S/PV.978 Security Council
▶ This meeting at a glance
5
Speeches
3
Countries
0
Resolutions
Topics
General statements and positions
General debate rhetoric
UN membership and Cold War
Diplomatic expressions and remarks
Peace processes and negotiations
Arab political groupings
In accordance with the previous decisions of the Council,
I shall, with the Council's agreement invite the representatives of Ethiopia, Belgiurn, India, the Congo (Leopoldville) and Sweden to take a place at the Council
table,
At the invitation of the President, Mr. Testaye Gebre~Egzy (Ethiopia), Mr. Walter Loridan (Belgium), Mr. C. S. Jha (India), Mr. Justin Bomboko (Congo), Lecpoldville) and Mrs, Agda Rossel (Sweden) took places at the Security Council table.
2. The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian}: Before opening the discussion, I wish to draw the attention of the members of the Cuuncil to the fact that the sponsors of draft resolution S/4985 have made some changes in their original draft, and in operative paragraph 8 in particular [S/4985/Rev.1]. I draw the Council's attention, also, to the fact that the United States has submitted amendment [S/4989] to the revised draft resolution.
3. The Council will now resume its discussion of the item on its agenda. I call on the distinguished representative of the United States of America who is first
on my list of speakers.
4. Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America}: The question before us is of course of the very gravest
5. At our last meeting the representative of Liberia suggested a revision of operative paragraph 8 of the draft resolution submitted by Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic. It appears in document S/4985/ Rev.1. Its effect would be to makeclear the opposition of the Security Council to secession wherever it may occur in the Congo, as well as specifically to demand that such activity in Katanga cease forthwith.
6. Speaking for my delegation, we welcome this revision of operative paragraph 8 as a distinct improvement in the text. The United States delegation can support almost all of the provisions of the three- Power draft resolution now before the Council. We feel, however, that it would be desirable for the draift resolution to be expanded, to be strengthened and to be clarified in certain respects, Cur amendments, circulated last night in document $/4989, are really additions which we hope the Council members will agree strengthen and broaden the three~Power draft. They do not contradict, they give somewhat broader authority to the Secretary~General both in the action that he may take and where he may take it,
7. To better enable members to follow these amendments we have prepared a composite draft resolution so that you can quickly identify the new language we are proposing. I believe that copies of this informal document have been circulated to members of the Council to aid in the conzideration of the proposals that I shall advance.
8. Let me describe briefiy the various amendments that we wish to offer. First, while we believe that the primary current cause of trouble in the Congo is secession in Katanga, the Government of the Congo is also plagued with other attacks against its authority. Whatever may be the origin or whatever may be the motives of such attacks, they weaken the effectiveness of the Central Government and they threaten the United Nations efforts to assist the Congo. We believe the Security Council, therefore, should express itself clearly against all such activities and authorize the Secretary-General to take appropriate measures against them. We have therefore suggested that the fifth preambular paragraph of the three~ Power draft—
and I invite your attention to the paragraph commencing with the word "Deploring"—be expanded slightly to read as follows:
"Deploring all armed action and secessionist activities in opposition to the authority of the Government of the Republic of the Congo, including specifically those carried on with the aid of external resources and foreign mercenaries, and completely rejecting the claim that Katanga is a ‘sovereign independent nation'."
So much for the first propesal.
we propose that operative paragraph 2 be amended to read:
"Further deprecates all armed action against United Nations forces and personnel and against the Government of the Republic of the Congo."
I think the reason for that is self-evident.
10. In this connexion, we would favour adding to the preamble an expression of regret for the acts of violence against United Nations personnel from such armed action. This seems to be an appropriate addition in view of the loss of life which the United Nations forces have suffered, including mast recently the barbaric slaying of thirteen Italian airmen, which Prime Minister Adoula has so eloquently denounced. We have therefore suggested the addition of a paragraph after the fifth preambular paragraph. This paragraph would read as follows:
"Noting with deep regret the recent and past actions of violence against United Nations personnel."
11. Since the formation of the Government of the Congo, headed by Prime Minister Adoula, any question concerning the exclusive authority to conduct foreign policy in the Congo has vanished. Only one Government exists, and the claims of any province to independence are inadmissible. For that reason we favour adding to the three-Power draft explicit recognition of the sole authority of the Central Government; and we propose therefore that another preambular paragraph be added following the paragraph commencing with the words "Noting with deep regret" reading as follows:
"Recognizing the Government of the Republic of the Congo as exclusiv-:ly responsible for the conduct of the external affairs of the Congo."
12. We favour giving the Secretary-General broad authority to rid the Congo of foreign mercenaries, However, the use of force by the United Nations is a most serious matter, as we all know, It should only be authorized in as precise terms as the Security Council can possibly state, for the protection of the Secretary-General and for universal understanding. For that reason we would favour a drafting change in operative paragraph 4, deleting the ambiguous phrase
"hostile elements" and substituting therefor the exact language of part A, operative paragraph 2 of our resolution of 21 February last,l/ to which the three-Power draft already refers. The phrase "hostile elements" could cause needless alarm and uncertainty as to the intentions of the United Nations, and creates a very imprecise authority for the United Nations action.
ment for January, February and March 1961, document $/4741,
"Authorizes the Secretary-General to take vigorous action, including the use of a requisite measure of force, if necessary, for the immediate apprehension, detention pending legal action and/or deportation of all foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries as laid down in part A, operative paragraph 2 of the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961."
14. Our next proposal relates to secession, We believe that secession in Katanga, as well as the use
of armed force against the authority of the Government elsewhere, is often the result of outside influence, including the use of arms imported from abroad. We feel that the three~Power draft resolution was defec~ tive in that it did not give the Secretary~General the broadest possible mandate to neutralize the effect of
such arms everywhere in the Congo, especially air~ craft and heavy weapons. In this connexion, we approve the decisionthe very historic decision, I suspect—to resist aircraft of the so-called Katanga Air Force if again used for military purposes. In order to give the Secretary~General explicit authority to deal with the problem, we favour the addition of a new paragraph 6 to the three-Power draft:
"Authorizes the Secretary~General, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo to neutralize, where necessary to prevent their use for military purposes against the United Nations, the Republic of the Congo, or the civilian population, aircraft and other weapons of war which have en« tered the Congo contrary to its laws and United Nations resolutions.*
15. One of the great needs in the Congo today is, we feel, for a rebuilding of the Congolese armed forces.
This is a need we have recognized in past resolutions. Recent examples in which discipline disappeared in certain Congolese Army units demonstrate that this problem, which we discussed at length last February, is still with us. We, therefore, propose the addition of a paragraph which would give new emphasis to United Nations efforts to assisting the Congolese Government in rebuilding its armed forces, It would be a new paragraph 11 and would read:
"Requests the Secretary-General to assist the Government of the Republic of the Congo to reorganize and retrain Congolese armed units and personnel to assist the Government to develop its armed forces for the tasks which confront it.*
"Further authorizes the Secretary—General to take all such steps in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council as he considers necessary, including those of negotiation and conciliation, to achieve the immediate political unity and territorial integrity of the Congo."
17. Several representatives have suggested that the word "authorizes" in this amendment should be changed to "requests". We are completely in accord with this suggestion and I should like to offer it as a slight verbal alteration in our seventh amendment: that is, that the second word read "requests" rather than "authorizes",
18. We believe that the sentiments I have attempted to express and the amendments I have presented are in accordance with the views of almost all, if not all, members of this Council. We believe that they reflect the needs of the United Nations and the experience of the United Nations in the Congo. We believe our amendments are entirely consistent with what we understand to be the intent of the three~Power draft resolution. We consider them vital aspects of our current effort to assist effectively the Government of the Congo and the new Secretary-General in their respective tasks. We hope, therefore, that they will have the full approval of the Council,
19. Mr. BARNES (Liberiaj: I should like to offer certain corrections to the amendments submitted by the United States delegation.
20, In paragraph 7 of the amendments I note that the new penultimate paragraph, which is intended to be included in our draft resolution, provides the following:
"13, Further authorizes the Secretary~General to take all such steps in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council as he considers necessary, including those of negotiation and conciliation, to achieve the immediate political unity and territorial integrity of the Congo."
21, Ido not know whether the United States delegation has reference to a specific resolution of the Security Council. As I expressed in my statement yesterday, all the resolutions of the Security Council have been designed to support the territorial integrity and political unity of the Congo. I would, therefore, propose that the word "resolution" be substituted by the word
"resolutions",
22. With regard to the French text of the amendment, I note in paragraph 4 the phrase "pending legal action" is not included in this text, I think that the French translation of this text is therefore incomplete; it would seem to me that the need arises to have this text amended to include that phrase "pending legal
action",
25. As we see it, the Security Council has already adopted quite a number of resolutions on the Congo question, and those earlier resolutions would really have been enough, if they had been carried out properly and if the United Nations staff and Command had done as required, in the spirit, in strict accordance with the spirit, of those resolutions.
26, Everyone knows, however, and we have said so repeatedly at meetings of the Council and the General Assembly, that unfortunately this did not happen, and as a result of the continued interference by the colonial Powers in the internal affairs of the Congo we now have a protracted crisis in that African country.
27, Even after the Security Council's resolution of 21 February 1961, following on the gravely critical state in which the Congo found itself after the murder of its national leader, Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, by the colonialists, even after that resolution, which provided for concrete measures of a sort to prevent direct foreign interference in the affairs of the Congo, matters unfortunately have not improved, although eight months have already passed since that resolution was adopted.
28, Nevertheless we thought that even now, if all the resolutions were carried out properly, including the latest resolution of 21 February, it would be possible to bring about a considerable improvement in the situation in the Congo. Recent events, however, particularly those in September, which ended, as we know, «'*h the death of Mr. Hammarskjold, have shown that tl. colonial Powers are continuing to interfere in the affairs of the Congo, and especially in Katanga, and that they are seriously aggravating the situation in that country and hindering the execution of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly.
29, It is precisely this fact which has led certain African countries to raise the question again in the Security Council and to ask for resolutions to be adopted with the aims, above all, of eliminating interference by the colonial Powers in Katanga, which is the main field of operation for the colonial forces which oppose the unity of the Congo and seek to under= mine the national unity of the country.
30. It was this attitude, as you know, which prevailed in the discussions in the Security Council and which prompted the resolution submitted by three members of the Security Council, the representatives of Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic, The whole reso~ lution is directed towards finally eliminating this source of internal disorder in the Congo, this source of interference by colonial forces in the life of that African country, and putting and end to such interference in Katanga, All the main provisions of the resolution were drafted from this angle. The resolution, in essence, gives concrete form to earlier
32, The African-Asian countries which brought this question before us and those countries which submitted the draft resolution have clearly indicated the lines on which they wish to solve the problem. We consider that we should not devitate from this general approach to the solution of the problem. if is from this angle, also, that we view the amendments submitted and introduced today by the representative of the United states.
33, Many of these amendments are an attempt to divert the Security Council's attention from the main question, the question of Katanga, although the United States representative himself, at the very beginning of his speech today, stressed that inhis view the most important thing was the events in Katanga. If that is so, it seems to us that many of the amendments are not justified and we cannot support them.
34, We are not concerned with all the amendments which have just been submitted by the representative of the United States, As far as some of the amendments are concerned, the Soviet Union delegation, although it does not consider them essential, will not oppose their adoption if the other members of the Council think it necessary to support them. But a number of other amendments are clearly designed to divert attention from the solution of the main prob~ lemthe elimination of the nidus of colonialism in Katanga—and the Soviet delegation will oppose them
and vote against them.
35. We should like to explain our position in some detail on certain amendments more particularly the fifth amendment, which reads as follows:
"5, Add a new paragraph 6 as follows, renumbering subsequent paragraphs accordingly,
"tg, Authorizes the Secretary-General, inconsultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to neutralize, where necessary to prevent their use for military purposes against the United Nations, the Republic of the Congo, or the civilian population, aircraft and other weapons of war which have entered the Congo contrary to its laws and
United Nations resolutions'.*
36. The United States representative, speaking on this amendment today, based his remarks on the fac* that aircraft and other weapons had simply appeared in Katanga, saying that this was disquit.ting. We en= tirely agree with this and mentioned it during the debate, But since that is the case, this paragraph must be drafted accordingly. We should therefore like the the paragraph to be somewhat modified and we are submitting the following sub-amendment to the United States amendment. We propose, first of all, that the word "neutralize" should be replaced by the word
"remove". For what does it mean to "neutralize" weapons and aircraft? The word is incomprehensible.
37. All the rest can remain, that is, the words ‘ts prevent their use for military purposes against the United Nations, the Republic of the Congo, or the civilian population", This will give this paragraph the meaning which really attaches to it in the specific circumstances in which we are considering this question. We proposed also that the words "where necessary" should be omitted, as they are now quite superfluous. It is now that it is necessary to remove the weapons which have entered Katanga from abroad and which are the basis of the armaments of the secessionist forces now opposing both the Central Government of the Congo and the United Nations.
38. We are submitting this sub-amendment 2/to the United States amet.iment. We hope that the United States will not reject it. We should like it to be circulated to the members of the Security Council for their consideration.
39, As regards, for example, the second amendment proposing that the following paragraphs should be added to the preamble,
"Noting with deep regret the recent and past actions of violence against United Nations personnel,"
and
"Recognizing the Government of the Republic of the Congo as exclusively responsible for the conduct of the external affairs of the Congo,"
although this has already been mentioned, if the United States and other members of the Council consider it advisable to add these paragraphs, we will not object and we will even vote for these amendments.
40, As far as the fourth amendment is concerned "revise operative paragraph No. 4"—which speaks of authorizing the Secretary-General "to take vigorous action, including the use of a requisite measure of force, if necessary, for the immediate apprehension, detention pending legal action and/or deportation of all foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries as laid down in part A, para= graph 2 of the Security Council resolution of 21 Februray 1961", the words “hostile elements", which appear in the draft resolution submitted by the three African-Asian countries, have been omitted. If the sponsors of the draft resolution do not insist on their wording, we will not oppose the adoption of this para~ graph, either, although we donot think that it is better. We shall simply abstain on this paragraph.
41, Those are the views which I thought it necessary to express, reaffirming our view that, as a whole, the
2/ Subsequently circulated as document S$/4991.
foreign colonial forces. This movement, as the iin source of colonialist opposition must be sup- 2ssed, and everything which diverts attention from s, everything which imposes an extraneous task on
: United Nations, we shall oppose. Anything which ps to achieve this end we shall support.
Mr, MALALASEKERA (Ceylon): The Ceylon deleion has noted with much satisfaction the trend of
42. l'anglais]: faite sécurité. dune pour
: discussion that has taken place this morning in
: Security Council. We feel that we are very closely yroaching a unanimous decision on what should be
1e to meet the present position in the Congo.
We were particularly happy to hear the statement the United States representative introducing the endments. These amendments were introduced ar frank and full discussions with the .o-sponsors the draft resolution. We have noted with pleasure t the United States delegation has gone a long way ards understanding the spirit of our draft resoon and the motives which actuated us insubmitting
43. que ments introduits avee noté s'est projet 4
o the Council,
We have also been happy to hear the statement ch the President has just made as representative the Soviet Union. He has expressed general agreent with much of our draft resolution and also with ne of the matters which were dealt with when the endments were introduced, while reserving his ht to express disagreement with some paragraphs the amendments. Particularly, he feels that suffiat emphasis has not been laid in the amendments ‘oduced by the United States representative on the t played by the provincial authorities of Katanga, se activities he regards as the chief cause of the sent unrest in the Republic of the Congo,
44. déclaration représentant bonne
certains amendements le graphes que pas du cause blique
45, particuliérement
Perhaps with the insertion of a few words recing specifically to Katanga in the United States sndment to the first paragraph of the preamble to
Etats-Unis de soviétique
draft resolution, the Soviet Union representative's hes could be met more than half way.
Also, it might be pointed out that in some of the rative paragraphs of the draft resolution proper ch we have introduced, specific mention is actually le to Katanga, so as to concentrate the attention of
46. paragraphes jution, né, ce
Security Council on the activities going on there.
Apart from that, the chief motive we had in mind n we introduced the draft resolution was that the retary-General should have a clearer mandate
47. poussés le clair ce de décisives, estimons amendements sentiment
1 he perhaps had before with regard to what is ex= ed of him and what he is authorized to do, so that n the time comes to take decisive action he will find himself undecided. We feel that both the draft dlution and the amendments give him that clear idate and give him the feeling of authority which
nay deem it necessary to have.
We also wanted to make it quite clear to Mr. ombé that his secessionist activities are nolonger g to be tolerated, and that the Security Council
48. a seront 1'ONU passifs, comptent de de
the United Nations will not look on without feeling
) concern and without taking appropriate action ar as those who helped Mr. Tshombé in his atpts to bring about the secession of Katanga are ‘erned. We wanted that to be clearly stated in the
against whom legal action will be duly taken, That, we feel, is a very important new feature that has been introduced in the draft resolution and in the amendments.
49, With regard to the words "hostile elements* which were in our original draft resolution and which have been altered in the amendments, the de:egation of Ceylon is not particularly anxious to see those words retained.
50. We made it clear in our observations earlier in the Council meetings what we meant by "hostile ele~ ments", and we feel that what we hadin mind is amply covered by the new formulation because what we also 1neant was the people, the military and paramilitary personnel and so on who were mentioned in part A, paragraph 2 of the Security Council resolution of
21 February.
51, We therefore feel that we could go along With most of the amendments, at any rate, because they reflect the spirit of our draft resolution. We hope that it may be possible for the United States delegation to meet the objections you raised, Mr. President, because if that could be done without too much alteration of their amendments, then perhaps we could get a unanimous resolution and that would indeed be a wonderful achievement.
52. When you assumed the Presidency of the Security Council for this month, and succeeded in settling the problem of the admission of Mauritania and Mongola, a question which had been in dispute for a long time, and when you managed to manceuvre the settlement of that question successfully, we expressed our satisfaction and our happiness at that event. We also expressed the hope that during the rest of your tenure of office as President, the same spirit of unanimity might prevail in the Security Council, We very much hope that our expectation in this matter will also be fulfilled with regard to this draft resolution and that if we cannot get complete unanimity, we can get very near unanimity with regard to the matter now under
discussion.
I call on the representative of Turkey, but if he will excuse me, I shall call onthe representative of Ceylon who wishes to add something to his statement.
54, Mr. MALALASEKERA (Ceylon): I wish to makea correction, I referred to your good fortune, Mr. President, and your wisdom in settling the question of the admission of Mauritania and Mongolia. What I did mean was when you settled the question of the appointment of the Secretary-General because the credit for settling the question of Mauritania and Mongolia be-
Turkey.
I thank the representative of Ceylon for his kind words.
57. When I placed my name on the list of speakers some time ago, it was with the intention of stating at the beginning of my remarks my delegation's deep satisfaction at seeing how much progress we have made this year in bringing many views which were very divergent in our last debates on the Congo much closer. As a matter of fact, as regards general principles one can speak of unanimity.
58. The speeches which were made after I placed my name on the list of speakers studied thera—still make it possible for me to say that we are satisfied that great progress has been made in the rapprochement of ideas at least as regards general principles. My delegation would be very happy if this could be reflected in a draft resolution which could be adopted that would show the great change which has taken place, the rapprochement which has taken place among all the members sitting around this table on the important question of the Congo,
59, Of course, important events have taken place since we last met, some of an unhappy character, others indeed of a very encouraging and very happy nature. Among the second category, we all have in mind the establishment of the new Government in the Congo which shows stability and which has the respect
of all concerned.
60. I wish to take this opportunity to congratulate especially the Foreign Minister of the Congo, Mr. Bomboko, who has come here with reasonable ideas and demands and who has gained the satisfaction that in principle all sitting around this table have given him credit for those ideas,
61, With regard to the draft resolution before us, I have already had occasion to state [976th meeting] that my delegation is in general agreement with it, and wishes to congratulate Liberia, Ceylon and the United Arab Republic for submitting this text, I also said that their best intentions were evident and that we could see that they covered very important ground. I stated that, since the draft resolution had been sub= mitted on 14 November and in the light of our discus sions, it would be necessary to make certain additions. I also expressed some reservations about certain
paragraphs.
62, Today we have seen the amendments which have been proposed by the United States. I wish to state that my delegation is fully satisfied with the nature and scope of these amendments, especially since we find that they tend to complete the text and are entirely according to the spirit of the three- Power draft resolution. They do not contradict nor do they try to eliminate ideas; they try to give more precise directives and in some cases more latitude to the Secre~ tary-General. My delegation believes that we owe it
1k
64. If it were another country, we would say "any part of that country" and that we are for iis central government and fundamental law. This, of course, can be done by carefully wording the part of the draft resolution in which the Katanga question is particularly emphasized; and I believe that the fifth preambular paragraph does emphasize it, It refers specifically to Katanga and states what is happeningin Katanga today.
65. With respect to operative paragraph 4, the precision which has been added by eliminating the words
"hostile elements" and spelling out exactly what we mean, has been generally accepted. I do not think that I have to add anything on that particular paragraph.
Of course, we agree with it.
66. Referring to the sixth amendment which deals with the reorganization of the Congolese Army and assistance to the Government of the Congo, that was a principle upon which our late Secretary-General insisted in his report during the debate which resulted in our adopting the resciution of 21 February, We have heard the Foreign Minister of the Congo also emphasize the importance which his Government attaches to strengthening, assisting and reorganizing the main Congolese Army. Therefore, we feel it is a very us>ful and constructive argument, and we would be happy to see it included in the draft resolution.
67. In general, and more particularly because these amendments do not go against but, on the contrary, follow the lines of the three-Power draft resolution and reflect the sentiments which have been expressed around this table, including those of the representative of the Republic of the Congo and all others sitting here, my delegation would be very happy to support these amendments.
68. As for the USSR sub-amendment, we need some time to study it further. For the moment, we are of the opinion that the word "neutralize" may give more latitude to the Secretary-General than the word "re~ move", For example, we can imagine a situation in which, without resort to force, the Secretary-General may enter into negotiations for the possession of certain arms located in a depot and have them guarded by the United Nations forces. This is removal from Congolese territory, but at the same time, itis re-
70. We consider, as regards the fifth amendment, that it is important to us that a reference to the general principles surrounding the Congo action and specific emphasis on Katanga should be included, all of which we explained in connexion with the first amendment,
71. Lastly, I wish to state again that my delegation is very satisfied at the high level of agreement we have seen on general principles. We should also be very happy if this were reflected in a draft resolution which would reswt in a quasi-unanimous or unanimous vote, as the case may be, of the Security Council,
72, Mr, STEVENSON (United States of America): I am going to forgo any argument with the representative of the Soviet Union regarding his charge that these amendments were designed to distract attention from the principal problem, in order not to prolong this meeting. The object of these amendments is transparently clear, It is not to distract attention; it is rather to concentrate attention on all the problems so that the Secretary-General's mandate is clear and comprehensive and we will not have to have another Security Council meeting to remedy the situation,
73, The objections advanced by the representative of the Soviet Union seem to relate to one amendment, that is, the fifth amendment. He suggests that the word "neutralize" be replaced by the word "remove".
The purpose of this amendment was to remedy a defect or an oversight in the three-Power draft resolution, which prevents only the entry of arms into Katanga and does not authorize the Secretary-General to eliminate their use. This amendment was intended to prevent the use of arms. We would, speaking for the United States delegation, accept "remove" as proposed by the Soviet Union—albeit reluctantly, because it is a more limiting word in our language than
"neutralize", It is obviously harder to go into enemy country and remove an aircraft, for example, than it is to shoot it down. However, we will accept that change as requested, providing we can also alter the subsequent language slightly so that it would read: ",.. to remove or to prevent the use for military purposes against the United Nations ..." andsoforth, thus giving the Secretary-General complete latitude to remove or prevent by other means. Ido not believe the representative of the Soviet Union would take exception to that alteration.
75. Finally, if anyone thinks that it would strengthen the draft resolution as a whole, we would glady redraft our first amendment so that it would read as follows: "... specifically those carried on by the provincial administration of Katanga with the aid of external resources and foreign mercenaries ...7 and so on.
76. With those additions, I should hope very much that the Council might decide to act on these amendments as a whole so that we could proceed to the adoption of a resolution at this morning's meeting.
We are coming to the end of this Security Council debate, during which I have constantly pointed out what the exact mission of the United Nations in the Congo was. This mission is to assist the legitimate and legal Central Government of the Republic, When we consider the draft resolution submitted by the three Powers, and the amendments and sub-amendments, we note that everyone here wishes to help this Central Government. There is no
inconsistency between the draft resolution, the amend-~ ments and even the sub-amendments, and I think that the few points of disagreement relate only to the meaning to be attributed to words. J therefore appeal to everyone to give concrete form to the spirit of unanimity which has appeared this morning by adopt~ ing the resolution and the amendments, which my delegation approves. I urge upon everyone the immediate adoption of a resolution that would enable my Government and the Secretary-General to co-operate in order to put an end, as soon as possible, to this Congolese tragedy with which you have been concerned for more than a year.
I hope I can prophesy that this Council will reach a unanimous decision in
regard to the question with which we are now seized. I think unanimity in our action, with regard to the draft resolution and amendments, is desirable, and in view of the situation prevailing in the Congo, the consolidation of our efforts should be of paramount concern. I think I can prophesy that we ought to reach unanimous agreement—I understand that the Biblical interpretation of my first name—Nathan—is "Son of the Prophet"so I am perhaps in a very salutary position to prophesy that we shail reach that agreement here today.
79, With regard to the amendment which has been submitted by the representative of the United States to the fifth preambular paragraph, I welcome it, But I would propose that instead of using the words "by the provincial administration of Katanga,TM we should use the words "in Katanga"; that would then correspond with paragraph 8 of our draft resolution. I trust that the United States can accept that sub-amendment.
81. When the representative of the United States spoke just now, I do not think he expressed our position quite accurately when he said that as he understood it the Soviet Union basically objected only to the United States fifth amendment. As I made clear in my statement, we also have objections with regard to other United States amendments which do not accord with the basic line of the three-Power draft resolution. I did not dwell on each of these amendments in detail, but my statement made it quite clear that I was not referring only to the fifth amendment to which we did propose a concrete sub-amendment, And the fact that the United States representative has agreed to change one word in this amendment does not alter the substance of our amendment, and we shall press the whole of our sub-amendment to this fifth amendment.
82. As regards the other United States amendments, I must say that we object to the sixth because it imposes on the Secretary~General and the United Nations as a whole tasks which are not part of the Organization's functions at the present time, for the United
Nations cannot undertake the task of reorganizing and retraining the Congolese armed units and personnel and assisting the Government to develop its armed forces for the tasks which confront it. Thisis such an enormous task that the United Nations cannot cope - with it. And the United Nations must not be set such a task unless we are prepared to see the armed forces and the whole machinery of the United Nations engaged in the Congo for decades. We are therefore un~ able to support such a paragraph in the resolution and we consider that it completely fails to meet either
the specific situation or the specific task set in the resolution as a whole, for, as I have already said, the draft resolution as a whole has a specific objective: the elimination of colonial interference above all in Katanga. But to attain this objective there is absolutely no need to introduce this point about the complete reorganization of all armed forces,
,
83, With regard to the United States seventh amendment, this paragraph states, as you know, that the Secretary-General is to be authorized "to take ail such steps in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council as he considers necessary, including those of negotiation and conciliation, to achieve the immediate political unity and territorial integrity of
the Congo",
84. But surely political unity and territorial integrity have been the object of our decisions in the Security Council and in the General Assembly from the very outset, and this object is restated in the preamble to
che three~Power draft resolution. It remains a long=- erm objective and it is this that must guide the ac- ‘ions of the Acting Secretary~General.
35, As far as negotiation and conciliation are con- ‘erned, however, with whom exactly are these negoiations to be conducted and who is to be conciliated?
n the statements that have been made here we have card a number of representatives, including the ‘epresentative of Belgium, say that they consider it ecessary to conduct negotiations and seek reconciliaion with none other than Tshombé, But the represen-
Council, to decide that negotiations should with him means contradicting both the policy Central Government and the policy generally by the United Nations, since the Organization whole and the Security Council have repeatedly a stand against the colonial forces and their
86. Consequently the seventh amendment unacceptable as an instruction to the Secretary- General,
87. And if we are to speak of national forces, is now, as you know, a Parliament, there is Government and from this point of view the forces are already united. With whom are we tiate? Negotiations can only be held with secessionist Katanga. But this, as I have indicated, is senseless but harmful to the cause of Congolese We are therefore unable to support such a paragraph and will of course vote against it.
88. Now, finally, let us turn to the fifth preambular paragraph which we were just talking about which the representative of the United States referred. The United States representative object to inserting a reference to Katanga preamble. But let us look at the text of the ambular paragraph. It reads as follows:
"Deploring all armed action and secessionist activities in opposition to the authority of ernment of the Republic of the Congo, specifically those carried on with the aid ternal resources and foreign mercenaries, completely rejecting the claim that Katanga
‘sovereign independent nation’.®
That is the text which is now proposed to us. forward to replace the text in the draft resolution Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic. text reads:
"Deploring the secessionist activities, to the United Nations decisions and purposes the interests of the Congolese people, by vincial authorities of Katanga aided by assistance and personnel and in opposition legally constituted authorities of the Congo,"
and so forth, It is clear that the one text replaces other and completely changes its emphasis.
89. The text submitted by Ceylon, Liberia United Arab Republic speaks of "the secessionist activities ... by the provincial authorities of aided by external assistance and personnel opposition to the legally constituted authorities Congo", whereas the text proposed by the United speaks of "all armed action and secessionist ties" in general "in opposition to the authority Government of the Republic of the Congo ...".
90. What is meant? We do not know. But extended toe any action of any authority, any provincial
91. The representative of the United States now says that he is agreeable to inserting the words "in Katanga". But where is he willing to insert these words? He is willing to insert them after these words:
"Deploring all armed action and secessionist activities in opposition to the authority of the Goveinment of the Republic of the Congo, including specifically those carried on by the provincial administration of Katanga ..."
That means "specifically in Katanga". The result is that Katanga is not the centre of attention but only a
"specific" case, while the rest of the activity is in all the other provinces,
92. It is perfectly clear that if we word the text in this way, the resolution as: a whole will be directed against all other provincial authorities which may have something to say about the activities of the Central Government. But that is surely not the purpose of the resolution, The resolution is directed against the hostile activity, the secessionist activity above all of Katanga, Why then has Katanga become a particular case? This amendment does not help matters at all; all it does is to mask slightly an attack directed not against Katanga but against all the other provincial authorities.
938, This does not meet the needs of the matter and will not help the unity of the Congo; it will help only to dismember it. We are therefore unable to support such an amendment, If the United States thought that the main blow should be directed against the seces~ sionist activity of Katanga, it would not object to the inclusion of the words "in Katanga" elsewhere in its amendment, namely:
‘Deploring all armed action and secessionist activities in opposition to the authority of the Government of the Republic of the Congo in Katanga* (there, why not agree to that) "including specifically those carried on with the aid of external resources and foreign mercenaries, and completely rejecting the claim that Katanga is a 'sovereign independent
nation!"
With this change we are prepared to vote for your amendment. But if you insert the words "in Katanga" to make it just a specific case, we cannot agree to that because it is not a specific case, but the main
essence of the matter.
94, That is why, when the representative of the United States says here that he does not want to divert attention from the main point, I cannot agree with him when in the same breath he inserts the words "in Katanga" in such a way as to make it a specific case, It is not a specific case, it is the main essence of the matter. If you do not agree with this, we cannot support your amendment and shall vote against it. H you consider that the essence of the matter is the seces- Sionist activity in Katanga, then you should agree with our proposal to place the words "in Katanga”TM after the words: "Deploring all armed action and seces- Sionist activities in opposition to the authority of the Government of the Republic of the Congo in Ka-
96. Itis this problem that has provided the basis for our present discussion of the question in the Security Council, so let us concentrate our attention on this problem. But if you want to concentrate attention on a.! problems, we cannot agree. We shall not support such a resolution,
97, Speaking now as PRESIDENT, I should like to propose that we should perhaps postpone the consecutive interpretation and adjourn now. We could arrange to hear the interpretation at 3 p.m. and then resume our meeting, Ef there are no objections, we shall follow that procedure.
It was so decided.
The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.
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