S/PV.959 Security Council
▶ This meeting at a glance
7
Speeches
6
Countries
0
Resolutions
Topics
General statements and positions
Global economic relations
War and military aggression
General debate rhetoric
Peace processes and negotiations
Syrian conflict and attacks
SIXTEENTH YEAR 959 th MEETING: 6 JULY 1961 -Im-e-SÉ-'AN--C-E-:-6-J-U.-IL-L-E-·-T-1-9-6-1-.:;...-------- .. .. SEIZIEME ANNEE DB OFFICIBLS CONSEIL DOCUMENTS
NEW YORK
The agenda was adopted.
At the invitation of the President, Mr. Adnan M. Pachachi (Iraq) and Mr. Abdel Aziz Hussein (Kuwait) took plaoes at the Counoil table.
1 would draw the attention of members of the Council to the fact that a draft resolution hasbeen submitted by the United Kingdom representative [S/4885].
The attention of the Government of Liberia has been drawn, by a painful interest, to the unfortunate development of events in the Near East, whereby a dispute has arisen between two Arab states, Kuwait and Iraq,. a dispute the circumstances of which, as expressed in the complaint [S/4844] of Kuwait against Iraq, are likely to endanger international peace and security. The United
4. It is significant that aU the parties to this dispute have sought an examination of their respective complaints by the Security Council, the organ of the United Nations having primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. My delegation is heartened by this act, although we would have wished that there had been no cause for it. And we are heartened because it evinces a clear recognition by the parties concerned of this world organization as the practical embodiment of the peaceful aspirations to harmonize contending and conflicting interests without resort to war. Such a recognition of the role of the United Nations is especiaUy welcome at a time when even a minor armed conflict May trigger a nuclear holocaust.
5. In the circumstances, it appears to my delegation imperative that this Council, after a thol'ough examination of the issues presented here, should adopt a constructive solution which will eliminate the sources of that friction and restore· peace and calm to that area of our world.
6. It is a source of gratification to my delegation to note the tone of Moderation which has so far characterized the debate. In this same spirit, I wish to bring to the attention of the Council a number of considerations which my Government believes should guide us in determining the questions before us.
7. Since its inception as a 8tate, Liberia has consistently advocated that aH peoples should be masters of their own destinies, and it is thus the policy of my Government to support, recognize and respect the right of aIl peoples to self-determination and independence. By this policy, we support the independence and territorial integrity of aU nations, large and small, and Kuwait is no exception. In a sense, the smaHer the nation, the more need it has for the protection of the United Nations.
8. As we see it, Kuwait has aIl the attributes of an independent state, having for some time enjoyed internaI independence and having more recently assumed the independent conduct of its foreign affairs. This progress from a protectorate status to independence, external as weIl as internaI, has been completed by the recognition of this status by the protecting Power, as evidenced by the exchange of notes af 19 June 1961.
9. In his statement before this Council yesterday afternoon, the representative of Kuwait said:
"The Government of Iraq has not only witnessed but even aided Kuwait in its development as an independent state. Iraqi representatives themselves have backed Kuwait's applications for membership in Many international organizations. Beginning with 24 July 1959, Kuwait has successively been admitted to the following intèrnational organizations:
10. Kuwait's applications for membership of the United Nations and the League of Arab States ~'e, as we understand it. now pending. In this era, whe so many nations have just achieved their independence and when the benefits of independence are so universally recognized, it behoves us to be especially sensitive to any threat to the independence of 3. nation which has so recently attained that state. And that is why my delegation earnestly wishes to see peace and calm restored between Kuwait and Iraq, which we claim among our friends and which are, so to speak, each other's brother.
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11. I listened with great respect to the statement of the representative of Iraq on. 2 July [957th meeting], in which he gave assurance that the Government of Iraq seeks to achieve its aL-ns solely by peaceful means, and that accordingly there is no justification whatsoever for the presence of British forces in Kuwait. This assurance was reiterated at the last meeting here. My Government has noted with great satisfaction and relief the pronouncements of the Government of Iraq as to its peaceful intentions, and we can only pray that events will bear out this assurance. While commending this determination for the solution of the matter, I have every reason to believe that settlement of this dispute will be approached with open minds, in the spirit of brotherly love, equal respect and a reciprocal genuine friendship.
12. The Security Council is nevertheless presented with a set of circumstances which were understandably interpreted by the Ruler of Kuwait as likely to threaten the independence of his .country and endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. The facts before us indicate that British forces were moved into Kuwait at the express request ofthe Ruler of this country. These forces, it shouldbenoted, were placed at the Ruler's disposaI for the purpose of offering him such assistance as he might consider necessary in the event the need arose to make use of them. In addition, this request was made under paragraph (Q) of the mentioned exchange of notes, which provides in effect that the Government of the United Kingdom would be ready to assist the Government of Kuwait at the latter's request.
13. In this connexion, it must be notedthat the United Kingdom has clearly stated that its forces will be withdrawn as soon as the Ruler of Kuwait considers that the threat to the independence of his country has been removed, and the representative of Kuwait has confirmed this undertaking. In the opinion of my Government, the United Kingdom has taken the power out of its own hands to impose the presence of British troops for a moment longer than the Ruler of Kuwait deems necessary, as well as having' made it impossible for the forces to be utilized by them for purposes other than those directed by the Ruler of Ku-
14. We are certain that the nations most immediately involved in this dispute, as weU as aU the members of this Council, are desirous of reaching an amieable settlement of these issues. We who are here represent l'lot only our own people, but the peoples of the world, who like us are determined ta "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war".
15. We must demonstrate our capacity for firm action, thereby instilling confidence in the effectiveness of this'Organization, the only organization in the world today which serves to maintain peace. Peace is l'lot the gift of a particular race. Thùs we shall show that this body is l'lot only the forumbut the conscience of the world.
1 shaH be extremely brief because, after the statements which we have heard from the two parties concerned and from the representative of the United Kingdom, the question under discussion seems ta me to be perfectly clear.
17. Pursuant ta the request addressed ta you, Mr. President, on 1 July by the state Secretary of Kuwait [S/4844] and supported by the representative of the United Kingdom [S/4845], you decided to convene an urgent meeting of the Council.
18. In his cable, Mr. Bader Al-Mulla submitted to us through you a complaint by his Government "in respect of the situation arising from threats by Iraq to the territorial independence of Kuwait which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security".
19. On this our third day of debate, the events which preceded this step are tao fresh in the minds of all our colleagues for me to needta recallthem at length. 1 shall mention only two of them. On 19 June 1961 the Ruler of Kuwait and the Government of the United Kingdom agreed ta put an end ta the Agreement of 1899 which had placed that Territory under the protection of the United Kingdom. By an exchange of notes, the two parties made it clear that Kuwait was to become a completely sovereign State entitled ta request adm~ssionta the United Nations.
20. Six days later, on 25 June, the Government of Baghdad claimed the Sheikhdom of Kuwait as an inte- . gral part of Iraqui territory. Troop movements towards Kuwait were announced, while radio broadcasts
22. Nevertheless we do not doubt tha.t the Ruler's fears were sincere, for they were shared by several States of the Near and Middle East and, in particular, by the Government of Saudi Arabia•
23. The steps taken by the United Kingdom were denounced by the representative of Iraq as an aggression. If that is what he calls the assistance granted by the United Kingdom Government to the Ruler of Kuwait, at the latter's request, there is certainly no justification for that judgement. Sir Patrick Dean has told us the circumstances in which his country was committed to respond to the Emir Abdullah's appeal and to comply with the undertaking of assistance it had contracted with regard to the Sheikhdom of Kuwait under the Agreement of 19 June. He repeated the assurance already given by his Government that this assistance would last no longer than was strictly necessary, until such time as the threat to Kuwait was over and the anxiety of its leaders dispelled.
24. These clear statements should reassure the Government of Baghdad, for they leave no doubt, hesitation or ambiguity concerning the United Kingdom's intentions.
25. In conclusion, l should like to express the hope that the strong feelings which had been manifested in that sensitive area of the Near East will die down as rapidly as they flared up.
My delegation has followed closely the debate on the question of Kuwait, and has heard with due attention the staternents of the parties directly concerned.
27. As a country in the area of the Middle East. our primary interest is the preservation of peace !ind of friendly relations in the region. In the question 'low under discussion, we have been gratified to hear the statement of the representative of Iraq, assuring us that his Government has no intention of undertaking any action which might disturb the peace.
28. We have noted the statement of the representative of Kuwait to the effectthat the presence of British forces on their territory was pursuant to an appeal of his Government, based on the provisions of an international treaty.
29. We have also heard the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom, and have noted, among other passages, the following paragraph:
"Her Majesty's Government earnestly hopes that the necessity to make use of this British force will not arise, and that it is intended· that the force should be withdrawn as soon as the Ruler considers that the threat to the independence of hîs country is over." [957th meeting, para. 17.]
31. My Government feels that in view of the debate which has taken place, and of the statements which 1 have mentioned before, any further action of the Council does not seem to be an urgent requirement as of this moment. In expressing this view 1 wish to reiterate the ardent desire of my Government for the maintenance of peace and tranquillity, as weIl as the st"rengthening of friendly relations among aIl the countries of our region.
1 explained in my statement before the Council at the 957th meeting the reason why the United Kingdom delegation had asked you, Mr. President, to convene an early meeting of the Council. This was so that my delegation could he given an opportunity of reporting without any delay on the steps which my Government has been compelled to take in connexion with Iraq's threat to the independence of Kuwait.
33. The question to which 1 should now like to address myself is Kuwait's complaint itself. The Council is seized of this complaint, we have inscribed it as an item on our agenda and, in justice to Kuwait and its people, we must take a decision accordingly.
34. What 1 sayon this score is, of course, relevant to that other item on the agenda, namely, the complaint lodged by Iraq; since whatever decision the Council reaches regarding the Kuwait complaint implies a corresponding decision on the Iraqi one. The Council cannot uphold both.
35. If, as 1 am confident it will be, the Council's conclusion is that Kuwait's complaint is justified in virtue of that country's independence and of the threatening posture adopted by Iraq, then our dutY is clear. We must insist that Kuwait's independence is respected by aIl States. We must look to Iraq to show that respect by abandoning forthwith its annexationist policies and military preparations. And then, in accordance with the undertakings which have been given and repeated, United Kingdom troops will be withdrawn from Kuwait.
36. If, at present, Iraq really feels its ownindependence and security threatened by the presence of United Kingdom troops in Kuwait-and this in spite of repeated statements by the United Kingdom Governmént that we harbour no aggressive intentions whatever against Iraq itself-then the remedy lies wholly with the Iraqi Government.
37. Let Iraq demonstrate its peaceful intentions toward Kuwait-I repeat, toward Kuwait-both in deed and in word, a.nd 1 can positively assure its representative here that United Kingdom troops will take their departure from Kuwait as swiftly and as effectively as they arrived.
38. We do not want to keep our troops there; the Kuwait Government does not want to keep our troops
40. 1 begin with the representative of Iraq. We have heard from him two long and, 1 am sorry to say, rather contentious speeches. 1 will refrain from commenting on them in detail or in kind. As 1 said on an earlier occasion, the Government of the United Kingdom earnestly hopes to maintain the friendliest possible relations with Iraq. We maintain these hopes even in the face of a Press campaign of considerable violenoe in Baghdad and of the insinuations which the representative of Iraq has seen fit to make here; and which, to its regret, my delegation considers unfounded and unworthy.
41. 1 will limit myself, therefore, to commenting on four specifie elements of the case he presented: fil'st, Iraq's historical claims to Kuwait; secondly, the Iraqi delegation's comments on the decision this Council took in inviting the representative of Kuwait to join our discussions; thirdly, Iraq's denial of threatening measures; and lastly, the representative of Iraq's assertions about the continuing build-up of British forces in Kuwait.
42. The Council has heard a good deal recentlyabout the ottoman Empire, first from General Kassim, then from the representative of Iraq, 1 certainly do not intend to take up the Council's time by examining point by point the rather inaccurate-to put it mildlyassertions which have been made. It will be enough for me to refer the representative of Iraq-and indeed anyone else who is interested in these studies-to the 1913 Anglo-Turkish Convention respecting the Persian Gulf and Adjacent Territories and to the Peace Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, in particular article 16 of that Treaty•
43. But as regards this aspect of the matter, we have the unchallengeable statements of the present Government of Kuwait itself, and we should observe what its representative said in the course of his statement at the last meeting: "Kuwait has no wish to indulge in any prolonged and fruitless argument with the Government of Iraq". 1 think members of this Council have a dutY to note that word "fruitless".
44. The representative of Kuwait also produced overwhelming evidence to establish convincingly that Kuwait was, and is, a fully independent state, in complete charge of its own affairs.
45. Given then this undoubted fact of Kuwait's independence, my delegation regretted that the representative of Iraq should yesterday have first attempted to frustrate the Council's wishes to invite the representative of Kuwait to the Council table; and then, when the invitation was extended, that he should have cast doubt on its validity hv questioning under what particular provisions of 0'. r rovisional rules of procedure or of the Charter L representfltive of Kuwait have been invited.
1 do not propose, as it IS not incumbent upon me do so, to pursue the rather complicated arguments
48. The representative of Iraq has repeatedly denied that any military preparations took place on the side of Iraq. That is all very well; but 1 would ask him tu place himself for a moment in the position of the Ruler of Kuwait and, in all honesty, to test his reactions to what at that time was being said by the Prime Minister of Iraq and others in positions of authority in that country. 1 have already quoted some examples, may 1 give some more.
49. What are we to make of the following telegram which was sent by Major-General Ahmed Saleh Al- Abbi, Iraqi Chief of staff and Military Governor- General, to General Kassim after the latter's press conference on 25 June 1961:
"In my own name and in the name of all members of the army of July 14, 1 support the statements in your pres's conference on June 25 with regard to the conspiracies of imperialists over Kuwait, the inseparable part of the immortal Iraq Republic. Irrespective of whatever conspiracies it may plot to separate it from our beloved homeland, go ahead, our faithful saviour, with God's blessing. Your army, with which you have destroyed the fortress of imperialism in the Middle East and achieved the greatest revolution in the twentieth century, is at your commando May God grant you success."
50. What again are we to make ofthe following words of the Iraqi Prime Minister on 25 June? He said:
"We shall warn this Sheikh of Kuwait not to wrong the people of Kuwait who are actually of the Iraqi people and, if he should violate this, he will surely have to face drastic punishment, being treated as one of the rebels."
51. As 1 have already said, the Iraqi forces at Basra are only about thirty miles from the Kuwait border and were clearly quite sufficient to occupy Kuwait by rapid movements against the modest Kuwait army.
52. In the light of the pronouncements that 1 have read, is it not inevitable that the Ruler of Kuwait should have feIt that that movement across his frontiers was about to begin?
53. And then, on 29 and 30 June 1961, evidence accumulated from a number of sources that reinforcements-especially reinforcements of armour-were moving towards Basra. In these circumstances, the Ruler felt it his dutY to make the urgent and formaI request for our assistance under the treaty we have with him.
54. 1 wish to draw the Council's attention in pa:..'ticular to the official statement made by the Minister of
"Through its various sources, the Government of the United Arab Republic has received indications that forces of the Iraqi Army have been ordered to move towards the Kuwaiti borders. The United Arab Republic Government has also received reports that some Baghdad circles are seriously discussing the possibilities of military intervention."
55. In the view of my delegation there was only one conclusion to be drawn from this. A real threat to Kuwait's independence had been created; and, in spite of the statement made by the representative of Iraq in this Council, there are as yet no signs at all in the area of the threat diminishing.
56. Finally, in regard to what the representative of Iraq has alleged about the build-up of British forces in Kuwait, I have this to say. British forces in Kuwait have now been built up to a point at which there is confidence that they can ensure the safety of the territory. It is not our intention to introduce any further fighting units into the operational area once the moves already in progress have been completed, probably on 7 July. There will, however, no doubt be continuing relief and replacement of front-line personnel who are serving in extremely difficult climatic conditions. So much for the Iraqi case.
57. My delegation also gave particular attention to the speech at the last meeting by the representative of the Soviet Union, as indeed we do to anything he says. Now, I may be wrong, but I thought that there seemed on this occasion to be somewhat less fervour and even less conviction than we have come to expect from this particular quarter.
58. I peered in vain through the customary smokescreen with which the representative of the Soviet Union beguiles us-the scarifying tales of a colonialist plot, of an intention to "deflect world opinion. into other paths", of references to Suez, to Jordan and Lebanon, to Belgium's part in the Congo, to the Portuguese and Angola. I confess that I found it impossible to determine whether or not the Soviet Government regard Iraq's claims to the territory of Kuwait to be justified.
59. I turn now to the statement made by the representative of the United Arab Republic. The Government of the United Arab Republic, like that of the United Kingdom, recognizes both Kuwait's independenCe and the existence of a threat to that independence by Iraq. Yet, if I may be aUowed to say so, in the comments which the representative of the United Arab Republic had made on the action taken by my Government, he appears to me to be denying to the Ruler of Kuwait one very obvious and important concommitant of independence, namely the right to caU upon a friend and ally for help in tirne of trouble. To insist, as the Government of the United ArabRepublic now seems to suggest, on the immediate withdrawal of British troops ignores both the military needs of
61. My delegation has circulated a draft resolution for the consideration of this Council [8/4855]. We believe it represents a proper statement of the views of this Council with regard to the question under discussion.
62. More particularly, we believe that in its three operative paragraphs it would provide, if adopted by the Council, clear and positive decisions on the three elements involved: first, the political aspect; secondly, th~ military aspect, and thirdly, the responsibilities of this Council for the future. Let me examine briefly each of these in turn.
63. First, the political aspect. It is evident that fundamental to the present situation is the disputed status of Kuwait. Perhaps "disputed" is too grand a word to employ, for clearly it is only a dispute in the mind of Iraq. Kuwait itself, the other Arab nations and the world at large recognize and have recognized for some time that Kuwait is a national entity in its own right. So too did Iraq once-and not just ten or twenty or thirty years ago, not even just before the July revolution in 1958, but as recently as 13 June 1961.
64. This is what Mr. AI-Umari, the Iraqi delegate at the forty-füth session of the International Labour Conference, said: "It gives me a great deal of pleasure to support the admission into our midst as a full member of the International Labour Organization of the young Arab state of Kuwait. 1 do so on behalf of my country, Iraq, and also on behtalf of the other Arab States." In a later passage he said:
"It is with pride indeed and with warm affection that we witness the coming of age of a younger sister who is taking ber place in world councils as to aIl intents and purposes she has done within the immediate Arab family councils."
This was on 13 June 1961.
65. Less than a fortnight later General Kassim was laying claim to the territory of Kuwait. It seems to my delegation that, confronted with such a situation, we have a clear dutY to announce that Kuwait is not for annexation.
66. I now turn to the 'military aspect. There are two elements to this: the evidence of military preparations by Iraq directed at Kuwait, and the introduction of British and Saudi forces into Kuwait at the request of its Ruler to meet this very real andpalpable threat.
67. I think there would be widespread and general agreement that the sooner the situation can return to what it was before these military measures were taken, the better it will be for the peace and security of that area and, indeed, of the whole international community. So what must be done?
68. First, the threat must be removed. We have had Iraqi assurances given in the Council-which 1 welcome-that no hostility is or was intended, that only
69. Finally, the responsibilities of this Council for the future. Mydelegation, no less than doubtlessmany others, finds it unsatisfactory that we should end our debate here in New York without the independence of Kuwait being wholly assured. There is also, in this particular case. we believe, a continuing responsibility to report to this Council onthe course of events, while British troops-albeit under perfectly lawful conditions-remain on foreign territory. For both these reasons we consider that the situation must be kept under review by the Council.
70. To end on a happier note, may l say how glad my delegation is to see among us here at the United Nations a representative of the Government of Kuwait. My country has had a long and friendly association with Kuwait.. We admire the statesmanlike and farsighted policies which the Ruler, His Highness' Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salem Al-Sabah, and his Government have pursued for many years, to the benefit of the Kuwaiti people. So much so that, in the words of their representative, speaking yesterday, Kuwait is now ila welfare state which is today the pride of the Middle East".
71. We are confident that Kuwait will long continue to deserve its good fortune and will play a worthy part among the nations of the world. We look forward in due course to welcoming that country to full membership of the United Nations.
72. Our only regret is that the occasion of an agreement concluded by Kuwait as an independent and sovereign states which ought in aIl conscience to be a matter for congratulations and rejoicing, should have beeJ;1 marred by the developments that we have been discussing in this Council. But there i5 an "amende honorable" which this Organization can and should make. Let us remove the dangers which beset the indepèndence of Kuwait. To this end my delegation has submitted the present draft resolution. We are confident that it will commend itself to every true friend of Kuwait and will receive the full support of this Council.
The Security Council has been called upon to deal with a question of an emergency character. The question is the military situation resulting from alleged troop concentrations in Iraq near the border of Kuwait and the sending of troops to Kuwait by the United Kingdom. At this stage l shalllimit my remarks to a discussion of this :.niiitary situation.
74. My .delegation has carefully studied the reports and statements made by the parties concerned. There
76. Such are the conflicting reports and allegations about the situation. The contradictions and the discrepancies could have been caused by misunderstandings, or they could have been caused by disputes of a political nature. It seems to my delegation that there is no need at the present moment for the Security Council to go deep into the causes of the trouble•. What is of paramount importance is for the Security Council to prevent the military situation from deteriorating and to maintain peace and security in the area affected. 77. In this respect my delegation appreciates the request of the United Kingdom for an urgent meeting of the Security Council and the promptness with which the steps taken by the United Kingdom Government, in response to the appeal of the Ruler of Kuwait, have been reported to the Council. In particular, my delegation notes with satisfaction the following statements contained in the report made by the representative of the United Kingdom at the 957th meeting of the Council: first, "that it is intended that the force should be withdrawn as soon as the Ruler considers that the threat to the independence of his country is over"; second, that the British forces "could only be employed in a combat role if Kuwait were to be attacked from across the border" and, third, that the Government of the United Kingdom "continues to hope that . counsels of moderation will prevail".
78. At the same time, my delegation also takes note of the statement made at the same meeting, and again at the 958th meeting, by the representative of Iraq' that bis .Government would employ only peaceful means to ;settle the difficulty concerning Kuwait. He has also repeated the denial of his Government of troop concentrations in southern Iraq.
79. In the view of my delegation, these statements made by the representatives of the United Kingdom and Iraq have considerably facilitated the immediate task of the Security Council. My delegation will give support to any measures to be taken by the Council which are designed to encourage peaceful settlement of the question, to ensure the realization of the declared peaceful intentions of the parties concerned, and to safeguard the security of aIl countries in the area. 80. lVIr. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation already had the opportunity, at the last meeting of the Council, of stating its position with regard to the question being considered by the Council. The
81. I shall now make a few short remarks from which it will be obvious that the representative of the United Kingdom was a victim of his own psychological venture and that the so-called smoke-screen to which he referred here as being characteristic of the statement of the Soviet delegation was in fact a dense, smoke-screen in his own statement, asI shall try to prove. 82. The course of events over the past twenty-four hours-an evaluation of the situation up to then having already been made in the statement of the Soviet representative-shows that the build-up of United Kingdom armed forces in Kuwait is continuing and that, in spite of the requests from large sectors of society in peace-loving countries, the UnitedKingdom Government, as it has often done in the past, is disregarding these requests and continuing its operation, namely, the occupation of the territory of Kuwait.
83. Secondly, the attempts made yesterday and today by the representative of the United Kingdom Government to substantiate his position by some sort of factual data relating to the so-called preparation of aggression by Iraq against Kuwait have, both yesterday and today, proved completely fruitless.
84. How, in fact, could the United Kingdom representative succeed in contradicting yesterday and try to contradict today, the clear and completely unambiguous statement both of the Government of Iraq and of its representative here in the United Nations to the effect that Iraq. did not and does not intend to solve the controversial questions connected with Kuwait by the use of armed force or any other kind of force? 85. How could the United Kingdom representative manage to contradict the perfectly clear statement by the head of the Iraqi Government to the effect that, even at the time when a dangerous concentration of United Kingdom armed forces was begun and was continued in the immediate vicinity of the Iraqi border, not one Iraqi soldier was moved either in the direction of Kuwait or elsewhere?
86. This fact, as well as the fact that there are no Iraqi troops in the territory of Kuwait but that there are United Kingdom armed forces in that territory, remains indisputable, and no amount of verbiage by the United Kingdom representative, as used by him yesterday and today, to distract the attention of world
88. The only document which has been submitted to us is the United Kingdom draft resolution, which l have already mentioned. As was to be expected, the Power responsible for the extremelydangerous situation that is a threat to international peace and security CQuid not submit a draft resolution which in our view is acceptable. If you examine the preamble to this draft resolution, you will clearly see, Mr. President and my distinguished colleagues, that a number of the points in the preamble to the United Kingdom draft resolution are none other than an attempt to justify the continued presence of United Kingdom armed forces in the territory of Kuwait. Other points in the same preamble are designed not only to justüy the presence of United Kingdom armed forces in the territory of Kuwait, but also to legalize for an unspecüied period of time-and l shaH now attempt to prove this-to legalize in effect for an unspecüied period of time the presence of those armed forces in that region.
89. Furthermore, some of the points contained in the operative part of the United Kingdom draft resolution touch upon a question which goes beyond the agenda as it was presented to the Security Council. l am referring to the points concerning a question which in fact is not now under consideration-the question of the status of Kuwait. We are asked to pass quite definite judgement on a question which we did not intend to discuss when we included this item in the agenda, this, of course, being nothing more than a premature and illogical attempt to distract us from discussing the basic question of the introduction of United Kingdom armed forces into the territory of Kuwait.
90. It would be wrong for me to limit my criticism of the points in the United Kingdom draft resolution solely to what l have just said. l am merely leading up to what is undoubtedly the principal defect of this draft resolution, namely, the omission of the prime demand which, it seems to us, should be made by the Security Council. The essence of this demand is that the Council must resolutely calI for the immediate withdrawal of the United Kingdom armed forces from the territory of Kuwait. This is the essential step which the Security Council must take in fulfilment of its basic responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the elimination, as soon as possible, of the dangerous situation which has arisen in that region.
91. These circumstances and the inadequacies of the draft resolution submitted to us demonstrate that the United Kingdom Government and its representative in the Security Council have regrettably not drawn any conclusions from the clear criticism directed tothem nor from the requests made yesterday here in the Council by the representative of the United Arab Republic and the representative of the Soviet Union, which consisted of a suggestion for the immediate withdrawal of the United Kingdom armed forces from the territory of Kuwait.
The Government and people of Chile are most anxious that the Security Council should belp to find a solution so that peace in the Middle East may not be disturbed and that this part of the world, which is developing apace, may not be afflictedwithvolcanic eruptions which will increase the fear of a conflict that would merely paralyze the efforts the various countries there are making to alleviate poverty, consoHdate freedom and independence and laythefoundations of the prosperity to which they are so justly entitled. 95. As a Latin American, l would venture to recall the close connexion between our two ragions in the light of modern problems. Latin America and the Middle East are two human reservoirs, two dynamic areas in which our generation has a hard task to accomplish, namely, the development of our resources as a collective and peaceful enterprise and the ennoblement of human existence.
96. Confronted with the particular case under discussion, we are appalled at the possibility that disagreements and conflicts may arise between the Arab peoples and that the unity which they themselves have so ardently proclaimed as the necessary condition for ensuring their progress and fulfilling their historie mission in the modern world may be broken. In accordance with the spirit of the Charter, the peacefuI settlement of any disputes which may arise in that area is largely a matter for them. Any antagonism which might become increasingly serious and degenerate into an open conflict would turn that region of the world into a source of international disturbances. 97. The Government of Chile has always shown that it adheres to the principle of self-determination of peoples as a basic axiom of law for the international community. We agree that it would be dangerous to use self-determination as a pretext for promoting the partition of aState, but we also consider that it would be arbitrary behaviour for any state, by a unilateral act, to regard another state as a Integral part of its territory through a mere proclamation. Astate may adduce historical arguments and ,?ut forward its own Interpretation, but it is only legal reasons, international law and the will of the people concerned, provided that it is expressed freely, that are valid.
98. In the case of Kuwait we realize that it obtained independence in progressive stages, culminating in the formaI declaration of 19 June-1961, and that its independence has been recognized by most of the peoples chiefly concerned, i.e. the Arab peoples.
100. The representative of the United Kingdom has explained the reasons which led his Government to send troops; they are legally in accordance with the obligations of the British Government under its agreement with the Government of Kuwait and with the formaI request addressed by Kuwait to the United Kingdom Government and to the King of Saudi Arabia.
101. It is true that any movement of troops arouses uneasiness, but my Government does not attribute sinister intentions, imperialist designs or colonialist plans to the United Kingdom. Indeed the United Kingdom has shown that it is willing to work for the independence of the peoples and the peoples are too advanced to allow colonial oppression, which the modern world has rejected and continues to reject in those areas where it still prevails, to be revived in disguised form.
102. Moreover, the United Kingdom has undertaken a formaI commitment before the international community and we are glad that the United Kingdom Government earnestly hopes that the necessity to make use of the forces which it brought in will not arise and that those forces will be withdrawn as soon as the Ruler considers that the threat to Kuwait's independence is over. That is to say, we do not believe that the United Kingdom is attempting to establish a legal claim to remain in Kuwait indefinitely. The representative of the United Kingdom has further stated that his country has no aggressive intentions against Iraq. While some alarm was felt at the first declarations by the Government of Iraq, the most recent statements made by its representative to the members of the Council, to the effect that only peacefuI means will be used to defend its position, give us confidence and encourage us to hope that any danger of conflict will be removed.
103. This debate has proceeded in great calm and deliberation. Many positive factors have emerged which should be received in a spirit of conciliation. We do not doubt the sincerity of the statements which we have heard or the clearly expressed wish to comply with the principles and obligations of the Charter. The chief protagonists in the crisis which arose over Kuwait have assured the Council of their peaceful intentions. We should therefore endeavour to find a constructive formula, assisted mainly by the Arab peoples under the Security Council's guidance, which would help to remove the difficulties and misunderstandings and bring back to the Middle East and to the whole world the tranquillity needed for ensuring peace and security and for continuing the great work of social and economic progress for so many peoples who need tranquillity in order to fulfil their destiny completely.
104. Ml'. HUSSEIN (Kuwah;; I have a very short
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105. The contrast between what the Iraqi representative says in the 8ecurity Council and what the Iraqi Government is doing in Iraq gives us all great sorrow, and you will no doubt deplore suchaction from a responsible member of the United Nations who has pledged itself to respect the principles of the United Nations Charter.
106. l am deeply sorry to inform you that after this illogical reversaI of position of the Government of Iraq, my Government has great difficulty in finding any basis of trust in the intentions and statements of the Iraqi Government. 107. Mr. PACHACHI (Iraq): l should like to apologize to you, Mr. President, and to the members of the Council for taking the floor at tilis late hour, but l have a few brief comments to make on some of the statements in the debate, particularly the statement this afternoon of the representative of the United Kingdom. He describes my two previous statements as rather long. However, l have consulted the records and l find his statement to be aImost exactly the same length as mine.
108. The representative of the United Kingdom said that if a decision is taken on the complaint presented by the United Kingdom, then there should be no need for the Council to pronounce itself on our complaint. It is difficult to understand the logic ofthis assertion. Our complaint relates to the threat to Iraq's independence °and security posed by the presence of the British forces in Kuwait. This is a matter which is not covered by the draft resolution presented this afternoon by the representative of the United Kingdom [8/4855]. Nowhere in that draft resolution is there any reference to the threat °to Iraq's independence and security, which is the subject and core of our own complaint.
109. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the remedy to the situation is in our hands, and according to him the remedy was to remove any intention of using force. Now, l do not know how many times ! have to say and repeat in the Council, and l do not know how many times my Government has to state, that we have no intention of using force at all, and we have never had such intention.
110. There is nothing more that a sovereign staie can do than to give its assurances; and from a Member of the United Nations, these assurances must be taken seriously, particularIy since the representative of the United Kingdom has not provided us with any concrete evidence of anY kind of aUeged troop concentrations in southern Iraq. Our statement that not one single soldier was moved in the direction of the still stands and is true. There is a small gar-
112. This is a question that will have to be faced and dealt with by the Seourity Council. This is the cause of the Immediate threat to international peace and security in the area. The Counoil is not called upon to pronounce itself on whether or not Kuwait posesses the attributes of sovereignty and statehood. This is not the matter before the Council. There are two oomplaints before the Council, complaints relating to threats to il}ternational peace and security. Since the threat from our side has never existed and certainly does not e.xist now, it is up to the United Kingdom Government to remove the threat which we feel, and feel very strongly, by the actual prese.nce of an enormous force just a few miles from Basra. It must be evident to the representative of the United Kingdom a.nd to aIl other members of the Council that so long as British troops are in Kuwait, there can be no hope of a peaceful solution. Let me repeat, there can be no hope of any peaceful solution so long as British forces remain in Kuwait. If the British Government is really interested in peace, then it must do the one thing that will serve the cause of peace and eliminate the threat to the independence and security of Iraq. And that is to withdraw its forces immediately from Kuwait.
113. The representative of Liberia, MI'. Barnes, stated that if, in the future, the presence of British troops should prove t6 be a threat to the security of Iraq, and if they are ever used for purposes other thanthose for which they were ostensibly sent, then the Council should take appropriate action to remove such a threat. Well, the situation which the ,representative of Liberia fears may develop in the future exists at this very moment. On our side, assurances have been given by the Prime Minister, bythe Foreign Minister, and several times by myself solemnly in the Security Council, that we have no intention and we have never had any intention of using force; and the facts of the situation are such as to make a threat of the use of force from Iraq extremelyunlikely-almost Iudicrous. Therefore, the reason for whichthe British troops were supposed to have been sent, and which in reaIity never existed, is no longer valide
~15. The representative of the United Kingdom answered some of the points which 1 made in my first speech. He spoke of the Treaty of 1913 and the Treaty of Lausanne. The Treaty of 1913 was concluded in July of that year at a time when the ottoman Empire had just come from a disastrous defeat in the Balkan wars and it was under duress that the Sublime Port was forced to conclude that Treaty. However, in spite of this fact, the first article of that Treaty says that the United Kingdom recognizes the sovereignty of the ottoman Empire over Kuwait. 1 should like to read that article. It says: "The territory of Kuwait, as delimited in articles 5 and 7 of this Convention, constitutes an autonomous 'kaza' of the ottoman Empire•••". "Kaza" means a sub-district belonging to a larger district which is called "province" or "vilayet". So that very first article recognizes the sovereignty of the ottoman Empire over Kuwait.
116. The representative of the United Kingdom referred to the Treaty of Lausanne and to article 16 in particular. Article 16 says: "Turkey hereby renounces aU rights ,and title whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty•••". 117. But if we read article 15, which relates to certain other territories of the former ottoman Empire, we see that there is a definite transfer of sovereignty to another state. Article 15 reads in part: "Turkey hereby renounces in favour of Italy all rights and title over the following islands: stampalia, Rhodes, Callei, Scarpanto, etc.". • • and the same thing about the transfer of sovereignty on Cyprus. But there is no mention in the Treaty of Lausanne about the transfer of sovereignty over Kuwait, as indeed there could not have been, because Kuwait was part of one of the sub-districts. That was surrendered by the ottoman Empire to the Allies of the First World War, and the sub-district of Basra, together with the two subdistricts of Mosul and Baghdad, subsequently became the state of Iraq, and was placed under the mandate of the League of Nations, but the British persisted in separating Kuwait from the sub-district of Basra.
118. Still referring to some of the historical aspects of this question, the gentleman who sits across from me said in his statement yesterday-before 1 come to this point may 1 add that the Treaty of 1913 was not ratified:
".••General Kassim's allegation that Kuwait during the days of the ottoman Turkish caliphate was a district governed by the Turkish provisional governor of Basra. This claim has no historical truth." Then he went on to say: "But it is a historical fact that Kuwait was never under Turkish rule." [958th meeting, para. 68.] 119. Mr. Hussein said the following in a book published in 1960-only last year: "During the 19th century, the ottoman Empire ruled over this part of the Arabian coast, and the
This hardly conforms to the fact that Kuwait was never part of the ottoman Empire. If memories are short, then history is not shorter; history does not change.
120. The representative of the United Kingdom made sorne references to my statement regarding the admissibility of inviting the gentleman seated across from me at the Council table. May l repeat that only under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure could this gentleman have been invited, and only as a private person, because rule 39 does not deal with representatives of State, but persons. And l may add that there have been many precedents of inviting people under rule 39-among them were representatives of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, in 1948.
121. We are still reminded by the representative of the United Kingdom that the threat continues, and the only reason the British Government sent its forces was because of alleged troop concentrations. In The New York Times of today there are certain statements attributed to Sir William Luce, British Political Resident in the Gulf: "Sir William said that the British had been aware since 1958 of Premier Kassim's general thesis that Kuwait was part of the old Turkish province of Basra, and hence part of modern Iraq." So what happens to the great surprise of the British Government when they heard General Kassim restate the claim of Iraq on 25 June of tilis year? May l read further from The New York Times of 6 July:
"Asked whether sorne parlicular troop movement by Premier Kassim had resulted in Sheikh Abdullah's request for British aid, Sir William said he believed the request was a result of the cumulative effect of Premier Kassim's propaganda, combined with the knowledge that Iraq had a brigade ,of infantry and armored forces in the Basra area. 1Î
122. l do not want to delay the Council any longer. l have studied in a very cursory manner the draft resolution presented by the representative of the United Kingdom and may l sayat once it is totally unacceptable to us. l hope that youwillbe good enough to give me the floor at a future meeting to discuss in some detail this draft resolution and its very serious implicatipns to my country.
123. MI'. BARNES (Liberia): l wish to thank my friend, MI'. Pachachi of Iraq, for the kind reference he has made to my statement this afternoon. l regret, however, to say that there is some misinterpretation or mistake by MI'. Pachachi of my statement, for l have searched diligently in that statement made this afternoon, and nowhere in the portion of the statement to which he referred have l used the word "future". 124. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): l have no more speakers on my liste l should like to know if any other member of the Council intends to make any statement this afternoon. Since no one wishes to do so, l propose that the Council should meet again at 3 p.m. tomorrow.
It was so deoided. The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.
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