S/PV.931 Security Council

Mr. President, the delegation of the Republie of Guinea wishes to express to yo~ and through you to aIl members of the Security Council, our gratitude for the opportunity you have kindly given us to utter a final warning about the Congolese drama and to urge the United Nations to effect the radical change of policy which is Imperative if it wishes to save the Congo and to save itself. 55. We also take this opportunity to associate ourselves whole-heartedly with the welcomeunanimously extended to the new representative of the United States of America who has joined us; we are happy to assure Mr. Stevenson, and the Government he represents, of the great hopes which Africa, struggling for complete liberation, places in the action of the new United States Administration, whose clear-cut attitude towards colonialism and its misdeeds in Africa and elsewhere will undoubtedly be an essential factor contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security and, consequently, to the very survival of the United Nations. 55;- For the first time the SecuritY Council is called upon, at the request of uncommitted countries, whose position has been dictated consistently and solely by the interests of the Congolese people, to take a decision on the dramatic situation in the Congo. This meeting has been rendered necessary by events i~ the young African State: events punctuated by the illegal detention, arbitrary transfer and shameful treatment of Prime Minister Lumumba and various members of the Congolese Parliament and Government. 57. The gravity of these ev~nts, which mark a new phase in the steady worsening of the situation in the Congo and the progressive faUure of the United Nations operation in that country, must be apparent to alI. 58. The delegation of the Republic of Guinea, conscious of this alarming situation and anxious that a solution be found without delay, has joined the delegations of Ceylon, Ghana, Mali, Morocco, Libya, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia in asking the Security Council, in a last desperate attempt, to save 60. My delegation has always stressed that the problem in the Congo is not an institutional problem. or stiU less a problem of personalities. The problem with which the Congo. the United Nations and the world is faced is the typical colonial problem of today. the problem of the plot hatched by the colonialists and their allies against the African peoples. The Congolese drama is also one of the most important and most decisive phases of the struggle for freedom that has the entire continent of Africa in turmoil. assailed as it is by its oppressors on all sides. It is the struggle of African nationalism against a neocolonialism which is trying to thrust itself upon the new African States. to which. in reality, it is only willing to grant a ridiculous. humiliating and, consequently. unacceptable régime of freedom on probation. Finally, this drama is one of the last phases in the struggle of the African who has so long been crushed under the weight of secular colonial bondage which has assumed such varied, Machiavellian and degrading forms as the slave trade, numerous forms of genocide. systematic plundering. sham independence and "katangaism". 61. In spite of aU these trials, the African peoples have never despaired, have never given in. For, when faced with traitors and mercenaries of aH kinds in the service of the foreign oppressor, men, the authentic spokesmen of their people. have always come forward to defend the honour and the dignity of their country. Yesterday it was Ho Chi Minh against Bao Dai, Bourguiba against Baccouche. Mohammed V against El Glaoui. and so much could be said about the noble struggles of aH the heroes of the anticolonial campaign such as the Nehrus. the Nassers. the Nkrumahs, the Sukarnos, the Sekou Tourés and so many others, against the puppets created out of nothing by the foreigIJer in their respective countries. Today in the Congo. which is no exception to this rule, these men are, on the one hand. Patrice Lumumba and the Congolese patriots grouped around him and. on the other hand. the Kasa-Vubus, the Tshombés, the Mobutus. and aH the other African 'mercenaries who are "messing about" in the Congo in the pay of foreign Powers. 62. Whatever happens, the Congolese nationalists. headed by Patrice Lumumba, will sweU the honourE. ranks of the heroic "élite" of Africa fighting for the independence and unity of their country. These heroes, worthy of the glorious past of their martyred country. have resolutely undertaken to free their people from foreign annexation. They have decided, against tremendous odds, to recreate in their country a humane society in which oppression. injustice, fear and racism will give way to liberty, equality, justice and happiness for aU. The others, who are merely the mouthpieces of foreign domination. which is determined to survive at aU costs and under different 63. In the Congo, as elsewhere, history has already passed judgement and its verdict is unmistakable: colonialism will be defeated, dragging down aU the puppets with it in its fall. 64. For all these reasons, my delegation earnestly urges that the outcome of this debate should be a clear and simple choice. It is Ume, high time, that those who advocate Ubert}, democracy and peace should take up a stand in favour of the only solution likely to bring about national reconciliation, harmony and peace in the Congo, namely the restoration of legaUty in the Congo, which we have continuaUyurged throughout the preceding debates on this question, both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council. 65. We cannot repeat too often that it was to the appeal from the Congolese Central Government that the Security Council answered with stringent and unequivocal resolutions. It was only in the interpretation and execution of these resolutions that extremely serious shortcomings were revealed. My delegation has always claimed that this fundamental defect and this alone is responsible for the plight of the Congo and of the United Nations. To prove this, we have only to recaU some of the essential provisions of these resolutions, the first of which is dated 14 July 1960 [S/4387]. In it the Security Council caUed upon " ••• the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo •••" and decided: " ••• to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo •••"-1 repeat: "in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo"-" ••• to provide the Government •.•"-1 repeat: "to provide the Government"-" ••• with such military assistance .as may be necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces May be able, in the opinion of the Government •• •"- again the Government is mentioned-" ••• to meet fuUy their tasks;". Operative paragraph 2 of the resolution adopted on 22 July 1960 [S/4405] is worded as follows: "Reguests aIl States to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of the Congo of its authority and also to refrain from any action which might undermine the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo." 66. These resolutions need no comment. We have repeatedly commended their clarity and explicitness. It is obvious that the Congolese question would have been settled to the satisfaction of aIl several months ago if the United Nations Emergency Force had respected this mandate by acting only in consultation with the Congolese Government, if it had restricted its action to providing this Government with such military assistance as was necessary and, finaIly, if it had refrained from any action which might tend to impede the exercise by the Government of the Congo, "Whether or not it is voiced, African opinion condemns the ambiguous position of the United Nations representatives who have deliberately and illegaHy disowned the Central Government of the Congo and encouraged secessionist movements and the chaos desired by the Belgian aggressors."Y 68. The balance-sheet of United Nations action in the Congo after seven months offers a particularly dismal picture. AH legality in the country has been destroyed, democracy has been flouted anJ the Parliament has been dismembered. The Central Government whose appeal had been answered by the United Nations has been gagged and its members imprisoned, tortured and humiliated. On the other hand, Belgian intervention is becoming more and more blatant, territorial integrity is increasingly threatened, order and peace are dangerously disturbed. Civil war is breaking out and spreading through the country. AH this has occurred since the intE:.rvention of the United Nations Force. 69. Quite recently the international Press reported the arbitrary transfer of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba from the prison at Thysville to Katanga, with a guard of Belgian torturers, ill-concealed behind their African minions. These serious events, with their aHirming consequences, have been officiaHy confirmed by the Secretary-General. Thus, Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, in spite of aH he represents, in spite of Congolese law and the clear mandate assigned to the United Nations by the Security Council resolutions, is treated more harshly than a criminal in ordinary law under the impassive eyes of the United Nations representatives. The man who, on behalf of the Congolese Government and people, had requested aid and assistance from the United Nations, is imprisoned and treated in the most inhuman and revolting manner. Furthermore, the minions of Leopoldville, with the blessing of the Belgian colonialists and their henchmen, are handing over Patrice Lumumba, through the puppet Tshombé, to the Belgians, who are the undisputed masters of Katanga. The brutal treatment meted out to Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, Mr. Okito, Vice-President of the Senate, and Mr. Mpolo, Minister for Youth, on their arrival at the airport of Elisabethville has shocked the conscience of the world and aroused the bitter indignation of the Congolese people and the African peoples. And aU this occurred in the presence of United Nations soldiers, whose detailed testimony renders aU comment unnecessary. 70. It is c1ear that, in attacking Patrice Lumumba and his supporters, the colonialists are seeking to attack African nationalism itself for, whether you y Ibid., Flfteenth Session (Part 1), Plenary 'Meetings. vol. l, 896th meeting, para. 30. 71. But let this be clearly stated: the colonialist plot, which is now aimed at the physical and inhuman liquidation of those patriots who opposé' the reconquest of their country, will be powerless in the face of Africa's determination to be free. Once again we loudly proclaim, in unison with the Congolese people, the obvious truth that nothing stable, nothing solid and nothing of value can be achieved in the Congo without Patrice Lumumba, and that even less will be achieved by working against him and the African nationalism of which he is the true standard-bearer. 72. Everyone will admit that the awakening of the Congolese people is an undeniable fact.Neitherblackmail, nor corruption, nor brutal aggression, nothing henceforth can haIt the wind of freedom which is blowing over the Congo and which will inevitably sweep away the colonialists and their lackeys. 73. It is this 'basic and obvious fact, overlooked by most protagonists in the Congolese drama, which should inspire aIl proposaIs for a new and more realistic United Nations policy in that country. Indeed, no one challenges-and the Secretary-General himself has just expressly advocated it-the need for such a change in policy in order to stop the regrettable events which have disorganized the country, destroyed aIl law and order, dangerously undermined bath national unity and territorial integrity, and brought the Congolese people everywhere to the brink of bankruptcy. 74. In any case, the Heads of State of Morocco, the United Arab Republic, Mali and Guinea, the Head of the Provisional Government of the Republic of AIgeria and the representatives of the King of Libya and of the Prime Minister of Ceylon devoted a large part of their discussions at Casablanca to the Congolese situation and to the formulation of a new and necessary policy for saving the Congo, Africa and the United Nations from disaster. From this historie meeting there emerged a clear and specifie programme of action whose implementation could alone rescue the Congo and the United Nations from the tragic impasse into which so many mistakes, crimes and acts of treachery have cast them. This programme of action, which is unanimously endorsed by enlightened and progressive African opinion, has already been widely publicized. Nevertheless, in view of its importance, which recent events have merely accentuated, my delegation wishes to stress its main provisions in the hope that the Security Council will find in it the basis for new instructions to the Secretary-General with a view to the successful so~ution of the Congolese problem. The Heads of State meeting at Casablanca, having made a thorough studyof the whole Congolese situation, have addressed the following suggestion. ta the United Nations in the declaration concerning the situation in the Congo [see S/4626 and Corr.l]: It(g.) To answer the appeals of the legitimate Government of the Republic of the Congo at whose request the United Nations decided to create its Operational Command; 1t(Q) To implement the decisions of the Security Council in respect of the situation in the Congo; It(Q) To safeguard the unity and independence of the Republic of the Congo and preserve its territorial integrity; It 4. Urges the United Nations to act immediately to: It(g.) Disarm and disband the lawless bands of Mobutu; It(:!:l) Release from prison and detention a11 members of the Parliament and legitimate Government of the Republic of the Congo; "(Q) Reconvene the Parliament of the Republic of the Congo; It(g) Eliminate from the Congo all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel (not belonging to the United Nations Operational Comma~d)whetheroperating as such or indisguise; It(\il) Release to the legitimate Government of .the Congo all civil and military airports, radio stations and other establishments·, now unlawfully withheld from that Government; "m Prevent the Belgians from using the United Nations Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi as a base to commit aggression, direct or indirect, against the Congolese Republic. 1t 75. The failure to respect and apply the initial resolutions of the Security Council makes the adoption of these proposaIs essential and urgent. If they are put into effect immediately, they can re-establish calm and order in the Congo, rescue the .United Nations and preserve international peace and security that are dangerously threatened in this sensitive region of Africa. 76. On the other hand, any delay in the i:tnplementation of this rescue policy will make things worse and complicate still further the already explosive situation in the Congo. It is for this reason that my delegation strongly urges the Security Council not to pass by what may be the last chance for the Congo and the United Nations. 77. The States represented at the Casablanca Conference have proclaimed that they do not intend to stand idle before the prolonged inaction of the UnIted Nations. In the event that their proposaIs were not 78. Who will shoulder the responsibility of confront- .ing us with this terrible possibility? - 79. The Security Council must remember that the anxious peoples of Africa have their eyes turned towards this forum. How could it be otherwise when in broad daylight the puppet Tshombê is massing against the Baluba patriots an enormous army of mercenaries recruited from the vilest and most depraved of the colonialists. imperialists and racialists; when hundreds of officers. attracted by dazzling allurements. are rushing to Elisabethville. Bakwanga and Leopoldville by way of Brussels. Paris. Teheran and Brazzaville. seized with the crazy ambition of spreading terror. misery and death in the Congo; when Belgium. pursuing its dream of bringing about in Ruanda-Urundi. an even worse catastrophe than the one it has provoked in the Congo. is reinforcing its troops in that Trust Territory with the clear intention of continuing its aggression against the provinces and regions already controlled by the 1egal Government of the Congo; when Colonel Trinquier, the evil torture:r of the Algerian people. has just been given leave of absence by the French Government so he can vent his murderous fury. tried and tested on aIl the colonial battlefields of Asia and Africa. upon the innocent Congolese people; when. finaUy. "round table" masquerades are being arranged under the aegis of colonialism. aU equally doomed to failure? It is vital for aIl concerned that the United Nations should assume its full responsibility for restoring law and order in the Congo; this is a fundamental condition for any national reconciliation and any lasting solution of the Congolese crisis. 80. To this end. the legal and constitutional Government of the Congo Republic. meeting at Stanleyville on 3:'.. January 1961. under the presidency of Mr. Antoine Gizenga. issued the following important declaration which. with the Council's permission, l will quote in full. In this declaration. which reveals both the sense of responsibility and the desire for independence and peaceful co-operation of the Congolese constitutional authorities. the Central Governo:- ment. faithfuUy reflecting the ideas and feelings of its President. Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. describes in turn the military situation, its foreign policy. its attitude towards Belgium and its views on and appreciation of the activities of the United Nations. The declaration of the Central Government of the Congo reads as follows:- "The military problem. The appeal made to the Belgians by Mr. Kasa-Vubu. Mr. Tshombê and Mr. Kalonji. the creation of the 'European Foreign Legion'. the landing on Congolese soil of European mercenaries withthe full knowledge of United Nations military and civilian authorities as well as the continuaI use of Belgian planes, equipment and arms by the Belgians to commit acts of aggression against the Congo have aroused general indignation in nThe military operation undertaken by unscrupulous individuals, aided and abetted by form~r Belgian officers of the colonial 'Force publique', threaten to plunge the Congolese into a merciless fratricidal war to the great satisfaction of the Belgian financial and mining companies. nSoldiers of the Swedish contingent of the United Nations Force in the Congo, who were present at Elisabethville airport during the criminal transfer of Prime Minister Lumumba and his two companions, were eye-witnesses of the kind of inhuman, humiliating and savage treatment meted out to the legal authorities and members of parliament at the hands of the Belgian mercenaries and Congolese mutineers in the pay of Belgium. nThe Government of the Congo, the official spokesman of the Congolese people, appeals to all peoples of the world who love peace and justice to condemn Belgian aggression in the Congo and urgently entreats the Mrican and Asian countries to help the constitutional Government at Stanleyville in every possible way to restore peace, order, harmony, legality and the integrity of the Republic of the Congo. "Foreign policy and economic and trade relations. The Government of the Congo reaffirms its foreign policy which continues to be based on non-alignment and positive neutralisme "The Congo belongs to the Congolese. Tt is they first and foremost who are entitled to the benefits of aU the country's natural resources. The Congo belongs to the great Mrican family of nations and should never become a battlefield in the struggle between the two great blocs which are disputlng world hegemony. "The mineraI wealth of the Congo, for the sake of which the Belgi~n imperialists and colonialists artl desperately striving to promote anarchy and disorder in our country, is the property of the Congolese people and can never be considered as belongiI;lg to any financial group, however powerful. nThe Government of the Congo remains ready to negotiate with all those who can help it to develop the wealth in and beneath its soil by contributing capital and technicians. These negotiations will be conducted according to the normal. internationallyrecognized procedure for the signing of economic and trade agreements without any political strings attached. nOnly the members of the Government of the Republic of the Congo are competent to negotiate on its behalf and, in accordance with the Constitution, to enter into commitments with other Governments, companies and organizations of foreign countries. "Attitude towards Belgium. Belgium is primarily responsible for the present situation in the Congo. Those countries which are supporting the diabolic work of sabotage and destruction carried out by the Belgian Government and the Katanga mining companies, which have now become the preserve of international trusts, are dealing a mortal blow to the independence and liberation of the whole of Africa. "The resumption of normal relations between the Congo and Belgium depends primarily on theunderstanding shown by the Belgian instigators of the imperialist and colonialist plot against the political and economic liberation of our young Republic. "Attitude towards the United Nations. The United Nations, a body established for the maintenance of international peace and security, has been used in the Congo to stir up war and jeopa.rdize national and international insecurity. !fIt is no secret that the United Nations authorities in the Congo are obeying instructions other than; those contained in the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. "We welcome with a certain amount of optimism -the recent change of Government in the United States. It is our sincerest hope that Mr. John Kennedv, of the Democratic Party, the new President of the United States, understands that the West will be saved only to the extent that Africa is entirely liberated and kept out of the cold war and outside the competition between the two blocs. "Having recognized the existence in the Congo of a Chief of State and a legally constituted Parliament. the United Nations has implicitly recognized the existence of _the Government constitutionally invested by that Parliament and responsible for the words and deeds of that Chief of State before the nation. "Time will have shown the former United States Government and the United Nations. which approved the admission of a non-representative and irresponsible Congolese delegation. the frightful mistake they have made and its unhappy national and international consequences. "Under the provisional cmlstitution, which is still in force in the Republic of the Congo, the responsibility for the domestic and foreign affairs of the nation ls vested in the Government controlled by the members of the Federal Parliament elected by the people. "Accordingly, the representative of the Republic of the Congo at the United Nations remains the minister-delegate to the United Nations, a mem- "Very shortly, the Government·wiIl send several of its Ministers to open preliminary negotiations with various foreign Governments for the purpose of signing economic or social agreements between .' those Governments and the Government of our Republic. "Conclusion. The Government and the people of the Republic of the Congo recognize that Mr.Joseph Kasa-Vubu is entirely responsible before history and the whole world for the Congolese crisis. Deputy Kasa-Vubu, who was a nationalist before the conquest of our independence and whom Parliament raised to the rank of Chief of State, with the approval and support of the Government, willplunge our beautiful country into chaos and anarchy, inspired as he is by anti-nationalistic feelings and under the control of many different foreign financial interests. . "The Congolese Government will do everything in its power to secure as soon as possible the release of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and of aIl the Ministers and members of Parliament still held in custody by the rebels, as weIl as to ensure the normal functioning of legal and national institutions. "As soon as material conditions permit, the Congolese Government will convene Parliament to report to if on the political, econoinic and financial situation of the nation and on the repercussions of the Congolese crisis throughout Africa and the world. It will also propose for adoption by Parliament appropriate and legal measures for the solution of the crisis. "The Government appeals to aIl Congolese to put an end to the killing of innocent people and for a return to national peace and harmony. For the last time, it calls upon Belgium to cease its continual acts of aggression against the Congolese people under the cover of a few irresponsible Congolese traitors. "The constant interference of Belgium in the domestic affairs of our country, with the blessing of its allies and the complicity of a handful of a.:œ- bitious Congolese who bear a grudge against us and are in the pay of Belgium, will make Belgium and the whole of Europe responsible for the real war which would break out in the Congo and in the world. "Done at Stanleyville, 31 January 1961. "(Signed) Antoine GIZENGA" ' 81. Such is, then, for those who were as yet unaware of it, the courageous, realisti'c and African attitude adopted by the Congolese nationalists who, under the leadership of Patrice Lumumba, are fighting for a united, strong and independent Congo, which is an essential requirement for African solidarity' and international peace and co-operation. 82. My delegation is happy to note that the warnings uttered from the very beginning of the United Nations 83. Perhaps the delegation of the Republic of Guinea may be allowed to make a few brief comments on that document, which we have considered with aU the attention it deserves. 84. First of all, after taking note of the confusion which has been created, financed and fostered in the Congo, the Secretary-General himself asks a question which, by itself, sums up to a cerbiiÎ1 extent the whole Congolese drama. This is what he said: " ••• it may well be asked where we are heading and what the possibilities are to achieve the aims of the United Nations in the Congo •••" [928th meeting, para. 66]. That surely is the question that must be asked of the United Nations: not only should it be asked in the grim days through which the Congo is now passing but it should also have been asked ever since last August, when the action of the United Nations Force seemed to us to be diverging more and more from the clear mandate assigned to it under the first two resolutions of the Security COUDcil. 85. Rere and now we must point out that we disagree with the definition of the mission ofthe United Nations in the Congo made by the Secretary-General: " ••• to provide protection to the country against outside military Interference and to assist in maintaining law and order, so as to enable the Congolese people to find their way to the establishment of a stable government, in constitutional and democratic forms ••• " [ibid.]. 86. This definition of the United Nations mandate, when compared with the Security Council resolution of 14 July [S/4387], reveals the misunderstanding to which the plight of the Congo and the United Nations stalemate in that country must be attributed. It was not the mission of the United Nations-and the mission was never assigned to it-to assist the Congolese people in establishing a stable Government along constitutional and democratic lines. On the contrary, it was at the request of just such a Government, set up by democratic elections and in accordance with the "Loi fondamentale" serving as constitution for the Republic of the Congo, that the United Nations went to the Congo in the first place. According to the terms of the Security Council resolution referred to above, the United Nations was to "take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary ••• ". That was the real mission which the United Nations had clearly and expressly assigned to the Secretary- General in response to the appeal of the Congolese Government. AIl this tragedy, therefore, arises from the fact that the United Nations, instead of adhering to this clear-cut mandate to assist the Central Government of the Congo, has looked on tha.t Government as a political party, if not simply as a private group. Under the pretext of non-intervention ih the domestic affairs of the Congo, the United Nations has thus tolerated and, by its very attitude, encouraged aIl types of subversion which have finally brought the 87. As regards this matter of intervention in the domestic affairs of the Congo, there is one essential fact that those who are using this inconsistent pretext as a shield seem to have completely forgotten and which it is our bounden duty to recall. We proclaim once more that, according to the Security Council resolution cited, the mandate of the United Nations has always been to oppose foreign interference and that, therefore, the United Nations has always had full powers to quell and nip in the bud aU the political and military uprisings of people like Tshombé, Mobutu· and Kalonji, who have never been anything else in the Congo but the puppets of foreign intervention. 88. The report by the Secretary-General, while certainly containing sorne appropriate, if somewhat belated, remarks, and sorne very useful suggestions regarding a new course of United Nations action, nevertheless makes numerous assertions which we must reject. Thus, it attributes the failure of United Nations action in the Congo to Member States and to the Congolese leaders. It also merely notes that there has been no progress since the United Nations intervened, whereas, in point of fact, the situation has deteriorated alarmingly and resuIted in the complete disorganization of the State. Then there is the matter of the withdrawal of contingents of certain countries, such as mine, which have feIt that they could no longer, by their presence, endorse the anti- Congo and anti-African action being carried out in the Congo under the banner .of the United Nations, and a number of other points on which 1 shaH not dweU at length as our object is to confine ourselves to seeking positive solutions for the Congo drama. 89. We are among those who have always feIt that the Secretary-General had received from the Security Council all the necessary powers to act in the Congo, and we have always wondered why, if and since he thought otherwise, the Secretary-General did notpropose specificaHy to the Security Council and to the General Assembly the adoption of measures which he considered indispensable to enable him to act. We note with interest that the Secretary-General himself recognized that If ••• the 'Organization could weIl be blamed if, at the present juncture, it did not reassess its policy in the light of experience •.•" [928th meeting, para. 70] and proposed that a mandate be given to him If ••• to take urgently appropriate measures for assistance in the reorganization of the national army, preventing it, or units thereof, from intervening in the present polltical conflicts in the Congo" [ibid., para. 85]. 90. In the complex situation at present obtaining in the Congo, where everything is' interdependent, no satisfactory solution can be reached unless the fundamental, psychological, polltical and military problem is taken into account as a whole. It is for this reason 91. My delegation feels that it would be in the interest of the United Nations and, more particularly, in the interest of the Secretary-General if the Security Council, bearing in mind the experience of these last seven months, were to avoid anything which, directly or indirectly, might be regarded as a blank check given to the United Nations Force. Therefore, Ml'. President, through you, my delegation would like to ask the Secretary-General if he would kindly be as precise as possible with regard to this mandate which he is requesting, so that there may be no possibility of misunderstanding about the Implementation of the measures which the Council is asked to authorize. 92. Furthermore, my delegation feels that, in any event, the mandate requested by the Sec~etary-Gen­ eral, even if it is defined in detail, will be insufficient because it would only settle one aspect of one of the two principal questions that underlie the whole situation in the Congo. Any mandate, if it is to be fully effective, must deal with these two essential points that wére brought into prominence at the Casablanca Conference. 93. Firstly, there is the need to put an end to foreign Interference in the Congo. So far as this is concerned, Belgian military Interference obviously lies at the root of the entire Congo drama. But it is far from being the only Interference. AlI the colonialist Powers have banded together in the Congo. This is an open secret. The colonial Roly Alliance is in full swing in that country. Foreign interference has also an important financial aspect atbiched to it and, on this point, my delegation would like to ask the Secretary- General, through you, Ml'. President, to reveal to the Security Council the methods of financing which have made possible, in the first place, the recruiting of mercenaries in Katanga, in the south of Kasai and in Leopoldvillej and secondly, the equipping of those forces which support, train, enlist and pay the troops of Mobutu; and, finally, how the costly administrative and political puppet machinery in these various regions of the Congo is financed. Foreign intervention-and this aspect of the Congo situation is of particular importance-is clearly discernible in the 95. Secondly, legality must bé re-established and maintained in the Congo. To this end, thé Secretary- General should receive a mandate for the following purposes: (a) To ensure the immediate release of Prime Minister Lumumba and the members of parliament and of the Central Government of the Congo, as well as of aIl those who are illegaUy held in custody in the Republic of the Congo. There must be no misunderstanding about this: aIl African peoples hold the Heads of the great Powers, the King of the Belgians and the Secretary-General personally responsible for the life of Prime Minister Lumumba; (Ill To facilitate the immediate convening of the Central Government and Parliament of the Congo and ensure their protection; these bodies would receive aU necessary assistance from the United Nations to prepare and carry out, without colonial interference, national reconciliation and such adjustments as are considered necessary by the Congolese people in the normal democratic institutions in the country; (Q) To reorganize the Armêe nationale congolaise so that it becomes a disciplined and efficient national instrument at the exclusive service of the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo. Such, we believe, ought to be the essence of the mandate given by the Security Council to the Secretary- General to deal with the situation in the Congo. 96. May 1 be aIlowed, at this juncture, through the President and with his approval, to ask the Secretary-General for his opinion on these clear and simple proposaIs. Mr. Secretary-General, wouldsuch a mandate appear to you to be sufficient and apprc,priate for the restoration of the situation in the Congo? If you agree, are you prepared to ask the Security Council for the necessary powers-powers which you have so often said you lacked? 97. If, however, such a mandate does not suit you, can you tell us why? And, in that case, what exactly would you propose to the Council in order to break this deadlock with the best possible chances of ensuring rapid success? 1 appeal to you, Mr. Secretary- General, to answer, for the hour is grave indeed for aH of us. Your replies to our questions will show everyone what the new prospects for the Congo are and what future lies ahead for the United Nations. 98. Merely to reorganize the army, whatever the method employed, will not rescue the Congo from its present chaos. Any satisfactory solution caUs for a return to legality in the Congo, that is, making a clean break with the policy thus far foIlowed in the 100. Let me conclude by expressing the hope thatthe sense of duty of each of the representatives on the' Council, the realistic attitude o~ the great Powers, and especially of the United States of America and the Soviet Union, the collective wisdom of the Security Council and, finaHy, the sense of historical responsi·~ bility feIt by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in the Congolese crisis, will make it unneces- . sary for my delegation to ask for the floor again in order to tell you tomorrow, 'when it is already too late, "Well, you had fair warning." 101. Ml'. WffiJOPRANOTO (Indonesia): l thank the President for giving me this opportunity ta participate in the deliberations of the Security. Council on the situation in the Congo. This is the third time that my Government has requested this Council toaHow Indonesia to express its views on this burning ques... tion. We have done so out of our acute and bitter awareness of what is at stake. 102. The Congo is a powder keg in the heart of Africa. The fuse is burning shorter. The coantry is being torn apart by two main contending forces. Let us have no illusions about what is happening there. It is not the Congolese who have lit the explosive fuse. It is not Congolese differences as such that are shaking the peace and security of the world. What we are witnessing in the Congo is a struggle of today's progressive forces and vital ideas against the reaction- .ary forces of a doomed era. l repeat again what l sai:! in my first statement before this Council five months ago [905th meeting]: the real struggle in the Congo is a struggle of nationalism against colonialism. It is a struggle of justice against injustice. There can be no question of where we stand in this struggle of Ïreedom against tyranny. 10:}. But, while this basic fact has not changed, time has not stood still in the Congo. Nor has this struggle been fought in isolation. Because it is occurring in our tension-ridden, divided world, the Congo now faces not only the colonialist scheme of "divide and rule", but the threat of a confrontation within the country of the opposing power blocs. This is thewhole threat. This is the 'challenge for the United Nations. 104. It is not from hindsight that l speak these ,words. From the very beginning, it has been our position that colonial aggression and subversion must end if the Congolese are to have any chanc.e of resolving their problems free from outside entanglements. In this Council, in the General Assembly, as well as in the Advisory Committee on the Congo, we have warned that the situation in the Congo involved not that country alone, but the peace and security of Africa and even' of the world as a whole. We have argued, urged and pleaded that the United Nations 105. It is against this background of our fuÙ awareness of aU that is ,at stake that 1 wish to ex:plain to the members of this Council the reasons for my Government's recent course of action. 106. After the most serious consideration, my Government reached the definite decision to withdraw its tr.oops from the United Nations Force in the Congo. It took that decision because both the Security Counci! and the General Assembly have failed to adopt a resolution to effectuate the release of Prime Minister Lumumba and other leaders of the Congolese people from imprisonment, and to enable them thereby to resume their normal duties as the legal Government of the Congo, whose request alone could actually justify the United Nations intervention. The political developments in the Congo have become so alarming and hostile as to render our continued participation in the United Nations Force impossible. Indonesia, therefore, requested the co-operation of the Secretary-General in repatriating its contingent at the earliest possible date, particularly as its sixmonth field duty was completed in February. 107. May 1 say here that, as a matter of belief and principle, we have always tried to give our full support to the United Nations and its organs. Though not always successfully-sometimes deeply disappointedwe have consistently turned to the United Nations as the best instrument for negotiation and reconciliation. In another context, Indonesian troops have served with the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East. In the same spirit we responded readily and speedily to the invitation of the Secretary-General to contribute troops to the United Nations Force in the Congo. 108. We did this gladly in the hope of assisting the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo to repulse the colonial aggressors, restore law and order, and safeguard the national independence and territorial integrity of the Congo. Our contribution was an expression of our sense of duty and national conviction. We did not expect any thanks. But neither did we expect, instead of appreciation, the imputation of undermining the United Nations operation in the Congo. 109. It is really incredible that, after our efforts and even sacrifices to achieve law and stability in the Congo have been sabotaged by others, we should now be charged with responsibility for the resulting developments, including the possible liquidation of the United Nations military and civilian operations in the Congo. This is a strange way of reasoning. Who is disloyal to the United Nations? Is it those who have been compelled to withdraw their forces from the United Nations operation in the Congo, or those who have compelled us to make this unwelcome decision? Is it those who have vainly striven to, carry out the task of the United Nations in the Congo, or those who are even now standing in the path of that task, sowing seeds of conflict and confusion? 112. To avoid any misunderstanding on this point, allow me briefly to recollect events as they have transpired in the Congo. 113. It is common knowledge that the United Nations is in the Congo in response to a request from the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo to assist that Government, in the wake of Belgian aggression, to restore law and order and to safeguard its unity, territorial integrity and political independence in the interesi of international peace and security. In the tirst two months, notwithstanding certain difficulties, this task was being carried outwith everincreasing prospects of success. This may well have been its undoing. True to form, the colonialists did not want to see the revitalization and consolidation of the Congo, except on their own terms. They were not slow in making their moves. Soon the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo found itself weakened by internaI dissension. President Kasa-Vubu illegally dismissed Prime Minister Lumumba. This was followed shortly by the Mobutu coup, establishing an unconstitutional, dictatorial military régime. 114. From our own past experiences, we knew well who was behind these moves. We therefore urged the United Nations to give its full support to the legally constituted Central Government of the Republic of the Congo. l stated in this Council on 16 September 1960: "It seems to us indeed self-evident that the relevant provisions of the Security Council resolutions preclude the United Nations Command from assuming a position of so-called neutrality between the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo and the dissident groups. It is in response to arequest for temporary military assistance by the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo that the United Nations Force is in the Congo. Our obligations and responsibilities are obviously to the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo, and to that Government alone." [905th meeting, para. 42.] 115. l further warned that the dissidents did not represent the true national spirit, but were seeking to bring about disintegration; that in this endeavour they were inspired, promoted, encouraged and sus.. tained by foreign colonial interests. "This disintegration of the Central Government was accompanied by, and perhaps even a result of, the emergence of units within the Armée nationale congolaise loyal to individual political leaders who began to feud with each other." [913th meeting, para. 39.] A little later on, the Secretary-General pointed out: "The development of private armies loyal to individual political leaders within the Armée nationale congolaise led in September to the emergence of Colonel Mobutu as a military leader in the Leopoldville area. It is difficult to see how this emergence of a more consolidated Armée nationale congolaise in the Leopoldville and surrounding area could be possible without some outside technica1 and financial assistance. This development has led to the crèation of authorities which have no basis in the constitution of the Congo." [Ibid., para. 41.] 117. The conclusions to be drawn fi.·om this are obvious. Indeed, subtlety has never been a forte of the colonialists. Having promoted from outside the .Mobutu régime, the colonialists wasted no time in swarming back into the Congo, under one flimsy pretext or another, thereby further challenging the task of the United Nations. They had never even bothered to leave Katanga. That was their headquarters. From there, they have today again become the real rulers in Leopoldville. 118. While the situation thus continued to deteriorate, Indonesia, with other like-minded Member States, still sought reconciliation among the Congolese leaders on the basis of national unity. In November 1960, we earnestly requested the Gëneral Assembly not to shut the door on this possibility by taking a decision on the credentials of the representatives of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville). Again, our views did not prevail. Instead, those who had always protested so vehemently against any infringement of Congolese domestic affairs feIt no compunction at taking sides. They accepted, in effect, the credentials of the representatives of the Mobutu régime-a régime which, in the words of both the Secretary-General and his Special Representative in the Congo, has no basis in the "Loi fondamentale" of the Congo, is the principal fomenter of lawlessness and terror and has directly and aggressively challenged the United Nations military and civilian operations in the Congo. Expediency is the mother of many curiosities. 119. In December, the threat to peace and security became more ominous. The emboldened Mobutu 121. On behalf of my Government 1 therefore proposed that the Security Council should express its opposition to the Mobutu régime, demand the complete withdrawal of Belgian military and paramilitary personnel in the Congo outside the United Nations operational command, and act energetically to restore constitutioilal and democratic government by calling for the Immediate release of aU imprisoned Congolese national leaders and the reconvening of Parliament. 122. These proposaIs were not adopted. What were the consequences? Intensified foreign intervention and military clashes, a colonial conflict superficiaUy disguised as a civil war. While we do not by any means minimize its seriousness, we do not see this conflict as another Spanish Civil War. That is what makes it all the more tragic. It is the colonialists who are busily promoting their favourite slogan of "let Congolese fight Congolese". The Congolese are the pawns in this tragic game, and the United Nations is the spectator. Towards that end the colonialists are committing the infamous crime of provoking armed clashes and even a war. They have abetted the Mobutu soldiers in using the Trust Territory. of Ruanda- Urundi to launch a military operation against the Republic of the Congo. They have flown aircraft from Katanga to bomb Congolese civilians and United Nations forces. Foreign mercenaries have been recruited on an increasing scale. In Katanga mercenary soldier-adventurers are being lured by high pay, ranging from $400 to $840 a month. Colonel Trinquier, one of the most notorious French parachute officers of the Algerian war, has been hired.to lead the army and police of Katanga. Prime Minister Lumumba, Ml'. Mpolo, Minister for Youth, and the President of the Senate, Ml'. Okito, have been abducted to Elisabethville and subjected to the most brutal assault. Are not aU these provocations to armed conflict? 123. On 29 January 1961, Ruanda, the northern half of the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi, proclaimed its independence. This was obviously engineered with ' Belgian assistance or, to say the least, connivance. On the foUowing day, President Kasa-Vubu warned that he would caU in troops from outside the United Nations. ls it not apparent from this course of events, all too coincidental, that he is counting on Belgian troops stationed in Ruanda? "Indeed, notwithstanding the presence of the United Nations in that unfortunate country, we are witnessing in the Congo today the return of the former colonial Power in a new and more dangerous guise. Since the decisions of the Security Council have not been carried out with the desired results, the 'raison d'être' for Indonesia's contribution to the United Nations opel'ation in the Congo no longer obtains. Unwilling, to lend ourselves to other ends contrary to the principles of the Charter, the Indonesian Government has decided to withdraw its troops from the United Nations Command in the Congo. We have taken this measur,e now in the firm conviction that the presence of Indonesian troops in the Congo is no longer in line with the original task assigned to them in conformity with the decisions of the Security Council•••3 [920th meeting, para. 9.] 125. \Ve were therefore astonished to hear from the Secretary-General, in his message to my Government dated 25 January, that our decision to withdraw our contingent: "results in a serious weakelling of the Force, for the consequences of which the responsibility is clearly assumed by those countries which, for whatever reason, have found it indicated to with.. draw" [S/4640, annex II]. This interpretation wé consider neither fair nor juste 126. In replying to these charges of our alleged responsibility, 1 can do no better than to echo, with the proper modifications, the thoughts expressed by the Secretary-General on 17 December 1960, in replying to criticism levelled at him. What is interesting about these charges is the fact that, by implication, they exclude even the possibility of any responsibility of the Security Councn and its members, or of the General Assembly and its Members, or of anybody in the Congo. Everything is laid at the door ofthe withdrawing countries. The concentration is such that for a moment even the imperialists and colonialists seem to fade out of the picture. Why? 127. Our decision to withdraw stemmed directly from the deteriorating political situation in the Congo. The Secretary-General himself has recognized that this could lead to the withdrawal of the United Nations Force. On a number 'of occasions he warned this Counci! and the General Assembly that the Force might have to be discontinued either because of political developments in and around the country or because of withdrawals of such magnitude as to render the remainder of the Force ineffective. 128. This warning was repeated by the Secretary- General on 1,9 December, with the following amplification: "There is naturally a point where the sharpening of those conflicts and the weight of foreign involvement become such, that neither the participating Member nations nor the Organization itself should continue, because continuation would contribute little to an improvement of the situation but risk 129. Those words used by the Secretary-General reflect our own deep conviction that we cannot continue to be spectators or even accomplices to the unconstitutional, anti-democratic political developments in the Congo. Why, then, now attack the effect rather than the cause of those developments? 130. Indeed, the presence of a United Nations Force of 10,000, 20,000, 30,000 or even 50,000 can do little, will be helpless, unless the mandate of the United Nations operation in the Congo is liberaUy interpreted and effectively implemented in conformity with the changing political situation. A strict and inflexible legalistic approach cannot rectify a fluctuating political situation. 131. Our quarrel here is not with the basic aims of the United Nations as enunciated recently by the Secretary-General: namely, the re-establishment of a civilian Government which has constitutionallegitimacy and commands nation-wide authority, the restaration of Parliament, the reduction of the army to its constitutional pla0e, and, foremost, the elimination of aU foreign intervention. Our difference has rather been one of approach. It has been our constant beli~f that the United Nations, utilizing aU the persuasion at its command-even if this comes close to a kind of pressure-must insist upon the achievement of these aims as the pre-requisite for its continued presence in the Congo. We reject the contention thatthis means control or direction of the Congo's internaI affairs because such pressure is designed to remove obstacles which have not been created by internaI events but are the direct result of outside interference. Consequently, the United Nations is not only justified but, und~r its Charter, is obligated to take effective counter-measures to bring about the adjustment or settlement of an international situation which might lead to a breach of the peace. 132. Up to this moment, however, the United Nations operational command has persisted in following a policy of neutrality vis-~-vis the deteriorating political situation in the Congo. What has this accomplished? We find that the United Nations Command is the focal point of misgivings and strong suspicions. We find that the United Nations Force is becoming a target for the internatio:.lal gangs of soldieradventurers and their schemes of provocation. It is even in danger of becoming the tool for drawing one more ~artition line across a country, Certainly we refus-:; '~o aUow our troopF LO be used in these ways. l wonder if other Member States are willing to contribute their troops on this basis? 11 Ibid•• Fifteenth Session (Part 1), PIenary Meetings, vol. 2, 957th meeting, para. 19. 134. First ther,e was a split between the Central Government of the Congo and the provincial government of Katanga. Then there was a split within the Central Government itself, between the President and the Prime Minister. There was a split between the military authorities and the legally constitutedcivilian government of the Congo. The entire Congolese body politic is being split into factions, civilian and military. Then, after the unanimous vote of 20 September 1960, the General Assembly has been split. The Security Council is split. There is a threatened split between the Secretary-General and some of the contributing countries. Finally, there are even attempts to force a split between the Secretary-General and his Special Representative in the Congo, Mr. Dayala man who is carrying out his duties conscientiously and accordi~g to his known abilities. 135. But there is no split between Brussels, Elisabethville and Leopoldville. They alone are not split, but are forging a strong axis against the forces of peace and stability•. 136. Surely the United Nations cannot stand aside while its prestige and effectiveness are so contemptuously undermined. It cawlot remain passive while its decisions, and the appeals of the Secretary-General. are disregarded with arrogance and scorn. 137. What should we do in the present circumstan.ces? Can we surrender to colonial intrigue and division? For our part, we believe that we must grasp the initiative by substituting actions for mere expressions of hope. We would like to see the Secretary... General demand-not express a hope, but demandthat an Member Governments make concerted efforts to put a stop to foreign intervention. We are convinced that such a demand would receive a positive response. We believe that, iÏ there is such co-operation among the Member Governments and a resolute implementation of the United Nations mandate, then even at this late hour-perhapsthe eleventh hourthis Organization may still be able to carry out its task in the Congo. 138. This means, however, tilat there must be a completely fresh start with a concrete programme of action. There must be no doubt in anyone's mind that this Organi.'?:ation is determined to control the course of events in restoring peace and stability in the Congo. 139. In the implementation of such a programme, priority must be given to the immediate and final elimination of an foreign intervention and subversion. Once Belgian Interference has been stopped, the foreign mercenaries ejected, the bombing and shootings ended, the conditions will have been laid and the favourable climate created for a negotiated political settlement of the Congo problem by and for the Congolese themselves. ments voulues institué problème mêmes. 141. We do not think that. in the face of the alternatives. it is too much to ask all Member Governuents to lend their support to such a programme. In partïcular. we ask the big Powers to agree on this fresh start. We ask them to work together to heal the split in this Organization. We ask them to use their great influence to stop all foreign interference while, at the same time, reaffirming their pledges of nonintervention. We ask them to refrain from anyactions that may inject the Power-bloc conflict into the Congolese scene. but to work together to promote a national Congolese Government for. by and of the Congolese people. If l may loosely paraphrase a recent statement of President Kennedy of the United States with regard to another newly independent country. we ask the big Powers-especially the United States and the Soviet Union-to work together, and to use their great influence. to secure the emérgence of an independent Congo. a peaceful Congo, an uncommitted Congo. concerned solely with the life of the people within the country. These are. in our view, the indispensable ingredients of a fresh start in the Congo. 142~ If the Security Council now adopts such a new course of action. my Government will naturally give this decision its most careful consideration anddraw the necessary conclusions. A new situation will not find us wanting in flexibility.

This appea::.'s to me to be a convenient moment to adjourn. Unless l hear any objection, l shaH adjourn the meeting until three o'clock. The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.