S/PV.941 Security Council

Wednesday, July 13, 1960 — Session None, Meeting 941 — New York — UN Document ↗ OCR ✓ 8 unattributed speechs
This meeting at a glance
23
Speeches
8
Countries
0
Resolutions
Topics
General statements and positions Security Council deliberations General debate rhetoric War and military aggression UN membership and Cold War Arab political groupings

SIXTEENTH YEAR st MEETING: 20 FEBRUARY
NEW YORK
The agenda was adopted.
At the invitation of the President, Mr. Said Hasan (Pakistan), took the place reserved for him in front of the Council table.
1 shall be very brief. The time for spee.çhes is pasto 1 mentioned this morning out indignation and our emotion on hearing the incredible news told to us by the Secretary-General. The repeated brutalities, the régime of terror and thepremeditated character of the acts of arrest, deportation and assassination which have been described to us, have utterly discredited those who have committed them. History will surely judge the crimes ofwhich Messrs. Kasa-Vubu, Kalonji, Tshombé and their like are guilty. They have dealt a fou! blow to our Organization whose banner is flying inthat countrywhile suchmurders are perpetrated. 3. My delegation, together with the delegations of Ceylon and Liberia, has submitted an urgent draft resolution concerning these terrible events whichwill be circulated in a few mInutes. Y This draft resolution calls for a condemnation of the illegal arrests, deportations and assassinations of political leaders. It asks the Leopoldville authorities to put a stop immediately to these crimes which shock the conscience of "the world. It provides that the United Nations shall takè the necessary steps to prevent such outrages, if necessary by the use of force. Lastly, it calls for an investigation to determine who is responsible for these crimes so that the p'3rpetrators may be punished. We believe that this d~aft resolution should have priority and should be put to the vote as soon as possible. 5. But aU this is the result of colonialism and its intrigues. As long as Belgian colonialism persists in the Congo, there will always be events of this kind to deplore. Once and for aU, we must put an end to colonialism and aUow the unhappy Congolese people to live in freedom and manage their own institutions. 6. We ask, therefore, as l have said, that priority should be given to a discussion and vote en this draft resolution and wa consider that the vote should be taken as soon as possible. 7. Ml'. SUBASINGHE (Ceylon): This morning, we heard the tragic news of a few more political assassinations in the Congo. l think we arewitnessing today the climax to one oftheworst tragedies in the p'Jlitical history of our times. 8. Everybody knows that the movement of national independence has swept the world during the last few decades. Numerous colonial territories have emerged as independent nations in recent years through the struggles of their peoples. The Congo was no exception. But the history of the Congo has taken a düferent turn because of the determination-I must say this-··of colonialists to hold on, no matter what manoeuvres, subterfuges and crimes they might haveto resortto in order to gain this end. The colonialists have succeeded in picking up agents in the Congo to carry out their ignoble deeds. One by one, the leading nationalists in the Congo are being p3.ysicaUy extermlnated. 9. To us who have foUowed the developments in the Congo, the pattern is quite cieal'. Düferences between tribes have been exploited, personal differences between leaders hâve been aggravated. Illegal actions by people who came into high places, whether constitutionaUy or otherwise, have been encouraged and aided. Whatever constructive measures some of us small countries have proposed have always been disp'Jsed of by some unseen hand. 10. It is quite cIeal' that Ml'. Kasa-Vubu was elected President of the Republic by the Parliament. We admit that. But the man l ho reached this position by the consent of Parliament very soon turned against the Prime Minister, in whom the Parliament at no time lost confidence. Having dismissed the Prime Minister against the will of Parliament, Ml'. Kasa-Vubu turned against the Parliament itself. 11. The timing of the dismissal of Prime Minister Lumumba is very signüicant. This was done a few days before the füteenth session of the General Assembly met inNewYorktoadmitthenew Members and seat their delegations. If Ml'. Lumumba had been permitted to continue as Prime Minister until the opening of the fifteenth session, the delegation of the Central Governmentof the Congo,led by Ml'. Lumumba, 13. The next development in the tragedy was the emergence of Mobutu as a factor. Every attempt was made to establish a militarydictatorship under Mobutu. He was supplied with arms and money. But Mobutu could not deliver the goods to the colonialists. 14. World public opinion became alarmed at these developm-ents, at these shameful steps. In order to give a mï.litary régime a constitutional façade, ,Ml'. Kasa-Vubu was made to collaborate with Ml'. Mobutu. Subsequently, Ml'. Kasa-Vubu's delegation was seated at the United Nations, against the h3tter counsel of a substantial section ofthe Memhers ofthe Organization. 15. After his admission, Ml'. Kasa-Vubu and his clique began to treatthe United Nations withthe utmost contempt. It will be recalled that the members of the Conciliation Commission were not admitted to the Congo until the Secretary-General had to take very severe measures. 16. Ml'. Lumumba was a-rrested arbitrarily. No charges were made against him; ha was noi; brought to trial. The allegations against him were a lie from beginning to end. Despite his Incarceration, Ml'. Lumumba' s stature in the country rose. He continued to be a threat to Belgian colonial interests and to the Kasa-Vubu clique. Kasa-Vubu had toliquidatehim, but he did not have the courage. He handed him to Ml'. Tshombé, of Katanga, a sworn enemy of a unified and independent Congo. Lumumba was liquidated in the most dastardly manner. 17. The callousness, brutality and illegality of Kasa- Vubu have been further established by the subsequent murders of which we learned this morning. There is a section of opinion that continues to accept the constitutionality of the actions of Ml'. Kasa-Vubu, but my Government is firmly of the opinion that Ml'. Kasa- Vubu' s actions can never be justified under the law or through the constitution. Can the United Nations condone the actions of a so-called Head of State who is acting in collusion with the professed enemies of the Congo? We condemn these actions and violations of fundamental human rights. 18. The question arises: Can we inthe United Nations go on in this manner? Cap. the Security Council justify its existence before the bar of world opinion if we continue to be bogged down because of the national interests of some countries? 19. My delegation appeals to aIl Members to think anew about the situation in the Congo and to take immediate steps to create the conditions necessary to bring about stability and peace in the Congo. 20. It Is with that in view, in the first place, that we have tabled a resolution, Ml'. President, which will be in your hands shortly, condemning in the strongest possible terms the crimes that have been committed in the Congo in the last few days. We do this as a symbolic gesture, expressing our disgust at the manner in which developments are taking place in the 21. 1 recommend this resolution to the Security Council. 1 appeal to the members to think anew about the existing situation, to forget somewhat their differences, and to take the necessary action and the necessary decisions today.
My delegation is cOnfounded at the continuaI deterioration of the situation in the Congo. There have been proposals from every avenue of thought and every sphere of influence, yet the efforts of the United Nations remain challenged, not only by Member Governments ofthe United Nations but also by Congolese authorities in their own territories. Time is against the prestige of the United Nations, and all small countries such as mine particularly must be more concerned than those further removed from this area of imminent danger. 23. While 1 am co-sponsoring and in full support of the draft resolution tabledbythe UnitedArab Republic, Ceylon and Liberia [S/4722J, and while 1 am also cosponsoring the more recent draft resolution condemning the recent assassinations in the Congo, 1 have a draft resolution which emanates from my delegation alone. It mtght be corisidered as being a little rash, but if this draft resolution grips the im'lginationof the majority of the members of the Security Council, 1 shall be more than happy to submit it immediately. It is as follows: liThe Security Council "Resolvesthat this meetingshall rise andthat it will 1 hold its next sitting in the Congo, or in any nearby country upon the invitation of that Government, for the purpose of meeting the political leaders of the Congo with a view to establishing the United Nations prestige and authority as weIl as reaching some p'Jint of reconciliation in that turbulent country. the Congo." 24. In my opinion, that is the mostpractical solution. It also offers a face-saving device to aIl the peoples and political ideologies so greatly involved in the Congo situation.
The President unattributed #227157
The present p'Jsition is as follows. The representative of the United Arab Republic has, with the representatives of Liberia and oeylon, submitted a further draft resolution, whichhas not yet reached us roundthis table. The representative of the United Arab Republic has asked that priority be given this draft resolution, when it has been circulated ta us. 1 hope that members of the Council will agree that it would not be convenientto discuss the new draft resolution until we have aIl had a chance to see it. 1 should therefore like to suggest thatthe Council should continue the discussion of the draft resolutions which were previously on our agenda and on which 1 do have some speakers, and that we should revert later on to the new draft resolution, when it has been circulated
When 1 asked for the inscription of my name on the list of speakers, 1 had hoped to speak on the' substantive aspects of the q·.lestionwhich was raised before the Security Council sorne two or three weeks ago. 1 wished to state the position of my Government on the incidents that had happened since, the most important ofwhich was, ofcourse,the murder of Ml'. Lumumba, Ml'. Mpolo and Mr. Okito, and to state our position on the draft resolutiqnthat had been submitted to the Council by Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic. 28. But this morningwe have hadnewsina statement from the Secretary-General to the Council which has filled all of us with the deepest sorrow and anxiety and-I hope 1 am notputtingittoo strongly-with a deep sense of shame. Nevertheless, we must keep before us the perspectives in the Congo, the basic problems there. 1 should therefore still like to make the substantive statement that 1 had earlier decided to make. At the same time, however, 1shalltake the opportunity of commenting on the latest events as they affect not only the Congo but the Security Council andthe United Nations itself. 29. On 2 February 1 had the honour to make a statement before the Council in which 1 indicated my Government's position in regard to the situation inthe Congo [929th meeting]. We statedthenthatthe situation was fraught with the gravest danger to the unitYand territorial integrity of the Congo and constituted, inthe circumstances of today' s world, a threat to international peace and security. Much has happened since then. The tragedy of the murder of Mr. Lumumba, Mr. Mpolo and Mr. Okito has taken place, as fearedand all this under the very nose of the United Nations. And this morning, as 1 said earlier, we have heard reports of more murders, more assassinations, onl exactly the same pattern. Divisions in the Congo are much deeper today than they were a fortnight ago, and the most profound feelings of indignation have roused millions of people in the Congo and in other parts of Africa, and indeed in far-away countries of theworld: in Asia, Europe, North and South America and Australasia. The situation, dangerous before, has now almost reached a point of no return. 30. AlI through these weeks the Security Council has continued its discussions at a pace which, against the background of the latest developments, would appearto be leisurely and somewhat unrealistic. Perhaps, however, these tragedies win not have been in vain if they spur the nations of the world and the members of the Security Council to take up a united position on what is admitted by everyone to be not only a grave threat to the Congo, but a great challenge to the United Nations itself. 31. One can understand the feelings of those dedicated to African nationalism and the independence of the African continent at this most shocking and deliberate murder of one of Africa's great national leaders and the subsequent murder ofothers, butthe repercussions of andthe reactions to thesetragedies have transcended the borders of the African continent, and it can truly be said that world public opinion in its entirety has been shocked and horrified by these brutal murders. "•••the mm'der of Mr. Lumumba and others in Katanga is an international crime ofthe first magnitude. It has come to us as a great shock. Unless immediate strong measures are taken against those who are responsible for this murder and who have consistently insulted and opposed the United Nations and are now carrying on practically a war against the United Nations, the consequences are going to be very grave indeed. The United Nations must meet this challenge. Foreign elements supporting Tshombé and Mobutu must be withdrawn." 32. It is the view of my Government that there should be an impartial international investigation into the circumstances of the death of Mr. Lumumba andhis colleagues and that the perpetrators ofthe outrage should be punished. In some quarters surprise has been expressed at the incensity of feeling and demonstrations aIl over the worJ.d. The representative of Belgium attributed the demonstrations against Belgium and Belgian diplomatie missions in a la.rge number of countries to a campaign of hatred and violence against his country. Others have called these organized or inspired by groups following a particular ideology. These are over-simplifications of tremendous facts and forces which cannot be ignored. l\~lJ.ch as one may deplore the violations of diplomatie immunities, one has to grasp the real significance and not try to find facile or make-believe reasons for the tremendous upsurge of emotion throughout the world. 33. Perhaps one of the most significant developments in the past decades and through two world wars has been the emergence of the concept of international morality. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in its preamble, refers to "the conscience of mankind". It is this conscience of mankind that has been shocked beyond measure by these murders. Grave violations of human rights anywhere today have international repercussions which, to those whose minds are set in the grooves of old concepts of internationallaw and domestic jurisdiction, may seem strange and hostile. Indeed, the recent murders in the Congo, apart from their grave political consequences, are a gross violation of the conscience of mankind and international morality. If only for this reason, there should be an impartial, high powered international investigation and the offenders must be brought to book. 34. What i - "'he situation in the Congo today? With Lumumba':,. i .lrder the chances of conciliation which previously (lill. not appear impossible have virtually disappeared. The country is deeply divided. There is grave fear of violence in the Congo and serious danger of clashes and vendettas. In this connexion we cannot 35. We have before us a very important report from the Secretary-General' s Special Representative inthe Congo [S/4691 and Add.1 and 2]. This report brings clearly to light a serious civil war situationwhich has already developed in the Katanga province, with evidence of similar impending developments in other parts of the Congo as weIl. The report brings to light the massive build-up of arms inKatanga and a force of 5,000 men led by nearly 400 Belgian and other foreign military officers. Thisforce has unilaterally abrogated the neutral zone in north Katanga and has now embarked on an offensive action against the populationof northern Katanga. Villages have been attacked and burned by this advancing army. According to latest information, clashes have already takenplace between the Katanga troops and those under the control of Oriental and Kivu provinces. It is also reported that Mobutu'8 troops, whlch owe allegiance to President Kasa-Vubu, are proceeding up the Congo River for an attack on Oriental province. Here, then, we have already a civil war on. Already there is an attempt to find a military solution of the Congo problem and to present another "fait accomplin to the Security Council. 36. The Security Council has to actquicklytoprevent this. Otherwise the Congo and. large parts of Africa will be engulfed in the most serious conflict, and the door will be inevitably opened to direct or indirect foreign military intervention. Military solutions are never durable; in particular, they are no answer to the rising tide of nationali8m against colonialism. Those who wish to cash in on Lumumba'8 death in this way are grievously mistaken. Lumumbadead i8 infinitely more powerful than Lumumba alive, as Ml'. Nehruhas 37. The principal task of the Security Council, therefore, becomes the prevention of the development of a civil war without any delay. Once this is achieved time will have been gained for the cooling off of tempers and abatement of emotions, for the dawnofgood sense and for the initiation of the processes of conciliation and the restoration of the rule of law, including primarily the convening of the Parliament. These alone can ensw;e the unity, territorial integrity and independence of the Congo. 38 May l quote the statement of the Prime Minister of India before the Indian Parliament on 16 February? Mr. Nehru said: "In spite of our anger and our great resentment at all that has happened-one cannot merely be swept away by anger and do something which may create more difficulties-we have restrainedourselves, althought we felt strongly and we do feel strongly. We hope that it may be possible for the Security Council . to come to firm decisions, so thatthe United Nations authority there can function effectivelyand strongly. This means that it shouldfunctionevenifit is necessary to use armed force, and not merely look on others using armed force for a wrong purpose; that the foreign elements must go fromthere andthat the so-called Congolese army should be controlled and disarmed. "These are the immediate issues. Then,havinggot the situation under control, it should try to get Parliament to meet fordecidingwhatkindofGovernment they will have, theobjectbeingthatthere should be unitYand that the unity, integrity and independence of Congo should be preserved. Their own people through their elected Parliament should decidewhat kind of Government they will have and no one else intervening except ta help them. l:Ïanyhelp has to be given to them, it shouldgo throughthe United Nations and not through other sources." 39. Herein are indicated the lines on which theproblem of the Congo can be solved, namely that the approach to the Congo problem must be governed by the imperative necessity ofmaintainingthe unity, integrity and freedom of the Republic of the Congo, with no foreign intervention and avoidance ofa cold or a hot war in the Congo, and the establishment of a representative government through and with the approvalof the Parliament. 40. The Security Council is no doubt aware of the strong feeling among many countries that the United Nations has failed in the Congo, and this failure is related particularly to its illability to prevent the murder of Mr. Lumumba and his colleagues, and now of some others, in spite of indications that these out- 41. In the last category we have in mind particularly the grave blunder of seating the Kasa-Vubudelegation at a time when there was constitutional crisis in the Congo, as brought out in the second progress report (S/455'1] of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, and there were rival claimants for the seat in the General Assembly. 42. We ourselves have not hesitated to criticize, sometimes rather strongly, the actions of the United Nations in the Congo or its inaction on particular occasions. We do not howeverthinkthattheSecretary- General can be made responsibleforall thesefailings. We certainly feel that the United Nations actions in the Congo could have been more firm and purposeful, but at the same time one cannot forget that agreements have been impossible to achieve either in the Security Council or the General Assembly. However, the Security Council now has a chance, and indeed the dutY, of thinking anew and of taking constructive steps. Past experience should be a guide in laying down correct policies and objectives for the future. The alternative we would not like even to contemplate. As the Prime Minister of Indra has pointed out: "••• if the United Nations withdraws from the Congo itwould be a disaster because then the field is left open to civil war and large-scale foreign intervention in various ways •••" 43. It is for the Security Council in its wisdom and in realization of the gravity of the situation to take firm and positive decisions which will meet the needs of the present situation. The draft resolution tabled by the delegations of Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic (S/4722]-and l am referring to the first draft resolution tabled by them, because l understand that there is another resolutionon theway-inour view is the minimum answer. It substantially reflects the views of my Government. 44. The draft resolution seeks the immediate withdrawal of Belgian and other foreign military andparamilitary personnel and mercenaries, tlÏe stoppage of civil war, and the creation of conditions in which the lawlessness by undisciplined ar.ned units andpersonnel can be made impossible, and through their neutralization Parliament can meet and a constitutional government can bé set up based on conciliation; and free politicallife, and on the preservationofthe unity, integrity and full polltical independence of the Congo. 45. We have been closely associated with the prolonged and earnest consultations which have resulted in this draft resolution. We believe that the resolution embodies the greatest common measure of agreement and gives real hope for the United Nations to assist in the solution of the problem of the Congo and save its own prestige and moral authority. l use the ward "assist" advisedly because in our view it is for the Congolese people themse!ves to solve theirproblems. others, including the United Nations, canonlyhelp. We further believe that this draft resolution, if sincerely implemented by aIl concerned, can make a real con- 47. Now 1 would like to say a fewwords on the situation that developed this morning and onthe draft resolution which 1 understand the delegations of Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic are placing be- . fore the Security Council. We feel that this is undoubtedly the greatest crisis, the greatest challenge to its authority, that the United Nations has ever been faced with. We believe thatifthis challenge is not met, if hesitation is still to be the order of the day, if procrastination bedevils the work of the Security Council, then 1 am afraid that all of us, and perhaps future generations, will have cause to rue the inaction of the Security Council. Something must be done, and very, very quickly. The minimum that the Security Council has to do inthe present situationis to condemn unreservedly the brutal murders, the political assassinations, the medieval barbarity, that is being committed in the Congo. 48. It should state in no uncertain terms that the world Organization will not permit this to happen. It should state unreserveCÙY that all those who have perpetrated these crimes and are flauntingthese murders, in the very face of the Security Council and the United Nations, must be brought to justice. Otherwise, 1 fear that the consequences will be grave indeed. 1 fear that if the Security Council is unable to reach decisions, there will be unilateral decisions reached by members who feel very strongly in the matter, and that is something which we do not wish to see. 49. Therefore, my delegation fully supports the views of the delegations of Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic. We have had occasion to see the draft of the resolution. That resolution should be given top priority. It should be adopted as a priority resolution, as an ~mergencyresolution, and the calI must go out from the Security Council to the Congo and all over the world that this world Organization is not prepared to put up with evil and tyranny and lawlessness and political assassinations which have become the order of the day in the Congo. Therefore, 1 would fully support that request. 1 think that the Security Council has to vindicate itself. We have been far too long dillydallying over this problem. Let us be firm and definite and clear for once. 50. Ml'. NGILERUMA (Nigeria): Ml'. President,Iwish first of all to thank you and all the members of the Security Council for the courtesy you have extended to my delegation by inviting us to participate in your deliberations. 51. The situation in the Congo llas alwayl:'l beengrave and contained the seeds of bitter division and conflict in Africa, and indeed'in the whole world. Now we have learned with the deepest shock and regret ofthe murder of Ml'. Lumumba and two of his coUeagues. Today the 53. My country, which attained its independence only recently, has watched with anguish the travails of the young State of the Congo. The Nigerian Government and people are deeply concerned. Numerous references have been made to the gravity ofthethreat to peace in Africa and elsewhere. The consequences of failure in the Congo for us asmembersofthe African race living in the same continent cannot as yet be correctly foreseen, but ther~ is no doubt they will be tragic. As 1 said earlier, we stand now on the brink. If we do not, at this meeting, arrive at decisions which will stop further deterioration, we shaH compromise the prestige and usefulness of the United Nations itself and at the same time damage seriously the cause of peace. 54. It i8 natural that passions should be inflamed as a result of the latest developments inthatunhappycountry. It is for us at this juncture, however, to weigh soberly our actions. One of the foundations of the foreign policy of my country is to uphold the principles upon which the United Nations is founded. Nigeria has aIl along acted on aIl matters concerning the Congo with absolute impartiality. We have striven to foIlow the truth as we see it. We warmly welcomed the immediate response of the United Nations to the Congolese appeal several months ago. We believethattheCongolese people were right to appeal to the United Nations rather than turn toanyindividualPower. Mydelegation stiU believes that the situation in the Congo can and should be handled effectivelyand successfully by the United Nations. It is not the question now only of reviewing the many mistakes which have been made, but in aIl sobriety we realize that the United Nations is the only Organization capable of restoring the situation in the Congo to normal. 55. To say that mistakes have been made does not assume doubt as to the honesty and integrity of the Secretary-General and his aides in the Congo. We of the Nigerian delegation recognize and appreciate the very difficult and the trying circumstances underwhich they have been attempting to execute a limited and controversial mandate. We respect their courage and 57. The basis of the United Nations intervention at the request of both the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic of the Congo were contained in the Security Council resolution of 14 July 1960 [8/4387]. Subsequent 8ecurity Council resolutions of 22July and 9 August 1960 [S/4405, S/4426] elaboratedthe original resolution of 14 July. The provisions of these resolutians are tao well known and 1 need not repeat them here. 58. The Prime Minister of Nigeria in his speech before the General Assembly on 7 October 1960 said: "But the mere sending of armedforces is not enough". He continued: "The first essentialis ta find a Government capable of governing, and for this it will probably be necessary to hold new elections in the Republic of the Congo. When these have beenheld, therewill be some properly authorized leaders with whom the United Nations Organization can co-operate. 1 think it is important that the United Nations should work only withthose whom 1havetermedthe authorized leaders. They may seem ta some ofus to be far from perfect, and ta some even objectionable; but if they are duly chosen by a majority, they must be supported. It would be the height of folly to attempt ta impose a Government which was not founded on popular support, and the result would only be even greater confusion."y The situation in the Congo can only be described as confusion worse confounded. Many weeks of growing disaster have passed since the speech from which 1 have just quoted. 59. There is as yet no effective Central Government capable of governing. The Republic is on the brink of serious civil war, an "international" civil war, if you please. The danger of disintegration is all too present. Rival groups with theirundisciplined "private armies" of doubtful loyalty terrorize the different regions of the country. The Congolese army, farfrom safeguarding law and order, has itself become the greatest menace to peace and security. The rival army bands have become most convenient channels through which foreign interventionists, adventurers and even criminaIs infiltrate into the country. 60. The United Nations forces interposei between these rival groups have become progres~vely ineffectuaI. Not only the Congo but also the United Nations operation, which was conceived in hope, now faces the danger of collapse and ignominy. 61. The situation described bythe 8ecretary-General as prevailing in the Congo is desperate, We agree with his analysis and assessment of the situation. It is time to clarify the mandate of the United Nations and to 62. A resolution co-sponsored byCeylon, Liberiaand the UnitedArab Republic [8/4722] isbefore'the Council. This resolution contains proposals which the Nigerian Government thinks are essential for a lasting solution. 1 should like to summarize as foIlows. 63. First, the Congolese army must be prevented from interfering in politics. AlI the armed groups throughout the entire territory of the Congo must be disarmed and neutralized, 1 emphasize aIl armed groups. We believe the realproblemoftheCongo calls for a political and not a military solution. AlI military operations must be halted. 64. 8econdly, immediate effect must be given to the repeated demands for the withdrawal and evacuation of all Belgian and other foreign militaryandparamilitary personnel, technicians andpolitical advisers from the whole of the Congo. Belgium cannot, with consistency, claim the right to intervene in the Congo in order ta protect Belgian lives and property and at the same time denyresponsibilityfor the so-calledprivate Belgian citizens who continue to armandfinance some of the warring elements of the Congo. We must hold Belgium responsible. In this connexion we strongly appeal to the friends and allies ofBelgiumto persuade and prevall upon it to stop its military intervention, direct or indirect, in the Congo. This is essential in the interest of the future relations of Belgium and its allies with aIl the countries of Africa. AlI military assistance, personnel and equipment must go to the Congo only through the United Nations. 65. Thirdly, the Nigerian Government strongly believes that law and order must be restored to the Congo in order to provide the essential climate of calm and security for significant political negotiations. Essential to this is the immediate and impartial investigation of the circumstances surrounding the murder of Mr. Lumumba, so that those guilty of this hideous crime may be duly punished. We must also re-emphasize that the full responsibility for the restoration of law and order must rest with the United Nations. 66. Fourthly. aIlpoliticalprisoners, especiaIlymembers of Parliament and political leaders, must be released without delay. This is necessary for national reconciliation. We believe that, without the participation of aIl, a Government of national unitY cannot emerge enjoying the broad popular support which is necessary. 67. Fifthly, to this end Parliament must be reconvened without further delay. The Congo must be enabled to return to the pathof law and constitutional government. 68. Nigeria earnestly prays for the formation of a genuine national Government embracing aIl the major 69. We support these proposaIs as the only alternative to the abandonment of the Congo to civil war, genocide and unthinkable brutalitiesi of the abandonment of the Congo to the merciless fury of strife between East and West with aIl its implications for world peace and security. 70. Allow me finally to make a soleron appeal to the great and small Powers alike. We implore the States with the power to intervene to respectthe mutual truce and military disengagement now proposed for the Congo. To other States, and African States inparticular, we appeal to provide a broad censensus of opinion and overwhelming support for the political solutions advanced in this draft resolution. It is, of course, for the Council to adopt this draft resolution and we strongly urge it to do so unanimouslYi but every other State has an important role to play, namely, to ensure that these proposaIs are effectively implemented to enable the Congo to achieve a realistic solution of its problems-realistic for an immense territorythe size of the Congo with its large population, its diversity and its strong local traditions. 71. Ml'. STEVENSON (United States of America): We meet at a timewhenthe sensibilities of aIl of us and the conscience of the world have been grossly offendedby the murder and violence in the Congo. The urgencyof action transcends, in our judgement, the temptationto further rhetorical expression of disgust with these crimes. 72. We also echo the feeling expressed so eloquently by the representative of India that this is a crisis in the life of this Organization. 73. Hence, l am going to address myself to the draft resolution proposed by Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic, which seems to us the only practical proposaI before the Council for effective and prompt action in the Congo. And l shall reserve, if l may, the privilege of speaking at a later hour, if necessary, about the emergency draft resolution that has been tabled. 74. First, however, let me say that we, the United States delegation, think that the suggestion advanced by the representative of Liberia has great merit. Nevertheless, we believe that we must act now ta restore law and order in the Congo; but after such action has been taken, if l may presume to make a preliminary expression of opinion by the United States Government, we would gladly go to Central Africa for the excellent objectives set forth bythe representative of Liberia. It would, we agree, put the United Nations in Africa with dramatic impact and, while l can, of course, make no commitment, l would hope that the United States Air Force could be helpful in arranging transportation. 75. l have been very much impressed by the presentations here of the representatives of India and Nigeria. May l also express the gratitude of the delegation of 77. The United States delegationwill support the draft resolution presented by Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic [S/4722]. Althoughwe have sorne reservations about certain aspects of the draft resolution, which we have made known to various members, including the sponsors, we think it is basically a good resolution and we believe it should be adopted as early as possible. But 1 must ask the indulgence of the Council to express the misgivings that we have communicated to other members so frequently. 78. On 15 February [934thmeeting],Ipresentedtothe Council the essential elements required for a solution of the Congo problem as seen by the United States. They coincided closely with what has been saidhere by the representatives of Nigeria and India. Theyincluded the prevention of the extension of civil war in the Congo, broadening the base of the government, reconciliation of political elements, the elimination of outside military aid and interference, investigationofthe death of Mr. Lumumba and his colleagues, the reorganization and retraining of the Congolese armed forces, their removal as an element in internaI politics and the conveningofParliament. These elements are aU included in the text beforeus, but not always in the language that we would have preferred. 79. There are three points which my delegationwould like to have seen covered more specificaUy. Yet we concede that, as others have pointed out, they are in fact involved in and covered bythepresenttext. These points are: the responsibility ofthe Secretary-General for carrying out the resolution, recognition that the United Nations is in the Congo to assist and uphold its sovereignty and independence, and the prohibition of outsiàe military assistance through supplies and "matériel" as weU as through personnel. 80. It is obvious that any Security Council resolution calling for United N;ltions action must be carried out by the Secretary-General. Under Article 97 of the Charter, he is the chief administrative officer of the Organization. To the extent that this resolution creates further authority for the United Nations in the Congo or caUs for Implementation of previous decisions, the Organization's executive officer must be responsible. Implementatio.'l. then, must be by the Secretary- General. 82. Operative paragraph 1 of part A of the draft resolution authorizes the United Nations to take "appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence ofcivil war in the Congo, including... the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort". 83. What is "appropriate" in these circumstances must obviously be governed by the provisions of the Charter, which place restrictions uponthe use offorce and which prohibit the Organization from intervening in internaI affairs. It is our understanding that authorization to use force, as stated in operative paragraph 1, only "in the last resort" means thatevery effort will be made to accomplish the purposes of this paragraph by agreement among the contending elements in that divided country. Clearly, this resolution means that force cannot he used until agreement has been sought by negotiation, conciliation, and aU other peaceful measures. 84. These essential considerations are further clarified by the fact that this resolution specificaUy reaffirms the various resolutions of the SecurityCouncil and the GeneralAssembly. These resolutions aU establish the principles of consultation and impartiality and that the mission of the United Nations is to assist in the maintenance of law and order and to safeguard the unity, the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Congo. 85. Finally, we regret that operative paragraph 3 of p~rt A does not specifically caU on aU states not only to prevent the departure of military and paramilitary personnel for the Congo but also to prevent the sending of inilitary "matériel", directly or indirectly. We are now faced, as l am sure aU Members agree, with the increasing danger of outside interfereD(le, andwe think it should be forbidden in any form, arms as weIl as men. We understand that this provision i8 included in fact, because the draft resolution reaffirms General Assembly resolution 1474 (ES-IV) of 20 September 1960, which caUed upon: "aU States to refrainfrom the direct and indirect provision of arms or other materials of war and military personnel ••• except upon the request of the United Nations ••• " 86. The Security Council would thus adopt as its own the General Assembly' s request to aU States to refrain from providing arms or other materials ofwar except through the United Nations. This seems to us a proper and a necessary decision of the Security Council in ft Calls upon all States to take immediate and energetic measures to preventthe departure orprovision from their territories for the Congo of any such personnel or of any aid for militarypurposes, direct or indirect, other than through the United Nations, and to deny any transit or other facilities for any such personnel or any such aid, and requests the United Nations to take the necessary measures to interdict any such personnel or aid. ft 88. We would "hope, as l say, that the sponsors would accept this improvement intheir draft resolution. With these understandings, the United States delegation is prepared to vote for the draft resolution, and to do so today. We emphatically share the view that prompt action, even if it is not perfect, even if does not fully accommodate the views of allofus, isbetter than none and better than the hazards of longer delay.
l wish briefly to state my delegation's position on the three-Power draft resolution which is now before the Security Council [S/4722]-. My delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution. In doing so, we have mainly the following points in mind. 90. The aims of the United Nations in the Congo, as expressed by the great majority of Member States and as reflected in the previous resolutions on the subject, may be summarized as follows: first, the preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the Republic of the Congo; secondly, the complete insulation of the Congo from all outside interference which is not channelled through the United Nations; and, thirdly, the conciliation oftheCongolese people among themselves. Although other points have been raised during our debates, it is my delegation' s opinion that those three are the fundamental ones, around which all the others are centred. 91. In my delegation's opinion, the text before us, taken in its entirety, does reflect those three principles. It has the merit of being an effort to bring together a number of points that have come out during the debates here. No doubt because of the complexity of this problem, despite the efforts and the good in- 0" tentions of the representatives of Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic some paragraphs ofthe draft resolution, if considered separately and only superficially, might give the impression of lacking clarity. However, a closer study of the text will, l am sure, 92. For those reasons, and in the light ofthe appeals made by the representatives of the United Arab Republic, Ceylon, India, Nigeria, Liberiaandothercountries concerning the urgency of this situation, an urgency of which we are greatly conscious, my delegation does not deem it necessary to tryto improve the text in any way. On that understanding we should be willing to vote in favour of the text as it stands. Of course, if it is possible to changeoperativeparagraph 3 of part A in the way suggested by the United states representative, that will be a great improvementwhich we should like to see included in the text. 93. l, too, have an appealto make. The representatives to whom 1 have already referred have stressed the importance of bath the draft resolutions which are before the Council, S/4722 and S/4733. 1 think that, with a slight modification, we might quickly come to a decision on the second text, which is also ofan urgent character and for which the representative of the United Arab Republic even requested priority. 1 would appeal to the sponsors of the draft resolution, ifthis is acceptable to them, to make this text another section, part C, of the draft resolution S/4722. In that way, a vote could be taken on bath texts in one draft resolution. 94. The suggestion which 1 wish to make to the sponsors of the second draft resolution relates to operative paragraph 2. In our resolutions up to now we have not named provinces or names. We are concerned with the Congo in general, and aIthoughthe latest incidents have taken place in certain provinces we do not know what tomorrow has in store, and certainlywewouldnot like to leave the door open for anymisinterpretation to the effect that we are concerned with one section of the country and notwiththe others. Therefore, in operative paragraph 2, instead of saying "Calls upon the authoritie~ in Leopoldville, Elisabethville and Kasai" we could say "Calls upon the authorities in the Congo" . 1 believe that we might thus arrive at a possibility of having a 96. Ml'. T8L.t\NG (China): The three delegations of Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic have placed before the Council an emergency draft resolution [8/4733], and they have askedpriorityforit. 8ince that is so 1 address myselfexclusivelyforthe moment to this emergency draft resolution and reserve my right to speak on the other draft resolution [8/4722] a little later. 97. Political conflicts and controversies between parties, factions and persons are aU too common, at least in most countries of the world. What is tragic in the Congo now is the physicalliquidation of members of the opposition. 8uch brutality is an offence against human rights, the promotion of which is part of the high mission of the United Nations. Itis only right and necessary that the 8ecurity Council should speak out clearly on this subject so that aU the people in the Congo can hear us. Indeed, we must speak so clearly that aU the peoples of theworldcanhear our words. It is unfortunate that in this twentieth century the brutal practice of purging and liquidating the political opposition is not confined to the Congo. It certainly must be our hope and our ~ndeavourto put a stop to such brutalities everywhere. It is for this reasonthat my delegation will give its support to this draft resolution in substance. 98. However, there are certainpoints towhichlwould like to caU the attention of the co-sponsors. 1 have twa points of a drafting nature and another point of some substance. One of the drafting points raised by the representative ofTurkey relates to operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution. He has suggested an alternative formulation which 1 think is an improvement. 1 myself would like to see thatparagraph worded as foUows: "CaUs upon aIl the authorities in aIl parts of the Congo (Leopoldville) immediately to put an end to such practices." This phrase "aU parts of the Congo" is intended to caver not only the authorities of the Central Government, not only the authorities in the provinces, but also the authorities who might be in control in parts oftheprovïnces, andwe certainly wish aU the authorities in aIl parts of the Congo (Leopoldville) to put an end to such practices. 1 hope that the co-sponsors of the draft resolution could see their way to accepting this drafting change. 99. A second drafting change which 1 would suggest is the foUowing. The final paragraph of the preamble reads: "Convincedofthe responsibility for such crimes of persons in high places". That phrase seems to indicate that the 8ecurity Council holds a strong conviction as to the responsibility. But then in operative paragraph 4 the draft resolution goes on to say: "Decides upon an impartial investigation to determine the responsibility for these crimes and punishment of perpetrators of such crimes." 100. It seems ta me that before we investigate, we had better not have convictions as to responsibility. Ifyou start with convictions as to the responsibility, thenwhy take the trouble to have an investigation? If our in- 101. These are the two points which 1 consider to be suggestions in drafting. In regard to the second suggestion, the phrase "Convinced of the responsibility for such crimes of persons inhighplaces", 1 hope that the co-sponsors could find it possible to accept my suggestion to delete that phrase. If they should insist on the retention of this phrase in the draft resolution, then 1 would request you, Mr. President, to put it to the vote separately. 102. Now 1 have a little difficulty in the matter of substance, and that relates to operativeparagraph3. That paragraph reads as follows: "Calls upon the United Nations authorities in the Congo to take all possible measures to prevent the occurrence of such outrages including, if necessary, the use of force as a last resort." Now we may have reached the point where we should authorize the United Nations Command in the Congo to use force. Butthat is an extreme measure. 1 feel that it is in a way against our constitution, our Charter. Therefore, my delegation would not support the phrase "including, if necessary, the use offorce as a last resort". May 1 ask you, Mr. President, to put that phrase to the vote separately.
Mr. President, 1 am grateful for being allowed today to address this august body which has been entrusted with the great task of preserving the peace of the world. 104. Watching the developments that havetakenplace around the Council table this afternoon, 1 have the feeling that a speech on the affairs ofthe Congo, apart from the discussion of the draft resolutions before the Council, might be considered a little out of date. But there are some aspects of these affairs which remain fresh and current and which will need consideration despite the final disposaI, even if itcomes about, of those draft resolutions. 1 therefore make no apology for discussing these problems even though it takes a little of the time of the Council. 105. 1 am not the only representative who has sat in one of the back chairs day after day, week after week and almost month after month listening to invective being hurled across the table, to platitudes, to solicitous regard for certain personages in the name of human liberties and democracy. But really, not a word has been spoken for the poor, sufferingCongole.se, the individual man, woman and child, living in famine and in insecuritYi uncertain every day and unsure every night, of what is going to happen to him and to his children of whether they will see the light of another day and whether there will be a crust of bread for another meaL While that tragedy, this deep and silent tragedy, is being lived by the people of the Congo, the melodrama of the struggle of a fewpoliticians is being televised in this room day after day and month after month. 106. With all Pakistan's solicitude for the people of the Congo and our sympathyfor them in their suffering, 107. Forgive me for the slight digression. Whatlwas going to say was that despite our regard for the Congo, and this regard is proved by the assistance that we have readily given to the Secretary-General in the United Nations operation-that assistance is athis disposaI for as long as he needs it-we have consistently abstained even from giving advice which might cause a complexity in reiationships. 108. But there hasnowdevelopedinthe Congo a situation which threatens to disrupt the United Nations itself, and we cankeep silent no longer, because we have always viewed the United Nations as the greatest bulwark of peace and protection of small countries that human ingenuity has so far devised; our faith has remained undiminished despite the failure of the United Nations to carry out its missions. In one important case that failure has affected, and continues to affect, the happiness and well-being of myownpeople. l refer to Kashmir, a question which has remained on the agenda of the Security Council for manyyears.And, if l may say so, it is perhaps the inaction in Kashmir that has set an example for the United Nations to procrastinate and for nations to disregard the United Nations. From the point of view of the United Nations Organization per se, there is one effect of the failure of its operations and undertakings which is even mo:re tragic than others, and that is the disillusionment of the small nations in regard to the United Nations. These small nations of the world, which have put their faith in the United Nations, and which feel a sense of security because of the existenceofthe United Nations, are losing that faith and that trust. And if that is truly lost, there will indeed be great despair in the world, and hope will have gone out of the lives of those millions, scores of millions, of people. It is for that reason that aIl of us have struggled to keep hope alive despite disappointments and failures. 109. As no man can be bigger than hiscountry, so no enterprise orprojectoroperatiœl undertaken under the control of the United Nations can have more authority or more power than the United Nations itself. It has often been averred that the intervention of the United Nations in the affairs of the Congo prevented direct intervention by the big Powers and thus prevented a "Korean situation". 110. We must pause here to distinguish between the United Nations as an Organization and an operation 111. I have already referred to dangerous disillusionment. It is the view of my Government that, at this turning point in the career of the United Nations, the most serious danger that must be avoided, is the disillusionment of small nations, particularly in connexion with the operations of the United Nations. We believe that this disillusionment has been caused primarily by the fact that the United Nations operation inthe Congo has not demonstrated any success in accomplishing what was understood to be its objective. I use the expression "what was understood" advisedly. Whatever might be the legal nuances involved, which are amenable to endless analysis by the experts of the Charter, world opinion clearly understood that the objective of the United Nations operation in the Congo was the regulation of the situation in that country, to the point thatitwouldnotgiveriseto a threat to peace. 112. We feel that it is evident now that this failure was due to the employment of means which were pitifully small for the accomplishment ofthe ends. And the ends were much larger than anypursued before by the United Nations. 113. I know that it is futile to dwell on the general failure of the United Nations, which is really prior to the failure of the present operation. At the same time, I cannot resist sayingthat ifthe questionof the creation and equipment of a permanent United Nations force had been taken up in a more forward and radical spirit in relatively tranquil periods, the controversies, the hesitations, the impediments which have plagued the current operation wouldnot have arisen at all. 114. It seems to us to bethe cruxof the issue, underlined by the question of the Congo, that the United Nations cannot hope to meet the demands of a situation by circumscribing itself too much and by giving the Secretary-General a mandate not commensurate with the objectives that he is required to fulfil. The lesson that has been driven home to us by the present deplorable situation is: either meet a situation thoroughly, or leave it alone. Ithas proveddangerousand it will always be proved dangerous-for the United Nations to concern itself with a situation in any part of the world, to concern itself operationally and at the same time, to put restrictions on its activities in bringing that situation to a successful end. 115. In the light of these observations, the responsibility of the United Nations seems to be inescapable to create such conditions in the Congo as would enable the people of the Congo themselves to evolve their political destiny according ta their own genius. We do not believe tMt this responsibility can be îulfilled merely by an attempt at the conciliation of any specifie political factions in that country, or even by convening 116. It is not my intention to make anyadverse comments on the recommendations of the Conciliation Commission-on whichwe are representedourselvesbut when we consider the recommendations we needto bear in mind that, even li some measures of political conciliation were to succeed, the success, in the very nature of things. will be ephemeral. Any political progress and stability in the country canbe postulated only within the framework oflaw andorder, a modicum of economic security and a certain degree of firm administration. So long as these prerequisites are lacking, any constitutional arrangement suggested from outside will not act as solvent of a situation of disorder and potential strife. 117. It therefore follows that, atthis particular stage, we must re-think the objective of the United Nations operation in the Congo. To our mind, this objective is none other than the regulation of the situation in the Congo. This is not a limited objective. If it is to be faced in a fOrWard and realistic spirit, it will be understood that it demands that the UnitedNations has a responsibility to furnish to the people ofthe Congo a viable administrative apparatus and a framework of secure law and order. In actual fact, this responsibility is already entailed by the responsibility, openly accepted, of giving to the Congo thb maximum amount of political and administrative assistance. Weneednot be too concerned with the possible objection that this would involve placing the Congo under United Nations trusteeship and thus negating a sovereignty. The trusteeship of the United Nations implies the mediation of an administering authority. That evidently is out of the question in the case ofthe Congo. What is required here is an effort by the United Nations itself, directly, to enable a country to sustain its sovereignty, to preserve its territorial integrity andtoprevent anyunilateral intervention in its affairs from the outside. 118. The implications of this responsibility, as 1have tried to define it, are enormous and we believe that they must be squarely faced. The weakness of the current operation, as it has been conceived in this Council so far, is that it alternately faces and refuses to face. the fact that the United Nations, by the very instigation of this operation, has assumed a jurisdiction over the Congo which exceeds the provisions of the Charter if too legalisticaUy interpreted. 119. It is significant that there is before the Council not a single proposaI today from any side which does not, in one way or another, involve somekind of interference in matters which would normally be withinthe essential jurisdiction of the Republic of the Congo. Indeed it would be no exaggeration to say that, despite aU controversies between different members of the Council and between various interested Members of the United Nations. a consensus has already emerged that the situation in the Congo is incapable of correction through means which are conventionaUywithin the terms of the Charter. 121. Whether it is the SOvietproposal, or the proposal made by Ghana, or even the proposaIs which are opposed to them, the fact is established that no party visualizes any action in regard to the Congo which would leave its normal domestic jurisdiction intact. Since that fact is so established we fail to see why, in our thoughts and pronouncements, it must still be evaded and a spurious respect be shown to the letter of the Charter as it is understood at normal times. If it is not evaded, then the United Nations, through the organ of the Security Council must bear open witness to the fact that in a changingworId situation, the United Nations Charter is undergoing historic evolution and, in the matter of the Congo, it is called upon to take action of a kind not in accordance with conventional notions of its scope and limits. 122. In the light of these observations, we believe that the solution of the problem createdbythe present situation in the Congo can be sought only in the administration of the country by United Nations assistance, to the end that, in the reslÙting conditions of peace and stability, the Congolese people may be enabled to achieve their own political settlement, unhampered by outside interference, military or political-and bath are important. Specifically, this solution wOlÙd imply: First, the withdrawal of Belgian military and paramilitary personnel from the Congo-and that has been said by everyone-anà also of all foreign personnel who are not in the country either under the authority or with the consent of the United Nations; Secondly, a clear decision from the SecurityCouncil that the continuing presence of personnel of the type described abave would lead to the application of sanctions prescribed under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter; Thirdly, an injunction to all Members of the United Nations to refrain from any unilateral act of intervention in the affairs of the Congo; Fourthly, a thorough reorganizationofthe Congolese armed forces, entailing their absorption under United Nations command and the training of the entire force. Such members of the force as are found to be unqualified or unwanted are to be disbanded; Fifthly, the United Nations must take over the entire civil administrative control and widen the scope ofthe programme for the provision ofoperational, executive and administrative personnel (OPEX) in the Congofor a specified period, during whichthe Congolese mustbe trained to replace the United Nations personnel; Seventhly, the reinstitution of constitutional processes in the Congo should commence when, through a referendum or otherwise, the opinion of the people of the Congo has been ascertained regarding the nature and form of the government, whether a confederacy, federal or unitary, which they will choose for themselves. 123. Before l conclude, there is just one more observation of a rather parenthetical nature that l may be permitted to make, and it does not really relate to the Congo. 124. The Secretary-General, in his statement to the Council on 15 February [935th meeting], said many wise things, and all the things he said deserve the greatest consideration from us all because of the esteem in which we hold him. There is, however, one observation regarding which some qualifying remarks might not be entirely inappropriate. He said he would notbe forced to resign so long as he was certain of the support of the "uncommitted" nations of the world. This might be construed as dividingthe membership of the United Nations into two classes. l am sure he did not intend to relegate to a second-class membership the large number of Members who have evolved regional arrangements for their safety because the United Nations itself has been unable to provide the necessary protection. l can, however, remind him of the great confidence which these nations have in him and which they have never failed to show. As regards the situation in the Congo and other situations with which the Secretary-General mayhave to deal infuture, these nations are as committed to the preservation of peace and the strengtheningofthe United Nations as the so-called uncommitted nations, if not more.
l hope l will be pardoned for requesting a second opportunity to make a short intervention, but it has become necessary at this stage. As is known, the delegations of Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic have submitted a draft resolution which is contained in document S/ 4733. As we indicated earlier, we wouldlikethat draft resolution to be voted upon at the earliestopportunity. We have taken into consideration some of the points made by various delegations in the course of the discussion that has taken place, and we therefore propose to revise the draft resolutJ.on. l will read the revision before it is actually circulated. 126. We suggest that the first prearnbular paragraph read as follows: "The Security Council, "Taking note of the report of the Special Representative in the Congo, S/4727 of 18 February 1961 and the Secretary-General' s communication to the Security Council in his statement of 20 February, bringing to the earnest attention of the Council the atrocities and the assassinations in Leopoldville, Katanga and South Kasai in the Congo," We have tried our best to maet some of the suggestions of a number of"delegations. 127. There is one other pointIwishtomake. We have been asked why, if we are already convinced of the 11 rtlsponsibility for such crimes of persons in high places", it is necessary to have "an impartial investigation to determ:ne the responsibility for these crim.es and punishment of perpetrators of such crimes". 128. Yes, we are convinced thattheresponsibilityfor these crimes lies on the shoulders of some people in high places in the Congo, but it milst be specifically determined who these people are and also how this came about. AlI the matters that enter into the picture must be taken into account in passing judgement. That is why, although we are quite sure in our own minds that certain people in high places have some responsibility for these crimes, we would like an impartial investigation to fix the blame on the guilty parties. 129. The text of the revised version of the draft resolution will be placed before the Council as soon as possible. 130. l would like to add that aIl the members of the Council recognize the gravity of the situation in the Congo, and l am sure aIl members will agree that we must aIl condemn the crimes that have been committed in the Congo during the pastfewdays. Therefore, once again, on behalf of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution, l appeal to aIl members ofthe Council to support the resolution. 131. Ml'. BEN ABOUD (Morocco) (translated from French): We find that the assassination of Prime Minister Lumumba and his colleagues has a disquieting significance which we already partly described in. our last intervention [935th meeting). It unmasks the criminals, shows where the responsibility for the Congo crisis lies, and draws the attention ofaIl honest men to the sombre prospects of both the immediate and the distant future. The Congo crisis has spread from the territory of the Congo to the United Nations. It has become very complex, and aIl impartial observers now recognize that it is more than likely to have serious repercussions on the African continent. 132. As regards the United Nations, the opinion is now unanimously held that it must seize energetically and firml.y its last chance of re-establishing the rule of law, for the tragedy has now entered its most serious phase. 133. We should keep in the forefront ofourminds the lessons to be drawn from the assassinations ofPrime Minister Lumumba and his colleagues in Katanga, Kasai and elsewhere in the country. When th~ colonialists have to resort to murder in broad daylight by maans of their servile henchmen, one can see that colonialism knows that it is on the brink of the abyss, which will soon swallow it. In order to hold on ta the reins of power, hiding behind their puppet or their secessionist governm.ent or both at once, the colonialists have resorted to the" coup d'état", brought about the dissolutionof Parliament and, with the power- 134. The first reflection this unpardonable crime evokes inus is thatblood caUs for blood and an infernal chain reaction sets in. Furthermore, we have every right to be anxious about the fate ofthe othe-r political leaders who are still in prison in spite of their parliamentary immunity. Since the United Nations has been unable to do anything during the past seven months to correct the situation, these criminals and their servile henchmen must be itching to set up a régime of terror through their mercenaries. 135. The second reflection to which the assassination gives rise is that a political crime, which nothing can justify, rouses the conscience ofthe people who, sooner or later, take their revenge by precipitating various crises. This is as much as to say that the last act of the Congo tragedy has not yetbeen reached, unless the cause of justice should triumph immediately in sucha way as to re-establish government ofthe people by the people, instead of a travesty of government imposed from outside. . 136. The third warning which we derive from this premeditated crime, committed by foreigners and their henchmen, is that the colonialist crimi~als resort to assassination with the hidden motive of plunging the country into violence so as tobring about a veritable civil war and accentuate the chaos, thereby succeeding in their dual plan of wiping out the patriots and dismembering the national territory. The disintegration of the Congo wouldfollow, and thenthe heads of the big mining companies would be free to do as they pleased. 137. Fourthly, our attention is drawn to the alliances between various kinds of imperialists who, through their combined efforts, are contributing to the failure of the objectives both of the Congolese patriots and of the United Nations. Imperialism cannotmaintainitself without alliances. Its allies are of two kinds: within a former colony or, as in this case, a victimized colony, they are puppets eager to satisfy their personal ambitions; while outside the country, they are the other colonialist Powerl;l, engaged in the sametrade. This is a kind of multilateral parasitism whichexpectstohold out against the United Nations or at leastto divert the United Nations from its mission and turnUnitedNations activities to its own account. 138. What is a most serious danger for aUmankind is also an indirect threat to the United Nations. The League of Nations became a haven for the colonialist Powers which cunningly made use of it to ensure the perpetuation of their empires. Itwas killedby colonialist dishonesty masquerading as a civilizing mission. The conduct of the colonialistPowers, with their policy of aggression and "Balkanization", offomenting crime and disorder, is a continued defiance of the United Nations and helps to discredit and wreck it. If we only try to imagine what the worldwouldbe like without the United Nations, we shaU readily see that it is the only buffer between peace and war. We, the smaller coun- 139. Consequently, if the United Nations does not sufficiently beware of neo-colonialism and its intrigues, to the point of using sanctions if necessary, its prestige-and perhaps its very existence-will be threatened. It can carry out its mission onlyby taking energetic measures, as it did in the case of the Suez aggression. Common action becomes impossible only when colonialism triumphs over all the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. We previously raised a timely alarm at the deterioration of the situation. Today we think that the new turn of events threatens all of Africa. Indeed, the victory of neo-colonialism in the Congo carries with itthe danger of contaminating neighbouring countries. In the north of Africa as well as in the south and southwest, there are enough explosive situations today to convince us that a struggle is going on between the forces of the past which want to impose a prefabricated government from abroad, and the forces of the future which are out to defend the system of government by the people, regardless of its constitutional aspect. 140. Lastly, blood sacrifice tempers a nation's character, and we are convinced that the sacrifice of Prime Minister Lumumba and of his colleagues will cost the colonial Powers very dear. An ever-increasing number of ever more powerful adherents have been rallying to the Congolesenationalideal. The silent demonstrations that have takenplace recently in the Congo are more impressive than street battles. When a patriot has been assassinated. the generations following after him are always more intransigentthan he was; this is an inevitable phenomenon and a matter of historical facto 141. Belgian colonialism is doing exactly as itpleases in the Congo and is thereby threatening both the existence of the Republic of the Congo, as it emerged on the day independence was achieved, and the prestige and effectiveness of the United Nations. 142. Why are the Belgians defying our Organization, and how is Belgium able to keepup that challenge? That is the question. The answer is clear: Belgium is not alone. The colonial Powers are backing ft. Belgium is also taking advantage of the cold war and does not hesitate to flout justice or fomentdisorder. Ittakes no notice of the existence and the decisions of the United Nations-not without tacit encouragement on the part of certain Members of the United Nations. One cannot help but note the following facts whichhave encouraged Belgium to defy the whole world. 143. First, there is the weakness of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the GenElral Assembly. These resolutions did not take a firm stand; they did not set a time-limit for ending the Belgian aggression, providing for sanctions if necessary, and 144. Secondly, there is the weakness of the United Nations action in the face of the reign of terror which has assumed gigantic proportions with the assassination of political prisoners and the massacre of the civilian population. This encourages the colonialists and their obedient agents to commit further criminal acts. We, the small nations, are justified in calling attention to the injustices committed in the Congo while the United Nations remains passive. 145. Thirclly, Belgium has opposed some leaders and lent Us support to others. It has had no difficulty in carrying out its plans. Mr. Kasa-Vubu's delegation was able to command recognition by the General Assembly, despite the Assembly's decisions. Sincethen, Belgium and its henchmen have become impossible to deal with. Political prisoners have beentransferred to Katanga, and now to South Kasai and elsewhere, where mass assassinations have taken place. The physical destruction of political prisoners is thus becoming a favourite method. Rere again Belgium's allies bear a great responsibility before history. 146. Fourthly, the direct or indirect complicity of certain colonial Powers has encouraged Belgium to pursue its action confidently. 147. Fifthly, these colonial Powers havetakenpart in the general colonialist plan to dismember the Congo by setting up weak and subservient puppet régimes. In these circumstances, are the small countries of Asia and Africa not justified in mistrusting the colonialist Powers and in being concerned at the lack of energy displayed by our Organization? 148. We wish to state quite bluntly to the Security Council that no African nation can retain its confidence in the United Nations Operation in the Congo if, after seven months of United Nations presence, the result is the catastrophic situation we see today. As for the colonialist Powers, we can say to them that the smaU countries' mistrust of them is becoming daily more justified. This mistrust is but caution inthe face of an enemy that is everywhere present in our continent, namely, colonialism and neo-colonialism. 149. If, after sevenmonths ofUnitedNations presence in the Congo, arbitrary action, crime and secessionist movements have become recognized features of that country, are we to conclude that after another seven months our Organization's passive attitude will have ended by starting a conflagration in Africa? Such an outcome is not impossible. Neo-colonialism is very active and those it seeks to encourage-that is to say, "good" nationalists-are becoming more and more numerous. 150. The United Nations will be able to accomplish its task only if certain energetic measures are taken. Such measures must include the following: 153. Thirdly, Belgium must be condemned for its defiance of United Nations resolutions and for the active and disastrous l'ole which it is continuing to play dangerously in the Congo. 154. Fourthly, an investigation must be made to establish the complicity of aIl the other colonialist Powers, which are acting in conjunctionwith Belgium, either openly or behind the scenes. 155. Fifthly, sanctions must be applied to Belgium if it persists in ignoring the existence of the United Nations and its resolutions. 156. Sixthly, with the help of United Nations Force if necessary, Belgian personnel must be evacuatedinstead of simply talking about the withdrawal by the Belgians of their military and paramilitary personnel and of their political advisers, who are playing just as disastrous a l'ole as the military personnel. 157. Seventhly, aIl political prisoners must be freed immediately in order to protect the rights and lives of these unfortunate people. 158. These are some ofthe energetic measures which the Security Council should adopt if it wants at the same time to defend justice and to defend the existence of the United Nations itself. 159. The most ardent wish of any reasonable man when confronted with a crisis is that he may succeed in making prevail a spirit of conciliation based on law and justice. Is it possible to ask Ml'. Gizenga, for instance, and his associates to take part in a broad coalition government when their friends and colleagues are being assassinated wholesale and other crimes perpetrated with the connivance of that coalition government's Chief of state? Would that not be tantamount to asking Ml'. Gizenga to constitute himself a prisoner? Can he and his associates have confidence in a man whose hands are stained with the blood of Ml'. Lumumba and some of the former Ministers and Members of Parliament of the Congo? Have they not every right to be suspicious and on their guard? Are they not thus forced to continue the struggle, and will not the civil war which we are trying to prevent and stifle be thus brought about, encouraged and sustained by Belgian military personnel, Belgian weapons, the money pouring in from 1'1.11 sides and the puppets who seek to destroy the territorial integrity of their own country? 160. After Ml'. Kasa-Vubu had been imposed on the United Nations he returned to his owncountry crowned with undeserved success, because the General Assembly, which had until then followed the dictates of reaEon and avoided 1'1.11 consideration, partial or otherwise, of the Congo problem, was obliged to reverse itself. Since then Ml'. Kasa-Vubu has been pursuing a 161. What we wish to see in the United Nations is the necessary foresight to resist colonialist intrigues, which are an international danger. 162. To conclude, if the criminals are not punished, deliberate crimes will be the order of the day. If the Belgian intriguers are not condemned and expelled, the Congo crisis and a parallel international crisis will become a chronic feature endangering peace inAfrica and in the worId. The stakes are high. It is not merely a question ofpreserving the sovereignty andterritorial integrity of the Congo; it is also a question of the struggle between neo-colonialism and freedom in Africa. That is the whole issue. 163. To paraphrase an American author who said "An empire is the best of all reasons for a greater empire", l would say that if neo-colonialism is victorious in the Congo, the Congo willbea sphere of influence which will constitute the best ofall reasons for a still greater sphere of influence. 164. We once again express the wish, therefore, that the resolutions which are adopted will not simply be added to the list of previous resolutions and remain, like them, a dead letter. Butwemuststate frankly that any resolution will remaina dead letter ifthe Belgian military personnel and political advisers do not leave the Congo and if Belgian or other military supplies continue to flow into that country. 165. There is no possibility ofputting the Congo back on its feet unless the cause of the Congolese crisis, which is frequently confused with its consequences, is not completely eliminated. And the cause of the crisis is Belgian aggression, which today has become a permanent feature. 166. Mc. PADMORE (Liberia): l wish to referonlyto the joint draft resolution S/4722, part A, operative paragraph 3, which read;:;: "Calls upon all States to take immediateandenergetic measures to prevent the departure of such personnel for the Conl5'O from their territories, and for the denial of transit and other facilities to them;" The interpretation of my delegation is that material '.l·om any country or other source should be included in this paragraph of the operative part of the draft resolution. l am sure that the members of the Council will agree with this as a necessary precaution. 167. Sorne countries, such as Belgium for instance, might refrain from active participation with military and paramilitary personnel, but quite possibly continue to send material, which would not in fact contribute to
The President unattributed #227177
l have the impression thatthe majority of the members ofthe 8ecurityCouncil, at any rate, would like to continue discussion of this matter later tonight, and l therefore would suggest that we adjourn until after dinner. 170. Ml'. ZORIN (Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics) (translated from Russian): Since the majority of the Council's members are in favour of taking a decision first of aU on the urgent draft resolution which has been submitted by the representatives of Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic, and which is now under discussion, it might be desirable tovote on that draft resolution now, since it is of a pressing nature and constitutes our first reaction to those shocking acts, which bring shame on aU mankind, perpetrated by the authorities ofcertainprovinces and by the régime of Kasa-Vubu, Mobutu, Kalonji and Tshombé againstpoliticalleaders who were fighting for the independence of the Congolese people. 171. Tt therefore seems to me that, since there has been a fairly extensive exchange of views onthis draft resolution, it would be advisable for us to vote on it now, and then we could adjourn, as we intended to do, before continuing the discussion of resolutions submitted on the Congo problem as a whole. 172. l can see novalid grounds for postponing the vote on that draft resolution. Some amendments have been submitted; they have beenaccepted in a certainwording by the co-sponsors; and it seems to me that, if, for technical reasons, the final textwiththose amendments is not yet ready, we could recess for ten minutes or so. By then we should have the final text and should be able to vote on the draft resolution at once, after which we can adjourn in order to refresh ourselves for the further meeting this evening. Those are my views on the matter. 173. Ml'. SCHWETI'ZER (Chile) (translated from Spanish): My delegation shares the indignation thathas been expressed by aU the members of the Security Council who have taken part in the debate concerning the crimes that continue to be committed in the Congo. But the profoundshockwe have experienced onlearning of these terrible events in no way excuses us from carefully considering the resolutions we have to adopt. 174. The President has suggested thatweadjournand resume our discussions this evening. The representative of the Soviet Union, on the other hand, has asked for an immediate vote, which l believe is not quite in accordance with procedure, since we are not sufficiently familial' with the revised text of the draft resolution. 175. May l urge the Sovietreprèsentativenottopress his proposaI, bearing in mind this simple fact: the time of day here is not the same as in Africa. In two hours from now, when the meeting is resumed, there will still be time to make known the Security Council's reaction to the dreadful misdeeds and the successive
The President unattributed #227180
The representative of the Soviet Union has proposed that we adjourn for a short time in arder to consider the documont which has not yet been circulated and that then we should meet and vote on it before dinner. 177. Speaking from the Chair, I am bound to say that I do not find that to be a very convenient process since I have notyetseenthe document except in a provisional copy and I have notyet seensuchamendments as there may be to it. I cannot help feeling that for the better conduct of our business it would be more convenient to do as the representative for Chile has proposed, to adjourn until after dinner and thenproceedto consider the draft resolutions which are before us. 178. Mr. PADMORE (Liberia): Mr. President, this is only a point of information. Youhave suggested that we adjourn untilafter dinner. Wouldyoube good enough ta suggest the hour that you intend calling the meeting to order again~ 179. The PRESIDENT: The normal adjournment is about two hours. I was going to propose that we should meet again at 8.45 p.m.
The view put forward by the Chilean representative must of course be considered, as must aU suggestions for a more careful consideration of proposaIs submitted to the Security Council. 181. But I wish to state that the substance of the brief d.raft resolution before us is sufficientlyclearto us aIl, and I feel that we ought to expedite the adoption of such resolutions because they are undoubtedly of an urgent political nature and a great deal depends on their timely adoption. 182. The representative of Chile said that the time of day ln New York is not the same as in Africa. I agree with him. But in Africa, it is already night and close to perhaps dawn; and as a rule aH crimes of this kind are committed at night or towards dawn. Thus our adopting a resolution earlier today may save a few lives. 1 merely say this in answer to the Chilean representative's observation concerning the difference in time. 183. If the members of the Security Council and the President in particular are anxious to postpone the meeting until this evening, 1 shall not insist on putting my suggestion to the vote; but fromapolitical point of view 1 consider that every hour's delay does harm.
The President unattributed #227184
1 am obliged to the representative of the Soviet Union for his courtesy in agreeing not to press his proposaI, in deference to the Chair. In the circumstances, and unless 1 hear objection, 1 shall adjourn the meeting until a quarter to nine this evening.
l do not insist that we adjourn atthis time, but l have to say that Iwould object to the resumption of our meeting with the voting on the draft resolution S/4733/Rev.1. l suspect that there maybe some other revisions which some delegations may wish to make anduntilthey have been heard and considered by the Council, it seems to me that it would be quite improper to proceed with the voting. Consequently, ifthe representative ofthe Soviet Union is eager to save time, l would say that for my part l am quite prepared to stay here until we vote on the importantdraft resolution S/4722, callingfol' action in substance, before adjourning. l have heard the interpretation given by the representative of Liberia of the meaning of operative paragraph 2 of part A; l assume it reflects the views of the other sponsors of the draft resolution, and on that assumption Iam prepared to proceedwith the voting onthat draft resolution at this time, it being infinitely more important. l would urge the Council to stay in session until it disposes of that draft resolution if we are eager to save time and, l might say, lives.
l now see that the question is not one of difference in time which was referred to by the representative ofChile but rather of a difference of approach to the resolution itself andthe points contained in it. 188. The United States representative has proposed that we should sit without any recess in order to come to a decision both on this draft resolution and on the other draft resolutions. The USSR delegation is quite prepared to do that. l would simply like to draw the attention of the United States representative to the fact that, while we have apparently all agreed to vote on draft resolution S/4733/Rev.1 first, we have not so far discussed, or agreed on, any changes in the order of voting on the other resolutions before us. As we know, there is a draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union as. early as 14 February [S/4706], and there is a draft resolutionproposed by Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic [S/4722]. On the understanding that we shaH now proceed to vote on draft resolution S/4733/Rev.1, and thenwe shaH discuss and vote on the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union, and after that deal with the draft resolution of Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic, the USSR delegation is prepared to proceed immediately to the vote on all three draft resolutions.
l am sorry that the representative of the Soviet Union both misunderstood and mis-stated my position. My position is that we are preparedto proceed now to vote on draft resolution S/4722. We will not be prepared to proceed to the vote ondraftresolution S/4733/Rev.1 191. Under the rules, as l understand it, l am bound to put those draft resolutions to the vote in the order in which they were presented, unlbss the Council, by procedural motion, decides to change the order and to give precedence to any other motion than that which was first put down.
May l recall that, onbehalfof my delegation and the delegations of Liberia and Ceylon, l asked that a priority vote should be taken on the druft resolu.tion S/4733/Rev.1.
The President unattributed #227202
Under the rules l am boundto put to the vote theproposaI ofthe representative of the United Arab Republic that the draft resolution standing in the name of his delegation and of the delegations of Ceylon and Liberia should be put to the vote first. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Ceylon, Liberia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic. Against: None. Abstaining: Chile, China, Ecuador, France, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great BritainandNorthern Ireland, United States tlf America.
The President unattributed #227205
The result of the vote is 4 in favour, none against and 7 abstentions. The draft resolution is rejected.
First, l should like to make a correction to the President's statement as Iheard it in the interpretation-perhaps it was an error: he said that the draft resolution was rejected. l think that is premature.
The President unattributed #227210
l stand corrected.
l should like to add that l am truly astonished at the attitude ofthe United States on this question, because we heard a statement by the United States representative in which he spoke of the need for an immediate reaction to these shockingacts of arbitrary violence. We heard statements from nearly aIl the members of the Security Council in which they spoke of the urgent need for the Security Council to react to the murders committedfor political purposes by the terroristbandwhich is now controlling
1 apologize for intervening so often, but 1 seem to have trouble making myself understood by the representative of the Soviet Union. 1 asked today for immediate action, not l'eaction. 1 think we have too much reaction and not enough action. And 1amprepared now ta voteand to sit here as long as it takes-on the Soviet draft resolution [S/4706] and on the draft resolution of Ceylon, Liberia and the UnitedArab Republic [S/4722], in the arder in which they were introduced; and tben on the further draft resolutionpresentedby these three delegations. [S/4733/Rev.1].
The President unattributed #227220
ln view of the position which we have now reached, 1 think the Council may like ta consider again whether it would not be in fact more convenient to adjourn for two hours before we take up the consideration of these draft resolutions.
1 agree with that suggestion. The way things are developing, we will have neither dinner nor a vote. Itherefore support the suggestion that we adjourn for two hours. " 202. The PRESIDENT: Unless 1 hear objection, the meeting will be adjourned until 9.15 this evening. The meeting rose at 7.15 p.m. ISRAEL Blumstein's Bookstares, and 4B Nachlat ITAlY·ITAlIE Libreria C.:tmmissionaria Gina Capponi 26, Azuni 151A, Rama. JAPAN.JAPON Maruzen Company, Nihonbashi, Tokyo. JORDAN....ORDANIE Joseph 1. Bahous Box 66, Amman. KOREA.COREE Eul-Yoo Publishing Chongno, Seou!. lEBANON·lIBAN Khayat's College 92-94, rue Bliss, LUXEMBOURG Librairie J. Trausch·Schummer, Théâtre, Luxembourg. MEXICO·MEXIQUE Editorial Hermes, 41, México, D.F. MOROCCo-MAROC Centre de diffusion B.E.P.I., 8, rue Michaux.Bellaire, NETHERLANDS·PAYS.BAS N.V. Martinus Nijhoff, 9, 's·Gravenhage. NEW ZEALAND.NOUVELLE-ZElANDE United Nations Association land, C.P.O. 1011, NORWAY·NORVEGE Johan Grundt Tanum gustsgt. 7A, Oslo. Orders and inquiries fram countries nat listed above mey be sent to: Sales Section, Publishing Sevice, United Nations, New York, U.S.A.; or Sales Section, United Nations, Palais Litho in U.N. Priee: $U.S. 0.50; 3/6 stg.; (or equivalent in other eurrencies)
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