S/PV.965 Security Council

My Governmentnoteswith mounting concern and dismay that the Government of France has failed to comply with at least that portion of our resolution S/4882 which called for a return of an armed forces to their original positions. 2. The statement in the letter to the President of the Couneil from the representative of France, dated 23 July 1961 [S/4887]. while categorically denyingthe allegation that his Government had refused to carry out the cease-fire order, makes no reference tothe portion of the resolution referring to the withdrawal of aIl armed forces to their original positions. We must also note that, even to the extent that the French have acquiesced in the cease-fire. it has beento their military advantage to do so since they have aiready attained their military objectives. This fact was strikingly underscored by a report in The New York Times of 5. The present attitude of the French Government is especially düficult to understand in the light of the statement made by the representative of France in the Security Counci! on 22 July 1961. The members will recall that my delegation had introducedthe resalution subsequently adopted by the Council with the observation that it would effect the restoration of a fully peaceful situation. The representative ofFrance, referring to my observation, stated: "The restoration of a peaceful situation is my Government's and my country's ardent wish. 1 have said this already, and 1 repeat itoncemore. "Such a restoration would of course signify the restoration of the conditions obtaining at the beginning of July, in other wcrds all necessary steps will be taken on both sides, troops will be withdrawn from the advanced positions ••. Il [962nd meeting, paras. 53 and 54.] The representative of France went on to explain "that his delegation would not participate inthe vote because Franee was the countrywhichhadasked continuallyfor a cease-fire. He said further: " ••• and it would be illogical, paradoxical even, for France to urge itself to do what it has been pressing for sinee 20 July". [Ibid. para. 55.] 6. Thus, on hearing these remarks ofthe representative of France, we hadevery reason to assume that the Counci! could expect the whole-hearted co-operation of his Government in the full Implementation of our resolution. 7. Subsequent developments, however, wouId appear to indicate that the French abstention was not based on their professedlydeeper concernforthe:restoration" of. a g~nuinely peaeeful situation. Such concern would have implied an unconditional aceeptance of the resalution, whereas the French intention was actually ta take advantage of that portion of the resolution dealing 8. The reports make it clear that there has been great loss of life on the Tunisian side. The Council cannot ignore the generally rd '}ognized fact that "The ferocity of the French reaction to the crisis over the Bizerta naval base was striking" as one reporter in The New York Times states in the issue of 25 July. The reporter's dispatch continued in the following words: "The ferocîty is shown in the shell-pocked walls, the blown-in windows and the stm smouldering mosques". Another reporter in the same issue states: "A well-qualified Western observer described the French military moves at Bizerta as a 'gross overreaction' to the Tunisian blockade of the base and Tunisian rifle fire on a French helicopter"• 9. 1 do not wish to dwell at length upon the merits of the situation. but merely to underline the senseless nature of the struggle 1 should like to refer this body to the terms of the French-Tunisian agreement of 17 June 1958 [8/48691. which expressly provides that there shall be no French forces in Bizerta. other than those then stationed there. without the further agreement of the parties. Consequently, the failureof the French to evacuate the forces introduced Bince the eruption of the conflict and to return aIl their armed forces to their original positions is a clear violation of their treaty obligations as weIl as of the Council resolution. 10. The continued failure of the French to withdraw their forces can only lead to reactions which will renew the unequaI struggle and to further military action grossly disproportionate to the occasion. unless the French Government reasserts its devotion to the code of humanity• n. It may still be hoped that the actionof the French military forces was taken without the full concurrence of the French Government. If that indeedwas the case. then the minimum atonement which we can expect the French to make is to discontinue their insistence on their alleged rights to the security of the base and to proceed at once to comply with theCouncilresolution. 12. In the event that the 8ecurity Council does not receive a categorical affirmation of the intention of the French Government immediately to withdraw its forces. the Council has no alternative but totake prompt and decisive action. The 8ecurity Councilhas primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. and the Members of the United Nations have ag-r.eed to accept and carry out the decisions of the security Council in accordance with the Charter. In carrying outits obligations. the Security Council must be mindful of the fact that it is the sole safeguard and guardian of the rights ofsmall nations which seek to protect themselves without reso.!'t to violence or to measures andforms ofassistance which can lead only to wide anddangerous conflagrations. We must not abdicate this function and thereby place Tunisia in a positionwhere itfeels compelledto accept 14. The basie problem, of course, continues to be the presence of French forces on Tunisj~!\ soil without the consent of Tunisia. Since this is incompatiblewith Tunisian soveréignty, it must continue tobe a constant source of friction and conflict. The only positive solution to theproblem lies in the total evacuation of sueh forces, and this is a solution which we must not hesitate to press while we seek an implementation of our interim resolution. That is why my delegation, along with the delegations of the United Arab Republic and Ceylan. has sponsored the draft resolution contained in document si4904, which 1 trust will he unanimously approved by the Council. 15. In the face of whathas transpiredbetweenTunisia and France, resulting in the loss of so many lives, we must examine the problem realistically even if we have hesitated to grapple with it before. Mattel~s have now progressed to such a pointthat it can no longer he expeeted that the Tunisians will tolerate the presence of French forces on their soil. 16. As a measure both ofhumanityand of safeguarding the 'peace, we can do no less than to take such action. The tragedy of what is occurring is compoundedby the fact that the ultimate evaeuation of the base at Bizerta by the French is a foregone conclusion in accordance with the irresistible tendency ofhistory. The prolongation of the struggle in the vain pursuit of objectives which are both impossible andundesirable-that is, the continued maintenance of a French outpost in free and independent Tunisia-can only weaken those forces which stand for freedom and democracy. 17. Finally, 1 would say this: The true friends of democracy must come to the aid of a nation which has so unüormly and at such great sacrifice to itself sought. to serve as a mediating influence between the new nations and the older democracies. Tunisia must he judged in the light of its record and its ultimate objectives. Friends of democracy should therefore be impelled to move to the aid of Tunisia so that it may have the opportunity to continue to serve as one.of the

On 21 Ju.Iy. during the first me€tting of the Security Council on the complaint of Tunisia [961st meeting]. acting upon instructions from my Government, 1 had expressed the deep sorrow and' concern feIt by the Government and people of Turkey over the tragic events which were recorded around Bizerta. and 1 had set forth an urgent appeal from my Government which, like other Members of the United Nations. urged an Immediate cessation of armed action and a return ofarmed forces to the positions they held before the incidents. 19. On 22 July. after the Council hadindicatedunanimous sentiment on the adoption of these measures. the draft resolution presented by the representative of Liberia [S/4880] was adopted by a quasi-unanimous vote [962nd meeting]. In fact, the representative of France who cast the only non-positive vote on that resolution explained that his Government too agreeà with the context·of the text adopted by the Council. That was the situation which presented itself to us on 22 July. a situation in which a unanimous desire had been expressed by all, including the two parties to the dispute. for a cease-fire and for a return to previous positions-a situation in which this unanimous desire was consolidated in a decision of the Security Council. 20. At the moment when the present debate is ta.1{ing place, it gives us satisfaction to witnesF. that at least the first provision of our :resolution and perhaps the most important provision-·considering the Ume element. as it aims to s?ve human lives and spare suffering and bloodsned-is generally speaking implemented. However, the second part of our resolution. the part concerning the return of all armed forces to their original positions. has unfortunately not been implemented up to this moment. Reports emanating from both sides. as well as from foreign correspondents. indicate that French forces continue to hold the advance positions which they occupied after 18 July. We have seen the letter addressed to the President of the Security Council on 27 July by the representative of Tunisia [S/4893]. in which he complains about the refusaI of French forces to withdraw to their original positions as required in the resolution of the Security Council. and he states that this refusaI indicated the intention of the French authorities not to comply with the decision of the United Nations in this matter. 21. On the other hand. we have heard statements of official French sources. according to which French units would return to their original positions, if they were given guarantees that the Tunisian authorities would notproceed to a renewal of the encirclement and isolation of the various separatecomponents of the Bizerta base. 22. We have also heard reports from both sides of attempts to proceed to direct negotiations on the 23. In the opinion of my delegation, the Councn should give priority to breaking through this impasse and security the Implementation of the resolution of 22 July [S/4882] on a cease-fire and withdrawal to original positions, while at the same time opening the path for a definitive solution of the question. 24. As for the disagreement on the locality of the negotiations which had been envisaged between the representatives of the two Governments, if such negotiations are considered of any'use, we on our part consider that the very fact that such a discussion has taken place as to the locality ia regrettable. Questions of protoccl, no matter how important they mayappear to the parties inv'olved, shouldneverbe allowedto take precedence over situations, which if pr-olonged, may give place to grave in.cidents and the tragic loss of human lives. Any party overlooking questions of protocol, with a view to a speedy solution in such circumstances, could not be considered as humiliated, on the contrary, it would rise in honour and esteem in the eyes of the enlightened opinion of the world. 25. On the specific question of the implementation of the second provision of resolution S/4882 of the 8ecurity Council, my delegation, having carefully studied the records ofour deliberations onthis matter, as well as the statements made on this specific point by both parties after the adoption of that resolution, does not consider that, in essence, the present obstacles are insurmountable. Doubts have been expressed by French authorities as towhat mighthappen after the· withdrawal of their forces to their original positions. However, the idea of achieving a peaceful solution and of establishing peaceful conditions has predominated in the debates in the Council aU along. In making its demand on withdrawal, it is the Security Councn which has assumed responsibility for the continuance of a peaceful observation of the provisions of its resolution after that resolution it has been implemented. Therefore if both sides give a clear-cut in-' dication of their intention to fully implement that resolution, we would not see the necessity for any further bilateral guarantees on this point. 26. It is our opinion that such an understanding could form the practical basis of a speedy 'Yithdrawal of all armed forces to their original positions, which is a matter which we consider ofthe utmosturgency. In my present statement 1 have, up to now, dealt in general terms with the position of my delegationregarding the 8ecurity Council resolutionS/4882 andits implementa- -tion. 21. During the 963rd meeting on 22 July the 8ecurity Council pronounced itself on two other draft resolutions [S/4878, S/4879] which were presented to the vote. These two texts contained differences which, al- . though important, in the final analysis may he said to reside in form rather than in content. The basic desire for a peaceful settlement through negotiations was contained in both texts. 'It is to be regretted that the Council could not reach a decision in spite of the fact a general consensus of opinion could be discerned on the basic principles involved. 29. And now 1 wish to introduce the draft resolution presented by my delegation. upon instructions from my Government with regard to the present situation,. The text of the draft being self-explanatory. 1 wish to dwell rather on the reasons which prompted this action. 30. The trend of the present debate having givenus the impression that the Security Counci! might again be unable to reach a decision on the wording of the existing proposaIs. my delegation has decided to make an effort to produce a text which would includa all the essential elements of a satisfactory solution. while at the same time being worded in language which might prove acceptable to a large majority. We believe that such a large majority would increase the effectiveness of a Security Counoil decision and add to its prestige. Tt would be of assistance in the maintenance ofpeace and friendly relations among nations. which àre the basic ideals of our Charter. 31. The experience of the lastballoting in the Security Council has shown that. if the same wording or the same kind of wording were pref.'ented to it again. we could not hope to obtain a decision. At a moment when any new incidents could have tragic consequences and cause the loss of humanlives. atamoment when world opinion has turned its eyes upon the Securii.y Council. awaiting a constructive. peaceful and just solution. we have considered it our duty to make an effort with the intention of achieving these objectives in.the question now under consideration. 32. Tt is with these considerations and the best intentions that my delegation. upon instructions from our Government. submits to the approval of the Council the draft resolution circulated indocumentS/4905. We recommend the adoption of this text, and we commend its acceptance to the interested parties themselves. Turkey has no other desire but the maintenance of peace and respect for the principles embodied in the Charter. Turkey has excellent relations with both of the parties involved in the present disagreement. These considerations should bring added proof of the sincerity of our intentions. which we hope will be successful. in the best interests of the parties concerned as weIl as of international peace and understanding. 33. Having terminated my statement. 1wish to make certain reserves on the French translation of our text which contains certain errors. 1 shall be in contact with the Secretariat. 34. Cu Patrick DEAN (Ul'Jted Kingdom): There are, as Ir.:elegation sees it. two elements to this tragic dispute between France and Tunisia. First. there is the immediate question of the conflict between the forces of both sides which broke out on 19 July; secondly. there are the more fundamental issues which 35. We did not think it right to specify how this negotiation should take place. any more than we sought to define how the cease-fire and the restoration of the status quo should be implemented. We believed then. and we believe now. that the wiserrole of this Council in the present dispute is to indicate clearly what should he done. but not to try to lay down here and r. -IV how it must be done. 36. It is certainly a matter of regret and concern to the Council that the draft resolution which was submitted last Saturday by the representative of Liberia. and which won almost unanimous approval. has not been fully implemented. 37. The test of any proposaI which may be presented to this Councn is. so far as Her Majesty's Government is concerned, whether it is calculatedto advance a solution and to facilitate negotiations or to retard them. 38. It is not my intention to rake over the pasto The task is to find the elements of a solution. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom has neither been espousing the cause of one side orthe other. nor sitting with folded hands. without any thought of how it might be able to help. Such a dispute between two of our good friends is particularly distressing. We have been in touch with both Governments. simply in an effort to identify what divides them andto discover whether there is some common ground between them on which a reconciliation might be effected. l refer not only to theimmediate questions coveredby the resolution of 22 July but also to the more fundamental issues of sovereignty and control. 39. If this Council wishes to act constructively. it must attempt realistically to bring about the sort of circumstances. first. which will go as far as we can to reduce the tension in the area and so minimize the dangers of any resumption of conflict. and. secondly. which will bring the two sides together andenable them to discuss their differences peaceably. 40. In the view of my delegation. the resolutionwhich has this morningbeen submittedbythe representatives of the United Arab Republic. Liberia and Ceylon [Si 4904]. and the resolution which was submittedyesterday evening by the same delegations [S/4903]. are unlikely to have this effect. For this reason. my delegation will be unable to support them. 41. On the Qther hand, the draft resolution which has just been submitted by the representative of Turkey [S/4905]. in our view. appears at first sight to represent a more realistic approach to the situation. It would appear to coyer the two essential elementsj namely, a reaffirmation of the resolution which this

The Soviet delegation would like, at this stage of the debate, to make sorne observations on the three draft resolutions submitted for the Council's consideration. 43. A careful study of the texts of these resolutions and of the exchange of views to which they have given rise seems to us to indicate quite clearly that the Council-to compare this meeting with those which took place a week ago-is going over exactlythe same ground a second time. What happened at the earlier debates in the Council is happening again, at a different level and indifferent circumstances. Butwhathappened was unacceptable even then, for at that time, too, many delegations here, including that of the Soviet Union, were firmly urging the adoption of resolutions which might quickly put an end to French aggression in Tunisia and ensure the immediate evacuation of French troops from every part of that country's territory. Unfortunately, then as now, the Counciltookno more than a preliminary step, in its adoption of the resolution of 22 July, and, to the regret of my delegation and of other members of the Councilrepresenting Asian and African countries here, did not see its way clear to adopting the very modest proposaI which was put forward at that time and supported by the delegations of the United Arab Republic, CeylonandLiberia. If this was weakness on the part of the Council (and there is no doubt that the Council didshow weakness), and if this enabled France in the past week to strengthen its positions in Tunisia so that it could undertake further aggression-so that it could continue its aggression against the Tunisianpeople andprepare for further aggression-then it is aH the more unacceptable that the same process should now be repeated and that we should be witnessing the same manœuvres as were used at the earlier meetings of the Council, especially when we have heard the completely cynical statement of the French Government which flagrantly ignores the Council's will, even in the form in which it was expressed inthe preliminary resolution adopted on 22 July. It seems to us now that in view of this attitude, one which shows contempt for the entire United Nations, the Council must act far more energetically than it did on 22 July. And yet (1 say it once again, for the third time) we are continuing to follow the same pattern. We are beginning the second round, the second circuit in the same general direction. 44. We have three draft resolutions before us. The first draft resolution of Ceylon, Liberia and the'United Arab Republic [S/4903], proposes that France shouldbe asked to complywiththe resolution of 22 July, and that, for all the shortcomings of this draft resolution, -would he a step forward. The second draft resolution, which was submitted by Ceylon, Liberia, and the United Arab Republic [S/4904], proposes that France should he asked to enter immediately into negotiations with Tllnisia with a view to the rapid evacuation of French forces from Tunisia. Although this draft resolution does not specify the action which should be taken, 45. And now, with regard to the third draft, submitted for our consideration by Turkey [Si49051, when1spoke about a repetition of what happened here at the first meeting of the Council a week ago, 1 was thinking particularly of those ideas which we find again in almost identical form in this Turkish proposaI; in fact, the present draft and the draft submittedby the United States and United Kingdom delegations on 22 July are as alike, almost, as two drops of water. 46. We are not disposed to adopt the course recommended to us by the distinguished representative of Turkey, and shaH not enter into an assessment of the psychological aspect of what he describedas Turkey's "best intentions" to contribute to a peacefulsettlement of the situation resulting from France's aggressionin Tunisia. The road to hell, as you know, is paved with good intentions, and any attempt to enter into a psychological ll.ssessment of the intentions of delegations submitting one or another text is extremely risky. Consequently, although 1 personally should very much like to evaluate this aspect of the matter too, 1 shall refrain from psychologicai excursions andfrom an assessment of the intentions of the disting-l1ished representative of Turkey. 47. 1 shan turn my attention directly to the draft resolution of Turkey. The representative of Turkey said that his text was so self-explanatorythatit would not require clarification, and he devoted the major part of his speech to the purposes which this text was to serve. 1 shall, if 1 may, analyse the text and pursue this comparative analysis in two directions. 48. In the first place, 1 shan try to show that the text submitted to us today in document si4905 coincides almost entirely, in its fundamental, political aspects with the text whichwas submittedfor our consideration a week ago by the United States and United Kingdom [S/48791. From the fundamental, politicalpointofview it is virtually identical with that text as regards the important matter-that of the immediate evacuationof French armed forces from Tunisia. 49. The second Une of analysis which 1 shan follow, for you to consider, will consist in a comparison of the text submitted by Turkey with the two texts submitted by Ceylon, Liberia, and the United Arab Republic. 50. Here is the first comparison. No one, 1think, will deny that the key paragraph in the text now submitted by Turkey is operative paragraph 3, which reads as follows: "Urges the early opening of tlif;gotiations for a peaceful resolution of their differences, including a definitive settlement of the question ofBizerta, having due regard for Tunisian sovereignty." And here is paragraph 3 as it appears in the draft resolution-which was not adopted by the Security 52. The reference to Bizerta, too, is not a new element in the Turkish draft, for it is perfectly clear that the United States and United Kingdom draft refers to the region of Bizerta and the events which took place there in connexion with the French aggression. 53. Thus, like operative paragraph 3 ofthe oldUnited States draft, paragraph 3 of the draft resolution submitted by Turkey proposes that the question of the future ofBizerta shouldform the subject oînegotiations between Tunisia and France. But this is the very 1 proposaI on which the French Government has so strongly insisted in its document of 26 July [S/4894 and Add.l, sect. m, in its statement yesterday [Si 4897] and in all the statements made by the French representative here in the Council, urging that the question of the "differences", as France calls its aggression in Tunisia, the question of the so-called differences between Tunisia and France should be the subject of negotiations between those two countries alone and maintaining, as is clear from the latest French documents, that it is not the concern of the United Nations. 54. The political tendency of this proposaI is thus perfectly clear: it coincides with that put forward by tho French Government, and that Tunisia cannot accept. The formula itself, the settling of differences between the two sides is, to put it very mildly, entirely out of keeping with the situation which actually exists in Tunisia, a situation resulting from France's attack on that country. This is not a question of differences; we cannot use the word "differences" ta describe a divergency of positions in which Tunisia demands that aIl French soldiers should be removed from Tunisian territory while France, in defiance of the principles of international law and of its obligations under the Charter, says that it wants to retain its soldiers on Tunisian soil. 55. The question is not one of differences but of aggress:i.on, and therefore the use of these formulr.a, 56. The analysis 1 have just made seems to me to prove conclusively that what we have to contend with is a profound political divergence, a divergence in principle and in the very approach to the matter. 57. While the United States and United Kingdom draft and the "new" Turkish draft do not touch upon the question of the recognition of the principle ofthe evacuation of French forces from Tunisian territory, the draft resolution presented by Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic [S/4904] (Iturnnowtothe second part of the analysis 1 promised to make), although insufficiently strong in form, nevertheless contains in principle a recognition by the Council of the need for the speedy evacuatiori of French armed forces from Tunisia, for in the second paragraph of the draft resolution the Council "Invites France to enter immediately into uegotiations with Tunisia with a view to the rapidevacuationof Frenchforces from Tunisia". No amount of words about the recognition of Tunisian sovereignty, as in the Turkish draft, or references to the fact that the negotiations should be in accordance with the Charter, as in the old United States-United Kingdom draft, can change or weaken the significance of the short and simple phrase used inethe draft submitted by Ceylon, Liberia, and the United Arab Republic, where it speaks of recognition of the principle of "the rapid evacuation of French forces from Tunisia". Here the difference is not one ofdrafting; it is a fundamental political difference. 58. That is why, justasitcouldnotsupport the United States and United Kingdom draft resolution, the USSR delegation cannot support, and indeed firmly refuses its support to, the draft resolution submitted by the Turkish delegation [S/4905]. We shaH vote for the draft of Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic [S/4904]. We shaH also support the other tèxt of Ceylon, Liberia, and the United Arab Republic [Si 4903]. 59. Allow me in conclusion to point out another important contradiction and difference of principle-and not merely a drafting difference-between the draft resolution S/4903 submitted by Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic and operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of the resolution submitted for our attention by the Turkish delegation. While the text proposed by Liberia, the United Arab Republic and Ceylon, in its operative paragraph l, stresses the fact that the Council's resolution of 22 July has not been complied with by France and that this situation continues to represent a serious threat to international peace and security, 'operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Turkish draft, which correspond to operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution of the three Powers, do exactly what we noted was done in the text submitted by the United States and United Kingdom. As in that text so 61. 1 beg you, distinguished colleagues, to ask yourselves who benefits from these formulre which set an equal value on the actions of the aggressor and his victim. Tt would not surprise me in the slightest if perhaps-I make no assertion, 1 am no prophet-if even France itself, which launched and is continuing the aggression against Tunisia, were unwilling to vote for such formulre. Tt would not surprise me because these phrases, in my opinion, bring us no nearer a satisfactory solution of the very acute situation, constituting a threat to peace in the North Mrican and Mediterranean area, which has arisen as a result of the aggression launched by France against the Tunisian people. 62. This is why the draft resolution submitted by Ceylon, Liberia, and the United Arab Republic, in that it requests France immediately to comply with the resolution adopted by the Council on 22 July, is basically better-it is not merely a question of drafting-than the proposaI the Turkish delegation is now making. 63. 1 believe that it is the Council's duty, as the minimum measures it can take in present conditions, to adopt both the drafts submitted by the three delegations representing Ceylon, Liberia, and the United Arab Republic in the Council. The delegation of the Soviet Union appeals to members of the Council to do this. The meeting rose at 1.00 p.m. AFRICA/AFRIQUE BELGIUM/BELGIQUE: ET MESSAGERIES 14-22, rue du Persil, CZECHOSLOVAKIA/TCHÉCOSLOVAQUIE: èESKOSLOVENSKY Narodni Trida 9, Praha DENMARK/DANEMARK: EJNAR MUNKSGAARD, N>irregade 6, K>ibenhavn, FINLAND/FINLANDE: AKATEEMINEN KIRJAKAUPPA 2 Keskuskatu, Helsinki. 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