S/PV.9944 Security Council

In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Israel to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs; and His Excellency Mr. Stavros Lambrinidis, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2025/335, which contains a letter dated 28 May 2025 from the President of the Security Council acting in the absence of a Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council, and document S/2025/397, which contains the nineteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). At this meeting, the Council will hear briefings by Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, His Excellency Mr. Stavros Lambrinidis and Ambassador Samuel Žbogar, Permanent Representative of Slovenia, in his capacity as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I now give the floor to Ms. DiCarlo. Ms. DiCarlo: I thank you, Madam President, for the opportunity to brief the Council on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). As the Secretary-General noted in his most recent report (S/2025/397), with less than four months left until the termination of its provisions, the objectives of resolution 2231 (2015), and those of the JCPOA, have yet to be fully realized. That is regrettable. The JCPOA was adopted in 2015 to ensure that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear programme would be exclusively peaceful. It included sanctions relief, nuclear programme restrictions and monitoring and verification. The JCPOA has faced many challenges since its inception, including the withdrawal of the United States from the agreement in 2018 and Iran’s withdrawal from some of its commitments as outlined in the Plan. Nevertheless, over the past few months, JCPOA participants increased their efforts to identify a way forward for full implementation of the Plan. In addition, Iran and the United States engaged in five rounds of bilateral talks, facilitated by Oman. Regrettably, neither of those initiatives produced a way forward to ensuring the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. Earlier today the Secretary-General welcomed the announcement by the United States, in coordination with Qatar, of a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Iran and urged them to respect it fully. That is a significant achievement that potentially pulls Iran, Israel and the region back from the brink. The people of Iran and Israel have already suffered too much. According to the Iranian Ministry of Health, since the start of the conflict at least 606 people have been killed, with 107 killed in the past 24 hours, and 5,332 injured. According to Israeli authorities, 28 people were killed and 1,472 were injured during the conflict. In its quarterly report of 31 May 2025, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) observed that the significantly increased production and accumulation of highly enriched uranium by the Islamic Republic of Iran was of serious concern. The IAEA reiterated that its verification and monitoring activities related to the JCPOA have been seriously affected by the cessation of implementation by Iran of its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan. The Agency also again noted that it had lost its continuity of knowledge on many aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme, as it had not been able to perform verification and monitoring activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran for more than four years. In addition, the IAEA noted it was unable to verify the total stockpile of enriched uranium in the country and had not done so since February 2021. During the reporting period, the Secretary-General received several communications from JCPOA participants. On 17 March, the Permanent Representatives of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation shared a joint statement adopted at their meeting of 14 March in Beijing (S/2025/167, annex), in which they stressed the importance of resolution 2231 (2015), including its time frames. In a separate letter received the same day, the Permanent Representative of China shared a proposal for the settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue, highlighting the JCPOA as the basis for a new consensus and cooperation through dialogue and a step-by-step and reciprocal approach. In letters received on 9 June (S/2025/358), 11 June (S/2025/374) and 12 June (S/2025/377), the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation shared their different views regarding the causes of the impasse in the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). Despite their diverging outlooks, all five Member States reiterated the importance of negotiations and reaffirmed their commitment to finding a diplomatic solution. I will now turn to the restrictive measures set out in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). The only measures that remain in effect pertain to nuclear activities and transfers. Those measures will remain in place until 18 October, unless decided otherwise by the Council. The Secretariat received no allegations of violations of those provisions during the reporting period. Moreover, no new proposals have been submitted in the procurement channel in the last six months of the reporting cycle. The Security Council, however, received eight notifications regarding the nuclear- related restrictive measures for certain activities consistent with the JCPOA. At the heart of this conflict is the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. Following the deadly clashes of the past 12 days, the ceasefire agreement is an opportunity to avoid a catastrophic escalation and achieve a peaceful resolution of the Iran nuclear issue. Diplomacy, dialogue and verification remain the best option to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme and to bring about concrete Finally, the Secretariat will continue to support the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) until the termination date of 18 October. I would like to take this oppor­ tunity to thank His Excellency Mr. Samuel Žbogar of Slovenia for his leadership as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I also thank the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission for our continued cooperation.

I thank Ms. DiCarlo for her briefing. I now give the floor to Mr. Lambrinidis. Mr. Lambrinidis: It is an honour to have the opportunity to address the Security Council on behalf of the High Representative of the European Union (EU) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Ms. Kaja Kallas, in her capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). I would also like to thank Secretary-General António Guterres and the Secretariat for their work related to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and Slovenia as the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). We take note of the nineteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementa­ tion of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2025/397). This meeting takes place under most serious circumstances, with a dangerous cycle of escalation following military action against nuclear-related sites in Iran. In view of that, the Secretary-General on Sunday stated in the Council (see S/PV.9941) that there is a growing risk that this conflict could rapidly get out of control, with catastrophic consequences for civilians, the region and the world. We welcome the ceasefire an­ nounced and urge all sides to effectively implement it. The High Representative is engaged and has been following very closely the situation in the Middle East, and she reiterates the EU’s strong commitment to regional security, including the security of the State of Israel, and the call on all sides to abide by international law, show restraint and refrain from taking further steps, which could lead to serious consequences, such as potential radioactive release. Ensuring that Iran does not acquire or develop a nuclear weapon remains a key security priority for the European Union. At the end of May, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Grossi reported on the further expansion of enrichment capacity and operation and on a sharp increase in the production of 60 per cent enriched uranium, close to military levels. Iran was already far from its JCPOA commitments. Iran chose to continue the dramatic expansion of its programme at an alarming pace, going beyond what is plausibly necessary for a civilian programme. At the special meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors on 23 June, Director General Grossi raised the need to account for the stockpile of highly enriched uranium, fol­ lowing the events of the past days. Moreover, it has been more than four years since the Agency has been able to perform all JCPOA-related monitoring activities and has therefore lost the continuity of knowledge as regards several key components of the nuclear programme of Iran. We continue to recognize that Iran has faced and continues to face very serious negative economic consequences following the withdrawal by the United States from the JCPOA and the reimposition by the United States of unilateral sanctions that it had previously lifted. The United States has also gradually imposed additional sanc­ tions linked to the nuclear programme. Many efforts have been made to preserve the JCPOA, notably when the High Representative put forward a compromise text laying out the necessary steps needed for the United States to return to the JCPOA and for Four months from now, the Security Council will no longer be seized of the Iran nuclear issue under resolution 2231 (2015), and we urgently need to come back to a diplomatic solution. Let us be clear in what will be the final meeting in this format under resolution 2231 (2015): a lasting solution to the Iranian nuclear issue can only be through a negotiated deal, not through military action. A fully functioning nuclear deal will be conducive to the stabilization of the entire region. Last Friday, as part of a process of intense diplomatic engagement, EU High Representative Kallas, together with the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, met with the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs in Geneva. They reiterated their long-standing concerns about Iran’s expansion of its nuclear programme, and they discussed avenues towards a negotiated solution. The matter can only be addressed in a sustainable manner with the adequate involvement of the international community. Moreover, the IAEA is and should remain the sole impartial and independent international organization to monitor and verify the implementation of Iran’s nuclear non-proliferation commitments. Diplomacy must prevail. The European Union High Representative will continue to contribute to all diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions and to find a lasting solution to the Iran nuclear issue.

I thank Mr. Lambrinidis for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Žbogar. Mr. Žbogar: I am speaking in my capacity as the Security Council’s appointed Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The nineteenth report of the Facilitator was approved by Council members on 20 June 2025. I would like to thank all Council members for their cooperation and constructive engagement in that process and for their willingness to seek consensus and compromise in preparing the report. As this is Slovenia’s first report as Facilitator since taking up the role on 29 May 2025, I am especially grateful for everyone’s kind support and the extra flexibility shown, owing to the resulting time constraints. The report provides a factual account of the activities related to the resolution 2231 (2015) format of the Security Council, covering the period from 14 December 2024 to 23 June 2025. It includes several subsections, namely, the summary of activities, monitoring the implementation of the resolution, relevant communications, key aspects of the workings of the procurement channel, and transparency, outreach and guidance. Council members may refer to the report for details, but I wish to mention the following key aspects. First, one meeting of the Council in the resolution 2231 (2015) format was held during this reporting period. The meeting was held on 23 June 2025, and representatives of the Council discussed the findings and recommendations contained in the nineteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2025/397), prior to its public release. Under-Secretary- General DiCarlo has already referred to that report in her statement. Secondly, during the reporting period, a total of 19 notes were circulated within the 2231 (2015) format. In addition, a total of 10 official communications were sent to Member States and the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission, and a total of 10 communications from Member States and the Coordinator were received. Among the communications circulated were the two regular quarterly reports issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency The IAEA plays an important role in the verification and monitoring of nuclear activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, as requested under resolution 2231 (2015). The IAEA’s work provides the international community with confidence that the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran is for exclusively peaceful purposes, in accordance with the modalities set out in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The reports of the Director General play a significant role in that regard. Thirdly, I report that no new proposals were submitted to the Security Council through the procurement channel during the reporting period. The procurement channel represents a key transparency and confidence-building mechanism under the JCPOA. It remains operational, and the Procurement Working Group stands ready to review proposals. We are approaching the expiration day of resolution 2231 (2015) in October, and this might be the last report in that framework. I reiterate that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as endorsed by the Council through resolution 2231 (2015), has been the best available option to ensure that the Iranian nuclear programme remains exclusively peaceful. The 2231 (2015) format is obviously facing a challenging environment, and the situation in the region is unfolding, as exemplified by numerous letters submitted to the President of the Council in the past couple of weeks. I firmly believe, however, that through dialogue and multilateralism, we can make the utmost effort in ensuring that the plan and resolution 2231 (2015) are implemented efficiently and effectively, promoting mutual trust and cooperation. In that regard, we hope for diplomatic efforts to find a way forward. Finally, I would like to state that, as Facilitator, I will do my utmost to support implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA, which underpins it. My team and I will continue to work closely with all Council members in an impartial and transparent manner to meet our shared responsibility. I look forward to further strengthening our dialogue and cooperation for the remainder of our mandate.

I thank Ambassador Žbogar for his briefing. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements.

I thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo and Ambassador Stavros Lambrinidis for their briefings. As we reflect today on the conclusions of the Secretary-General’s final report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2025/397), Iran continues to openly violate its United Nations obligations. Tehran has sustained its provision of arms to the Houthis in Yemen and Hizbullah in Lebanon — both actions are in violation of Security Council resolutions. Moreover, Iran did not comply with the relevant provisions of resolution 2231 (2015) when they were in place, as evidenced by the hundreds of drones that it transferred to Russia in 2022 for use in attacks against Ukraine. Iran’s failure to uphold its non-proliferation obligations has prolonged conflicts and perpetuated instability across the Middle East and beyond for many years. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) most recent report on verification and monitoring in Iran in the light of resolution 2231 (2015) demonstrates plainly that Iran continued to accelerate its nuclear activities without any credible civilian justification. On 12 June, the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran to be in non-compliance for its many failures to uphold obligatory nuclear safeguards. It is regrettable that certain members of the Council have opted to turn a blind eye to, if President Trump has clearly reiterated that it is time for Iran to make peace. Despite the President’s continuous good-faith efforts to negotiate and resolve those issues diplomatically, Iran’s leaders stonewalled and ultimately refused to agree to a deal that would have prevented them from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon. On 21 June, a United States precision operation effectively fulfilled our narrow objective to degrade Iran’s capacity to produce a nuclear weapon. Those strikes, in accordance with the inherent right to collective self-defence and consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, were aimed at mitigating the threat posed by Iran to Israel, the region and, more broadly, international peace and security. Following that historic operation, President Trump immediately coordinated a ceasefire between Israel and Iran. In this critical moment, we must all urge Iran to seize this opportunity for peace and prosperity and to abide by its international obligations.

I wish to thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo for her briefing and for the kind words addressed to me and my team as Facilitators of the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I also want to thank the representative of the European Union for his insights. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is undoubtedly one of the greatest achievements of multilateralism of the past decade. A unified position among the key actors was a decisive factor. It brought about a robust regime that comprehensively addressed a pressing international security issue. Regrettably, it suffered its share of tough trials and setbacks in recent years. To our regret, the United States withdrew from it, and Iran gradually took several steps away from its JCPOA commitments. Slovenia remains deeply concerned by the continued, alarming expansion of Iran’s nuclear programme. The re-establishment of Iranian constructive engagement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is key and will help Iran to regain the international community’s confidence in its nuclear activities. We have consistently condemned Iran’s unacceptable disregard for its non-proliferation obligations, including the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. Slovenia has zero tolerance for nuclear proliferation. However, Slovenia also has zero tolerance for attacks against nuclear infrastructure anywhere. The Iran nuclear file is on a decidedly wrong path, and we urgently need a change of pace. We welcome the announcement of a ceasefire, which is an important step towards restoring stability in the region. We join the calls to both parties to respect it. This is potentially the last regular Council meeting about the implementation of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). It seems as if an era is coming to a close, and it is uncertain what the ensuing era will bring. The latest developments in the region add unpredictability and raise questions about the future of not only Iran but the entire region and the nuclear non-proliferation architecture. One thing is certain, however: as October and the termination day are approaching, it is important to recall that the JCPOA’s objectives remain valid. We need diplomacy, and we need it now.

I thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo for her valuable briefing. I also thank the Head of Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, His Excellency Mr. Stavros Lambrinidis, and Ambassador Samuel Žbogar, the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), for their important remarks and valuable contributions. We welcome the report of the Secretary-General (S/2025/397), which reaffirms that diplomacy remains the best, and indeed the only viable, path for addressing concerns related to Iran’s nuclear programme and regional security. We call on Iran to restore full transparency by reinstalling all International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring equipment, concluding the Additional Protocol without delay, continuing cooperation with the IAEA, and granting the Agency unhindered access to all nuclear facilities. Resolution 2231 (2015) remains the principal non-proliferation framework for Iran. Its provisions regarding nuclear-related transfers, verification measures and the procurement channel will sunset on 18 October. A failure to achieve measurable progress by that date would weaken the Council’s authority, undermine the global non-proliferation architecture and erode confidence in the NPT’s three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Sierra Leone reaffirms its unwavering support for the IAEA’s verification mandate and underscores the imperative of protecting safeguarded nuclear facilities. Safeguarded nuclear installations serve exclusively peaceful purposes and must remain inviolable. International humanitarian law obliges all parties to refrain from attacks on such facilities, the destruction of which could release hazardous materials with devastating consequences for civilians and the environment. Should further strikes occur on safeguarded nuclear facilities, the Security Council must be prepared to act decisively in the discharge of its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security. Sierra Leone commends the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Coordinator’s continued efforts to engage all participants, including the United States, in pursuit of full implementation of the Plan. We welcome the four new notifications under annex B of resolution 2231 (2015), which reflect ongoing legitimate nuclear cooperation. We call on all States to safeguard the integrity of the procurement channel and to refrain from any actions that might undermine JCPOA commitments or jeopardize the diplomatic momentum vital to non-proliferation efforts. To advance resolution 2231 (2015), strengthen the NPT and avert further escalation, Sierra Leone proposes the following five points as a road map. First, with respect to the ongoing conflict, which I shall turn to shortly, we stress the urgent need for a comprehensive ceasefire, an immediate cessation of all reciprocal strikes and sustained measures to de-escalate tensions and return to dialogue. We welcome the announcement of a ceasefire reportedly reached between Israel and Iran, as announced by President Donald Trump of the United States, and we urge the parties to demonstrate good faith and fully comply with that agreement. Secondly, we call for full and unrestricted IAEA verification consistent with NPT safeguards, including the prompt reactivation of all monitoring equipment and the comprehensive application of the Additional Protocol. Thirdly, we call for the revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action through sustained, coordinated diplomacy involving the E3 — Germany, France and the United Kingdom — Iran, the United States and regional partners. Fourthly, we call for continued operation of the procurement channel and calibrated sanctions relief linked to verifiable compliance, as a means of building confidence in legitimate peaceful nuclear trade. Turning briefly to the ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran, with the involvement of the United States, Sierra Leone recalls its statements of 20 and 22 June (see S/PV.9939 and S/PV.9941), in which it cautioned that recent military escalation had gravely undermined diplomatic efforts essential to defusing the crisis. We are equally concerned by Iran’s missile strikes on 23 June against a United States military base in Qatar. While Qatar’s air defences successfully intercepted the missiles, as reported, and prevented casualties, those attacks triggered regional airspace closures and heightened instability. Such actions could imperil diplomatic channels and risk drawing additional actors into a broader regional conflict. We continue to reiterate the centrality of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations and stress that no reliance on Article 51 can justify violations of that fundamental prohibition on the use of force. On this International Day of Women in Diplomacy, we join in echoing the Secretary-General’s call to “give peace a chance” through an immediate ceasefire, de-escalation, sustained diplomacy and the urgent resumption of negotiations. In conclusion, Sierra Leone underscores the imperative of upholding the Charter of the United Nations in good faith, particularly Articles 2, 25 and 103, which enshrine the primacy of peaceful dispute resolution and the binding nature of Council decisions. In that regard, with the sunset of resolution 2231 (2015) looming on 18 October, the clock is ticking. Member States must now rise to the challenge and demonstrate the statecraft demanded by their Charter obligations. This moment must be seized to reinforce the global non-proliferation regime, advance disarmament, facilitate peaceful nuclear cooperation and reaffirm our collective commitments under the NPT. The alternative is simply unthinkable.

At the outset, we would like to thank Under-Secretary- General DiCarlo and Ambassadors Žbogar and Lambrinidis for their briefings. We appreciate their continuing efforts to support the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). We take note of the nineteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2025/397) and the report of the Joint Commission on the status of the Procurement Working Group’s decisions (see S/2025/335). Resolution 2231 (2015) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action represent significant achievements of multilateral diplomacy, and we continue to view them as vital pillars for regional and international peace and security. We note with concern the findings of the Secretary-General’s nineteenth report and the Facilitator’s six-month report, which highlight the ongoing challenges facing the full implementation of the JCPOA. This briefing takes place in a deeply dangerous context in which recent developments have shifted focus away from diplomatic efforts to address the Iranian nuclear programme. The evolving geopolitical landscape in the Middle East underscores the critical importance of resolution 2231 (2015) in preventing further escalation and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region. Somalia welcomes the recent ceasefire between Israel and Iran and urges all parties to fully respect and abide by it. That development is a positive step towards reducing tensions in the region and demonstrates the potential for diplomacy, even in challenging circumstances. Somalia acknowledges the divergent perspectives among Council members and JCPOA participants regarding the causes of the current impasse. We believe that mutual respect, patience and a genuine commitment to dialogue are essential to overcoming those differences. The international community must remain united in its support for the peaceful resolution of disputes and the preservation of the non-proliferation regime. As the expiration date of resolution 2231 (2015) approaches, we encourage all Member States to continue engaging constructively and transparently in support of the JCPOA. Somalia believes that a balanced approach, which addresses the concerns of all parties, is essential to resolving the current situation. In conclusion, Somalia reiterates its unswerving support for the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). We call on all parties to redouble their diplomatic efforts, to address outstanding issues in good faith and to work collectively towards a peaceful and sustainable solution that enhances security for the region and the world.

I extend my gratitude to Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo and Ambassador Lambrinidis for their briefings. I also appreciate the Permanent Representative of Slovenia for his role as the new Facilitator. At the outset, the Republic of Korea truly welcomes the ceasefire announced between Iran and Israel. We commend the parties concerned for exercising restraint and choosing the path of de-escalation at a perilous moment when conflict could have further  escalated. As the Secretary-General has rightly pointed out in this Chamber, the core issue underlying this conflict is the nuclear question, and a significant trust gap has long existed with respect to Iran’s nuclear programme (see S/PV.9939). Our shared concerns on Iran’s nuclear programme and the outstanding Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons safeguards issues remain unaddressed. The most recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports have indi­ cated Iran’s continuous and rapid expansion of its uranium enrichment activities, and the IAEA Director General’s comprehensive assessment has concluded that the Agency is not in a position to verify that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. Conse­ quently, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on Iran’s outstanding safe­ guard issues. As a result of that persistent trust gap — which Iran has long dismissed and failed to properly address — we have witnessed a military conflict unfold over the past 12 days, which has been a source of grave concern for us. We now find ourselves entering a new phase. Nevertheless, we note that, even after the ceasefire, the limited availability of relevant information is causing considerable uncertainty. That uncertainty makes it challenging to accurately assess the situation on the ground and to consider the appropriate path forward. Precisely because of such uncertainty, our objective, as embodied in resolution 2231 (2015), remains unchanged. We have consistently worked to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities. To that end, it is critical that the IAEA’s monitoring and verification activities continue without hindrance. As a first step, we therefore expect Iran to fully guarantee the IAEA’s unhindered access in the aftermath of the ceasefire. That will also enable the Agency to promptly resume its monitoring and While the Iranian nuclear issue remains unresolved, we note with concern that resolution 2231 (2015) is set to expire this October. Without further action, the Council’s direct mandate on the Iranian nuclear file will lapse. In that regard, we strongly urge Iran to ensure full and transparent cooperation with the IAEA. The Republic of Korea fully supports the Agency’s pivotal role in that important process. Based on the IAEA’s reliable information, we trust that the Council will be able to make an informed and responsible decision.

I would like to thank the Under- Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, the representative of the European Union, Mr. Stavros Lambrinidis, and our colleague, the Permanent Representative of Slovenia, as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), for their briefings. They reminded us of the seriousness of the events we have just lived through and of the seriousness of the problems posed by Iran’s conduct of its nuclear programme over many years. First of all, France welcomes the announcement by the President of the United States of a ceasefire between Israel and Iran. Since 13 June, we have followed with concern the exchange of strikes between Israel and Iran, followed by the strikes carried out by the United States against three Iranian nuclear facilities. Those military operations carried a major risk of escalation, which could have had serious consequences for regional stability. The ceasefire must now lead to a complete cessation of hostilities, which we call on all parties to respect. It is in everyone’s interest to avoid a new cycle of violence. The ceasefire must allow for the resumption of negotiations on the Iranian nuclear issue and on all the security challenges posed by Iran. It was in order to advocate for such negotiations that Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot, together with his German, British and European counterparts, met with the Iranian Foreign Minister last Friday in Geneva. France’s position is clear. The Iranian nuclear issue can only be resolved in a lasting manner through diplomatic means. Given the risks of proliferation and the threats to international peace and security, it is essential for the Security Council to remain seized of the matter. As we meet to review the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) a few months ahead of its expiration, it is worth recalling the series of events that led to the current situation. Without going back to 2003, the diplomatic settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue is the raison d’être of the 2015 Vienna agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, supported by the E3+3 countries — France, Germany and the United Kingdom plus China, the Russian Federation and the United States — and of resolution 2231 (2015), by which the Council endorsed that agreement. Since then, the Europeans have never stopped implementing their commitments under the agreement, including after the withdrawal of the United States in 2018. In 2019, Iran took responsibility for ceasing to implement its commitments. We then resorted, as many have recalled, to the dispute resolution mechanism provided for in the agreement. In that context, the E3 countries — France, Germany and the United Kingdom — have made significant diplomatic efforts to bring the United States back into the agreement and to bring Iran back into compliance with its commitments. Iran was, in fact, offered two revised agreement proposals in 2022. We regret that it did not seize those opportunities. On the contrary, in recent years, Iran has engaged in an escalation of its nuclear programme. It has violated almost all the limits imposed by the agreement on its nuclear activities. By the end of May, Iran had thus accumulated a stockpile of That escalation has raised serious doubts about the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. The Director General of the IAEA himself has said that he was not in a position to guarantee the peaceful nature thereof. A resolution adopted on 12 June by the IAEA Board of Governors acknowledged Iran’s breach of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Over those years, Iran has continued to develop its ballistic missile programme, which could be used as a vector for nuclear weapons. Iran also refuses any substantial cooperation with the IAEA. In particular, it has removed the monitoring equipment installed by the Agency and removed the accreditation of some of the IAEA’s most experienced inspectors. As a result of the obstacles imposed on its work, the Agency no longer has continuous knowledge of all aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme. Iran is also making increasingly worrisome statements, threatening to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We urge Iran to resume full cooperation with the Agency and, in particular, to allow the Agency access to its nuclear facilities as soon as possible. It is essential that the Agency be able to ensure that Iran’s uranium stockpile is not diverted. In that context, we reiterate our support for the IAEA, its staff and its Director General, who are continuing their work with impartiality and professionalism. Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would threaten regional stability and international peace and security. It would jeopardize the integrity of the non-proliferation regime. For that reason, the Iranian nuclear issue continues to warrant the Council’s attention. Time is running out as the 18 October deadline set by resolution 2231 (2015) approaches. We expect Iran to return to the path of dialogue without delay in order to reach a robust, verifiable and lasting diplomatic solution that addresses the legitimate concerns of the international community regarding Iran’s nuclear programme. France, alongside the E3 countries and the European Union and in close coordination with the United States, will continue working to that end. We are determined to conclude an agreement that takes into account the non-proliferation regime, regional stability and European security interests. France and its E3 partners remain ready to activate the levers established by resolution 2231 (2015) — namely, the snapback — if a satisfactory agreement is not reached by the summer. Since 2003, France has had only one guiding principle: the search for a diplomatic solution, which alone can guarantee, in the long term, that Iran will never be able to develop a military nuclear programme. That remains our top priority now more than ever.

We commend and thank Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo; the representative of the Coordinator of the Joint Commission and Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, His Excellency Mr. Stavros Lambrinidis; and the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), Ambassador Samuel Žbogar. We welcome with interest and hope the announcement of intentions to establish a ceasefire between Israel and Iran. We believe that that possibility would present a valuable opportunity to reduce tensions and open up a space for dialogue and peace. We hope that that ceasefire will be the first step towards broader negotiations that make it possible to move towards lasting solutions and contribute to the stability of the entire region. We recognize the value of multilateral nuclear agreements as essential pillars of international peace and security. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was undoubtedly one of multilateralism’s greatest achievements in the area of non-proliferation. To return to that mechanism and give it another chance is to reaffirm our commitment to diplomacy. We remain concerned that the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015) will expire on 18 October. Despite that date, the objectives of the resolution and those of the Plan have yet to be fully realized. We are also concerned that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification and monitoring related to the JCPOA have been severely affected by the cessation of compliance on Iran’s part, as noted by the most recent report of the IAEA Director General. In that context, we reiterate that our position, based on fundamental principles of Panamanian foreign policy, is to prioritize the strengthening of the global non-proliferation regime, compliance with that multilateral architecture and the promotion of diplomatic dialogue as a means of mitigating tensions and reducing strategic risks. However, we cannot overlook the most recent developments, which only undermine the already fragile existing confidence and raise serious concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme and about the verifiable fulfilment of the international commitments that it has undertaken. Through its resolutions, the IAEA has warned that attacks on nuclear facilities pose a significant risk, as they could lead to the release of radioactive material. At this critical moment, we call on Iran to allow the monitoring and verification of its facilities by International Atomic Energy Agency personnel. It is also vital to understand the magnitude and scale of the damage caused by the most recent attacks, which is why we agree with IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, who said that: “Establishing the facts on the ground is a pre-requisite for any agreement, and this can only be done through IAEA inspections.” We also urge Iran to comply fully with its commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, its Safeguards Agreement and the provisions of Council resolution 2231 (2015), especially given the possibility of the movement of enriched uranium without proper IAEA supervision. We must not allow the non-proliferation architecture, which has provided greater assurances of international stability and security by significantly reducing the risk of nuclear weapons becoming a source of confrontation or conflict, to be weakened. It is urgent in that context that the parties resume negotiations, making full use of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, resolution 2231 (2015) and the established bilateral mechanisms in order to achieve progress towards regional and global stability and security.

I thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and Ambassadors Žbogar and Lambrinidis for their comprehensive briefings. The Council convenes today on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear programme. This is our last briefing on the implementation of the resolution, which expires in October. Needless to say, this meeting comes at a critical juncture. We meet with cautious optimism but real relief, following the announcement of a ceasefire between Iran and Israel, brokered by the United States and Qatar. We welcome this important diplomatic achievement, which puts an end to 12 days of While this ceasefire represents a really positive development, it also serves as a reminder of the critical importance of respecting international legal norms, including those enshrined in the IAEA safeguards system. Those safeguards are central to ensuring that nuclear energy is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. In that regard, we reiterate the importance of the full and balanced implementation of the JCPOA by all parties, including its provisions related to the lifting of sanctions. It remains a key component and offers a practical framework for addressing concerns related to Iran’s nuclear programme through dialogue, transparency and verification. As the Secretary-General stated in his report (S/2025/397), diplomacy remains the best and the only way to address concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear programme and regional security issues. On the subject of regional security issues, allow me to underscore the urgency of establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Such a zone would represent a major step forward for regional and international peace and security. In that context, we recall resolution 487 (1981), which called on Israel to place its nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards. More than four decades later, that call remains ignored, unanswered and unfulfilled. In conclusion, the announced ceasefire provides a valuable opportunity to reinforce the norms that underpin the global non-proliferation regime without selectivity or double standards. Algeria stands ready to work with all partners to uphold international law and to strengthen the integrity of the global non-proliferation regime — a cornerstone of our shared security.

We thank Under- Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo and the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and Permanent Representative of Slovenia, Samuel Žbogar, and take this opportunity to congratulate our Slovenian colleagues on the consensus approval of the Facilitator’s six-month report and count on their continued efforts to support the activities under the resolution 2231 (2015) format until its scheduled conclusion in October 2025. We have listened to the Head of the European Union delegation, Stavros Lambrinidis. On the night of 12 to 13 June, a Member State of the United Nations and party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was subjected to unprovoked aggression, and the whole world found itself on the brink of a major nuclear catastrophe. The Russian Federation strongly condemns the attacks on the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including its peaceful nuclear infrastructure, which is under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The actions of the United States and Israel were in direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations, Security Council resolutions — including resolutions 487 (1981) and 2231 (2015), which is under discussion today — the Statute of the IAEA and relevant resolutions of the Agency’s General Conference. They constituted a direct and very dangerous encroachment on the authority of the NPT, in particular on Iran’s right — enshrined in article IV of the Treaty — to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including to enrich uranium, while dealing a heavy blow to the non-proliferation regime. All of those actions were taken by two States, one of which is a depositary of the NPT, and the other of which, for decades, has altogether avoided acceding to this linchpin of international security and to place its nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. Attacking Iran’s infrastructure, including installations involved in the nuclear fuel cycle, poses a real threat of dire radiological consequences for not only the people of Iran but also the entire Middle East. All of that — and this is again unfortunate — took place not only with the tacit consent but also the approval of the United Kingdom, France and Germany, which continue to regard themselves as full participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Whereas the assurances of their commitment to finding a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear programme inspired little confidence in the past, it is now simply impossible to take them seriously. Council members should judge for themselves: first, those countries deliberately refused to uphold their obligations under the nuclear deal by failing to create the necessary conditions for ensuring economic benefits from the lifting of European sanctions against Iran, which were in effect until 2015. They then followed in the footsteps of the United States, which withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, and renewed their unilateral sanctions pressure on Tehran, thereby precluding any prospects for a full restoration of the JCPOA, to which our Iranian colleagues have repeatedly expressed their openness. Simultaneously, Berlin, London and Paris attempted to portray Iran’s legitimate retaliatory measures, which they themselves — that is, Berlin, London and Paris — provoked, as proof of some imaginary Iranian nuclear threat. They repeatedly attempted to negate Iran’s constructive cooperation with the IAEA Technical Secretariat, which included efforts to settle unresolved questions. And even in spite of that, Iran remained and remains the most rigorously verified IAEA member State. And the IAEA Director General’s reports clearly indicate the lack of any proliferation risk. Here, I emphasize that nowhere in the IAEA’s reports is there any mention of the conversion of nuclear material accumulated in the Islamic Republic of Iran for undeclared or military purposes. In other words, the IAEA has not found any evidence that Iran is developing a nuclear weapon. Therefore, all the assertions by Western delegations to the contrary are falsehoods intended for an audience that has either not read those reports or does not understand the issue. The cynicism and hypocrisy of our Western colleagues reached its peak on 12 June. On that day, the IAEA Board of Governors — egged on by Western countries — adopted yet another resolution on Iran that was pretentious and divorced from reality. Immediately afterwards, Israel carried out strikes against Iran’s peaceful nuclear sites. A week later, the sovereign territory of Iran was attacked by the United States. And as if to confirm that this move had been agreed upon in advance, the United Kingdom and France, which claim to be champions of diplomacy, rushed to defend the actions of West Jerusalem and Washington. As a result, last Sunday we witnessed yet another attempt to legitimize the use of force, in contravention of the United Nations Charter, along with strikes against peaceful nuclear facilities, in violation of the IAEA Statute and all norms of nuclear safety and security. And German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, as we have already mentioned, was so bold as to cynically remark that Israel is doing the Europeans’ dirty work. Those are the actual remarks of the Head of Government of a State party to the JCPOA. We must not forget that West Jerusalem began its operation just two days before a scheduled round of Iran-United States talks on nuclear issues, mediated by Oman, with the clear intention of sabotaging that process. Against that backdrop, the Western trio even has the audacity to demand of Tehran — not of Israel and the United States, but of Tehran, which is the victim of aggression — that it return Special responsibility in that regard lies with the IAEA and its Technical Secretariat. Given the infringement by Israel and the United States of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, which is based on the NPT, Director General Grossi and his colleagues must strictly adhere to their mandate and to IAEA General Conference resolutions GC/(XXIX)/RES/444 and GC/(XXXIV)/RES/533. The IAEA leadership should not content itself with evasive language and fragmented information; rather, they should provide detailed reports on the attacks carried out on Iranian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. At the same time, it is extremely important to call a spade a spade and directly indicate who exactly carried out targeted attacks that clearly violated the United Nations Charter, the IAEA Statute, Security Council resolutions and the Agency’s General Conference resolutions. Unfortunately, we have already seen what happens when the IAEA Director General includes, in addition to objective facts and statistics, ambiguous evaluative judgments in his reports. And those judgments are then used by a certain group of countries to justify unprovoked aggression. The issues surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme can be resolved only through diplomacy, within the framework of negotiated solutions based on international law and the principle of equal and indivisible security. The Russian Federation has consistently supported the search for a peaceful solution to address the concerns surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme that would be acceptable to all parties and the international community as a whole. In that regard, the Security Council bears the primary responsibility and is obligated to take the requisite measures. That is the goal of the draft resolution proposed by Russia, together with its Chinese and Pakistani partners. Today, we are proposing to our Council colleagues an updated text that takes into account the most recent developments and aims to bring about a lasting ceasefire and oversight of that ceasefire by the Security Council through appropriate reporting by the Secretary-General. The JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015), adopted in 2015, demonstrated that the international community at that time rejected the military approach and clearly chose diplomacy instead. Today we must make the same choice again and without delay.

I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and the Head of the Delegation of the European Union, Mr. Lambrinidis, for their informative and timely briefings. I would also like to commend my Slovenian colleague, Ambassador Žbogar, and his team for their efforts in compiling the report of the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) in a timely manner. First of all, I would like to welcome President Trump’s announcement of a ceasefire agreement and to commend the mediating efforts of the United States and Qatar. It is a necessary first step towards sustainable security, which can be achieved only through diplomacy and a negotiated deal that would address all proliferation risks and guarantee the security of all the countries of the region. First and foremost, Greece reiterates its unwavering commitment to preserving and strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remain its indispensable institutional cornerstones. We therefore urge all States parties to comply with the full range of their obligations under the NPT. Secondly, we express serious concern about the findings of Director General Grossi’s most recent report, of 31 May, and the resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on 12 June. According to them, the Agency’s ability to verify Iran’s implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has been seriously affected. The cessation of Iran’s application of the Additional Protocol, the removal of JCPOA-related monitoring and surveillance equipment, the non-compliance with its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement and the refusals of access to experienced IAEA inspectors have collectively led to a loss of continuity of knowledge — a gap that, the Agency now confirms, cannot be restored. Of equal concern is the steady increase in Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium. Since late February, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has considerably increased and been enriched up to 60 per cent, according to data from 17 May. That is deeply alarming from a non-proliferation perspective, as there is no credible civilian use for uranium enriched to that level. We remain deeply concerned about the Director General’s inability to provide assurances that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. Thirdly, Greece continues to view the JCPOA, as endorsed by the Council through resolution 2231 (2015), as the best available framework to ensure that Iran’s nuclear programme remains exclusively peaceful. Its full and effective implementation would provide both transparency and confidence, not only with regard to verification, but also with a view towards sanctions relief, economic development and regional de-escalation. It is in that spirit that we fully support all diplomatic efforts to secure Tehran’s full compliance with its obligations under the JCPOA. We welcome last Friday’s talks between the E3 countries — namely, France, Germany and the United Kingdom — and Iran, and we call for the resumption of the United States-Iran talks. As a country with historical ties and geographical proximity to the region, Greece stands ready to support all constructive efforts aimed at de-escalation, diplomacy and dialogue. In conclusion, let me stress that Iran and, as a matter of fact, any other nation, must never be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons. The international community cannot afford a major nuclear proliferation crisis. With the credibility of the global non-proliferation regime at stake and with military escalation threatening the security and stability of the Middle East, the time has come for responsible action. We call on all parties to demonstrate political will, engage meaningfully and in good faith and reaffirm their commitment to dialogue and diplomacy. As the events of the past days demonstrate, we are glad that, even in these very difficult circumstances, the window of diplomacy has remained open and there is now an opportunity for addressing, through dialogue, all concerns about the Iranian nuclear programme.

As others did, I thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, Ambassador Lambrinidis and Ambassador Žbogar for their briefings and updates. The situation in the Middle East continues to evolve. We welcome the ceasefire announced between Israel and Iran as a critical step towards de-escalation in a region that has endured far too much instability. We urge both parties to adhere to it and to abide by their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and international law. Even before the recent developments, Denmark has continuously expressed its concern about Iran’s nuclear trajectory and its activities in blatant violation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). We have also persistently warned against an Iranian withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Our position is clear. Iran must never be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon. That is in line with Iran’s obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its commitments under the JCPOA. It is therefore deeply alarming that the recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report shows that Iran has failed to declare nuclear material in its possession and demonstrates that Iran has impeded and obstructed Agency verification activities, as also conveyed by the resolution 2231 (2015) Facilitator’s letter (S/2025/335). We reiterate our grave concern that the IAEA is unable to assure that the Iranian nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. Those concerns are added to by Iran’s pro­ duction and stockpiling of vast amounts of enriched uranium, with no plausible civil­ ian purpose. It still remains unclear whether Iran has ceased its enrichment activities. We do not take that lightly and call on Iran to change its course of action and abide by its obligations. That remains the case even if recent events have changed the circumstances surrounding the Iranian nuclear issue. As many have highlighted here today, this is the last mandated meeting before the expiration of the JCPOA, meaning there is no time to spare. Iran must, therefore, engage seriously in negotiations with the international community, leading to an agreement that addresses all concerns related to its nuclear programme. Securing an agreement on the nuclear issue has the potential to foster lasting stability in the Middle East. All efforts must be deployed to that end. The role of the IAEA’s verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear programme remains imperative also in the current situation. Denmark strongly supports the Agency’s professional and impartial efforts in carrying out its mandate to verify the implementation of Iran’s safeguard obligations, especially during these complex circumstances in which the safety and security of the inspectors must also be kept in mind. In conclusion, we continue to call for a diplomatic solution. Only a negotiated so­ lution can bring about a lasting settlement to concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme.

We thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo and Ambassador Stavros Lambrinidis for their briefings. I would also like to thank Ambassador Samuel Žbogar for presenting the report in his capacity as the Facilitator of the resolution 2231 (2015) format. The core common element of those three briefings that we just heard in this meeting was the primacy of a peaceful diplomatic solution. We are meeting at a crucial point in the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the Security Council’s consideration of Iran’s nuclear issue. Obviously, the developments of the past two weeks have affected the context of the whole issue and have a bearing on our discussions today. However, what has not changed are the fundamental principles and multilateral spirit behind the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and resolution 2231 (2015), adopted 10 years ago. The JCPOA was a unique instrument, the manifestation of an approach based on dialogue, diplomacy and pragmatism. It was the outcome of painstaking and arduous Notwithstanding those challenges, the most widely held view was that dialogue, diplomacy and constructive engagement was the only viable way forward. That view was still held and was indeed present in the negotiations between Iran and the United States, facilitated by Oman, until it was violently disrupted by the unlawful and illegal military attacks on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguarded Iranian nuclear facilities. Those military strikes also impeded the IAEA’s crucial verification functions in Iran. Pakistan has expressed its clear position on those developments in this Chamber and elsewhere over the past two weeks. Our leadership has also remained actively engaged with counterparts from many other countries during this period. What we have witnessed should never have happened. Even now, it is our firm belief that those actions should not be allowed to further complicate the peaceful resolution of long-standing issues and the full and effective implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). We reaffirm our support for the resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue through peaceful means, diplomatic engagement and sustained dialogue. Pakistan advocates the preservation and renewal of the JCPOA, or its substitution by an equally sound agreement that is acceptable to all sides, before it expires in October this year. The IAEA is the institution responsible for verifying compliance with the respective nuclear safeguards obligations of Member States. It is mandated to do so in an objective, impartial and credible manner, purely on technical grounds. The IAEA must be enabled to fulfil that statutory function. We believe that verification activities by the IAEA should continue unimpeded. The IAEA must continue its work in an impartial and apolitical manner to provide objective reporting and credible information regarding the issues under its purview. With regard to recent developments in the region, I would like to emphasize the following points. First, we express our condemnation of the violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States and the threat or use of force to settle disputes. Secondly, we clearly reject attacks on IAEA safeguarded nuclear facilities, which violate Security Council and IAEA resolutions and international humanitarian law. Thirdly, we request the Secretary-General to report on the implications of those developments for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), particularly those arising from military strikes against nuclear facilities, and we also request the Director-General of the IAEA to share his assessment from the legal, technical, safety, security and safeguards points of view. Fourthly, we urge a sustained cessation of hostilities and a permanent ceasefire to allow the resumption of dialogue and the IAEA’s verification activities. Fifthly, there is an urgent need to renew diplomatic engagement to seriously and faithfully address the outstanding issues in a cooperative manner as per the rights, obligations and responsibilities of the parties concerned. We welcome the announcement of the ceasefire understanding between Iran and Israel, and we expect it to be fully respected. We commend all those who played a pivotal role in facilitating that development and hope that that positive step will The Council should allow sufficient time for efforts among the IAEA, Iran and other parties to continue to resolve outstanding issues. Recent developments have yet again manifested the grave dangers that arise when there are violations of the Charter of the United Nations and international law. The cost of seeking to resolve issues through military means is more than evident. The region and, indeed, the whole world cannot be held hostage to such adventures, dangerous precedents and spiralling escalations. Diplomatic engagement and the resumption of dialogue are the best means to resolve all outstanding issues. Diplomacy delivered previously and, with the necessary political will, it can certainly deliver again. Lastly, allow me to inform the Council that, following the circulation of the draft resolution by China, Pakistan and Russia on Sunday, we have updated and revised the text to reflect the latest developments, including the ceasefire, and have circulated it to Council members. Securing the ceasefire was one of the primary objectives of the draft resolution, in addition to calling for a negotiated settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue and promoting respect for international law under all circumstances. We will engage constructively with fellow members on the text of the draft resolution with a view to arriving at a consensus outcome, signifying the Council’s support for a sustained ceasefire, sustained dialogue and diplomatic engagement for a lasting solution. Dame Barbara Woodward (United Kingdom): I thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, Ambassador Lambrinidis and Ambassador Žbogar for their briefings. Let me start by welcoming the announcement by President Trump of a ceasefire between Israel and Iran, but the situation remains extremely fragile. We call on all sides to respect the ceasefire in full. Our priority remains stability in the Middle East, and we are clear that restarting this conflict is in no one’s interest. Now is the time for a return to diplomacy. We, along with our partners, are clear that only diplomacy can achieve a durable solution to the Iranian nuclear threat. We urge Iran to take this opportunity to engage in negotiations now. It is critical that Iran not miss this window for diplomacy. As we know, Iran’s nuclear programme has gone far beyond any credible civilian justification, including an enriched uranium stockpile 40 times the limit set by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. It is urgent that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have full access, especially in relation to Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile. We have been clear that Iran cannot develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. The United Kingdom, alongside its E3 partners, stands ready to support efforts towards a negotiated solution. We will use all diplomatic levers at our disposal to support a negotiated outcome and ensure that Iran does not develop a nuclear weapon. Lastly, we commend the IAEA and the Director General for their vital work, including under the mandate of resolution 2231 (2015). They have displayed professionalism and impartiality, and they have our full support. We urge Iran to cooperate with the IAEA in the interests of both safety and diplomacy. We urge all parties to urgently pursue a deal that establishes international confidence long-term that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. The ceasefire is the first step towards that. Israel and the United States, on the grounds of possible future threats, resorted to the use of force against Iran in a grave violation of international law and Iran’s sovereignty. What is more, striking Iranian nuclear facilities, which are subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, sets a dangerous precedent, threatening the international non-proliferation regime. China, once again, unequivocally condemns such actions, which have also undermined diplomatic efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue and have given rise to great uncertainty surrounding the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). China is gravely concerned and deeply alarmed about that. China has noted that some Council members have done nothing but accuse Iran of violating its non-proliferation obligations in an attempt to justify the military action of Israel and the United States. China wishes to remind those countries of the following basic facts. It was none other than the United States that started the Iranian nuclear crisis. The United States unilaterally withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2018. Thereafter, it reinstated and escalated unilateral sanctions against Iran and exerted maximum pressure, preventing Iran from enjoying the economic dividends of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and forcing the country to be less compliant with its obligations under the Agreement. It was also the United States, which, with not a thought for its own credibility, launched military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities, undermining the negotiation process that it itself had initiated, leading the Iranian nuclear issue into yet another impasse and resulting in a sharp escalation of the regional situation. Iran’s sincerity about resolving the nuclear crisis should be valued. To this day, Iran continues to fulfil its nuclear non-proliferation obligations and implement the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Iran has repeatedly stated that it does not seek to develop nuclear weapons. It engaged constructively in several rounds of professional and pragmatic negotiations with the United States and never abandoned its diplomatic efforts. However, some countries, citing selectively the report of the IAEA Director General and ignoring the positive aspects of Iran’s cooperation with the Agency, pushed for the adoption of a resolution by the IAEA Board of Governors without sufficient consultation, thus jeopardizing the atmosphere for dialogue while fuelling tension and confrontation. We call on those countries to ponder the adverse effects of that irresponsible move. China believes that diplomatic means to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue have not been exhausted and that there is still hope for a peaceful solution. All parties should learn the necessary lessons, restart dialogue on an equal footing and put the Iranian nuclear issue back on track for a political solution. I would like to emphasize three points in that regard. First, ensuring a ceasefire is the top priority. Facts have shown that force is not the right way to resolve international disputes, nor can it resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. China takes note of the current situation and looks forward to the effective implementation of a genuine ceasefire. The parties concerned should take practical measures to prevent the situation from escalating again. Meanwhile, the international community must make efforts to de-escalate the situation and to promote dialogue and negotiation. Secondly, we must recognize that a political settlement is the only way forward. The core goals and objectives set out in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and resolution 2231 (2015) remain valid in the next step of the political Thirdly, dialogue and negotiation is the fundamental way forward. China supports all efforts to relaunch the Iranian nuclear talks and believes that this is also the position of the vast majority of Council members. The Security Council should play a constructive role in assisting the parties concerned to build trust, bridge differences and create favourable conditions for the resumption of negotiations. Relevant countries should abandon the practice of threatening to activate the snapback mechanism at any moment, as that will only aggravate tensions and confrontations and further undermine diplomatic efforts. The proper resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue will directly impact the authority and effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system and is crucial to peace and stability in the Middle East. The regional situation is at a critical and crucial juncture. China calls on all parties to act with a greater sense of urgency and responsibility and to de-escalate the situation and resume negotiations as soon as possible. As a permanent member of the Security Council and a party to the JCPOA, China will maintain an objective and impartial position, strengthen communication and coordination with all parties to build synergy and uphold fairness and justice, with a view to playing a constructive role in restoring peace in the Middle East and promoting a political solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.

I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Guyana. I thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo for presenting the nineteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2025/397) and Ambassador Samuel Žbogar, for presenting the report of the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I also thank Ambassador Lambrinidis for his briefing. In the light of the recent escalations over the past two weeks, Guyana welcomes the announced ceasefire between Israel and Iran. We reiterate our call for dialogue and a return to the negotiating table as the only way forward for a diplomatic solution that promotes regional and international peace and security. Guyana also urges all parties to exercise maximum restraint and to unequivocally commit to safeguarding all nuclear installations in accordance with their international obligations. We stand at a critical juncture, with resolution 2231 (2015) being mere months away from expiration, and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has yet to achieve its core mandate. Guyana recalls that the JCPOA, endorsed by resolution 2231 (2015), was meant to ensure that Iran’s nuclear programme would be of an exclusively peaceful nature. Guyana also recalls that resolution 2231 (2015) encourages Member States to cooperate with Iran in the framework of the JCPOA, including through the involvement of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It also encourages cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and engagement in mutually determined civil-nuclear cooperation projects, in accordance with annex III of the JCPOA. Guyana recalls that agreement on the JCPOA was reached through intensive multilateral negotiations. We must continue to work towards the full implementation of the Plan of Action. Guyana believes that this is vital for ensuring regional and international peace and security and for building confidence and trust among the parties. We therefore urge all participants to return to the Plan of Action and to engage in dialogue and diplomacy as a matter of urgency. Mutually assured destruction can never be a good policy. We urge stronger commitment towards the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and encourage States that have not yet done so to accede to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. We underscore the need for decisive action by the international community in advancing the abolition of nuclear weapons. In conclusion, I reiterate Guyana’s commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons and a world where there is greater investment in peace. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. The representative of the United States has asked for the floor to make a further statement.

I am compelled to respond to some assertions made by certain Council members. I spoke earlier about the precision operation that the United States took to degrade Iran’s capacity to produce a nuclear weapon. We did not take this action lightly, and we are confident that it is consistent with the inherent right of self-defence under the Charter of the United Nations. Nothing in the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency prevents States from taking legitimate steps for their own or collective self-defence.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

I thank you, Madam President, for convening this meeting. Today is International Day of Women in Diplomacy. Let me therefore begin by congratulating you and all women diplomats on this occasion. I also congratulate you, Madam, on your successful leadership of the Council thus far in June and commend your tireless efforts to convene this emergency meeting to divert the Security Council’s attention to the aggression and blatant violation by Israel and the United States against my country. I wish to sincerely thank our brotherly and friendly nation, the State of Qatar, for its sincere and diplomatic efforts to help end Israeli aggression, establish a ceasefire and prevent further escalation of regional tensions that threaten peace and stability First and foremost, I wish to express my strong objection to the participation of the delegation of the Israeli regime in this meeting. Legally and procedurally, Israel has no standing to take part in the meeting. The regime has no connection to the agenda of the meeting nor to resolution 2231 (2015) or the JCPOA. The participants in the JCPOA are clearly defined in resolution 2231 (2015), and the Council’s practice in convening meetings under this agenda item has always limited them to JCPOA participants. This meeting is the final Security Council briefing on resolution 2231 (2015) before its expiration in October. In that context, I would like to make the following points. First, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018. It then imposed illegal extraterritorial sanctions, violating resolution 2231 (2015). Iran has honoured its commitments. In contrast, the United States, with full support from the United Kingdom, France and Germany, has repeatedly violated both the spirit and letter of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). The root causes of the current situation are simple and clear. Therefore, they are not in a position to accuse Iran of non-compliance. Second, today’s meeting takes place as my country faces an unprovoked military aggression that blatantly violates international law, the Charter of the United Nations, the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the General Conference resolution and resolution 2231 (2015). Resolution 2231 (2015) calls on all United Nations Member States to avoid actions that undermine the resolution and the JCPOA. However, with full United States support, Israel targeted Iran’s peaceful nuclear facilities, civilians and civilian infrastructure. Israel falsely justified those attacks on the basis that Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme was an imminent threat. That claim is baseless and has no legal basis. In reality, Israel — the region’s only undeclared nuclear-armed entity and a non-party State to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) — refuses IAEA inspections and monitoring, while Iran complies with the NPT and has subjected its nuclear programme to the most rigorous IAEA monitoring. Breaches of resolution 2231 (2015) and international law are not limited to Israel. The United States — a permanent member of the Council, responsible for upholding its resolutions — also attacked Iran’s nuclear facilities, which were under IAEA safeguards. Third, it is profoundly troubling that, even after a decade of resolution 2231 (2015), Iran’s fully monitored peaceful nuclear programme has been repeatedly targeted by Israel and the United States. Those illegal actions set a dangerous precedent, undermine the non-proliferation regime and damage the credibility of the Security Council. Resolution 2231 (2015) was intended to promote a peaceful solution and strengthen the Council’s role in preventing unnecessary crises. However, reckless attacks on Iran’s peaceful nuclear facilities by Israel and the United States have gravely weakened that role. It is disappointing that the Council failed to condemn those illegal attacks, despite the strong request set out in resolution 487 (1981), which prohibits such illegal acts. We call on the Council to, at the very least, explicitly condemn those acts of aggression and ensure that they do not happen again. Fifth, claims that Iran has violated resolution 2231 (2015) are groundless. For the past decade, Iran has upheld resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA. Our remedial measures have been fully consistent with those two instruments and are meant only to restore balance and encourage all parties to return to their commitments. Iran’s remedial measures must not be misused to justify new pressure on the JCPOA or resolution 2231 (2015). The Council must prevent any attempt to manipulate that mechanism against Iran. Sixth, resolution 2231 (2015) must conclude on schedule, and Iran rejects any attempt to revive expired provisions under any pretext. Unfortunately, the European JCPOA participants have failed to meet their obligations. Even worse, they falsely assert that Iran is close to acquiring nuclear weapons — a falsehood, unsupported by credible evidence. Our peaceful programme, under strict IAEA verification, cannot be denied. Despite that aggression and the unconstructive behaviour of the European parties, Iran remains committed to diplomacy and peaceful dispute resolution. Resolution 2231 (2015) proved that diplomacy can and must resolve differences. Seventh, Iran continues to believe that diplomatic resolution of nuclear and sanctions issues is possible. Our commitment is evident through our full implementation of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). But if the other parties truly want a resolution, they must respect Iran’s right and stop undermining diplomacy. Eighth, Iran never initiated this war. Once the aggressors stopped their attacks, Iran also stopped its lawful military response. Nevertheless, Iran will not overlook the deceit and double standards. Our brave armed forces remain fully prepared to respond to any further threats or violations. Lastly, in conclusion, we are now closer to diplomacy than ever before. The long, large-scale war that they thought could force Iran into a so-called “unconditional surrender” and could make it abandon its peaceful nuclear programme through intimidation, threats and the use of force has clearly failed more than ever. They unleashed their full military might, supporting and providing Israel with advanced fighter jets, sophisticated weaponry and the most powerful bombs — even bunker busters — with which to attack Iran’s peaceful nuclear facilities and covertly, deliberately and indiscriminately targeted civilians and critical infrastructure. Those attacks led to the martyrdom of hundreds of innocent people, including women, children, nuclear scientists, academics, athletes, students, aid workers and senior military officials, and left thousands more injured. We honour the martyrs for their sacrifice and our brave patriotic people for their defence of our homeland. Iran emerged proud and steadfast in the face of that criminal aggression. That proves one simple truth more clearly than ever: diplomacy and dialogue are the only path to resolving the unnecessary crisis over Iran’s peaceful programme.

I now give the floor to the representative of Germany.

I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, Ambassador Žbogar and Ambassador Lambrinidis for their valuable briefings and continuous efforts to implement resolution 2231 (2015). For two decades, the Council has been deliberating on the Iranian nuclear programme. We find ourselves at a particularly difficult juncture today. France, Last Friday, the E3 Foreign Ministers and the European Union High Representative met with their Iranian counterpart in Geneva to call upon Iran to engage in negotiations. We will continue our joint diplomatic effort to address all concerns associated with Iran’s nuclear programme. We have always been clear: Iran must not have a nuclear weapon; it can only be a non-nuclear-weapon State under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); and it must respect its nuclear safeguards obligations. Our efforts, conducted jointly with many partners around the globe, have aimed at preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. We successfully concluded the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which put robust and verifiable restrictions on Iran’s nuclear programme and would have provided the entire international community with confidence that Iran’s nuclear activities would remain exclusively peaceful. Throughout the past years, we have witnessed an expansion of Iran’s nuclear programme far beyond Iran’s commitments under the JCPOA. As of last month, Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile was 40 times higher than what was allowed under the JCPOA limits. Iran continued to enrich uranium to up to 60 per cent, which lacks any plausible civilian purpose, in an underground facility. It also stopped implementing almost all of the key transparency commitments it subscribed to under the JCPOA. The E3 have always pursued diplomacy to find a solution to the Iranian nuclear proliferation crisis. In 2021 and 2022 we negotiated in good faith to bring the United States back into the JCPOA and Iran to full compliance with its commitments. It was to no avail: Iran twice refused a fair proposal put on the table by the JCPOA Coordinator and decided to further escalate its nuclear programme to the level we all know. In conjunction with Iran’s failure to comply with its legally binding safeguards obligations — an assessment that was confirmed by the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) last month — Iran’s nuclear activities have remained a threat to regional and global security. Iran’s nuclear programme continues to pose serious proliferation concerns. We are particularly concerned about the possible relocation of nuclear material since the recent military strikes. We reiterate that, as a member of the NPT and its nuclear safeguards regime, Iran is obliged to declare and put all nuclear material located in Iran under IAEA safeguards. Iran must fully cooperate with the Agency and refrain from threats against its personnel and Director General Grossi himself, whose professional work we commend. In that regard, we are alarmed by the initiative in the Iranian Parliament to suspend cooperation with the Agency, as well as by Iran’s deliberations to withdraw from the NPT. In closing, let me welcome the ceasefire between Israel and Iran, announced yesterday. Germany joins call on all sides to respect the ceasefire and to re-engage in diplomacy.

I now give the floor to the representative of Israel.

First, I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and the representatives from the European Union and Slovenia for their remarks. I advise my colleague, the Ambassador of Iran, to comply with resolution 2231 (2015) instead of giving advice to the Council on how to conduct its affairs, so that we do not have to come back here almost every day to discuss Iran’s violations. In full coordination with President Trump, Israel has agreed to the President’s proposal for a ceasefire. We thank the United States for its support and critical role in removing the Iranian nuclear threat. Last night, the Iranian regime fired missiles at our civilian population. Four innocent civilians were murdered in Be’er Sheva. Their tragic deaths are a reminder of the evil we dealt with — a regime that could not restrain its hatred. Israel is a peaceful nation. We pray for peace three times a day. But make no mistake, we will respond forcefully to any violation of the ceasefire and any threat facing our people. I have no doubt that the leadership and determination Israel displayed will allow the Abraham Accords to expand and bring other nations into the fold of normalization. If there were a Nobel prize for deception, the Iranian regime would win it every single year. It has broken every commitment it has ever made. There is no reason to believe that this deception will not continue. Let us walk through the facts. In July 2015, the Council endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran supposedly agreed to many conditions — restricting its enrichment, reducing its stockpile and opening its facilities for inspection. In return, it was granted sanctions relief and global legitimacy. But even then, Iran was already building its exit strategy. By July 2019, Iran had already breached the 300-kilogram limit on enriched uranium. In January 2021, it resumed enrichment to 20 per cent — more than five times the agreed limit. In April of that same year, it crossed into truly dangerous territory, enriching uranium to 60 per cent — a level with no civilian application. In June 2022, Iran removed the surveillance cameras and monitoring equipment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), attempting to eliminate all oversight. Today, the IAEA is completely blind. As of May 2025, Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile stands at over 9,000 kilograms. That includes more than 400 kilograms enriched to 60 per cent. The IAEA has confirmed that it can no longer verify the extent of Iran’s programme. For years, the international community spoke of resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA as a framework for peace. But for Iran, it was a framework for deception. While the diplomats and politicians talked, Iran built. While we negotiated, they enriched. While we hoped, they lied. Today, the regime in Tehran stands completely exposed as the regime that has weaponized every opportunity the international community gave it. Iran did not abandon its commitments last week or last month. It walked away from its obligations years ago, if it ever adhered to them at all. It has been violating this resolution with impunity for as long as it existed. The Council just refused to see it. We all know that the Iran’s level of enrichment has no civilian usage — that is a fact. The Council does not need a nuclear scientist to understand what that means. The international community now knows what Israel has known for a long time. Iran was working on the key elements for a nuclear bomb in hidden facilities protected from international view. These were facilities like Fordow, originally built for 90 per cent enrichment and hidden from the IAEA. Iran engaged in systematic, calculated assault on every safeguard the Council claimed would prevent them from attaining a bomb. Israel has been warning the Council for years. We warned it when Iran crossed the enrichment threshold. We warned it when Iran denied IAEA inspectors access. We warned it when Iran spun lies at the negotiating table. Many here refused to listen. They held on to the illusion that diplomacy was working. They convinced themselves that silence was stability. They told themselves the time was on their side. It was not. For years what was Iran met with? There were statements of concern and condemnations, but no consequences. Israel did what responsible nations must do when faced with extermination. We took action. We moved to dismantle what the world had allowed to grow unchecked. The Council was built to uphold international law, not to be exploited by those who trample it. Today, as we speak, Iran remains untouched by consequences from the broader international community — the same Iran that refused IAEA inspections, the same Iran that enriched uranium to weapons grade levels and the same Iran that used its seat at the table to delay, deceive and arm itself. There is still time to take meaningful and decisive action to ensure that the threat of a nuclear Iran does not return stronger than before. The international community must reassert its authority. It must remain vigilant. It must reimpose the measures necessary to deny Iran the tools of destruction. It must do so before the clock runs out. We are often told that diplomacy must be given a chance. It was given every chance, every round, every channel and every deadline, but so far it has failed. The regime in Tehran never had any intention of complying. Council members know with whom they are dealing. They are not engaging with a regime that negotiates in good faith; they are dealing with the masters of lies, deceit and delay. They have seen the response to the usual approach. Therefore, I urge them to take a different approach. Israel has done its part. The United States has done its part. Now the world must do its part.