S/PV.804 Security Council

The Philippine delegation has co-sponsored, with the delegations of Australia, Colombia, the United Kingdom and the United States, the draft resolution which appears in document S/3911. At the present stage which we have reached in the discussion of the India-Pakistan question, we are bound to consider what action the Council can take that would most likely promote a solution to the dispute. 1. M. ROMULO (Philippines) [traduit de l'anglais] : La delegation des Philippines a presente - conjointement avec les delegations de l'Australie, de la Colombie, du Royaume-Uni et des Etats-Unis - le projet de resolution contenu dans le document S/3911. Au point oil nous en sommes dans le debat sur la question Inde-Pakistan, nous avons le devoir de rechercher ce que le Conseil peut faire pour favoriser au mieux un reglement du differend. 2. One course of action would be to prolong the debate indefinitely. It would not be difficult to do this. The records of our current meetings, as well as of our meetings at the beginning of the year, show that the argumentation can proceed in an endless series of statements, replies and rebuttals, large portions of which have little or no relevance to the heart of the controversy. Obviously, the Council cannot follow this course, nor would such a course be in the long-term interest of either of the parties to the dispute. 2. Nous pourrions simplement prolonger le debat indefiniment, ce qui ne presenterait aucune difficulte. Les comptes rendus de nos seances actuelles, aussi bien que-des seances que nous avons tenues au debut de l'annee, montrent que la discussion peut prendre la forme d'une serie infinie de declarations, de reponses et de refutations qui n'ont tres souvent rien it voir, ou presque, avec le sujet de la controverse. Il est evident que le Conseil ne peut proceder de cette maniere et qu'une telle fac;on 'd'agir ne servirait it la longue les interets d'aucune des parties au differend. 3. Perhaps we could decide at a certain point in the lengthening series of rebuttals to bring the debate to an end without adopting any resolution Or by approving 3. Peut-etre pourrions-nous decider, it un certain point de cette longue suite de repliques, de terminer le debat sans adopter de resolution ou d'en adopter 4. Moreover, the Council did try, between the years 1952 and 1957, to submit the dispute to the process of direct negotiations between India and Pakistan. This method brought no satisfactory results. 5. The original complaint and counter-complaint by which the Council has been seized of this question may, of course, be withdrawn by the parties to the dispute. Or, the question may be removed from the agenda of the Council and brought to the floor of the General Assembly. In either case, action can be taken only on the express desire of the parties themselves. Therefore, unless and until there is a change of venue or there are positive signs that the question is being resolved through direct negotiations between the parties, the Council has a duty under the Charter to take necef;sary measures to alleviate tension in the disputed area and to promote a just and peaceful solution of the conflict. 6. Neither· India nor Pakistan can possibly desire that this question should fester indefinitely. We are equally certain that neither of them would seek a solution by means of a fait accompli either through force of arms or through failure of the Council to act. 7. It is in this belief that the Philippine delegation has joined in co-sponsoring the draft resolution before the Council. This proposal seeks, through the intermediary of Mr; Frank P. Graham, the United Nations representative for India and Pakistan, to explore the possibilities for further action in connexion with part I of the resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 [8/1100, para. 75], and to enter into negotiations with the Governments of India and Pakistan in order to implement part II of the resolution. 8. The spokesmen for India and Pakistan have affirmed that their respective Governments stand engaged by the Commission's resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 [8{1196, para. 15]. It is gratifying to note that, through the long polemics of this debate, nothing has been said to indicate that either India or Pakistan desires to denounce those agreements or that it considers itself absolved of the obligation which it has contracted thereunder. We have heard it argued that one party or the other has failed to abide by certain terms of the agreement, and we have heard it said also that the agreements may become progressively more difficult to implement because of the changed and changing elements of the situation in Kashmir. But neither India nor Pakistan has taken the position that the agreements have lapsed, as it were, by prescription and should, therefore, be regarded as null and void. On the contrary, we have received fresh assurances from both Governments that it is their desire to seek a solution of their dispute on the 4. D'autre part, le Conseil s'est effectivement efiorce, e'rltre les annees 1952 et 1957, de favoriser le reglement ue ce difierend par voie de negociations directes entre l'Inde et le Pakistan. Cette methode n'a donne aucun resultat satisfaisant. 5. Certes, les parties au differend peuvent retirer respectivement la plainte initiale et la demande reconventionnelle dont le Conseil a ete saisi. On bien la question peut etre rayee de I'ordre du jour du Conseil et renvoyee devant l'Assemblee generale. Dans I'un et I'autre cas, la decision ne peut etre prise que si les parties elles-memes en manifestent expressement le desir. En consequence, tant que la question n'aura pas ete renvoyee devant un autre organe ou qu'aucun indice positif n'indiquera qu'elle est en voie d'etre resolue par des negociations directes entre les parties, le Conseil a le devoir, aux termes de la Charte, de prendre les mesures necessaires pour diminuer la tension dans la region en cause et pour favoriser un reglement juste et pacifique du conflit. 6. Ni l'Inde ni le Pakistan ne peuvent reellement souhaiter que cette question s'envenime indefiniment. Nous sommes egalement certains que ni I'une ni I'autre des parties ne cherchera la solution dans un fait accompli, soit par la force des armes, soit en profj.tant de I'inaction du Conseil. 7. C'est dans cet esprit que la delegation des Philippines a participe a la redaction du projet de resolution presente au Conseil. Cette proposition vise a examiner, par I'intermediaire de M. Frank P. Graham, representant des Nations Unies pour l'Inde et le Pakistan, la possibilite d'une nouvelle action dans le cadre de la premiere partie de la resolution adoptee par la Commission des Nations Unies pour I'Inde et le Pakistan le 13 aout 1948 [8{1100, par. 75], et a engager des negociations avec le Gouvernement indien et le Gouvernement pakistanais afin de mettre en reuvre la deuxieme partie de cette resolution. 8. Les representants de I'Inde et du Pakistan ont affirme que leurs gouvernements restaient lies par les resolutions de la Commission en date du 13 aout 1948 et du 5 janvier 1949 [8{1196, par. 15]. Je constate avec satisfaction que, au cours des longues polemiques qui ont caracterise le debat, rien de ce qui a ete dit n'indique que l'Inde ou le Pakistan veuillent denoncer ces resolutions ou se considerent dispenses de l'obligation contractee aux termes desdites resolutions. Nous avons entendu soutenir que rune ou I'autre des parties ne s'etait pas conformee a certaines dispositions des accords; on a soutenu egalement que les accords pouvaient devenir peu a peu plus difficiles a appliquer en raison des changements qui se sont deja produits ou qui sont en cours au Cachemire. Cependant, ni I'Inde ni le Pakistan n'ont considere que les resolutions etaient devenues caduques par prescription et devaient, en consequence, etre considerees comme nulles et non avenues. Au contraire, ces deux gouvernements nous ont assures a nouveau de leur desir de 9. It was on this understanding that the Council decided in February 1957 to entrust Mr. Jarring with a mission to proceed to the sub-continent. It is on this same understanding that it is now proposed to entrust a similar mission to Mr. Graham. 10. The ultimate objective of both missions remains 10. L'objectif final de ces deux missions reste le the same, namely, to explore with the Governments of meme, a savoir etudier avec les Gouvernements indien India and Pakistan any proposals which are likely to et pakistanais toute proposition de nature a fa,ciliter contribute towards the settlement of the dispute. Under le reglement du differend. Aux termes de ce mandat this general mandate, and as a result of his initial general et a la suite de ses premieres conversations exploratory talks with the two Governments, Mr. Jaravec les deux gOllvemements, M. Jarring a decide de ring decided to address himself to the possibility of s'efforcer d'amener les deux parties a consentir a sougetting both sides to agree to cubmit to an arbitrator mettre a un ou a plusieurs arbitres ayant le pouvoir or arbitrators, with powers of recommendation, the de faire des recomandations la question de savoir si question of whether or not part I of the resolution of la premiere partie de la resolution du 13 aout 1948 13 August 1948 has been fully implemented. This a eM entierement mise en reuvre. Cette methode a approach failed, in the words of Mr. Jarring, because echoue parce que, suivant les propres termes empioyes the Government of India" did not feel that arbitration, pa,r M. Jarring, le Gouvernement indien « a estime as outlined by me, would be appropriate". [8/3821, que l'arbitrage, comme je le concevais, n'etait pas la para. 19.] procedure appropriee en 1'0ccurrencell [8/3821, par. 19.] 11. Mr. Graham would doubtless be equally free to Ill. M. Graham serait sans aucun doute egalement examine with the Governments of India and Pakistan /libre d'examiner avec les Gouvernements indien et any proposals whatever that would lead to the imple- . pakistanais toute proposition, quelle qu'elle soit, de mentation of the agreements embodied in the Comnature a assurer la mise en reuvre des accords enonces mission's resolutions. However, in the draft resolution dans les resolutions de la Commission. Cependant. [8/3911] before the Council, he is specifically requested dans le projet de resolution dont le Conseil est saisi to address himself to the question of the demilitarization [8/3911], il est expressement dema,nde au representant of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, in particular to des Nations Unies de consacrer ses efforts a la question "a reduction of forces on each side of the cease-fire de la demilitarisation de I'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire. line to a specific number", and to the formulation of et notamment a la question de «la reduction des forces an agreement to this end which is to be implemented deployees de part et d'autre de la ligne de suspension within a specified period. The proposal also calls on d'armes a un chiffre qui sera fixe... ll, et a l'elaboration both sides to refrain from any statements or actions d'un accord acette fin, cet accord devant etre applique that might aggravate the situation. dans un delai specifie. Le projet de resolution invite egalement les deux parties a s'abstenir de toute decla- . ration ou de tout acte qui pourrait aggraver la situation. 12. The specific character of the mandate given to Mr. Graham is fully in keeping with the statements made to the Council by the representatives of India and Pakistan. The current argument between the parties has turned mainly on the issue of whether or not the cease-fire agreement has been fully implemented and whether or not it has since been violated. The representative of India, Mr. Krishna Menon, has contended that Pakistan is guilty of such repeated violations and is responsible for hostile propaganda and provocative acts against India. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Firoz Khan Noon, has made similar accusations against India. 13. The proposal to charge Mr. Graham with the task of promoting an agreement between the parties on reduction of forces on each side of the cease-fire line and to call on India and Pakistan to co-operate with him on the formulation and implementation of demilitarization procedures is a logical and necessary answer to the mutual charges of violation that have been made here. And the request addressed to both countries to refrain from hostile propaganda or provocative acts 9. C'est dans cet esprit que le Conseil a decide, en fevrier 1957, de confier a M. Jarring la mission de se rendre dans la peninsule. C'est dans le meme esprit que 1'0n propose maintenant de confier une mission identique a M. Graham. 12. Le caractere explicite du mandat donne a M. Graham est entierement conforme aux declarations faites devant le Conseil par les representants de I'Inde et du Pakistan. La controverse actuelle entre les parties a principalement porte sur la question de savoir si l'accord de suspension d'armes a ete pleinement applique et s'il a ensuite ete vioIe. Le representant de l'Inde, M. Krishna Menon, a accuse le Pakistan d'avoir viole l'accord a plusieurs reprises et d'avoir mene une propagande hostile et commis des actes de provocation contre l'Inde. Le Ministre des affaires etrangeres du Pakistan, M. Firoz Khan Noon, a porte des accusations analogues contre I'Inde. 13. La proposition tendant a confier a M. Graham la tache de favoriser la conclusion d'un accord entre les parties sur la reduction des forces de part et d'autre de la ligne de suspension d'armes et d'inviter I'Inde et le Pakistan a cooperer avec lui en vue de l'elaboration et de la mise en reuvre d'une procedure de demilitarisation est une reponse logique et necessaire aux accusations reciproques de violation qui ont ete lancees ici. L'invitation faite a,ux deux pays de s'abstenir de 15. I would crave your indulgence, Mr. President, to address through you, to the representative of India, who I regret is absent this afternoon, a few words of gentle remonstrance. I value his friendship highly and I deeply appreciate his many acts of courteous consideration towards me. My Government maintains friendly relations with India and sincerely hopes that those relations shall prosper. It is possible that my Government's notion of where justice lies in this dispute may differ from that held by the Government which my good friend Mr. Krishna Menon so ably represents here. It is also possible that my idea of where the true and lasting interest of India lies in this dispute may differ from his. But it does not follow from this difference that our views are vitiated by motives that are suspect. 16. Si l'on suspecte nos motifs, c'est principalement, semble-t-iI, parce que nous appartenons a l'Organisation du Traite de I'Asie du Sud-Est [OTASE]. Il se trouve que ces soupl(ons sont justifies, mais pas dans le sens oil. l'entend M. Khrishna Menon. Dans la Charte du Pacifique, qui a ete adoptee en tant que partie integrante du Pacte de ManilIe, les Philippines etlePakistan ont pris, conjointement avec cinq autres pays, l'engagement solennel de defendre «le principe de l'egalite de droits des peuples et de leur droit a disposer d'euxmemes ». Cette obligation est partagee par les autres membres de l'OTASE qui, justement, sont egalement membres du ConseiI de securite, a savoir les Etats- Unis d'Amerique, le Royaume-Uni, la France et l'Australie. Mais comme cette declaration de principe est tiree textuellement de la Charte des Nations Unies, il est clair que tous les autres membres du Conseil, y compris l'lnde, sont egalement tenus de respecter le principe du droit des peuples a disposer d'eux-memes. 17. Finally, I would assure our distinguished friend 17. Enfin, je tiens a donner a mon eminent ami, le from India that my Government does not consider this representant de l'Inde, l'assurance que mOJ;lgouvernequestion as mainly or exclusively the concern of the ment ne considere pas la question comme interessant great Powers. Nor do we approach this question as principalement ou exclusivement les grandes puissances. an aspect of great Power relations with political under- Nous n'abordons pas non plus cette question comme si tones that might conceivably influence our judgement. elle constituait un aspect des relations entre les grandes All countries, great and small, have a stake in the / puissances, avec des arriere-pensees politiques qui, il principles involved in the dispute: considerations of est permis de le supposer, pourraient influencer notre justice and equity, the honouring of international jugement. Tous les pays, grands ou petits, ont un inte- 16. Those SuspIcIOns appear to rest mainly on our membership in the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Those suspicions happen to be justified, but not in the sense intended by Mr. Krishna Menon. In the Pacific Charter, which was adopted as an integral part of the Manila Pact, the Philippines and Pakistan jointly assumed with five other States the solemn undertaking "to uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples ". This obligation is shared by the other members of the SEATO alliance that also happen to be members of the Security Council, namely, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Australia. But since this principle was lifted word for word from the Charter of the United Nations, it is clear that all the other members of the Council, including India, are equally committed to the principle of self-determination of peoples. 15. Permettez-moi, Monsieur le President, d'adresser par votre intermediaire au representant de I'lnde, dont je regrette l'absence cet apres-midi, quelques mots amicaux de remontrance. J'apprecie hautement son amitie, de meme que les nombreuses marques de courtoisie qu'iI a r,1nifestees a mon egard. Mon gouvernement entretient des relations amicales avec 1'Inde et espere sincerement que ces relations deviendront plus cordiales encore. Dans le present differend, peut-etre mon gouvernement a-t-iI de la justice une idee qui s'ecarte de celIe du gouvernement que mon excellent ami, M. Krishna Menon, represente ici avec tant de distinction. Peut-etre n'ai-je pas la meme idee que lui sur les interets veritables et durables de I'lnde dans ce differend. Mais, de cette divergence de vue, iI ne s'ensuit pas que nos opinions soient viciees par des motifs suspects. 18. It is in this spirit that I would beg him to believe that during this discussion I have spoken to him as one Asian to another Asian, on behalf of a small Asian country speaking to a far greater one whose words and actions here, on this embittered question of Kashmir, can do much either to illumine or becloud our common Asian dream of a better world order of peace and freedom based on justice.

I have no more speakers on my list from among the members of the Security Council. Naturally I would have liked to speak in my capacity as representative of Iraq after all the members of the Council had spoken, However, as some members have not expressed a desire to speak, while others have shown a desire to speak only after listening to the two parties, I would like to take this opportunity to speak as the representative of IRAQ with the permission of the Council. 20. I have listened most carefully to the statements made by the representatives of India and Pakistan on Mr. Jarring's report [8/3821] as well as to the opinions expressed thereupon by members of the Council. During the present series of meetings as well as in the previous ones since Iraq was elected to the Security Council, there was occasion to review the whole history of the case with endeavours by both parties to the dispute to throw some light on the nature, origin and development of the problem. My Government, however, remains convinced that its views on the question, which were based on an objective appraisal of the facts connected therewith, are still valid. The ultimate goal has been and still is to decide the future of Kashmir by means of a free and impartial plebiscite, and the fundamental issue impeding the achievement of this goal has been the failure to create satisfactory conditions for carrying out the plebiscite. 21. A number of the resolutions adopted by the Council reflect the principles according to which a settlement should be sought. The series of endeavours made by the United Nations representatives up to the end of 1952 were directed towards overcoming the obstacles which stood in the way of implementing the principles initiated in the decisions of the Council. Although a number of years have elapsed since the Council had occasion to consider the question, Mr. Jarring has emphasized in his report that the basis for a departure on a new endeavour at settlement is still the two resolutions adopted by the Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, which both Governments consider binding. 18. C'est dans cet esprit que je prie le representant de I'Inde de croire qu'au cours du debat je me suis adresse it. lui comme un Asiatique it. un autre Asiatique, au nom d'un petit pays d'Asie parlant it. un autre pays d'Asie, beaucoup plus grand et dont les paroles et les actes peuvent largement contribuer ici, sur cette question du Cachemire qui est un tel sujet de dissensions, it. rendre radieux ou sombre le reve de tous les Asiatiques, qui se representent un monde meilleur de paix et de iiberte, fonde sur la justice. 19. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Aucun autre membre du Conseil de securite n'est inscrit sur la Iiste des orateurs. Naturellement, j'aurais aime attendre, pour prendre la parole en qualite de representant de I'Irak, que tous les membres du Conseil aient parle. Cependant, comme certains membres n'ont pas demande it. intervenir et que d'autres ont declare leur intention de n'intervenir qu'apres avoir entendu les deux parties, je prendrai la parole maintenant, avec votre permission, en qualite de representant de I'IRAK. 20. J'ai ecoute avec la plus grande attention les declarations faites par les representants de I'Inde et du Pakistan au sujet du rapport de M. Jarring [8/3821] et ce que les membres du Conseil ont dit de ce rapport. Tant au cours de la presente serie de reunions qu'au cours des seances qui ont eu lieu depuis l'election de I'Irak au Conseil de securite, on a pu refaire tout I'historique de la question, et les deux parties se sont efforcees de jeter un peu de lumiere sur la nature, 1'0rigine et l'evolution du probleme. Toutefois, mon gouvernement demeure convaincu que son attitude dans cette affaire, qui etait fondee sur une a.ppreciation objective des faits, demeure justifiee. L'objectif final est et a toujours ete de regler l'avenir du Cachemire au moyen d'un plebiciste libre et impartial, mais on se heurte it. un obstacle fondamental qui a ete et qui reste l'impossibiIite de creer des conditions favorables a l'organisation de ce plebiscite. 21. Un certain nombre de resolutions adoptees par le Conseil montrent selon quels principes on devrait chercher it. regler la question. Tous les efforts faits par les repreSj:lIltants des Nations Unies jusqu'it. la fin de 1952 tendaient it. surmonter les obstacles qui empechaient l'appIic:ltion des principes enonces dans les decisions du Conseil. Un certain nombre d'annees se sont ecoulees depuis que le ConseiI a eu l'occasion d'examiner la question, ma.is, a souIigne M. Jarring dans son rapport, on doit - si l'on veut tenter un nouvel effort en vue de regler la question - continuer it. se fonder sur les deux resolutions de la Commission pour l'Inde et le Pakistan du 13 aout 1948 et du 5 janvier 1949, par lesquelles les deux gcmvernements se considerent comme lies. 23. The main difference as presented by both parties centres around the augmentation of the forces after the cease-fire. This is a very real problem which, if true, runs contrary to part I, paragraph B, of the resolution of 13 August 1948. We have already stated our opinion in respect of the adherence of Pakistan to the recommendations contained in part I, paragraph B, and we do not wish to repeat it now. We know, at the same time, how much importance the Council has attached to the question of demilitarization and the great bearing this question has on reaching a settlement. In fact, the reports of Dr. Graham which covered his efforts to bring the two parties to agree to his twelve proposals [8/2375, annex 2] centred around solving the question of the quantum of military forces - that is, the specific number of forces which should remain on either side of the cease-fire line. His proposals, however, did not bring agreement between the two parties, and therefore the central point of demilitarization remained unsolved. This stage, it should be recalled, was reached by the end of 1952. The Council's resolution of 23 December 1952 [8/2883] failed to bring about an agreement, and Dr. Graham's fifth report [8/2967] provided a pointer to that effect. 24. We note that after a period of five years some members of the Council think it appropriate that a new effort for solving this deadlock should be made, starting from the point where it was left off in 1952. This approach is indicated in paragraph 2 of the operative part of the joint draft resolution [8/3911]. 25. Although it is our sincere desire to collaborate in finding some basis for advancing towards a settlement of the dispute, we feel, in the light of the arguments presented on the question of the military situation, that the joint draft resolution deals only partially with the real issue. Furthermore, we fear that the procedure suggested might lead to a prolongation of the existing state of affairs, as we are very much discouraged by the attitude of India, firstly, in respect of its assumed legal position in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and, secondly, by its effort at introducing a number of alien elements into the issue of demilitarization. For these and other reasons, we are inclined to think that the procedures suggested in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the operative part of the joint draft resolution, though following logically upon the elements which were previously envisaged in the general framework 23. Selon les deux parties, la principale divergence concerne le renforcement des forces armees apres la suspension d'armes. C'est hi un probleme tres reel, et, si l'allegation est vraie, ce renforcement est contralre au paragraphe B de la premiere partie de la resolution du 13 aoftt 1948. Nous avons deja expose notre opinion sur l'adhesion du Pakista.n aux recommandations contenues dans le paragraphe B de la premiere partie, et nous ne reviendrons pas sur ce point. En meme temps, nous savons queUe importance le Conseil a attachee a la question de la demilitarisation et l'immense influence qu'exerce cette question sur le reglement du differend. En fait, les rapports dans lesquels M. Graham parlait de ses efforts pour amener les deux parties a accepter ses 12 propositions [8/2375, annexe 2] portaientessentiellement sur le reglement de la question de l'importa.nce des forces militaires, c'est-a-dire sur les effectifs precis des forces qui deva.ient demeurer de part et d'autr~ de la ligne de suspension d'a.rmes. Cependant, les propositions de M. Graham n'ont pas reussi a concilier les deux parties, et, par consequent, la question fondamentale de la demilitarisation est demeuree sans solution. On en etait la vers la fin de 1952. La resolution du Conseil en date du 23 decembre 1952 [8/2883] n'a pas permis d'aboutir a un accord, ce qu'a note M. Graham dans son cinquieme rapport [8/2967]. 24. Apres cinq ans, certains membres du Conseil pensent qu'il convient de faire un nouvel effort pour sortir de l'impasse dans laquelle nous sommes depuis 1952. C'est ce qui est dit au paragraphe 2 du dispositif du projet de resolution commun [8/3911]. 25. Nous avons certes le desir sincere de. cooperer a tous les efforts que l'on fera pour trouver une base permettant de progresser vers un reglement du differend, mais, apres avoir entendu ce qu'on a. dit de la situation militaire, nous pensons que le projet de resolution ne traite qu'une partie du probleme veritable. En outre, nous craignons que la methode proposee ne contribue a prolonger l'etat de choses actuel; nous sommes en effet profondement decourages par l'attitude de l'Inde, qu'il s'agisse de sa pretendue situation juridique dans l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire ou de ses efforts pOUf introduire dans la question de la demilitarisation un certain nombre d'elements parfaitement etra.ngers au sujet. Toutes ces raisons nous portent a croire que les methodes suggerees aux paragraphes 2 et 3 du dispositif du projet de resolution commun, bien qu'elles decoulent logiquement des elements que 1'0n avait 27. The representative of Pakistan suggested very sound and practical methods for the solution of the question of demilitarization. He stated in his first statement to the Council: "In order to facilitate the task of th~ Security Council in demilitarizing Jammu and Kashmir as well as to end the long-drawn-out arguments about the implementation of the Commission's resolutions so far as Pakistan is concerned, I would urge that all troops, whether of India or Pakistan, should be withdrawn from the cease-fire line and a United Nations force be stationed on the cease-fire line to prevent any violation of the line. Alternatively, the Government of Pakistan would be prepared to remove immediately every Pakistan soldier on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line provided a United Nations force, strong enough to defend these areas and ensure their integrity, is stationed beforehand along the cease-fire line; and provided that India reduces its own troops to the level prescribed by the Security Council in its resolution of 23 December 1952 [8{ 2883]. India cannot objectto this course being adopted, which safeguards it from any possible attack from the Pakistan side. Nor should India have objection to a United Nations force being posted in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, which at present is neither Indian nor Pakistan territory, particularly since such a force will be stationed only on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line." [191st meeting, para. 79.] 28. These suggestions, in our opinion, are the proper answer to the deadlock of which Mr. Jarring spoke in his report, to the objections raised by the Indian Government on the specific question of the augmentation of military potential on the Pakistan side, and to the doubts expressed by certain quarters as to the possibilities of the Secu' • Council to settle disputes of an acute character. 1 as, furthermore, come from a party to the dispute - a fact which guarantees 100 per cent co-operation on its part. Last but not least, the implementation of such a plan. would uncover 27. Le representant du Pakistan a suggere des methodes pratiques et fort satisfaisantes pour regler la question de la demilitarisation. Lors de. sa premiere intervention au Conseil, il a declare: « Afin de faciliter la tache du Conseil de securite en ce qui concerne la demilitarisation de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire, et de mettre fin aux discussions interminables auxquelles a donne lieu la question de savoir si le Pakistan avait applique ou non les resolutions de la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Inde et le Pakistan, je suggererais que toutes les troupes, aussi bien indiennes que pakistanaLes, soiel1t retirees de la ligne de suspension d'armes, le long de laquelle une force des Nations Unies prendrait alors position afin d'empecher toute violation de cette ligne. Ou bien encore, le Gouvernement du Pakistan serait dispose a rappeler immediatement tous les soldats pakistanais qui se trouvent du cote pakistanais de la ligne de suspension d'armes, a condition, d'une part, qu'une force des Nations Unies, assez puissante pour defendre cel; regions et faire respecter leur integrite, prenne pl'ealablement position le long de cette ligne, et que, d'autre part, les effectifs des troupes indiennes soient reduits de fa~on qu'ils correspondent aux chiffres que le Conseil de securite a fixes dans sa resolution du 23 decembre 1952 [8{2883]. L'Inde ne peut elever d'objection contre cette procedure, qui la met a I'a,bri de toute attaque possible du cote pakistanais de la, Iigne de suspension d'armes. Le Gouvernement indien ne devrait pas davantage s'opposer au stationnement d'une force des Nations Unies sur le territoire de I'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire, qui n'est, actuellement, ni indien ni pakistanais ; et il devrait d'autant moins s'y opposer que cette force des Nations Unies ne prendrait position que du cote pakistanais de la ligne de suspension d'armes.» [791e seance, par. 79.] 28. Ces suggestions constituent, a notre avis, la reponse qui convient pour sortir de l'impasse dont M. Jarring a parIe dans son rapport, pour repondre aux objections du Gouvernement indien sur la question particuliere de l'augmentation du potentiel militaire du cote pakistanais et aux doutes exprimes par ceux qui se demandent si le Conseil de securite est capable de regler des difIerends graves. En outre, ces suggestions emanent d'une partie au differend, ce qui garantit que cette partie apportera son entiere cooperation. Enfin, I'execution d'un t~l plan revelerait les intentions 30. In conclusion, I should like to say that, in his statements, the representative of India referred to certain aspects of my country's foreign policy and tried to interpret certain engagements in a way which is completely alien to our understanding and intentions. I do not, however, desire to reply to his statements, as such a reply would be, as the statements themselves, irrelevant to the question we are discussing and would contribute in no way to its advancement. On the other hand, my country cherishes great respect and friendship for the Indian people, and we prefer therefore to overlook certain personal excesses. Since the desire of my Government isto lessen and remove the existing tension between India and Pakistan through the settlement of the Kashmir dispute, I feel certain that, when normal conditions are established between the two neighbouring countries, the Indian Government will view the efforts of a small country like mine in another perspective. Mr. Krishna Menon will find out that we are a people who could, as Shakespeare said, "feel the future in the instant". The future is always stirring beneath the surface of the present, and it is therefore those who live closest to their time that can surely sense the future.

Before I proceed, I should like to say a word about the slanderous attacks made on me personally by the representative of India in his various interventions, and particularly during his speech at the 803rd meeting of the Security Council. I take strong objection to his observations. I can pay him back in his own coin, but I do not wish to convert the Security Council into an arena for personal abuse and recrimination. I shall certainly answer him fully elsewhere. Here all I wish to do is to express the hope that debates in the Security Council will be kept within the bounds of decency, sobriety and good sense. 32. My delegation has carefully studied the draft resolution before the Council [8/3911] and has listened with great attention to the statement made by its 30. Pour conclure, iI y a, un point sur lequel je dois revenir : dans ses decla,rations, le representant de l'Inde a fait allusion a certains aspects de la politique etrangere de mon pays et a essaye d'interpreter certains engagements d'une maniere qui ne correspond nullement a notre interpretation ou a nos desseins. Je n'ai cependant pas !'intention de repondre a ces declarations, car cette reponse, comme les declarations eIles-memes, n'aurait aucun rapport avec le sujet et ne contribuerait en rien au reglement du differend. En outre, comme mon pays a le plus profond respect et la plus grande amitie pour le peuple indien, nous preferons ignorer certains exces de langage. Etant donne que mon gouvernement desire que, grace au reglement de la question du Cachemire, la tension qui existe entre l'Inde et le Pakistan s'attenue et disparaisse, je suis certain que, lorsque la, situation sera redevenue normale entre ces deux pays voisins, le Gouvernement indien considerera les efforts d'un petit pays comme le mien sous un jour different. M. Krishna Menon comprendra que nous sommes un peuple qui peut, comme l'a dit Shakespeare, « percevoir l'avenir dans l'immediatn. Le present la,isse toujours, en filigrane, appa,raitre l'avenir, et ce sont ceux qui vivent le plus avec leur temps qui peuvent le mieux prevoir l'avenir. 31. M. NOON (Pakistan) [traduit de l'anglais] : Avant d'en venir aU sujet, je voudrais dire quelgues mots des attaques calomnieuses dont j'ai ete personnellement l'objet de la part du representant de l'Inde dans ses diverses interventions, et en particulier dans le discours qu'iI a prononce ala 803e seance du Conseil de f'eCUT'lte. Je m'eleve avec vigueur contre les propos qu'i a tenus. Je pourrais lui rendre la monnaie de sa piece, mais je n'entends pas transformer le Conseil de securite en une arene ou se videraient les querelles personnelles. J e ne manquerai pas de lui repondre en detail, mais ailleurs. Iei, je me bornerai a exprimer l'espoir que les debats du ConseiI de securite seront maintenus dans les limites de la decence, de la mesure et du bon sens. 32. Ma delegation a etudie attentivement le projet de resolution dont le ConseiI est saisi [8/3911] et a ecoute avec la plus grande attention les declarations l r 34. I have repeatedly submitted earlier that there has been no augmentation whatsoever, so far as Pakistan is concerned, of the military potential in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. On the contrary, the evidence adduced by me in my previous statements shows that there has been a reduction, and indeed the facts given by the Indian representative himself confirm this conclusion. The fact that a substantial reduction has been made in the armed forces on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line has also been certified by the United Nations representative. 35. Regarding part I, paragraph E of the resolution of 13 August 1948, I have already stated that repeated appeals have been made by my Government to promote an atmosphere which would permit the peaceful holding of a plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. I reaffirm that my Government has made every effort to maintain, and has succeeded in maintaining, a peaceful atmosphere throughout " Azad " Kashmir as well as in Pakistan. I need hardly assure the members of the Security Council of our sincere and earnest efforts in this direction. Despite provocative propaganda emanating from the other side, we have done, and shall continue to do, our best to maintain a peaceful atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations. 36. In view of what I have stated, I cannot but regard it as a matter of profound disappointment that a reference to part I of the 1948 resolution should have been inclUded in the draft resolution. As I have said before, less than justice has been done to Pakistan by some members of the Security Council in their assessment of where the blame lies for the non-fulfilment of accepted obligations. 37. In the draft resolution, the importance of demilitarization in the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a necessary prerequisite to the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite has been recognized, even though the procedure suggested for the achievement of demilitatization is tardy. It is the considered view of my delegation that it is only through speedy demilitarization that progress can be made towards full implementation of the two resolutions by which both the 34. J'ai affirme a maintes reprises qu'il n'y avait eu aucun renforcement, quel qu'il soit, du potentiel militaire pakistanais dans I'Etat de Jammu et Ca,chemire. Au contraire, les elements de preuve que je vous ai presentes dans mes interventions anterieures montrent qu'il y a eu reduction des effectifs ; les faits cites par le representant de l'Inde lui-meme confirment d'ailleurs cette conclusion. Le representant des Nations Unies a lui aussi constate une reduction notable des effectifs du cote pakistanais de la ligne de suspension d'a,rmes. 35. En ce qui concerne le paragraphe E de la premiere partie de la resolution du 13 aout 1948, j'ai deja declare que mon Gouvernement a lance de nombreux appels pour que soit creee une atmosphere favorable a 1'0rganisation pacifique d'un plebiscite dans I'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire. J'affirme a nouveau que mon gouvernement a tout mis en reuvre pour maintenir, et a reussi a maintenir, un climat pacifique dans le territoire du Cachemire azad aussi bien qu'au Pakistan. J'ai a peine besoin d'assurer les membres du Conseil de securite de nos efforts sinceres et inlassables a cet ega,rd. Malgre la campagne de propagande et les provocations de l'autre partie, nous a,vons fait et nous continuerons a faire de notre mieux pOUf maintenir une atmosphere pacifique favorable a la reprise des negociations. 36. Pour tous ces motifs, je ne puis qu'etre profondement dec;u de constater qu'on ait crn bon de faire allusion a la premiere partie de la resolution de 1948 dans le projet de resolution soumis au Conseil. J'ai deja dit, et je repete, que certains membres du Conseil de securite, lorsqu'ils ont cherche a etablir les responsabilites en ce qui concerne la non-execution des obligations acceptees, n'ont pas fait entierement justice au Pakistan. 37. Le projet de resolution reconnait l'importa,nce de la demilitarisation de I'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire en tant que preliminaire indispensable d'un plebiscite libre et impartial, bien que la procedure suggeree pour realiser la demilitarisation soit fort lente. Ma delegation estime que seule une prompte demilitarisation peut nous rapprocher de la mise en reuvre integrale des deux resolutions de la Commission, qui lient ala fois le Gouvernement de l'Inde et le Gouvernement 38. We note that Mr. Frank P. Graham is being asked to enter into negotiations with the two Governments, in order to implement part II of the 1948 resolution and, in particular, to reach an agreement on the reduction of forces on each side of the cease-fire line. Mr. Graham ~ held in great respect as a highly principled negotiator of great integrity, wisdom and sincerity of mind; and we welcome his selection to discharge this important assignment. We note that the Security Council has called upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to co-operate with Mr. Graham in order to formulate an early agreement on demilitarization procedures. We, on our part, will not fail to give our fullest cooperation to him in the dischargeo f his responsibilities, and we very much hope that Mr. Graham will be successful in this mission. 39. I would add that we earnestly hope that the expression "as soon as possible" in operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution will be interpreted in its literal sense, and that the United Nations representative will be able to report back to the Security Council within a reasonably short period. We trust that no impediments will be placed in the way of the United Nations representative, nor co-operation withheld from him. We shall certainly do whatever we can to enable him to report to the Security Council at the earliest opportunity on the completion of his task. 40. The Kashmir dispute has now been before the Security Council for ten long years. It is in the interests of India and Pakistan, as well as in the interests of international harmony generally, that the dispute be settled amicably on agreed principles and without further delay. I seek the assistance of the Security Council in this happy result; and in particular I request the representative of the Soviet Union to let the processes of United Nations conciliation take effect as speedily as possible. 41. In conclusion, I submit that my Government, in accord with its constant desire to assist the Security Council in a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute, will, in spite of its serious objection to some aspects of the draft resolution, receive the United Nations representative, Dr. Graham, and accord him all courtesies and co-operation in carrying out the mission assigned to him. 38. Nous constatons que M. Frank P. Graham est prie d'entamer des negociations avec les deux gou- vernements afin de mettre en reuvre la deuxieme partie de la resolution de 1948 et, notamment, de faciliter la conclusion d'un accord sur la reduction des forces deployees de part et d'autre de la ligne de suspension d'armes. M. Graham jouit d'une grande autorite comme negociateur, il est repute pour sa hauteur de vues, sa parfaite integrite, son extreme sagesse et sa sincerite; nous sommes heureux qu'll ait ete choisi pour s'acquitter d'une mission aussi importante. Nous notons que le Conseil de securite a invite les Gouvernements indien et pakistanais a cooperer avec M. Graham pour parvenir sans retard it un accord sur les modalites de la demilitarisation. De notre cote, nous nous efforcerons de lui accorder notre cooperation la plus complete dans l'exercice de ses fonctions; nous esperons de tout notre creur que la mission de M. Graham sera couronnee de succes. 39. Nons esperons vivement que l'expression «aus- sitot que possible», figurant au paragraphe 5 du dis- positif de ce projet de resolution, sera interpretee lit- teralement, et que le representant des Nations Unies pourra rendre compte au Conseil de securite dans un delai raisonnablement bref. Nous osons esperer que le representant des Nations Unies ne se heurtera a nul obstacle, ni it un refus de cooperation de la part de quiconque. Pour notre part, nous ferons certai- nement tout notre possible pour lui permettre de rendre compte au Conseil de securite dans les plus brefs delais de l'accomplissement de sa mission. 40. Le Conseil de securite est saisi du differend relatif au Cachemire depuis dix longues allnees. Il est de l'interet de l'Inde et du Pakistan, comme de l'interet de l'harmonie internationale, que ce differend soit regie a l'amiable et sans nouveau retard selon des principes reconnus. Pour parvenir it cet heureux resul- tat, je demande l'assistance du Conseil de securite; en particulier, je demande au representant de l'Union sovietique de permettre aux procedures de conciliation des Nations Unies d'etre mises en reuvre aussi rapi- dement que possible. 41. Pour conclure, je declare que mon gouvernement, comme le veut son desir constant d'aider le ConseiI de securite it regler pl\cifiquement le differend du Cachemire, et malgre les objections serieuses que lui , inspirent certains aspects du projet de resolution, accueillera M. Graham, le representant des Nations Unies, et lui accordera en toute courtoisie son entiere cooperation afin de lui permettre de remplir la mission qui lui est confiee. La seance est levee a 16 h. 20.