S/PV.942 Security Council

AIl the other members of the Security Council having spoken, 1· vish now ta make a statement on behalf of the UNITED KINGDOM delegation. 2. In my statement to the Council on 15 February [935tb meeting], 1 said that Iwouldwish to put forward at a later stage the views of my delegation about the substance of the problem which confronts us in this debate. 1 amnowaddressingtheCouncilagainon behalf of the United Kingdom delegation in order to state my delegation's views. 3. We have had a long and oftenembittereddiscussion, ranging over the whole situation in the Cong9 and weIl beyond the scope of the particular documents included in our agenda. Since our debate opened, the position has been made much more difficultbyreports ofthe death, in most questionable circumstances, first of Mr. Lumumba and his two companions and later of Mr. Finant and five Congolese politicians. In spite ofthese embittering circumstances, 1 am glad that the majority of representatives have clearly been genuinely concerned to consider constructively the situation with which we are now faced in the Congo. 4. The United Kingdom delegation fully recognizes that the course of events in the Congo, and especially perhaps the recent reports about the deaths of Mr. Lumumba, Mr. Finant, and their associates, most naturally cause great distress and arouse great passions among many delegations. It is rightthatexpression should be given ta these feelings. For my part 1 have already made it clear that my Government deplores the violent death of these men, as well as all other acts of violence, whether in the Congo or else= where. But much of what we have heard in this Council bas, in the opinion of my delegation, gone far beyond what is justified by anythingwhich is know so far about these deplorable incidents. 1 refer, of course, to the slanders on the Secretary-General, to accusations against particular leaders and Governments before the facts are known, to the deliberate incitement ta hatred and violence addressed to the peoples of the Congo, 5. What we should surely be trying to do is to look constructively to the future. rather than to pour out our indignation and bitterness over the pasto In other words-and 1 quote fromthe speechofthe United states representative-"Let us join in c0ndemning the past. but let us join in facing the future". [934th meeting. para. 50.] But before l turn to the future l must draw the attention of the Councilto the fact that brutality and inhuman treatment have undoubtedly taken place in many parts of the Congo. Itisnoservice to truth or to a solution of the problems before us to levei accusations about the treatment of Mr. Lumumba or Mr. Finant and their companions and deliberatelyto ignore the many other shocking violations of human decency which have taken place elsewhere in the Congo. Tt is not the political position or the popular notoriety of a human being that entitles him to humane treatment and the protection ofthe law. It it is right to protest against the violence inflicted on Mr. Lumumba andMr. Finant it is no less right to do so when man. women and children. who perhaps have less power to defend themselves. are subjected to equal violence and brutality. 6. l do not propose todaytooccupyfurthertime in the Council by giving details of the truly appallingbrutalities which we know to have been committed. We have heard enough of these. more than enough. l think it would be more constructive if l were now to try to consider the future. 7. The goal to which the United Kingdom Government has consistently been working is to help. through the United Nations. in the establishment of order and stability in the Congo so that the inhabitants of that country should be united in freedom. should be free from. intervention from outside and free from exploitation in the cold war. Tt is towards that goal that my Government will continue to work. Let me indicate the way in which my Government would hope that progress might be made. given the necessary good will on the part of all Members of the United Nations who may be concerned. S. First~ we are in favour of a united Congo. In spite of contrary tendencies. which unfortunately persist. there had recentlY' been some slight beginning of progress. even ifpainfuHy slow. towards findingapolitical solution, which alone can forro the basis for a united Congo. 1 refer to the proposed round table conference and to the efforts of the United Nations Conciliation Commission in the Congo. whose preliminary report has recently been circulated to us.Y l shaH have :tytore to say about that report a little later on. bUfMre l simply wish to make the point that even if p ogress sometimes has been disappointingly slow ~e, shQuld 10. Rere 1 must make thepointthat, inthe last resort, it must be for the Congolese and the Congolese alone to reach a political accord among themselves. 1 realize that recent events have, as 1 said this morning, made a reconciliation agreement much more difficult. But much as we may regret these events, unless it is recognized inside and outside the Congo that the Congolese people and their leaders alone are competent to decide on the political structure and future of their State and to choose their own leaders, there can be no real progresse No external power, not even the United Nations, can do this for them. AlI the United Nations can and should do is to encourage and help the Congolese to the best of their ability. My delegation believes that the United Nations must continue to try to do this in spite of aIl the setbacks which have occurred. 11. Then, secondly, there is the question of outside intervention. My delegation does not understand why certain speakers seem to approve of intel'Vention by some Powers and not by others. In the opinion of my Government, aIl foreign military intervention, whether by personnel, by war "matériel" or by money, is equally to be condemned, from whatever quarter it comes. 12. Thirdly, there is the question of assisting the Republic of the Congo to create those conditions of order and stability which are obviously necessary if peace and prosperity are to be firmly based. As to this, it seems to my delegation that it is indeed the duty of the United Nations to assist in the reorganization of the Congolese army, which never had an opportunity to be trained for its present and future national responsibilities. AlI that 1 would stress here is that my Government does not think that there should be any question offorcing any measure upon the Congo, whether in regard to the reorganization of the armed forces, or in any other field. The true raIe of the United Nations-and 1emphasize this-the true raIe of the United Nations is ta help the Congolese ta solve their own problems. 13. 1 wish now ta say something about the preliminary report of the Conciliation Commission ta which reference has been made by a number of speakers and which has now been circulated to the members of the Security Council. Some remarks were made at this table on 17 February which seemed to belittle the importance of this report, and 1 note that the Advisory Committee has drawn our attention to the fact that this is merely a preliminary report and does not necessarily reflect the views of governments. Of course, 1 fully accept this latter point and 1 must say for my part that the United Kingdom Government has not had time to study the report itself, and lam not in a position today to state a considered view upon it. 14. At the same time, it seems ta me that this is a document of which the Security Council should notfail 15. These are, it seems to us, the steps which should now be taken by the United Nations inworking towards a solution of the problems of the Congo. 16. Now, against this background, it will be readily understood that my delegation cannot for one moment accept the terms of the draft resolution proposed by the representative of the 80viet Union [8/4706]" 1 do not wish to waste the time ofthe Council in criticizing this draft resolution which, if carried out, would have a wholly deplorable, mayI sayreactionary, effectupon the situation in the Congo. 17. The draft resolution put forward by Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic[8/4722] is, 1 am glad to say, of a very different character. Many of the considerations in the minds of its authors are similar to those which 1 have already suggested in my statement. But 1 am sure that the sponsors of the draft resolution will understand that my delegationhas some reservations about the texte 18. In the first place, as 1have all'eady said, we must always have in mind that the true l'ole of the United Nations is to help the Congolese to solve their own problems. My delegation is therefore extremely glad to see the fourth preambular paragraph of part B of the draft resolution which states that: ".•. the solution of the problem of the Congo lies in the hands of the Congolese people themselves without any interference from outside ••• ". 19. My delegation could not agree that any part of the draft resolution before us, if adopted, could be interpreted to derogate from this principle. In particular, 1would draw attention to part A, operative paragr.aphs 1 and 4, and part B, operative paragraph 2. Each of these paragraphs, if taken in isolation, could, it seems to me, mean that the United Nations would take action in the Congo by force without appropriate consultation with the representatives of the Congolese people. This interpretation wodd, in the opinion of my delegation, he extremely dangerous. 20. However, my understanding, like that of the representative of the United 8tates whom we heard at the last meeting, is that under part A, operative paragraph 1, there will be no question ofusingforce until agreement has been sought by negotiation, conciliation and other peaceful measures. A similar reservation was 21. Specüically as regards paragraph 1 of part A, l must explain that the interpretation which my delegation puts upon the wordsat the end of that paragraph, namely "and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort", is that force will only be used by the United Nations to prevent a clash between hostile Congolese troops. There can be no question of empowering the United Nations to use its forces to impose a political settlement. 22. The representative of the United States has proposed an amendment to operative paragraph 3 of part A of the draft resolution inorderto cover the question of interdicting aIl aid for military purposes, direct or indirect, other than through the United Nations. In the opinion of my delegation this proposed amendment would be an improvement on the draft resolution as it stands at present. 23. l have noted also what the representative of the United States has said about the position ofthe 8ecretary-General to the effect that operative paragraph1 of part A should be interpreted to mean that the Secretary-General should implement the resolution. l fuUy agree with this interpretation, and indeed l cannot see that this paragraph is open to any other interpretation. The views of my delegation about the position of the 8ecretary-General are far too weIl known and l do not need to repeat them here. 24. In the light of these interpretations l am able to say now that my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution 8/4722, sponsored jointly by Ceylon, Liberia and the.United Arab Republic. 25. Our debate has been long and charged with emotion. Can we not now lay aside our partisan feelings, can we not now think only of the good of the Congolese people, can we not now, in the light of the explanations which have been made, join together in approving this draft resolution? 26. In my capacity as PRESIDENT, may l add that, there being no further speakers on my list, the Council will now proceed to vote on the draft resolutions which are before it.

Mr. President, l was informed by the Secretariat that there were two more speakers on the list; l therefore did not ask for the floor, and am ready to give way to the speakers on the liste If there are none, l should like to speak.

l was just on the point of explaining to the Council that, although we were about to proceed to the voting, there were three or four mem- 32. The draft resolution submittedby the Soviet Union [S/4706] proposes, in an intemperateandunacceptable manner, thatwe should dismiss the Secretary-Gbneral, that the United Nations Operation in the Congo should be discontinued within one month, that the actions of Belgium should be condemned and that sanctions sl10uld be applied to Belgium as toanaggressor, while, at the same time, it enjoins the United Nations Force to disarm and to arrest certain persons. 33. We welcome the explanation given by the Soviet representative regarding the withdrawal of the United Nations Force because it implies his acceptance ofthe essential aims that must first ba achieved. We cannot support the Soviet draft resolution, however, because we feel it to be exaggerated and unfair. 34. The draft resolution submittedbyCeylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic [S/4722j is a commendable effort, on which we congratulate the sponsors. We must admit that it does not satisfy us and that we do not understand the deliberate avoidance of any reference to the Secretary-General. He ia not even mentioned, and yet he has provided us with valuable information and ideas, and we should be doing less than our duty if we did not consider it carefuUy. We agree that the previous resolutions of the Council and the General Assembly should be expressly reaffirmed, for this remedies many defects in the draft resolution. We agree with the impartial investigation itproposes, and we consider very r ê': tnent the recommendations it contains regarding :: need to prevent imminent civil war and regarding the withdrawal ofmilitary personnel not under the United Nations Command and the need to prevent the departure of military personnel for the Congo from other countries. 36. We have the greatest doubts about partB. Operative paragraphs 1 and 2 would represent interference contrary to the Charter if it were not for the fact that the Congo is now disorganized and divided, and that, in consideration of the tragic plight ofa country which has asked for assistance to restore peace and order and to defend its unity, territorial integrity andpolitical independence. our aim-as stated in the preamble to part B-of preventing interference from outside and our appeal for conciliation make up for the shortcomings to which we referred. 37. AIthough the draft resolution urges the convening of the Parliament, this is not made mandatory any more than is the reorganization ofthe Congolese armed forces. Tt will be necessary to negotiate and conciliate for that purpose; the greatest caution must be exercised, and no effort must be spared. 38. We also note that there is nottheslightest reference to the civilian aspects of the United Nations operation in providing the assistance requested by the Congo. This type of assistance must be intensified to the maximum extent oftheOrganization's capabilities. 39. We concur in the explanations and interpretations already given by other Council members, and l am referring here to the United States. Turkey and the United Kingdom. Hence, in order to prevent the United Nations from being discredited and rendered ineffective, we prefer. like Caesar, to vote, in spite of everything, for the draft resolution that can save the Congo fro""J. chaos and disintegration, and mankind frolll the increasing peril in which, if the Congo was not saved, it would be involved. 40. My delegation further supports the three-Power draft resolution [S/4733/Rev.l1, which is particularly satisfactory in its revised form, for the sponsors have much improved it by making it more forceful and objective. We support it on the ground that it is a draft resolution resuIting from an emergency situationwhich requires an immediate decision by the Security Council. We have always believed that this body has not merely political but also moral authority and that its action must be feIt throughout the world wherever human rights are trampled underfoot. 41. The draft resolution to which we are referring is in complete harmony with the principles of the Uni-

The Council is aware oftheattitudeofreserve adopted by my delegation since the beginning of the Congo crisis and of how we have accordingly voted. French public opinion reacted with feeling and indignation at the news of the disappearance of Mr. Lumumba and his companions and, more recently, ofsix otherleading Congolese figures. The French Government is in favour of an investigation being held to establish the precise circumstances. We recall that from the very beginning of the Congo crisis we have unceasingly urged· that every measure should be taken to ensure that the human rights and fundamental freedoms ofall the inhabitants of the Congo were respected. In the same way we believe that the task of justice and humanity which has been proposed to us and which we should adopt as our own cannot be carried out in any partisan spirit and must, if it is to have its full value, serve all political leaders and all the inhabitants of the Congo without distinction. 43. My Government continues to appeal to aU States to refrain from furnishing, directly or indirectly, any arms or other war Ilmatériel Il , any personnel or any other type of military assistance to the Congo. 44. My Government insists that it is for the Congolese people ta decide their owndestiny. We have unceasingly advocated respect for the unity and territorial integrity of the Congo, the re-establishment of order and constitutional legality, and the restoration of discipline within the Armée nationale congolaise. But we are at the same time convinced that any measures taken in the Congo must scrupulously respect the sovereignty of that independent State, and that any other attitudewhich would in any event be contrary to the Charterwould be likely to set a dangerous precedent, particularly in the case of the newly independent States. We would also recall that, whatever the circumstances may be, the present President of the Congo is the only legitimate authority in the country who has been recognized as such by our Organization andthat the decisioll taken in this regard by the United Nations must be respected. My delegation endorses what has been ~aid on this subject by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States. My Government notes that the preliminary report of the Conciliation Commission sent ta the Congo by the decision of the United Nations takes note ofthe efforts at present being made by Mr. néo, the Prime .Minister, to broaden his Cabinet and thus recognizes the legality ofhis Government. !t is highly desirable that the United Nations should help the lawful authorities of the Congo to reorganize the armedforces and to restore order within the country, but ft is clear that nothing can be done without their co-operation. !t is also for those authorities to convene the Parliament and ta take the necessary steps, which we hope will be both prompt and 46. My Government has also duly noted the stand taken here by the representatives of a large number of Africancountries whichare more directly concerned in this matter than many others andwhose only desire is to work for the restoration of peace and concord in a country which is dear to them. These representatives have expressed their opposition to any s'olution of the Congo crisis which might be forced upon the lawful authorities and have constantly expressed the hope that their leaders be given time to work together with theil' Conf;;olese brethren in drawing up a plan for settling the present crisis. 47. These are the various considerations by which my delegation will be guided in voting on the draft resolutions before us. 48. Ml'. TSIANG (China): In view of the lateness of the hour, and in view of the factthat 1 have intervened several times before in this debate, 1 shall be extremely brieL 49. First of all, my delegation cannotacceptthedraft resolution proposed by the Soviet Union[S/4706]. That draft resolution calls for the dismissal of the Secretary-General. It calls for ending the United Nations operation in the Congo within one month. Onboth those counts my delegation is opposed. We consider the draft resolution purely destructive. 50. Now let me turn to the three-Powerdraftresolution [S/4722]. That draft resolution is constructive. It has certain defects, but it is moving in the right direction. 1 regret that it does not reflect as fully as it should the sentiments and suggestions of the States members of the Brazzaville Conference.Y On 16 February [936th meeting] the representative ofMadagascar read to us extensive extracts from the com- ~uniqué of that Conference. 1was deeply impressed by the thoughtfulness of the suggestions of that Conference. The manifestly fraternal and disinterested feelings of the participants in the Conference should recommend their suggestions to a more ser-ious consideration by the Security Council. 51. Secondly, this draft resolution has certain ambiguities, and we might evensay inconsistencies. However, if we had more time or if we thought it worthwhile to take more time, we might get a more perfect resolution. But time is pressing, and 1 do not wish to delay this Council hy suggesting amendments of this kind or that kind. 52. Thirdly, the situation in the Congo is extremely complicated. It is easy to criticize a draft resolution proposed by somebody else, but if 1were to produce a draft resolution it mightmeetwith even more criticism than this one before us. y PoUtica1 Conference of Afrlcan States and Madagascar, he1d at Brazzaville from 15 to 19 December 1960. 54. Finally, in regard to part B of this draft resolution, operative paragraph 1 reads: "Urges the convening of the Parliament". The draft resolution does not say whom it urges. It urges the convening of Parliament. l take it that the Secretary-Generalcould not convene the Parliament in a Member State. l am sure that the Special Representative of the Secretary- General in the Congo could not do that, and l am sure Ûlat the commander of the United Nations Force in the Congo could not suddenly convene the Parliament. So it is myunderstandingthatthis paragraph reallymeans that the Secretary-General shouldurge the Government of the Republic of the Congotoconvenethe Parliament because that is the only procedure possible. 55. Then in operative paragraph 2 of this part, we see the following: "Urges that Congolese armed units and personnel should be reorganized". This again is in the passive. Who is to do the reorganizing? l take it that the Secretary-General should urge the Government of the Republic of the Congo to have its armed forces reorganized. That is the only procedure possible, and that is the only procedure consistent with the Charter and with our previous resolutions. 56. With these understandings and making these allowances, my delegation will vote for this draft resolution. 57. Ml'. BENITES VINUEZA (Ecuador) (translated from Spanish): My delegation does not feel that it needs ta justify its vote by a pointless repetition of certain concepts. To be brief, at the present juncture, is to co-operate in a positive way. Therefore, l shall merely recall that the views already expressed by my delegation are similar to those to be found in the draft resolution submitted by Ceylon, Liberia andthe United Arab Republic [S/4722]. l only wish to state that my delegation is voting for that draft resolution on the understanding that it is to be interpreted inthe manner explained by the representative of Liberia and inconformity with the views expressed by the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and Turkey. 58. My delegation reserves the right to speak on the second draft resolution submitted by the same delegations [S/4733/Rev.1] if it sees fit to do so. 59. Ml'. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Ml'. President, l should first like to say a few words about the Soviet delegation's attitude to the draft resolution which we were discussing at the last meeting, the consideration of which was deferred. l am referring to the resolution of the delegations of Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic [S/4733/Rev.1] . 60. The Soviet delegation again, this morning [940th meeting], drew the Council's attention to the need for 61. This draft resolution mentions the continuance of large-scale assassination of political leadel's; the· places where these murders have been committed- Leopoldville, Katanga and SouthKasai inthe Congo; the extreme gravity of the situation in the Congo; and the fact that responsibility for these crimes lies with persons in high places-a very important point, since we are dealing not with irresponsible sharp-shooters, as one might say, but with responsible persons, answerable to the State. It also says that the Security Council strongly condemns the unlawful arrests, deportations and assassinations ofpoliticalleaders ofthe Congo. 62. At the same time the Council caUs upon aU concerned in the Congo immediately to put an end to such practices, and caUs uponthe United Nations authorities in the Congo to take aU possible measures to prevent the recurrence of such outrages, including, if necessary, the use of force as a last resort. 63. Thus we have not only an evaluation, not only a political and moral reaction to this course of exterminating the national political leaders which is clearly being foUowed by the present leaders in the Corgo, including such people as Kasa-Vubu, not to speak of Tshombé, Mobutu and Kalonji; we have also mention of the need to stop these activities, and to that end to use aU possible measures, including the use of force as a last resort. 64. The draft resolution also states that the Security Council has decided to carry out an impartial investigation to determine the responsibilityfor these crimes and punishment of perpetrators of such crimes. 65. We do not think that this resolution is a strong one. In its various paragraphs, its definition of the measures to be taken is insufficiently clear and the same applies to its mention of the persons in high places who are guilty of these criminal acts. But l hardly think that much explanation is needed, today, to tell world public opinion who is involved. l think that anybody who reads this resolution will understand that those involved are persons of high responsibility- Kasa-Vubu, Mobutu, Tshombé and Kalonji. These are the people to whom this resolution in fact refers. 66. However, we consider that, despite a certain weakness, this resolution does reflect the current feeling of aH those who are genuinely concerned in putting a stop to illegalities in the Congo, and to the violence of colonialist terror there; and it also refers to certain measures which could really put an end to these criminal actions. 68. 1 must now say a few words about the Soviet draft resolution [S/4706], because it mentions not only the first essential measures for the prevention of a further dangerous turn of events throughouttheCongo, but also a course of action for the swift improvement and transformation of the situation inthe Congo, which is now, obviously, a dangerous and alarming one•. 69. The representative of the United Kingdom has stated here that we must have a constructive approach towards the solution of these basic problems. He further said-and in this he was quoting the representative of the United States-that we must join in condemning the past but must also join in facing the future. This was what the UnitedKingdomrepresentative said. We, too, think that the Security Council should, as a body, condemn the pasto For this reason, in the opening part of our resolution, we say: "The Security Council, "Regarding the murder of the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo, Patrice Lumumba, andof the outstanding statesmen of the Republic okito and Mpolo as an international crime incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations and as a flagrant violation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples adopted by the General Assembly at its fifteenth session, "1. Decisively condemns the actions of Belgium which led to this crime." 70. Since the representative of the United Kingdom has, 1 repeat, supported the United States representative in suggesting that we join in condemningthe past, 1do not think that he should refuse to adopt the Soviet Union resolution so far as a decisive condemnation of the actions of Belgium is concerned. 71. 1 must say that 1 was somewhat puzzled by the Chilean representative's statement where he said that the Soviet delegation's draft resolution was unaccept-· able to him and identified, as one of the unacceptable points, the condemnation of Belgium. It must be a matter for astonishment that, after all we have heard here in the Council, after all that theworld has learnt during these seven months of grievous tragedy in the Congo, we should apparentlybe afraid to condemnthose 72. 1 should like to point out that now, when we have reached the last stages of our discussion. we have just received a report dated 20 February 1961 of recent developments in Northern Katanga from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, which contains this passage: "After burning Mukulakulu Village and putting the population to flight. the attacking force of some 300-400 gendarmes. officered by Belgians, advanced in sixty trucks and occupied Luena from which the population had previouslyfled." [Si4691/Add.2. para. 1.} The report also states the fouowing: "On 17 February fighting took place at Bukama between two companies of 'gendarmerie', armedwith 75 mm guns andfourmortars. againstBaluba tribesmen ••• A Belgian officer, CaptainProtin, commanding the 'gendarmerie' atMitwaba. was encounteredby a United Natiqns patrol on 17 February south of Djobo: he stated that the intention of the 'gendarmerie' was ta capture Manono and that the United Nations Force should not attempt to intervene as the operation was part of a larger offensive." [Ibid., para. 3J --- 73. Such are the latest reports. After this, can we ignore these criminal actions by the Belgian colonialists. who are continuing their outrages with the help of their puppet Tshombé? Should we not decisively condemn these actions? 74. 1 therefore think that the paragraph ofour resolution decisively condemning the actions of Belgium which led to the crime ofthe murder of Prime Minister Lumumba. even if it does not meet with the support of ail the members of the Council, will be supported by the whole world. 75. Our resolution states that the Council: WDeems it essential that the sanctions provided under Article 41 ofthe United Nations Charter should be applied to Belgium as to an aggressorwhich by its actions is creating a threat to international peace, and calls on the States Members ofthe United Nations for the immediate application of these sanctions." This provision of our resolution should, 1 think. also be supported by the African and Asian countries, and by all who are concerned that Belgium's colonial domination in Katanga and throughout the Congo should be effectively liquidated. 76. With regard to Belgium. we have already more than once discussed the measures which should he taken. but the Belgian Government continues to ignore all the accusations justifiably levelled against it. and we cannot any longer tolerate such disrespectbothfor 77. In the draft resolution we also state that the Security Council: "Enjoins the command of the troops thatare in the Congo pursuant to the decision ofthe Security Council immediately to arrest Tshombé and Mobutu inorder to deliver them for trial, to disarm aIl the military units and 'gendarmerie' forces under their control, and to ensure the immediate disarming and removal from the Congo of aIl Belgian troops and aIl Belgian personnel." Is this request not justified? Is this not a measure which would fundamentally alter the present situation in the Congo and which it is not only necessary but possible to take, assuming that we are really determined to find a radical solution for the Congolese problem? Tshombé and Mobutuhaveproved themselves to be the puppets ofthe Belgians and of others. carrying out direct orders for the murder of people-and not merely of people, but for the murder of political leaders, about which the entire Council has spokenwith indignation. If you'are really indignant, you should immediately take steps against the persons who committed these murders. 78. We have been speaking of the disai'ming of the Tshombé and Mobutu bands for some time, for a long time; and the present actions of these bands in the territory of the Congo dictate the raising ofthis question again and again, with aIl urgency. 79. The removal from the Congo ofaIl Belgiantroops and aIl Belgian personnel is one ofthe basic conditions for maintaining the independence of the Congo andestablishing true law and order there. 80. In the draft resolution of the Councilwe also suggest: " ••• that the 'United Nations operation' in the Congo shaIl be discontinued within one month and aIl foreign troops withdrawn from there so as to enable the Congolese people to decide its own internaI affairs". 81. An attempt has been made here to describe this proposaI as a destructive one. But in what way i6 it destructive? After the United Nations troops have successfuIly carried out the operation to remove aIl Belgian troops and aIl puppet troops establishedby the Belgians, what would there be left for them to do? Surely the Congolese people can organize its political life on the basis of the usual democratic system, convening Parliament, setting up its Government and ensuring the subsequent normal development of democratic life? 82. The French representative has just expressed the view of France that the Congolese people itselfshould decide this matter, that the Congolese people and its representatives should decide their own internaI affairs. And it might be understood that he was ap- 83. With regard to the conclusions ofthe Conciliation Commission, 1 must say, in reply to the statements of the representatives of France and the UnitedKingdom, that the note which was distributed to the members of the Council, and aboutwhich therewas so m'lch concern on Friday, is in fact not alegaldocument, because the Advisory Committee, which sent this note is not a body set upby the General Assembly or the Security Council. Neither of these constitutional bodies approved this Advisory Committee. It was arbitrarily set up by Hammarskjold and has been acting, uncontrolled, outside the fratnework of the United Nations Charter. rts decisions and opinions cannot be binding for the Security Council. The Advisory Committee itself assumed no responsibility for what was said in the messages from the Chairman ofthe Conciliation Com- .mission. In the note from The Advisory Committee it is stated that "The Advisory Committee has not considered the substantive aspect of the conclusions set forth in the message from the Conciliation Commission."Y Naturally, if it has not considered the substantive aspects, the Committee cannot define its attitude towards the conclusions of that Commission. It is also appropriate to note that originally the Conciliation Commission had fifteen members, but that subsequently the representatives of the United Arab Republic, Guinea, Mali and Indonesia withdrew from it. The Commission's message of 15 February was approved by only nine members, and such approval cannot be regarded as unanimous. The activities of the Conciliation Commission had some meaning, and the Soviet delegation did not oppose it, while there was still some chance of eliminating the differences of opinion between the principal parties in the Congo, between their leaders. However, since the establishment of the Tshombé-Mobutu-Kasa-Vubu terrorist régime in the country, the nationalleaders in the Congo have been subjected to repression and then brutally murdered, and the aim assigned to the Commissionhas y Official Recol"ds of the Genel"al A::uembly, Flfteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 85, document A/4696, pal"a. 3. 84. 1 shaH not dweH further on these conclusions. to which the representatives of France and the United Kingdom have referred; but 1 must saythatthose conclusions are now meaningless. because the situation has recently altered radicaIly and aIl the recommendations discussed in this Conciliation Commission can no longer have any force. after such tragic events as the murder of three national leaders. and now of seven further active leaders of the Congolese people. Accordingly. no reference to the ConciliationCommission and its conclusions can now serve as anybasis for the actions of our Council. 85. The reference in our draft resolution to the discontinuance of the United Nations operation is. therefore. the logical outcome ofaH the events in the Congo. and this is a justifiable proposaI after the centres of colonialism in the Congo have been eliminated and the Congolese people itself. conveningits ownParliament. has settled its own affairs. 86. Finally. our draft resolution states thatthe Council deems it essential to dismiss Dag Hammarskjold from the post of Secretary-General of the United Nations, as a participant in and organizer of the violence committed against the leading statesmen of the Republic of the Congo. We have already said a great deal on this subject in theCouncil. and 1 do not wish to dwell on it now at length. but it is absolutely clear to us that no confidence can be placed in the man who calls himself the Secretary-General of the United Nations but has in fact dishonoured the United Nations by his actions. particularly in respect of the national leaders of the Congo. 87. 1 must say that now. when attempts are being made somehow to defend the Secretary-General. no serious or convincing arguments have really been put forward. On the contrary. most representatives ofthe African-Asian countries who have taken the floor have spoken not only of serious shortcomings but ofserious omissions and mistakes. and of their loss of confidence in Hammarskjold. 1 should like to say that nr·'l. when the facts themselves have clearly revealed Tshombé's role to be that of a Belgian puppet. a person who settles accounts with his political opponents by the basest means. this role of Tshombé is closely linked with Mr. Hammarskjold who. when he visited the Congo on the instructions of the Security Council. first went to Mr. Tshombé, reviewedwithhima parade of Tshombé's bands. and published that shameful photograph in the official journal of the United Nations as depicting his most brilliant achievement-Mr. Tshombé with Mr. Hammarskjold. 1 think that Mr. Hammarskjold and Mr. Tshombé will remember this photograph for a long time to come; the Africans will remember it too. In any case. as 1have already said. the Soviet Government considers it quite inadmissible for Hammarskjold to remain as Secretary-General any longer. and will not recognize him as such.

The Council will now proceed to vote on the first ofthe three draft resolutions which are before it, which is a draft resolution proposed on 14 February 1961 by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [S/4706]. A vote was taken by show ofhands. In favour: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Agai!1st: Chile, China, Ecuador, France, Liberia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. Abstaining: Ceylan, United Arab Republic. The draft reso1ution was rejected by 8 votes to l, with 2 abstentions.

Before the Council proceeds ta the vote on the second draft resolution before it, the representative of the United States has asked for the floor ta explain his vote.

In my earlier statement today 1 expressed my understanding of various ambiguities in the draft resolution S/4722 proposecl, by Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic, and I made a suggestion for a revision of operative paragraph 3 which I want to refer ta once more this evening. My purpose was ta have the text expressly prohibit military supplies, as weIl as personnel, from flowing into the Congo outside of the United Nations operation, and ta request the Secretary- General to prevent any such unauthorized supplies and personnel from entering the Congo. 92. We agree with what has been said by the representatives of the United Kingdom, ChUe, China, Ecuador and others here this evening, and said sa well, including the declaration that aIl outside Interference must be prevented if the civil war is ta be stopped, if the cold war is to be excluded, and if the Congo is ta have a chance of peace and arder and political reorganization. My understanding is that this meaning was intended by the sponsors ofthe draft resolution by affirming General Assembly resolution 1474 (ES-IV) which forbids the export of arms as well as military personnel to the Congo. 94. In the absence of any such statement, Itake it that it is agreed that the draft resolution taken as a whole has the intent and the meaning to prevent any outside interference whatsoever by arms or men from any source, and it is on this basis thatthe United States is happy to vote for it. We echo the hope expressed by the representative of Chile that it will be adopted unanimously, and that this Council will thereby give unmistakable .evidence of our determination to save the Congo, to save Africa, and to save this great Organization from disaster. l express once more the gratitude of my Government to the sponsors of this constructive draft resolution.

The Council will now proceed to vote on the draft resolutionputforwardby the delegations of Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic [S/4722]<

The third and last draft resolution before the Council is a draft resolutionput forward on 20 February by the three delegations of Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic [Si 4733/Rev.1]•

l have some amendments to propose to this draft resolution and l should like to explain them to members of the Council. The propo3ed amendments [S/4740] are as follows: "1. In the first preambular paragraph add after the words '20 February' the words 'and of other reports'; ,after the words 'assassiuations in' add the word 'stanleyville'; "2. Delete the last preambular paragraph; "3. In operative paragraph 3, add after the word 'measures', the words 'in accordance with the Charter'; "4. In operative paragraph 4. add the words 'to seek the' after the word 'and'. 99. In the second place. the purpose of these amendments is to remove the prejudgement as to responsibility for these occurrences. which is now contained in the last preambular paragraph reading: "Convinced of the responsibility for such crimes of persons in high places". This provision of the draft resolution. frankly, astonishes me. How there can be conviction about responsibility before the investigation, Iconfess 1 do not understand. Conviction about guilt for crimes should follow investigation, and the investigation is included here in the last paragraph. We do not believe in arresting and condemning first, and then investigating afterward. 1 thought, as 1 read this, of the remark that some American lawyers would remember of the young lawyer who said to the jury: "And these, gentlemen, are the conclusions on which 1 base my facts. " 100. In the third place. my amendment is intended to make it cIeal' that the objective of the United Nations is to seek the punishment of the perpetrators of unlawful arrests. deportations and assassinations. As it is written now, it sounds as though the United Nations itself was to punish the perpetrators of such crimes. but of course the United Nations has no means either of trial or of punishment. 101. Fourthly, these amendments are intended to make clear that any action by the United Nations in the Congo must be in accordance with the Charter. Surely there could be no objection to acting legally. AIl action of the United Nations in the Congo, and specifically the use of force. is circumscribed by the provisions of the Charter. Force cannot be used against the State in the absence of specifie findings oÏ the Security Councn under Article 42; nor can the United Nations intervene in the domestic affairs of the country. 102. In the last resolution. the limits ofUnited Nations action were made clear by reference to previous resolutions. But here we must be more specific because there il3 no such incorporation by referenee. 103. If these amendments are adopted. my delegation will support the resolution with warm enthusiasm. 104. Ml'. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (translated from French): 1 appeal to the members ofthe Councn. 1 ask them to vote infavour ofour draft resolution, and 1 would prefer the vote to be taken without regard to the proposed amendments. 105. The situation is very grave. Our Organization has been dealt a terrible blow. Certain mistakes of the United Nations Command in the Congo and its passive attitude have placed us in a very awkward situation. Crimes have been committed despite the presence of the United Nations in the Congo and the faet that its flag was flying there. 1 do not need to 107. We are then asked to deletethefinalpreambular paragraph, which reads: "Convincedofthe responsibility for .such crimes of persons in high places". We certainly believe that persons in high places are responsible for thes8 crimes, although we donotknow who those persons are. That will be known only after due investigation. Some of these persons have themselves admitted that they committed the crimes in question. Some of them have even made the most extraordinary statements ever heard. Whether they happen to be from Kasai or Katanga, all of them are persons inhighplaces. Iprefernotto give their names, but an investigation concerning them is called for. 108. The representative of the United States then proposes that in operative paragraph 3, after the word "measures", the words "in accordance with the Charter" should be added. In so fa:r as this paragraph is concerned, .1 have no objection to the words "in accordance with the Charter" being added. An ofus here have accepted the Charter, so that we cannotobject to the addition of these words. 109. As regards operative paragraph 4, the United States representative has proposed that the words rlto seek the" should be inserted after theword "and". Although 1 have no basic objection to this, 1 would prefer tb draft resolution to be voted on immediatelywithout the amendments.

We are all awareof the reasons which led us tothe formulation of the draft resolution' that is now about to be voted upon. We, as co-sponsors, strongly believe thatwe must condemnin no uncertain, terms the assassinations that have taken place during the last few days in the Congo. We are very anxious that this draft resolution sho~l1dbe adopted so that world public opinion may be satisfied that the Security Council has condemned·in nouncertain terms the criminal acts that have been committed in the Congo. For that reason, we are anxious to make every possible alteration that we can without sacrificing the spirit of the draft resolution. Therefore, wewouldlike to consult with our other co-sponsors and 1would ask you, Mr. President, for a short recess ofa few minutes so that we may consult with each othe.r. The meeting was suspended at 12.45 a.m. and resumed at 1.10 a.m.

When 1 asked for a recess 1 stated that we would like to see our draft resolution adopted by the Security Council unanimously, and with that in mind we tried our hardest during the recess to bring about certain changes. We were prepared to make one change, namely, insteadof deleting the words "Convinced of the responsibilityfor such crimes of persons in high placss," we were prepared to substitute, "Taking' note of the alleg-ations of the responsibility of persons in high places for such crimes". We were prepared also to accept the third United States amendment which reads, "In operative paragraph 3 add after the word 'measures', the words 'in accordance with the Charter'". Similarly, wewere prepared to accept the fOUl'th amendment, "In operative paragraph 4 add the words 'to seek the' after the word 'and'''. 113. However, wb were not in a position to accept the addition of "Stanleyville" in the first paragraph of the preamble because we are convinced that the present situation, that we are discusslng now, has arisen out of the assassinations that have taken place during the last few days in certain parts of the Congo. It may be that there have been certain reports earlier about some incidents that had taken place elsewhere, but these matters have not been raised and we are not prepared to equate at this moment Leopoldville with Stanleyville. Therefore, we are unable to accept the addition of Stanleyville there. 114. Under the circumstances we find that we cannol: arrive at an agreement to amend this draft resolution to the satisfaction of all. Therefore, in consultation with its co-sponsors, the Ceylon delegation wouldlike to inform the Council that we stand by the original draft resolution contained in document S/4733/Rev.1.

The representative of Indiahas asked to speak before the vote is taken.

Ml'. President, Iam very sorry to take the floor at this stage. Iwould much rather not have done so because l have had my share of speaking in the Council; 1 am afraid that 1 have already spoken twice. My intervention now has no reference and no connexion with the voting. 1 am really speaking on the substance. 117. 1 wish to speak on draft resolution S/4733/Rev.1 and the amendments that have been introduced to that draft resolution. If 1 do so, it i5 only because my delegation feels that this is a draft resolution of the highest importance. It is not a draft resolution which, for sorne technical reason or for sorne change inwording, ought to be thrown out by the Security Council. This is a draft resolution which seeks to express in no uncertain 118. The sponsors of the draft resolution and others who have been associated with them informally had no intention of putting forward any draft resolution but the one which is conta.ined in document S/4722. Thisdraft resolution became necessary because of the tremendous challenge to the Security Council and the United Nations, and the great outrage to aIl concepts of international morality and international co-operation that were contained in the incidents which were reported to the Council by the Secretary-General's SpecialRepresentative. 119. If the Security Council for some reason does not react against and does not strongly condemn these acts, then 1 am afraid very wrong inferences will be drawn aIl the world over. World public opinion will certainly not think weIl of this body and of the United Nations, if on an occasion like that we could not react against and could not condemn something which was a patent outrage against aIl concepts of civilized behaviour. 120. The representative of the United States moved sorne amendments [S/4740] to this draft resolution, and the sponsors, in deference to the suggestions, met together and consulted among themselves, and it seems to us that they have gone a long way toward meeting the point of view of the representative ofthe United States. Out of the four amendments that were suggested they are prepared to accept 2, 3 and 4 and they have changed the fifth preambular paragraph in a way to which nobody can reaIly take exception. There have certainly been allegations, more than allegations. Even Ml'. Dayal's report mention that the Minister of Justice has himself said that "Yes, so-and-so were executed". Therefore, the circumstances are such that if the Security Council recalls in the preamble to its resolution its awareness of allegations of the responsibility of persons in high places for such crimes, that is something which is just the truth; it is the bare and naked truth and there should be no shil'king away from that. 121. The only paragraph where the sponsors, as 1 understood from the statement ofthe representative of Ceylon, are not in a position to accept the amendments suggested by the delegation of the United States is the first preambular paragraph. Here, if! may say so with aIl respect, they stand on very good ground. The amendment refers to "other reports". What other reports? Surely if there are reports about assassinations having been committed, political assassinations and atrocities in Stanleyville. we should have proper documentation of that. My delegation does not remember having seen any reports concerning Stanleyville which faIl in the same category as document S/4727. 122. To equate one part of the Congo. where these things have not happened and at any rate have not been brought to the notice of the Security Council. with another. does not seem to be fair. It does not seem to be based on facts. Of course. as the representative of Ceylon said. perhaps very bad things. very undesirable 123. 1would also like to point out that operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution calls upon all concerned in the Congo immediately to put an end to such practices. It uses the words "all concerued", and nobody is excepted. That is the decision which, alongwith the other three paragraphs in the operative part .of the draft resolution, the Security Council is being asked to take. The preamble should be a statement of· !acts. These facts shouldbe accu1'ate, and it is my submission that it would not he quite consistent with the facts to insert Stanleyville there and equate it with other parts of the Congo which are mentioned in the second prearnbular paragraph. 124. My delegation, as 1 said, apologizes to the Security Council for coming before it at this late hou1'. But 1 do wish to place befo1'e you, Ml'. President, and the members of the Council, our very great desire to see that the Council should react in terms of this draft resolution as amended and accepted by the sponsors of the resolution, because we do feel that if the Security Council does not do so, the Inferences from that will be very adverse and the effect of that in the Congo itself may be that many more lives might be lost. Surely it is not the intention of the members of this Council and the Members of the United Nations to undertake this responsibility. 125. Ml'. STEVENSON (United States of America): We agree \Vith the representative of India that the Council should strongly condenm these barbarie acts. We think that this draft resolution proposedby Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Bepublic is a suitable document for that pUl"pOse. We advanced in good faith some suggested arnendments to improve the document. 1 arn happy that the sponsors have accepted sorne of our suggestions· to improve this draft resolution, and in the sarne spirit of conciliation and anxiety to adopt this resolution, my delegation \Vill accept their proposaI to substitute for the last preambular paragraph their wording: "Taking note of the allegations of the responsibility of persons in high places for such crimes". 126. This leaves us with only the disagreement about the language of the preamble, whether or not "Stanleyville" should be included along with the other names of cities. The speakers have said that they do not know about any reports about Stanleyville. Perhaps 1 can help them. 1 have three before me. The most recent is dated 23 January 1961. 1 will quote just two sentences from this messagefrom the Secretary-General: "During the last few weeks, 1have received several confirmed reports from representatives of the United Nations in Oriental province indicating that a very large number of violations of the most basic human rights of both Congolese and non-Congolese elements 127. 1 am sure that the sponsors are against atrocities wherever they occur, whether in Stanleyville, Katanga or South Kasai, and 1 am sure they share with my delegation grave anxiety about the safety of Ml'. Songolo and other Members of Parliament who have been imprisoned in Stanleyville for over three months. 1 eould also add that we do not oppose ineluding the word "Leopoldville" although there are no reports of atroeities in Leopoldville, and that city has been incIuded by the sponsors for some reason. 128. 1 should be very happy to try to reach agreement with the sponsors by striking out all' references to the cities and substituting, after "20 February", thewords "and other reports bringing to the urgent attention of the Council the atrocities and assassinations in various parts of the Congo". 1 hope 1 have more than fulfilled what 1 am sure is the obligation of everyone who with good faith and purpose is anxious to see this draft resolution adopted.

Before putting the draft resolution S/4733/Rev·.1 as amended to the vote, 1would remind the Couneil that the representative of China asked for a separate vote on the words "including, if neeessary, the use of force as a last resort" in operative paragraph 3. Unless there is any objection, under rule 32 of the provisional rules of procedure, the Couneil will proeeed to vote separately on these words. 1 therefore put to the vote the retention of the words "ineluding, if neeessary, the use of force as a last resort" in operative paragraph 3.

We shall now proceed to vote on the amendments which have been suggested to the drflft resolution. As 1 understand the position. the proposaI. with regard to operative paragraph 3. to add the words "in accordance with the Charter"aftertheword "measures". and in operative paragraph 4 to add the words "to seek the" after the word "and" have been agreed. as also has been agreed by the sponsors of the revised version the last preambular paragraph, which now reads: "Taking note of the allegations of the responsibility of persons in high places for such crimes". 132. What reason is there to add here "in accordance with the Charter"? No reason at aU, so far as 1 can see. Any appeal to prevent the recurrence ofoutrages must be in accordance with the Charter. 1 do not understand why this is necessary. It seems to me that this amendment no longer has any meaning. 1think that the representative of the United States, who introduced this amendment when it was coupled with the phrase providing for the use offorce, cannot now insist on this amendment, especially taking into account his "spirit of conciliation". 133. Ml'. STEVENSON (United States of America): 1 want to say that 1 am not responsible for deleting the words "including, if necessary, the use of force as a last resort", and 1 am very eager toaccommodate the representative of the Soviet Union. But, now that these words have been deleted, to delete the words "in accordance with the Charter" would seem to me to l'aise sorne question and to suggest at least the possibility of actions that are not in accordancewith the Charter. 1 am surprised, 1 must say, to hear anyone suggest that it is ever a mistake to include "in accordance with the Charter". Everything that we do, every resolution that we adopt, every action that we authorize, should be in accordance with the Charter-and not just the use of force. 1 would plead with the representative of the Soviet Union not to insist on deleting "in accordance with the Charter". 134. Ml'. TSIANG (China): By the deletion of the last part of operative paragraph 3, the use of force, of course, is ruled out. But there are other means which should be used only in accordance with the Charter, such as the use of economic sanctions or the use of diplomatie sanctions. Such measures should also be used only in accordance with the Charter. 135. Ml'. ZORIN (Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics) (translated from Russian): Ml'. President, Iverymuch regret having to waste time discussing questions which 1 do not think deserve discussion. However, since such a discussion is necessary, 1 too am obliged to say a few words about the views expressed by the representative of the United States. Idonotwish to speak of the views of the other gentleman. 137. MI'. TSIANG (China): A policeman, of course, must prevent murder. A policeman must pursue the murderer, but in doing these things, a policeman is obliged to act within the law. Those, lunderstand, are what we calI civilized standards. 1 do not believe that any civilized country could say that the policeman is above the law.

As 1 understand the position we have now reached, agreement has been reached on aU the draft resolution S/4733/Rev.1, except for the first preambular paragraph, where certain amendments have been suggested. If1understandthe position correctly, the latest form these amendments have tak~n ls to add after the words "20 February" the words "and of other reports" and, later on, to delete the words "in, Leopoldville, Katanga and South Kasai in the Congo" and replace them with the words "in various parts of the Congo". '139. 1 put to the vote these amendments to the first preambu1ar paragraph. A vote was takeh by show of hands. In favour: Chile, China, Ecuador, France, Liberia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. Against: Ceylon, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic. The result of the vote was 8 infavour and 3 against. The amendments were notadopted. one ofthe negative : votes being that pfa permanentmemberofthe Council. '~

1 now propose to put to the vote the draft resolution as a whole with the amend-

l must apologize for speaking again. but l attach the greatest importance to the adoption of this draft resolution tonight. to expressing our reaction to the horrors that have befallen the Congo in "recent weeks. 143. In another effort to find mutually satisfactory language. l would propose-and l hope that the Soviet Union representative will find this acceptable-that the first paragraph of the preamble end with the phrase "20 February and of other reports". deleting aIl the language about specifie cities or various parts of the Congo. 144. l am as hOPElful as the representative of Liberia that this language will be acceptable and that we may leave here this evening having expressed our deep distress. having condemned these atrocities andhaving taken action to remedy them. 145. Mr. SUBASINGHE (Ceylon): l am sorryto intervene in this discussion so often. but l think that my delegation must make its position quite clear inorder to avoid any misunderstanding. 146. Ever since July of last year. when this matter came up before the Security Council and the United Nations, there have been incidents of various sorts in the Congo. Crimes of varyingdegrees ofintensityhave been committed. Sometimes we have dealt with them in the Security Council and the General Assembly. On some occasions the Security Council and the General Assembly have expressed their points of view. But today we are faced with a differentproblem altogether. Why have we taken up this matter as an emergency issue? Because of the murders that have taken place; murders with which. we are strongly of the opinion. Leopoldville. Katanga and South Kasai have a close connexion. That is why the delegations of Liberia. the United Arab Republic and Ceylon have formulated this draft resolution and placed it before the Security Council. 147. Now an attempt is being made to generalize the question. That is something which we cannot do at the moment. The whole world is shocked at these particular incidents. It is not that we do not condemn any kind of crime that is committed. Buttoday the world is thinking of these particular crimes, which. in my opinion. are of a different order and took place under peculiar circumstances. That is why we want to emphasize that aspect. 148. My delegation is therefore opposed to any amendment to the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft resolution. l merely wished to restate that position. 149. Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (translated from French): l should like to say justone word at this 151. 1 listened very carefully to the statement made by the representative of Ceylon, with whichthe representative of the United Arab Republic has just said that he completely agrees. It is my understandingthat the representative of Ceylon said that the sponsors of the draft resolution had in mind certain atrocities that had been committed. But 1 do.notthinkthat these atrocities would be omitted from the text üwe deleted the last part of the first paragraph of the preamble, as suggested by the United States representative. The draft resolution would stiU referto the communication of 18 February and to other documents in which these atrocities are specüicaUy listed. Hence, this is aU a mere technicality; it i8 just a question of whether or not the names of the cities and provinces should be included. The substance would not be affected in any way. The particular crimes mentioned by the representative of Ceylon would stiU be specificaUy referred to because the documents inwhich they are listed would be cited in the draft resolution. 152. 1 do believe that it would be very helpful if we could reach an understandingon this point, which reaUy appears to be of minor importance in view of the fact that we have eliminated aU the other düficulties.

Mr. President, 1shouldlike to draw the attention of members of the Council to the abnormal situation in connexion with the voting on this resolution. For a long time, repeated attempts have been made to eliminate from the resolution the most cogent facts which led to the question being raised today and placed on the agenda of the Security Council. This morning [940th meeting], after the communication which we heard here, the question arose of its being necessary immediately to take measures and react ta the facts which had angered aU present. We have, since this morning, heard voices expressing regret and saying that measures should be taken immediately, that these were inadmissible acts of violence and so forth. Now, finally, when we have almost reached the next day, we cannot adopt the draft resolution, because certain representatives wish to exclude the mostconcrete aspects around which the debate has continually centred and reduce everything to a violation of human rights. 154. Where were you, gentlemen, when for seven months there were ceaseless violations of human rights and murders of private individuals? Then you were silent. But now, when there are real facts, when aU acknowledge and cannot deny a single one of these facts enumerated here, you do notwish te record these concrete facts or to react to them. You wish to take 155. To the representative of Turkey, my coUeague, 1 should like to say that the amendment which you propose is not a technical amendment. you yourself understand this perfectly weIl. The mention of the actual towns where these murders were committed is a political accusation, a political condemnation of these doings. Andthis is what you want to avoid. Of course, you can vote against the drait resolution, or you can abstain, preventing it from obtaining the required number of votes. You can do aU this, but you cannot escape the facts. And you cannot repudiate the general condemnation passed today. 156. 1 repeat, you can vote as youwish, but 1 think the representatives of Ceylon and the United Arab Republic were right thatwehavehadenoughof this game. We must cease this game of playing with aU kinds of little amendments to blur the essence of the question. 157. The Soviet delegation therefore considers that the text ofthe resolution as accepted by its co-sponsors should forthwith be put to the vote, with only the amendments to which they have agreed, in order that the Security Council may clearly know who is infavour of condemning the actual concrete facts andwho advocates drawing a veil over them.

Again 1 choose to speak on behalf of the countries of Africa. 159. This situation reminds me of the old story about two women who claimed ownership of a child, and the matter became of such consequence that they decided to take it to a judge. The judge himself had great difficulty in establishing who was the mother ofthe child, so he ruled that perhaps the child should be cut into two pieces and shared between the two women. One of the women agreed, but the other woman could not conceive that the child should lose its life. She therefore agreed to surrender her claimon the child to the other woman who had agreed for the child to be cut into pieces. In that way motherhood could easily be established. 160. In this case Africa is the mother of this child and so, Mr. President, 1 ask you and the members of the Council to be indulgent and give us a recess of ten minutes to consult.

The representative of Liberia has asked for a recess. Unless 1 hear objection, 1 wiU recess the Council for ten minutes. 163. Ml'. ZORIN (Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics) (translated from Russian): Ml'. President. since this draft resolution is already covered with amendments, 1 must confess that Ihonestlydonotknow what resolution is before us. 1 would therefore:gropose that the Secretariat should issue a revised text of the l'esolution, so that it will be clear what we are voting on. In order to save time, we mightproceedwith the speeches according to the list of speakers which you now have. and in the meantime the Secretariatmightprepare and circulate a revised text of the resolution.

Although the text has been revised, 1 personally have a fairly clear idea of what is in it and 1 am sorry that the representative of the Soviet Union did not make his proposaI haU an hour ago, when we could have saved time. If it is the wish of the Council, 1 will arrangefor the text to be retyped including the amendments that have been agreed so far. 165. MI'. STEVENSON (United States of America): 1 cau hardly believe there is any ambiguity, confusion or misunderstanding about our present position. Rather than spend the additional time onhavingthe Secretariat redistribute the draft resolution, 1 should be very glad to write it out in long-hand and present it to the delegation of the Soviet Union. However, 1 think it is important to expedite the business now and proceed to a vote on this last amendment, thenonthe whole resolution, and dispose. of the matter. 166. Ml'. ZORIN (Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics) (translated from Russian): 1shouldmerelylike to make one small comment on your observation, Ml'. President. You seemed to chide me for nothaving made my proposaI haU an hour ago, but quite honestly 1 could not have done so because half an hour ago there were three other amendments.

In the circumstances, 1 think it would be better ifweproceededwiththe text in front of us, which we nowalreadyknow.lnow propose to put to the vote the first preambular paragraph of the text which is in front of us. Ihavejust read out the amendments which have been suggested, that is the addition of the words "and of other reports" after the words "20 February" and the omission of the words "in Leopoldville, Katanga and South Kasai in the Congo" and their replacement by the words "in various parts of the Congo". 168. This amendment has beenproposedbytheUnited States representative, and 1 would be obliged if he "Taking note of the report of the Special Representative in the Congo [S/4727] of 18 February 1961 and the Secretary-General's communication to the Security Counci! in his statement of20 Februaryand other reports." 170. Ml'. ZORIN (Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics) (translated from Russian):' Ml'. President, aIthoughyou have directed that a vote be taken-and1have the right, like other members of the Council, to receive the exact text of any amendmentor resolution-but now, as 1 say, thatyou have directed that a vote be taken, in violation of the rules of procedure, 1would ask you to explain te me whether we are YOUng onthe .amendment to the first paragraphof the preamble, oron something else.

In the first place, 1shouldlike to say to the Soviet representative that 1 do not think 1 am in breach of the provisional rules of procedure because the relevant rule states: "Proposed resolutions, amendment~ and substantive motions shallnormally he placed before the representatives in writing." There have been a number of instances where amendments have been made which were not in writing and which were accepted. 172. Following on that. the amendment, as 1 understand it, upon which we are now to vote, is an amendment to the first preambular paragraph of the draft resolution S/4733/Rev.1. It reads as follows: "Taking note of the report of the Special Representative in the Congo [S/4727] of 18 February 1961 and the Secretary-General's communication to the Security Council in his statement of 20 February and other reports." 173. To make the position quite clear, 1 would say that we are now voting On an amendment to the first paragraph of the preamble which would delete the words "bringing to the urgent attention of the COlJIlci! the atrocities and assassinations in Leopoldville, Katanga and Sout.i. Kasai in the Congo" and replace them by the words 11and of other reports" . 174. Ml'. ZORIN (Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics) (translated from Russian): In your first statement, Ml'. President, in which you explained what you were going to put to the vote, you merely read out the text of the first paragraph ofthepreamble. Butthat clearly was not an amendment. It was merely the first paragraph of the preamble. What you have now read out is, 1 see, an amendment-the proposaI to dn.lete the words "bringing to the urgent attention of the Council the atrocities and assassinations in Leopoldville, Katanga and South Kasai in the Congo" . The proposaI is to delete these words. li ,m:t.t is so, 1 am prepared to vote.

1 am not sure if it is entirely clear to the representative of the SovietUnion that the wards he has read out will be replaced by the words "and of other reports", which would appear immediately after the words "20 February". 1 shall now Against: Ceylon, Union of SovietSocialistRepublics, United Arab Republic. Abstaining: Liberia. The result of the vote was 71nfavour, 3 against, with 1 abstention. i votes being that ofapermanentmemberofthe COl.lilal1. '-176. Mr. BENITES VINUEZA (Ecuador) (translated ::'rom Spanish): My delegation voted for the amend- ments proposed by the United States delegation. Furthermore, it considers that the interpretation given by the representative of Turkey was logical and cor- rect; there is no need to make an express reference to the geographical locations if they are mentioned implicitly in references to the Secretariat reports in . the first paragraph of the preamble. As Mr. Stevenson rightly pointed out, we believe that atrocities have been committed at Stanleyville, but the reports to whichwe refer mention events in Katanga and Kasaï. Hence, al- though we condemn both, it is obvious that here we are considering the latter. 177. It would seem somewhat inconsistent to reject the draft resolution as a whole because it spells out what would have been accepted if it had been referred to only implicitly. We regret that the amendments proposed by the United States representative in a noble spirit of conciliation were not accepted, but we are obliged to put up with this disappointment. The facts are to be found in the Secretariat reports; they oc- curred in Katanga and Kasai beèause the victims were sent there from LeopoldviÜe. These facts are ta be ! èondemned, and, without regard to its resuIts, an in- vestigation of them must be undertaken, and they must be prevented from recurring. 178. For this reason, and merely on the ground of principle, my delegation will vote forthedraftresolu- tion as a whole.

My delegation supported the various amendments that were proposed to the first preambular paragraph of the draft resolution before us because it feIt that they were reasonable. The fact,however, that they were not adopted because of the veto does not prevent us from voting, as we did when dealing with the murders in Katanga, for the condemnation of the later and more extensive crime in Kasai and the need to investigate it. 180. We agree with the statement just made by the representative of Ecuador, and, for the same reasons, we are prepared to vote for the three-Power draft resolution as a whole. 181. The PRESIDENT: If no other representative wishes to speak l propose now to put to the vote the draft resolutioIi of Ceylon, Liberiaandthe United Arab Rep1.1blic as a whole [S/4733/Rev.l] as amended, by agreement! in the fifth paragraph of the preamble and Against: None. Abstaining: China, France. Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States o~ America. The result of the vote was 6 in favour, none against and 5 abstentions. The draft resolution was not adopted, having failed te obtain the affirmative vote of seven members.

Mr. President, the Soviet delegation considers it necessary to make a statement in connexion with bath the draft resolution on which we have Just voted and the three-Power draft resolution on which we voted previously. 183. As is clear from the vote which has just been taken, all those 'who in words protested against an expressed regret over the repressive and terroristic action taken against the national leaders of the Congo have indeed prevented the adoption of a simple, clear and very limited resolution-but one which took a definite stand-when it came to condemning that action and taking specüic measures to combat it. This fact throws a sharp light on aU the manoeuvres which have taken place in the past few days during consideration of the problems of the Congo and during the drafting of resolutions and the voting on them. The whole Council has witnessed every kind of attempt to distort the basic political intention ofthe resolution submitted by the representatives of Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic on a question which, it would seem, could he the subject of no controversy. But the political sympathies of certain Powers which do not wish to condemn the activities of their allies, the Belgian colonialists, who are conducting a definite policy aimed at the destruction of the national leaders in the Congo, have reached such a point that now we have been able ta adopt no resolution at aU condenming these criminal activities. 184. 1 think that at this point any comment is, as they say, superfluous. The anti-colonialism of certain States has remained no more than anemptyphrase. In this connexion 1 should like to read a rather wise observation which one American citizen made recently and sent ta me. Hewrote ta me: fi For YOlIr information, on the subject of the carnage in the Congo and the murder of Lumumba. 1 would bring the foUowing quotation ta your attention: 'We said that those who turn their backs on wrongs they have the power to avert, share in the fauIt of those who initiate the wrongs themselves.' " Further on, tne writer ofthe letter said: "This quotation is taken from Chester Bowles, United States Under-Secretary of State, and is apparently a paraphrase of a saying of President Woodrow Wilson. It is drawn from Mr. Bowles' recentbaokThe Coming Polltical Breakthrough." 186. 1 shaH now explain the reasons for my vote on the resolution which the Council has just adopted. As you know, the Soviet delegation abstained in the vote on the draft resolution submitted by Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic. However, thatabstentiondid not cause the defeat of the draft resolution-unlike the abstentions of several other States just now, which did bring about the defeat of anotherdraft resolution. This reveals a fundamental difference between our policy and the policy of those who just now abstained. 187. Why did we abstain?We abstained on that draft resolution because it incorporated no decisive and radical solution for the Congolese question. !ts language was, unfortunately. too weak in regard tothe measures to be taken against those primarilyresponsible for the events in the Congo-the Belgian colonialists and their allies. 188. Secondly. there was a lack of precision in the drafting of the resoïution in many aspects-afact which might have been exploited by the colonialists and those serving them, when it came to implementingthe resolution. This was clear, for example, from the explanations given by many representatives who votedfor the draft resolution; eachofthemhad his own interpretation of virtually every paragraph. That was a weakness and a material shortcoming in the draft resolution, and for this reason too the Soviet delegation was unable to vote for it. 189. Certain paragraphs of the text were drafted in such a way that they were unrealistic about the whole substance of the matter. Indeed. the paragraph which refers to the need for an Immediate investigation into the "circumstances of the death of Mr. Lumumba and his coUeagues" might even remain a dead letter becausel until those mainly responsible for these deaths have been arrested. they will. with the help of their supporters. put every conceivable obstacle in the way of a true investigation of all the circumstances of the case. 190. The Soviet delegation also has doubts about the passage in the resolution which refers to the formation of a government andwhich reads: "the formation of any government not based on genuine conciliation would. far from settling any issues, greatly enhance thedangars of conflict within the Congo and threat to international peace and security". It is doubtful whether it is now possible to form a government one part of which would consist of the murderers of the close friends of another wing of that government. AlI this, the resolution proposes, is to be based on "genuine conciliation". It is hardly possible, however, to reconcile the irreconcilable. 192. It might be asked why we considered it possible to refrain from preventing the resolution's adoption. The reason is that, despite its weakness and shortcomings, the resolution contains an objective condemnation of the national leaders' murderers. That the Security Council should state that it learned "with deep regret the announcement of the killing of the Congolese lead~rs, Mr. Patrice Lumumba, Mr. Maurice Mpolo and Mr. Joseph Okito" , that it should be "deeply concerned at the grave repercussionsofthese crimes...", and thatit should adopt certainmeasuresthis circumstance alone bespeaks the positive nature of the whole resolution, and that is why we did not consider it possible to oppose the adoption of the resolution, weak and Inadequate though it is. 193. Moreover, the resolution contains the extremely important provision that the Security Council ft urges that measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of aU Belgian and other foreign military and .paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries". This important demand for the withdrawal of the Belgians and their mercenaries is a significant step forward, and is the first such concrete measure, directed specifically against the Belgian colonialists, which the Council has adopted. This positive demand is also a basic reason why the Soviet Union did not veto this resolution. 194. Again, the resolution refers to the prevention of the military activities recently initiated by the Tshombé-Mobutu camp against Oriental province. While it does not mention Tshombê and Mobutu specificaUy, it refers to the report of the Secretary- General' s Special Representative dated 12 February 1961 [S/4691 and Add.1 and 2.] This report makes specific mention of these activities by Tshombé, who recently advanced against the forces of Oriental province, thereby creating a danger of civil war and a threat to the peace in the Congo and in Africa. And precisely in this connexion the Council has adopted a decision, urging that the United Nations take immediately aU appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of aIl military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort. 196. Further, the resolution gives no concrete instructions to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Incidentally, this fact was mentioned with regret by the representative of ChUe, who voted for the resolution. He noted this with regret because apparently, for him and for several other delegations, it would have been highly desirable to reaffirm the Secretary-General's mandate and to give him special instructions. Butthis resolution gives no mandate to the Secretary-General. This is a positive factor, because it means that confidence in the Secretary-General-at least on the part of those countries which submitted the resolution-is not so great as to warrant the issue of fresh instructions to him. We consider that it is necessary to take a very firm position with regard to the Secretary-General, and this we have done; the Soviet Government has announced it openly. We are convinced that the continuance of the Secretary- General' s activities in his present post can bring no good to the United Nations, and experience has shown us to be right. 197. Another reason why we did not vote against this resolution is that theAfrican-Asian countries, although aware of its weaknesses. expressed, here inthe Council, their view that in present circumstances it represented the only chance of remedying the situation in the Congo. We cannot fully agree with this position of the resolution's sponsors. We alsoknowthattherewas not, and is not now, full unanimity on this question among the sponsors of the resolution and those who took part in drafting it Many of them clearly realized that they had to adhere to the existing wording of the resolution if they were to secure theWestern Powers' support for the draft. That is the most they were able, so to speak, to "wring" out of the Western Powers. 198. We think thai; this should be the basis for real action by the United Nations with a view to the taking of measures to terminate Belgian coercion in the Congo and put an end to the terroristic attacks of the Tshombê-Mobutu bands against the Congolese armed forces supporting the national Government. We are convinced th9.t those of the African and Asian countries which believe in the usefulness of this resolution will discover, in actual practice, whatvaluetoattachtothe promises and the positions announced. here in the Council, by certain representatives who voted for this resolution. when they described each concrete measure incorporated in it. 199. The great Lenin once said that, for the broad masses of the people, life was the best teacher. And we think that, in the Implementation ofthis resolution. life will again be the best teacher. We do not take a very optimistic view of the course to be followed in the Implementation of this resolution as described by certain representatives who, even intheir comnients on various paragraphs, have spoken of the resolution's Implementation in terms of their own specifie political 200. We regard this resolution merely as afirststep towards the implementation of those radical measures that are absolutely necessary and were provided for in the Soviet draft resolution, which the majority of this Council rejected. We believe that, after the first steps outlined in the resolution have been taken, we shall have to proceed to more drastic measures if we really wish to stamp out the nest ofcolonialism in the Congo and ensure the full freedom and independence of that Republic. 201. Such are the basic reasons why the Soviet delegation did not oppose the adoption ofthis resolution, and we hope that it will be faithfully implemented in order to bring about a real improvement of the situation in the Congo. If, however, those who side with the colonialists attempt to use individual provisions of the resolution in the interests of the colonialists, we shaH not leave them in peace. We shaH, as before, fight unremittingly to evictthe colonialists entirelyfromthe Congo, to bring true independence to the Congolese people, and to preserve the Congo's territorial integrity in order to ensure the country' s democratic development. 202. The fact that the resolution mentions the convening of Parliament also offers a basis for the normalization of political life in the Congo within the very near future. This will be possible, however, only on one condition-that the direct agents of the Belgian and other colonialists should be removed from political life, and that unitYshould be achieved on the basls of the Congolese people's true national interests with the participation of the Congo' s real national leaders. 203. The Gizenga Government which now exists is the lawful Government of the Congo, and should be the centre for the restoration of any political rêgime in the Congo based on the principles of democracy and legality. Parliament should be immectiately convened, and on it the Congo's entire political life should be organized. 204. In the discussion ofthis question, several representatives, including those of the United States and France, mentioned the need for taking aIl possible measures to put an end to outside interference in Congolese affairs. It must be said that this resolution provides the basis for the taking of the first speedy measures for the termination of outside interference in its chief form-interference by Belgium. 205. We cannot however understandwhy, in connexion with the Council' s discussion of this question and when stress is being laid on this principle of non-interference, the United States fleet should have arrived and be manoeuvring in the gulf of Guinea, or why the American Press should write about 80,000 Marines who are ready for service in the Congo. This does not seem to agree with non-intervention in the domestic affairs of another State, and we would hope that these 206. The general conclusion which we draw from this resolution is that we must guarantee the proper conditions in which the Congolese people itself may be able to decide its own fate. This will be possible only if the Belgian colonialists, their assistants and their agents are really thrown out of the Congo at once, in the very near future. If that is not done, there will be no improvement in the Congo. This has beenproved by life and experience, and it is on the implementation of this all-importantant decision that the whole success of further action now depends. 207. We think that these considerations, thisposition which the Soviet Government has consistently maintained, are fully justified bythecourseofevents in the Congo and are fully supported by those events. We are convinced that, if no reaUy decisive steps are taken against Belgian aggression, aU the measures enumerated by the Soviet Government should be adopted immediately, so as to bring about a radical change in the situation in the Congo. 208. Such are the explanations which 1 havewished to give in order that our position may be understood. We hope it will be understood by aU African and Asian countries, which realize the difficulties that the drafting of this resolutionhasinvolvedand,Ithink, the even greater difficulties involved in its implementation. 209. We, however, shaU continue to strive for the genuine liberation and true independenceofthe Congolese people and of all the peoples of Africa. 210. As for the Liberian representative' s proposaI that the Council should meet in the Congo, the Soviet Union agrees to such a meeting shoulditprove necessary in the very near future.

1 shaU not detain the Council more than a minute and a half. 1 wanted to say to the representative of the Soviet Union that 1 am a great admirer of Chester Bo\,..-les, that we talk often-we have for more thanforty years, but seldom at four o'clock in the morning. 212. Also 1 should like to saythat1recognize that the representative of the Soviet Union was in some difficultY in explaining why he did not support actively the resolution which we adopted this evening. 1 am glad to hear his explanation. 213. 1 should also like to say that, in spite of the hour, after the Soviet attack on us for not condemning the crimes in the Congo, the United States delegation thinks

In my capacity as representa.,.. tive of the UNITED KINGDOM, 1 wish very briefly at this point to explain why my delegation abstained on the last draft resolution on which the Council voted. 215. Had either of the amendments to the !irst preambular paragraph been carried, my delegationwould, of course, have voted for the wholedraftresolution as we voted for the proposed amendments. But, in the opinion of my delegation, the draft resolution as finaHy voted upon was one-sided because it referredto a restricted category of atrocities committed in particular areas in the Congo, even though, as pointed out inthe course ofthe discussion, similar crimes have been committed in other areas. In aH other respects the draft resolution was acceptable to my delegation, but in view of this defect, which could so easily have been rectified, my delegation was, with much regret, obliged to abstain.

1 strongly welcome the first three-Power resolution adopted todayby the Council [S/4722] as giving a stronger and more clear framework for United Nations action although, as so often before, it does notprovide a wider legal basis or new means for implementation. 217. 1 note the reaffirmation of previous resolutions which entrusted the Secretary-General with execution of the decisions of the Security Council in the Congo affairs. On that basis 1 shaH urgently avail myself of the valuable assistance of the Advisory Committee. It is from its members, fifteen of whom are from African and Asian countries, that 1will seek guidance in the implementation. 218. The resolution adds to the duties of the United Nations Force, and 1 am certainthatthe States backing it, many of which have troops in the Congo, fully realize that these duties will necessitate the strengthening of the Force by further generous contributions from their side. I do not believe that such additions to the troops-or at least their maintenance-will require re-negotiation since I understand the reaffirmation of the earlier resolutions as clearly indicating that those additions to the troops would be on the sarne legal basis as previous contributions. 219. The second three-Power draft resolution [Si 4733/Rev.1] was not adopted, and I regret it. Its adoption would have strengthened the hand of the United Nations representatives in the Congo. However, Inote that there has been no difference of opinion, if I understand the situation correctly, as regards the operative paragraphs. Under such circumstances 1 feel entitled to use those operative paragraphs with the 221. As regards the fourth point, the impartial investigation to determine responsibility, it will have to be done within the means of the Secretariat, or rather at the initiative ofthe Secretariat, but1see in the stand taken on operative paragraph 4 an acceptance of the fact that such an investigation be made. 222. 1 hope that the Council will bearwithme if 1 say a word about some interventions whichwere addressed to me very personally and which, for that reason, seem to require a reaction from me on the record. 223. Speaking after the representative of the Soviet Union on 15 February [935th meeting], 1 puton record what seem to me to be the main points regarding the relationship of the United Nations to the fate of Mr. Lumumba. The same representative has later renewed his personal attacks and he has, in this, been followed at the table by four non-members, as well as in some messages addressed to the Council. 224. This is not the time for detailed comments on these attacks-nor do 1 believe that there is much reason for such comments here-whatever the bitterness of the accusations, whatever the gross distortions on which they are based, whatever especially the unprecedented and immoderate language used and whatever, finally, the emotional impact of this language on the uninformed, to whom, of course, it is addressed. 225. Therefore, 1 shall only recall a couple of facts which usefully should be kept in mind together with those 1 mentioned in my intervention on 15 February. Some have found it proper to label me the "organizer of the murder of Mr. Lumumbaft. Regarding the long series of developments finally leading to the tragedy, may 1 first refer to the fact that Mr. Lumumba, on 7 November, made a statement in which, in unequivocal terms, he expressedhis appreciationfor the assistance of the United Nations and his confidence in the Secretary-General. With respect to 1ater events, the arrest and detention and, subsequently, the transfer to Katanga, it does appear necessary for me to draw attention to certain facts which have been ignored. 226. The accusations addressed ta me suggest that the action 1 took upon learning of Mr. Lumumba's arrest Was inadequate. In fact, what must be implied is that 1 should have ordered the United Nations Force in the Congo to take military initiative in order to liberate Mr. Lumumba from the custodyofthe Armée nationale congolaise at Thysville. But could there be any question that the use of such militaryforce'againstthe authori- 227. When it became known that Mr. Lumumba and his colleagues hadbeentransferred to Katanga andheld incommunicado, again 1 took immediate action tourge the authorities concerned, and in particular Messrs. Kasa-Vubu and Tshombé to return Mr. Lumumba and apply normallegal rules, with the implications 1mentioned a moment ago. In addition, 1 immediately took the matter to the Advisory Committee on the Congo in order to ask them what, li any, further steps they would recommend. 228. At this meeting on 20 January, the members of that Committee expressedtheir objections to the illegal detention of Mr. Lumumba, but laid emphasis on the need for steps for reconciliation and, in consequence, for calling on the authorities to release him. This led, from my side, to an urgent additional message to Mr. Kasa-Vubu [S/4637 and Add.l, sect.III] which certainly did not understate the unanimous view of the Advisory Committee-I referred this question to the , members. What should be underscored at this stage is that the members of the Advisory Committee did not, at any time, propose that the Secretary-General take further action, specliically military action, against the Katanga authorities to bring about his release. While it was the unanimous view of these members that aIl possible pressure should be brought to bear on the responsible officiaIs, it was not suggested that the Secretary-General was in a position to order military measures against the authorities for that purpose. 229. This attitude of the Member States most directly concerned with the Congo, and with the fate of Mr. il Ibid., document A/L.331/Rev.l. 230. It is telling that in the second three-Powerdraft resolution [S/4733/Rev.1] considered by the Council today, there was a reference to the use of force which, obviously, was regarded by the sponsors as a new departure giving new rights, presumably with Article 42 as a basis. That being so, it is e.iear a contrario that such a right to military intervention to liberate prisoners detained by local authorities, de facto or de jure, was not considered as having existed inprevious resolutions, and the draft thus confirmed the interpretation maintained so far. 231. The stand in the draft resolution, as well as the Interpretation by the main organs of previous resolutions, therefore, supports the position that whatever differences there might be regarding the interpretation of the Charter it could hardly be doubted that military action by the United Nations to free prisoners charged with crime must be regarded as prohibited by the Charter except when such military action constitutes part of an enforcement measure and is expressly adopted by the Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. 232. The representative of Czechoslovakia in a speech on 17 February [938th meeting] talked about my"procolonialist policies" and more specifically said thatwe had "condoned and abetted" the return of the Belgian colonialists to the Congo. It seems appropriate in this context simply to quote a couple of paragraphs of my letters tothe BelgianGovernment, and to Ml'. Tshombé, of 8 October 1960, to which 1 have already briefly referred but which seem to have been forgotten. First is a short quotation from the letter to Ml'. Tshombé: "The dangers, as they appear at present, seem in my opinion to derive from three factors: the confused and disquieting situation which still prevails at Leopoldville, the continued presence of a considerable number of Belgian nationals-soldiers, paramilitary personnel and civilians-and, lastly, the unresolved constitutional conflict, threatening the unitYof the Congo, which is symbolized by the name Katanga. Among these factors, 1 regard the last two as of crucial importance, evenfrom the standpointof the first: that is tu say that, if we could fully circumscribe the Belgian factor and eliminate it"-I meant, of course the military and political factor-- "and if we could laythe groundworkfor a reconciliation between Katanga and the l'est of the Territory of the Republic of the Congo, the situation at Leopoldville might very well be rectified. "••• You will fully realize that if the Belgians also withdrew all their technicians, under whatever title they are now serving in the Congo, and if, in addition, 233. That should be read together with the following quotation from the "note verbale" sent simultaneously to the Government of Belgium, inwhich1discussed the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 20 September 1960: '..On the basis of tbis conclusion, the Secretary- General would request the Belgian Government to witbdraw all the military, paramilitary or civil personnel which it has placed at the disposaI of the authorities in the Congo and henceforth to follow the example of many other States by channelling aU aid to the Congo, or to any authorities in the Congo, through the United Nations." [Ibid., sect. 1.] 234. Certainly, this is the language and these arethe demands of a colonialist "condoning and abetting" the return of Belgian colonizers to the Congo. As Mr. Kurka so rightly said, .. Facts are stubborn things ... you may distort them as you like, but you cannot get away from them" . 235. And certainly this is the language of the man, whose collaboration with Mr. Tshombé was so spectacularly demonstrated by Mr. Zorin, with thepicture showing that, in order to get the United Nations troops into Katanga and the Belgian troops out ofKatanga, as requested by the Security Council, the Secretary- General had to deal with the man whose resistance he had to break, if the Council were to get its decisions implemented with all the necessary speed. A full record of the events was considered by the Council in August 1960. The conclusions now drawn from it are new. Even the implementation of a request of the Council can obviously now be held against me.

1 have asked for the floor inorder to make a very brief statement which my Government would like the Security Council to put on record. 237. My Government has just reiterated most solemnly, both in the ParUament and in public statements, its condemnation of political assassination as something which has ahflaYs been aUen to the customs of my country. In other words, we share the moral reprobation and the shock aroused in world opinion by the Secretary-General's announcement today of the execution of various politicalleaders in the Congo. 238. On the other hand, aU political crimes and aU inhuman and brutal acts must be stigmatized, no matter where they are committed or bywhom. That is why the Belgian delegation also feIt it to be its duty, on 15 February [935th meeting], to denounce before the Security Council the crimes and innumerable brutalities committed during the last few weeks, both in Oriental province and in Kivu. 239. The Belgian Government feels that it is incumbent upon the United Nations to strengthen guarantees

1 should like to make only two comments. One concerns the investigationprovided for in the resolution adopted by the Security Counci!. It is clear to aU, 1 think, that when this decision was taken no one intended that the investigation should be entrusted to the United Nations Secretariat. 242. The resolution contains no instruction to the Secretariat to concern itself with the investigation. Such an instruction would be particularly absurd inthat the Secretariat itself bears part of the guilt. How is it possible to ask the Secretariat to investigate its own misdeeds? Such a course 1 regard as completely inadmissible, and as representative of the Soviet Union 1 formaUy state thatwe do not agree to any instructions being given to the Secretariat to participate in the investigation of Lumumba' s murder. And l consider that the Council cannot regard its decision as constituting a directive to the Secretariat. 243. My second comment concerns the statement of the Belgian representative. 1 see that the Belgian Government and its representative here have learnt nothing from the serious discussions whichhavetaken place or from the resolution which has been adopted. Belgium does not acknowledge the guilt whichhas been fixed upon it by the overwhelming majority of the representatives of the African-Asian States and the members of the Counci!. 1 think this testifies to the seriousness of the situation and requires that the Council exercise the utmost vigilance to ensure that the decision just adopted in regard to B\~lgium is executed strictly, firmly and resolutely.

If it is not the intention of the Security Counci! that the wheels should be set in motion by the Secretary-Generalwith regard to the investigation, then 1 must say that 1find this clause in the resolution very incomplete. What will then happen? 245. On the other hand, it has never been my intention-I can assure the Soviet Union representative of this-that the Secretariat should itself undertake such an investigation. The Secretariat has neither the resources nor the competence to do so. Iwould refer the matter to the Advisory Committee which, as 1 r..av8 said, has among its members fifteen representatives of African and Asian nations, and 1 would abide by its advice.

1 wish to thank the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union for giving favourable consideration to my delegation' f: suggestion that the Security Council should visit the Congo. We seriously believe that such an

l have taken note of the suggestion made by the representative of Liberia, and l shall enter into consultations with other members of the Counci! with a view to calling a meeting, if that is the general desire. The meeting rose on- Tuesday, 21 February, at 4.20 a.m.