S/5/PV.294 Security Council

The debate on the Korean problem is drawing to a close. The General Assembly faces the task of adopting a decision on one of the most im.1?ortant matters on its agenda. 2. The discussions in the First Committee1 and in the Assembly have brought out two clearly distinguishable approaches to the settlement of the Korean problem. 3. The delegations of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR, the Byelorussian SSR; Poland and Czechoslovakia ,have insisted on the need for a pf~ceful settlement of the Km'ean conflict. 4. The delegations of those five Pow,~rs have submitted a draft resolution [A/1426] t,o the General Assembly. Essentially, that draft resolution provides for putting an end to foreign intereference in t.he settlement of the internal conflict between North ~~nd South Korea, and for giving the Korean people itself, by its , freely e.."'Cpressed will, the opportunity to settle the problem of the unification of Kqrea in a single, democratic , State and of the establismnent of a legislative organ and , a goverJ;11nent of the Republic. , 5. These proposals show the sincere deslte of the ~()viet Union· and. the peace-loving States united with it to step the war at once and to create conditions pro- ,Tti-.22'1 '.; Saturday, 7 October 1950, at 10.45 a.m. Flushing ~eadow, New York pitious to, the peaceful development of Korea, to which United States intervention and aggressiotl have brought innumerable misfortunes and heavy losses. These peace proposals are designed only to put an end to the Korean conflict through the concerte;d efforts o~ the United Nations. Nevertheless, they have been opposed and countered by a number of delegations, headed by the delegation of the United States. 6. But however much the opponents of our proposals try to distort their meaning and belittle their importance by alleging that their only aim is propaganda, they will not succeed in concealing from world public opinion and from their own peoples the steadfast will for peace expressed in those proposals. . .' 7. The other approach to the solution of international problems is expressed in the d.raft resolution [A/14Z2] submitted by eight delegations headed by the United Kingdom. What kind of a programme for the settlement of the Korean conflict does that draft resolution propose? 8. The basic difference between it and the five-Power 'draft resolution is ~hatit does not provide for p'utti!lg an end to the war In Korea. On the contrary,. Its mm is to extend the aggression to the entire territory of Korea. 9. Thus, on the' one hand, there is an attempt to stop the conflict forthwith and end the war in Korea by peaceful means, and on the other 'an iattempt to extend the area 01 -conflict and· to prolong the internecine war in Kfllrea. 'I· 10. 'That is why it is diffi,~111t to reconcile the posi14on of, the delegations of the five State~ with that otthe of the United States in Korea. 13. It is small wonder, therefore, that the puppet government of South Korea, following the general line of United States foreign policy, was concocting broad plans of aggression long before the actual attack on North Korea. It was banking on United ~tates int~r­ vention in the internal affairs of Korea, an mterventton aimed at destroying the democratic regime in North Korea and which was to be the first step towards the ... extension of United States aggression in Asia. ,14. As early as 3 December ~948, Pen Ku-en, a (minister of the Syngman Rhee chque, sent a letter to Syngman Rhee concerning what he called tpe future destiny of Asia. He wrote: i "After the liberation of our northern territory, the Korean and American a):mies should proceed across the Liao-tung peninsul8. and up to Harbin. A reconstituted Chinese nationalist army should restore the territories lost by China, including the province of I Liao-tung... After the victorious completion of the war, the Korean and American armies should occupy Manchuria ... At a subsequent stage in the reorganization of the Far East, Japan should be assured a preponderant influence, and should receive Vladivostok and part of Siberia . . . You no doubt have a better plan for the reconstruction of Asia than the one that I have;" outlined, but I am again expounding this point of view in full so that I, rather than you, the supreme head of 30 mi!li~n Koreans, should be the obj~ct of attack at;ld rIdICule b~ our enemies if our plans should be discovered or mtercepted." 15. Perhaps the United States delegation will say that the United States was not a party to the elaboration of these adventurous plans; but that cannot justify the United States Government. The United States Government bears the responsibility for i:he fact that s,uch plans are made and implemented, and for the fact that in pre- Korea, thus calling for the extension of aggression beyond the 38th paralIel. \ 26. As was admitted by Mr. Spencer, the repres~t1ta­ tive of Australia and one of the authors of the eight.. Power draft resolution, the text was deliberately drafted in vague terms, leaving broad possibilities for any kind of interpretation or action. That point was stressed by a number of representatives; during the ~ebate, p~r· ticularly by EI-Khouri Bey, th,e representattve of Syria. 28. But the United States and the other authors of that draft resolution base their proposals on false premises. They entirely ignore the masses of the people, who cannot be disregarded and to whom the final word belongs. 29. We know that the enemies of peace, among whom are· a number of delegations to the present Assembly, wiIJ vote against our draft resolution..We shall not be astonished to find Mr. Spender at thelr head. It could not be otherwise. Mr. Spender brags too much about the illusory independence of his government's foreign policy' and with affected indignation thunders at those who would question that point, passing over in silence certain well known facts. Those facts are that Mr. Chifley, former Prime Minister of Australia and leader of the Labour Party, connected the dispatch of Australian troops to Korea with the securing for Australia of a loan of 100 million dollars from the United States. He said that the Australian people was getting the impression that Menzies was trading Australian soldiers for a dollar loan. ' 30. .That is no communist propaganda: it is a statement by the leader of the Labour Party and the former Prime Minister of Australia. 31. Naturally we cannot count upon support for our proposals from traders in human lives and human blood, or from their representatives in the Assembly. No one will be deceived by the theatrical pathos ,and menacing outcries made by Mr. Spender and his New Zealand or other colleagues in the anti-peace camp against the imaginary "aggressors". The aggressive intentions of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdoril, Canada, Australia and some other countries towards Korea are clearly distinguishable through the camouflage of grandiloquent phrases which conceal the real intentions of the authors of the eight-Power draft resolution. . 32., We repudiate the eight-Power draft resoJution because it would bring to Korea a continuatiol1 and aggravation of the war, and an indefinite occupation. It would not give Korea democratic freedom or political independence. It would necessarily impose the Syngman Rhee regime, deeply hated by the p.eople, on all Korea. nis hostile to the people, for it is designed to secure the enslavement of the country by foreign capital. The people of Korea would not accept a decision of the Ge~eral ,Assembly which ~hus ,ignored its interests. 33. The United Nations should show its determina;.,· tion to resist Anglo-American pressure and should not permit the transformation of an international instru- , !llent of peace into a tool of aggression-a tool for the [ ~thplementation of imperialist and expansionist plans I In the Far East. , . I, 34. The governments represented at this Assembly ~'.,hou,,Id realize what the adoption of the draft, resolution of. the ,Anglo-American bloc would mean for. them. It will not settle the Korean conflict. It can only further 45. Peace and the policing of the peace are the ptim~ry purposes of our Organization. Determined o;)position to the exercise of this function, which is it'itended to ensure peace while the new State is being organized, is a repudiation of the most essential part of the Charter. Nevertheless, to judge by a later paragraph of the five-Power draft resolution-the penultimate, if I am not mistaken-the United Nations would be wel~ome to reconstruct the country ravaged by the aggr~ _.•! and to rehabilitate the .sorely-tried population. . i virtue of what principle can the Charter be repudiated in some of its parts, and upheld in others, according to whether these parts are favourable or unfavourable to our designs? 46. These reasons are, Lt! our vi~w, sufficient for us to say here, as we did in the First Committee, that we a.re in favour of the draft resolution proposed by the remain there until the ~nification of Korea has been completed and stability achieved. If such is the intention of the draft resolution-and there is a widespread impression that it is-then the draft resolution authorizes the United Nations forces not only to cross the 38th parallel but to remain in North Korea for a somewhat indefinite pet:iod of time, because 11.0 one knows how long unification may take. . 50. My government fears that the result may be to prolong North Korean resistance, and even to extend the area of con.i~ict. Our fears may turn out to be wrong, but each government has to judge the situation .upon the best information at its disposal and to act accordingly. Thus we 'View with the gravest misgivings the particular re(;ummend~Ltion that I have mentione<l. 51. There is another con.sideration that is very much in the minds of my delegation. For some time past India has done whatever it·could to exercise a restraining influence on ~ll1 concerned and to plt'event at whatever cost the K(Jreanconflict from extending to other regions and, as I have.said elsewhere, even at the risk of being misunderstood, India has to go on doing so in the interests of peace in tl1e Far East. My government feels that for us to support the recommendation in question would seriously diminish our effectiveness in this respect. During the past few'days India has been charged with having no positive policy or definite view in regard to Korea. I thought I had ttlade our position perfectly clear in the First Committee. Let me repeat it. 52~ Our position, broadly stated, is that at this stage the General Assembly should first of all declare, or reaffirm, its objectives, namely, first, the creation of an independent and united Korea by .means of free etectiops and, secondly, economic rehabilitation of the country. 53. On these two points there is complete unanimity in the General Assembly. Both these points are men· tioned in almost identical language in both the eight- , 54. Having done this, and before the United Nations forces advance further, we should call upon the North Korean forces to cease hostilities by a certain specified date. In the face of a declaration of objectives made by all of us t'll·~.re-unanimously, or at least without dis- ·sent-the Nm."th Korean forces would, in their present military situation, have every inducement to comply with the call. If they did comply, we could then go on with the implementation of the declared objectives; if they did not comply, we could review the situation and decide upon some other course. In this way we should minimb:e the chances of arty further prolongation or extension of the conflict, and We should be in a position to achieve our objectives with the least possible friction or discord. , .. 55. .My delegation, in the First Committee, proposed the appointment of a sub-committee for co-ordinating, a~ far as possible, the various proposals and suggestions which bad been made regarding the future of Korea. To give an example of the kind of service which such a sub-committee might have rendered, I would refer to the proposal in the five-Powe~ draft resolution, that when Korea was unified the question of its admission to the United Nations shoulo' be considered..That was actually adopted by the First Committee by 18 votes to 10, with 31 abstentions. Bu.t it does 110t appear in the eight-Power draft resolution now before us. The proposal is along the lines of similar proposals which were adopted by us in the case of Indonesia and Libya [resolution 289 A(IV)). It is obviously a useful idea which, suitably worded, might have been woven into the draft resolution. It is now lost unless we retrieve it by a last-minute amendment. This is only one example .:.-.whi'ch is almost before our very eyes-and it should suffice to prove that the sub-committee might have served a useful purpose. . 56. A great war leader has somewhere inscribed, for our guidance, the motto :which-I speak from memory -runs: "In war, resolution; in defeat, defiance; in victory, magnanimity; in peace, good wi11~'. It is the third part of this inspiring appeal that has a special app~opriateness for us· now: ,,"in victory, magnanututy". 57. I am well aware that. there is a. school of opinion that generosity to a defeated enemy is at best an act of faith and is often apt to turn out to be downright foolishness. But let us look soberly at the facts. No one advocates that the United Nations forces should occupy Korea for all time or even for a long time. Once stable unification has been achieved, they have to withdraw. When they do withdraw, the Koreans will be left to manage their own affairs. We must make sure that when that time comes-and it may come 800n- , they will remember with gratitude the United Nations Organization and the countries taking part in the present action. We must therefore take care that the military operations do not last a day longer than is necessary, that the conflict is kept within the narrowest bounds possible, that there is no avoidable loss of life or property-for even economic rehabilitation cannot ~ 63. . The PRESIDENT (translatea from French): In accordance with the, request of the representative of Egypt, we shall proceed to vote paragraph by paragraph. Sub-paragraph (a) was cuJopted by 46 'Votes to S) with 7 abstentions. . Sub-paragraph (b) was adopted by 52 'Votes to 5. Sub-paragraph (c) was adopted by 51 'Votes to S) with 2'abstentions. Sub-paragraph (d) was adopted by 43 'Votes to 5) with 4 abstenti{)ns. Sub-paragraph,· '(e,) Was adopted by 54 votes to none) with 5 abstentions. . 64. The PRESIDENT (translated jro'n!r French) ~ We shall now proceed to vote on the second part of the operative part, which deals with the appointment of the commission. You will recall that yesterday [293rd meeting) we /. "~~ in the blank in the text. Consequently the list ot ~~G _ seven countries which will comprise the commission has now been oompleted by the name of Thailand. I now put to the vote sub-para· graph (a). The sub-paragraph was adopted by 53 'Votes to 4, 'With 1 abstention. .

I have before me an al11endment submitted by the Australian delegation [A/l429] to the effect that the first sentence of sub-paragraph (b) should be reworded as follows: pos~d of representatives meetin,g at the seat of the Umted Nations • • ." The rest of the sub-paragraph is unchanged. 66. I shall put this amendment to the vote. The amendment was adopted by 43 'tlotes to 4, with 2 abstentions. 67. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I shall put to the vote sub-paragraph (b) as amended. Sub-paragraph (b), as amended, was adopted by 44 votes to 6, with 3 abstentions. 68. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): As a separate vote has not been requested on the remainder of the draft resolution, I shall put to the vote the part of the text beginning: 11(c) The Commission shall render a report to the next regular session of the General Assembly", to the end. The remainder of the draft resolution was adopted by 51 'Votes to 5. . 69. The PRESIDENT (transkJted from French): I shall now put to the vote the dra.ft resolution as a whole. ,\" The draft resolution as a whole, as amena{1d, was <>" adopted by 47 'Votes to ...i, with 7 absten~ions.

You will have noted that the Fifth Committee recom.. mends in its report [A/1424] that the General As.. sembly should take account of th~ financial implications of the draft resolution which we have just adopted. 71. r take it that in voting on the draft resolution, you took into consideration the financial implications involved. It is therefore not necessary for me to put the Fl'fth Committee 9s recommendation to the vote. . ~ 72. r call upon the representative of Chile, who wishes to explain hiS vote. ' 73. ~r. SCHAULS.OHN (Chile) (translated from Spamsh): We have Just adopted a resolution of the utmost importance, the purpose of which is to unify the whole of Korea and to grant the country its in.. dependence as a democratic and sovereign State. At the same time, we have considered the rK1easures necessary for its rehabilitation and, at the request of Chile, other measures designed to speed the economic and social development of the country. 74. In order to achieve these purposes, the Gener&l Assembly has seen fit to appoint a commission composed of seven members, among them Chile. My delegation therefore feels bound to say a. 'few words about the importance it attaches to its appointment and the principles which will guide it .in the fulfilment of. the task which the United Nations has assumed. ' 75. In the first place, my country is greatly honoured by this mark of international confidence. 76. Secondly, Chile is aware of the serious respun.. sibility it is undertaking: to put into effect an extremely important decision of the United NaHons. For the first Now, in Korea, Chile will make a resolute and honest contribution to the effective independence and unity of this nation of Asia numbering more than 30 millio'l inhabitants. Together with the other members pf the commission, it will take steps to see that 'this nation elects the government it wants freely and democratically, free from prejudices and foreign intervention, We shall study the country's economic problems and . play our part in rendering the United Nations assistance for rehilbilitation a,nd development truly 'effective. 78. In the past, Chile gained its independence and now it knows what a real democratic system is, for that is the system under which it is living. Chile knows, therefore, what this resolution and its honest impJementation will mean for the people of Korea. Accordingly, it will spare no efforts in furthering the interests of Korea. It krtows that in doing so, it will be contributing to the prestige of the United Nations, and to the establishment pf peace and security in the world. 79. ' Finally, we hope that, when our common task is completed, the General Assembly, world public opinion and, above all, the people of Korea will feel that we were worthy of this great mark of confidence. , 80. The PRESIDENT (translated fro'm, French): In order' to avoid any misunderstanding in the future, may I draw the Chilean representative's attention to the fact that the statement which he has just made is not an explanation' of a vote. As however, his name was on the list of speakers before the vote, and as he kindly withdrew his name from, the list in order to help the Assembly conclude the debate more quickly, I did not interrupt him now. I hope the other speakers who ask for the floor to explain their votes will come to this rostrum to make such an explanation.

1 should like to explain the position of my delegation on the resolution just adopted by the Assembly. 82. Our vote should not be interpreted in any manner as implying that we are opposed to the principles and aims which the resolution embodies. I hardly need to reiterate the position of ~y government, which has been made sufficiently clear. My government is unequivocally opposed. to all forms of aggression anywhere and in any circumstances. My delegation is in complete accord with the basic objectives of the resolution. We welcome the attempts to unify Korea and to estabtish there an independent and democratic government. 83. Durinfi~ the debate in the First Committee, how- 88. The representative of Chile made his statement in the political and military interests of a special group of States in the Assembly. 89. The delegation of the Soviet Union considers that such statements on resolutions adopted by the Assembly are unacceptable and intolerable.. 90. The PRESIDENT (translation from French): I permitted this last speech, but here is my ruling. I shall' give the floor for an explanation of their votes only to those members of the Assembly who did not participate in the discussion which preceded the vote. It is inconceivable that some delegations should wish to speak again in order to explain their votes after speaking. for two hours. Surely during their speeches they had time to give such explanations. 91. If any d.elegation wishes to ehallenge my ruling, I shall put it to the vote. ' 92. I see that my ruling is not challenged. Therefore we shall proceed to the vote on the draft resolution put forward by the delegations of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian' SSR, the Byelorussian SSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia [4/1426]." 93. Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet SodaUst R.epublic) (translated front Russi4n) ~ The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR proposes that the five-Power proposal on the independence of Korea should be put to a roll-call vote in parts. 94. The PRESIDENT (translated front French): In accordance with the request we have just heard, we Abstaining.' Philippines, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Honduras, Mexico, Pakistan. The second recital was rejected by 27 votes to 19, with 14 abstentions. . A vote was taken by ,·oll...call on the third 'recital. Egypt, having been drawn by lot by the President, voted first. In favotw; Egypt, Indi3~ Indonesia, Liberia, Poland, Syria, Ukminian Soviet Socialist RepUblic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Re.. public, Czechoslovakia. Against: El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United States of America, Belgium; In favour: Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic. Against.' Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 'Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Li- beria, Lwcembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zea- land, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, .Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada) Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba. Abstaining.' Egypt, India, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, Burma. PQ,ragraph 1 was rejected by 46 votes to 6, with 8 abstentions. A 'Vote was taken by roll-call on paragraph 2 of the operative part. In favour: Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Re- public, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Byelorus- sian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia. < • Against: Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire- land, United States of Americap Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Liberia, Lwcembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan. Abstaining: Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Egypt, Leban()n. Paragraph 2 was rejecte'd by 48 votes to 5, with 7 abstentions. A vote was taken by .yoll~call on paragraph 3 of the operative part. Patlama, having been drawn by lot by the President, voted first. In favour: Poland, Ul(rainian Soviet Socialist Re- public, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Byel()rus~ sian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran. Abstaining: Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Israel, Lebanon. Paragraph 3 was rejected by 42 votes to 8, with 10 abstentions. A vote was take1~ by roll~call on paragraph 4 of the operative part. . Guatemala, having been drawn by lot by the Presi· dent, voted first. In favour: Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Re- public, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Byelorus- sian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia. Against: Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland>, Indo- nesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Lib(!)rt;J., Luxem- bourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand<, N~caragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, :Pe\ru~ Philip- pines, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Unitpn of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain aind North- ern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia., Belgittt,n, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece. Abstaining: India, Saudi Arabia, Syri&\, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt. Paragraph 4 was rejected by 47 votes to 5, with 8 abstentions. A vote was taken by roll-call on paragraph. 5 of the operqtive part. In favour: Indonesia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Soci- alist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Byelorussian Sovie'~ SOCi3list Republic, Czechoslovakia. Against: France, Greece, Guatemala,' Haiti, Hon- duras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zeaiand, Ni- caragua, 'Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Vetlezu~la, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia. Abstaining: India, Saudi Arabia$ Syria, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Burma, Egypt. Paragraph 5 was rejected by 45 votQS to 6, with 9 abstentions. A vote was taken by roll-call on paragraph 6 of the operative part. Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Pana- ma, Paraguay, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada. Abstaining: Chile, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Haiti, Leb- anon, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Afghan- istan, Argentina. . Paragraph 6 was rejected by 33 votes to 16, with 11 abstentions. ; t..~ A vote was taken by roll-call on paragraph 7 of the Qperative part. New Zealand, having been drawn by lot by the President, voted first. In favour: Pakinstan, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yemen, Yugo- slavia, Afghanistan, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet So- cialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, In- dia, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Liberia, Mexico. Against: New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Para- guay, Peru, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United States of America, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Den- mark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Greece, Hon- duras, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherb\Dds. Abstaining: Norway, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Urug,ttay, Venezu1ela, Argentina, Australia, Chile, Cuba, El S~\lvador, France, Guatelrtala, Haiti, Lebanon. Paragraph 7 was rejected by 2S votes to 22, with 13 absten.~ions. 95. .The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The representative of Bolivia wishes to explain his vote.

My delegation voted against part of the preamble of the Five-Power draft resolution. It did likewise in the First Committee, together with the Belgian delegation. It is aware that the draft enunciates a number of basic principles and it did not intend to commit the heresy of denying those principles, but bore in mind the fact that principles and even extracts of the Charter are often deliberately embodied in paragraphs of draft resolutions which are often contrary to the true principles of the Charter. Moreover, my delegation voted thus because it considers it logical to vote against various parts of a draft when it intends to vote against the draft asa whole. 97. Finally, we hope that this interpretation will gain general acceptance so that in future we may avoid these

We shall now proceed to vote on the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union [A/1427]. A rolL-call vote has been requested. A vote was taken by roll-call. France, having been drawn by lot by the Presidentl 'voted first. In favour: Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Repilbli,,;s, Byelorus~ sian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czech('jslo~a.kia. Against: France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Xran, Iraq, Israel,' Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Urugua;y, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia. Abstaining: Syria, Yemen, Yugoslavia. The draft resolution was rejected by S2 vot2S to 51 'with 3 abstentions. 99. The PRESIDENT (translated from F1"ench)': We shall now vote on the last draft resolution before us on this subject. It is submitted by the Soviet Union [A/1428]. A foil-call vote has been requested. A vote was taken by roll-call. Burma) having been drawn by lot by the President) voted first. In favour: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Reptlblic; Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Against: Burma, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay. Venezueta, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil. . The draft resolution was rejected by 55 votes to 5. Election of three non-permanent members of the \ Security CouncU (continued) [Agenda item 14]

We have now completed the first ham on our agenda. Before turning to the second: item, the report of the Gel1eral Committee, may I suggest that the Assembly should deal with the third. item, the election of a non- Inclusion of new items in~he agenda: report of the General Committee (A/1430) 106. .The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The General Committee has considered the inclusion of certain additional Items in the agenda and has submitted a report [A/1430]. It proposes the inclusion of five new items. In order to make our work easier, we shall examine these one by one. 107. The first item is as follows: "The question of Formosa: item proposed by the United States of Am~dca." 'fhe General Committee recommends that this matter should be placed on tke agenda and referred to the First Committee for consideration and report. 108. Mr. l\tIALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian) : The delegation of the Soviet Union objected to the inclusion of the question of Formosa in the General Assembly's agenda when this question was discussed by the General Committee. 109. The USSR delegation continues to object to the inclusion of this item in the agenda of the fifth session of the General Assembly for the same reasons which it mand should accept the surrender of Japanese troops on Taiwan, on the legal grounds that, pursuant to the Cairo agreement and subsequent international agree~ ments cot\c1uded during the Second World War, Tai~ wan constituted an inalienable part of Chinese territory. 112. Since then no one has questioned, much less objected to the fact that Taiwan forms part ofthe ter~ ritory of China. As recently as 5 January, and again on 8 February 1950, the United States Government reiterated its view that Taiwan belonged to China. Now, however, the fact that the island of Taiwan belongs to China is suddenly considered "not clear" by the Gov~ ernment of the United States, which demands that the United Nations should examine the question. 113. The United Nations cannot deal with the question of Taiwan any more than it can deal with the ques~ tion of the Hawaiian islands, since the fact that Taiwan belongs to China has already been established by wartime agreements and is not subject to review. When the United States ceases to drag out the qUt:stion of concluding a peace treaty with Japan, that peace treaty will merely endorse an internatbnal act which has already been completed and cannot be reviewed, :.md by which Taiwan has been handed over to China. 114. Consequently it is not incumbent upon the United Nations to consider the question of Taiwan, that is to say the status of this Chinese island, as the United States delegation is proposing. It is incumbent upon the United :N~tions to consider the situation which has arisen as a rc~ult of the invasion of Taiwan by United States forces and which threatens the peace of the Far East. The General Assembly should therefore discuss not "the question of Formosa", as the United States delegation proposes, but the question of United States aggression against China. That question has alr~ady been included in the agenda of the fifth session 01 the General Assembly at the request of the USSR delegation and has been referred to the First Committee. 115. The discussion of Uthe question of Formosa" by the United Nations would constitute an intervention in the internal affairs of China and would be a flagrant violation o£ Article 2, paragraph 7 of the.Charter, which provides that nothing in the Charter "shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are agreed that the Cairo agreement shou.ld be carried out. This m.eans that this was a final settlement of the question. So it was conceived by the authors of the agreement, even the United Stattes, which at that time, unlike now, was still keeping agrl~ements in some cases. That this is the correct interpretation is proved by the fact that Taiwan' was brought under the control and legislation of Chinese authorities. 119. Therefore the argument put forward by the United States in its explanatory note [A/138.l] to the Secretary-General, to the effect that the transfer of Taiwan to China was to await the conclusion of a peace settlement with Japan or some other formal act, is a technical, formal and futile argument, and it cannot change the final and valid character of the stipulations of the Potsdam agreement. It is natural that only a peace treaty can formally settle a transfer of territory, but the signatories to an agreement comprising p~rticu­ lar stipulations are bound to incorporate such stipulations in a peace treaty. .' 120. It fenows from these undeniabl.e facts that Taiwan has become an integral part of Ch~nese territory. Until the recent events~ nobody-not ever. ....he United States-contested these fads. Therefore, in tertns of international law, the action taken by the United States in regard to Taiwan constitutes 8J1 attempt against the independence and sovereignty of China and a violation of its territoriai Integrity. That means that it i:onstitutes an act of aggression on the part of the United States. At the same time, it constitutes a breach of peace and security, and necessarily a violation of the Charter of the United Nations. 12l: What is the reason for putting this question on the agenda when clearly it has alr(',ady been sett!ed? The reason is obvious. The United States is trying to 123. In any case, these hopes are futile, because the unanimous will of 500 million Chinese people is mailifest as far as the liberation of this part of Chinese territory is concerned; Nevertheless, it WQuld be against all principles of international law if the General Assembly were to lend itself to these manoeuvres aimed at achieving these American objectives. 124. This reasoning emerges clearly from the very text of the letter from the Chairman of the United States delegation to the Secretary-General, which ex.. plains the.motives of the United States in trying to put this question on the agenda of the General Assembly. In this letter, the United States delegation unscrupulously passes over the fact that 'international agreements stipulating the future of 'J'aiwan are in existence and are valid. The United States delegation gives only one unheard-of argument for its aggressive action: that the occupation of Taiwan by communist forces is a direct threat to the Pacific area, and that therefore the United States has launched a sort of preventive aggression-something new in international law and international relations. 125. It does not matter that this argument is a ridiculous one, but it· matters that it means a flagrant ·~·iolation of the territorial integrity of China. 126. Out of all this it foll~ws that there is not only 110 need, but not the slightest justification for the Assembly to deliberate <:11 the item put bef~r~ us by the United States delegat'(n, the less so as It IS proposed by the United States Jeh~gation with the aim of inducing us 1to approve an armed aggression and a flagrant violation. of the Charter. For all these reasons, the Czechoslovak delegation is opposed to the inclusion of this item in the agenda. . .. 132. In the brief period of national administration of this islartd, economic recovery has reached its pre:.war level. My government has carried out fundamental land reforms of the island. Local civil government is being promoted as fast as possible. Peace and order reign on this island. The percentage of literacy on this island is ~s high as in any other area is Asia. Th~ standard of living on this island today is 3,S high as in any other part of Asia. Therefore this island today is a worthy demonstration that human beings can achieve wellbeing better under a system of freedom than under a system of communist slavery. 133. So long as Formosa stand~;,. ~: " I;::ommunist conquest of the mainland of China Cb,""'1,'.£ be completed or consolidated. So long as Formoali, ':;tands, the puppet regime in Peiping cannot throw its resources into adventures in Indo-China, Malaya, the Philippines, Korea or other adjacentioegions. 134. This island is therefore the bastion of freedom in the whole Far East. It would be dangerous if the 135. My country has suffered and is still suffering from the same kind of aggression of which Korea has been a victim. The United Nations has gone to the aid of Korea. The United Nations has not come to the aid of China. Gertainly, the least the General Assembly can do is to refrain from taking the step which may have the effect of pushing the 450 million people of China into the abyss of communist. slavery and Russian domination. It is because we fear that this item will have the effect of pushing China into that abyss that my delegation opposes the inclusion of this item in the agenda of the General Assembly. I urge all representatives to vote against the inclusion of this item.

Three speakers have opposed ·b.~e inclusion of this item in the agenda. Now, therefore, I can give the floor only to speakers who wish to speak in favour of placing this item on the agenda. I call upon the representative of the United States.

I wish to thank the President for permitting the United States delegation to ~peak on this question of parliamentary procedure. It is quite natural, I believe, that the United States should be called upon at this point, because it was the United States which proposed the inclusion of this item in the agenda. wrcz:-ns'"' 'iT....,..... __ ..... _., 138. Let me say at the outset that i listened with tremendous sympathy to the remarks of Mr. Tsiang, who represents the sovereignty of China-the only China that has status before the United Natiollls. I respect the status of that sovereignty in the United Nations, but I am also moved by something very deep within me, and that is my high regard and great lov~ for the Chinese people. In saying this I am not talking about Chinese govemments-one or anotheror undertaking to prejudge at all, in advocating the inclusion of this item in the agenda, the merits of the question of sovereignty over Formosa. I am speaking from an experience among the people of China that was very intimate and long enough for me to learn what a great people they are, and long enough to make me their advocate in the United Nations today and every day. It is in the last resort the people of China whom the United Nations will take into account in deciding upon this question. 139. With all this sympathy and understanding, I want to say to my colleagues in the United Nations that I disagree with Mr. Tsiang p.pon what is good for his people here at this moment. It would not be well, I think, for action on the merits of this question to be postponed, but that would be the effect of failing to include the question of Formosa on the agenda. Would it not be better to have this question placed on the agenda and to have the friends of the people of China, 142. The question of Forrnosaaffects those interests, and that is why we think the item should be placed on the agenda and the question decided, if possible, during this session of the General Assembly.

I have asked for the floor to make a short statement at this time beca,use I believe that the matter with which we are concerned is of fundamental importance and that the divergence of views about it can only complicate th~e work of peace with which the United Nations is concerned. 144. The position of my government with regard to the situation in Formosa-or Ta,iwan-has been quite clear. The Government of El Salvador belie\Tes that what has been called the revolution in China was not solely the spontaneous movement of a people which, owing to its conflicting political opinions, tried to overthrow its government. My government believes that there was an element of foreign intervention, and consequently, although what is now known as the Government of the People's Republic of China controls the greatel' part of the territory-the whole of what is known as continental China-it has continued to recognize the Nationalist Government and regards Formosa as the last bulwark of a people fighting to preserve its independence and t.o repel foreign intervention. 145. In these circumstances, the delegation of El Salvador finds itself in a peculiar position, which may possibly be similar to that of many other, but not, of c:ourse all, delegations. 146. Because of'it.s geographical position, Formosa has become rather closely conneded with the develop., Election of three non-permanent members of the Security Council (concluded)

I apologize for proposing an alteration in the agenda. We had decided to postpone the election of a non-permanent member of the Security Council, but 1 have just learned that there is now some hope of agreement. With your permission, I shall call upon the representative of Lebanon.

AlthOU2'h we found the results of this morning's vote encouraging, they did, nevertheless, show that we were still in the same irnpasse as before [29Oth and 291st meetings]. My government w\.Iuld· 'i"10t like that situation to continue, nor would it like us to be taxed with the slightest wish tCI obstruct a,ndimpede the operation of the United Nations. . 155~ In these circumsta~ces, I wish to state on behalf of my government that Lebanon withdraws its candidature. I do.not want to do this without expressing on behalf of my country our deep gratitude to all those delegations which honoured us with their votes, and our thanks to the countries that they represent. I hope very much that, two years from now, Lebanon will again receive their votes, to which will be joined, I hope, those of other countries'which this time have n()t suppnrted our,application for various reasons that, I am sure, do nof in any way'reflect on their friendship ff.:>r Lebanon nor the friendship of Lebanon for them. I repeat, I hope that in two years' time you will all place your trust in us. 156. I should like once again to assure the representative of Turkey, in confirmation of what was said before, that we are retiring from this sporting contest with no hard feelings. The future will show, I hope, that the friendship which unites Turkey with Lebanon and all the Arab countries is not only in no way impaired but will be maintained and strengthened. 157. Th~ PRESIDENT (translated from French): The representative of Turkey has asked permission to speak, but I am sure he ~ill forgive me if I do not give him the floor until af.ter the vote. 158. I should like first to thank and congratulate the representative of Lebanon for his fine gesture. Any gesture of compromise made in a spirit of co-operation will always be welcomed with the greatest pleasure in this Assembly. I should remind you that our rules of procedure prohibit nominations. If the representative of Turkey were to speak now,' his statement might fall foul of the rules. Accordingly, with his permission, we shall first take the vote and I shall -then be glad to allow him to speak. A vote was taken by secret ballot. At the invitation of the President,.Paris El-Khouri Bey (Syria) and Mr. Jonste (Union of South Africa) acted as tellers. Number of ballot papers: 60 InvaUd ballots: 0 Abstentions: 3 Numbe-r of valid votes cast: 57 'Required majority: 38 Number of 'Votes obtained: Turkey . . . '. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Lebanon ..........................• 4 Turkey} having obtained the required two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting, was elected a non-permanent member of the Secttrity Council.

I declare 1 urkey to have been elected to the Security , Council.. On this occasion, I should like to congratulate the three States, Brazil, hte Netherlandsand Turkey, 'on having been elected non-pertrtan.ent members of the Security Council for two years. 160, I call upon the representative of Turkey; Inclusion of new items in the agenda: report of the General Committee (A/1430) (concluded)

. We shall now resume our examination 'of the General ' Committee's report. We have reached item 2: "Duties , of States in the event of the outbreak of hostilities: item proposed by Yugoslavia". The General Committee decided unanimously to recommend that the item should . be included in the agenda and further decided by 10 votes to none to recommend that it should be referred j to the First Committee. ' . 165. If there is no objection, I shall consider that' there is agreement on the inclusion of this item in' the agenda. It was so decided. 166. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Item 3 reads: "Establishment of a permanent commis- : sion of good offices: item proposed by Yugosla.via". The General Committee deCided unanimously to recommend that the Assembly should include this item in ' the agenda and that it should be referred to the First I Comm~ttee for consideration and report. 167. If there is no objection, I shall consider that there. is agreement on the inclusion of this item in the agenda. It was so decided. 168. The PRESIDENT (tra'iJslated from French):' Item 4 reads: Provision of a United Nations distinguishing ribbon or other insignia for personnel which: has participated in Korea in the defence 'of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations: item pro" posed by the Philippines". The General Committee de-' cided by 12 votes to 2 to recommend that the Assembly' should include the item in the agenda and refer it to the Sixth Committee for consideration and report. . 169. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist· Republics) (translated from Russian): The USSR delegation protests against the inclusion in the agenda or the fif.th session of the General Assembly of the, ques- , tion proposed by the Philipph1es concerning the provill 170. As the Gov.ernrnent of the Soviet Union has 1 stated repe~~tedly, the Security Council resolutions of 25 and 27 June ana 7 July 1950 4 on the Korean question, which the Government of the TJnited States is 'using to. justify its armed intervention in Korea, were I adopted illegally by the Security Council and constitute . cl flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter. 171. As we all know, only three of the five permanent members of the Council, namely, the United States, the United Kingdom and France, were present at the meetings of the Security Council at whi(~h those resolutions were adopted. The two other perman,~nt members of the Council, the USSR and China, were not present at those meetings of the Security Council. Thus those resolutions were adopted at privatemeetings of certain members of the Securiqr Council and are not legally binding. , 172. In those circumstances, it is clear that these decisions of the Security Council and, in particular, the decision to use the United Nations flag in the course of military cperations in Korea, cannot have any legal force. 177. Such references as have b,~en made here by the representative ot the Soviet Union, denying the existence of the United Nations fl:>rces, have already been answered by this General Asscembly by its overwhelming approval of the resolution cm Korea. 178. In behalf of the Philippine deleg-ation, therefore, I ask that the General Assembly should support the inclusion of this item in the agenda and that the item should be referred to the Sixth Committee for consideration and report. . ' 179. Mr. MICHALOWSKI (Poland) (translated from Russian) : We are considering a rather' unusual question today. In accordance with the proposal of the Philippine representative, General Romulo, the United Nations is called upon to establish a kind of decoraHon to be granted to participants in the Korean war who are fighting in the ralLks of the United States army. 180. General Romulo wants this decoration to De given"''' to persons who are·intervening in a civil war and who are fighting, in the interests of American imperialism, against the Korean national movement, against those who are struggling for their independence and freedom and for the unificntion of Korea. It would appear from the proposal th~at this decoration would also be awarded to soldiers of the South Korean forces. 181. I should like to draw your attention to the absurdities to which this might lead. The result would be that we, the United Nations, would be giving decorations for political convictions, that is to say, for convictions which are shared only by certain representatives and certain governments and which are foreign and hostile to hundreds of millions of people. We cannot and we h~ve no right to decorate anyone for any political convictions. The Philippine delegation seems to have forgotten this fundamental principle. We know that g'enerals are 1rery fond of decorations, and that they hike to put mu~ticoloured ribbons on tneir chests, but I do not think that this prC'posal will beautify General Romulo. . 182. This proposal would lead t.lS along a dangerous path. Today the Organization will decorate the troops of Syngman Rhee and MacArthur; tomorrow someone will propose a decoration for the tr~ops of Chiang Kaishek; and so it will go on. 183. Not so long ago nearly all of us, nearly all of the States Members of the United Nations, were combating fascism; millions of people perished while defending their countries in the struggle for the realization of our common aims. And evert then, although at that time there were no differences of opinion as to who was right and who was wrong, who was the aggressor and who was the victim of aggression, even then no one proposed that the soldiers of the United Nations should be rewarded. That was perfectly understanqable. The Untted Nations has no rig-ht to reward anyone. The United Nations has no right to give orders, medals or ribbons. That right is reserved exclusively for States and ~ov­ ernments, and we must leave it to them. Such actiVities 17.3. In its reply I) to the telegram in which Mr Trygve Lie communicated to it the text of the resolution adopted by a group of meJ.1?bers of the Security Council at the meeting of 7 July 1950, the Government of the Soviet Union pointed out that the purpose of the resolution was to permit the illegal use of the United Na- Hons flag as a cover for the military operations of the United States in Korea, operations which constituted open aggression by the United States against the Korean people, and that that decision of the Security Council was illegal and tantamount to direct support of armed aggression against the Korean people. 174. It is absolutely clear that the military operations ~n Korea are conducted not by the armed forces of the United Nations, whatever words may be used to conceal this fact, but by the armed forces of individual States which, in contravention of the Charter, are usurp- ! ing the name and flag of the United Nations. It is ~ equally clear that the participation of those States in I the Un!ted States aggression against the Korean people ~ not only does not constitute a defence of the principles I of theUnited Nations Charter, but is a flagrant viola- !tiOll of those principles. ~ 175. The USSR delegation therefore objects to the ! inclusion of the aforementioned item in the agenda of ~ the General Assembly and to consideration of the draft . resolution [A/1421] submitted by the Philippines on this question. . 176. Mr. ROY (Philippines): The delegation of the , Philippines has taken the initiative in proposinga United Nations distinguishing ribbon or other insignia for personnel which has participated in Korea in the defence of the principles of the United Nations, because it believes that it is proper that the soldiers of peace should I I I 16 and 18. I·See document 5/1596. 184. There is yet another fact that we should remember. The armies of aggression in Korea include persons, especially among the airmen, who have taken part in barbarous air raids against the civilian population, have bombed towns and villages and have machinegunned the peaceful population, women. and children. The decoration of such persons with any kind of ribbon would represent a cynicism borde!ing upon cri!De. Such a decoration would become a sign of opprobrIUm in the eyes of the majority of honest people, and our Organization would have to hang its head in shame for instituting such a decoration. 185. For those reasons, and taking into consideration -the fact already mentioned by the USSR representative, namely, that the decisio~ to cal~ the aggr~ssivc .forces of certain States the Umted Nations forces was Illegal, since it was adopted by six members of the Security Council in the absence of two permaI\ent members of the Council, our delegation considers the proposal of the Philippine representative to be wrong and ~ontrary to the principles of the United Nations and mternational practice. 186. The Polish delegation will ther~fore vote against the inclusion of this item in the agenda.

Two speakers have already spoken against the inclusion of this item in the agenda. I can give the floor only to one more, but I saw the delegations of the Ukrainian SSR and Czechoslovakia raise their hands almost simultaneously and I cannot say which of the two asked to speak first. If they would like to come to an agreement and appoint the speaker who will say least, I should be glad to call upon him.

I shall be extremely brief; as a matter of fact, I shall say only a few words. • 189. The Czechoslovak delegation objects most emphatically to the inclusion of the proposed item in the agenda of !he General Assembly. My Goyernment considersas It has declared a number of times, that the decisi~ll taken by some members of the Security Council by which the intervent~o1}ist aggression of the Un!ted States in the Korean CIVtl war was declared a Umted Nations action, is void of legality and therefore not valid. Consequently all and whatever actions, resolutions or reccom~:":'2::..jations are based on that decision must be considered as not legal and void of validity. ritory by that air force, and against the bombardment and illegal inspection or a merchant ship of the Peo~le's Republic of China by a military vessel of the Umte~ States". 194. The General Committee recommends by 11 votes to one that the General Assembly should include this item in the agenda and by 8 votes to 2 that the item should be ref~rJ.·ed to the Ad Hoc Political Committee for consideration and report... . 195.. I put the inclusion of this l~st item in the agenda to the vote. The General Committee's recommendation was adopted by 43 'Votes to one, with 2 abstentions. 196. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The agenda of the' fifth session of the General Assembly is now complete. The meeting rose at 2.25 p.m.