S/PV.862 Security Council

In addition to the joint draft resolution submitted by the representatives ofArgentina, Ceylon, Ecuadorand Tunisia[S/4323J, the Council has before it the amendments submitted by the representative of the Soviet Union [S/4326J.

When I asked yesterday to have my name put on the list of speakers, I did so with the intention of saying only a few words, in order to explainthe French delegation's position in the forthcoming vote. Since then, the SOViet delegation has submitted some amendments. I shall therefore have to speak on those amendments also. 3. The draft resolution before us calls for certain comments on the part of my delegation. I should like to say a word or two, inparticular, concerning operative paragraph 3. The vote which I shall cast in no way changes the position which the French delegation has taken with regard to the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on these questions. My delegation has, moreover, noted with satisfaction the link established by the draft between disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests~ With that link, account is taken of the FrenchGovernment's argument that a prohibition of this kind is futile without genuine nuclear disarmament. Because ofthis conviction, France, as its Government has pointed out on several President: sir Claude COREA (Ceylan). Pr6sents: Les representants des Etats suivants: Argentine, Ceylan, Chine, Equateur, Etats-Unis d'Amerique, France, Italie, Pologne, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, Tunisie, Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques. Ordre du jour provisoire (SIAgenda/862) 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour. 2. Lettre, en date du 23 mai 1960, adressee au Pr6sident du Conseil de securite par les repr6- sentants de I'Argentine, de Ceylan, de I'Equateur et de la Tlmisie (S/4323/Rev.l, S/4326). Adoption de I'ordre du jour L'ornre du jour est adop~. Lettre, en date du 23 mai 1960, adresde au i~fesident du Conseil de securite par les representants de I'Argentine, de Ceylan, de l'Equateur et de la Tunisie (S/4323/Rev.1, S/4326) 1. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Outre le projet de r6so1ution commun presente par les representants de l'Argentine, de Ceylan, de I'Equateur et de la Tunisie [S/4323!Rev.1], le Conseil est saisi des amendements presentes par le repr6sentant de I'Union sovietique [S/4326]. 2. M. BERARD (France): Quand je me suis fait inscrire, hier, pour prendre la parole, c'etait avec l'intention de prononcer seulement quelques mots pour expliquel', dans le vote a. intervenir, la position de la delegation fran~aise. Depuis lors, des propositions d'amendement ont ete faites par la delegation sovH!ltique. Je serai done am.ene a. me prononcer egalement a. ce sujet. 3. Le projet de resolution qui nous etait soumis n'6tait pas sans susciter, je dois le dire, quelques :r'emarques de la part de ma d61egation. J e voudrais dire deux mots, specialement, en ce qui concerne le paragraphe 3 du dispositif. Le vote que j'emettrai ne change en rien l'attitude qu'a prise la delegation fran~aise au regard des resolutions qu'a vot6es, sur ces sUjets, l'Assemblee generale.·Ma delegation a releve, d'autre part, avec satisfaction, le lien etabli dans ce texte entre le desarmement et l'interdiction des experimentations nucleaires. Ce lien tient compte de la tMse cm Gouvernement franQais suivant laquelle pareille interdiction reste vaine en l'absence d'unveritable desarmement nu- 4. In my statem.:nt of 24 May [858th meeting], I expressed the deep regret of my Government and of public opinion in my country at the failure of the Summit Conference. The spirit in which the French Government approached thatConferenceiswell known. It was not my Government's fault that the Conference did not succeed. I need not recall the efforts made by General de Gaulle to enable the Conferencetobe held; the Soviet Minister for ForeignAffairs, whois present here, himself witnessed them. 5. Despite that failure, or perhaps because of it, the French Government, conscious of the hopes whichhad been aroused throughout theworld, wishedinthe statement of 17 May to emphasize its regret that the Conference had collapsed. In particular, it once again affirmed its unshakable conviction that all important international questions should be settled, not by the use or threat of force, but by peaceful negotiation. 6. My delegation found a reflection and confirmation of these feelings in the draft resolution submitted by Argentina, Ceylon, Ecuador and Tunisia. It noted that its hopes and those of the other signatories to the statement of 17 May were shared by other Members of the United Nations, andthatthe draft submitted to the Council was meeting with approval within our Organization. That was why my delegation decided to support it. 7. It was my understanding that the sponsors of the draft wished to separate it from the preceding debate and for that reason had made it a separate item of the agenda. They hoped that, once our debate had been concluded, a resolution of a general nature would be adopted, affirming the desire of the Council's members that the Summit Conference whioh had failed ten days ago should be convened a little later on, that questions connected with every aspect ofdisarmament should continue to be studied, and that the search for peaceful solutions should go forward in all fields. Accordingly, they aimed at a text which would be one of conciliation. 8. The first two amendments proposed by the Soviet delegation do not seem to us to be in line with what the four sponsoring countries had in mind. I would even say that they run counter to it. They attempt, in fact, to introduce into the text certain features which appeared in the Soviet draft resolution [S/4321]. They thus associate two questions which it had been sought to keep separate. They introduce an element ofdivergence and controversy into a text which was intended to express a unanimous feeling of good will. By the use of the words "threat to peace and international security", they tend, implicitly, to representtheflight of 1 May once again as an aggressive act, and thus to attribute to that flight a character which most of the previous speakers have denied that it possesses. The objections which prevented my delegation from voting 4. J'ai dit, d'autre part, dans mon intervention du 24 mai [858~me seance], les profonds regrets quia suscites, de la part de mon gouvernement et de l'opinion de mon pays, l'echec de la Conference eau sommet". On sait dans quel esprit l'abordait mon gouvernement. n n'a pas dependu de lui qu'elle n'ait pas reusSi. Je n'ai pas besoin de rappeler les efforts quIa deployes le g6neral de Gaulle pour que la Conference puisse se tenir. Le Ministre des affaires etrang~res sovietique, ici present, en a 6te lui-m~me le temoin. 5. Malgre cet 6chec, ou plutOt en raison m~me de cet ~chec, le Gouvernement franc;ais, conscient des espoirs qui s'etaient fait jour dans le monde entier, a tenu, par la declaration du 17 mai, l marquer son regret de la rupture. n a surtout affirme une fois de plus qulil demeurait inebranlable dans sa conviction que toutes les questions internationales importantes doivent etre reglees non par l'usage ou la menace de la force, mais par les moyens pacifiques de la negociation. 6. C'est un echo, une conf~rmation de ces sentiments que ma delegation a retrouve dans le projet de resolutionpresentepar l'Argentine, Ceylan,l'Equateur et la Tunisie. Elle a constate que son espoir et celui des autres signataires de la declaration du 17 mai etaient partages par d'autres Membres de 1'Organisation des Nations Unies et que le projet soumis au ConseU recevait dans les milieux de notre organisation un accueU favorable. C'est pourquoi elle a decide de s'y rallier. 7. J'avais compris que la volonte des protagonistes de ce projet etait de le separer du debat qui I'a precede et c'est la raison pour laquelle Us en ont fait un point distinct de 1'ordre du jour. ns souhaitaient qu'une fois termine le debat auquel nous avons assiste rot votee une resolution d'un caract~re general affirmant le souhait des membres du Conseil de voir se. reunir un peu plus tard la Conf~rence "au sommet" qui n'a pu aboutir il y a 10 jours, se poursuivre l'etude des questions interessant le desarmement sous tous ses aspects et s'affirmer dans tous les domaines la recherche .de solutions pacifiques. ns cherchaient donc une motion d'apaisement. 8. Les deux premiers amendements proposes par la delegation sovietique ne nous semblent pas repondre aux preoccupations des auteurs de ce projet de resolution. Je dirai m@me qu'ils vont a leur encontre. Us visent, en effet, a. inserer dans ce texte certains des elements qui etaient contenus dans le projet sovietique [S/4321]. ns m@lent donc deux questions que l'on voulait separer. ns intraduisent un element de divergence ou de controverse dans un texte dont on voulait qu'il exprimat un sentiment de bonne volonte lIn8nime. En parlant de menace pour la paix et la securite internationales, ils tendent implicitement a. presenter de nouveau comme agTessif le vol du 1er mai, lui donnant ainsi un caract~re que la plupart des orateurs que nous avons entendus refusent de lui reconnaftre. Les

The draft resolution presented by the delegations of Argentina, Ceylon, E.cuador and Tunisia belongs to a category of res.olutions which we encounter only too often in the course of our proceedings and which arouse rather mixed feelings. I have no doubt that this draft reflects the serious concern of the above-mentioned delegations in connexion with the international situation. They have, I am sure, been motivatedbythebest intentions. 12. We have to admitthatthedraftresolutionincludes a number of reasonable thoughts andthatmost of them taken separately are convincing. But taken as awhole, the draft resolution cannot fulfil the hopes ofits sponsors and unfortunately cannot bring about any improvement in the international situation. There are a number of reasons for the shortcorilings of this draft resolution. I should like to analyse brieflythosewhich the Polish delegation considers to be of real importance. bri~vement celles que la delegation polonaise juge vraiment importantes. 13. Tout d'abord, nons estimons que l'ensemble de la proposition est fort loin de la realite, de la situation telle qu'elle se presente aujourd'hui et des 6v6nements des dern1~res semaines. Quiconque imaginerait qu'aprl'ls toutes les journees dramatiques 13. Firstly. we feel that the whole proposal is divorced from reality, from the situation as it stands today, and from the happenings of the past weeks. If anybody imagines that after all the dramatic and difficult days, which the whole world has so recently 14. In order to be able to return to the rule of law and justice, one has to bear certain consequences resulting from the fact that grave errors have been committed and the rule of law violated. But as we have witnessed here during the debate in the Security Council, the United States Government does not seem to see its way towards such a solution. 15. Political documents have to be judged not only by what they contain but very often by what they lack. In the four-Power draft resolution there is no attempt to clarify, or even to modify partially, the causes for the tension which arose in the world within the last three weeks, On the contrary, the resolution tries to sweep under the carpet a situation which, if not solved, may become truly dangerous and menacing. 16. The 'first paragraph of the preamble underlines the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance af peace and security. But only yesterday the Council proved clearly that it is avoiding this responsibility. The Council was squarely faced with the duty of condemning a case of violation of internationallaw, by both the United States Air Force and the United States Government, which did not admit that it was wrong in violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the USSR and raised it to the rank of its official policy. The Security Council did not see its way to condemn this behaviour and never even demanded that these actions should never be repeated in the future. 17. The draft resolution completely ignores all of this. But it expresses its regret at the fact that the present situation could lead to an increase in tension and that it endangers peace. Again, a just and true statement. But in order to prevent a situation from getting out of hand, one has to change it. 18. In its operative part the draft resolution appeals to countries and demands that they should refrain from any move which might increase tension. The draft resolution bears the date of 23 May, but on 25 May the President of the United States made a speech which unfortunately contributes to a further deterioration of the international situation. The Head of the United States Government not only refrained from the announcement of a return to the respect for other countries' sovereignty and territorial integrity but simply confirmed his intention of further official and open espionage actions. The means will be changed, but the aims remain the same. 19. The Security Council did not even take noUce of th.is fact, and now the draft resolution completely ignores it and pretends that nothing new has happened. The draft resolution, in one of its paragraphs, mentions rules of international law, but it does it in a vague and ambiguous way. It seems tous that it should 15. Les documents politiques doivent ~tre juges, non seulement d'apr~s ce qu'ils contiennent, mais tr~s souvent d'apr~s ce qui leur manque. Le projet de resolution des quatre puissances n'essaie pas de dissiper ou m~me de modifier wrtiellementles causes de la tension qui s'estfaitjourdansle monde au cours des trois derni~res semaines. Au contraire, la resolution cherche ~ camoufler un probl~me qui, s'il n'est pas regIe, risque de devenirvraimentdangereux: et menaQant. 16. Le premier alinea du preambule souligne la responsabilite qui incombe au Conseil de securite pour le maintien de la paix et de la securite. Mais, hier encore, le Conseil a donne la preuve qu'iI eludait cette responsabilite. Le Conseil se trouvait place categoriquement devant le devoir de condamner une violation du droit international commise ~ la fois par l'armee de l'air des Etats-Unis et par le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis qui n'a pas reconnu qu'il a eu tort de violer la souverainete et1'integriteterritoriale de 1'URSS et qui a annonce que son acte etait un element de sa politique officielle. Le Conseil de securite n'a pas juge devoir condamner un tel comportement et n'a m~me pas exige que de tels actes ne se reproduisent jamais dans l'avenir. 17. Le projet de resolution passe compl~tementtout cela sous silence. Toutefois, il e~rime des regrets devant le fait que la situation actuelle peut entratner un accroissement des tensions internationales et met la paix en peril. Une fois de plus, c'est juste et vrai. Mais, si l'on veut emp@cher une situation de s'aggraver, il faut la modifier. 18. Dans son dispositif, le projet de resolution fait appel ~ tous les pays et leur demande de s'abstenir de tout acte qui pourrait accroftre les tensions. Le projet de resolution porte la date du. 23 mai; d~s le 25 mai, le President des Etats-Unis a fait un discours qui contribue malheureusement ~ aggraver encore la situation internationale. Non seulement le chef du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis s'est abstenu d'annoncer qu'il revenait au respect de la souverainete et de l'integrite territoriale d'autres pays, mais encore il a simplement confirme que son pays avait 1'intention de continuerafaire de l'espionnage officiellement et ouvertement. Les moyens serontdifferents, mais les fins restent les m@mes. 19. Le Conseil de securite n'a m~me pas pris note de ce fait et maintenant le projet de resolution n'en tient pas compte et pretend que rien de nouveau n'est arrive. Dans un de ses paragraphes, le projet de resolution fait allusion aux: principesdu droit international., mais il le fait de mani~re vague et ambigui!. 20. The amendments put forward by the Soviet delegation formulate precisely a specific rule based on the principle of sovereignty and in such a way wbich really cannot offend anybody. They simplyrestate that military aircraft should under no circumstances violate the air space of foreign countries. These amendments, moreover, reflect the opinion of the majority of the members of this Council expressed here during the debate. May I substantiate this contention with quotations from the speeches made by the sponsors of the draft resolution. Referring to the question of' flights over the territory of foreign countries, the representative of Tunisia had this to say: "The Tunisian delegation can only regret sincerely, that such flights have takenplace. Deeply attached to the well-established principles of international law, it is difficult for us to condone the violation of the air space of a sovereign State, whatever the reason for it may have been." [S/PV.859, para. 4.] The representative of Ecuador stated the following on 25 May: "We understand the anger which flights of foreign aircraft over its territory inspire in the Soviet Union. Such flights would cause equal anger in any country, no matter where they came from." [Ibid., para. 39.] - The representative of Argentina, in his statement of 24 May declared: "We wish to affirm our support for the principles of international law and our fervent hope that all States will regulate their conduct towards other States according to these principleg. In particular, we would like to emphasize that it is absolutely essential that the territorial sovereignty of every country, great or small, should be respected. We do not believe that any necessity can make it1awful or desirable for a nation to violate this rule, even for a brief period of time." [S/PV.858, para. 58.] Finally, our President, representing Ceylon, stated the following on 25 May: "As a Member of the United Nationswhich accepts the principles of its Charter, Ceylon considers that the territorial integrity ofeachState,largeor small, and the sanctity of its sovereignrights are inviolable and are guaranteed not only by the Cha,rter, but also by the universal acceptance of these principles. The observance of these basic and fundamental rights is absolutely necessary for the preservationofpeace among all nations. A peaceful and orderly society , is possible only under the rule of lawand the fullest compliance with international treaty obligations.' [S/PV.859, para. 51.] 21. There is a common denominator in all thesefour statements, a matter of principle reaffirmed in this 20. Les amendements presentes par la delegation sovietique formulent justement une r~gle precise fondee sur le principe de la souverainete et libelIee en termes qui ne peuvent vraiment offenserpersonne. ns rappellent simplement que des avions militaires ne doivent en aucuncasviolerl'espaceaeriendes pays etrangers. De· plus, ces amendements traduisent l'opinion de la majorite des membres du Conseiltelle qu'elle a ete exprimee au cours du debat. Permettezmoi d'appuyer ce que je viens de dire ~ l'aide de citati,ons prises dans les discours faits parles auteurs du projet de resolution. En ce qui concerne la question des vols au-dessus du territoire de pays etrangers, le representant de la Tunisie a dit ce qui suit: ItLa delegation tunisienne ne peut que regretter sinc~reinent que de tela vols aient pu avoir lieu. Profondement attaches aux principes bien etablis du droit international, il nous est difficile d'admettre la violation de l'espace aerien d'un Etat souverain, quelle que soit la raison qui l'a determinee." [859~me seance, par. 4.] Le representant de l'Equateur a declare le 25 mail "Nous comprenons certes que l'Union sovietique s'irrite de voir son terr1toire survolepar des avions etrangers. Semblable entreprise, quels qu'en soient les auteurs, susciterait partout la m~meirritation.It []bid., par. 39.] Le repdsentant de l'Argentine a dit dans sa declaration du 24 mai: "[L'Argentine] tient ~ exprimer sa foi indestructible dans les principes du droit international etson vif desir de voir tous les Etats mettre en accord avec ces principes leur attitude U'egarddes autres. En outre, nous voulons insister tout particuli~re­ ment sur 1'imperieuse oblig--..tion de respecter la souverainete territoriale de tous les pays, petits et grands. Nous ne croyons pas qu'aucune raison de necessite puiss'e rendre licite ou admissible la violation, m~me temporaire, de ce principe." [858~me seance, par. 58.] Enfin, notre President, parlant en qualite derepresentant de Ceylan, a declare le 25 mai: ItEn sa qualite de Membre de l'Organisation des Nations Unies acceptant les principes de la Charte, Ceylan estime que l'integrite territoriale de tout Etat. grand ou petit, et le caract~re sacre de ses droits souverains sont inviolables et sont garantis non pas seulement par la Charte, mais aussi par l'acceptation universelle de ces principes. Le respect de ces droits essentiels et fondamentaux est absolument necessaire au maintien de la paix parmi toutes les nations.L'existenced'une societe pacifique et ordonnee n'est possible que dans le respect du droit et que si chacun s'acquittede fa90n scrupuleuse des obligations decoulant des traites internationaux." [859~me seance, par. 51.] 21. n existe un element commundans ces quatre declarations, une question de principe reaffirmee au 22. It is now the ·principle, and only the principle, they contend they uphold, and not the qualification or the condemnation that they are now requested to consecrate in the amended draft resolution we are about to adopt. Therefore, this amendment seems to us essential. It wUl make the draft resolution alive and valid. It gives it political and legal significance. Provided the amendments are accepted, tlte draft resolution may become instrumental in the l'elaxation of international tension. For all these reasons, the Polish delegation will vote for them. 23. I strongly appeal to all delegations-if they are really striving to achieve anything at this sessionnot to reject lightly the Soviet proposal!:!, butto accept them in order to get a unanimous decision which may have beneficial results in the present strained world situation. 24. Sir ;E>iersonDIXON (United Kingdom): lexplained yesterday the reasons for which my delegation welcomes the four-Power draft resolution as a forward looking proposal which might help us to resume the solution of existing international problems by negotiation. The amendments which the delegation of the Soviet Union has now introduced, andI amat this point speaking of the first two of those amendments, would entirely alter the character of the four-Power proposal. 25. What do those amendments amount to? The language is different from that of the Soviet Union's own draft resolution, whichwas heavily defeatedyesterday, but the effect is the same. The wording of the first amendment in the context of the whole deba~e, in the context of the speech made by the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union yesterday andinthe contextof the rejection of the Soviet draft resolution, ineffectamounts to an attempt to restore the objective which the delegation of the Soviet Union has sought throughout these proceedings, namely a condemnation of the Unii:ed States overflights as aggressive and creating a threat to peace. 26. The second amendment, referring to the dispatch of aircraft into the air space ofother States, is a consequential amendment and, in its context, has the same effect. 27. Now during our long and fuli di",cussion of the Soviet item, it' emerged very clearly th~t the overwhelming view' of the Council was against the Soviet view. The Council did not accept the contention that the acts complained of were aggressive. Apart from 22. Or, c'est maintenant le principe et le principe seul, qu'ils pretendent d'ailleurs appuyer, et non la qualification ou la condamnation qu'on leur demande de consacrer dans le projet de resolution amende que nous somme'Tl sur le point d'adopter. Par consequent, ces amendements nous semblent essentiels. Ds donneront un sens et une valeur auprojet de resolution. Ds lui donneront une signification politique et juridique. A condition que les amendements soient acceptes, le projet de resolution pourra contribuer l la detente internationale. C'est pour toutes ces raisons que la delegation polonaise votera pour ces amendements. 23. J'adresse un appel pressant 11 toutes les delegations, si elies cherchent vraiment 11 accomplir quelque chose au cours de cette session, pour qu'elles ne rejettent pas 11la Ieg~reles propositions sovietiques mais pour qu'elles les acceptent en vue d'obtenir une decision unanime, quipeut avoir des resultats heureux, etant donne la tension qui existe dans les relations internationales A 1'heure actuelle. 24. Sir Pierson DIXON (Royaume-Uni) [traduit de l'anglais]: J'ai expose hier lesraisonspourlesquelles ma delegation accueille favorablement le projet de resolution des quatre puissances, qui montre la voie du progr~s et pourrait nous aider 11. reprendre la recherche d'une solutiondes probl~mesinternationaux par la negociation. Les amendements queladelegation de 1'Union sovietique a maintenantpresentes - jeveux parler des deuxpremiers de ces amendements - modifieraient enti~rement le caract~re de la proposition des quatre puissances. 25. A quoi se ram~nent ces amendements? Le langage employe est different de celui que l'on trouve dans le propre projet de resolution de l'Union sovietique, qui a ete rejete l une forte majorite hier, mais le resultat est le m~me. Dans le contexte du debat tout entier, dans le contexte de 1'intervention faite hier par le Ministre des affaires etrang~resde 1'Union sovietique et dans le contexte du rejet du projet de resolution sovietique, le libelle du premier amendement se ram~me en fait l une tentative d'atteindre par d'autres moyens l'objectif vise par la delegation de 1'Union sovietique tout au longde ce debat, l savoir une condamnation des survols effectues par les Etats- .Unis comme etant de nature agressive et constituant une menace Ala paix. 26. Le deuxi~me amendement, qui a trait Al'envoi d'aeronefs dans l'espace aerien des autres Etats, decoule du premier et, vu son contexte, recherche les memes resultats. 27. Or, au cours de notre examen prolonge et complet du texte sovietique, il est apparu tr~s clairement que la grande majoriteduConseils'oppose au point de vue sovietique. Le Conseil n'a pas admis l'argument selon lequelles actes qui faisaient l'objet 28. The moving of these amendments, to my mind, really goes to the heart of the matter. In Paris, as we contended, the Soviet Union was unreasonable in maintaining the complaints about the overflights as a reason for refusing to take part in the Summit Conference for which such lengthy preparations had been made. The reason it gave was that it would not take part in the Conference unless the United States Government, in effect, condemned its own actions. My delegation, and, indeed, I think most of the members of the Council, considered that this was a totally unjustifiable attitude on the part of the Soviet Union. In effect, what the delegation of the SovietUnionis trying to do by these amendments is oncemore to reintroduce the same impossible point of view which it failed to get accepted in Paris and whichworldopinionrejected when it yesterday rejected the Soviet draft resolution before the Security Council. 29. My delegation will therefore vote againstthefirst two amendm~nts. 30. As to the third Soviet amendment, which is an amendment to operative paragraph 3 dealing with the negotiations on various aspects of disarmament, this seems to me to be of a different nature. It does not seek to alter the basic contention ofthe original draft, but rather to substitute wording more closely approximating to the Soviet view of the disarmament question. I do not think it would be advantageous to embark on a detailed discussion of this amendment. It might, in fact, lead us into a disarmament debate which would be really quite irrelevant to the general question we have been discussing. And in the opinion of my delegation, the original wording of the sponsors is adequate in the general context of the draft as a whole. 31. The attitude of the Soviet Government in Paris administered a severe set-back to the process oftrying to solve international problems by negotiation. The tenor of the debate here andthe terms of the four- Power draft indicate how widespread is the hope that this process of peaceful discussion will be resumed.

Yesterday the Soviet representative declared that President Eisenhower, in his speech of Wednesday night, had said that the United States-and I now quote from Mr. Gromyko's speech of yesterday- "•.• intends to persist in its policy of military espionage and subversion against the Soviet Union, 29. Ma delegation se prononcera donc contre les deux premiers amendements. 30. Quant au troisi~me amendement sovietique, qui est un amendement au paragraphe 3 du dispositif concernant les negociations sur divers aspectsdu desarmement, il me paraf!; ~tre d'une nature differente. n ne vise pas i\ modifier l'argument fondamental du projet primitif, mais plutOt i\ substituer au texte actuel un libelle qui soit plus proche du point de vue sovietique sur la question du desarmemento Je ne crois pas qu'il y aurait avantage h se livrer i\ un examen detaille de cet am.endement. En fait, il pourrait nous conduire i\ un debat sur le desarmement qui n'aurait rien i\ voir avec laquestion generale dont nous avons parle jusqu'ici. Et, de l'avis de ma delegation, le libelle primitif des auteurs est satisfaisant, w le contexte general de l'ensemble du projet. 31. L'attitude quIa eue le Gouvernement sovietique i\ Paris a fait J;lubir un serieux recul aux efforts entrepris pour resoudre les probl~mes internationaux par la negociation. Les declarations faites au cours du debat institue ici et les termes du projet des quatre puissances indiquent combien est grand l'espoir de voir reprendre ces efforts de discussion pacifique. 32. M. LODGE (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) [traduit de l'anglais]: Le representant de l'Union Bovietique a declare hier que le president Eisenhower, dans son discours de mereredi soir, avait dit que le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis - et je cite M. Gromyko: "••• a. l'intenUon de poursuivre sapolitique d'espionnage militaire et de sabotage contre l'Union sovie- 33. Any honest reading of the President's speech of last Wednesday night shows that he saidno such thing. For one thing, the United states has never engaged in sabotage, and Mr. Gromyko cannot cite one instance of sabotage by the United States of America. The United States has alsonever engagedinacts of aggression, and Mr. Gromyko's resolution to that effect was soundly rejected by the Council yesterday. 34. The United States, in common with many other countries, tries to get information, and no war has ever been made to break out because of attempts to get information. The structure of the world is not perfect, but it is not so fragile that war can be made to break out because of attempts to get information. Please let us use words accurately, and, in a matter of this importance, call things by their propernames. 35. Of course, Mr. Gromyko knows all this just as well as I do. Why does he, thel'afore, say the reverse? Why does he continue to talk as though he regrets President Eisenhower's statement stopping theflights -because that is how he has been talking? Obviously it is because he has an ulterior motive. For some reason emanating from the obscurities of Soviet internal politics, he wants to have a pretext for a new zigzag in Soviet foreign policy. 36. It ia said of Communist agitators that nothing succeeds like fallure. In other words, they must have a grievance as a rallying point and as a pretext for what they do. Give a Communistagitatorwhathe wants and he loses bis pretext and he loses his rallying point. I suspect that it is rather inthis spirit that Mr. Gromyko appears to regret President Eisenhower's statem.ents ending the U-2 flights. I am surethis must be the explanation of Mr. Gromyko's astoundingdeclaration about PresidentEisenhoweryesterday. The only other possible explanation for his implication that President Eisenhower placed us on the brink of war is that Mr. Gromyko has taken leave of his senses, and I do not consider that this has happened. 37. Certainly all these phrases i1Hitlerism", "imperialism" and "the brink of war" cannot be taken at face value. There is a hidden meaning. Some sort of game.is being played here. In this gameMr. Gromyko wishes the pending draft resolution introduced by 38. The propqsed Soviet amendments are contrary to the declared intentions of the four sponsors. We hope the Council will reject them.

The Italian delegation has already explained in the debate yesterday its attitude to the whole of the draft resolution submitted by the four non-permanent members. We have now in front of us three amendments proposed by the Soviet delegation which seem to us to give another meaning to the initiative of the said non-permanent members. In fact, the three amendments, or at least the first two of them, are clearly meant to bring back into the pieture of our debate what has actually been voted down just yesterday. 40. As to the suggested draft for operative paragraph 3, its wording, in the opinionofthe Italian delegation, appears far less appropriate thanthatproposed by the four sponsoring Powers and it certainly does not reflect the decisions and the wording which on the very same problems have been adopted in the resolutions which were approved at the fourteenth sessionof the General Assembly. In other words, the Sovietproposals tend, in the opinion of the Italian delegation, to give another character to the draft resolution in front of us, the character of which Iyesterday defined as constructive because it aims at international {looperation and at general understanding and comprehension. They tend to injectagain a referenceto events which we have all amply debated andonwhich we have already pronounced ourselves. 41. The draft resolution is conciliatory in nature and positive in aims, and it is because of this character that we pronounced ourBelves in favour ofityesterday. The acceptance of the Soviet amendments would add a note with which we cannot concur.

Atyesterday's meeting of the Security Council, my delegation's attitude towards the resolution submitted by the representatives of four countries was set forth. Today, therefore, I have little to add to what has already been said. My additional comments will be made primarily in the light of what the representatives of certainStates said after my statement of yesterday about the four countries' draft resolution. 43. What is the main point of the Sovietamendments? The first amendment to the four-Power draft resolution reads: "Considering that the incursion offoreignmilitary aircraft into the territory of other States is incompatible with the principles andpurposes oftheUnited 38. Les amendements proposes par I'Union sovietique sont contraires aux intentions declarees des quatre auteurs. Nous esperons que le Conseil les rejettera. 39. M. ORTONA (Italie) [traduit de l'anglais]: La delegation italienne a deja. fait connm1re au cours du debat d'hier son attitude a. l'egard de l'ensemble du projet de resolution presente par quatre membres non permanents. Nous avons maintenant devant nous trois amendements presentes par la delegation sovietique qui nous paraissent donner un sens different a leur initiative. En fait, les trois amendements, ou du moins les deux premiers, visent nettement ! faire reparaftre dans notre d6bat ce qui, en fait, a 6t6 rejet6 par le vote d'hier. 40. Quant au texte propose pour le paragraphe 3 du dispositif, son libelle apparait, aux yeux de la delegation italienne, comme beaucoup moins approprie que celui des quatre puissances et il ne tient certainement pas compte des decisions et du libelle adoptes par l'AssembleE' generale, au sujet de ces m@mes probl~mes, dans les resolutions qu'elle a approuvees lors de sa quatorzi~me session. En d'autres termes, les propositions sovietiques, de I'avis de la delegation italienne, tendent a modifier le caract~re du projet de resolution dont nous sommes saisis et que j'ai qualifie bier de constructif, etant donne qu'il a pour objet la: cooperation internationale ainsi que l'entente et la comprehension generales. Ces propositions sovietiques visent a rappeler des evenements dont nous avons tous amplement debattu et sur lesquels nous nous sommes deja prononces. 41. Le projet de resolution est conciliant par sa nature et positif par les buts qu'il poursuit; crest pourquoi nous nous sommes prononces en sa faveur bier. L'acceptation des amendements sovietiques y ajouterait un element auquel nous ne pouvons donner notre accord. 42. M. GROMYKO (Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques) [traduit du russe]: A laseance d'bier, nous avons expose notre attitude al'egard du projet de resolution des quatre puissances.Ilnemerestedonc pas grand-chose a. ajouter aUjourd'hui~ Mes observations porteront avant tout sur ce que certains representants ont dit apr~s ma declaration d'bier sur le projet des quatre puissances. 43. En quoi consistent les amendements de I'Union sovietique? Le premier amendement se lit comme suit: "Considerant que l'incursion d'avions militaires etrangers au-dessus du territoire d'autres Etats est incompatible avec les principes et les buts des 45. The third Soviet amendment reads: "Requests the Governments concerned to continue their efforts towards the achievement ofgeneral and complete disarmament and the discontinuance of all nuclear weapons tests under an appropriate international control system as well as their negotiations on measures to prevent surprise attack". What is wrong or unacceptable about this amendment proposed by the Soviet Government, if there is recognition of the need for furthering negotiations among the Powers on all the issues mentioned in the amendment? The amendmel\t refers to general and complete disarmament. I wish to remind the representative of France, who spoke today, and the representatives of other States who adopt a guarded or negative attitude towards this amendment proposed by the Soviet Government, that the General Assembly itself approved the idea of general and complete disarmamentandthat the representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and Francevotedfor suchapproval in the General Assembly. Thus if the representatives of these three States and ofthe otherswhich, as I have said, adopt a guarded or negative attitude towards this Soviet amendment could vote for approval of the idea of general and complete disarmament in the General Assembly, why, one may ask, can they not vote in the same way in the Security Council? If they do not do so, they will necessarily be in contradiction with the attitude which they adopted in the General Assembly. 46. Moreover, in the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee, which as you know, has been meeting for a comparatively long period at Geneva, the representatives of the Western Powers in one form or another have supported the idea of general and complete dissi~gent au Conseil de securite prononcent mal le mot "souverainete" et encore plus mal certains mots employes pour defendre le principe de la souverainete nationale, c'est-h-dire 1'une des dispositions essentielles de la Charte des Nations Unies, qu'ont signee tous les Etats representes ici. 44. Notre deuxi~me amendement se rapporte h la m~me question, mais il interEI~seun autre passage du projet de resolution des quatrr.; puissances. C'est pourquoi, ce que je viens de dirt:l a.propos du premier amendement me dispense da m'etendre longuement sur le deuxi~me. 11 s'agit a aussi, sous une autre forme, de condamner la violation de la souverainete nationale d'autros Etats par1'envoi d'avions etrangers dans leur espaee aerien. 45. Le troisi~me amendement de I'Union sovietique se lit comme suit: JlInvite les gouvernements interesses hpoursuivre leursefforts en vue du desarmement general et complet et de la cessationde tous les essais d'armes liueleaires dans le cadre d'un syst~me de contr61e international approprie, ainsi que leurs negociations sur les mesures visant h prevenir les attaques par surprise". QU'y a-t-il lel de mauvals ou d'inacceptable si 1'on part du principe qu'il faut favoriser les negoeiations entre les puissances sur les questions mentionnees dans cet amendement sovietique? 11 est question du desarmement general et complete A cet egard, je voudrais rappeler au representant de la France, qui est intervenu aujourd'hui, ainsi qu'aux representants d'autres Etats qui aceueillent avec mefianee ou desapprouvent cet amendement du Gouvernement sovietique, que l'Assemblee generale - je dis bien l'Assemblee generale - a souserit i:l. 1'idee du desarmement general et complet, et que les representants des Etats-Unis, du Royaume-Uni et de la France y ont vote dans ce sens. Mais, si les representants de ces trois puissances, ainsi que ceux d'autres pays qui, comme je viens de le dire, aecueillent avec mefianee ou desapprouvent l'amendement sovietique, ont pu voter pour 1'idee du desarmement general et complet h 1'Assemblee generale, pourquoi ne le feralent-ils pas au Conseil de s~eurlt~? Agir autrement serait contraire h la position qu'ils avaient adoptee a. 1'Assemblee. 46. Qui plus est, au Comite des Dix sur le desarmemeht qui, vous le savez,-.a siege assez longtemps a. Gen~ve, les representants'~despuissances occidentales, sous une forme ou sous une autre et parfois, il est vrai, avec des reserves 10rsqu'U s'agissait 47. Further, what argument can be advanced against the Soviet Government's proposal that the Security Council resolution should include a reference to the necessity of continuing and promoting negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests? Those States which favour the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests should not have objected to that reference in the resolution. Why are there Governments represented at the Security Council table, other than the United States. which object to this amendment, despite, apparently. the fact that the question is so obvious and the Soviet Government's amendment so entirely justified? In our opinion, which would seem to be more or less generally shared. the only possible answer is that the UnitedStates Government and the militarist circles in the United States, which are acquiring ever greater influence in the determination of United States foreign policy. are erecting every kind of obstacle on the road to an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. The United States Government is evidentlypersisting in a policy designed to obstruct the signing of an agreement on the discontinuance ofnuclearweapons tests. 48. In any event. what we are Witnessing today does not indicate the readiness and desire of the United States Government to enter into an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. Apparently the United States Government andthe Pentagonbelieve that a resumption of nuclear weapons tests will give the United States an advantage over the Soviet Union. That is the only possible explanation of the United States position on this question. Yetthese calculations may not necessarily prove to be right. Apparently it is thought in the United States that, should atomic and hydrogen weapons tests be resumed, the UnitedStates will take the lead in the perfection of these weapons (if indeed it is permissible to use the word "perfection" in reference to such frightful things as atomic and hydrogen weapons). But, I repeat, these calculations may not necessarily prove correct. Exactly the opposite may occur; the United States may not take the lead at all. If the United States wrecks an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests and is going to resume these tests, the Soviet Union will also resume testing, since it will be placed in a position where it will have no alternative butto do so. 49. The SovietGovernment's amendmentindicates the need, in the Security Council resolution, ofa statement in favour of negotiations on the prevention ofsurprise attack. One may well ask what is unacceptable about an amendment containing that point, even to theUnited States Government. Is the prevention of surprise attack not emphasized in one form or another-of late, almost daily-in statements by the United States Government and President Eisenhower personally? However, there is absolutely no need to remind the Soviet Government of the importance of preventing surprise attack, because it has always maintainedthatanagree- ~ New York? L~ encore. crest impossible, ~ moins que les gouvernements de certains Etats ne contredisent la position qu'ils ont prise au cours des negociations de Gen~ve sur le desarmement. 47. D'autre part. que peut-on reprocher ~ la proposition du Gouvernement sovietique tendant ~ ce que la resolution du Conseil de securite souligne la neces·' site de poursuivre et de favoriser les negociations sur la cessation des essais d'armes nucleaires? Les Etats qui jugent indispensable de mettre fin aux essais d'armes atomiques et ~ l'hydrog~nene devraient pas s'opposer ~ ce que la resolution le mentionne. Mais comment se fait-il que. bien que la question soit extremement claire et que l'amendement du Gouvernement sovietique soit parfaitement fonde, il se trouve des gouvernements representes au Conseil de securite - autres que lee Etats-Unis - qui s'opposent A cet amendement? Cela s'explique, A notre avis, et il me semble que cette explication s'impose plus ou moins Atous. uniquementpar le fait que le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis et tous les milieux militaristes americains qui exercent de plus en plus d'emprise sur la politique etrang~re des Etats-Unis dressent tous les obstacles possibles sur la voie d'un accord concernant la cessation des essais d'armes nucleaires. Apparemment.le Gouvernementdes Etats- Unis continue de s'ingenier Ane pas signer d'accord sur la cessation des essais. 48. Quoi qu'il en soit, les evenements auxquels nous assistons aujourd'hui n'indiquent gu~re. chez le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis, la volonte ou le desir de conclure un accordsur lacessationdes 6SSaiS d'armes nucleaires. Apparemment.le Gouvernement americain et le Pentagone estiment que la reprise des essais donnera l'avantage aux Etats-Unis sur l'Union sovietique. crest la seule explication que l'on puisse trouver A l'attitude des Etats-Unis Acet egard. Mais leurs calculs ne se justifient pas necessairement. Les Etats-Unis estiment sans doute que, s'ils reprennent les essais d'armes atomiques et A l'hydrog~ne. ils prendront de l'avance dans le perfectionnement de ces types d'engins, 11 supposer que l'on puisse parler de "perfectionnement" A propos de ces armes terribles. Mais, je le rep~te, ces calculs ne se justifieront pas necel;lsairement. Le contraire peut seproduire: la premi~re place peut ne pas revenir aux Etats-Unis d'Amerique. Si les Etats-Unis, en faisant echouer l'accord sur la cessation des essais d'armes nucleaires. ont l'intention de reprendre ces experiences, 1'Union sovietique se verra dans 1'obligation de les reprendre, elle aussi. 49. D'apr~s l'amendement sovietique, il faut que le Conseil de securite, dans Sa resolution. se prononce en faveur des negociations sur les mesures visant ~ prevenir les attaques par surprise. Qu'y a-t-il lA d'inacceptable, meme pour le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis? Celui-ci et le president Eisenhower luimeme. surtout ces tempsderniers,soulignentpresque tous les jours, sous une forme ou sous une autre, 11 quel point il importe de prevenir une attaque par surprise. Mais il n'est nullement necessaire de le rappeler au Gouvernement sovietique, qui a toujours ete partisan d'une entente sur cette question aussi. 50. Despite the fact that the United States political leaders and the Head of the UnitedStates Government, President Eisenhower, emphasize the need for negotiations on this issue, and even attempt to use the importance of preventing surprise attack to jUstifythe conducting of subversive military espionage against the Soviet Union, it appears that the Soviet Government's amendment referring to the necessity for or usefulness of an understanding between States on this issue is unacceptable. Such a conception, such an attitude towards the Soviet Government's amendment, is anything but logical or consistent. 51. Any Security Council resolution which avoided all the main issues and, in particular, condemnation of the agr~ssive policy pursued by the United States Government in regard to the Soviet Union and certain other States, would be of little use in the matter and would not do much on behalf of the negotiations advocated, possibly quite sincerely, by certainStates and political leaders. The adopting of such a resolution, and the rejecting of the amendments proposed by the Soviet Government which sincerely wishes to improve the draft resolution submitted by the four countries, constitute a poor preparation for negotiations. 52. President Eisenhower's speech on major issues of international policy-and particularly on policy to-- wards the Soviet Union, on Soviet-United States relations-has a direct bearing on the whole question. No matter how hard the United States political leaders and representatives to the United Nations tryto justify that policy, with which the name of President Eisenhower himself is associated, it is our profound conviction that such a course cannot bring them success. 53. The representatives of members of the Security Council here present undoubtedly know that the Head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Khrushchev, and the Soviet Government as a whole have frequently said many kind things about President Eisenhower. The attitude of the Soviet people, the Soviet Government and our whole nation towards the people of the United States has always been friendly; it is friendly now, despite the fact that there are persons who seek to present the Soviet people's attitude towards thepeople of the United States in a distortedlight. As I just mentioned, many kind things were said about President Eisenhower. But how should we assess, now, theposition of the United States Government and of its Head, President Eisenhower, personally, when that Government has proclaimed the unheard-of, unprecedented policy of flagrantly violating the sovereignty of the Soviet Union by the incursion of UnitedStates military aircraft into the territory of the USSR? 54. This policy has been proclaimed more than once by the State Department wi~ as later became ap- 54. Cette politique a ete definie maintes fois par le Departement d'Etat, avec l'approbation - comme 12 50. Ainsi donc, bien que les dirigeants americains et le president Eisenhower, chef du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis, soulignent la necessite de negocier et tentent m~me d'expliquer leurs activites d'espionnage et de sabotage contre 1'Union sovietique par 1'importance des mesures V· .lJlt aprevenir une attaque par surprise, Us n'acceptent pas l'amendement sovietique qui tend II faire ressortir l'inter~t d'un accord entre Etats sur ce probl~me.Cetteconception, cette attitude du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis II l'egard de 1'amendement sovietique esttout ce que lIon voudra, sauf logique. 51. Si le Conseil de securite adoptait une resolution oil il eluderait toutes les questions essentielles, et avant tout la necessite de condamner la politique agressive des Etats-Unis d'Amerique II l'egard de 1'Union sovietique et de certains autres pays, cette resolution n'aurait gu~re d'utilite et ne favoriserait gu~re les negociations que preconisent, tr~s sinc~ rement peut-~tre, certains Etats et certains dirigeants. Ce serait mal preparer les negociations que d'adopter une telle resolution sans les amendements du Gouvernement sovietique, qui souhaite sinc~re­ ment ameliorer le texte des quatre pays. 52. La declaration que le president Eisenhower a consacree aux grands probl~mes de politique internationale et surtout aux relations americanosovietiques interesse directement la question qui nous occupe. Quelques efforts que fassent les dirigeants americains et les representants des Etats- Unis a 1'Organisation des Nations Unies pour defendre la politique liee au nom du president Eisenhower, nous sommes profondement convaincus qu'ils ne reussiront pas. 53. Les representants des Etats membres du Conseil de securite savent que M. Khrouchtchev, chef du Gouvernement sovietique, et le GouverIlement sovietique dans son ensemble ont prononce 11 maintes reprises des paroles bienveillantes II l'endroit du president Eisenhower. Quant II 1'attitude du peuple et du gouvernement sovietique envers le peuple americain, eUe a toujours ete et reste amicale, encore que d'aucuns veuillent la presenter sous l,Ul jour defavorable. Comme je viens de le dire, on a prononce maintes paroles bienveillantes a l'endroit du president Eisenhower. Mais que faut-il penser de la position actuelle du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis et du president Eisenhower lui-m~me, qui proclament une politique inoure, sans precedent, de violation grossi~re de la souverainete de 1'URSS, caracterisee par l'incursion d'avions militaires americains en territoire sovietique? 55. Thus, President Eisenhower has personally approved, and several times confirmed, the conducting of a dangerous policy of provocation in regard to the Soviet Union, so that this heavy responsibility lies not only with the United States Governmentbutwith President Eisenhower himself. I repeat, President Eisenhower has assumed a major responsibilityfor carrying on this policy. That cannot be forgotten, either by the Soviet Government or by the whole Soviet people. 56. President Eisenhower said openly that he was sorry the U-2 mission had failed. He regrets the failure of that mission. But it appears that this type of subversive espionage agaInst the Soviet Union will be replaced by others, of a more refinednature, for which the United States President has called. 57. Let the United States Government and President Eisenhower not expect, then, kind words from the Soviet Government, the Soviet people and their representatives. We have said, and we repeat, that the activities now being undertaken by the United States Government and President Eisenhower himself, and the policy being carried out by the United States Government, in regard to theSovi~tUnionaretreacherous and two-faced. Such a partner in negotiations cannot be a reliable one. 58. Such are the comments which I havefeltit necessary to make in completion of what we said yesterday concerning the draft resolution submitted by four countries for the Security Council's consideration.

There are no more speakers on my list, but I know that some of the sponsors of the draft resolution before us would like to speakin reply to the discussion which has takenplace. I would therefore propose that we adjourn the meeting at this stage and that, in order to enable these members to consider the situation as it exists at thepresent time, we meet again this afternoon at four o'clock, at which time we can have the French interpretation of the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union. I would like to state that it is intended to conclude this debate and take a decision on the draft resolution today. 59. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de 1'anglais): Il n'y a plus d'orateurs inscrits sur ma liste, mais je sais que certains des auteurs du projet de resolution dont nous sommes saisis voudraient prendre la parole ~ la suite de la discussion qui vient d'avoir lieu. Je proposerai donc que nous ajournions la seance pour le moment et qu'afin de permettre A ces membres d'examiner la situation telle qu'elle se presente A l'heure actuelle, nous nous reunissions ~ nouveau cet apr~s-:rnidi A 16 heures; on pourra alors nous donner 1'interpretation franQaise de la declaration faite par le representant de 1'Union sovietique. J e voudrais declarer que la conclusion du debat et la decision sur le projet de resolution sont prevues pour aUjourd'hui. 13 58. VoilA les observations que j'ai juge indispensable de formuler pour completer ma declaration d'hier sur le projet de resolution des quatre pays. Litho in U.N.