S/PV.982 Security Council

At an early stage in the discussions on this question the Chairman of my delegation made a detailed statement on the attitudes, the anxieties and the concern of the Government of India, Thereafter, naturally, this question was discussed among the members of the Council. There was a three-Power draft resolution which from our point of view was very ‘Satisfactory and incorporated the very points which on 17 November 1961 had been stressed in the statement of the Defence Minister of India [976th meeting). There~ after some further suggestions were made with the view to having that draft resolution amended, Naturally, my delegation, not being a member of the Council, did not wish to intervene in those discusgions as we have full confidence that the members of the Council, in their wisdom, wiil reach agreement on an appropriate resolution, which, to us at this time, seems much the most important thing, in the peculiar circumstances that have developed in the Congo, These circumstances are dangerous; they have already caused the United Nations a lot of difficulties, My delegation is intensely interested in their right treatment, not merely because we are active and rather large participants in the United Nations operations, but also because of our membership in the Organization and the interest of the Organization which we have at heart, 6, I do not wish to comment on the various amend~ ments or on the views that have been expressed, with such eloquence, by different members of the Council, There are different points of view. I would only like to say that, in the view of my delegation, it is extremely important, psychologically and otherwise, that there should be a positive expression of opinion by the Council at this time, because if the Council shows itself as a house divided against itself, I fear that the consequences in the Congo—consequences in various directions, from the point of view of the Central Government: its strength and its continued existence, and from the point of view of what happens in Katanga—may be very serious. 7, Therefore, we are extremely anxious that there should be a resolution. Of course, in view of the divergent views that have been expressed in the Council, the resolution can only be a compromise resolution, But we feel that such a compromise ought to be reached, In fact, it does not seem to us that the Council is very far from reaching it; the differences are really not very great, We therefore appeal to the members of the Council, bearing in mind the supreme 9, Now we have several amendments before us, It is not for my delegation, as a non-member of the Security Council, to say very much about these amendments. However, generally speaking, wefeei that most of them are such as could be incorporated in the three-Power draft resolution and perhaps give it strength. For example, we think that the second and third amendments submitted by the United States are of great importance because they do pinpoint still further--as a matter of fact, this was covered by the three-Power draft resolution—the complete rejection by this Council of all acts of violence and all armed action against United Nations forces, I think it is the duty of this Council to proclaim in nouncertain terms that there shall be no war against the United Nations. It is only when the Council makes up its mind in that direction that we can really strengthen the forces in the Congo, give them better morale and weaken the malevolent resolve of forces which are operating against the United Nations in the Congo. 10. Similarly, the fourth amendment is very important from our point of view, I understand that there is no great objection to this from any side, il. We feel that the fifth amendment, as worded, is not very appropriate, because it seems to assume that weapons of war have entered Katanga and other regions, Actually there is no evidence of any kind that any weapons cf war have entered other regions, The only real evidence that we have relates to Katanga— the Fouga fighters and the various other arms that have got there, Therefore, it would not be good to place both on the same footing. That seems to us to be one of the main defects of the fifth amendment, We think it would be helpful if the expression "or any other region of the Congo" were removed or if there were a suitable substitution of that expression by something general in the sense of authorizing the Secretary-General to take effective steps to secure or to ensure the observance of United Nations resolutions about the interdiction on the entry into, and use of, foreign arms in the Congo, 12, With respect to the sixth and seventh amendments, we think both these are covered by the resolution of 21 February 1961. 1/ However, in deference to the point made at the 979th meeting by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of the Congo (Lecpoldvilie}, perhaps something along the lines of the sixthamend~ ment would not be inappropriate, We-do not think that the seventh amendment is necessary, because we are 18. These are the few observations that we thought we should make, I trust that the President will forgive me for intervening at this stage, but I did want to ex~ press our delegation's view in general. I do not wish to influence or over-influence members of the Council, They will naturally take a decision on these proposals and amendments according to their own lights. But we of the Indian delegation have a very great interest in these operations. We cannot forget, nor should the Council forget, that we have involved ourselves in the Congo at very great sacrifice, and that involvement does not mean merely the discomfort, the inconveniences and scmetimes the loss of Hfe to our young men serving in the Congo, This involvement is related to the whole state of public opirioninour country and, ourselves being a democratic country, this naturally has a great influence on our Parliament and on our Government, So our anxiety is very real, We keenly desire that there should be a positive expression of opinion by this Council, We would therefore appeal to the members that they should try their best when coming to a decision to bear this aspect in mind and perhaps not sacrifice something which may not be the ideal for something which is unattainable, that is to say, the ideal. 14, Mr, BARNES (Liberia): After seven meetings of the Security Council on the situation in the Congo, we have returned to this table this afternoon in an effort to reach some decision. During the debate in this Council, two adjournments of the Council debate were arranged, both designed to provide an opportunity for negotiation so that the Council might be able to take positive action in connexion with the issue before us. 15. When the representative of the United States on 21 November requested the adjournment of the meeting to an indefinite date, my delegation tookissue with him on this matter because we felt that the question should not be adjourned indefinitely in view of the pressing and urgent situation prevailing in the Congo, We then proposed that the meeting be adjourned to this afterncon so that in the interim an opportunity might be provided for us to reach some agreement, 16. I must point out again, as I stated on 21 November, that if after prolonged discussion in the Security Council we are unable to arrive at some decision, the results may be disastrous. 17. The amendments which have been submitted and modified by the.United States have the support of my delegation. These amendments merely reiterate deci~ sions which have been taken by the Security Council and the General Asserably in matters affecting the Congo, 18. I stated at one of our meetings that I thought it was fortunate for us to have the Foreign Minister of the Congo (Leopoidville) at cur meetings, because 9. AsI said then, I would prefer to see us act rather han speak of the things we ought to do. I regret that had to intervene before we take a vote on the draft esolution and the amendments here before us, but I ave apprehension that we may act wrongly here today, f that happens, we shall be placing ourselves in the ands of those who oppose the United Nations opera~ lon in the Congo, 0, Icome from avery small country, We have forces a the Congo, and wearevery anxious to see the situalon in the Congo relieved so that our forces may reurn home, The longer we delay in this matter, the aore we impose upon countries which are contributing ) the operations in the Congo, forcing them to keep heir forces there, and creating difficulties for them a their own homelands, 1. I therefore again appeal to the members of the ‘ouncil to give support to the amendments and the esolution before this body, so that, in taking some ositive action, we may assure a consolidation of our ction in improving the situation in the Congo. 2, The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): Be~ sre we proceed to the vote, I should like to receive ome ¢larification from the United States represenative on the following point relating to his fifth mendment, in which a new paragraph 6 is proposed, t the last meeting, the Soviet delegation proposed ae deletion of the words “or any other region of the ‘ongo" after the words "which have entered Katanga". loes the United States delegation accept this amend~ ient or not? I simply wish to clarify this point before 'e proceed to the vote,

I m not in accord with that proposition, We feel that tis essential that the prevention of the use of weapons f war or aircraft should relate not only to Katanga ut to any other region in which they may enter, now zr in the future, contrary to the laws of the Congo and inited Nations resolutions, Hence, we prefer to see 1ose words remain, since they help to giveassurance ) the Secretary-General that he has authority to use arce wherever such weapons .may appear. 4, The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I hould like to draw the United States representative's ttention to the fact that this passage refers to the ast, not to the future, The passage reads: "Authorizes 1e Secretary-General ... to remove ... aircraft and ther weapons of war which have entered Katanga or hy Omer region of the Congo ...*. Sofaras we know, lere are no suci. weapons in any region of the Congo xcept Katanga itself, Hence there is no justification a reference to any other region ofthe Congo, That i why we submitted our amendment. 5. Mr, STEVENSON (United States of America): This raft resolution is a mandate to the Secretary-General 26. Myr. MALALASEKERA (Ceylon): Mr, President, I seem to remember that at the last meeting of this Council the Soviet representative had certain objections to the sixth and seventh United States amendments. The sixth amendment refers to assistance being given to the Government of the Republic of the Congo to reorganize and retrain Congolese armed units and personnel, The impression that was left in my mind when I was listening to the remarks of the representative of the Soviet Union was thatthere was a kind of fear that this might introduce some undesirable features such as a very large influx of officers and others who might find this an excuse to find their way into the Congo for the purpose mentioned in this para~ graph, If that be the fear—because that kind of thing has happened in other parts of the world—I wonder whether the amendment could not be rephrased to read something like this: "Requests the Secretary~General to render to the Central Government of the Congo such technical assistance as may be necessary to organize and train Congolese armed units and personnel for the tasks which confront it." 27. The technical assistance will necessarily be of a limited nature. It may constitute only sending a few officers for purposes of training the Congolese armed forces. These officers could be drawn from countries which are not aligned to any military alliances or military blocs, so that any fears that may exist in the minds of some may thereby be allayed. I wonder whether-an amendment of the nature that I have suggested would be agreeable to the Soviet delegation. I would submit thet for the consideration of the representative of the USSR. 28, With regard to the seventh amendment, if my memory serves me correctly, the objection of the Soviet delegation centred around the negotiation and conciliation that are here mentioned, He asked the question: negotiation and conciliation with whom? Then he himself supplied the answer and said that the only person with whom negotiation and conciliation would be contemplated would be Mr. Tshombé, and that he was not a desirable person to negotiate with and that to ask the Secretary~General to carry out negotiations was asking him to de something which is not quite proper. 29. In view of that objection I would submit for the consideration of the representative of the Soviet Union an amendment like this: "Further requests the Secretary-~General to give such assistance as may be requested by the Central Government of the Congo for purposes ofnegotiation and conciliation, in order to achieve the immediate political unity and territorial integrity of the Congo.* 30, I would therefore submit with great earnesiness these two suggestions for the consideration of the representative of the Soviet Union, in the hope that he may help to get this resolution passed, with the useful amendments which, we feel, should also be incorporated in the original draft resolution submitted by the three countries, 31, The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian); Since the representative of Ceylon has addressed himself directly to me in my capacity as representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS in con= nexion with some of his proposals, I shall take the liberty of replying to him immediately. 32, First of all, I am somewhat surprised at the Ceylonese representative's position in defending, not his own draft resolution, which he co-sponsored with two other members, but someone else's amendments. It is not quite clear to me why he is doing this, But that, of course, is his own affair. 838. I should now like to say a few words on the substance of the suggestions which he has put forward, He indicated his reactions to the sixth and seventh amendments submitted by the United States and said that it might perhaps be advisable to amend the wording of the sixth amendment so as to refer to technical assistance for the reorganization of the army, In my opinion, such an amendment would not improve the resolution but, on the contrary, would make it worse, because it would divert attention from the main task now before us—a task which, { understand, the Ceylonese representative was stressing when he submitted his draft resolution, That task is the elimination of the centre of colonialist intervention in Katanga. If this centre of colonialist intervention in Katanga were liquidated, all questions relating to the domestic af-~ fairs of the Congo would be greatly simplified and the Central Government would be given every possibility of solving all its internal problems—including those connected with the reorganization of the army, which . is a matter pertaining entirely to the Congolese Government, 34, If the Ceylonese representative considers itnec~ essary to supply the Central Government with assist~ ance in solving this problem, this is fully provided for in previcus resolutions of the General Assembly and in resolution S/4°°* of 21 February of the Security Council. In the s .er resolution it is specifically stated that the Security Council "urges that Congolese armed units and personnel should be re-organized", What more is needed? On the basis of the resolution 35. For these reasons the proposal put forward by the Ceylonese representative seems to us completely unjustified; it impairs the resolution, I consider that the author of a resolution should not advocate scmething which worsens it; but if he does so, that is of course his own affair, The Soviet Union delegation not only will not support that proposal, butit will vive against it, 36, With regard to the seventh United States amendment, which would request the Secretary-General to take all such steps as he considers necessary, including those of negotiation and conciliation, to achieve the immediate political unity and territorial integrity of the Congo, the Ceylonese representative has said that there might be some advantage in rewording it, so that it would provide that the Secretary~General would be requested to "give such assistance as may be requested by the Central Government", 37, But here I must raise the question: with whom are the negotiations to be conducted? With whom is reconciliation to be sought? You cannot escape this question, With whom does the representative of Ceylon wish the negotiations to be undertaken? With thatper~ gon who opposes the Central Government and announces that Katanga is an independent State? With that person who played a part in the murder of Lumumba? Do you wish to enter into negotiations with him? I fail to understand this, especially since the passage concerning the immediate political unity and territorial integrity of the Congo would remain in the paragraph, Political unity has been achieved through the convening of Parliament and the election of a Central Government, Territorial integrity will be achieved when Katanga becomes in actual fact a part of the Congo, when this so-called “independent State" has been liquidated, That is precisely what the whole resolution calls for! If you wish to conduct negotiations with those who are separating Katanga from the Congo, with those who are waging war against both the Central Government and the United Nations, then we are opposed to such negotiations. We are opposed, because such a cause would simply imply an attemptto initiate negotiations with those who are destroying the unity of the Congo and who are agents of the colonial Powers. We are against this, and no amendments in that sense can do anything to improve matters; they will not remedy the paragraph's main defect, which is that it proposes negotiation and conciliation with those with whom there can be no conciliation and no negotiation, 38. That is our position, and I am somewhat surprised by this attempt of the Ceylonese representative to reword these two paragraphs without changing the basic thought underlying them, 39. I should also like to draw attention to the fact that we regard the whole draft, proposed by three members of the Security Council, as weak and inadequate. Had we wished to submit amendments to improve it, we would have done so, but we do not wish to complicate the situation and we are introducing no amendments.

Sir, I would like to say a few words by way of explanation of my action which, I am sorry to say, has failed to win your approval, I was making a very earnest attempt to ses whether some kind of compromise could be effected, whereby we could have some resolution adopted at this meeting of the Security Council, if not with complete unanimity, at least with near unanimity. That is why I addressed my suggestions to you, sir, as the representative of the Soviet Union, asking whether a rephrasing of the two paragraphs under discussion might meet with your approval, but evidentlyI was not correct in my assumption, 41, May I just add one or two words to indicate why I thought these amendments might be useful? As to the seventh amendment of the United States requesting the Secretary~General to make himself avail~ able for negotiation and conciliation, I personally thought that it would be a good idea if negotiation and conciliation were carried out with anybody. I belong to a culture in which it is taught that even the worst criminal is capable of redemption, and I should not be true to the traditions in which I have been brought up if I allowed myself to be a party to anything which would completely cut off the possibility of bringing , i about a settlement of the dispute by peaceful means, if this is possible. Our traditions teach us that the ways of peace are the best ways of settling anything— any dispute, any quarrel, Unfortunately, in the practical realities of life sometimes, when all peaceful methods have failed, resort-must be had to force, But I always feel that we must not completely shut off the possibility of negotiation and conciliation in our attempts to settle disputes. That is why I thought that this amendment might be allowed to stand if you, sir, were prepared to accept the rephrasing of the amendment on the lines suggested, Butyouarenot agreeable to that, 42, I was happy, however, to hear you say that negotiation and conciliation have already been provided for in the Security Council's resolution of 21 February, 80 the possibility is already there, Therefore, I was not completely committing a great crime by drawing special attention to that fact—the possibility of negotiation and conciliation. 43, With regard to the amendment which deais with the training of Congolese armed units, and with rendering such technical assistance as may be requested by the Central Government of the Congo, this was originally put in, I know, at the request of the Foreign Minister of the Central Government of the Congo. He thought that it was necessary to have Congolese armed units and armed personnel properly trained, but that the facilities for such training were not available to his Government. He thought, therefore, that he should 44, But I see that the representative of the Soviet Union is not agreeable to my suggestions and I certainly do nct intend to press my suggestions as amendments, I was only attempting to bring about some kind of compromise, Apparently the attempt has failed and Tam sorry; and there the matter rests. 45, Mr. BOMBOKO (Congo, Leopoldvilis) (translated from French): In these debates my delegation has tried to put the Congolese Government's views objectively and without passion, because the Congo problem is a very important one and the future of several million inhabitants of our country depends upon its solution, 46, We thought it our duty to appeal for United Nations assistance so that our country might not be an occasion of cold war or political alignment, When we asked for independence we meant to choose freedom: for us there was no question of falling once more under any other form of domination, 47. But assistance, as I have said before, implies the co-operation of those assisted, and this is why I thought it necessary for my country to have forces of order which were capable of preventing any secession, This is also one of the most practical ways of avoiding the need for members of the Security Council having to meet several times a year to discuss my country. 48. If we ourselves have forces capable of suppressing any rebellion, it will be very easy for us to take direct action and thus to avoid constantly calling upon the United Nations. But when we expressed this wish and made this appeal to the United Nations, we had no intention of placing our army under United Nations command. In the Secretariat files I think there is a Letter from the Congolese authorities, dated 5 March of this year,2/ describing the way in which we intend to organize our army. 49, We said that this reorganization should be carried out legally, that the army should be commanded in accordance with the "Loi fondamentaleTM and that what we were being given was simply technical assistance in the formation. of an officer corps and the training of our troops. There was never any question of calling upon foreign officers to command our army; they were to act only as instructors, In that way we hoped to prevent any country from using technical assistance as a means to takecommand of ovrarmy and interfere in our domestic affairs, and tha. 1s why we chose this course, I think it would be useful for the Congo io possess its own forces. We pressed this point simply in order to make up for the existing lack, If the Re~ 2/ Bid, document $/4752/Add.3. 50. We think—and this is not only my own view but, I believe, the view of all the African and Asian delegations here—that this meeting of the Security Council should be able to adopt a resolution. Otherwise this would be in a way a victory for Mr, Tshombé, 51. So far we have heard no one here directly defending Mr. Tshombé, Of course there were certain speeches which, perhaps, were rather in Mr. Tshomb&'s favour. But we must be fair: no one here has dared to defend Mr. Tshomb6 publicly, Everyone agrees that Tshombé's action must be resisted, Are we now going to try to justify Tshombé by delaying tactics and strengthen his position still further? 52. This is why I appeal to everyone here to vote for a resolution enabling the Secretary-General to help us finally to suppress the secession of Katanga, This is not a personal appeal. It is anappeal by the Congolese people, whom I represent here, and by all the African and Asien countries represented here, which are fighting with.1] their strength to defeat colonialism forever, so that their peoples may enjoy fullfreedom, 538, Mr, STEVENSON (United States of America): I should like to thank the representative of Ceylon for his efforts to conciliate our differences. We emphatically share his view, and rather than close the door to conciliation and negotiation, we feel that the door should be opened wider. 54, As to his suggestions, the first one, the proposed amendment to our sixth amendment, sounded to us, at first impression, quite satisfactory. I amsorry that he has withdrawn it, However, since you, Mr. President, have indicated that you would vote against it, perhaps no harm is done. 55. As to the second proposal, his proposed amend-~ ment to our seventhamendment providing for conciliation and negetiation, may I point out that tle author .y already exists in the Secretary-General and that he has used it before and, I trust and assume, will use it again, I refer the Council to the resolution of the "Convinoed further that the imposition of any solution, including the formation of any government not based on genuine conciliation would, far from settling any issues, greatly enhance the dangers of conflict within the Congo and threat to international peace and security," 56. In order to do nothing there which would be calculated in any way to limit or restrict the authority of the Secretary-General to use the civilized means of negotiation and conciliation, the delegation of the United States would gladly withdraw that entire seventh amendment, in order to prevent an adverse vote, 57, The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): Does anyone else wish to speak? Since nobody else wishes to speak, I would remind members of the Council what we shall be voting on. First of all we have the draft resolution submitted by Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic [$/4985/Rev.1]. Then we have the revised amendments submitted by the United States [S/4989/Rev.2] to that draft, According to the statement just made by the United States representative the seventh amendment has been withdrawn and will not be voted upon, Lastly, there is a small subamendment by the Soviet Union to the fifth United States amendment—for the deletion of the words "or any other region of the Congo". 58. The representative of France has asked to speak before the voting, and I give him the floor, 59, Mr. BERARD (France) (translated from French): Now that the general debate is over and you, Mr. President, have announced that we shall take a vote, I should like briefly to explain my Government's attitude in the coming vote, On 15 November [974th meeting] I explained, I hope clearly, my Government's position since the beginning of the Congo affair.I took particular care to show that this attitude was consistent. The explanation I gave on that occasion shows that my delegation shares some of the anxieties which have given rise to the draft resolutions or amendments now before us. In particular, my Government is obviously in agreement with anything which helps to reaffirm the independence, sovereignty and unity of the Republic of the Congo, the authority of its Government over all its provinces and its right to conduct the country's external affairs, I added that my Government deplored and denounced both the secession of Katanga and the activities of the.mercenaries, 60, L[also, however, spoke of mydelegation's general reservations about any action which, by its form or its spirit, would go beyond the proper limits of our Organization's tasks. We think it particularly dangerous that the United Nations Force, in violation of the resolution of 9 August 1960,2/ was a party toa domestic conflict, constitutional or otherwise, We a ibid,, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960, document $/4426,

We shall now proceed to the voting. 68, We shall vote first on the Soviet Union's subamendment to the fifth United States amendment; it is for the deletion of the words "or any other region of the Congo", following the words "to remove ... air-. eraft and other weapons of war which have entered Katanga", 64, Mr, STEVENSON (United States of America); Mr, President, you made an inquiry some time ago as to whether or not this language did not relate only to the past and not to the future, I offered at that time to insert after the words "have entered", the words "or may enter", so that it would read: "other weapons of war which have entered or may enter Katanga or any other region of the Congo...", I had assumed that these words were desired by you, sir, but I notice that they were omitted when you read your proposed amendment, 65, The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian}: The representative of the United States has just given a clarification in connexion with the text which has been distributed—I am referring to the revised text of his amendments. 66. Speaking as the representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS I should like to addin this connexion that if the réference is to the entry of weapons of any kind, generally this has been prohibited by the decisions of the General Assembly. There is, I think, a relevant resolution of the General Assembly—if I am not mistaken—of 20 September 1960, which prohibits the entry of weapons without the agreement of the Central Government and without the agreement of the United Nations. Consequently it seems to us that, even in this form, the paragraph is unnecessary. 67, Mr. MALALASEKERA (Ceylon): Mr. President, in order to help my delegation with regard to the vote on this amendment, perhaps the Secretariat would be good enough to read the resolution that you referred to, because we do not have before us that resolution of 20 September 1960 which concerns the entry of arms. 68, The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): Since the representative of Ceylon has requested this, I shall read the relevant paragraph in resolution 1474 (ES-IV) adopted by the General Assembly at the fourth emergency special session on 20 September 1960: "6. Without prejudice to thé sovereign rights of the Republic of the Congo, calls upon all States io refrain from the direct and indirect provision of arms or other materials of war and military per~ sonnel and other assistance for military purposes

Mr. President, I understood that you consider that this paragraph in our amendment is unnecessary be-~ cause of paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1474 (ES-IV) of 20 September 1960, I note in passing that the Soviet Union vetoed substantially the same resolution that you now refer to in the Security Council, But the point is that this paragraph 6 that you have just read out calls upon States fo refrain from direct or indirect introduction and importation of arms into the Congo. The amendment to which we are addressing ourselves, the fifth revised United States amendment, relates not to the importation of weapons but io their removal and to the prevention of their use. They are entirely different questions. 70, Mr, BOMBOKO (Congo, Leopoldville) (translated from French): Mr, President, I must say that the resolution to which you referred has had no effect, I note that the date of that resolution is 20 September 1966, but that did not prevent the colonialists who supported Tshombé from providing him with jets and full military equipment. The Congolese Government, which suggested at the time that this equipment should be destroyed, has always encountered the resistance of the United Nations, which had no clear mandate, I think the amendment now proposed would enable us to destroy the weapons illegally imported into the Congo, because a decision without a sanction is a decision which can achieve nothing, Here there is provision for a sanction, and my Government com-~ pletely agrees that these aircraft, which have been brought into our country without our consent, may be destroyed,

As the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics I should like to explain to the representative of the Congo (Leopoidville) and to the representative of the United States that that is just what we are aiming at—that this resolution should refer specifically to weapons delivered to Katanga and that there should be no attempt to include in this paragraph a general reference to all questions affecting the Congo. The representative of the Congo (Leopoidville) says that the General Assembly resolution which we have just been discussing did not prevent the supplying of weapons*to Tshombé and that these weapons should be confiscated and destroyed; we agree, and we shail vote for this paragraph if the words "or any other region of the Congo" are deleted, leaving only the words "which have entered or may enter Katanga". 72. We shail vote for this paragraph precisely because a direct violation of the decisions ofthe General Assembly has been laid bare in Kaianga. 73, Furthermore, I should like to say that therepresentative of the United States was completely inaccurate when, for some reason, he said that the USSR had applied a veto io the paragraph of the resolution which I read out. It was a General Assembly resolution; the Soviet Union had, like any other country, 75, The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): For the sake of absolute clarity—since the representative of the United States of America has referred to the Security Council and to our veto in the Security Council—I should like to say as representative of the : UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS that there , was no question, in that body, of our vetoing this par- | ticular isolated paragraph; we were concerned with the _ whole resolution, which we did indeed veto, Thatis the : truth, But the representative of the United States cannot ‘deny that this paragraph 6, which readout, concerning the prohibition of the introduction of weapons without United Nations permission was adopted in theGeneral Assembly with the affirmative vote of the Soviet Union. You cannot deny that. 76, Mr, STEVENSON (United States of America): I do not deny that the Soviet Union voted for this para~ graph in the General Assembly. I repeat for the third time what I said originally, that the Soviet Union vetoed a similar paragraph in the Security Council, This is what I said originally; this is what I repeat, I also invite the attention of the Council to the fact that the Soviet Union abstained from voting on the resolution as a whole in the General Assembly, But I must say I am very happy that it changed its mind between the time that this particular paragraph was under consideration in the Security Council and when it was under consideration in the General Assembiy, 77, The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian); We shall now proceed to vote, I shall put to the vote first the Soviet oral sub-amendment to the fifth United States amendment which appears in document 8/4989/ Rev.2. The Soviet amendment would delete in the new paragraph 6 the phrase "or any other region of the Congo", A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Against: Chile, China, Ecuador, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. Abstaining: Ceylon, France, Liberia. The sub-aniendment was rejected by 6 votes to 2 with 3 abstentions, 78, The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): We shall now vote on the United States amendments | [S/4989/Rev.2], in the order they are submitted. To begin with, we shall vote on the first United States amendment to the draft resolution of the three Powers, A vote was taken by show of hands, Abstaining: France, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, The first amendment was adepted by 9 votes to none with 2 abstentions.

We now come to the second United States amendment; as it proposes two new preambular paragraphs, we shall vote on each of those paragraphs separately. First of all we will vote on the first of the new preambular paragraphs proposed by the United States, reading: "Noting with deep regret the recent and past actions of violence against United Nations personnel". A vote was taken by show of hands, In favour; Ceylon, Chile, China, Ecuador, Liberia, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Against: None. Abstaining: France. The paragraph was adopted by 10 votes to none with 1 abstention.

We shall now vote on the second of the new preambular paragraphs proposed by the “United States, reading: "Recognizing the Government of the Republic of the Congo as exclusively responsible for the conduct of the external affairs of the Congo", A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Ceylon, Chile, China, Ecuador, Liberia, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. Against: None. Abs taining: France. The paragraph was adopted by 1@ votes to none with 1 abstention.

We shall now vote on the third United States amendment, which calls for revision of operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution. A vote was taken by show of Bands, In favour: Ceylon, Chile, China, Ecuador, Liberia, Turkey, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Against: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Abstaining: France. The result of th #ote was 9 in favour, 1 against, with 1 abstention. The amendment was not adopted, one of the negative votes being that ofa permanent member of the Council. in favour: Ceylon, Chile, China, Ecuador, Liberia, Turkey, United Arab Republic, United States of America, Against: None, Abstaining: France, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, The amendment was adopted by 8 votes to none with three abstentions, ' 83, The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): Weshall now vote on the fifth United States amendment, for the introduction of a new paragraph 6; the text of the amendment will remain unchanged, in view of the fact that a sub-amendment to the paragraph proposed was not adopted, A vote was taken hy show of hands, In favour: Chile, China, Ecuador, Liberia, Turkey, United States of America, Against: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Abstaining: France, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, The result of the vote was 6 in favour, 1 against, with 3 abstentions, one member having not participated in the voting, The amendment was not adopted, faving failed to obtain the affirmative votes of seven members, 84, The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): We shall now vote on the sixth United States amendment, for the addition of a new paragraph 11. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Ceylon, Chile, China, Ecuador, Liberia, Turkey, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Against; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Abstaining: France, The result of the vote was 9 in favour, 1 against, with one abstention, The amendment was not adopted, one of the negative votes being that ofa permanent member of the Council,

To sum up, the results of the votes on the amendments are as follows: the first amendment is adopted; both party of the second amendment are adopted; the third amendment is rejected; the fourth amendment is adopted; the fifth amendment is rejected; and the sixth amendment is rejected, 86, We shall now go on to voteon the draft resolution with the amendments as adopted, I am sorry; I give the floor to the representative of the United States, 87, Mr, STEVENSON (United States of America): So that we can consider the effect of the vote which has 88, The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I must point out to the representative of the United States that, if he proposes a suspension for a specific amount of time, his motion may be debated under paragraph 38 of rule 33. 89. I call upon the representative of Liberia,

I am somewhat amazed at this move to suspend our deliberations in regard to the voting here for the sake of consultations, As I understand the rules of procedure, once a vote has commenced it cannot be interrupted except in respect of the coriduct of the voting, Ifthe objective of suspending the meeting is to secure manimity, then perhaps I can concede the request of the representative of the United States, but I would much prefer that we proceed with the vote in this case. 91, Mr. STEVENSON (nited States of America): I would ask for such a concession by the representative of Liberia to allow us ten minutes in order to review the situation as a result of the veto of three of these amendments,

Under the provisional rules of precedure I am sup~ posed to continue the voting, since it has already begun, If any member insists on a suspension of the meeting, I shall have to put his motion lo the vote, but the rules of procedure do not allow forthe suspension of meetings during the voting, If no one insists on suspension, we shall r :seed to vote on the draft resolution, 93. Mr, STEVENSON (United States of America): I must insist on a vote on the motion, 94, The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian); Then I shall put the motion for suspension of the meeting to the vote, as requested by the representative of the United States, A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Ceylon, Chile, China, Ecuador, France, Turkey, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Against: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Abstaining: Liberia, The motion was adopted by 9 votes fo 1, with i abstention, The meeting was suspended at 6 p.m. and resumed af 6.15 p.m.

We shall now proceed to vote on the draft resolution as amended, 96, Before the vote, [ call upon the representative of the United States. of these vetoes of paragraphs desired by the representative of the Congo, and clearly defining the authority of the Secretary-Generai, we will vote for this resolution because we believe that the Council should take a firm stand against the activities in the Katanga and specifically in support of the Central Government. We do so in the light of our review of previous resolutions and executive actions by the Secretariat which have convinced us that this new resolution can in no way be a diminution of, but only an addition to, authority previously granted. We have full confidence that the Secretary~General will continue to carry out all of these resolutions to the full effect. 98, We reserve the right to introduce these amendments again in the General Assembly, 99, The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): We shall now vote on the draft resolution submitted by Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic [S/4985/ Rev.1] together with the three amendments which have already been adopted. A vote was taken by show of hands, In favour: Ceylon, Chile, China, Ecuador, Liberia, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United States of America. Against: None, Abstaining: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, The draft resolution, as amended, was adopted by §$ votes to none with 2 abstentions. 100, The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I call upon the Acting Secretary-General, 101, The ACTING SECRETARY-GENERAL: Mr. President, in this, my first intervention in the Security Council as Acting Secretary-General, I have no need to take up very much of your time, Indeed, I ask to speak even briefly only becauseI think the members of the Council and all interested parties are entitled to know without delay what they may expect from me with respect to those provisions of the resolution just adopted which call for action by the Secretary-—General. In this regard, I may refer particularly to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the resolution, sources available to the United Nations Operation in the Congo. 103. I am sorry in this connexion, however, to have to utter a word of realistic caution. It would be highly desirable, in fact, to be in a position to focus all of our resources on the elimination of mercenaries and hostile elements in Katanga, for that objective is of major importance and I believe its realization could lead to decisive results, But the recent tragic events in Luluabourg, Albertville and Kindu—or more important, the causes underlying those evonuts— carry implications of the most serious nature for the United Nations Force, It is clear that the need for continuing United Nations assistance in the maintenance of law, order and security in many parts of the Congo is still critical, Moreover, recent performances by Congolese troops, as pointedly indicated in addendum 13 todocument $/4940,4/ certainly are not encouraging as to the capability of the Central Government, at this stage, to assume an increased responsibility in the vital sphere of law and order, It may be necessary, there~ fore, from time to time to establishtemporary, shortrange priorities in the continuing efforts to achieve the various objectives, 104, All the United Nations responsibilities flowing from past resolutions on the Congo continue with new ermphasis, since these resolutions have all been reaffirmed in the action just taken. Assistance must be given to the Central Government in the maintenance of law and order, Everything possible must be done to avert civil war, even by the employment of force, ‘should this prove necessary as a last resort, This, I believe, necessarily implies a sympathetic attitude of a part of ONUC toward the efforts of the Government to suppress all armed activities against the Central Government and secessionist activities. Supporting the territorial integrity of the country, the United Nations position, it seems to me, is automatically against all armed activities against the Central Government and against secessionist forces. This, of course, is reinforced by our confidence in Mr. Adoula and his Government. More determined and effective steps must be taken with regard to the training and reor-~ ganization of the Congolese armed forces under the terms of the previous resolutions adopted by this Council. The United Nations programme of technical assistance should be steadily expanded, particularly as conditions in the country permit the military assistance to be reduced, 4/ Ibid., Sixteenth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1961. 06. Above all, I may assure you that the United lations will continue and even redouble its attempts o achieve reconciliation, by peaceful means of course, f the sharp differences which now seriously endanger he unity of the country. Much skill and effort have lready been employed by the United Nations in this irection, It might be a further useful step for me to esignate a special representative of high standing to evote his energies exclusively to the purpose of ational reconciliation for a limited time, if the Govrnment of the Republic of the Congo so desires, Iam ondering over this since, in ~ view, national reconiliation should figure in our attempts to restore law nd order in the Republic of the Congo. 07. My duty now, as I see it, is to do all that can be one to give full effect to the resolutions of the Genral Assembly and of this Council relating to the ‘ongo, including the one just adopted, I shall devote ayself steadfastly to that purpose, 08. Before concluding, I feel impelled to say aword r two about Kindu, There, on 11 November 1961, a orrifying crime was committed by Congolese troops gainst thirteen brave Italian men serving the United lations. This was an act of bestiality, andI assure - ou that ONUC, on my orders, is taking all possible ieasures to see to it that all who are guilty of the rime will be severely punished. But I must point out hat the Kindu tragedy is not a new experience for the Inited Nations in the Congo, nor is it necessarily an adication of any new condition. There has beena long nd very painful series of such experiences at the ands of Congolese soldiers which ONUC personnel, ioth civilian and military, have suffered with patience nd fortitude, beginning in August 1960, This includes he savage beatings of American, Canadian and Indian lyv-crew personnel at the Leopoldville and Stanleyville irports; the ambush of the Irish in Niemba, North iatanga, with eight casualties; the massacre of the orty-two Ghanaians and two Swedes at Port Francqui; he assault on the Sudanese at Matadi; and the befleging of the Irish at Jadotville. It wilibe noted from his recital, incidentally, that these attacks follow no iattern with regard to the race, colour or nationality f the victims. Undisciplined but heavily armed troops tho do not respect their officers are a threat to the Tyurity of everyone, Congolese and non-Congolese ike, 09. I must also say, without opening up any new ‘ehates or entering into a defence of the United Naions Secretariat—for I think it needs none—that I relcome constructive criticism of the Secretariat and 119, Finally, I need not stress thatthetaskof guiding the Congo operation is a difficult and complex one, under any circumstances. It becomes possible of -achievement only if I -can count on the goodwill of Member Governments and especially on their readiness to provide the resources, and particularly the financial support, that is essential for its successful accomplishment, 111, There is, unfortunately, no reason to anticipate in the next few months an order of expenditure appreciably different from that being incurred at present, I am confident, however, that ONUC will fulfil all of its responsibilities if the necessary resources are made available,

It cannot be denied that the eight meetings of the Security Council on the ques~ tion of the Congo were indeed tedious, But I believe we all feel compensated for this hard work by having been able to secure some positive action, 113. On hehalf of the sponsors of the resolution which has been adopted, I wish to record our appre~ ciation for the support given this resolution, notwith=- standing the amendments which were submitted and adopted. 114, Sir Patrick DEAN (United Kingdom): I have little to add to my previous statements. My delegation adheres strongly to the views which I then expressed. 115. In particular, we wish to stress once again the paramount importance of the role of pacification and conciliation which, in our view, is central tothe man= date of the United Nations and to the functions of the Secretary-General. If the amendments proposed by the United States delegation had been approved, my delegation would, as I said earlier inthis debate, have been glad to vote for the resolution as a whole; but unfortunately some of the most important of these amendments were vetoed by the Soviet Union or were withdrawn as a result of the threat of such a veto. 116. It has become perfectly clear from the interventions of the representative of the Soviet Union that the Soviet delegation had decided to veto anything which does not precisely suit their views. As the Council knows, the Soviet action, in exercising their veto, left unamended certain paragraphs of the original reso-= lution which, as I explainedearlier, were unacceptable ’ to my delegation. 117. in particular, we could not agree that reference to secessionist activities should be lMmited only to 118. As for the paragraph about the mercenaries, I have nothing to add to my previous statements. We are strongly in favour of getting rid of the mercenaries; but the wording of the resolution goes, in our opinion, dangerously far in encouraging the local command to use an added measure offorce, thus perhaps endangering the uneasy peace now prevailing in Katanga. 119, For these reasons, with great regret my delegation was obliged to abstain in the voting on this resolution, 120, At the same time, my delegation derives much comfort from the remarks just made by the Secre= tary-General, We warmly welcome the emphasis which the Secretary-General placed, in his statement, on the role of conciliation in settling the problems of the Congo. We will study with interest the suggestion which he threw out for the appointment of a highly qualified person to undertake the difficult task of conciliation, 121. We earnestly hope that in spite of thé rather less than satisfactory resolution which has now been adopted, the Secretary-General will be able to bring the United Nations Operation in the Congotoa success= ful conclusion, If he can do this, no delegation will be better pleased than my own. 122, Finally, in spite of the abstention which, for the reasons I have just stated, my delegation has recorded, my delegation would like to assure the Foreign Min~ ister of the Republic of the Congo of our full support for the Government which he represents. My delegation, like that of the United States, is glad that he is not going home empty-handed. We should have pre=- ferred him to return armed in either hand to deal with secession and armed action wherever and whenever they may occur in the Congo, We hope very much that Mr. Adoula and Mr. Bomboko and their Government will find the passage of this resolution which the Security Council has adopted a source of strength and encouragement in the performance of that task of bringing at last péace and prosperity to the Congolese people.

We submitted this question to tne Council [8/4973] on 3 November 1961 after having studied it very seriously. As we explained in our intervention, our presence in the Congo is pri-= marily to help maintain Congolese integrity and unity, and, in particular, to help bring about the reintegration of Katanga in the Congo. 124, We are grateful to the co-sponsors of the draft resolution for the work that they have dene and we are also grateful to each member of the Security Council that voted for the resolution. We hope very much that this resolution will bring about the reintegration of Katanga in the Congo. I repeat, our presence is pri+ 5/ tid. Suppiement for July, August and September 1961, document 126. We also thank the Secretary-General for the clear and precise account he has given the Security Council of the continuing work of the United Nations in the Congo. 127, As I have remarked on several occasions, my Government and the Congolese people need assistance, and we assure the Secretary-General of our full cooperation because we believe that only with our cooperation will it be possible to achieve useful results. 128. We also take this opportunity to thank all who are working in the Congo, all who have sent troops and all who are making a financial contribution to the success of the operations in the Congo. 129. The Congolese people, as we know, occupy a strategic position in Africa. We are also well aware that we have resources. We shall be able to repay this debt of gratitude when we shall have recovered our balance. We shall then be ready to use our re= sources to help peoples who are in similar difficulties to our present ones. 130. Before i close, I should like to remerk briefly on what the representative of the United Kingdom said about the cease-fire in Katanga. As Ihave always said, we do not think Mr. Tshombé keeps his word. I shall give only one proof, The Protocol of Agreement sub= sequent to the cease~fire§/ provides that Katanga shall abstain from inflammatory broadcasts attacking the United Nations. But what dowe see? The Katanga radio has become a platform for daily demagogy, and for stirring up the people against the United Nations forces. 131. The representative of the United Kingdom cannot say that Katanga has kept its word. This is one point in the Agreement which is not being respected. T shall not mention the other points in the Agreement which Mr. Tshombé is ignoring. Every day he broadcasts appeals in the Congolese languages, inciting the Congolese troops to mutiny and to attack the United Nations troops. These broadcasts have been recorded, and we can let anyone hear them. The representative of the United Kingdom must realize that these facts prove that Mr. Tshombé dees not respect this Agree- .9/ Ibid,, document $/4940/Add.11, annex I. 33. This is what we ask. We, on our side, want coniliation. Those who have constantly called for concili= tion should go and find Mr. Tshombé and try to con-= ince him of the need for conciliation. For it is Mr. ‘shomb6 who refuses conciliation, and I believe that ,0se who have some influence with him, because they ave helped him or had some contact with him or ecause they are his friends, can help us by trying ) convince him of the need for conciliation. None of 8, the Congolese people, want to use force, But we ave sacred duties and we are ready to fulfil them to 1 end.

The resolution that has just een adopted by thé Security Council is satisfactory rom the point of view of my Government. It strength< ns the hand of the Secretary-General, it gives strong upport to the Central Government and it deals a evere blow to all secessionist activities. Here I refer » what is uppermost in our minds and to what is the nly problem on which the United Nations has to conentrate at present, that is the secession in Katanga. 35. No resolution of the Security Council can be erfect because of the realities of the situation in-the touncil and outside. Naturally, therefore, the resoluion is a compromise. Perhaps it has not pleased verybody. It may have gaps, but we are very glad o hear the statement of the Secretary~Generai which, n our opinion, fills many of the gaps and gives us romise of firm action by the United Nations in ace ordance with the mandates of the Security Council, 36. This resolution seems tc us to have delivered . well aimed, a severe and, I shouldsay, a long over= lue blow at secession and war-like activities against he United Nations. 387, The spirit of the debate, if I may say so, has en auspicious in the sense that we were able to ‘rather the impression that whatever may have hapened in the past, members of the Council and Memiers of the United Nations in general are cognizant of he great dangers in the existing situation and will do heir utmost to help the United Nations both in letter ind in spirit. We have hope that a new chapter has lawned for the Congo and for the United Nations. It is ur hope that by the appropriate implementation of hese resolutions and by the firm direction, the promse of which has been given in the Secrstary-General's itatement, and his firm determination to handle the situation, a new era will be brought aboutfor the people

If no other representative wishes to speak, I shall speak briefly in my capacity as representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. 140. The Security Council has discussed, over a lengthy period, the question raised by three States concerning the dangerous trend of developments in the Congo due to the actions of separatists and colonizers in Katanga against the Central Government and against the United Nations. This was the angle from which the present item was viewed throughout the discussion. In the course of the meetings devoted to this item, the disposition of forces within the Security Council and, as regards States involved in the settlement of the Congo problem, outside it, has become completely clear. 141, The Soviet delegation has repeatedly stated its view both of the Congolese problem as a whole and of the latest developments in the Congo, particularly in respect to Katanga. The latest statement by the Soviet Mission, issued yesterday, gives a fairly detailed assessment of the situation which arose yesterday in the Security Council in the preparatory phase of the resolution's adoption. It can be said that the assess~ ment we made in our statementhas been fully justified by today's voting. In our statement, we wrote; "Belgium, England and France, however, came out against the basic provisions of the Afro~Asian draft resolution. The United States of America, while supposedly supporting a number of the resolution's provisions, at the same time showed no readiness to vote for the resolution as awhole, even though the resolution was assured of the necessary majority in the Council if the United States delegation adopted a favourable attitude towards it," 142, The votes cast today by the representatives of the United Kingdom and France fully support our assessment, and the United States representative's statement that he voted for the resolution with reluc~ tance also confirms our evaluation of the United States position. 143. The essence of the question as posed by the countries which submitted the item to the Security Council, and as discussed in the debate itself, was quite vividly demonstrated in our various meetings. Most of the Council's members, and of the African and Asian non-members who spoke in the Council, Stated that the paramount requirement was to eliminate the’centre of foreign intervention in Katanga and to put down the attempt to separate Katanga from the Congo. The representative of Ethiopia was quite right, therefore, when he told us just nowthatthe main task, as he saw it, was to maintain Congolese unity and to ensure the return of Katanga to the Congo. This is the heart of the problem and it was at this that the three- Power draft resolution was aimed, notwithstanding the attempts made tc turn it in another direction. 144, Thanks to the firm position taken by the Soviet Union, these attempts did not succeed, although of 145. Had we submitted our own draft resolution, it gbviously would not have been the same as that submitted by our three distinguished colleagues, But I repeat that we regarded the three-Power text as acceptable because it met the main requirement by which we were confronted, 146. The adoption of the resolution is, however, only the beginning. The important thing now is to put it into effect, and in the present circumstances this will % no easy task, All members of the Council will regall that, when the resolution of 21 February 1961 was adopted, we made a detailed statement[942nd meeting] in which we pointed out that even that resolution, which ve regarded as inadequate and for which we could not vote because we considered many paragraphs to be improperly formulated~we did not, however, vote wainst it—even that resolution could be carried out mly if those responsible for its implementation had the genuine intention, from beginning to end, to give real effect to the resolution's basic provisions. But as we have seen, eight months after that resolution's adoption its main provisions are still not implemented. 147, Why is this so? First, because their imple«- nentation was vigorously opposed by the colonial ‘orces both within the Congo and outside it, in States surrounding the Congo; and secondly, because the nachinery used to implement the resolution did not ict in full accordance with the resolution, and when it lid begin to act‘more or less in line with the resolution's basic provisions, it was prevented from carry~ ng those provisions out, 148. Prevented by whom? By the resolution's oppo~ 1ents, by the colonial forces which resisted the ex~ wilsion of colonialist elements from Katanga. Hence, he implementation of the resolution adopted at this neeting of the Councila resolution which is more jlecisive on the question of expelling the colonialist ‘orces and mercenaries from Katanga, and in that sense vests greater authority in the Acting Secretaryxseneral and in the United Nations troops—will ensounter no less difficulty and will face the resistance of those forces which do not like the resolution as a locument, let alone as a reality. These forces will fer resistance, and this must be borne in mind. They vill obstract the implementation of the main clauses 0 this resolution, especially where it would directly iffect the foreign agents and foreign mercenaries— hose forces which have established themselves in Satanga and are trying to sever Katanga from the >ongo as a whole. 49. What is more, the Acting Secretary-General has ¥en left a poor legacy indeed, and it must be said that Congo is, to our profound regret, one=sided. It has been given a definite bias. It is a structure of a pre=~ determined character. We do not find in it the repre= sentatives of the different groups of States which take part in the United Nations and in the adoption of decisions, including decisions of the Security Council. And this raises certain difficulties. Yet this obstacle too must be surmounted. 150. We express the hope that in this matter also, the Acting Secretary-General will display the necessary firmness and initiative and will not hesitate to replace any officials whe do not perform the duties for which they were sent to the Congo, or who perform those duties one+sidedly. 151, Lastly, it seems to me that the main task which now confronts the Acting Secretary-General and the United Nations Command is that of scrupulously and consistently implementing the specific provisions of the newly adopted resolution and of refraining from interpreting them in some particular way of their own, They must act in accordance with the decision as adopted, and not with any of the proposals that have not been adopted. 152. If the Acting Secretary-General and United Na~ tions Command act in precise conformity with the adopted provision of the resolution, they will ensure the success of the entire undertaking. If they depart from the letter of the adopted resolution and interpret it in the spirit of statements by individual representatives who made proposals that have not been adopted, this may lead to unfortunate results. Unhappily, the experience of sixteen months of work in the Congo indicates that these results are unfortunate for the United Nations as a whole, and this was largely because the former Secretary-General interpreted all Security Council decisions in his own way and did not at all times act in keeping with these decisions. That is our view of the matter. 153. We hope that the Acting Secretary-General will carefully consider the specific ways and means of implementing the newly adopted resolution and will act in conformity with it, and that in considering all major issues he will consult all the principal advisers about whom he spoke at the time of his appointment. 154. These are the considerations I have thought it essential to voice in connexion with the adoption of the present resolution. 155. I call upon the representative of the United Kingdom on a point of order. 156. Sir PATRICK DEAN {United Kingdom): Mr. President, may I suggest, in view of the lateness of the hour and the comparative length of the statement which you have just given to us, that we might forgo the English consecutive interpretation.

If there are no objections from members of the Council, and if this is not to be regarded as a precedent for the future, I think we may agree to the suggestion in order to save time. It was so decided.

If there are no other speakers, we shall regard our agenda as completed and shall close the meeting. The meeting rose at 7.25 p.m. BELGIUM/BELGIQUE: ET MESSAGERIES DE 14-22, rue du Persil, CZECHOSLOVAKIA/TCHECOSLOVAQUIE: CESKOSLOVENSKY SPISOVATEL Nérodni Trida 9, Praha DENMARK/DANEMARK: EJNAR MUNKSGAARD, Ngrregade 6, Kgbenhavn, FINLAND/FINLANDE: AKATEEMINEN KIRJAKAUPPA 2 Keskuskatu, Helsinki. FRANCE: EDITIONS 13, rue Soufflot, Paris GERMANY (FEDERAL ALLEMAGNE (REPUBLIQUE R. EISENSCHMIDT Schwanthaler Str. 59, ELWERT UND MEURER Hauptstrasse 101, Berlin-Schéneberg. ALEXANDER HORN Splegelgasse 9, Wiesbaden. W. E. SAARBACH Gertrudenstrasse 30, GREECE/GRECE: LIBRAIRIE KAUFFMANN 28, rue du Stade, Athénes. ICELAND/ISLANDE: BOKAVERZLUN SIGFUSAR EYMUNDSSONAR H, Austurstraeti 18, Reykjavik, IRELAND/IRLANDE: Dublin. STALY/ITALIE: LIBRERIA COMMISSIONARIA Via Gino Capponi 26, & Via D. A. Azuni 15/A, LUXEMBOURG: LIBRAIRIE SCHUMMER AFRICA/AFRIQUE CAMEROUN: LIBRAIRIE DU PEUPLE AFRICAIN La Gérante, B. P. 1197, Yaoundé, ETHIOPIA/ETHIOPIE: INTERNATIONAL PRESS AGENCY, P. 0. Box 120, Addis Ababa. GHANA: UNIVERSITY BOOKSHOP University College of Ghana, Legon, Accra. MOROCCO/MAROC: CENTRE DE DIFFUSION DOCUMENTAIRE DU B.E.P.I., 8, rue Michaux-Bellaire, Rabat. SOUTH AFRICA/AFRIQUE DU SUD: “WAN SCHAIK'S BOOK STORE (PTY.), LTD. Shurch Street, Box 724, Pretoria. UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC/ REPUBLIQUE ARABE UNIE: IBRAIRIE "LA RENAISSANCE D‘EGYPTE” 9 Sh. Adly Pasha, Cairo, ASIA/ASIE BURMA/BIRMANIE: CURATOR, 3OVT, BOOK DEPOT, Rangoon. sAMBODIA/CAMBODGE: ENTREPRISE KHMERE DE LIBRAIRIE moprimerie & Papeterie, S$. aR. L., Phnom-Penh, VEYLON/CEYLAN: LAKE HOUSE BOOKSHOP Assoc. Newspapers of Ceylon, P. 0. Box 244, solombo, SHINA/CHINE; THE WORLD BOOK COMPANY, LTD, 19 Chung King Road, lst Section, Taipeh, Taiwan. THE COMMERCIAL PRESS, LTD, 211 Honan Road, Shanghai. YONG KONG/HONG-KONG: THE SWINDON BOOK COMPANY 25 Nathan Road, Kowloon. NDIA/INDE: JRIENT LONGMANS 3ombay, Calcutta, Hyderabad, Madras Place du Théatre, Luxembourg. NETHERLANDS/PAYS-BAS: N. Vv, MARTINUS NIJHOFF Lange Veorhout 9, *s-Gravenhage. NORWAY/NORVEGE: JOHAN GRUNDT TANUM Karl Johansgate, 41, PORTUGAL: LIVRARIA 186 Rua Aurea, Lisboa. SPAIN/ESPAGNE: LIBRERIA BOSCH 11 Ronda Universidad, LIBRERIA MUNDI-PRENSA Castelié 37, Madrid. SWEDEN/SUEDE: CG. KUNGL. HOVBOKHANDEL Fredsgatan 2, Stockholm. SWITZERLAND/SUISSE: LIBRAIRIE PAYOT, 5S, Lausanne, Genéve, HANS RAUNHARDT Kirchgasse 17, Ziirich & New Deiti. SXFORD BOOK & STATIONERY COMPANY talcutta & New Delhi. 2, VARADACHARY & COMPANY fadras, NDGNESIA/INDONESIE: PEMBANGUNAN, LTD. junung Sahari 84, Djiakarta. IAPAN/JAPON: MARUZEN COMPANY, LTD. i Tori-Nichome, Nihonbashi, Tokyo. Rud o COREA (REP. OF)/COREE (REP. DE): MUL-YOO PUBLISHING CO., LTD. i, 2-KA, Chongna, Seoul. ,AKISTAN: "HE PAKISTAN CO-OPERATIVE BOOK SOCIETY Jacca, East Pakistan. *UBLISHERS UNITED, LTO. hore. “HOMAS & THOMAS \arachi. ‘HILIPPINES: ALEMAR’'S BOOK STORE '69 Rizal Avenue, Manila. " -TURKEY/TURQUIE: LIBRAIRIE HACHETTE 469 Istiklal Caddesi, UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST UNION DES REPUBLIQUES SOVIETIQUES: MEZHDUNARODNAYA KNYIGA, Smolenskaya UNITED KINGDOM/ROYAUME-UNI: H. M, STATIONERY OFFICE P. 0. Box 569, London, (and HMSO branches Bristol, Cardiff, Edinburgh, YUGOSLAVIA/YOUGOSLAVIE: CANKARJEVA ZALOZBA Ljubljana, Slovenia. DRZAYNO PREDUZECE Jugosiovenska Knijiga, Beograd. PROSVJETA 5, Trg Bratstva i Jedinstva, PROSVETA PUBLISHING Import-Export Division, Terazije 16/1, Beograd. HNGAPORE/SINGAPOUR: ‘HE CITY BOOK STORE, LTO., Collyer Quay. ‘HAILAND/THAILANCE: PRAMUAN MIT, LTD. i5 Chakrawat Roac, Wat Tuk, Bangkek. NET-NAM (REP. OF/REP. DU): ISRAIRIE-PAPETERIE XUAN THU 85, rue Tu-do, 8. P. 283, Saigon. :UROPE USTRIA/AUTRICHE: iEROLD & COMPANY iraben 31, Wien, 1. }, WOLLERSTORFF farkus Sittikusstrasse 10, Salzburg. ders and inquiries from countries where sales agencies have not yet been or to Sales Section, United Nations, Palais es commandes et demandes de renseignements émanant de pays ol il n'existe ONU, New York (E.-U.), ou a ia Section des ventes, itho in UN. Price: $U,S, 0,50 {or equivalent