ce qui faisait obstacle a leur mise en ceuvre integrale. Certains soutiennent - mais ni le representant de 1'Inde ni le representant dU Pakistan ne sont parmi ceux-la - que les resolutions de la Commission doivent etre ecartees et qu'il faut maintenant aborder le probleme d'une autre fagon. 4 Proces-verbaux officiels du Conseil de securiie, quatrfeme annee, Supplement special nO 7, document 8/1430. 64. I did not attempt to disguise in my speech at the 797th meeting of the Security Council that the United Kingdom Government was fully aware that there is a long and difficult road to a fmal settlement of this dispute. Mr. Jarring himself was aware of the grave problems that might arise in connexion with and as a result of a plebiscite. The resolution of which we are one of the sponsors does not attempt to deal with these problems. It confines itself to the earlier phases of the question, dealt with in parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948. 65. I come now to the operative paragraphs of the draft resolution. 66. In operative paragraph 1 of the draft, words are reproduced from the Security Council resolution of 17 January 1948,5 and this wording has been combined with a reiteration of the words of part I, paragraph E, of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948 [8/1100, para. 75]. The effect is to lay emphasis on the need to maintain an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations. 67. In his statement on 5 November [799th meeting], the representative of India indicated that he regarded the idea of a request of the kind in the first operative paragraph, which I had adumbrated in my speech at the 797th meeting, as superfluous so far as the Government of India was concerned, but he stated that he did not object to it. I also recall the stress which he has laid on the Security Council resolution of 17 January 1948. 68. Mr. Firoz Khan Noon has contended that in my speech adumbrating this part of the resolution, I have placed a far wider interpretation on part I, paragraph E of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948 than its terms suggest. But an appeal to both sides by a United Nations organ such as that in the draft resolution is, of course, a normal and useful practice with which we are all familiar. I believe members of the Council will agree, having listened to what has been said on both sides, that an appeal of this kind is desirable and would be desirable even if both sides were not engaged by the Commission's resolution. 5 Documents officie1s de l'Assemblee generale, troisieme session, Supplement nO 2, chap. 5, sect. C. 64. Dans le discours que j'ai prononce ala 797e seance du Conseil de securite, je n'ai pas cache que le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni se rend parfaitement compte que la route qui doit mener a un reglement definitif du differend est longue et difficile. M. Jarring lui-meme a reconnu la gravite des problemes que pourraient soulever l'organisation et les resultats d'un plebiscite. Le projet de resolution dont nous SOUlmes l'un des auteurs ne traite pas de ces problemes. Il ne concerne que les phases initiales du probleme, qui font l'objet des premiere et deuxil~me parties de la resolution adoptee par la Commission le 13 aolit 1948. 65. J e passe aux paragraphes du dispositif du projet de resolution. 66. Le paragraphe 1 du dispositif reprend les termes de la resolution du Conseil de securite en date du 17 janvier 1948 5, combines avec ceux du paragraphe E de la premiere partie de la resolution de la Commission en date du 13 aolit 1948 [8/1100, par. 75]. Il souligne ainsi la necessite de maintenir un climat propice a de nouvelles negociations. 67. Dans sa declaration du 5 novembre [79ge seance], le representant de I'lnde a declare qu'une invitation du genre de celle qui est adressee aux gouvernements interesses dans le paragraphe premier du dispositif. invitation quc j'avais laisse pressentir dans mon discours de la 797e seance, etait superflue en ce qui concerne le Gouvernement indien, mais il a ajoute qu'il ne s'y opposait pas. J e rappelle egalement que le representant de l'Inde a insiste sur la resolution adoptee par le Conseil de securite le 17 janvier 1948. 68. M. Firoz Khan Noon a dit, lorsque j'ai ebauche ce paragraphe devant le Conseil, que j'avais interprete beaucoup trop largement les tennes du paragraphe E de la premiere partie de la resolution du 13 aofit 1948 de la Commission pour l'Inde et le Pakistan. Mais un appel adresse aux deux parties par un organe des Nations Unies, comme celui qui est contenu dans le projet de resolution, est normal et utile, et constitue une pratique qlli nous est familiere. Je suis certain que les membres du Conseil reconnaitront, apres avail' entendu les declarations des deux parties, qu'un appel de ce genre est souhaitable, et le serait meme si les deux 70. In my statement on 25 October [797th meeting], I dealt at some length with the relationship between parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948. I think I made clear our view that the connexion between these two parts of the resolution is such that it would be dilflcult for the Security Council at this stage to take action on either part without regard to the other. In view of the ftrmly held conviction of the Government of India that part I has not been implemented, and in spite of the view of the Government of Pakistan to the precise contrary, it would be wrong to exclude part I from the terms of reference of a United Nations representative. I regret that we and our co-sponsors have felt obliged to record this view in face of the known objections of the Government of Pakistan. 71. In view of the need to make progress and of the connexion whieh I described in my previous speech [797th meeting] between parts I and Il, it has seemed to the sponsors that some step forward on part Il is necessary. Conscious of the view of the Government of India that no progress can be made on part II until part I has, in its view, been implemented, we have made an attempt to bridge the opposing views of the two Governments in this matter of demilitarization. It will be seen, however, that our draft resolution gives considerable discretion to Mr. Frank P. Graham. We do not lay down a rigid sequence for the various tasks entrusted to him. We feel it desirable that he should be able to use a flexible approach. As regards part I, we hope that he will be able to make recommendations which will be acceptable both to Pakistan and to India. We hope that the necessity for making such recommendations as he considers desirable will in no way militate against progress. We also hope that he will be successful in making progress on a plan for a reduction of forces; for this, in our view, is a necessary preliminary to the creation of conditions in which progress towards a final solution will be possible. Surely no single step could do so much to reduce tension and restore confidence between the parties, and until a basis of mutual confidence is established, progress towards a solution obviously is extremely difficult. 72. As I understand the position of the Government of India, as expressed by Mr. Krishna Menon, it is that it does not consider itself bound by the twelvepoint proposals made by Mr. Graham in the course of his discussions with the Governments of India and Pakistan and embodied in his fifth report [8/2967, annex .II] • This is fully understood. Certainly Mr Graham must seek an agreement on the basis of the. 70. Dans ma declaration du 25 octobre [797e seance], j'ai parle assez longuement de la relation qui existe entre les premiere et deuxieme parties de la resolution adoptee par la Commission le 13 aout 1948. Je crois avoir demontre que cette relation est si etroite que, au stade actuel du debat, il serait dilUcile au Conseil de securite de prendre des mesures concernant une partie sans tenir compte de !'autre partie. Etant donne que le Gouvernement de l'Inde est fermement convaincu que la premiere partie de la resolution n'a pas ete mise en ceuvre, etant donned'autre part que le Gouveruement du Pakistan pretend exactement le contraire, ce serait une erreur que de ne pas faire mention de la premiere partie de la resolution dans le mandat assigne a un representant des Nations Unies. Jc regrette que les auteurs du projet de resolution se soient vus dans l'obligation de le faire, en ctepit des objections connues du Gouvernement du Pakistan. 71. Etunt donne, d'une part, la necessite d'aller de l'avant et, d'autre part, le rapport qui existe entre la premiere et la deuxieme parties de la resolution, rapport dont j'ai parle au COUl'S de mon intervention precedente [797e seance], les auteurs du projet de resolution ont estime qu'il fallait faire quelques progres en ce qui concerne la deuxieme partie. Tenant compte de l'opinion du Gouvernement de l'Inde, qui considere qu'aucun progres ne peut etre realise touchant la deuxieme partie tant que la premiere partie n'aura pas, a son avis, ete appliquee, nons nous sommes eiTorces de concilier les vues opposees des deux gouvernements sur cette question de la demilitarisation. On verra toutefois que notre projet de resolution laisse une grande latitude a M. Frank P. Graham. Nous ne fixoDs pas un ordre chronologique rigide pour l'execution des diverses taches qui lui sont conf1ees. Nous avons pense qu'il vaIait mieux lui donner la possibilite de recourir a des methodes tres souples. Nous esperons qu'il pourra faire, au sujet de la premiere partie, des recommandations qui seront acceptees a la fois par le Pakistan et par I'Inde. Nous esperons que la necessite de faire les recommandations qu'il jugera souhaitables n'entravera nullement les progres. Nous esperons aussi que M. Graham reussira a realiser des progres en cc qui concerne un plan de reduction des effectifs, car c'est la, anotre avis, une condition preliminaire indispensable pour la creation de conditions qui permettront d'avuncer vel'S une solution definitive. Rien, assurement, ne pourrait contribuer autant a reduire la tension et a retablir la confiance entre les parties, et, tant que la conliance mutuelle ne sera pas retablie, il sera, de toute evidence, extremement difficile de progresser vel'S une solution. 72. Si je comprends bien la position du Gouverncment de l'Inde, exposee par M. Krishna Menon, cc gouvernement ne se considere pas comme lie par les 12 points des propositions elaborees par M. Graham au cours des discussions qu'il a eues avec les Gouvernements de !'Inde et du Pakistan, propositions contenues dans son cinquieme rapport [S/2967, annexe Il]. Cela est bien entendu. Il faut assurement que M. Graham 73. Operative paragraph 3 merely asks for co-operation from the two Governments to work out procedures for putting whatever agreement is reached into effect within three months. Its sole purpose is to say, as has been said in the past, that when agreement on demilitarization is reached, that agreement ought rapidly to be translated into action. 74. Such then are the purposes and hopes that lie behind our action in joining in sponsorship of the draft resolution. We recognize that the success of Mr. Graham's mission will depend on the co-operation which he receives from the parties. I am confident that this co-operation will be forthcoming. What we are proposing is a modest step forward towards the settlement which both parties have told us they desire. 75. In summing up my remarks I would point out that nothing in the draft resolution prejudices, or is intended to prejudice, the stands of the two parties on the various points at issue. On the other hand, it is only out of the exercise of compromises and a willingness to try to find common ground that the solution will be found. 76. I would like to appeal to the representative of Pakistan not to reject this draft resolution because of its request to Mr. Graham to make any recommendations which he considers desirable in connexion with part I of the resolution adopted by the Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948. I appeal also to the representative of India. Nothing would contribute more to a settlement, which is so much in the interests of both parties, than a reduction of mutual suspicion and hostility. Surely the first and Illost efIedive step in this direction would be - in the words of the draft resolution - an agreement on a reduction of forces on each side of the cease-fire line. 77. It is the task of the Security Council to help to bring about an easing of tension and to foster conditions of mutual confidence between the parties in order that a solution may more easily be attained. That is the purpose which animates the United Kingdom in joining the sponsors of the draft resolution now before the Council. 78. It is the earnest wish of the United Kingdom to see a settlement of a problem which so troubles the relations between India and Pakistan. I therefore appeal to both Governments to accept any recom- 73. Au paragraphe 3 du dispositif, on prie simplement les deux gouvernements de cooperer a la recherche de methodes permettant de donner effet dans un delai de trois mois Et tout accord qui aura ete realise. Le seul but de ce paragraphe est de repeter ce qui a deja ete dit, a savoir que, des qu'un accord sera atteint sur la question de la demilitarisation, il devra se traduire rapidement par des actes. 74. Tels sont done les objectifs et les espoirs qui nous ont incites a nous joindre aux auteurs du projet de resolution. Nous savons que le succes de la mission de M. Graham dependra de la cooperation qu'il recevra des deux parties. l'ai la conviction qu'il obticndra cette cooperation. Ce que nons proposons est une mesure modeste, permettant de nous rapprocher du reglement que les deux parties declarent desirer. 75. En resumant ces observations, je tiens a souligner que rien, dans le projet de resolution, ne porte ou ne vise Et porter prejudice aux positions des parties sur les diverses questions litigieuses. D'autre part, c'est seulement en recherchant un compromis et en desirant sincerement trouver un terrain d'entente qu'il sera possible d'arriver a une solution. 76. le voudrais adresser un appel au representant du Pakistan et lui demander de ne pas rejeter ce projet de resolution parce que M. Graham y est prie de recommander toutes mesures qu'il juge souhaitables dans le cadre de la premiere partie de la resolution de la Commission pour l'Inde et le Pakistan en date du 13 aout 1948. le fais egalement appel au representant de l'Inde. Rien ne contribuerait plus au reglement du probleme, qui est de l'intef(~t des deux parties, qu'une diminution de la mefiance et de l'hostilite reciproques. 11 est certain que la premiere et la plus efficace des mesures que ron peut prendre it cette fin est, comme le dit le projet de resolution, un accord sur la reduction des forces deployees de part et d'autre de la ligne de suspension d'armes. 77. n appartient au Conseil de securite de contribuer au relachement de la tension et de favoriser la creation de la confiance mutuelle entre les parties afin qu'il soit plus facile d'aboutir it une solution du probleme. Tel est l'etat d'esprit dans lequel le Royaume-Uni s'est joint aux auteurs du projet de resolution dont le Conseil de securite est saisi. 78. Le Royaume-Uni desire sincerement le reglement. de ce probleme, qui trouble a tel point les relations. entre l'Inde et le Pakistan. le fais done appel aux gouvernements de ces deux pays pour qu'ils acceptent.

At this stage of the debate, my delegation wishes once again to restate its position on the question of Jammu and Kashmir and to clarify some matters raised in recent statements by the Indian representative. 80. In the first place, I should like to say that it could not reasonably be deduced from my statement of 29 October 1957 [7981h meeting] that my delegation had made a proposal. When the Indian representative said in his statement of 11 November 1957, "Supposing the proposition of the representative of Cuba was accepted" [800th meeting, para. 13], when he spoke of attempts to Balkanize India, and so on, he was taking issue with opinions my delegation had never expressed. 81. In the case of Jammu and Kashmir, when we speak of the self-determination of these peoples, we are not expressing an abstract concept of political law, we are merely using these words in their literal sense, which is very clear in Spanish. We refer to the right of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, taking into account what was previously accepted by the Governments of India and Pakistan, to decide freely, through an impartially held plebiscite, on their accession to one of the two countries. In political law we would call it a restricted right of self-determination, and that is literally, at least in Spanish, the right to decide freely between accession to India or to Pakistan. This seems very simple to us, and we have by no means forgotten the peculiar manner in which the States of India and Pakistan were established and the regulations which the British Crown and Parliament laid down in order to bring them into being. 82. When my delegation spoke of a plebiscite, which is something very different from an election, we used the words used by the Prime Minister of India in his telegram of 8 November 1947 to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, in which he said the following: " It will thus be seen that our proposals, which we have repeatedly stated are (1) that the Government of Pakistan should publicly undertake to do its utmost to compel the raiders to withdraw from Kashmir; (2) that the Government of India should repeat its declaration that it will withdraw its troops from Kashmir soil as soon as the raiders have withdrawn and law and order are restored; (3) that the Governments of India and Pakistan should make a joint request to the United Nations to undertake .a plebiscite in Kashmir at the earliest possible date." 79. M. NUNEZ PORTUONDO (Cuba) [traduil de l'espagnol] : La delegation de Cuba desire, a ce stade du debat, preciseI' a nouveau sa position sur la question de Jammu et du Cachemire et apporter en meme temps quelques eclaircissements qui lui paraissent necessaires apres les recentes interventions du representant de 1'lnde. 80. Il nous parait utile tout d'abord de declarer qu'on ne saurait raisonnablement deduire de notre intervention du 29 octobre 1957 [798e seance] que nous avons presente une proposition. Lorsque le representant de 1'lnde a declare, le 11 novembre 1957 : I( supposons que la proposition du representant de Cuba soit acceptee» [sooe seance, par. 13], lorsqu'il a parle de tentatives de « balkanisation ) de l'Inde, etc., il a combattu des opinions que nous n'avons jamais soutenues. 81. Lorsque nous parlons du droit des peuples de J ammu et Cachemire de disposer librement de leur sort, nous n'enonltons pas, en fait, une notion abstraite de droit politique ; nous pensons seulement it la valeur semantique de ces mots, dont la signification en espagnol est tres claire. Tenant compte de ce que les Gouvernements de l'Inde et du Pakistan ont accepte precedemment, nous faisons allusion au droit du peuple de J ammu et Cachemire de decider librement, au moyen d'un plebiscite organise en toute impartialite, de leur accession a run des deux pays. En droit politique, nous appellerions cela un droit de libre disposition restreint et, du point de vue semantique, nous dirions qu'il s'agit, du moins en espagnol, du droit de decider librement entre l'accession a l'Inde ou au Pakistan. Cela nous semble tres facilea expliquer, et nous n'avons nullement oublie les conditions particulieres dans lesquelles ont Cte constitues les Etats de I'Inde et du Pakistan, ni les reglements que la Couronne et le Parlement britanniques ont promulgue s a cet effet. 82. Lorsque nous parlons de plebiscite, ce qui est bien different d'une election, nous employons les termes meroes que le Premier Ministre de I'Inde a utilises dans le telegramme qu'il a adresse le 8 novembre 1947 au Premier Ministre du Pakistan et dont le texte etait le suivant : «( On constatera donc que nous avons propose it plusieurs reprises : 1) que le Gouvernement du Pakistan s'engage publiquement a faire tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour forcer les envahisseurs it se retirer du Cachemire; 2) que le Gouvernement de l'Inde se declare de nouveau pret a rappeler ses troupes du Cachemire des que les envahisseurs se seront retires et que 1'0rdre public aura ete retabli ; 3) que les Gouvernements de I'lnde et du Pakistan demandent conjointement a1'0rganisation des Nations Unies d'organiser aussit5t que possible un plebiscite au Cachemire.)) 84. For the foregoing reasons, my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted to the Council by Australia, Colombia, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Since the members of the Council indicated their general views on this question, we have had the opportunity of hearing further statements from the representatives of India and Pakistan. It seems timely, therefore, for the Council to consider what further steps might now profitably be taken. As an expression of our concern over this situation and of our desire to assist the Council in its consideration of it, the Australian delegation has joined with the delegations of Colombia, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and the United States in co-sponsoring the joint draft resolution contained in document S/3911, which was introduced this afternoon by the representative of the United States and supported by the representative of the United Kingdom. In view of the very clear explanations given by Mr. Wadsworth and Sir Pierson Dixon, I would wish only to offer, on behalf of the Australian delegation, some brief observations on this draft resolution now before us. 86. The preambular paragrapl1s of this draft resolution include several points which seem to us of special importance. First, the Council desires to place on record its appreciation of the assignment performed so ably by Mr. Jarring, the representative of Sweden, whose report is the occasion for our meetings at this time. Secondly, the Council records its appreciation of the statements of the parties that they are desirous of co-operating with the United Nations in finding a peaceful solution to this problem. Thirdly, it notes that the Governments of India and Pakistan recognize and accept the commitments undertaken by them in the two resolutions adopted by the Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. It is on the basis of these two resolutions that the Council's efforts of the past nine years have been guided. 87. The concluding parts of the preamble express our common concern over the lack of progress and stress the importance of the demilitarization of the State of J ammu and Kashmir as one of the steps towards a settlement. I think this preamble tlows very naturally from the views expressed around this table. 88. En ce qui concerne le dispositif du projet de resolution, je reconnais que ce texte ne donnera satisfaction a aucune des deux parties. Comme l'une et l'autre ont 88. Now as regards the operative paragraphs, I recognize that neither of the parties will be satisfied. It is natural enough that, after expending such efforts and 84. Pour les raisons qui precedent, la delegation de Cuba votera en faveur du projet de resolution que l'Australie, la Colombie, les Etats-Unis d'Amerique, les Philippines et le Royaume-Uni ont presente au Conseil. 85. M. WALKER (Australie) [traduit de l'anglais] : Depuis que les membres du Conseil ont indique, dans ses grandes !ignes, leur opinion sur cette question, nous avons eu l'occasion d'entendre a nouveau les representants de I'Inde et du Pakistan. Le moment semble done venu de nous demander quelles nouvelles mesures il y aurait interet a prendre. Afin de donner expression a l'inquietude que lui cause la situation et a sa volonte d'aider le Conseil a en deliberer, la delegation australienne s'est jointe aux delegations de la Colombie, des Etats-Unis, des Philippines et du Royaume-Uni pour soumettre le projet de resolution contenu dans le document S/3911, qui a ete presente cet apres-midi par le representant des Etats-Unis et appuye par le representant du Royaume-Uni. Puisque nous avons deja entendu les explications fort claires de M. Wadsworth et de sir Pierson Dixon, je me bornerai a formuleI', au nom de la delegation australienne, quelques breves observations sur ce projet de resolution. 86. Le preambule du projet de resolution comporte plusieurs points qui nous semblellt particulierement importants. Tout d'abord, le Conseil desire remercier M. Jarring, representant de la Suede, dont nous examinons en ce moment le rapport, de la fagon si competente dont il s'est acquitte de sa mission. En deuxieme lieu, le Conseil prend note avec satisfaction du desir sincere exprime par les deux parties de cooperer avec les Nations Unies pour rechercher une solution pacifique de ce probleme. En troisieme lieu, il note que les Gouvernements de l'Inde et du Pakistan reconnaissent et acceptent les engagements qu'ils ont pris dans les resolutions de la Commission pour I'rnde et le Pakistan en date du 13 aout 1948 et du 5 janvier 1949. Cc sont ces deux resolutions qui onc guide les efforts que le Conscil a deployes au cours de ces neuf dernieres annees. 87. Les dernieres parties du preambule expriment I'inquietude du Conseil devant l'absence de tout progres, et souligne l'importance qu'il attache a la demilitarisation de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire, dans laquelle il voit l'une des mesures propres a faciliter un reglement. J e pense que ce preambule reflcte fort bien les vues exprimces au Conseil. 89. I do not see that either party should object to our operative paragraph 1, though I suppose that each may feel that it has special application to the other. This is, however, a solemn appeal by the Council addressed to both Pakistan and India to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations. 90. Paragraph 2 touches on the delicate question of the progressive implementation of the Commission's resolutions, which both parties have accepted as the framework within which a practical solution of the problem might be found. The Council may recall that on 29 October, I stated that: "... it is a valid concern of the Council to resolve any doubts that may exist whether part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 remains unimplemented in any respect at this time." [798tlz meeting, para. 10.] This finds expression both in the first and second operative paragraphs of the draft resolution. We believe that the prospects of progress being made along the lines of the two resolutions adopted by the Commission for India and Pakistan will undoubtedly be improved, if the Council and the two parties can be assured that part I of the 1948 resolution has been fully implemented. Indeed it seems all too clear that without such an assurance there would not be much hope of proceeding rapidly with the implementation of part n, which is the next logical step. As I said in my previous statement, the Australian delegation shares the view "... that within the framework of the Commission's resolutions and of the Security Council's own discussions and resolutions on the subject, a further investigation should now be made· on whether some progress can be attempted on the problem of demilitarization in Kashmir." (Ibid., para. 11.] 91. These are the immediate objects of the draft resolution. To help the parties towards them, the Council requests the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, Dr. Frank P. Graham, once more to place himself at the service of the Council and calls upon the parties to co-operate with him. Dr. Graham is asked to report to the Council on his efforts as soon as possible. He has been left discretion and flexibility because we have great confidence in his expcrience and his intimate knowledge of the issues. 92. I would hope that the parties will accept this draft resolution in the spirit in which it is proposed, that is, in the hope and belief that some forward steps on this matter can and should be taken at this time. '93. Mr. ARAUJO (Colombia) (translated from .spanish): My delegation has listened with particular 89. Je pense qu'aucune des parties n'a d'objection contre le paragraphe 1 du dispositif, bien que chacune d'elles pense peut-etre que ce paragraphe s'applique surtout a I'autre. C'est cependant un appel solennel que le Conseil adresse a l'Inde et au Pakistan pour qu'elles aident it creer et a maintenir un climat propice a de nouvelles negociations. 90. Le paragraphe 2 porte sur la question delicate de I'application progressive des resolutions de la Commission que les deux parties ont acceptees Comme base de reglement pratique du probleme. Le Conseil se souviendra que j'avais declare, a la seance du 29 octobre : «Le Conseil est fonde a essayer de dissiper tous les doutes qui peuvent exister sur le point de savoir si, a quelque egard que ce soit, la premiere partie de la resolution du 13 aolit 1948 n'a pas encore ete appliquee.» [798e seance, par. 10.] Cette idee trouve expression dans les paragraphes 1 et 2 du dispositif du projet de resolution. Nous estimon5 que I'on aura assurement plus de chances de realiser des progres dans I'application des deux resolutions de la Commission pour I'lnde et le Pakistan si le Conseil et les deux parties peuvent etre assures que la premiere partie de la resolution de 1948 a ete integralement mise en ceuvre. Sans une telle assurance, il ne fait pas de doute que I'on ne peut guere espercr voir appliquer rapidement la deuxieme partie, ce qui est logiquement la prochaine mesure it prendre. J'ai dit, toujours dans la meme declaration, que ma delegation partageait le point de vue d'apres lequel, «Dans le cadre des resolutions de la Commission et des discussions et resolutions du Conseil de securite a ce sujet, il conviendrait de faire une nouvelle enquete pour voir si I'on peut tenter de realiser quelques progres en ce qui concerne la demilitarisation du Cachemire.» [Ibid., par. 11.] 91. Tels sont les objectifs immediats du projet de resolution. Pour aider les parties it les atteindre, le Conseil demande au representant des Nations Unies pour l'Iude et le Pakistan, M. Frank P. Graham, d'offrir une fois de plus ses services au Conseil, et fait appel aux deux parties pour qu'elles cooperent avec luL n charge M. Graham de presenter aussit6t que possible au Conseil de securite un rapport sur son activite. Nous avons accorde a. M. Graham toute latitude et toute liberte dans l'accomplissement de sa mission, car nous avons la plus grande confiance en son experience et en sa connaissance approfondie du probleme. 92. J'espere que les parties accepteront ce projet de resolution dans I'esprit dans lequel il a ete presente, c'est-a.-dire avec l'espoir et la conviction que des mesures nouvelles peuvent et doivent maintenant etre prises en ce qui concerne ce probleme. 93. M. ARAUJO (Colombie) (traduit de l'espagno.1J: La delegation colombienne a ecoute avec une attention 94. The draft resolution before us in no way, not even by a single line, changes the final goal which the Security Council has sought since 1948, with the express consent of the parties concerned, namely, that a solution to this problem should be found by means of a free and impartial plebiscite in which the peoples of Jamum and Kashmir would determine their legal status. The fulfilment of this fundamental premise will constitute what we might call the birth certificate of a new life for these two provinces, and the incidents that have occurred have done nothing to invalidate all the proposals and resolutions adopted by the Security Council, which also reflect the position always held by the Colombian delegation in this matter. 95. Now we are entrusting to the skill, the intelligence, the authority and the recognized experience of Mr. Graham the task of approaching the two disputing Governments in order to diminish the areas of disagreement and to bring closer the goal I referred to previously. It is necessary, of course - and this is a basic prerequisite of the proposal which we are cosponsoring - that the two parties should co-operate sincerely and in a real spirit of understanding with Mr. Graham. 96. My delegation trusts that the resentment and differences to which our proposal may at times have given rise will disappear without leaving any trace of bitterness. 97. So far, we have heard no other proposal which would serve peace and the settlement we have in mind so well. Therefore, until some other proposal within the framework, the limitations, and the approach laid down by the Security Council is presented to us, we must hope that the Council will give this proposal its unanimous support.

The consideration of the present item on the agenda of the Security Council, namely, the India-Pakistan question, began on. 6 January 1948. As an item of our agenda. the IndIa- Pakistan question is unique in two respects. In the first place it is the only territorial dispute between two Asian'States on the books of the United Nations. In the second place, this question has lasted longer .than any other territorial dispute before the United Nations. 94. Le projet de resolution dont le Conseil est sais ne s'ecarte pas en quoi que ce soit du but final que depuis 1948, le Conseil de securite s'efforce d'atteindre avec l'assentiment expres des parties au litige, a savoir la solution du probleme par un plebiscite imparthil et libre qui permettra aux populations du Jammu et Cachemire de cboisir leur statut juridique. La realisation de cette preoccupation fondamentale constituera en quelque sorte 1'acte de naissance d'une vie nouvelle pour ces provinces, et les incidents qui sont survenus n'ont nullement affecte toutes les propositions et toutes les resolutions que le Conseil de securite a adoptees, qui concordent avec la position qu'a toujours prise a l'egard de cette question la delegation de la Colombie. 95. Nous nous en remettons maintenant a 1'habilete, a 1'intelligence, a l'autorite et a la grande experience de M. Graham, qui s'entremettra entre les parties au litige pour reduire les zones de desaccord et nous rapprocher de ce but final dont je viens de parler. 11 faut naturellement - et c'est la un postulat de la proposition que nous a.vons presentee avec d'autres delegations - que les deux parties collaborent loyalement avec M. Graham et montrent un esprit de comprehension sincere. 96. La delegation colombienne espere fermement que le ressentiment et les divergences que notre proposition a pu parfois provoquer disparaitront, sans laisser la moindre trace d'amertume. 97. Nous n'avons ete saisis jusqu'ici d'aucune autre proposition qui soit, mieux que celle-ci, capable de servir la paix et de faciliter la solution que nous envisageons. Aussi longtemps que d'autres propositions ne seront pas presentees dans le cadre, dans les limites et dans la direction fixes par le Conseil de securite. nous devons esperer que le Conseil adoptera celle-ci, al'unanimite, je l'espere. 98. M. TSIANG (Chine) [traduit de Z'anglais}: L'examen de la question dont le Conseil de securite est actuellement saisi - la question rude-Pakistan - a commence le 6 janvier 1948. En tant que point de notre ordre dl1 jour, la question lnde-Pakistan est unique pour deux. raisons. En premier lieu, elle est le seul differend territorial entre deux Etats asiatiques. dont l'Organisation des Nations Vnies ait He saisie. En second lieu, c.ette, question est demeuree inscrite a notre ordre du josr beaucoup plus longtemps qu'aucun autre litige de: 100. I was by sheer accident asked by the President of the Security Council, General McNaughton, to speak. For very good reasons, I ask the President's permission to quote three paragraphs from my statement on that date. cc It was a pure accident that the President called on me to speak after the representative of India had spoken. I do not think the President had in mind that I desired to make a reply to the very grave and serious speech of the representative of India. However, I should like to take advantage of this present occasion to make one point, mainly to the delegation of India. The representative of India is disappointed with what we have done here. Whatever reasons he may have on that ground, I should like to call his attention to one fact: that, I think, the Security Council is right in recommending that the plebiscite should be free and impartial. I think, in emphasizing that point, that no member of this Council is guided by any prejudice. I think advocates of this idea are guided by the deepest concern for the welfare of the people there. "The plebiscite is right in itself. It has been announced and accepted by the Indian Government. We are not imposing anything on the Indian Government. If you agree to a plebiscite, it must be a free and impartial plebiscite. Furthermore, it seems to me that the announcement and the establishment of a scheme of a free and impartial plebiscite would be the most potent means to pacify the Muslims and the tribesmen. I cannot think of any other way of carrying across to the people in revolt the .. message that it is unnecessary for them to resort to violence and that, for their own good, they should stop violence as early as possible, because they will have n fair chance to decide their own future. "Therefore, as to that part of Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar's speech, I must confess I was somewhat disappointed. I hope that he will take advantage of his return to India to explain exactly to his Government the reasons why this Security Council hopes that a really free and impartial plebiscite will be held in Jammu and Kashmir."· [243rd meeting, pp. 72 and 73.] 101. Since that time, one material difference in the circumstances has intervened. On the day when I made the speech from which I have quoted, there was bloodshed and the threat of greater bloodshed. Now, 100. C'est par un pur hasard que le President du Conseil de securite, qui etait alors le general McNaughton, m'a demande de prendre la parole. Pour des raisons tres valables, je vous demande, Monsieur le President, 1'autorisation de lire trois paragraphes de !'intervention que j'ai faite ce jour-la. « C'est tout a fait par hasard que le President m'a donne la parole apres que le representant de l'Inde a parle. J e ne pense pas que le President ait cru que je desirais repondre au discours tres important et tres serieux du representant de l'Inde. Toutefois, je voudrais saisir cette occasion pour dire une chose qui s'adresse surtout a la delegation de l'Inde. Le representant de l'Inde est deQu par ce que nous avons fait ici. QueUes que puissent etre les raisons a cet egard, j'aimerais attirer son attention sur un fait : a mon avis, le Conseil de securite est fonde a recommander que le plebiscite soit libre et impartial. J e crois qu'en soulignant ce point, aucun membre de ce Conseil n'est guide par un prejuge quelconque. Selon moi, ceux qui preconisent cette idee sont inspires par le souci sincere d'assurer le bien-etre du peuple de cette region. «Le plebiscite est juste en lui-meme. Il a ete annonce et accepte par le Gouvernement de l'Inde. Nous n'imposons rien au Gouvernement de l'Inde. Si vous acceptez un plebiscite, celui-ci doit etre libre et impartial. De plus, il me semble que 1'annonce et l'organisation d'un plebiscite libre et impartial seraient les moyens les plus surs de calmer les musulmans et les tribus. Je ne con«ois pas d'autre moyen de faire dire aux populations revoltees qu'll est inutile d'avoir recours a la violence et que, dans leur propre interet, elles devraient y mettre fin, des que possible, parce qu'on leur donnera loyalement la possibilite de decider de leur avenir. « C'est pourquoi je dois avouerque j'ai ete quelque peu deQu par cette partie du discours de M. Gopalaswami Ayyangar. J'espere qu'll profitera de son retour dans l'Inde pour expliquer avec precision a son gouvernement les raisons pour lesquelles le Conseil de securite a 1'espoir qu'un plebiscite vraiment libre et impartial aura lieu dans l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire.» [243e seance, par. 72 et 73.] 101. I1 Y a cependant une difference importante entre la situation d'alors et celle d'aujourd'hui. Le jour OU j'ai fait le discours dont j'ai cite des passages, le sang coulait et mena<;ait de couler plus gravement encore. 102. Mr. Krishna MENON (India): In the explanations which you, Mr. President, and Sir Pierson Dixon kindly permitted me to make at the beginning of Sir Pierson Dixon's statement to the Council, I forgot to mention one point. This has to do with the draft resolution and the Presiden;t's ruling. I was not questioning that ruling. I was merely trying to point out that this document was officially before us; I was not referring to the contents. No disrespect of any kind was intended towards you, Mr. President, or towards the delegation of Iraq.

Thank you, Mr. Menon. 104. There are no other names on the list of speakers for today's meeting. If there are no objections, the next meeting of the Council will be held tomorrow afternoon - keeping in mind the schedule of the activities and meetings of the General Assembly. The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m. 102. M. Krishna MENON (lnde) [traduit de l'anglais] : Au cours des explications que vous, Monsieur le Pre- sident, et sir Pierson Dixon m'avez autorise it donner avant la deClaration de sir Pierson Dixon devant le Conseil, il est quelque chose que j'ai oublie de dire. Cela a trait au projet de resolution et it la decision du President. J e ne contestais pas cette decision. J'ai seulement voulu souligner que nous etions officiellement saisis de ce document; je n'ai pas pade de sa teneur. J e n'avais aucune intention d'~tre irrespectueux a votre egard, Monsieur le President, ou it l'egard de la delegation de l'Irak. 103. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Je vous remercie, monsieur Menon. 104. La liste des orateurs est epuise-e. S'i! n'y a pas d'objections, la prochaine seance du Conseil aura lieu demain apres-midi - compte tenu du programme des activites et des reunions de l'AssembIee generale. II en est ainsi decide. La seance est levee a17 h. 35. A,h~n••. GUATEMALA Sociedad Econ6mlca Financterc:l, 60 Av. 14-33, Guo'.mala Clly. HAITI lIbratrie "A la CarClvelle", Boile podale I J1-8, Part-au..Prince. HONDURAS Ubrerra Panamerieana, Teguclgalpa. HONG KONG-HONG-KONG The Swindon Book Co" 25 Nathan Road, Kawloon. ICELAND-ISLANDE Bakaver:zlun stgfular EymundllDnar H. F.• Austllrstraetl 18, Reykjavik. INDIA.INDE Orient langmans, Calcutta, Bombay, Ma~ dros.. New Delhi & Hyderobad. Oxford 800. & StoUonery Co., New D.lhl & Coleutta. P. Varadachary & Ca., Madro•. INDONESIA-INDONESIE Pembangunon, Ltd., Gunung Sohari 8,(, Dla1<orlo. IRAN "Guity", 482 Ferdow.i Avenue, leheran. IRAQ·IRAK Mocken2ie/s Bookshop, Baghdad. IRLANDE Stationery OHice, Dublin. ISRAEL Blumsteln's Bookstores, Ltd., 35 Allenby Rood, Tet A"lv. ITAlY-ITALlE L1br&ria Commlsslanarla SQntoni, Via Glno Capponl 26, Firenul & L"ngatevere Arnaldo do Bresela J5, Rama. JAPAN·JAPON Maruxen Company, Ltd., 6 Tori.Nlchame. Nlhonbo'hl, Tokyo. JORDAN-JORDANI E Jo.eph I. Bahous & Co., Dor.ul-Klltub, Box 66, Amman. KOREA-eOREE Eul·Yoo Publi.hlng Co., Ltd., 5, 2.1CA, Chongno, Seolll. I, LEBANON-L1BAN Ubrall'ie UnlveneUe, Beyrouth. LIBERIA J. Momolu Kamara, Monrovlo. LUXEMBOURG lIbratrle J. Schummer, luxembaurg. MEXICO-MEXIQUE Edltarlol H.rm... S.A., Ignoelo Morhcol .41, Mexico, D.F. NETHERLANDS-PAYS-BAS N.V. Mortlnu. Nljhafl, Long. Voarhout 9, 'I-Grovonhage. NEW ZEALAND.NOUVEllE-ZELANDE United Nailons ASJcciotlon of New Zea. lond, C.P.O. 1011, Welllng'on. NORWAY.NORVEOE Johon Grundt lanum Forlag, Kr. Au. gUltsgt. 7A, 0.10. BELGIUM·BELGIQUE Agence et Mesaagerlel d. ro Presa., S.A., 14.22, rue du PertU, Bruxelle•• W. H. Smith & Son, 71·73, boul.vord Adolphe-Mo)C, Bruxellea. BOLlVIA-BOLlVIE Ubr.rio Selecci~ne" Caallla 972, La Paz. llRAZIL.aRESIL linarra Aglr, Ruc Mexico 98~B, CalxCl POltal 3291, RID de Janeiro. BURMA-BIRMANIE Curator, Gevt. Book Depot, Rongcon. CANADA Ryerson PraSl, 299 Que." St. West, Toronto. CEYLON-CEYLAN Lake Hause Bookshop, Assoc. Ne:wspapers of Ceylon, P.O. Box 244, Colambo. CHILE-CHill Edltorl." del Podflco, A.umodo 37, Santiaga, Llbrerra Ivensl CalmCl 20.5, Santiago. CHINA-CHINE Th. World Boo1< Co., Ltd., 99 Chung King Road~ 1sf Sedlon, Taipeh, laiwan. lhe COMmerclcd Preu, ltd" 211 Honan Rd., Shanghol. C010MBIA-eOLOMBIE ltbrerCa Buchhol:r:, B09at6. tibreda America, Medeflfn. UbreJ'l'a Naclonol, lida.., Botlonqullla. COSTA RICA - COSTA·RICA ,Imprenta y lIblerCa lreioJ, Apartoda 1313, Son Jo.6. 'CUBA la Cala Belga, O'.Reilly ,(.5.51 la Habona. PECHOSLOVAKIA·TCHECOSLOVAQUII CeskoslovenlJtY Splaavotel, N6rodnf lrfda 9, Praha 1. DENMARK-DANEMARK E[nor Munksgaord, Ltd., N.rregade 6, Ktibenhovn, K. DOMINICAN REPUBUC:- REPUBLlQUE DOMINICAINE lIbrer(a Domrnlcona, Mercedes .4:9, CI\I- dad Truflllo. ECUADOR-EQUATEUR Libr.rra CI.nll'I"" Guoyoqull & Qulta. EL SALVADOR-SAlVADOR Manuel Navas y Cia., 1a.. Avenlda SUI' 37, San Salvador. ETHIOPIA·ETHIOPII Internatlol\csl P...... Agency, P.O. Box 120, Addl. Ababa. flNLAND-I'INLANDE Akateem.Jn.n KJrlakauppa, 2 Ke.kuskafu, Helolnld. fRANCE Edt!ions ~ Pedone, 13~ rue SouHlot, Pori. (V.). Orclen ancl TnquTtle. ',a", coll"'r;'.....h.re sal.. agent. haye >1101 yet been appoln'.cl may b. Nnl to: Sale. anel CircurcsHon .S.ction, UnUecl Na"on... New Yarle, U.S.A..; or Sale. Sedlo,,~ ,uni'ed Nation. O(l;l;e, Palal! d•• Notion... Geneva,' Swifxerlanel. [59B1) Le. commancl., .t demande. cle renseign.me"'. ~mananl tie p~~ o~ JI n'uirl. po. encore de cl~posi1r:l;re. pewent atre acl,e..6e. c\ 10 Sedioft clef vente. e' tie la cliffribufion, Organi.atIon des Nation. Unis., New·yorle (ffaf.·U"i. cl'A",.· rlqu.), ou c\ la S.d;on clef vente., Organisation cle. Nations Unie.., Polals cles Nation., Gen.v. (Sui...e).