S/PV.9666 Security Council

In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Germany and the Islamic Republic of Iran to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs; and His Excellency Mr. Stavros Lambrinidis, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2024/435, which contains the text of a letter dated 4 June 2024 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council. At this meeting, the Council will hear briefings by Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, His Excellency Mr. Stavros Lambrinidis and Ambassador Vanessa Frazier, Permanent Representative of Malta, in her capacity as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I now give the floor to Ms. DiCarlo. Ms. DiCarlo: I thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to brief the Council on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). As the Secretary-General stated in his report (S/2024/471), restoring the Plan and resolution 2231 (2015) to their full and effective implementation unfortunately remains elusive. The United States has not returned to the Plan, nor has it lifted or waived the unilateral sanctions it reimposed after its withdrawal from the Plan in May 2018, or extended waivers regarding the trade in oil with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Islamic Republic of Iran, also, has not reversed any of the steps inconsistent with the nuclear- related commitments that it has taken since May 2019. During the reporting period, the Secretary-General received several letters from JCPOA participants conveying their diverging views on the current impasse. In a joint letter dated 3 June (S/2024/429), the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom stated that Iran’s nuclear escalation had “hollowed out the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, significantly reducing its non-proliferation value”. Those countries restated their concerns about Iran’s violations of the JCPOA, specifically those related to the country’s increasing stockpile of enriched uranium and manufacture and use of advanced centrifuges. They stressed that the current state of Iran’s nuclear programme, coupled with recent public statements made by Iran regarding its technical capabilities to produce nuclear weapons, were especially concerning given the expected termination of resolution 2231 (2015) in October 2025. The Permanent Representative of Iran responded in a letter dated 5 June (S/2024/439) that his country’s reduction of nuclear-related commitments, following the United States withdrawal from the JCPOA, was in compliance with the terms of the Plan. The Permanent Representative wrote that France, Germany and the United Kingdom had failed to uphold their sanctions- lifting commitments related to transition day. He described the concern raised by those countries regarding the termination of resolution 2231 (2015) as misleading and provocative. Further, the Secretary-General also received a letter from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation (S/2024/467), as well as a joint letter from the Permanent Representatives of China, Iran and the Russian Federation (S/2024/466), both dated 12 June. In their view, the United States withdrawal from the Plan and reimposition of unilateral sanctions, as well as the decision of some Member States to maintain national sanctions after transition day, were the cause of the ongoing deterioration of the JCPOA. Those representatives recalled their collective efforts to restore the Plan and noted that a fully operating JCPOA would serve as assurance to the international community. Those letters were not received in time to be included in the Secretary-General’s report. In its most recent report, dated 27 May 2024, the International Atomic Energy Agency observed again that, regrettably, its verification and monitoring continues to be “seriously affected by the cessation of Iran’s implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA”. Furthermore, while the Agency had not been able to verify the total stockpile of enriched uranium in the country since February 2021, it estimated that the Islamic Republic of Iran maintains a total enriched uranium stockpile 30 times the amount allowable under the JCPOA. That includes increased quantities of uranium enriched to 20 per cent and 60 per cent. Such a stockpile of enriched uranium and level of enrichment remain very concerning. The Agency also issued an ad hoc report, in which it described Iran’s intention to commence previously declared enrichment activities in excess of its JCPOA limits. That update was circulated to the Council after the Secretary-General’s report had been finalized. I would like to turn now to the restrictive measures set out in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). At this juncture, the only restrictive measures that remain in effect pertain to nuclear activities and transfers. Those measures will remain in place until October 2025, unless otherwise directed by the Council. No information regarding actions alleged to be inconsistent with paragraph 2 of annex B was brought to the attention of the Secretariat during the reporting period. Meanwhile, there were again no new proposals submitted to the procurement channel in the past six months in this reporting cycle. The Security Council, however, received 14 notifications regarding the nuclear-related restrictive measures for certain activities consistent with the Plan. The decision to renew waivers for nuclear non-proliferation projects foreseen in the Plan and the nuclear-related provisions in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) is under review by the United States. In conclusion, I would like to echo the Secretary- General’s call for participants in the Plan and the United States to pursue all possible avenues for dialogue and cooperation. In the current climate, it is crucial to prioritize multilateralism and diplomacy and to set a course that promotes peace and security. I would also like to thank Her Excellency Mrs. Vanessa Frazier for her leadership as Facilitator for resolution 2231 (2015) and the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission for our continued cooperation.

I thank Ms. DiCarlo for her briefing. I now give the floor to Mr. Lambrinidis. Mr. Lambrinidis: It is an honour to have the opportunity to address the Security Council on behalf of the High Representative of the European Union (EU) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Mr. Josep Borrell Fontelles, in his capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). I would also like to thank Secretary-General António Guterres and the Secretariat for their work related to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), and Malta as the Facilitator of resolution 2231 (2015). We take note of the seventeenth report of the Secretary- General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2024/471). Ensuring that Iran does not acquire or develop a nuclear weapon is a key security priority for the European Union. Iran’s nuclear programme today cannot be seen in isolation from regional developments. The risk of a nuclear proliferation crisis in the region is increasing as a result of Iran’s nuclear trajectory. We still believe that diplomacy is the best way to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) remains the sole impartial and independent international organization mandated by the Security Council to monitor and verify the implementation of Iran’s nuclear non-proliferation commitments under the JCPOA. We fully support the IAEA’s monitoring and verification of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments and, at the same time, express our strong concern about Iran’s lack of cooperation with the Agency. IAEA reports are clear. Iran continues to depart from its JCPOA commitments and to irreversibly gain knowledge. Iran’s accumulation of highly enriched uranium, its continuously growing stockpile of enriched uranium and the expansion of its nuclear enrichment infrastructure are alarming. Such actions carry very significant proliferation-related risks and raise grave concerns about Iran’s intentions. Moreover, Iran’s consistent lack of cooperation with the IAEA is affecting the Agency’s ability to carry out its monitoring duties and impedes it from providing assurances that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. The IAEA has now reached a point where it has lost the continuity of knowledge as regards several key components of the nuclear programme of Iran, which would make the resumption of diplomatic efforts even more challenging. Iran’s announcement of its intention to further increase its installed enrichment capacity, as reported by the IAEA on 13 June, further increased our concerns. If implemented, those actions would constitute a significant escalation by Iran with regard to its nuclear programme and capabilities, and a further departure from Iran’s commitments under the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). We call on Iran not to proceed with the implementation of its plans, as that would undoubtedly put at risk any future nuclear diplomacy. We continue to recognize that Iran has faced and continues to face very serious negative economic consequences following the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and the reimposition by the United States of previously lifted unilateral sanctions. The United States has also imposed additional sanctions linked to the nuclear programme. At the same time, Iran’s nuclear programme is now more advanced than ever and without sufficient monitoring and verification by the IAEA. Regarding other aspects of JCPOA implementation, we note that the procurement channel remains ready to receive proposals. It was designed as a transparency and confidence-building mechanism to give assurances that transfers of nuclear and dual-use goods and services are fully in line with resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA. We are extremely worried about Iran’s military support for Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, including through deliveries of drones, which was provided in violation of the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015). In view of that situation and of Iran’s support to non-State armed groups in the Middle East and the Red Sea region, and following the Iranian drone and missile attacks against Israel on 13 April 2024, the EU decided on 14 May 2024 to expand its restrictive measures on uncrewed aerial vehicles to include the transfer of missiles. We call on the Government of Iran to stop military cooperation with a country that is violating the Charter of the United Nations. The EU will continue to respond to that, as necessary. In particular, any ballistic missile transfer from Iran to Russia will be met with a strong reaction. The world is facing a range of severe crises. In that context, it is important to keep in mind that the deeply troubling situation in the Middle East makes it even more urgent to find ways to stabilize the region — an effort of which the JCPOA should be an essential part. With that in mind, we call on all remaining parties to the JCPOA and on the United States to sustain dialogue in order to address without delay the Iranian nuclear programme. Nuclear diplomacy must be restored. The Coordinator has continued to be in touch with all JCPOA participants and the United States in order to preserve the space for nuclear diplomacy, based on the framework of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). A diplomatic solution remains the only way to sustainably address the Iran nuclear issue. We urge Iran to resume full cooperation with the IAEA and to refrain from any more steps away from its JCPOA commitments as a first and minimum measure. De-escalation steps on the nuclear front will help restore trust. They could recreate an environment conducive to the resumption of negotiations. It has now been two years since the High Representative put forward a compromise text laying out the necessary steps that, at that time, were needed for the United States to return to the JCPOA and for Iran to resume the full implementation of its commitments. We regret that Iran has not made the necessary decisions to return to its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. That compromise text is still on the table as a potential point of departure for any renewed effort, although the new situation as regards Iran’s nuclear programme and sanctions against Iran will need to be taken into account in any future talks. Nevertheless, the High Representative remains ready and will spare no effort to facilitate the dialogue between all JCPOA participants and the United States, in line with the call made by the Secretary-General in the report before us today, at the right time.

I thank Mr. Lambrinidis for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Frazier. Mrs. Frazier: I will now speak in my capacity as the Security Council’s appointed Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The seventeenth Facilitator’s report (see S/2024/476) was approved by the members of the Council on 19 June. I would like to thank all Council members for their cooperation and constructive engagement in the process and for their spirit of compromise and flexibility. This is my third report as the Council’s appointed Facilitator, and I am grateful for the Council’s continued support. I am also very pleased that we were able to put forth the report to the Council. The report provides a factual account of the activities that took place relating to the 2231 format of the Security Council, covering the period from 15 December 2023 to 19 June 2024. It includes five subsections, namely, the summaries of activities, monitoring the implementation of the resolution, relevant communications, key aspects of the workings of the procurement channel, as well as transparency, outreach and guidance. Members may refer to the report for details, but I would like to mention several key aspects. First, one meeting of the Council in the 2231 format was held during the reporting period. The meeting was held on 18 June, and representatives of the Security Council discussed the findings and recommendations contained in the seventeenth report of the Secretary- General (S/2024/471) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), prior to its public release. Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo already referred to those points in her statement. Secondly, during the reporting period, a total of 22 notes were circulated within the 2231 format. In addition, a total of 16 official communications were sent to Member States and the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission, and a total of 15 communications from Member States and the Coordinator were received. Among the communications circulated were the two regular quarterly reports issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in February and May and ad hoc reports in December 2023 and June 2024. The key aspects of those Agency reports are duly reflected in my report. The IAEA plays an important role in the verification and monitoring of nuclear activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, as requested under resolution 2231 (2015). The IAEA’s work provides confidence for the international community that the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran is for exclusively peaceful purposes, in accordance with the modalities set out in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The report of the Director General plays a significant role in that regard. Thirdly, I report that no new proposals were submitted to the Security Council through the procurement channel during the reporting period. The procurement channel represents a key transparency and confidence-building mechanism under the JCPOA. It remains operational and the Procurement Working Group stands ready to review proposals. As stated by the speakers before me, the JCPOA, as endorsed by the Council through resolution 2231 (2015), is the best available option to ensure that the Iranian nuclear programme remains exclusively peaceful. While recognizing the challenging environment that the 2231 format is facing, I believe that, through dialogue and multilateralism, we can make the utmost effort to ensure that the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015) are implemented effectively, while building on mutual trust and cooperation. Finally, I would like to state that, as Facilitator, I will do my utmost to support the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA, which it underpins. My team and I will work closely with all Council members in an impartial and transparent manner to meet our shared responsibility. I look forward to continuing and strengthening our dialogue and cooperation ahead.

I thank Ambassador Frazier for her briefing. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements.

I thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and Ambassador Lambrinidis, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, for their briefings. I also thank Ambassador Frazier for her work as Facilitator. As we reflect today on the conclusions of the report of the Secretary-General (S/2024/471), Iran continues to deny the international community visibility of its nuclear activities. It obstructs International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) efforts to resolve outstanding safeguards issues and wilfully hampers IAEA verification and monitoring activities. We should not be shy about condemning that kind of destabilizing and dangerous conduct. Instead of demonstrating to the world that its nuclear programme is meant only for peaceful purposes, Iran has expanded its programme and stirred up speculation regarding its intentions. IAEA reports from 27 May and 13 June show that Iran is determined to expand its nuclear programme in ways that have no credible civilian purpose. Iran should take actions that build international confidence and de-escalate tensions, not continue nuclear activities that pose grave proliferation risks. The United States is prepared to use all means necessary to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. We nevertheless remain fully committed to resolving international concerns surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme through diplomacy. The international community will face an inflection point in October 2025, when the Council could close consideration of Iran’s nuclear issue under resolution 2231 (2015). It is important to recall, though, that when the Council originally adopted resolution 2231 (2015), the objective was to help to establish the international community’s confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. Given Iran’s actions, we are far from that point. Iran’s actions suggest that it is not interested in verifiably demonstrating that its nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. Meanwhile, Iran continues to fuel conflict and instability in the Middle East, blatantly disregarding the Council’s resolutions by providing weapons to its regional proxies, including in Yemen and Lebanon. In fact, Iran’s own State-affiliated media has touted its country’s supply of prohibited ballistic missile technology to the Houthis — something that United Nations experts have concluded as well and published in their reports. All the while, the Iranian Government sends letters to the Secretary-General calling those allegations “unfounded” and “based on falsehood and misinformation”. The Security Council must be clear and united in condemning this brazen, destabilizing activity. When Iran flagrantly defies the Security Council repeatedly, without consequence, and ignores the published concerns of the IAEA, it undermines the credibility and authority of this organ, which is charged with advancing international peace and security.

I thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo and the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, Ambassador Lambrinidis, for their briefings. Through Ambassador Lambrinidis, I acknowledge the European Union’s will to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). I also thank the Permanent Representative of Malta, Ambassador Vanessa Frazier, for the information provided in her capacity as Facilitator of the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). It is clear that the JCPOA is stalled as a result of unilateral actions unrelated to the agreement endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 2231 (2015). Transparent dialogue and cooperation in good faith, as Ecuador has repeated on several occasions, is always the best way to ensure results, accountability and the potential revitalization of the JCPOA, whose implementation remains the best option for dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue. Ecuador reaffirms its support for the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and stresses the integrity, impartiality, objectivity and independence of its technical teams. Only IAEA supervision will restore the international community’s confidence in the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. The IAEA Director General can therefore count on our support for his mandated verification, surveillance and monitoring efforts. Similarly, restoring trust among all actors is indispensable. The Iranian authorities are responsible for full and effective cooperation under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its Safeguards Agreement. In that vein, I emphasize the importance of the content of the resolution, on the Safeguards Agreement in connection with the NPT concluded with the Islamic Republic of Iran, adopted on 5 June 2024 by the IAEA Board of Governors, of which Ecuador is a member. In conclusion, I reiterate my country’s support for all efforts to rebuild bridges in search of a diplomatic solution in the framework of the full and effective implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

I thank Under-Secretary- General DiCarlo, His Excellency Mr. Lambrinidis and Ambassador Frazier for their informative briefings. Six months have passed since we last discussed Iran’s non-proliferation agenda in the Chamber (see S/PV.9511). Unfortunately, the situation remains tense. Japan is deeply concerned that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)-related verification and monitoring activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have been seriously affected by the cessation of Iran’s implementation of its nuclear- related commitments under the JCPOA. IAEA Director General Grossi’s recent report is highly alarming, as it clearly states that the Agency has lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the production and inventory of centrifuges and rotors, among other things. Japan is also extremely worried about the steady increase of Iran’s stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and the ongoing installation of infrastructure for advanced centrifuge cascades. We share the Director General’s deep regret that Iran has yet to reverse its decision to withdraw the designations of experienced inspectors. Japan reiterates its support for the non-proliferation objectives of the JCPOA. Iran needs to ensure that the nature of its nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful, and the IAEA’s verification and monitoring activities are essential elements to that end. We therefore once again urge Iran to fully implement its JCPOA commitments, including transparency measures, and to re-apply the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Japan welcomes the efforts by Director General Grossi to engage with Iran, including his visit to Tehran and Isfahan in May. We note that the Director General welcomes Iran’s agreement that the joint statement of 4 March 2023 continues to provide a framework for cooperation with the Agency and for addressing the outstanding safeguards issues. We strongly hope that the planned technical consultations will take place soon and that Iran will seriously engage with the Agency’s proposals. Those consultations could yield concrete outcomes towards resolving all outstanding issues and pave the way for wider arrangements among the parties. The Middle East is facing an extremely volatile and dangerous situation. Further escalation is not in the interest of the international community. We urge all parties concerned to seriously explore more avenues for diplomacy in order to restore the deal for the sake of international peace and security. Japan has had a number of meetings with Iran, including at the highest level, at which we directly conveyed our concerns and exchanged candid views on a variety of issues, including nuclear-related ones. We will continue to do our necessary part based on our traditional relationship with Iran and other key stakeholders.

Before talking about the agenda item of this meeting, I wish to strongly condemn the terrorist attack that struck the Republic of Dagestan of the Russian Federation on 23 June. We extend our sincere condolences to the injured, the bereaved families, the Russian Government and its people. I wish to start by thanking Under-Secretary- General DiCarlo, Ambassador Lambrinidis, Head of the Delegation of the European Union (EU) to the United Nations, and Ambassador Frazier, Permanent Representative of Malta, for their briefings. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is a major achievement of multilateral diplomacy, endorsed by the Security Council. Currently, negotiations to restore its implementation remain deadlocked, and the Iranian nuclear situation is at a crucial juncture. It is the shared wish of the international community that negotiations achieve an early breakthrough so as to inject positive energy and bring new hope to the conflict- and crisis-ridden region of the Middle East and to a world rife with uncertainties and instability. I wish to share four observations in that regard. First, in furtherance of the overarching goal of political and diplomatic settlement, parties must act with a greater sense of urgency, demonstrate a positive attitude and step up dialogue and engagement in order to restart negotiations and resume the JCPOA’s complete and effective implementation without delay. The European Union, in its capacity as Coordinator, has used its good offices for the resumption of negotiations. We encourage the EU to maintain its vital coordinating role. It was the United States’ unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA and its ongoing maximum pressure against Iran that have perpetuated the Iranian nuclear crisis to this day. The United States should shoulder its responsibility, show goodwill and propose concrete measures to create conditions conducive to the Plan’s prompt return to the right track. Secondly, the unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States against Iran are not in keeping with the fundamental principles of fairness and impartiality. They are detrimental to mutually beneficial cooperation among countries, run counter to international fairness and justice and severely undermine international law and international relations. We urge the United States to swiftly lift its illegal sanctions against Iran, as well as its long-arm jurisdiction measures against third party entities and individuals. That will help Iran regain its rightful access to trade and economic activities, creating the conditions for normalized trade and economic cooperation between Iran and other parties, offering incentives to the Iranian side and paving the way for future negotiations. Thirdly, it is necessary to foster a positive, favourable atmosphere for negotiation. It has been repeatedly borne out by facts that pressuring Iran will not help the matter. Communication and dialogue is the right path. International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Grossi has been engaging with Iran, including through his visit in May. That helps to build mutual trust between the Agency and Iran and facilitates the Agency’s monitoring activities on the ground. However, certain countries have pushed the Agency to adopt resolutions to exert pressure on Iran. That is not a constructive approach and only escalates animosity, provokes confrontation, damages mutual trust and further complicates the situation. Fourthly, there is a need to seek a proper settlement to regional security issues. The Iranian nuclear issue bears on the Middle East situation. Safeguarding the JCPOA contributes to regional peace and stability and aligns with the common interest of the countries of the region. The regional countries concerned must uphold the concept of common security and take seriously each other’s legitimate and reasonable security concerns in order to mitigate tensions through dialogue, build mutual trust and garner consensus, thereby laying the groundwork for durable peace in the region. That said, certain countries should stop exploiting the Iranian nuclear issue in order to advance their own geopolitical agendas. They should refrain from linking the Iranian nuclear negotiations with other issues. Doing so will only disrupt negotiations on the agreement’s resumed implementation and undermine diplomatic efforts to address the Iranian nuclear issue. Safeguarding the JCPOA means upholding multilateralism, maintaining international fairness and justice and preserving the authority of the Council. China has constructively participated in the negotiations to restore its implementation and has played a constructive role in forging consensus. Going forward, China will continue to work with all parties to ensure an early agreement on restoring the Plan’s implementation, to push for a political settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue, to safeguard the international non-proliferation regime and to strive tirelessly for peace and stability in the Middle East.

I thank you, Mr. President, for convening this briefing. I also thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, Ambassador Stavros Lambrinidis and Ambassador Vanessa Frazier for their very interesting and insightful briefings. Sierra Leone would like to take its first opportunity to engage on this agenda item to register our appreciation to the participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), in the light of the current situation, for their continued commitment to a diplomatic solution in order to ensure the peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. At the outset, allow me to reaffirm Sierra Leone’s unwavering commitment to global peace and security. As a Member State dedicated to the principles of non-proliferation, we firmly support all international and diplomatic efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We welcome the seventeenth report of the Secretary-General (S/2024/471), the seventeenth six- month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2024/476) and the seventeenth report of the Joint Commission to the Security Council on the status of the Procurement Working Group’s decisions and on any implementation issues (see S/2024/435), which covers the period from 6 December 2023 to 31 May 2024. Having heard the view of the Secretary-General, Sierra Leone is deeply concerned that restoring the JCPOA remains elusive, as there has been no reversal of steps by the relevant party since May 2019, thus signalling an increase in their nuclear programme, in contravention of their International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) commitments. On the other hand, we also note that some unilateral sanctions, reimposed in 2018 by one party, have been neither lifted nor waived. In that vein, we take note of the letter dated 3 June 2024 (S/2024/429) from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In the letter, they state their observations, concerns and claims pertaining to nuclear escalation, extensive violations of the JCPOA, the irreversibility of gains by Iran and the difficulty of returning to full implementation of the JCPOA. We also take note of the letter dated 5 June 2024 (S/2024/439) from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the joint statement delivered on 4 June 2024 by the Permanent Representatives of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation, circulated to the Security Council on 13 June 2024, in response to the observations, concerns and claims set out in document S/2024/429. Sierra Leone is of the firm view that the reports of the Secretary-General, the Facilitator’s ad-hoc reports on 26 December 2023 and 13 June 2024, as well as regular reports on 26 February 2024 (S/2024/376) and 27 May 2024 on the IAEA’s verification and monitoring activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of resolution 2231 (2015), provide a fair assessment of the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) since the issuance of the sixteenth report (S/2023/975) on 15 December 2023. Sierra Leone commends the Secretary-General, the Facilitator and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency and his team for their work and extensive reports. Both the February and May regular reports noted that between 16 January 2016 and 8 May 2019, the IAEA verified and monitored the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its nuclear-related commitments in accordance with the JCPOA. Sierra Leone also notes that the reports brought to light the grave concern that the IAEA’s JCPOA-related verification and monitoring has been seriously affected by the cessation of Iran’s implementation of its nuclear- related commitments under the JCPOA. According to the reports, the situation has been exacerbated by the decision of the Islamic Republic of Iran to remove all the Agency’s JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring equipment and to halt the provisional application of the Additional Protocol. As such, the Agency has not been able to perform JCPOA-related verification and monitoring activities for more than three years in relation to centrifuge production and inventory. What is deeply concerning is that the Agency has not been able to verify the total stockpile of enriched uranium in the Islamic Republic of Iran since February 2021, but estimates a huge excess of enriched stockpiles that far exceeds the JCPOA limit of enrichment levels. That is particularly concerning given the upcoming termination of resolution 2231 (2015) in October 2025. We also note with concern from the May 2024 report that the Islamic Republic of Iran has yet to reverse its September 2023 decision to withdraw designations for several experienced Agency inspectors. We re-echo the call of the Director General in requesting the Islamic Republic of Iran to reverse that decision in the context of the ongoing consultations between the Agency and Iran, as doing so is essential to fully enabling the Agency to effectively conduct its verification activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran. As there are reports of extensive violations that raise questions on the irreversibility and non-proliferation capability of the JCPOA, a return to the full and effective implementation of the Plan will, without a doubt, require mature political will. We urgently call for a halt in nuclear escalation by the Islamic Republic of Iran and for the continuation of its peaceful nuclear energy programme, in cooperation with the IAEA. We commend the JCPOA Coordinator for his continued effort to consult with the Plan’s participants and the United States of America on addressing developments regarding the Plan of Action, with a view to the possible return by the United States to the Plan and to ensure the full and effective implementation of the Plan by all. Sierra Leone joins the Secretary- General in urging the United States and the other participants to pursue all available avenues for dialogue and cooperation. We note that no new proposals were submitted to the Security Council during the reporting period. The 52 proposals submitted thus far since implementation day have been processed as follows: 37 were approved, five were not approved and 10 were withdrawn. We commend the JCPOA Joint Commission and the participants in the Procurement Working Group for continuing their work even after the withdrawal of the United States and for their commitment to upholding the integrity of the procurement channel and fully supporting the continuation of its functioning as a transparency and confidence-building instrument. We join the Facilitator in advocating for the full utilization of the procurement channel. We recall resolution 2231 (2015) and call upon all States to refrain from any action that undermines the implementation of commitments under the JCPOA. In conclusion, Sierra Leone reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the principles of disarmament, non-proliferation and international peace and security. We call upon all Member States, regional organizations and international organizations to take all appropriate action to fully support the implementation of the JCPOA.

Mozambique thanks Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, and His Excellency Mr. Stavros Lambrinidis, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, for their important and comprehensive briefings. We extend our appreciation to Ambassador Vanessa Frazier, Permanent Representative of Malta and Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), for her dedicated engagement on this issue. We acknowledge the presence of the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the representative of Germany in this meeting. From the briefings and the reports before us (see S/2024/435 and S/2024/471), we note with regret that, since the Security Council last convened to address this topic on 18 December 2023 (see S/PV.9511), no substantive progress has been made in the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). That lack of progress demonstrates the need for the participants in the JCPOA and the international community as a whole to renew and redouble our efforts aimed at a return to the full and effective implementation of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). We strongly believe that sustained dialogue and cooperation can make a difference in ensuring that international peace and security are not jeopardized by the prospect of nuclear proliferation in an already sensitive and fragile regional and international context. We are aware of the existing challenges to the full implementation of the JCPOA. However, we reiterate our call on all signatory parties to recommit to this important and noble cause. To that end, we continue to underscore the importance of renewed confidence-building measures, the effective use of every single diplomatic channel, constructive dialogue and multilateral engagement and an approach that can ensure cooperative and mutual benefits. We defend the belief that the United Nations must be at the centre of those common efforts. Mozambique has always advocated the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We believe that they intrinsically contravene the concept of our collective security. Their potential use anywhere and by anyone would be catastrophic for all of humankind. Since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, for almost eight decades, the international community has been able to uphold the principle against the use of weapons of mass destruction. Their unparalleled and devastating impact on human beings and the environment is a stark reminder of why the preservation of peace must continue to guide our collective efforts. Article 11 of the Charter of the United Nations prescribes that the General Assembly: “may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments”. In that context, we believe that the principle of the general and complete disarmament of all States must be upheld by all peace-loving nations as the sole and absolute guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons.

I thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo, Ambassador Frazier and Ambassador Lambrinidis for their briefings. Switzerland is disappointed by and concerned about the state of the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The latter was, however, rightly considered a success story of multilateral diplomacy in the service of non-proliferation in 2015. Switzerland has repeatedly expressed its deep concern about both the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and the various measures taken by Iran. In particular, Switzerland deplores the fact that despite the will shown by most of the parties to negotiate a rapid return to the JCPOA in 2021, no progress has been made. We still face the risk of a regional conflagration. Maintaining this important element of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and of international security would nevertheless be in our common interest. Consequently, the rapid and full implementation by all parties of their obligations is imperative and urgent, particularly as the expiry date of resolution 2231 (2015) is just over a year away, in October 2025. Reviving the prospect of implementing resolution 2231 (2015) and returning to the JCPOA depends on three aspects. First, the most recent report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) raises many questions about the overall increase in Iran’s stocks of enriched uranium, the installation of new centrifuges and the difficulties encountered by the Agency in verifying Iran’s nuclear programme. However, in order to reassure the international community of the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, the Iranian authorities must cooperate rigorously, transparently and unequivocally with the IAEA. More than a year after the joint declaration of 4 March 2023, no progress has been made, which is very disappointing. The commitments made under that agreement, the JCPOA and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons must be fully respected by Iran, without delay. Secondly, we are particularly concerned about substantiated indications of the transfer of drones from Iran to third countries, such as Russia and Yemen, and of ballistic missiles to the latter. We stress that, until 18 October 2023, any transfer of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology listed under the Missile Technology Control Regime constituted a violation of resolution 2231 (2015). The recent developments in the region have underlined the extent to which such transfers can contribute to the escalation of conflicts. We also regret Iran’s development and testing of ballistic missiles, which is inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). Finally, the state of the JCPOA reminds us that urgent diplomatic efforts are needed to prevent it from collapsing completely. It is significant that the Secretary- General recommends nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament as key actions in his New Agenda for Peace. It is through the negotiation and maintenance of such norms that the true cornerstone of the multilateral framework — trust — is built. We hope that talks will resume and enable the parties involved to remember the interest we all have in resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. To ensure a sustainable solution, political détente must go hand in hand with a return to compliance with the obligations and the spirit of the JCPOA. The Council must find a common voice on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation. Switzerland has hosted critical stages in the negotiations and now stands ready to facilitate any diplomatic solution aimed at sustaining the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

I wish to thank Under- Secretary-General DiCarlo and Ambassador Lambrinidis, Head of the Delegation of the European Union (EU) to the United Nations, as well as our Maltese colleague, Ambassador Frazier, in her capacity as Facilitator, for their valuable insights. I also want to welcome the representatives of Iran and Germany to the Chamber. It remains a great concern for my country that Iran decided to stop the implementation of the transparency measures envisaged by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). When, in addition, a decision was made to remove all JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring equipment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the full oversight of Iran’s nuclear programme was rendered impossible. Without the Additional Protocol and with the JCPOA not being fully implemented, it is becoming increasingly challenging to confirm the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. For us, that is very concerning. Our concerns are exacerbated by the latest developments. According to most recent IAEA reports, Iran is in the midst of significantly expanding its enrichment capacities. In addition, its stockpiles of enriched uranium drastically exceed JCPOA limitations. The increase in highly enriched uranium is also substantial, which is especially troubling. At the same time, we lack an explanation of how that highly enriched uranium can be used for civilian purposes. With those concerns in mind, Slovenia calls on Iran to reverse those actions and refrain from any further escalatory steps. Until a solution for the JCPOA is identified, Iran’s full cooperation with the IAEA remains crucial. I would like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation for the IAEA’s objective and relentless work on the issue. Slovenia fully supports the work of the Agency and commends its professionalism in that regard. Slovenia still views the JCPOA as perhaps the most substantial achievement of multilateralism of the past decade. It proved that multilateral diplomacy can work and provide solutions to major international security challenges. It is a robust non-proliferation deal and an important element for the region’s stability. However, since the United States’ withdrawal and since Iran began to implement the so-called remedial measures, the JCPOA regime has taken some hard blows. As the JCPOA termination day is less than a year and a half away, it is time to start thinking of the day after. We were always well aware that the size and unclear nature of Iran’s nuclear programme presented challenges that the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement simply could not fully address. That is even more true today than in the years leading up to the adoption of the JCPOA. What shape a new solution to the Iranian nuclear issue will take is impossible to say. What we do know is that we will need it very soon.

I would like to thank Ms. DiCarlo and the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) for their briefings. For more than five years, Iran has violated its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Over the past six months, those violations have continued and worsened. The report published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 27 May paints a worrisome picture. Iran has now accumulated a stock of enriched uranium more than 30 times larger than the limits authorized under the agreement. Iran is continuing enrichment activities at rates that clearly exceed the limits defined in the agreement, and which have no credible civilian justification. While Iran continues to strip the agreement of its meaning, it refuses to cooperate with the IAEA in a substantive manner. Iran has continued to place restrictions on the verification activities of the Agency, which has lost continuity of knowledge on whole sections of the Iranian programme, and can therefore provide no assurance of its exclusively peaceful nature. In addition, Iran has recently made a number of extremely worrisome statements referring to its technical capacity to assemble nuclear weapons and a possible change in its alleged nuclear doctrine. Such statements run counter to Iran’s commitment under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action not to  — under any circumstances  — seek to obtain, develop or acquire nuclear weapons. They also contravene Iran’s obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Faced with that alarming situation, France — together with its E3 partners, Germany and the United Kingdom  — is continuing its efforts to find a diplomatic solution and to address Iran’s broken commitments. In January 2020, in response to Iran’s failure to honour its commitments, the E3 members activated the dispute settlement mechanism provided for in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. We have been working within that framework for almost four years. We also held talks in 2021 and 2022 that led to proposed agreements to enable the United States to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and Iran to fully comply with its commitments. Iran chose to reject those opportunities by making demands that went beyond the scope of the agreement. In October, the E3 decided, with our partners, not to lift some of the sanctions that were due to expire. Given Iran’s ongoing violations of the agreement, that was a proportionate response, taken in accordance with the agreement’s dispute settlement mechanism. A resolution calling on Iran to cooperate urgently and in good faith with the Agency, in order to clarify outstanding issues relating to the detection of undeclared nuclear material at several sites in the country, was adopted at the latest IAEA Board of Governors meeting, held early in June. That text reminds Iran of its obligations under its Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. That is a separate issue from the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Iran has nonetheless seized on that pretext to go even further in its violations of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as the IAEA noted in its latest report of 13 June. Iran has chosen to increase its enrichment capacity by operating new centrifuges at the Natanz site, installing new centrifuges at the Fordow underground site and announcing its intention to install thousands of new advanced centrifuges at Natanz and Fordow. That is unacceptable. The escalation of Iran’s nuclear programme is dangerous. It strips the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of its meaning as a non-proliferation agreement It is an obstacle to the resumption of a diplomatic path to address the international community’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme. It is a threat to international peace and security and requires the Council’s full attention in that regard. France reaffirms its support for the IAEA and its Director General. We once again urge Iran to cooperate fully with the Agency and return to compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. We remain committed to seeking a diplomatic solution in order to ensure that Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons.

At the outset, I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and Ambassadors Frazier and Lambrinidis for their briefings. Algeria appreciates their continuing efforts to support the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Algeria reiterates its strong support for the JCPOA, recognizing it as a significant multilateral diplomatic achievement and an important contribution to achieving regional peace and security. We firmly believe that it remains the best available option for ensuring Iran’s adherence to its nuclear-related commitments in exchange for the comprehensive lifting of all the sanctions against it. We stress the importance of resuming the diplomatic talks aimed at reviving the JCPOA, a critical undertaking that must be pursued. We urge all the parties to engage constructively, show flexibility and work for a swift return to the implementation of the agreement. Restoring the JCPOA is in the interests of all parties and the broader international community. We also stress how important it is for all the parties to refrain from actions that could escalate tensions and undermine the JCPOA. That includes provocative rhetoric as well as actions inconsistent with the resolution. Algeria firmly believes that the ability to pave a pathway forward is closely linked to diplomacy and dialogue. We therefore call on all parties to maximize their diplomatic efforts, build on the progress that has been made and demonstrate the political will needed to reach a solution that is mutually acceptable to all. A fully implemented JCPOA is in the interests of regional and global security. Algeria stands ready to support the diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving the full implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and restoring the JCPOA, and we urge the Council to remain united in support of that goal. Dame Barbara Woodward (United Kingdom): I thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, Ambassador Lambrinidis and Ambassador Frazier for their reports and briefings. Iran’s unabated nuclear escalation means that it is now closer than ever to being able to develop a nuclear weapon. The situation makes the region and the world far more dangerous and escalation by others more likely. Through resolution 2231 (2015) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Security Council has sought to give Iran an opportunity to demonstrate the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. However, as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has repeatedly reported, Iran continues to escalate its programme beyond credible civilian justification and far beyond JCPOA limits. The Director General of the IAEA reports that Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile is more than 30 times the JCPOA’s limits. As we speak, Iran is installing yet more advanced centrifuges that would further increase its capacity to produce fissile material for a weapon. Let us be clear about what is now at stake. Resolution 2231 (2015) is due to expire in October of next year, and with it the right to reimpose United Nations sanctions on Iran. Given Iran’s dangerous advances, which have brought it to the brink of being able to develop a weapon, the situation should be one of grave concern for the Council. The three European parties  — France, Germany and the United Kingdom  — remain committed to a diplomatic solution. We have maintained our compliance with the JCPOA, and Iran must demonstrate the same commitment. We will continue to keep all diplomatic options on the table, including triggering United Nations snapback before October 2025 if necessary.

I thank Under-Secretary- General DiCarlo, Ambassador Lambrinidis and Ambassador Frazier for their briefings. I also acknowledge the presence here today of the representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Federal Republic of Germany. Guyana takes note of the seventeenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2024/471). We are concerned about the fact that the implementation of the resolution and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) remains elusive. We have noted the statement in the recent report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that “the Agency’s JCPOA-related verification and monitoring have been seriously affected by the cessation of Iran’s implementation of its nuclear- related commitments under the JCPOA”. We also note that the removal of the IAEA’s equipment from Iran has had a negative effect on its ability to provide assurances about the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. Given the current precarious situation in the Middle East, it is imperative to redouble the efforts to achieve peace and security in the region. The conclusion of the JCPOA and the unanimous adoption of resolution 2231 (2015) in 2015 provided an important pathway for guaranteeing the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme and facilitating the development of normal economic cooperation with the country. Guyana believes that the full implementation of the Plan and the resolution are critical to promoting peace and security in the region. The implementation is also important for confidence-building. Guyana urges all the parties concerned to return to the Plan and calls on Iran to recommit to its nuclear-related obligations under it. Those are both crucial to promoting confidence-building. Guyana would also like to highlight the important roles of the Security Council, the Secretary-General, the IAEA and the Joint Commission’s procurement channel in facilitating the implementation of the resolution and the Plan. We support their continued efforts and are of the view that it is still possible for the Plan to succeed before resolution 2231 (2015) expires in October 2025. In conclusion, Guyana calls on all the parties concerned to engage in dialogue and diplomacy in pursuit of the full and effective implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA. We also reiterate our commitment to advancing the disarmament and non-proliferation regime as we continue to advocate strongly for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

I will now make a statement in my national capacity. I too thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and Ambassador Lambrinidis for their briefings. We welcome the Secretary-General’s seventeenth report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2024/471) and the Joint Commission’s report on the status of the Procurement Working Group’s decisions (see S/2024/435). We have taken note of both reports. We remain fully committed to a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. We continue to support the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the full implementation of its provisions and of resolution 2231 (2015). The JCPOA, along with its endorsement in resolution 2231 (2015), was a great diplomatic achievement and a crucial instrument for non-proliferation efforts. We urge all parties to refrain from taking further steps away from the agreement and to return to their commitments under it. Malta commends the continued professional and impartial work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In its most recent ad hoc report, dated 13 June, the Agency noted that Iran has further expanded its enrichment capacity at two nuclear facilities, a concerning development that violates the commitments that Iran accepted under the JCPOA. As of this May, the IAEA estimated that Iran’s total stockpile of enriched uranium, including uranium enriched to 60 per cent, greatly exceeded the limits established under the JCPOA. We urge Iran to down-blend its stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 per cent and to immediately cease all production of highly enriched uranium. Furthermore, the IAEA noted that its monitoring and verification activities have been “seriously affected”. That has led to a loss of continuity of knowledge and impeded the Agency’s ability to ensure the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. We regret that Iran has not yet reversed its decision to withdraw the designation of several IAEA inspectors. We urge it to fully cooperate with the IAEA in a timely manner and to return to the full implementation of its commitments under the JCPOA. We are committed to ensuring that all parties take steps to return to the full implementation of the JCPOA, and we support all diplomatic solutions in that regard. In conclusion, I renew my call on the Council to ensure the full and effective implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

I would first like to thank the Chinese delegation for its words of sympathy and its condolences regarding the heinous terrorist attack in Dagestan. We thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and Ambassador Vanessa Frazier, Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and Permanent Representative of Malta, for their briefings. We would also like to take this opportunity to thank Ambassador Frazier and her team for their efforts in preparing the biannual report by the Facilitator of the 2231 format (see S/2024/435), which the Security Council endorsed by consensus last week. We also listened to the statement made by the Head of Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, Mr. Stavros Lambrinidis. However, we have to admit that we did not understand the capacity in which Mr. Lambrinidis was speaking. Was it as Coordinator of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Joint Commission or a representative of Brussels? His politicized remarks, which clearly go beyond the subject of the JCPOA, rather suggest the latter. He did not try to create even the appearance of the respect for the principle of impartiality that the European Union should adhere to when carrying out the duties of Coordinator. Instead of outlining the objective context surrounding the Plan, our European colleagues are trying to lay the responsibility for the current crisis in the JCPOA’s implementation at Iran’s doorstep, and they are spreading unproven allegations in the Security Council about the issue of Ukraine that have nothing to do with the JCPOA. In other words, they are doing everything they can to cover up the illegitimate and destructive measures undertaken by the United States, the European parties to the JCPOA and Brussels itself, in particular their violation of the Plan’s provisions on anti-Iranian restrictions, which were supposed to be lifted in October 2023. All of that raises questions about the European Union’s ability to act as mediator in the context of the JCPOA. The Russian Federation believes firmly that there is no alternative to the JCPOA, as agreed on in 2015. The document was a unique example of what multilateral diplomacy was capable of achieving. At the time, the States parties to the nuclear deal set aside their political differences and adopted a pragmatic approach that took into account the interests of all parties concerned and provided every opportunity for the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme to be verified. Unfortunately, we note in that context that the description of the JCPOA as the best possible way to achieve that goal has vanished from the Secretary- General’s biannual report (S/2024/471). According to its text, the prospects for restoring the nuclear deal are faint. Against that backdrop, the Secretary-General’s appeal to the parties to the JCPOA and the United States to pursue all available avenues for dialogue and cooperation is entirely insufficient. We welcome the fact that the report now points to the main problem for the JCPOA, which is the unilateral decision by the United States in 2018 to refuse to fulfil its obligations under the Plan and to impose illegitimate, unilateral sanctions against Iran. Six years have passed since then, and yet Washington has taken no real steps to address the situation. And the Americans’ promises to abandon their policy of maximum pressure on Tehran and to return to the nuclear deal have remained empty words. Regrettably, some of the States parties to the JCPOA are doing their best to rock the boat further by aggravating the possibility of implementing the nuclear deal, which has only contributed to the impasse in negotiations on restoring the deal. The destructive effect on the implementation of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015) of the decision by the United Kingdom, the other two European States and the European Union to deliberately disregard their obligations and unilaterally maintain the anti-Iranian restrictions that they were supposed to have lifted on 18 October 2023 barely differs from that of the United States, the sole difference being that Washington is completely non-compliant with the nuclear deal and London, Berlin, Paris and Brussels only partially. We are once again dealing with blatant disregard for international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the authority of the Security Council. And the Secretary-General, who should have defended those principles and is well aware of the true state of affairs, is simply ignoring those facts. In that context, we should also point to the attempts by the United States and European parties to the JCPOA to agitate the information background and create the illusion of Iran’s non-compliance with resolution 2231 (2015). That is being done, among other means, by circulating in the Security Council similar letters about alleged violations by the Islamic Republic of Iran of the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015). It is also important to remember that from the very beginning, all of the steps that Tehran has taken have merely been responses to such actions, and in fact that Iran refrained from taking those steps for an entire year after the United States withdrew from the deal. The report of the Secretary-General that we are discussing today notes that Iran has continued to uphold its 2019 nuclear commitments in a responsible manner, and the regular and ad hoc reports of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also attest to that. The detailed and informative nature of those reports testifies to the high intensity and impressive scope of IAEA verification activities in Iran, which remains one of the most closely and deeply monitored Member States in our Organization. Contrary to the unfounded attacks and speculation by the West, Iran’s nuclear programme remains under constant monitoring by the IAEA, with which Tehran continues to maintain dialogue and robust practical interaction. It is important to take into account that it is the Agency that provides the international community with detailed data on Iran’s nuclear activities. As has been the case with other countries, the technical issues linked to verification that have arisen are gradually being resolved in accordance with established practice and on the basis of standard procedures. There is no information in the reports that might call into question Tehran’s commitment to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. The Agency has not identified any threats of nuclear proliferation. Various signs of forward movement in the implementation of the 4 March 2023 joint statement by Iran and the IAEA give us hope for further progress in that regard. We emphasize that politicization and external interference in the regular cooperation between the IAEA and Iran are unacceptable. After the Security Council has taken decisions on a particular country  — with lengthy negotiations and in strict compliance with the Charter of the United Nations  — we cannot be reconciled to the reprehensible practice whereby the United States and their allies subsequently turn everything upside down using unilateral sanctions without the Council’s approval. The Iranian side cannot be held responsible for the backlash resulting from the United States’ and European countries’ subversive policies and gross violations of resolution 2231 (2015). It is they that are chiefly responsible for the failure to implement the nuclear deal, and it is they that should bring their policies in line with its letter and spirit. That said, Iran has regularly indicated its willingness to return to the agreed parameters of the JCPOA if Washington, London, Brussels and Paris make reciprocal and synchronized efforts. Iran officially declared its readiness to conclude an agreement to restore the deal as long ago as December 2022, and we consider the fact that there was no reference to that in the Secretary- General’s report a blatant omission. However, that situation can be reversed. All the necessary elements were arrived at long ago and are contained in the Joint Commission’s draft comprehensive decision aimed at restoring the JCPOA. We believe firmly that the Security Council’s decisions must be rigorously implemented in strict accord with the agreed parameters. It is long past time for the Americans and Europeans to work to overcome their innate bias against Iran and stop putting their selfish ambitions above the interests of enhanced international security. Against that background, we expect Western countries to abandon their policy of imposing unilateral restrictions on the Islamic Republic of Iran as soon as possible. If they are truly concerned about how to ensure the accountability and transparency of Iran’s nuclear activities, they should remember that resolution 2231 (2015) contains all the tools needed to achieve that. We call on the European participants in the JCPOA and the United States to return to the Vienna negotiating table and prove their commitment to the task of restoring the nuclear deal. The Russian Federation believes that there is no alternative to the JCPOA. A relaunch of the Plan as quickly as possible is the only path that genuinely reflects the interests of both regional and international security. We hope that the Secretary-General will speak out more clearly on the matter and avoid sending ambiguous messages that could jeopardize the prospects for the full restoration of the Vienna agreement.

I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the Republic of Korea. I thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and the Secretariat for their role in supporting the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I also thank Ambassadors Frazier and Lambrinidis for their briefings. I would like to begin by expressing our support for a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The verification and monitoring activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are crucial to ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, and the IAEA safeguards are a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The implementation of effective safeguards requires a cooperative effort between the Agency and States. That is what the Security Council affirmed through its unanimous adoption of resolution 2231 (2015). However, we are deeply concerned about the fact that the current situation seems headed in the opposite direction. Iran’s nuclear activities have gone far beyond the boundaries of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The steady increase in Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium is very worrisome. Six months ago, Under- Secretary-General DiCarlo referred to an IAEA report estimating that Iran had a total enriched uranium stockpile 20 times larger than the amount permitted under the JCPOA. As of this May, we now have an additional report estimating that the figure is actually 30 times larger. Iran has more than 700 kilogrammes of uranium enriched up to 20 per cent, and approximately 140 kilogrammes enriched up to 60 per cent. That could further exacerbate the instability in the region and beyond. It is difficult to find a credible civilian justification for such a large amount of highly enriched uranium beyond the JCPOA limits. At the same time, it is alarming that Iran has recently informed the IAEA of the installation of cascades of advanced IR-6 centrifuges at the Fordow fuel enrichment plant. We are also concerned about the IAEA’s assessment that the Agency has lost its continuity of knowledge on parts of Iran’s nuclear programme, as a result of Iran’s years-long suspension of its implementation of its nuclear-related JCPOA commitments. As Iran accumulates highly enriched uranium stockpiles, it is crucial to ensure that the IAEA can fully carry out its monitoring and verification activities in the country. In addition, Iran should reverse its decision to withdraw the designations for several experienced IAEA inspectors. Against that disconcerting backdrop, we call on Iran to fully and immediately cooperate with the IAEA in the spirit of the 4 March joint statement and abide by its commitments under the JCPOA. Among the many challenges facing the international community, none is as threatening to humankind as proliferation issues. A case in point is the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear programme, through which the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has brazenly rejected the relevant Security Council resolutions and continued its illegal nuclear programme. In contrast, the JCPOA is a hard-earned multilateral agreement endorsed by the Council and aimed at curbing nuclear proliferation. The phased lifting of restrictions is fundamentally predicated on Iran’s full and effective implementation of its commitments under it. We call for all the parties to the JCPOA to find a way back to mutual compliance as soon as possible, so the international community can confirm whether Iran’s nuclear programme is an exclusively peaceful one. The Republic of Korea stands ready to provide its support to that vital and noble endeavour. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I give the floor to the representative of Germany.

I would like to join other delegations in thanking Under-Secretary- General DiCarlo, Ambassador Frazier and Ambassador Lambrinidis for their comprehensive briefings. Our goal is clear — to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, a goal that we believe is shared by all in this Chamber. Germany remains firmly committed to using diplomacy to remove the existing doubts about the exclusively civilian nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. We have worked tirelessly since 2018 to uphold our Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) commitments following the United States’ withdrawal and Iran’s non-compliance. But that task is becoming more difficult. With every step that Iran takes, we are moving further away from the JCPOA. Iran’s nuclear activities have become completely inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015) and Iran’s obligations under the JCPOA. As a result, Iran is undermining international security, as well as global non-proliferation norms. When we met in this Chamber one year ago, Iran had expanded its enriched uranium stockpile to 21 times the JCPOA limit. Half a year ago, it was 22 times, and today the enriched uranium stockpile exceeds the JCPOA limit by more than 30 times. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran’s stockpile of uranium, now enriched up to 60 per cent, is now likely to be more than three times the amount of fissile material needed to build a nuclear explosive device. These facts speak for themselves and reveal the path of escalation upon which Tehran has embarked. In addition, Iran is producing highly enriched uranium in the underground facility at Fordow, in clear violation of Iran’s JCPOA commitment that explicitly stipulates that there should be no enrichment at Fordow. And recent IAEA reporting indicates that Iran is further increasing the site’s capacity, amounting to further escalation. Equally disturbing is Iran’s lack of cooperation with the IAEA. This seriously restricts the Agency’s ability to assess the real nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. This is not only serious and a serious blow to transparency but also strongly diminishes the possibility of reaching an agreement in the future. The international community is well aware of Iran’s blatant violations of its JCPOA commitments. We share the concern regarding Iran’s lack of compliance with its core non-proliferation commitments and obligations. The safeguards resolution, which France, Germany and the United Kingdom (EU3) brought to the vote during the IAEA Board of Governors’ quarterly meeting in Vienna just two weeks ago, called on Iran to adhere as a matter of urgency to its Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons obligations. The resolution was adopted with an unambiguous result: 20 in favour and 2 against. That vote is a stark indication of how far Iran has isolated itself through its conduct. With reference to what the EU3 recently stated in Vienna, we urge Iran to immediately halt its nuclear escalation; to return to the limits imposed by the JCPOA, in particular those regarding centrifuge production, enrichment and the enriched uranium stockpile; to implement the commitments it made regarding transparency, including reapplying all the transparency measures that were stopped in February 2021; to reimplement and swiftly ratify the Additional Protocol; and to cooperate immediately and fully with the IAEA, including by reversing its September 2023 decision to withdraw the designations of experienced Agency inspectors. In conclusion, in spite of Iran’s track record, the EU3 have consistently advocated for diplomatic solutions. We have negotiated in good faith, trying to reach a deal during many rounds of negotiations in Vienna. Unfortunately, the most recent proposal we put on the table, back in August 2022, was rejected by Iran after months of talks. Iran’s actions since then, in particular the installation of thousands of advanced centrifuges and the enrichment of uranium to unprecedented levels, raise legitimate doubts about Iran’s genuine interest in returning to the negotiating table. We are determined to use any window of opportunity for renewed negotiations  — negotiations aimed at addressing the serious international concerns about the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. I reiterate that we stand ready to negotiate, and we are eager to see Iran re-engage in good faith to that end.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

I want to begin by condemning the recent terrorist attacks that targeted innocent civilians in Dagestan, Russia, and express our sincere condolences and sympathy to the people and Government of Russia for that tragic incident. I thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo for her briefing. I also thank Ambassador Frazier and her team for their efforts as the facilitator of resolution 2231 (2015). We note the statement delivered by the representative of the European Union (EU). Despite the EU’s role as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Coordinator, it is regrettable that the statement remains politicized, biased and one-sided. We also note the Secretary-General’s recent report (S/2024/471), which accurately states that the United States has neither returned to the JCPOA, nor lifted the unilateral sanctions reimposed after its illegal withdrawal on 8 May 2018, and urges participants, especially the United States, to pursue dialogue and cooperation. However, the report continues to overlook the root causes of the current situation: the unilateral and unlawful withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and the subsequent failure of France, Germany and the United Kingdom (EU3) and the EU to honour their commitments under the deal. We sincerely appreciate the fact that most Council members have reaffirmed their resolute support for the restoration of the JCPOA and have called for its full implementation by all sides as the only viable course of action. However, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany, again, have unsuccessfully attempted to shift the blame for the JCPOA’s current status onto Iran. It is simply untrue that the blame rests with Iran. They deliberately disregarded one of the underlying causes of the current situation, that is, the unilateral and unlawful withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA. They also intentionally ignored another root cause of the current situation, namely, the significant failure, for years, of those countries to comply with their explicit legal obligations. Instead, they launched a disinformation campaign against my country, as is their standard practice. However, repeating big lies does not make them true. The JCPOA was not perfect, but it remains the most viable option. Despite the gross and systematic violations by the United States and the EU3/EU, restoring the JCPOA to ensure its full, effective and unconditional implementation by all participants is in everyone’s best interest. To that end, Iran made substantial efforts through active engagement in nine rounds of negotiations in Vienna and was willing to reinstate the JCPOA based on the understanding reached in August 2022. Nevertheless, despite our good-faith efforts, the United States and E3/EU have consistently lacked the sincerity and determination to revive the deal. The EU3/EU continue to grossly and systematically violate their obligations under the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). Their failure to implement their sanctions- lifting commitments under annex V, paragraph 20, of the JCPOA on 18 October 2023 is one of the latest examples of their significant non-compliance. Again, instead of addressing their non-compliance with the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015), the EU3, with United States support, took an unconstructive approach by proposing a politically motivated resolution at the recent Board of Governors meeting. We have already warned that such a move, intended to pressure Iran, is a mistake that will be counterproductive. We have made it clear, time and again, that Iran’s remedial measures have been taken in response to the unlawful withdrawal of the United States and the subsequent failure of the EU3/EU to uphold their commitments. Our measures have been in full conformity with our rights under paragraphs 26 and 36 of the JCPOA, according to which, in the case of the reintroduction or reimposition of sanctions by the United States or the EU, Iran has the right to cease performing its commitments under the JCPOA in whole or in part. The objective of Iran’s decision was to restore balance to reciprocal commitments and benefits. Taking such remedial measures was unavoidable, as the JCPOA is based on Iran’s nuclear commitments being made in exchange for the lifting of the United Nations, United States and EU sanctions and the promoting and facilitating of the development of normal economic and trade contacts and cooperation with Iran, as clearly stated in resolution 2231 (2015). Yet Iran’s measures were implemented gradually, starting a full year after the United States’ withdrawal and the EU3/EU’s failure to lift sanctions. At the same time, unlike the irreversible effects of the United States and EU3/EU sanctions, our remedial measures are reversible if all sanctions are lifted fully and verifiably. Therefore, it is crystal clear that the responsibility for the current state of the JCPOA lies only with the United States and the EU3/EU. Instead of playing a destructive blame game, they must prove that they genuinely advocate dialogue and diplomacy. Iran’s nuclear activities, including enrichment at various levels, are for peaceful purposes. They are conducted in full accordance with Iran’s rights and obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Those activities are under the strict monitoring and verification of the Agency, and to date, Iran has been under the Agency’s most robust verification and monitoring activities. Iran continues its maximum and constructive cooperation with the Agency in full conformity with its Safeguards Agreement. Within the framework of our remedial measures, we ceased the implementation of Modified Code 3.1, which was just a voluntary transparency and confidence-building measure beyond our obligations under Iran’s Safeguards Agreement  — as explicitly reflected in annex I, paragraph 65, of the JCPOA. Likewise, Iran’s decision to enrich uranium in Fordow was another remedial measure. It is also in full conformity with our rights and obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and our Safeguards Agreement and is conducted under the Agency’s supervision. The EU3’s claim that Iran’s nuclear programme has reached a critical point or its expression of concern over the termination of resolution 2231 (2015) on 18 October 2025 is irrelevant and provocative. What in fact is a source of serious concern is the continued significant non-performance by those States of their explicit legal obligations under the JCPOA and that very resolution. Despite the fact that resolution 2231 (2015) has nothing to do with regional issues, unavoidably, I must react to a number of such issues raised by certain members of the Council. First, Iran’s space and missile programmes have always been outside the scope and competence of resolution 2231 (2015). That had been our consistent position even prior to the termination of certain restrictive measures of that resolution on 18 October 2023. Secondly, the Islamic Republic of Iran has never engaged in any activity in contravention of any of the binding resolutions of the Security Council. Thirdly, the main and long-standing threat to the peace and security of our region is indeed the decades- long aggression, occupation, expansionist policies, brutal systematic crimes and other adventuristic and destabilizing practices of the Israeli regime. Therefore, if the United States and the EU3 are genuinely concerned about the peace and security in our region, they must put an immediate end to their long-standing direct complicity in all warmongering policies, aggressions, occupations and criminal acts of the Israeli regime against regional nations, particularly the Palestinians. Fourthly, the massive military build-up, aggression and occupation of the United States, as well as its widespread export of sophisticated weaponry to our region in past decades and at present, is another source of regional insecurity and instability. A living example of the destructive and destabilizing role of the United States is the massive supply of highly sophisticated bombs to the Israeli regime to enable it to kill more Palestinian women and children more brutally and destroy more hospitals, schools, mosques and homes in Gaza. Fifthly, Iran has always called for the peaceful resolution of the Yemen crisis. We also reaffirm our strong support for maritime security and freedom of navigation. The ongoing armed attacks by the United States and the United Kingdom against Yemen are provocative, unjustifiable and thus unacceptable. They constitute a blatant violation of Yemen’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and are material breaches of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and pertinent Security Council resolutions. Accordingly, the Islamic Republic of Iran condemns, in the strongest possible terms, all armed attacks by the United States and the United Kingdom against Yemen. Obviously, such violations only jeopardize regional peace and stability, obstruct efforts towards achieving a peaceful resolution to the Yemen crisis and exacerbate the already dire humanitarian crisis in Yemen. Sixthly, our principled position on the ongoing conflict in Ukraine has not changed, and any claim regarding Iran’s involvement in the transfer of arms for use in that conflict is completely unfounded and categorically rejected. In conclusion, I reiterate that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s principled policy in rejecting nuclear weapons, as well as its strong determination in exercising its inherent rights to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes has remained unchanged. I also reaffirm our unwavering commitment to dialogue and diplomacy. The JCPOA is a hard-won multilateral diplomatic achievement that effectively averted an undue crisis. It remains the best option, has no alternatives and its revival is indeed in the interest of all of its participants. For its part, Iran has never walked away from the negotiations and has shown its sincere willingness to resume talks for the JCPOA’s revival. And it stands ready to resume the full implementation of its commitments under the JCPOA once it is revived and the United States and all other parties accept to fulfil, in a timely, effective, full and faithful manner, all their obligations under the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). That indeed requires their genuine political will. Let me be clear: pressure, intimidation, threats and confrontation are non-starters and will ultimately lead to a dead end. The only viable option for restoring the JCPOA is sincere dialogue and constructive cooperation.