S/PV.9818 Security Council

In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Germany and the Islamic Republic of Iran to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs; and His Excellency Mr. Stavros Lambrinidis, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2024/880, which contains the text of a letter dated 5 December 2024 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council. At this meeting, the Council will hear briefings by Ms. DiCarlo, Mr. Lambrinidis and Ambassador Vanessa Frazier, Permanent Representative of Malta, in her capacity as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I now give the floor to Ms. DiCarlo. Ms. DiCarlo: I thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). With 10 months remaining until the termination day of resolution 2231 (2015), the impasse on restoring the JCPOA persists. Meanwhile, since I previously briefed the Council on the issue (see S/PV.9666), the regional context has deteriorated further. Against that backdrop, the need for a comprehensive, long-term-solution that would restore the objectives of the Plan has never been greater. The United States has not returned to the Plan, and neither has it lifted or waived the unilateral sanctions it reimposed after withdrawing from the JCPOA in May 2018. It has also not extended waivers regarding the trade in oil with the Islamic Republic of Iran. For its part, Iran has not reversed any of the steps it has taken since May 2019 to move away from its nuclear- related commitments. In its most recent quarterly report, dated 19 November 2024, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) observed again that its verification and monitoring activities related to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action have been “seriously affected by the cessation of Iran’s implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA.” (GOV/2024/61, para. 29) The IAEA also noted that it has lost continuity of knowledge on many aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme. In plain words, the Agency is unable to assure the international community of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. In addition, the IAEA remains unable to verify the stockpile of enriched uranium in the country, a situation that has persisted since February 2021. However, it estimated that Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile is approximately 32 times the amount allowable under the JCPOA. That includes increased quantities of uranium enriched to 20 per cent and 60 per cent. Such a stockpile of enriched uranium and level of enrichment remain very concerning. The Agency has also issued two ad hoc reports that are not reflected in the Secretary-General’s report. They describe Iran’s intention to commence previously declared enrichment activities exceeding its JCPOA limits. They also contain information about Iran’s activities to increase production of uranium enriched to 60 per cent. During the reporting period, the Secretary-General received letters from some JCPOA participants. The Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom exchanged differing views with the Permanent Representatives of Iran and the Russian Federation on the root causes of the current impasse regarding the implementation of the Plan, their respective steps taken as a result and their views on the path forward. The Secretary-General is concerned about the ongoing and persistent disagreements among those Member States at such a critical juncture. Despite those differences, those Member States have expressed their commitments to making constructive efforts to resolve them. I urge all JCPOA participants and the United States to rise to that challenge. I will now turn to the restrictive measures set out in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). The only measures that remain in effect are set out in paragraph 2 of annex B and pertain to nuclear activities and transfers. Those measures will remain in place until 18 October 2025, unless otherwise decided by the Council. No information regarding actions alleged to be inconsistent with that paragraph was brought to the attention of the Secretariat during the reporting period. Meanwhile, there were again no new proposals submitted to the procurement channel in the last six months of the reporting cycle. The Security Council, however, received four notifications regarding the nuclear-related restrictive measures for certain activities consistent with the Plan. I would like to echo the Secretary-General’s call for participants in the Plan and the United States to prioritize multilateralism and diplomacy — principles that made agreement on the JCPOA in 2015 possible. The parties should summon the political will and urgently re-engage in negotiations. Time is of the essence. While the onus is on JCPOA participants and the United States, their success or failure matters to all of us. The region cannot afford further instability. There must be genuine commitment to dialogue and diplomacy. That is the way to restore confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, realize the aspirations of the Iranian people and contribute to stability in the region and beyond. Finally, I thank Her Excellency Mrs. Vanessa Frazier for her leadership as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) over the past two years. I also thank the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission for our continued cooperation.

I thank Ms. DiCarlo for her briefing. I now give the floor to Mr. Lambrinidis. Mr. Lambrinidis: It is an honour to have the opportunity to address the Council on behalf of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Ms. Kaja Kallas, in her capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). I would like to thank Secretary-General Guterres, Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and the entire Secretariat for their work related to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), as well as Malta and my colleague Ambassador Frazier as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). We take note of the eighteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2024/896). Ensuring that Iran does not acquire or develop a nuclear weapon is a key security priority for the European Union (EU). Today more than ever, Iran’s nuclear programme cannot be seen in isolation from regional developments. We still believe that diplomacy is the best way to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme and that a fully functioning nuclear deal will be conducive to the stabilization of the whole region. Resolution 2231 (2015), which endorses the JCPOA, still provides the reference framework for the assessment and regular reporting by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In that framework, the IAEA remains the sole impartial and independent international organization to monitor and verify the implementation of Iran’s nuclear non-proliferation commitments. We commend Director General Grossi and his continuous efforts to restore an adequate cooperation with the Iranian authorities, as demonstrated during his trip to Tehran in November. We are alarmed that, as confirmed by IAEA reports, Iran’s nuclear trajectory is constantly expanding. Iran continues to depart from its JCPOA commitments and is irreversibly gaining knowledge. Iran’s accumulation of highly enriched uranium and the expansion of its nuclear enrichment infrastructure are particularly grave. Moreover, Iran’s lack of cooperation with the IAEA is affecting the IAEA’s ability to carry out its monitoring duties. It impedes the Agency from providing assurances that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful, as just noted by Under-Secretary- General DiCarlo. As a result of not having been able to perform JCPOA-related monitoring activities for more than three and a half years, the IAEA has lost its continuity of knowledge on several key components of the nuclear programme of Iran. That makes the definition of a baseline — a key component for the resumption of diplomatic efforts — even more challenging. The reporting by Director General Grossi at the end of November on the further expansion of enrichment capacity and operation, as well as in early December on a sharp increase in the production of 60 per cent enriched uranium, close to military levels, is extremely concerning. Iran was already far away from its JCPOA commitments. With those moves, Iran chose to take another escalatory step. Such actions carry very significant proliferation-related risks and raise grave concerns about Iran’s intentions. In that context, the comments made on various occasions by Iranian officials suggesting that Iran’s nuclear doctrine could change are of great concern. We continue to recognize that Iran has faced, and continues facing, very serious negative economic consequences following the United States withdrawal from the JCPOA and the reimposition by the United States of previously lifted unilateral sanctions. The United States has also imposed additional sanctions linked to the nuclear programme. At the same time, Iran’s nuclear programme is now more advanced than ever. Regarding other aspects of JCPOA implementation, we note that the procurement channel remains ready to receive proposals. It was designed as a transparency and confidence-building mechanism to give assurances that transfers of nuclear and dual-use goods and services are fully in line with resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA. We are also extremely worried about Iran’s military support to Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, including through deliveries of drones, which was done in violation of the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015). In view of the transfer of ballistic missiles to Russia, the EU adopted new and significant restrictive measures. Those measures, unanimously adopted by the 27 States members of the EU, include entities involved in shipping Iran’s military equipment. They were taken under the EU framework in view of Iran’s military support to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities in the Middle East and the Red Sea region. They are not linked to the implementation of the JCPOA. We call on the Government of Iran to stop military support to a country that is violating the Charter of the United Nations. The EU will continue to respond to that as necessary. In the six months since our previous meeting on resolution 2231 (2015) (see S/PV.9666), we have seen the situation worsen on many aspects, including the nuclear trajectory and beyond. The next few months will be uncertain and risky. No one would be served by increasing escalation, which could easily spiral out of control. With that in mind, we call on all remaining parties to the JCPOA and the United States to sustain dialogue on the Iranian nuclear programme and related sanctions matters. At the same time, we urge Iran to resume full cooperation with the IAEA and to refrain from further moving away from its JCPOA commitments, as a first confidence-building measure. De-escalation steps on the nuclear front would help restore trust. They could recreate an environment conducive to the resumption of negotiations. The Iranian nuclear issue can be addressed only in a sustainable manner with the adequate involvement of the international community. The EU High Representative, in her role as Coordinator, is committed to contributing to the development of a diplomatic solution to Iran’s nuclear programme in order to preserve the space for nuclear diplomacy. Iran must deliver on its side.

I thank Mr. Lambrinidis for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Frazier. Ms. Frazier: I speak in my capacity as the appointed Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (see S/2024/918) was approved by Council members on 13 December 2024. I would like to thank all Council members for their cooperation and constructive engagement in that process and for their spirit of compromise and flexibility. This is my fourth report as the Council’s appointed Facilitator, and I am grateful for the Council’s continued support. I am also very pleased that we were able to put forth the report to the Council. The report provides a factual account of the activities that took place relating to the 2231 format of the Security Council, covering the period from 20 June to 13 December. It includes five subsections, namely, the summaries of activities, monitoring the implementation of the resolution, relevant communications, key aspects of the workings of the procurement channel and transparency, outreach and guidance. Members may refer to the report for details, but I would like to mention the following key aspects. First, one meeting of the Council in the 2231 format was held during the reporting period. The meeting was held on 13 December, and representatives of the Security Council discussed the findings and recommendations contained in the eighteenth report of the Secretary- General (S/2024/896) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) prior to its public release. Under- Secretary-General DiCarlo already referred to those points in her statement. Secondly, during the reporting period, a total of nine notes were circulated within the 2231 format. In addition, a total of five official communications were sent to Member States and the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission, and a total of four communications from Member States and the Coordinator were received. Among the communications circulated were the two regular quarterly reports issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in August and November and ad hoc reports in June, November and December. The key aspects of those Agency reports are duly reflected in my report. The IAEA plays an important role in the verification and monitoring of nuclear activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, as requested under resolution 2231 (2015). The IAEA’s work provides confidence for the international community that the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran is for exclusively peaceful purposes, in accordance with the modalities set out in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The reports of the Director General play a significant role in that regard. Thirdly, I report that no new proposals were submitted to the Security Council through the procurement channel during the reporting period. The procurement channel represents a key transparency and confidence-building mechanism under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. It remains operational, and the Procurement Working Group stands ready to review proposals. As stated by the speakers before me, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as endorsed by the Council through resolution 2231 (2015), is the best available option to ensure that the Iranian nuclear programme remains exclusively peaceful. While recognizing the challenging environment that the 2231 format is facing, I believe that, through dialogue and multilateralism, we can make the utmost effort in ensuring that the Plan and resolution 2231 (2015) are implemented effectively, while building upon mutual trust and cooperation. Finally, I would like to state that, as Facilitator, I have done my utmost to support the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which it underpins. Over the past two years, my team and I have worked closely with all Council members in an impartial and transparent manner to meet our shared responsibility. I thank all Council members, as well as the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran, for their cooperation and the confidence that they have placed in us. I would also like to thank the staff of the Secretariat for their invaluable advice and strong support during the period. It has been a great honour to work with everyone on this important file.

I thank Ambassador Frazier for her briefing. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the United States. I thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and Head of Delegation Lambrinidis for their briefings. I also thank Ambassador Frazier for her critical work as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) during her time on the Security Council. When we look into the forces behind some of today’s most devastating and destabilizing conflicts, we see one country’s name pop up over and over again — Iran. Iran continues to fuel conflict and instability in the Middle East and other parts of the world, and its nuclear activities continue to be of grave concern. The report of the Secretary-General’s (S/2024/896) notes that Iran continues to expand its nuclear programme, installing additional advanced centrifuges and accumulating greater quantities of highly enriched uranium. The report issued by Director General Grossi of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IEAE) on 6 December further exposes Iran’s relentless pursuit and continued expansion of its nuclear programme. Iran will tell everyone that its aims are peaceful and that they are for civilian use. But the IAEA’s report calls that into question. The IAEA Director General has said that Iran is ramping up production of 60 per cent enriched uranium at a pace that significantly increases its ability to rapidly produce additional material. All of that is happening against the backdrop of continued comments by Iranian officials suggesting that Iran may decide to change its nuclear doctrine and to build a nuclear weapon. We have good reason to be concerned about Tehran’s intentions. Iran’s actions suggest that it is not interested in demonstrating verifiably that its nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. We must be clear — all of us — in our condemnation of that dangerous conduct and Iran’s failure to cooperate with and address the IAEA’s unresolved questions. Iran has the opportunity to change course and engage in diplomacy. Instead of expanding its programme and stirring up speculation about its intentions, Iran should take actions that build international confidence and de-escalate tensions. The United States has long believed such diplomacy to be the best way to achieve a sustainable, effective solution to the international community’s concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear programme. Although diplomacy is the best option, the United States also has been clear that a nuclear Iran can never be an option. We are prepared to use all elements of national power to ensure that outcome. We are also concerned about the developments with Iran’s ballistic missile and drone programmes — weapons we have seen Iran use against its neighbours repeatedly over the past year. Indeed, Tehran continues to export chaos and violence to other countries, especially in the Middle East. The regime openly brags about that. Iran’s own State-affiliated media has touted its country’s supply of prohibited ballistic-missile technology to the Houthis — violations documented by United Nations experts. Iran was fully implicated in supplying weapons to Hizbullah. Iran has also transferred drone technology and short-range ballistic missiles to Russia, enabling Russia to prosecute its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. We know without a doubt that Russia acquired hundreds of unmanned aerial vehicles from Iran for use against Ukraine before October 2023, in violation of resolution 2231 (2015). It is therefore no surprise that Russia leaps to defend Iran at every opportunity. But we cannot allow Russia’s dependency on Iran to deter the Council from demanding that Tehran abide by its obligations under various Security Council resolutions, including resolution 2231 (2015). We all have a role to play in condemning Iran’s brazen, destabilizing behaviour, not only in our statements today but, even more important, through concrete action. When Iran flagrantly defies the Security Council without consequence and flouts its resolutions, and when it ignores the clear and consistent concerns of the IAEA, it undermines the credibility and authority of the United Nations. We must therefore continue to hold Iran to account and continue to live up to our mandate to advance international peace and security. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make a statement.

I would like to thank the Secretariat, the representative of the European Union and the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) for their briefings. Since our previous meeting in June (see S/PV.9666), Iran has continued to escalate its nuclear programme, in violation of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran is continuing to accumulate a stockpile of enriched uranium, which is now 32 times greater than the limits set by the JCPOA. That includes a stockpile of uranium highly enriched up to 60 per cent. The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) pointed out that Iran was the only non-nuclear-weapon State to enrich uranium to such levels. Today Iran is said to have four significant quantities, that is, four times the quantity of fissile material from which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear weapon cannot be ruled out. Those enrichment levels and activities have no credible civilian justification. Furthermore, Iran is continuing to increase its enriched uranium production capacity, installing thousands of advanced centrifuges, including at the Fordow underground site, where such activities are prohibited by the JCPOA. Those elements, taken from the most recent IAEA reports, testify to the very worrisome trajectory of Iran’s nuclear programme. Iran has also stopped implementing almost all the transparency measures provided for in the agreement, and more than a year ago, withdrew the accreditation of several experienced inspectors. We must also note Iran’s lack of technically credible cooperation with the Agency on outstanding safeguards implementation issues. In that context, the Agency has repeatedly indicated that it has lost the continuity of knowledge on entire sections of Iran’s nuclear programme, including the inventory and production of centrifuges, and that it is not in a position to affirm that the programme was exclusively peaceful. Iran has made a number of very worrisome statements regarding its technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons and a possible change in its alleged nuclear doctrine. Such statements run counter to Iran’s commitment under the JCPOA according to which it will under no circumstances seek to obtain, develop or acquire nuclear weapons. They also run counter to Iran’s obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Iran is also continuing to develop its ballistic missile programme, which could one day be used as a delivery vehicle for nuclear weapons. We must recall that arms transfers from Iran, including drones to Russia, began before October 2023, in violation of the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015) on ballistic activities. France, together with its E3 partners — Germany and the United Kingdom — is continuing to work for a diplomatic solution. Faced with Iran’s serious and persistent violations of the agreement, we activated, in January 2020, the dispute settlement mechanism provided for by the JCPOA. In that context, we have made considerable efforts, including holding negotiations in 2021 and 2022 in Vienna, which would have enabled the United States to return to the agreement and Iran to fully implement its commitments. We regret that Iran did not seize those opportunities. The nuclear escalation in which Iran is engaged is very dangerous. It empties the JCPOA of its substance and hinders the resumption of a diplomatic path to address the international community’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme. It threatens international peace and security and requires the attention of the Security Council. We once again call on Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA, whose constant efforts France commends. We remain committed to seeking a diplomatic solution to ensure that Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons. We are determined to use all diplomatic tools to achieve that.

I thank Under-Secretary- General DiCarlo, Ambassador Lambrinidis and Ambassador Frazier for their briefings. I also welcome the participation of the representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Federal Republic of Germany in this meeting. Guyana acknowledges the eighteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (see S/2024/896). We note with concern that the regional context surrounding the Joint Comprehen­ sive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has further deteriorated. We also take note of the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of 19 November, in which the Agency continues to highlight its difficulties in performing JCPOA-related verification and monitoring and providing assurances of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. We noted also the concerns about the production and accumulation of highly enriched uranium by Iran, which exceeded the limit stipulated in the Plan. While noting the concerns of the Secretary- General and the IAEA, we also observed one important point of convergence by participants of the Plan. In letters sent by the E3 — France, Germany and the United Kingdom — and by Iran on 27 November and 2 December, respectively, both expressed a commitment to diplomacy. Additionally, we noted Iran’s decision to consider the acceptance of the designation of four additional experienced inspectors. Guyana believes that those are positive indications which should be capitalized upon to find a sustainable path forward. Guyana also reaffirms its belief that full implementation of the Plan and resolution are critical for promoting peace and security in the region and for confidence-building. We stress that it is imperative in a time when the region is gripped by growing insecurity and instability, as well as increasing mistrust between and among countries. We must remember the basis under which the Plan was negotiated — cooperation and diplomacy. Those two key principles remain valid and are even more necessary in the current context. In that regard, Guyana once again urges all concerned parties to return to the Plan. We also call on Iran to recommit to its nuclear- related commitments under the Plan. Guyana continues to underscore and support the vital efforts of the Security Council, the Secretary- General, the IAEA and the Joint Commission’s procurement channel in facilitating the implementation of the resolution and Plan. I would also like to express my gratitude to Malta as Facilitator for its commitment and efforts in promoting the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) over the past two years on the Security Council. In conclusion, Guyana remains hopeful that there could be movement towards the implementation of the JCPOA before the expiration of resolution 2231 (2015) in October 2025. We reiterate our calls for all participants to the Plan to engage in dialogue and diplomacy to that end. We also reiterate our commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons, which is possible only through their total elimination.

I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, Ambassador Frazier and Ambassador Lamdrinidis for their briefings. Switzerland remains disappointed and concerned about the state of the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Switzerland has repeatedly expressed its deep concern about the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and the various measures taken by Iran. And as we approach the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 2231 (2015), we deplore the fact that no progress has been made in the past four years towards a return to the implementation of its measures by all parties. As conflicts in the region flare up, it remains essential to maintain this important element of international security and the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Consequently, the rapid and full implementation by all parties of their obligations is imperative and urgent, given that the expiry date of resolution 2231 (2015) is less than a year away, in October 2025. We therefore believe it is vital to speed up the Security Council’s commitment on three fronts in the coming months. First, compliance with the obligations arising from the JCPOA remains essential. In that respect, the latest reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) raise many questions about the overall increase in Iran’s stocks of enriched uranium, in particular the recently increased enrichment capacity of 60 per cent and the difficulties encountered by the Agency in verifying the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. More than 21 months after the joint declaration between the IAEA and Iran on 4 March 2023, no progress has been made, which is unsatisfactory. Iran must fully comply with its commitments under this agreement, without delay, and the Iranian authorities must cooperate rigorously, transparently and unequivocally with the Agency. Secondly, a number of legal obligations arise from the Agreement between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, besides the additional commitments undertaken by Iran under the JCPOA. Those commitments must be fully respected by all States parties. In that respect, we are particularly alarmed by narratives calling into question Iran’s doctrine of never acquiring nuclear weapons. We also reiterate the need to fully implement the legally binding obligations relating to nuclear safeguards and the four resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors, the last of which was adopted in November. Furthermore, mutual criticism of non-compliance with such obligations should not be seen as a reason not to pursue negotiations. That undermines the confidence needed to reach agreement and runs counter to the clearly expressed desire of Member States, most recently in the Pact for the Future (General Assembly resolution 79/1), to advance nuclear disarmament. In addition, we are concerned about the substantiated indications of the transfer from Iran to third countries of weapons systems, such as drones and even ballistic missiles, in possible violation of Security Council resolutions. Thirdly, recent developments, in particular the risk of escalation into regional conflict, remind us of the importance of maintaining non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. While this agreement is still a point of reference, we must work as quickly as possible to return to the path of negotiation and strengthen dialogue in the spirit that prevailed in Geneva, Lausanne and Vienna 10 years ago. For it is through negotiation and respect for standards that trust, the cornerstone of the multilateral framework, is built. We call for the resumption of talks without delay and remind those involved of the interest we all have in resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. The Council must find a common voice on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation. Switzerland, as it has done in the past by hosting critical stages in the negotiations, stands ready to facilitate any diplomatic solution aimed at maintaining the non-proliferation regime.

I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, Ambassador Lambrinidis and Ambassador Frazier for their briefings. Algeria appreciates their continued efforts to support the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Algeria reaffirms its unwavering support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which remains a significant achievement of multilateral diplomacy. It is also an essential contributor to regional and international peace and security. We maintain our firm conviction that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action continues to represent the most effective framework for ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities, while providing for the lifting of sanctions. As we approach the final year of the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), we underscore the paramount importance of preserving diplomatic dialogue to fully restore the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In that regard, we urge all parties to exercise restraint and avoid provocative actions that risk escalating tensions or undermining a diplomatic resolution and would have serious repercussions, creating a major crisis that serves no one’s interests. We support the ongoing cooperation between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and welcome the recent high-level meeting between Iran and the IAEA on 14 November. In that context, we take note of discussions on technical verification measures that could contribute to addressing current concerns. We urge all parties to build on those diplomatic openings, demonstrate maximum flexibility and work towards the full implementation of their respective commitments under the agreement. Algeria firmly believes that diplomacy remains the only viable path forward. We call on all parties to intensify their diplomatic efforts, capitalize on progress achieved thus far and demonstrate the necessary political will to reach mutually acceptable solutions. Algeria stands ready to support all constructive diplomatic initiatives aimed at achieving the full implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and preserving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. We strongly encourage the Security Council to maintain its unity in supporting that crucial objective, particularly as we approach this critical juncture in the final year of the resolution’s implementation.

I thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, Ambassador Lambrinidis, Head of the Delegation of the European Union (EU) to the United Nations and Ambassador Frazier, Permanent Representative of Malta, for their briefings, and welcome the presence of the Permanent Representatives of Iran and Germany at today’s meeting. For some time now, Iran has adopted a constructive position on nuclear issues and constantly sent positive signals, repeatedly indicating its willingness to restart negotiations on the Iranian nuclear issue. The EU, the United Kingdom, France and Germany have responded positively and recently held a new round of talks with the Iranian side. The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency paid a successful visit to Iran last month, and the two sides have continued cooperation on outstanding issues related to Iranian nuclear safeguards and monitoring. Such positive developments are hard won. All parties concerned should seize the opportunity and meet one another halfway in order to resume talks on the Iranian nuclear issue and strive to achieve early results. To that end, we should make efforts on the following fronts. First, we should stay the general course towards a political settlement and maintain the effectiveness of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), rather than overturning the Plan or reinventing the wheel. The JCPOA was concluded after more than 10 years of painstaking negotiations and was endorsed by the Security Council. It remains the best option to this day and represents the greatest common denominator to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomatic means. The parties made extensive efforts in 2021 and 2022 on resuming compliance with the Plan and almost reached a consensus on the final text at one point. The parties should appreciate those negotiation results, continue to focus on the resumption of the full and effective implementation of the Plan, address the legitimate and reasonable concerns of all parties in a balanced manner and safeguard the parties’ legitimate rights and interests. Secondly, we should create a favourable political environment and strengthen mutual trust and understanding. The parties should not resort to sanctions, pressure or confrontation at every opportunity. The lack of trust among the relevant parties, especially between the United States and Iran, is the main obstacle to the resumption of talks. As the party responsible for causing the Iranian nuclear crisis, the United States should assume its historical responsibility, demonstrate political goodwill and promote the resumption of talks rather than doubling down on its practice of exerting maximum pressure once again. The other parties concerned should also take positive steps, promote dialogue and engagement and continue to build mutual trust so as to create the conditions necessary for the resumption of talks. The snap-back mechanism of the Security Council should not be used by certain countries as a tool for intimidation, megaphone diplomacy or pressure. Threatening to activate the mechanism at every turn is not helpful. It only erodes mutual trust and impedes the process towards achieving a political settlement. Thirdly, we should adopt a rational and pragmatic attitude and adhere to extrapolating truth from the facts instead of expanding or complicating the Iranian nuclear crisis. In the face of the continuing turbulence in the Middle East, parties should uphold a common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept; address differences and disputes through dialogue and consultation; promote the building of a universally accepted Middle East security architecture; and create the conditions necessary to achieve lasting peace and common security. The parties should play a constructive role in easing regional tension and avoid linking the Iranian nuclear issue with other matters. Otherwise, it will only exacerbate antagonism, fuel confrontation, further complicate the Iranian nuclear issue and eventually render all diplomatic efforts futile. In the current international security context, appropriately addressing the Iranian nuclear issue through political and diplomatic means is of paramount importance to maintaining the international non-proliferation regime and peace and stability in the region. China once again calls on all parties to act with a greater sense of urgency, demonstrate responsibility and ownership, resume talks as soon as possible and strive to achieve consensus and results. As a permanent member of the Council and participant in the JCPOA, China will continue to maintain an objective and impartial position, remain in close contact with the parties and actively promote the political process for the settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue, while firmly safeguarding its legitimate and legal rights and interests.

I thank Under- Secretary-General DiCarlo, Ambassador Lambrinidis and Ambassador Frazier for briefing us today. Iran continues to develop its nuclear programme to levels that lack any credible civilian justification. Iran is not only failing to uphold its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), it is also peddling dangerous and escalatory rhetoric around its nuclear capability and doctrine. And Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium is already more than 32 times that of the JCPOA limits. On 6 December, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran had significantly increased its production rate of 60 per cent high enriched uranium, which is now approximately five times higher than a month ago. There is no justification for Iran’s stockpiling of high enriched uranium, which gives it the capability to rapidly produce enough fissile material for multiple nuclear weapons. Iran is the only State without nuclear weapons to enrich uranium at that level. We should be under no illusions as to Iran’s growing capabilities. Iran’s nuclear programme has never been so advanced, and the IAEA can no longer assure us that its purposes are exclusively peaceful. We should all be worried about what that means for global non-proliferation. Iran has a choice. It can continue to escalate over the coming months, or it can choose diplomacy. It must choose the latter. The United Kingdom and our partners within the European three group (E3) are determined to reach a diplomatic solution. We will continue to engage Iran to find a constructive way forward. But let us be clear. With resolution 2231 (2015) set to expire in October 2025, we are reaching a critical juncture. We will take every diplomatic step to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, including triggering the snap-back mechanism if necessary.

I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, Ambassador Lambrinidis and Ambassador Frazier for their briefings. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is undoubtedly one of the greatest achievements of multilateralism of the past decade. It instituted a robust regime that comprehensively addressed a pressing international security issue. Unfortunately, it has suffered some hard blows since the United States withdrew from it and Iran started to implement the so- called remedial measures. Slovenia remains concerned that Iran stopped the implementation of the transparency measures envisaged by the JCPOA. When, in addition to that, the decision was made to remove all of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring equipment, a full overview of Iran’s nuclear programme was rendered impossible. All of that is detrimental to the Agency’s ability to confirm the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. In the meantime, Iran has accumulated a stockpile of enriched uranium that is now nearing a level of more than 32 times more than the JCPOA limit. In addition, and as underlined numerous times by the IAEA, Iran is the only non-nuclear-weapon State to produce and accumulate highly enriched uranium, and, thus far, Iran has accumulated almost 200 kilograms of it. Those concerns have been exacerbated by the latest developments, as Iran intends to significantly increase the production of highly enriched uranium. And, most importantly, we still lack a credible explanation of how the highly enriched uranium will, or can, be used for civilian purposes. With that in mind, Slovenia calls on Iran to reverse those actions and refrain from any further escalatory steps. Iran’s full cooperation with the IAEA remains crucial. Slovenia fully supports the Agency and commends it for its important work. The size and unclear nature of Iran’s nuclear programme presents challenges that the comprehensive safeguards agreement simply could never have fully addressed. Today that is a greater concern than it was before JCPOA was adopted. We have entered the final year under resolution 2231 (2015), and the termination day is drawing closer. We remain confident that there is only a political solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Slovenia joins the Secretary-General’s call to remain committed to a diplomatic solution for restoring the JCPOA’s objectives.

I shall now deliver a statement in my national capacity. I begin by thanking Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and Ambassador Lambrinidis for their briefings. We welcome the Secretary-General’s eighteenth report (S/2024/896) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the Joint Commission’s report on the status of the Procurement Working Group’s decisions. We have taken note of both reports. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), along with the endorsement of the Plan in resolution 2231 (2015), has represented a great diplomatic achievement and a crucial instrument for non-proliferation efforts. However, over the past two years, the environment around the JCPOA, including regional dynamics, deteriorated deeply, with detrimental impacts on the Plan’s implementation. During its time on the Council, Malta has tried to facilitate all efforts towards dialogue aimed at the full implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). Regrettably, efforts have been unsuccessful in ensuring renewed compliance with the JCPOA commitments, including a full return to the Plan’s implementation by all parties. Nevertheless, we remain deeply committed to a diplomatic solution to the Iran nuclear issue, in line with the objectives and the spirit of the JCPOA. We will continue to support all initiatives in that regard. To that end, we echo the Secretary-General’s call on all parties to prioritize diplomacy. That is the only pathway to ensuring a stable and peaceful resolution of this issue. In its most recent reports, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has painted a worrisome picture of the situation. It noted that Iran has continued to increase its stockpile of enriched uranium, including uranium enriched to 60 per cent, now reaching what the Agency calls four significant quantities. In the latest ad hoc report, the Agency also stated that Iran has further increased its production capacity. Furthermore, the Agency’s monitoring and verification activities have been seriously affected by Iran’s non-compliance with the JCPOA, including its removal of surveillance and monitoring equipment. That resulted in a loss of continuity of knowledge for the Agency and hindered its ability to provide assurances on the peaceful nature of the nuclear programme. We take note of Iran’s decision to consider the reappointment of four designated experts, which was welcomed by the IAEA Director General. At the same time, we reiterate our concerns about Iran’s previous decision to withdraw the designation of several experts. The full reversal of that decision is essential to allow the Agency to conduct its verification activities effectively. Once again, we commend the professional work carried out by the IAEA. Its verification and monitoring activities are indispensable, and it can count on Malta’s full support. In conclusion, I reiterate our support for a diplomatic solution to restore the objectives of the JCPOA. I also thank all Council members for their engagement and for entrusting us with this role. I call on them to continue to work constructively on this file, and I wish our successor all the best for a fruitful term.

I thank Under-Secretary- General DiCarlo, His Excellency Mr. Lambrinidis and Ambassador Frazier for their informative briefings. Japan reiterates its support for the non-proliferation objectives of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme must be ensured, and verification and monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are essential to that end. We are therefore seriously concerned that the Agency’s role has been significantly affected by the cessation of Iran’s implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. As a result, the Agency has lost continuity of knowledge in relation, inter alia, to the production and inventory of centrifuges and other materials. Japan also expresses its grave concern about the installation and operation of new advanced centrifuges and the increase in Iran’s stockpiles of highly enriched uranium. In particular, the recent change in the rate of production of enriched uranium up to 60 per cent at Fordow reported by the IAEA is deeply worrisome. We emphasize that such action undermines the momentum for dialogue, and we call on Iran to cease and reverse such provocative nuclear activities. Even at this challenging moment, we are aware that Iran recently had meetings with the E3 countries — namely, France, Germany and the United Kingdom — and the European Union in Geneva. We encourage all relevant countries to continue consultations to rebuild the nuclear deal. Moreover, what is needed to build confidence is for Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and to fully allow the Agency to effectively conduct its verification activities. We strongly hope that Iran will demonstrate its Government’s orientation towards a path of dialogue and cooperation through concrete actions, not only words, including by resolving the outstanding safeguards issues. The situation in the Middle East is extremely volatile. Further escalation is not in anyone’s interest. All parties concerned must work to restore peace and security through diplomacy. For its part, Japan has engaged with Iran, including at the highest level, and has directly exchanged candid views on a variety of issues, including the nuclear-related ones. We will continue to make diplomatic efforts based on our traditional relationship with Iran and other key stakeholders.

I thank Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs; His Excellency Mr. Stavros Lambrinidis, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations; and Ambassador Vanessa Frazier, Permanent Representative of Malta, in her capacity as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), for their briefings. I welcome the participation of the representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Federal Republic of Germany in this meeting. Sierra Leone reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the principles of disarmament, non-proliferation and international peace and security and to diplomatic efforts aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. We welcome the eighteenth report of the Secretary-General (S/2024/896), the eighteenth six-monthly report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (see S/2024/918) and the eighteenth report of the Joint Commission to the Security Council on the status of the Procurement Working Group’s decisions and implementation issues, covering the period from 1 June to 4 December 2024 (S/2024/880). Sierra Leone recalls that, in the seventeenth report of the Secretary-General (S/2024/471), it was noted that restoring the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) remains elusive, as the Islamic Republic of Iran has not reversed the steps it took away from its nuclear-related commitments since 8 May 2019, following the withdrawal of the United States from the Plan. In addition, the United States has not lifted the unilateral sanctions imposed after its withdrawal in May 2018, or extended the waivers on oil trade with Iran. We express deep concern that the verification and monitoring activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) related to the JCPOA have been significantly hindered by Iran’s cessation of its nuclear commitments under the JCPOA. That has resulted in a loss of continuity in the IAEA’s understanding of many aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme. While positions remain unchanged, Sierra Leone is gravely concerned by reports of further negative developments regarding the implementation of the JCPOA and the deteriorating security situation in the region. Particularly concerning is the IAEA’s inability to verify Iran’s total stockpile of enriched uranium since February 2021. In the light of the IAEA’s estimates of Iran’s uranium stockpile as at 26 October, we have taken note of the letters dated 27 November from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, contained in document S/2024/862, the response dated 2 December from the Permanent Representative of Iran, contained in document S/2024/874), and the dated 3 December from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, contained in S/2024/878. Having reviewed the observations, concerns, claims and counterclaims of those parties, Sierra Leone firmly believes that the reports of the Secretary-General, of the Facilitator and of the IAEA on verification and monitoring activities in Iran offer a fair and balanced assessment of the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). They highlight significant violations, which have the potential to exacerbate the situation, and raise serious questions about Iran’s nuclear programme and its commitment to the JCPOA and the Plan’s non-proliferation goals. Sierra Leone therefore takes due note of the IAEA’s additional report of 14 November on its high- level meetings with Iran, during which the possibility no further stockpile expansion of uranium enriched up to 60 per cent by Iran was raised. We also note Iran’s assurance that its actions are reversible and that nuclear weapons have no place in its defence doctrine, emphasizing that all its nuclear activities are exclusively for peaceful purposes. We call for de-escalation and cooperation with the IAEA as Iran pursues its peaceful nuclear energy programme. In that regard, we urge Iran to reverse its September 2023 decision to withdraw designations for several experienced IAEA inspectors, who are essential to the Agency’s effective verification activities in Iran. We commend the JCPOA Coordinator for his continued efforts to consult with the Plan’s participants and the United States, working towards the latter’s possible return to the Plan and ensuring its full and effective implementation. As we call for a return to the JCPOA, we join the Secretary-General in urging all participants to pursue all available avenues for dialogue and cooperation. We commend the participants of the JCPOA for reaffirming their commitment to a diplomatic solution and to ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. We welcome Iran’s reaffirmation of its unwavering commitment to diplomacy and its interest in a solution based on mutual respect, adherence to international law and the creation of an environment conducive to negotiations. It is relevant to note that, during the reporting period, although no new proposals were submitted to the Security Council for approval, four new notifications were received pursuant to paragraph 2 of annex B of resolution 2231 (2015) for certain nuclear-related activities, consistent with the JCPOA notification requirements to the Council, without the need for approval. We commend the Joint Commission and the participants in the Procurement Working Group for their continued efforts to uphold the integrity of the procurement channel and fully support its functioning as a transparency and confidence-building mechanism. We join the Facilitator in advocating for the full utilization of the procurement channel. We recall that resolution 2231 (2015) calls on all Member States to refrain from actions that undermine the implementation of commitments under the JCPOA. In conclusion, Sierra Leone commends the Secretary-General, the Facilitator and the Director General of the IAEA and their teams for their work and reports. We call on all Member States and regional and international organizations to take appropriate action to fully support the implementation of the JCPOA.

We thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo and Mrs. Vanessa Frazier, Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and Permanent Representative of Malta, for their briefings. We would like to take this opportunity to congratulate Mrs. Frazier and her team on successfully agreeing the most recent biannual report of the Facilitator (see S/2024/918). We thank our Maltese colleagues for their active efforts and contribution to the functioning of the resolution 2231 (2015) format over the past two years. The European Coordinators of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) should learn from Malta’s objective and balanced approach. We listened closely to Mr. Stavros Lambrinidis, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations. Alas, yet again, his briefing cannot be described as impartial or as being aimed at returning to the implementation of the nuclear deal. Brussels continues to abuse its powers and advance the same anti-Iranian narrative. The goal is clearly to play up to a small group of countries that are trying at all costs to cover up their own multiple violations of resolution 2231 (2015). The Russian Federation remains convinced of the need for full compliance with resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA. Nine years ago, the parties to the Plan demonstrated that any issues or misunderstandings could be resolved if we abandon politicized agendas and adopt a pragmatic approach. The endorsement of the JCPOA made it possible to consider the interests of all parties concerned and gave the international community all the necessary tools so that no one had any doubts about the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. However, time has shown who really is interested in constructive interaction and who is only seeking to advance their political and propaganda directives. The most recent biannual report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2024/896) shows, both in form and in content, how unseemly the current situation is. We now see that it is all a direct consequence of the ill-conceived policies and gross violations of the resolution by the United States and the European parties to the JCPOA. Despite pressure from Western countries, Secretary-General Guterres did not turn a blind eye to objective reality. In his report, he quite rightly notes that, in the past six months, the United States has done nothing to somehow rectify its wrongdoings. First and foremost, I am referring to the unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 and the introduction of illegal sanctions against Iran. And it is not only in the past six months. The outgoing United States Administration, which came to power on a wave of promises to correct the mistakes of its predecessors, has done absolutely nothing to bring the United States of America back into the nuclear deal, nor has Washington demonstrated any political will to do so. The European parties to the JCPOA — the United Kingdom, France and Germany — have not deviated from the path set by Washington either. Despite their stated commitment to diplomacy, they seize on any excuse to stir up anti-Iranian hysteria, and, in doing so, they reduce the possibility of reaching any negotiated solutions. They distort the facts over the Iranian nuclear programme and present them in a way that would play into the hands of Washington and its allies, they disseminate false or irrelevant data — all that has long become a tool for exerting so-called “maximum pressure” on Tehran. Alas, we must also note that some points in the Secretary-General’s report also leave room for interpretation. The report quotes very selectively from the reports of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) circulated during the reporting period. The focus is once again placed on excerpts stating that the cessation of Tehran’s good- faith commitments under the JCPOA has seriously affected the IAEA’s verification and monitoring activities and undermined the continuity of knowledge about Iran’s nuclear programme. The report provides statistics, taken out of context, that suggest that Iran is increasing its stockpiles of uranium enriched to 20 and 60 per cent. As we can see from today’s meeting, the United States and the European parties to the JCPOA are actively seizing upon that data and trying to use it to reprimand Tehran even further. But will the representatives of Washington, London, Paris or Berlin say — or indeed have they said — why Iran has taken such steps? That is a rhetorical question, so we can therefore answer it for them — and after us, I imagine, our Iranian colleagues will do so as well. Everyone is well aware that Tehran’s actions are nothing more than a reaction to the reckless policy of the United States, along with the United Kingdom, France and Germany. It was those countries that were the first to strike a blow against the JCPOA, which ultimately led to the reduction in the IAEA’s verification activities in Iran. It was those countries that took the path of neglecting their international obligations, freely interpreting the provisions of the Plan. Do I really need to recall, for example, how the unilateral refusal by the United States and the Western parties to the nuclear deal to lift the restrictions under resolution 2231 (2015), which expired in October 2023, has cast a long shadow over the prospect of the Majlis ratifying the additional protocol to the comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA? Nevertheless, the European parties to the JCPOA are hypocritically trying to rebuke Tehran for that. We would like to recall that Iran’s freezing of its voluntary transparency measures provided for in the nuclear deal was also a reaction to the unlawful actions by the Western parties to the deal. Attempts to portray that as a violation of non-proliferation obligations are clearly intended to be fed to the lay person, and in legal terms, they are completely untenable. If Washington, London, Paris and Berlin really wanted greater transparency — which is something that Tehran was ready for and it has repeatedly confirmed as much — they would have taken concrete steps to return to the full implementation of the nuclear deal. However, they did not want to do so and instead have opted to undermine multilateral efforts aimed at reviving the JCPOA. Since the Western troika is unwilling to move in that direction, then we have to be guided by the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, with which Iran is complying in good faith. The Islamic Republic of Iran was and remains the most closely and meticulously verified State among all the members of the IAEA. The international community receives all its information on nuclear activities in Iran from the Agency. The cooperation between the IAEA and Iran is continuing, as clearly demonstrated by the visit of Director General Rafael Grossi to Tehran on 14 and 15 November. The productive results of those meetings are reflected in both of the reports before us today — the Secretary General’s report and the report of the Facilitator on the implementation of resolution on 2231 (2015). However, the United States, the United Kingdom and the two European countries are doing everything they can to not notice that. On the contrary, they are doing everything possible to reduce to nothing the agreements between the IAEA and the Iranian leadership. Members do not need to look far to find examples of that. Just look at the adoption of an anti-Iranian resolution by the IAEA Board of Governors that was pushed through by Western countries in November. In the same vein, the United Kingdom, France and Germany, circulated in the Security Council, in bad tradition, two letters (S/2024/862 and S/2024/886) at the very end of the work on the semi-annual reports of the Secretary-General and the Facilitator, apparently, in a desperate attempt to fill those reports with anti-Iranian passages. By cynically flouting the agreements reached previously and citing meritless arguments, the United States and European parties to the JCPOA are making it clear that they are not going to uphold their obligations under resolution 2231 (2015). At the same time, they are doing everything they can to shift the responsibility for the stagnation and ultimate collapse of the nuclear deal on Tehran. I want to make it clear that the aggressive hyping-up of supposed threats allegedly emanating from the Iranian nuclear programme must not be used to pin on Tehran the West’s miscalculations, mistakes and gross violations of resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA. We are not at all surprised that some Western countries decided by force of habit to turn today’s meeting into yet another exercise in vilifying all countries they do not like, including the Russian Federation. They stop at nothing in their vilification campaign — they resort to retrospective accusations of violations of resolution 2231 (2015), which has already ceased to have effect — and insinuations about the Ukrainian issue that have nothing to do with the issues under discussion whatsoever. My country has repeatedly and categorically refuted such accusations, demonstrating the meritless nature of the arguments put forward by Western delegations. Anyone who wishes to do so can familiarize themselves with our statements and the relevant letters we have circulated in the Security Council. We also have to address another very serious matter. Unfortunately, resorting to fabrications divorced from reality about the status of Iran’s nuclear programme is not enough for some countries. Sometimes they even resort to direct threats. We are referring to the irresponsible rhetoric of the United Kingdom and the two European countries about their intentions to trigger the snapback mechanism. The Russian Federation has already repeatedly explained that such a step would have neither political nor legal grounds. Back in 2020, we circulated in a letter addressed to the Security Council containing an exhaustive analysis on that matter (S/2020/816). The references by Western countries to them having allegedly triggered the dispute-resolution mechanism at the Vienna forum at that time are absolutely without merit. It was never launched, given the numerous procedural violations by Western colleagues. Therefore, any attempts by the Europeans to go down the snapback path are doomed to failure. However, we have to deal with much more dangerous rhetoric. Judging by reports in the media, some States do not rule out the option of using force against Iran. We have noticed that in particular in recent publications in The Wall Street Journal and The Times of Israel. From those, we can see that the new United States presidential Administration and the senior leadership of Israel consider it possible to launch strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities. We hope that the members of the Security Council and the international community will send a firm and unambiguous message to the United States and Israeli hawks. Military strikes against Iranian territory, including on nuclear and energy infrastructure objects located there, are unacceptable. Besides the fact that such actions will not succeed, they also spell disaster for the entire world, with extremely grave consequences, including radiological and humanitarian consequences. I think it is clear to everyone how that would affect the already dire situation in the Middle East. Therefore, to even attempt to speculate on that subject, let alone to undertake concrete action on it, is irresponsible and immoral. Nine years ago, the international community categorically rejected military and force-based approaches, making a clear choice in favour of diplomacy. And we are happy to see that the Secretary-General has consistently supported a similar position, urging the parties to find a solution based on multilateralism. In that context, we firmly believe that the position of three members of the Security Council should not shake the conviction of the overwhelming majority of our colleagues that a constructive approach is needed to resolve the issues surrounding the JCPOA. We hope that all the key players will demonstrate the necessary political will in that regard, keeping in mind that resolution 2231 (2015) is in effect until October 2025.

I extend my gratitude to Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo and His Excellency Ambassador Lambrinidis for their briefings. I would also like to express my appreciation to the Permanent Representative of Malta, Vanessa Frazier, for her dedication as the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) over the past two years. In the six months that have passed since our last meeting on this agenda item (see S/PV.9666), we regret to observe that the situation has not only failed to stabilize but also further deteriorated. The Republic of Korea is concerned about the following aspects. First, we are profoundly concerned about the assessment by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran continues its expansion of its enriched uranium stockpile, which is now 32 times the limit of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). We are particularly troubled by Iran’s accumulation of highly enriched uranium — up to 60 per cent — which cannot be justified for civilian use. Secondly, we note with grave concern that Iran is installing additional advanced centrifuge cascades at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant to produce 60 per cent enriched uranium, according to the most recent IAEA reports. That action is especially disappointing given recent encouraging indications that Iran had discussed with the Agency the possibility of capping its stockpile of 60 per cent enriched uranium. Thirdly, the IAEA’s assessment that it has already lost continuity of knowledge on Iran’s nuclear programme owing to Iran’s persistent breaches of its own commitment is also very worrisome. If Iran genuinely wishes to reassure the international community of the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, the IAEA’s monitoring and verification activities should be carried out without hindrance. The Council is well aware, through its long experience dealing with North Korea, of the consequences when those measures are not upheld. Iran must provide the fullest possible cooperation to the IAEA in the spirit of the March 2023 joint statement. In that context, we take note of Iran’s recent indication of accepting four additional experienced inspectors from the IAEA. We expect and call on Iran to follow through on that matter. Taking this opportunity, I would like to reaffirm our steadfast support for a diplomatic and peaceful resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue. We commend France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the European Union and IAEA Director General Grossi for their persistent efforts to engage Iran. With the JCPOA’s expiration in October 2025, less than a year away, we believe that resolving that issue through diplomacy is of paramount importance. To that end, all parties must refrain from actions that could escalate tensions and demonstrate a constructive attitude. Unfortunately, recent developments are undermining the atmosphere that is conducive to negotiations with Iran, including reports on ballistic missiles and drone transfers from Iran to third parties. Amid recent unexpected developments and growing volatility in the region, including the situation in Syria, the future of the JCPOA has become increasingly precarious. To prevent the regional crisis from escalating further and to preserve the integrity of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which is already substantially undermined by North Korea, we strongly urge all parties to urgently engage in diplomatic efforts and find a way back to mutual compliance. The Republic of Korea stands ready to provide its full support to this critical endeavour.

I thank the United States presidency for convening this meeting on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I also thank Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, and Ambassador Stavros Lambrinidis, Head of the Delegation of the European Union, for their insights. We extend our appreciation to the Permanent Representative of Malta for her role and dedicated engagement as Facilitator of the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). We also welcome the Permanent Representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Germany to this meeting. The evolving geopolitical landscape in the Middle East underscores the critical importance of resolution 2231 (2015) in preventing further escalation and weapons of mass destruction proliferation in the region. That includes reinforcing mechanisms for monitoring and verification, as well as promoting diplomatic efforts to de-escalate tensions and prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. We strongly believe that sustained dialogue and cooperation can make a difference to ensure global peace and security in an already sensitive and fragile international context. The continued lack of progress in the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) remains concerning, highlighting the need for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) participants to renew and redouble their efforts aimed at a return to the full and effective implementation of that Plan and resolution 2231 (2015). We are deeply concerned that since May 2019, the Islamic Republic of Iran has not reversed its steps away from its nuclear-related commitments following the United States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA. That has led to a significant increase in its enriched uranium stockpile. We also note with concern that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not been able to verify the total stockpile of enriched uranium in Iran since February 2021. We request that Iran cooperate fully with the Agency under the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015). Confrontation often exacerbates tensions rather than resolving them. Emphasizing cooperation and diplomacy is crucial for addressing complex issues such as the Iranian nuclear situation. We therefore urge all countries that maintain close ties with Iran to leverage their influence and persuade Iran to fulfil its JCPOA obligations. Similarly, we advocate for the IAEA to enhance its verification and monitoring activities related to the JCPOA to ensure Iran’s compliance with its commitments. By rallying global cooperation and strengthening IAEA oversight, we can foster a more secure and stable environment, addressing the legitimate concerns surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme effectively. Mozambique firmly believes in renewed confidence-building measures, the effective use of all diplomatic channels and multilateral dialogue towards ensuring peace and stability. It is in that context that the United Nations should continue providing the platform for nations to come together and work collaboratively towards common goals. In conclusion, we advocate for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons owing to the calamitous threat they pose to humankind. That goal requires our unwavering commitment and collective action from the international community.

I thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and the representative of the European Union, Mr. Lambrinidis, for their informative briefings. I also thank Ambassador Vanessa Frazier for her valuable work as Facilitator of the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). Ecuador deplores the stalemate surrounding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the lack of significant progress in addressing the issue over the past two years, during which my country has been a member of the Security Council, caused by unilateral actions that are at odds with the commitments made pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015). As we approach the last year of implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), as noted by the Secretary-General in his most recent report on the subject (S/2024/896), the relevant actors of the JCPOA must strengthen their commitment to a diplomatic solution that will allow for the goals of the Plan to be achieved. Ecuador reiterates that dialogue and cooperation within the context of the JCPOA are the best ways to address the nuclear issue concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran. My country also reaffirms its support for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its crucial role in verifying and monitoring the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran. I stress once again that only through full and effective cooperation with the IAEA will it be possible to restore the international community’s confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. I therefore call for the necessary access to be provided for the Agency to carry out its verification work. International peace and security are the result of a shared commitment to respect for international law, transparency and genuine cooperation. From that perspective, it is essential that all relevant actors prioritize diplomacy and multilateralism as the basis for resolving the problems in the JCPOA. Ecuador joins the call to redouble efforts in favour of a negotiated solution in which the collective interest and global security prevail over individual interests. In conclusion, I reiterate Ecuador’s position that there are no safe hands for nuclear weapons to be in. I therefore call on all relevant States to work together not only to revitalize the JCPOA, but above all to strengthen the multilateral non-proliferation regime — a fundamental pillar of global stability and the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

I now give the floor to the representative of Germany.

I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, Ambassador Frazier and Ambassador Lambrinidis for their briefings and continuous efforts to implement resolution 2231 (2015). There is no doubt that Iran is not in compliance with its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This non-compliance, which is well documented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), is continuously getting worse. For the past five years, Iran has been stepping further away from the 2015 JCPOA. As we just heard, the IAEA found that Iran has massively increased the rate of production of uranium enriched up to 60 per cent. Moreover, as the IAEA and members of the Council have stated, Iran is the only State without nuclear weapons to enrich at 60 per cent — why? That escalatory path must stop now. Together with our partners, we have spared no effort over the years to bring Iran back into full compliance with the JCPOA. In 2022, Iran refused to seize a critical diplomatic opportunity to agree on a revised JCPOA. Since then, Iran’s actions have hollowed out the JCPOA even further. It is high time, in our view, for Iran to reverse the expansion of its nuclear programme with concrete and verifiable steps. Another necessity in order to regain confidence is to again allow the IAEA full access. We are extremely worried that the IAEA has lost the continuity of knowledge on key parts of Iran’s nuclear programme as Iran continues to restrict the Agency’s ability to observe. We urge Iran to return to full transparency. Iran has always emphasized its commitment not to seek, develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. Iran’s ongoing non-compliance and recent statements, including from Iranian government officials, cast grave concerns about that declared intention. They are in clear contradiction of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), to which Iran is a party. Iran thereby jeopardizes the international non-proliferation system. We urge Iran to abide by its commitments as a non-nuclear-weapon State under the NPT. I assure the Council that all actions we have taken, including the decision not to lift certain restrictions on transition day, are in full accordance with the JCPOA and with resolution 2231 (2015). We have not taken those steps easily. We have negotiated in good faith, and we have tried to resolve the issues. In the light of Iranian non-compliance, we had to act, and we reserve the option to take further steps. Resolution 2231 (2015) will expire in less than a year, as many speakers have mentioned, and the clock is ticking. We remain firmly committed to working towards a diplomatic solution, fully addressing the concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme. For that to bear fruit, Iran must urgently change course and engage in good faith. The goal of our meeting with Iran in Geneva was precisely to convey that message.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

I thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo for her briefing. Since this is Malta’s final report in its capacity as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), I would like to express our sincere gratitude to Ambassador Frazier and her team for their dedicated efforts over the past two years. Iran takes note of the report of the Secretary-General (2015) (S/2024/896). In the report, the Secretary-General urges all participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as well as the United States, to remain steadfast in their commitment to a diplomatic solution aimed at restoring the agreement’s original objectives. He also called on all parties to prioritize multilateralism and diplomacy — the very principles that enabled the adoption of the agreement in 2015. Iran reaffirms its steadfast commitment to that call and to the pursuit of those shared principles. We listened carefully to the statement delivered by the representative of the European Union (EU). However, despite the EU’s role as Coordinator of the JCPOA, which should make it impartial, the statement regrettably remained politicized, biased and one-sided. The unfounded accusations made against Iran today by the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany cannot distort the facts on the ground, nor serve to obscure or justify their own failures in fulfilling their commitments under the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). The root cause of the current situation is undeniable: the United States unilaterally withdrew from the agreement, abandoned its obligations and reinstated all lifted sanctions, while the European three group (E3) failed to honour their commitments under the deal. Time and again, Iran has made it clear that its remedial actions were fully consistent with its rights under paragraph 26 and 36 of the JCPOA in response to the unilateral withdrawal by the United States and the E3’s non-compliance with their obligations and to restore the balance of commitments. Therefore, allegations regarding Iran’s non-compliance are not only factually incorrect, but also rely on arbitrary and misleading interpretations of the JCPOA. Those allegations were aimed only at deflecting attention from the E3’s ongoing breaches, such as their refusal to implement their commitments on transition day. The reimposition of lifted sanctions and the introduction of new unlawful restrictive measures are in flagrant violation of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). Iran’s nuclear programme is and has always been exclusively peaceful, operating under the most vigorous monitoring regime in the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) history. Claims that Iran seeks nuclear weapons are baseless and provocative. Iran remains steadfast in its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and will never compromise its legitimate rights under the Treaty. Despite unfounded accusations and the pursuit of a politically motivated resolution by the E3 and the United States, Iran is committed to continuing cooperation with the IAEA in accordance with its obligations. The censure resolution against Iran adopted at the recent Board of Governors meeting, despite a constructive and successful visit by the IAEA Director General to Tehran in November, demonstrate that the E3 and the United States have a politicized agenda to undermine diplomacy, trust and the very principles necessary for constructive engagement. Iran categorically rejects any threats of invoking the so-called snapback mechanism by the E3, an action that would be both unlawful and counterproductive. Let us make it clear, once and for all, that the so-called snapback is not a tool in their hands to be abused to threaten Iran. Iran has made it very clear that such a provocative move would be reciprocated through a firm and proportionate response. That position was explicitly conveyed by Iran’s then-President in a letter addressed to the E3 leaders on 8 May 2019. Triggering the so-called snapback mechanism for the reapplication of the provisions of terminated resolutions will create a major crisis that does not serve the interests of any side. Iran has consistently acted in good faith to uphold the environment for the revival of the JCPOA, even after the United States’ withdrawal and the E3’s persistence in violating their commitments. Iran engaged in the Vienna talks in good faith, showing the utmost flexibility to achieve a balanced and mutually beneficial agreement. Unfortunately, the unrealistic demands of the E3 and the United States, their lack of political will, domestic political considerations and attempts to tie the negotiations to unrelated issues ultimately failed in efforts to revive the deal. Blaming Iran for the failure to conclude the negotiations is both unjust and factually incorrect. Iran also rejects attempts to link Iran’s JCPOA commitments to unrelated regional and geopolitical issues. Claims regarding Iran’s alleged arms transfers to Russia for use in the Ukraine conflict are entirely unfounded and politically motivated. Likewise, accusations against Iran’s missile programme, which falls outside the scope of resolution 2231 (2105), are irrelevant and baseless. Instead of diverting attention to fabricated threats, the United States, France and the United Kingdom, as permanent members of the Security Council, must allow the Council to live up to its responsibility and address and confront the genuine sources of insecurity and instability in our region — the Israeli regime’s illicit nuclear weapons arsenal, its decades of aggression and occupation and its ongoing campaign of systematic war crimes, crimes against humanity and acts of genocide against the Palestinian people in Gaza. Furthermore, Israel’s relentless aggression and atrocious crimes against Syria and Lebanon underscore its role as the primary driver of violence and instability in the region. Equally destabilizing is the complicity of the United States, whose unwavering military, financial and political support have enabled Israel’s atrocities in the region. This blatant hypocrisy not only emboldens Israel in committing its crimes but also gravely undermines regional peace, international law and the very principles that the Council is duty-bound to uphold. Iran remains steadfast in its commitment to diplomacy and dialogue as the only viable path forward. In a spirit of constructive engagement, Iran’s delegation held substantive rounds of discussions with the E3 and European Union delegations in New York on the sideline of the General Assembly at its seventy-ninth and again on 28 and 29 November in Geneva. Those talks were aimed at exchanging views on the current situation and exploring the prospects for resuming nuclear negotiations. Iran has shown its seriousness and sincerity at those talks and expects its counterparts to do the same. It was agreed in Geneva to continue engagement in the upcoming weeks to create an environment conducive to meaningful negotiations. Meaningful diplomacy requires mutual respect, reciprocity and an unwavering commitment to international law. The E3 and the United States must abandon confrontational approaches and demonstrate a true commitment to diplomacy. The path forward lies in responsible and constructive engagement, not in threats, coercion and pressure. Past experience has shown that threats and pressure are ineffective against Iran, only undermine trust and complicate future efforts. We firmly believe that the JCPOA remains a robust and effective framework for resolving unnecessary and fabricated crises over Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme. Iran is ready to engage meaningfully, provided that others show genuine political will and adhere to international law.