S/PV.10117 Security Council

In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and Türkiye to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Adedeji Ebo, Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs; Mr. Andrew Moore, Regional Director at the HALO Trust; and Mr. Lennie Phillips, Senior Research Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of the Council members to document S/2026/101, which contains a letter dated 26 February 2026 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council. I now give the floor to Mr. Ebo. Mr. Ebo: I thank Council members for the opportunity to brief them once again, on behalf of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. Since the previous consideration of this matter by the Council, and consistent with established practice, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has been in regular contact with counterparts in the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Technical Secretariat regarding activities related to resolution 2118 (2013). In addition, I held a meeting last week with His Excellency Ambassador Ibrahim Olabi, Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations. Since the Council’s most recent meeting on this matter (see S/PV.10086), the OPCW and the Syrian Arab Republic have continued to engage on how to eliminate any remnants of the chemical weapons programme developed by the previous Government. As previously reported, since 2014, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has not been able to confirm that the declaration submitted by the previous Government was accurate and complete because of the insufficient and inaccurate information it contained. The OPCW Technical Secretariat reported “serious concern” about the substance of the declaration’s issues, as it involved large quantities of potentially undeclared or unverified chemical warfare agents and chemical munitions. In this month’s report (S/2026/101, annex, enclosure), the OPCW Technical Secretariat reiterates that in addition to the 26 declared chemical weapons-related sites, information made available to the OPCW suggests that there are more than 100 other sites that may have been involved in the previous Government’s chemical weaponsrelated activities. As part of its work on this matter, the OPCW Technical Secretariat plans to visit all these locations, taking into account security and other relevant considerations. The new Government of Syria has been working with the OPCW Technical Secretariat to obtain clarifications on the full extent and scope of the programme developed by the previous Government and to ensure Syria’s long-term compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Given the significant challenges to be overcome in these efforts, I welcome the continued progress that has been made since the Council’s previous meeting. Since March 2025, more than 20 locations have been visited. The OPCW has also conducted interviews with former chemical weapons experts and collected 19 samples and more than 6,000 documents from the locations visited. The Syrian Government handed over 34 sealed cardboard boxes containing documents to the OPCW Technical Secretariat, which have been documented and scanned and will be processed for translation and analysis. During the reporting period, the OPCW Technical Secretariat also continued consultations with the Syrian authorities on the implementation of expedited on-site destruction in exceptional cases, as provided for in decision EC-110/DEC.1. On the basis of the information gathered through the OPCW’s deployment in 2025, at least two locations visited by the OPCW could be declarable under the CWC. The OPCW is planning further activities to determine the full scope of chemical weapons-related activities conducted at these two facilities and their subsequent declarability. Unfortunately, I understand from counterparts at the OPCW Technical Secretariat that further visits are currently on hold, given the conflict in the region. However, the OPCW teams are continuing to conduct interviews and review documents until the security situation becomes more permissive. As noted in the report, from 27 to 29 January, the OPCW Technical Secretariat and the Syrian National Authority visited a location in the Aleppo area to assess potentially undeclared elements of the chemical weapons programme developed by the previous Government, including “storage containers for chemical precursors, and 75 undeclared cylinders” (ibid., para. 22). Upon arrival at the location, the OPCW Technical Secretariat observed more than a dozen large-volume containers, from which the OPCW team collected eight samples for further analysis. The cylinders were no longer present at the site, but on 28 January, the Syrian National Authority identified that they had been removed and reportedly destroyed at a local scrapyard. On 29 January, the OPCW team visited the scrapyard and observed pieces that may have been part of the gas cylinders. The significant challenges ahead have been repeatedly emphasized in the Council, and the details shared about this visit further underline some of these challenges. I welcome the Syrian National Authority’s continued cooperation with the OPCW Technical Secretariat, which is essential to these efforts. However, significant and consistent support from the international community is also needed to complete the extraordinary efforts to rid Syria of all chemical weapons. I also take this opportunity to reiterate the support of the United Nations for the integrity, professionalism, impartiality, objectivity and independence of the work of the OPCW. As I have previously emphasized, this is a critical opportunity for the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. I once again urge the members of the Council to unite and show leadership in providing the support that this unprecedented effort will require. The United Nations stands ready to support and will continue to do its part to uphold the norm against the use of chemical weapons — anywhere and at any time.

I thank Mr. Ebo for his briefing. I now give the floor to Mr. Moore. Mr. Moore: I thank you, Madam President, for the opportunity to address the Council on this vital issue. I specifically want to thank the United States Government for the invitation to speak today and for the generous support of the American people for conventional weapons disposal programmes worldwide. I am here today on behalf of the HALO Trust to outline how conventional weapons assessments and disposal are necessary to support safe access to sites potentially containing chemical weapons in Syria. At the outset, I underscore HALO’s view that the Syrian Government is committed to removing and destroying all chemical weapons threats in the country in a timely and transparent way and to removing the obstacles to this process. The HALO Trust stands ready to support it alongside international partners. The remnants of chemical weapons in Syria cannot be assessed and destroyed unless Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) inspection teams can safely access and traverse weapons storage sites that have been previously bombed and are likely awash in deadly unexploded conventional ordnance. Addressing explosive contamination is only one of several impediments to accessing these sites of interest, but, with the right support and investment, it is an easy and practical impediment to remove. To fulfil these goals, three conditions must be met. First, an organization with the requisite expertise needs to be funded to begin immediately assessing explosive contamination at the sites in question and, once positively identified, start removing any explosives that block access to the sites. Secondly, a capacity-building project with the newly formed Syrian National Mine Action Centre needs to be established to build, train and mentor Syrian national teams in the range of capabilities needed to carry forward this work. Thirdly, the National Mine Action Centre needs to be supported for the establishment of such a capacity and for its running costs until such a time as the Syrian Government itself can support the Centre. The HALO Trust is an international non-governmental organization founded in 1988 and registered in the United Kingdom and the United States. We are best known for the clearance of landmines, but other core elements of our work are dealing with all types of conventional explosives, including air-dropped weapons, guided weapons and improvised explosive devices. We have particularly strong experience in the clear-up of unplanned explosions at weapons storage sites. Our operational model is to train and develop the staff of our host nations to the very highest levels, keeping the expatriate footprint to an absolute minimum. We also work closely with national authorities and national partners to enhance long-term, resilient capabilities. This model has been adapted to deliver results across regions and countries, from Angola to Laos to Ukraine and many others, including seven Middle Eastern States. HALO has been operating in Syria since 2016, and since January 2025 we have grown from 40 to 250 staff, 240 of whom are Syrian. We are now working in seven governorates, in which we are conducting surveys of suspected minefields, landmine clearance, explosive ordnance disposal and explosive ordnance risk education. We have built strong relations with local populations, the National Mine Action Centre, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, governorates and municipalities across Syria, United Nations institutions and civil society. HALO has not yet conducted a comprehensive assessment of locations of potential interest to the OPCW, but we understand that conventional weapon threats at sites inhibit safe access. These threats could include perimeter and internal minefields, abandoned weapons and booby traps or improvised explosive devices. Some sites have been subject to air strikes, leaving the sites strewn with volatile unexploded bombs, shells and other ordnance. Working alongside the Syrian National Mine Action Centre, a conventional weapons team needs to make initial assessments of each site. Depending on the threats assessed, a number of response options could be deployed, including explosive ordnance disposal, landmine clearance, high-risk search, improvised explosive device disposal or teams with armoured machines to clear safe paths through sites that have been bombed. To ensure the safety of everyone involved, the explosive disposal capacity will need strong coordination and integration with all stakeholders, including the National Mine Action Centre, chemical weapons specialists and inspectors, medical and decontamination teams, the logistics support capacity and local hospitals. While support from international organizations will be needed at the outset, the Syrian Government is committed to developing its national capabilities to perform the vital work of explosives disposal itself. A two-year capacity-building project can fulfil this goal, providing training and mentorship to the highest internationally recognized standards. HALO is discussing with the Syrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the National Mine Action Centre a memorandum of understanding to govern this work. Further, in developing this capability to international standards and enabling safe access to sites of interest for chemical weapons with an international partner, such as HALO, this work provides an entry point for Syria and the international community to jointly build confidence in the security sector. All of this costs money, but the likely return on these investments is high, both in terms of facilitating the destruction of any remaining chemical weapons stores and in building the capacity of the Syrian Government to meet ongoing explosive needs. In summary, although there are many challenges to accessing chemical weapons in Syria, the blockage created by conventional weapons is one that can be addressed. HALO and similar organizations have been conducting this work for decades. We know how to achieve results safely, to the highest international standards, deploying locally trained staff. If resources match ambition, it can be done. Most immediately, we need to get on with assessing every site to develop a clear sense of the time frame and costs required for conventional weapons disposal at the sites. We stand at a critical juncture at which real progress can be made in Syria, with Syrians, for Syrians. The HALO Trust stands ready with our national and international partners to undertake this work with the urgency required.

I thank Mr. Moore for his briefing. I now give the floor to Mr. Phillips. Mr. Phillips: Good morning. I am Lennie Phillips, a Senior Research Fellow in the Royal United Services Institute. As a small bit of relevant historical background, I joined the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as an inspector in 2008 and, in 2013, was part of the mission that verified the destruction of Syria’s declared chemical weapons production capability. This involved visiting a variety of sites throughout the country that were controlled by Al-Assad’s forces. It is also worth noting that equipment and chemicals were removed from sites prior to them being taken by what were then the opposition forces and they were secured in sites in Al-Assad-held areas visited by OPCW teams. In this context, Al-Assad’s chemical weapons team always maintained that they never lost control of their chemical weapons and associated infrastructure. Between 2015 and 2017, I was team leader for the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission. From those investigations, it was clear that Al-Assad’s team had not declared all their chemical weapons programme. Where are we now? There is a new Government in Syria that has no institutional knowledge of the Al-Assad era chemical weapons programme. Documentation of the programme, whether held centrally or locally, is likely to be limited, if available at all, and would not have been updated if chemical weapons-related material had been moved at short notice in the last weeks of Al-Assad’s hold on the country. Personnel, especially senior personnel, involved with the chemical weapons production programme may be able to offer insights. However, given their track record of obfuscation for more than 10 years and a vested interest in extending the verification activities, any inputs should be treated with a great deal of scepticism. Once potential sites have been located, they need to be visited and assessed for their relevance to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Intact sites present their own hazards, such as mines, explosive remnants of war, booby traps and chemical contamination. We just heard about that from Mr. Moore. Sites that have been damaged by attacks are likely to have all these hazards mixed up in rubble, making access, never mind verification, very difficult. Once identified, the Technical Secretariat needs to visit relevant facilities and commence verification activities as soon as is practical, given the potential difficulties in providing long-term security for all facilities. The chemical weapons themselves need to be relocated to consolidation areas while they await destruction. Weapons that cannot be moved need to be verifiably destroyed in line with EC-110/DEC.1, on the expedited on-site destruction of any remnants of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. The facilities themselves would then need to be verifiably destroyed. Processes and equipment for destruction of the chemical weapons need to be designed, procured and operated, with ultimate verification of that destruction. This, in itself, is not straightforward, given that the identity of the chemicals and their quantities are currently unknown. What is needed? What has been very apparent is that the responsibility for declaring the Al-Assad era chemical weapons has been taken very seriously by the new Government, trying to operate in very difficult circumstances, circumstances not just related to chemical weapons. This is not a case of throw some money at it and the problem will get solved; this is about giving Syria the capability and capacity to locate and destroy the former chemical weapons programme in a verifiable manner while maintaining the capability to update declarations and implement destruction in the future, should further chemical weapons be found, for example, in a cave near a former storage facility. There are countries with intelligence on the former chemical weapons programme that could share relevant information on the location of sites and thereby aid the process of identifying relevant sites. The infrastructure is such that Syria is unlikely to be able to design and construct destruction facilities themselves. There are several States Parties with experience in destruction, including some that have not destroyed or dismantled their destruction processes and that could make relevant equipment available, along with training and expertise in operation. There are companies that can provide training to be able to identify toxic environments, operate in them and take samples and analyse them, while building capacity for selfsufficiency for those occasions on which undeclared chemical weapons are discovered, somewhere in the country. There are people who are available to work alongside Syrians, to visit facilities, to help to differentiate between chemical and conventional weapons, understand verification requirements and make judgments on the most suitable destruction technology. I could go on, but those requirements are best heard from Syrians themselves. It is hard to look at where we are now, without a nod to the past. In the northern hemisphere, we are at the start of spring. Spring is often hailed as an era of regrowth, warmer and lengthening days, a resurgence after what are often cold and dismal winters. In former opposition-held areas of Syria, spring marked the start of chemical weapons season. This was when weather conditions often favoured the deployment and heightened the impact of chemical weapons. There are many people who lost family members to, have had their physical health affected by and are still traumatized by the use of chemical weapons, whether chlorine, sarin or other chemicals. These people will never get back what they lost, but they do deserve justice. They deserve justice and accountability, not just for themselves but also to send a message that the use of chemical weapons is unacceptable and that perpetrators of their use will be held accountable. The Geneva Protocol was adopted more than 100 years ago, based on the horrors of the use of chemical warfare agents in the trenches of the First World War. Instead of adhering to this Protocol, we seem to have moved away from using chemical weapons only on troops and, by lack of accountability, have now found it acceptable to use chemical weapons on civilians. In my opinion, this is why we need to get rid of the Al-Assad era chemical weapons, not so much because it is a requirement of the Chemical Weapons Convention, but so we can concentrate on accountability and send a message that the use of chemical weapons is indeed prohibited and that if they are used, one day the users will also be held accountable.

I thank Mr. Phillips for his briefing. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the United States of America. I thank our briefers for their representations today. The United States welcomes the continued progress made by the Syrian Government and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) towards locating and destroying any remnants of the Al-Assad regime’s chemical weapons programme. We welcome Syria’s efforts to provide the OPCW access to relevant sites and are encouraged by the spirit of cooperation between them. We urge the Syrians to redouble their efforts as they turn the page of this dark chapter of Syria’s history. We also remind all Member States of the need to support both the OPCW and Syria so they can operate effectively and safely on the ground. The United States is proud to be working alongside Syria and six other partner nations in the Syria-led destruction planning group. This group was established to support Syria’s chemical weapons destruction effort, strengthen Syrian national capacities and mobilize technical and operational support for this mission. We also welcome the release of the fifth report by the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) on the events of 1 October 2016, in Kafr Zayta (S/2026/48, annex, enclosure). This is a significant milestone as it is the first report produced by the IIT since the Syrian Government granted full and unfettered access to its territory. We hope this report will aid Syrian and other efforts to identify and, eventually, hold to account those responsible for the use of chemical weapons against the Syrian people. In this regard, we also welcome the efforts of the Syrian National Commission on Transitional Justice to investigate the use of chemical weapons as part of its broader effort to uncover the truth about atrocities perpetrated by the Al-Assad regime. Taken together, these actions represent real progress towards achieving the aims and obligations set out in resolution 2118 (2013). Finally, we welcome the decision of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities to remove Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham from this sanctions regime, which, together with other recent sanctions relief, should further enable Member States to provide counter-chemical weapons assistance to Syria. Finding, securing, declaring and verifiably destroying any remnants of the Al-Assad regime’s chemical weapons programme is no easy task and is therefore costly. The United States echoes the calls by the OPCW Director General and the Technical Secretariat for voluntary monetary and in-kind contributions to its Syrian mission. We thank the Council members who have contributed to the OPCW’s work and call on all Council members to continue to prioritize this critical matter until the work is done. I resume my functions as President of the Council. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements.

We welcome the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Adedeji Ebo and thank him for his briefing. At the same time, we wish to express our confusion regarding the fact that the United States presidency invited to today’s meeting two representatives of civil society. In line with established practice, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs or her Deputy have long been the only briefers at meetings on the Syrian chemical weapons file, informing Council members of the content of the reports by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Technical Secretariat. We consider other briefings to be an unreasonable waste of the Security Council’s time and resources. We have closely studied the latest report by OPCW Director General Fernando Arias (see S/2026/101, annex). We welcome the constructive engagement demonstrated by the Syrian transitional Government with the OPCW on the Syrian chemical file. Russia has consistently advocated for the prompt resolution of outstanding issues related to Syria’s initial declaration under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC). This would facilitate the closure of the Syrian chemical file. Unfortunately, we are compelled to note that the activities of the OPCW Technical Secretariat in Syria remain geared towards a single goal: searching for elements of the Syrian Arab Republic’s military chemical programme that were allegedly “concealed” by the former authorities, with a view to accusing the previous Government of committing chemical crimes. The entire arsenal at the disposal of the Technical Secretariat is being used to this end, including its illegitimate and biased Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), created at the behest of Western countries. This is evidenced by the IIT latest, fifth, report devoted to events that transpired 10 years ago (S/2026/48, annex, enclosure). The gist of the cumbersome 84-page document, which our colleagues will surely praise today, is that, on 1 October 2016, in the town of Kafr Zayta, in the Hama Governorate, the Syrian air force supposedly deployed a chemical weapon, namely chlorine. Yet the content of the report resembles the plot of a low-quality action film: a cylinder of chlorine fell from the sky, shattered on impact with the ground, and the released gas penetrated ventilation shafts, resulting in civilian deaths. If we carefully examine the technical details presented in the report, numerous questions arise. For example, the IIT’s conclusions are based on the outcomes of a technical examination, carried out by the fact-finding mission, of a chlorine cylinder allegedly found in the Kafr Zayta area. This examination, in turn, was conducted in violation of the principle of preserving material evidence. Moreover, the fact-finding mission’s work was carried out with the involvement of unidentified “third parties” as “experts”, whose professionalism and competence raise serious doubts. What is also outrageous is that neither the fact-finding mission staff nor the IIT specialists travelled to Kafr Zayta “owing to security considerations”, even though the new Syrian authorities granted them unfettered access to all sites and areas of interest to them. We note that Mr. Arias’ reports of the past few months are replete with “sensational” figures that take stock of the “transgressions” of Al-Assad’s Government, which allegedly concealed critical information about the Syrian Arab Republic’s military chemical programme. However, apart from the figures, the Technical Secretariat provides neither testimonies nor evidence that in any way substantiate the allegations being levelled. In fact, these are uncorroborated words that we are supposed to take at face value. Such an ultimatum-based approach of “take it or leave it” is unacceptable. It is obvious that all the Technical Secretariat’s activities in the Syrian Arab Republic are subordinate to a single objective, and, to our disappointment, this objective has nothing to do with resolving the 19 outstanding issues contained in Syrian Arab Republic’s initial declaration under the CWC. Rather, it is about a relentless search for new evidence to prove the existence of a covert chemical programme, and allegations about the chemical crimes perpetrated by the country’s former authorities are being tailored to this objective. In this regard, we once again call on the OPCW Technical Secretariat to act professionally. The OPCW’s inability to do its job properly, along with the principled unwillingness of the leadership of its Technical Secretariat to correct the methodology it uses, remains a key problem hampering the implementation of the objectives of resolution 2118 (2013). Until these challenges are tackled, it will be impossible to turn this page in Syria’s history.

My thanks go to Mr. Ebo, Mr. Moore and Mr. Phillips for their insightful and highly relevant briefings, and I welcome the participation of the representatives of the Syrian Arabic Republic and Türkiye in our meeting today. The United Kingdom remains resolute in its commitment to eradicating the threat posed by chemical weapons in Syria. We welcome the 22 January publication of the fifth report of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Investigation and Identification Team (S/2026/48, annex, enclosure). The report concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the Syrian Arab Air Force, under the former Al-Assad regime, carried out the chlorine attack on Kafr Zayta on 1 October 2016, injuring at least 35 people. Its findings add to an already extensive body of evidence confirming a systematic pattern of chemical weapons use by the former Al-Assad regime. The publication of this report is a significant milestone. It is the first attribution report to have received direct support from a Syrian Government. It demonstrates Syria’s commitment to accountability and represents a crucial step towards truth and justice. The United Kingdom thanks the OPCW Technical Secretariat staff for their unwavering dedication and professionalism in the pursuit of attribution, and we look forward to the conclusion of other ongoing and future investigations into chemical weapons attacks in Syria. The progress made by the Syrian Government and the OPCW provides a genuine opportunity to eradicate the threat of Al-Assad-era chemical weapons once and for all. However, progress is neither inevitable nor assured. As we stated in the Security Council in January (see S/PV.10086), and as the OPCW Director General reaffirmed at the Executive Council meeting in The Hague today, significant and sustainable additional financial and in-kind support from the international community remains essential to ensure the safe, verifiable and rapid elimination of Al-Assad’s chemical weapons programme. The United Kingdom has contributed more than $3.8 million to the OPCW Syria missions since the fall of Al-Assad. We encourage other States parties who have not previously supported Syria-related destruction activities financially to contribute at the earliest opportunity. For our part, we will continue to provide technical expertise to both Syria and the OPCW. Let us not squander this window of opportunity. Together we can support Syria and the OPCW to make further progress to eliminate Al-Assad’s chemical weapons programme and help to ensure those responsible for chemical weapons use are held to account.

I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the three African members of the Security Council (A3), namely, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia and my own country, Liberia. We thank the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs for his briefing, and we have listened carefully to Mr. Moore’s and Mr. Phillips’ remarks. We welcome the participation of the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic in today’s meeting. At the outset, the A3 reiterates its unwavering commitment to Syria’s sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity. The A3 reaffirms its commitment to the full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and reiterates its unequivocal condemnation of the use of chemical weapons anywhere, by anyone and under any circumstances. Upholding this principle is therefore not merely a legal obligation; it is a moral imperative. We further underscore that accountability, cooperation and verification remain indispensable to upholding the Convention’s integrity. Against this backdrop, the A3 wishes to highlight the following. First, we note the Secretary-General’s letter transmitting the 149th monthly report of the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (S/2026/101), which reflects continued technical progress and engagement between the Syrian Government and the Technical Secretariat. We welcome the continued organization of activities through the Office of Special Missions and the re-establishment of a continuous OPCW mission presence in the Syrian Arab Republic since October 2025. These developments, alongside the reestablished National Authority and the appointment of a new Permanent Representative to the OPCW, demonstrate a constructive framework for the sustained cooperation shown by the Syrian Government at this critical juncture. Secondly, the A3 welcomes the successful deployment conducted during the reporting period, specifically the visit to the Aleppo area from 27 to 29 January to access storage containers and cylinders. We further acknowledge the Syrian Government’s cooperation in handing over 34 boxes of documentation in Damascus on 15 January. This collection of more than 6,000 documents and the ongoing analysis of samples and witness interviews represent indispensable steps towards building international trust and providing necessary clarifications on the Syrian chemical weapons programme. Thirdly, while progress is important, clarity remains essential. The A3 supports the ongoing work of the Technical Secretariat to address the remaining outstanding issues, including those involving potentially undeclared chemical warfare agents and munitions. However, we note with concern the reported disappearance and destruction of undeclared cylinders in the Aleppo area. We encourage the Syrian Government to provide the results of its ongoing investigation to the Technical Secretariat to ensure all verification requirements are indeed met. Fourthly, the A3 recognizes the importance of the needs and gaps assessment prepared by the Technical Secretariat. Therefore, the work of the OPCW Technical Secretariat must continue to receive the support it requires. The A3 urges the international community to ensure that the Technical Secretariat has both the financial and technical resources necessary to carry out its mandate effectively. While we are encouraged by the technical progress, we remain concerned about the broader security environment. The A3 underlines that sustainable progress requires full and sustained cooperation between the Syrian Government and the OPCW. The importance of adequate international funding and technical resources and the prevention of chemical weapons or related materials falling into the hands of criminals or terrorist groups cannot be downplayed. To conclude, history reminds us that difficult disarmament challenges are rarely resolved in a single moment. They are resolved through persistence, cooperation and a steady commitment to transparency. When those elements come together, even the most complex files can be resolved. Therefore, the A3 encourages continued dialogue and pragmatic engagement between the Syrian Arab Republic and the OPCW to resolve all outstanding issues and permanently close this long-standing file.

At the outset, I would like to thank the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Ebo, for his briefing, as well as Mr. Moore and Mr. Phillips for their remarks. I also welcome the participation of the Permanent Representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and Türkiye in this meeting. As a fundamental principle, Greece strongly condemns the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, at any time and under any circumstances. It constitutes a grave violation of international law and may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. While the entire Middle East region is facing complex challenges and multiple crises, we reiterate our aspiration for the ongoing political transition in Syria to contribute to the resolution of the chemical weapons file, which remains a legacy and a consequence of the prolonged conflict. In this regard, I wish to highlight three points. First, my country commends the ongoing constructive cooperation between the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Technical Secretariat and the Syrian transitional authorities, with a view to dismantling the Al-Assad era chemical weapons programme and to Syria fulfilling its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. We commend Syria for having reinitiated the regular monthly reporting, and we welcome the submission of four monthly national reports covering the period from 15 August 2025 to 15 January 2026. However, we note with concern the recent handling of 75 cylinders of category 3 chemical weapons in the Aleppo region. We regret that the Secretariat received neither prior notification nor any subsequent information regarding the reported removal and destruction of these cylinders. Greece has taken note of the measures taken by Syria in response and encourages the Syrian National Authority to complete the inquiries into the matter as soon as possible and share the information with the Secretariat and the States parties. In addition, we repeat our call on the Syrian National Authority to work closely with the OPCW Technical Secretariat in order to resolve the 19 remaining outstanding issues in Syria’s initial declaration. Secondly, we took note of the fifth OPCW Investigation and Identification Team report of 21 January (S/2026/48, annex, enclosure), which found the Syrian Arab Air Force responsible for a chemical weapons attack in Kafr Zayta on 1 October 2016. We pay tribute to the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team for its thorough and professional work. It is now time to hold those responsible accountable and deliver justice to the victims. Thirdly, Greece remains committed to supporting the OPCW, including in its capacity as a member of the Executive Council and through its pledge of a financial contribution to the OPCW Trust fund to destroy Syrian chemical weapons, with a view to ensuring full accountability for those responsible for these heinous crimes in Syria. Moreover, we are working closely with the competent Syrian authorities with a view to providing further assistance, particularly training, to enhance Syria’s means and resources and enable it to implement its obligations under the Convention. In conclusion, we reiterate our full support to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Syria and to a fully inclusive, Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition, in the spirit of resolution 2254 (2015), and we call for unity within the Council in upholding resolution 2118 (2013) and the international norm against any use of chemical weapons.

Let me begin by thanking the Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Ebo, for his informative briefing and the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for the report. Let me also thank the invited briefers, Mr. Moore and Mr. Phillips, for their contributions. I welcome the participation of the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and Türkiye in this meeting. Chemical weapons, as prohibited weapons of mass destruction under international law, pose a grave threat and a real danger to international peace and security. Recent repeated violations of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction therefore reinforce the importance of safeguarding the norm against their use anywhere. In January, the OPCW published the fifth report of the Investigation and Identification Team (S/2026/48, annex, enclosure), which concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that on 1 October 2016, the Syrian Arab Air Force used chlorine gas. We also acknowledge and appreciate Syria’s cooperation with the OPCW to conclude this investigation. The findings of this report are deeply disturbing, but it is crucial that evidence of the use of such weapons has seen the light of day. It is proof that accountability prevails and that the facts will be revealed. The use of chemical weapons is completely unacceptable anywhere, at any time and by anyone. We must ensure that the taboo on the use of chemical weapons remains in force, that such cases are investigated promptly and thoroughly and that perpetrators are identified and held to account. We must also undertake all efforts to swiftly identify and eliminate all remnants of chemical weapons in Syria, thereby upholding international norms and preventing the diversion of chemical weapons‑related materials to terrorists and other malign actors. The recent situation in the Aleppo area, where the Technical Secretariat team and officials from the Syrian National Authority discovered that a dozen large-volume storage containers for chemical precursors had been emptied and that 75 undeclared cylinders of potential chemical components had disappeared or were said to be destroyed, is a matter of concern. The work done by the Technical Secretariat in Syria is crucial, and robust cooperation with the new Syrian authorities has been key. We encourage both sides to maintain and strengthen their constructive cooperation, including on identifying and investigating the potential sites. We are pleased to see the ongoing political and economic reforms in the country and hope that they will contribute to fostering greater technical capabilities in addressing the threat of chemical weapons. It is clear that, owing to the secretive and complex nature of the Al-Assad regime’s chemical weapons programme, regional and international financial and technical support is needed to assist the OPCW and the new Syrian authorities in achieving the elimination of those weapons. In conclusion, let me reiterate Latvia’s appreciation for the good work of the OPCW and its Technical Secretariat and for the good-faith cooperation of the new Syrian authorities as we strive towards a Syria free of chemical weaponry.

I would like to thank Mr. Adedeji Ebo, Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, for his comprehensive briefing to the Council on the monthly report on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013). I also welcome the participation of the Permanent Representative of the fraternal Syrian Arab Republic and the representative of the fraternal Republic of Türkiye and all other briefers at today’s meeting. We take part in this meeting amid the grave challenges facing the Middle East region. Foremost among those challenges is Iran’s brutal and unjustified aggression against my country, the Kingdom of Bahrain, and a number of Gulf Cooperation Council countries and fraternal Arab countries, through treacherous missile attacks targeting populated civilian areas in the Kingdom of Bahrain. Those areas include Sitrah and the capital, Manama. These attacks have resulted in the deaths of and serious injuries to civilians, damage to public and private property and the terrorization of innocent people during the holy month of Ramadan. These are sinful, unjustified attacks and flagrant crimes that contravene the principles of international law, tolerant religious teachings and all human and moral values and norms. In this context, these serious Iranian attacks reflect the magnitude of the challenges to regional security and stability and underscore the need to adhere to the principles of good neighbourliness, respect for the sovereignty of States and noninterference in their internal affairs. They also highlight the importance of strengthening international efforts aimed at promoting the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and addressing their dangers, thereby contributing to easing regional tensions and maintaining international peace and security. The Kingdom of Bahrain therefore reaffirms that it is of vital importance that the Middle East region be rid of all weapons of mass destruction, without exception, as a strategic choice to enhance collective security, consolidate the foundations of stability and build a future on the basis of cooperation, development and peace. Based on its commitment to international cooperation and to promoting international peace and security, the Kingdom of Bahrain affirms its full support for the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction as a fundamental pillar of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The Kingdom also categorically condemns the use of chemical weapons under any circumstances and stresses the need to ensure accountability and prevent impunity, so as to ensure that all those involved are held accountable, civilians are protected and international security and stability are preserved. In this context, allow me to address the following points. First, the Kingdom of Bahrain values the content of the report of the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (S/2026/101, annex, enclosure). This report contained important information and clarifications on the latest developments regarding the chemical weapons file in the Syrian Arab Republic. We also value the efforts of the OPCW to implement its mandate, including its cooperation and coordination with the Syrian Government in the current period. We call on the international community to provide the necessary support to the OPCW to strengthen compliance with international obligations and provide the necessary conditions to close this file permanently. Secondly, the report referred to ongoing field activities carried out by the OPCW and to strengthening coordination with the Syrian Government, including visits to more than 20 locations, the gathering of a number of samples and the conduct of technical interviews. This reflects positive indications of a current willingness to cooperate. We believe that this cooperation is an important opportunity that should be supported and built upon to allow the OPCW to carry out its functions without any obstacles. We also welcome the steps taken by the Syrian Government to facilitate communication with the OPCW teams and to provide information and documents, including a number of boxes that include relevant documents, and we encourage the continuation of this approach to uncover the truth and address the remaining issues in a technical, professional and objective manner. Thirdly, we took note of what was mentioned in the report concerning the disappearance of a number of cylinders that are linked to chemical activities. We welcome the investigations carried out by the Syrian Government in this regard in order to maintain transparency and cooperation with the OPCW and to help to provide clarifications and address any concerns. In conclusion, the Kingdom of Bahrain reaffirms the need to fully implement resolution 2118 (2013) in order to fully eliminate the chemical weapons remaining in Syria. We call for collective action to rid the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction and appeal to the international community to continue to support the Syrian Arab Republic during this period.

I would like to thank the United States, in its capacity as President of the Security Council for this month, for organizing this meeting. I would also like to thank the Deputy to the High Representative, Mr. Adedeji Ebo, and the briefers who are with us today for their presentations. Colombia reaffirms its absolute rejection of the use of chemical weapons by any State, organization or individual, under any circumstances and for any purpose. At the same time, it reiterates its recognition of the technical, transparent and impartial work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), whose work continues to be fundamental to the defence of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime. In the light of the briefings, Colombia wishes to highlight three points. First, with regard to the value of the technical findings and the need to focus on the victims and survivors, we have taken note of the presentation of the most recent monthly report of the OPCW (S/2026/101, annex, enclosure), as well as the fifth report of the Investigation and Identification Team (S/2026/48, annex, enclosure) and its conclusions. In that regard, we express concern about the report’s findings and the conclusion that there are sufficient grounds to believe that chemical weapons have indeed been used on Syrian territory. We therefore call for the information contained in those reports to be used, together with political will, to help to ensure effective access to justice and to advance the accountability of those allegedly responsible for the use of such weapons. Impunity not only prolongs the suffering of victims but also represents an obstacle to peacebuilding. Secondly, on the issue of sustained cooperation by the transitional Government and the need to ensure verifiable compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, my delegation acknowledges the transitional Government’s collaboration and assistance in OPCW activities, as reflected in the reports presented. Maintaining and deepening that cooperation will be essential to achieving a comprehensive clarification of the scope of the chemical weapons programme and ensuring sustained compliance with the international obligations assumed by Syria. Colombia welcomes the reports submitted by the Syrian authorities and urges them to continue taking the necessary steps to respond fully, promptly and transparently to requests for information and documentation made by the competent bodies. Thirdly, with regard to the preservation of evidence, the integrity of relevant sites and the need to move towards the definitive closure of outstanding issues, Colombia notes with concern that the latest monthly report reiterates the persistence of operational limitations that could compromise both the preservation of evidence and the integrity of declared and suspected sites. Given the current regional context, marked by military actions and volatile security conditions, safeguarding these sites is more crucial than ever. Likewise, the information reported by the OPCW indicates that there are still outstanding issues relating to possible significant quantities of munitions and chemical agents that have not yet been declared or verified. Consequently, we reiterate our call for the adoption, without delay, of measures to adequately safeguard these sites and prevent the loss or alteration of evidence, as this is the only way to preserve the conditions necessary to resolve in a verifiable manner the issues that remain unclear and move towards the definitive closure of outstanding issues. In conclusion, Colombia reiterates its support for the transitional Government’s renewed cooperation with the relevant multilateral organizations. Actions leading to the verifiable and definitive closure of the file can make a concrete contribution to security and stability. Colombia has been consistent in the Council in its calls to avoid all forms of violence and in its defence of peaceful means of conflict resolution. Therefore, at a key moment for Syria, which is seeking to move towards peace at a time marked by violence and the proliferation of conflicts, no effort aimed at ensuring justice, accountability and respect for international law should be considered insignificant.

I thank Mr. Ebo, Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, for his briefing. We also take note of the remarks by Mr. Moore and Mr. Phillips. Pakistan attaches great importance to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC) as a pillar of the global disarmament regime. We support calls for universal adherence to the Convention and its full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation. Pakistan reiterates its firm opposition to the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere and under any circumstances. We strongly support Syria’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Important opportunities have come up in Syria to advance reconciliation, recovery, peace and stability. It is imperative to turn these opportunities into concrete progress on the ground through an inclusive political process, international engagement and support. The security situation in Syria is seriously affected by foreign military occupation of parts of the country and air strikes that also have an impact on the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The risk of terrorism and the presence of foreign terrorist fighters also pose a challenge to the country’s security and affect the OPCW’s verification activities. It is important to address these factors to enable a conducive environment for the resolution of chemical weapons-related issues in Syria at the earliest opportunity. Pakistan appreciates the commitment of the Syrian authorities to fully implement the CWC, lauds their cooperation to secure suspected chemical weapons sites and address outstanding issues and welcomes the progress achieved thus far. The OPCW Technical Secretariat must continue to be enabled to carry out its independent verification to eliminate suspected chemical weapons in Syria and any risks of proliferation, in compliance with the CWC. Enhancing the capacity of Syrian authorities would contribute to the work of the OPCW, including in declaration, investigation, analysis and verification, on an expedited basis. We hope that the continued engagement between the Technical Secretariat and the Syrian authorities will further build on the positive momentum to resolve all outstanding issues at the earliest opportunity.

I thank the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Adedeji Ebo; Andrew Moore, Regional Director of the HALO Trust; and Lennie Phillips, Senior Research Fellow in Chemical Weapons at the Royal United Services Institute, for their briefings. I also extend a warm welcome to the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and Türkiye, who are honouring us with their participation. In the current context of regional instability, the Syrian chemical weapons file remains a central issue for the international community. Panama welcomes the Syrian authorities’ recent signs of cooperation with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and appreciates the re-establishment, at the end of 2025, of its continued presence in Syrian territory. We believe that this progress represents a decisive step towards the total elimination of chemical weapons in Syria, and we reaffirm the fundamental principle that the use of chemical weapons, under any circumstances and by anyone, is unacceptable and contrary to international law. Panama sees the investigation efforts aimed at clarifying the use of chemical agents in the context of the conflict in Syria as timely. In this regard, we take note of the conclusions presented in the latest report by the Director General of the OPCW (see S/2026/101, annex), which identifies reasonable grounds for attributing to the Syrian air force, under the Al-Assad regime’s orders, a chlorine attack that occurred in 2016 in the town of Kafr Zayta — an incident that affected dozens of civilians. We believe that these rigorous technical efforts are essential to ensuring that the use of chemical weapons does not continue or go unpunished, providing the justice system with verifiable information that allows those who have used them to be held accountable. Accountability is an essential pillar in strengthening the credibility of the international system for the non-proliferation and prohibition of chemical weapons and in reaffirming a collective commitment to the protection of civilians. Moreover, the disappearance and alleged destruction of 75 undeclared cylinders in January in the Aleppo region demonstrates the need to strengthen control mechanisms and ensure unrestricted access to all relevant sites. Chemical disarmament is not only a matter of technical compliance; above all, it represents a collective responsibility to defend international humanitarian law and international security. Addressing this reality not only protects the international community, but it also recognizes the suffering that the Syrian people have endured during years of conflict and the commitment that they have shown to moving towards peace and security. Panama reiterates the importance of strengthening cooperation, facilitating full access to information, experts and relevant sites and guaranteeing the financial and human resources necessary to irreversibly complete this process to ensure that the achievements made are lasting and that the Syrian people can live in an environment free from the threat of chemical weapons.

Let me also thank Mr. Ebo, Deputy to the High Representative, for his briefing, as well Mr. Moore and Mr. Phillips for their valuable insights. I also welcome the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and Türkiye to our meeting. In Syria, we have witnessed a positive development with the transitional Government and Syrian Democratic Forces reaching a comprehensive agreement in January. It is key to continue the ongoing implementation of this agreement, and we urge the parties to prioritize the peaceful integration of the north-east as part of the political transition. Also, it is important to avoid the transition being undermined by wider regional tensions. Turning to the issue of chemical weapons in Syria, Denmark supports the effective and comprehensive closure of this file, while also securing accountability for the atrocious crimes committed by the Al-Assad regime against the Syrian people. The task of destroying all remaining chemical weapons in Syria is already complex. With the continued presence and threat of Da’esh and other terrorist groups in Syria, it grows even more important. Counterproliferation efforts must therefore be prioritized so that no chemical weapons fall into the hands of terrorists. Syria has identified challenges in the safe disposal of chemical agents and precursors, lacking both the means and relevant expertise. The assistance of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is critical in this regard. We urge all actors to extend technical and financial assistance to Syria and the OPCW. We also call on Syria to ensure that all chemical agents and stockpiles are accounted for and safely stored until their eventual destruction. In line with resolution 2118 (2013) and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, all transportation and destruction of chemical weapons must be coordinated with the OPCW. Accountability remains a cornerstone of a successful political transition in Syria. This also means accountability for those responsible for the use of chemical weapons. All victims of the Al-Assad regime’s illegal and heinous chemical weapons attacks deserve justice. In this regard, we welcome the fifth report of the Investigation and Identification Team on the 2016 chemical attack in Kafr Zayta (S/2026/48, annex, enclosure). The people of Syria have waited too long for the victims of chemical attacks to be identified and recognized. Denmark calls on all actors to redouble their efforts to this end. In closing, let me reiterate Denmark’s strong support for the OPCW and Syria in making further progress towards concluding the chemical weapons file this year.

I thank Mr. Adedeji Ebo, Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament, Mr. Andrew Moore of the HALO Trust and Mr. Lennie Phillips, former head of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) inspection mission in Syria for their briefings. I also welcome the presence of the representative of Syria in our discussion. We are meeting at a critical time, when the Middle East is, once again, confronted by war. Just over a year ago, Syria embarked on a political transition, aspiring to become a factor of stability and peace in the region. France fully supports the Syrian authorities in effecting a political transition that is peaceful, inclusive and respectful of all segments of Syrian society and consonant with the spirit of the principles laid out in resolution 2254 (2015). The complete and verifiable destruction of the chemical weapons programme inherited from the Bashar Al-Assad regime is a strategic step towards a successful transition. On numerous occasions, the Al-Assad regime used chemical weapons against its own population. A recent report by the investigation team of the OPCW, whose independence, neutrality, impartiality and professionalism I wish to emphasize, established that the Al-Assad regime was responsible for perpetrating a chemical attack in Kafr Zayta in 2016. Remembrance of the victims compels us to continue striving tirelessly to eliminate chemical weapons and combat impunity for the use thereof. For more than a decade, and despite acceding to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 2013, the Al-Assad regime obstructed the OPCW’s activities. It is now evident that the regime never declared the entirety of its chemical weapons programme, contrary to its obligations under the Convention that it claimed to have ratified. Even now, uncertainty persists as to the exact scale of the programme at that time. The location and destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles are an absolute priority for regional security, with a view to preventing the risk of proliferation. The new Syrian authorities have decided to usher in a new era by committing to full cooperation with the OPCW. We welcome the progress already accomplished in the form of a number of deployments of OPCW teams to Syria since 2025, Syria’s appointment of a new Permanent Representative to the OPCW and the decision of the Executive Council of the OPCW in October 2025 to authorize the expedited on-site destruction of any remnants of chemical weapons found in Syria. This impetus for cooperation must continue and culminate in the complete elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons programme as soon as possible. Pursuit of concrete progress in that direction will mean that the reinstatement of Syria’s rights and privileges as a State party to the CWC — rights that were suspended in 2021 — could be contemplated. The task to be accomplished to that end is colossal, as are the needs of Syria and the OPCW teams if they are to do so. The latest report from the organization’s Director General (S/2026/101, annex, enclosure) underscores that it will be necessary to inspect more than 100 sites that were not declared by the previous regime and that may have been involved in activities related to chemical weapons. France, alongside its partners, intends to support Syria in its efforts to expedite the destruction of undeclared weapons stockpiles, to comply with its international commitments as soon as possible and to free the country and the region from the painful legacy of the Al-Assad era’s chemical weapons programme. Were this programme to eliminate chemical weapons in Syria to be seen through to completion, it would send three powerful messages to the world at a time of war and challenges to the arms control regimes governing weapons of mass destruction. First, the new Syria is committed to its programme of peace with the support of the international community. Secondly, the universal prohibition on chemical weapons remains a priority and an achievable goal. Thirdly, peace ensues from a decision on the part of those subjected to an iron rule and the rule of force and war to replace them with dialogue and reconciliation.

I thank Deputy High Representative Ebo for his briefing and welcome the representatives of Syria and Türkiye to today’s meeting. China takes note of the monthly report of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) transmitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council (S/2026/101, annex, enclosure). The OPCW Technical Secretariat has continued its active engagement with the Syrian transitional Government on outstanding issues concerning chemical weapons in the country and conducted on-site investigations at 20 locations in Syria. China welcomes these developments and supports enhanced communication and cooperation between the two sides with a view to a swift and comprehensive resolution of all outstanding issues. China notes the recent report by the OPCW’s Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) released by the Technical Secretariat (S/2026/48, annex, enclosure). It must be pointed out that the IIT has been highly controversial since its inception. The accountability functions of the IIT and the Office of Special Missions exceed the mandate conferred by the Convention on Chemical Weapons. The OPCW should abide strictly by the verification provisions of the Convention and its relevant annexes and uphold the principles of impartiality, objectivity and professionalism when investigating and addressing allegations concerning the use of chemical weapons in order to ensure that the findings can withstand the test of time and practice. The 110th session of the Executive Council of the OPCW adopted a decision mandating the expedited on-site destruction of any remnants of chemical weapons in Syria and requiring Syria to consult with the Technical Secretariat on the conditions for such destruction. Verifiability and irreversibility are the principles established by the Convention for Chemical Weapons destruction and must be strictly adhered to. Counter-terrorism is one of the top priorities of the international community in addressing the issue of Syria. In January, when the situation in north-east Syria underwent a shift, some terrorists escaped from detention facilities amid the chaos, raising international concerns. We call on the Syrian transitional Government to fulfil its international obligations and take all effective measures to resolutely combat all international terrorist organizations listed by the Council, including the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement. Under no circumstances should terrorists be allowed to acquire, manufacture or use chemical weapons.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.

I congratulate you, Madam President, and your country on assuming the presidency of the Security Council for this month. I wish you every success. I would also like to thank Mr. Ebo for his briefing and for placing developments in their important context. I also wish to thank Mr. Moore for explaining the importance of international support for demining. I would like to thank Mr. Phillips for his efforts over the past years, for charting the road ahead and specifically for mentioning what spring means to the world and what it means in Syria. To the world, spring means fresh air and a gentle breeze. But as we approach April, I note that Syria, during this time of year, has experienced two chemical weapons attacks that have suffocated our children. However, as is clear today, the truth was not, nor will it be, suffocated. Syria’s commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention is not merely a legal obligation; it is rooted in the Syrian experience and a deep sense of the pain endured by our people, who fell victim to chemical weapons. When the provisions of the Convention became the responsibility of the victims themselves, this commitment became a sacred covenant and an unshakeable moral duty. Rooted in this belief in achieving justice and preventing recurrence, Syria has translated its compliance with the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention into practical action. It considers the final disposal of any possible remnants of the former Al-Assad regime’s chemical programme to be a national responsibility to safeguard the security and safety of Syrians first and foremost and to promote security and stability in the region. As some colleagues here have already mentioned, Syria is shouldering this responsibility amid significant and complex challenges. Those challenges include security and operational aspects and the attendant difficulties arising from the secretive nature of the secret chemical weapons programme of the Al-Assad regime, the lack of institutional memory and the legacy of 14 years of war and the resulting economic exhaustion and institutional weakness that has affected technical capabilities, capacities and human resources. All of that notwithstanding, Syria continues to cooperate with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Technical Secretariat and has taken a series of practical measures to strengthen this cooperation, including the establishment of a national working group. And as colleagues mentioned, the Syrian National Authority has also continued to submit monthly reports, reflecting enhanced transparency and regular institutional and technical communication with the OPCW and its Technical Secretariat, in addition to Syria’s compliance with the decisions of the Executive Council. The most noteworthy developments on this file in the field during the recent period can be summarized as follows. First, Syria facilitated visits to more than 25 suspect sites, including declared sites and additional sites potentially linked to past activities. During these visits, environmental samples were collected, and a number of documents were reviewed. In this context, the Syrian Government provided the necessary facilities and support, including arrangements to facilitate movement and guarantee security and safety, as access to some sites requires engineering surveys and mine clearance, as Mr. Moore mentioned, before international teams are able to work there. Secondly, the Syrian Government provided the Technical Secretariat with access to more than 10,000 original documents and official records, and the Technical Secretariat conducted interviews with 19 witnesses, including individuals who were associated with the chemical programme under the previous regime. Thirdly, the Syrian Government continues to cooperate with the OPCW teams in planning additional visits during the next phase, including the assessment of priority sites and preparation for on-site destruction activities where circumstances require it. With regard to efforts to achieve accountability, as was mentioned previously, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons issued the fifth report of its Investigation and Identification Team (S/2026/48, annex, enclosure), which concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the Al-Assad regime’s air force was responsible for the chemical attack with chlorine gas that took place on 1 October 2016 in Kafr Zayta, in the Hama countryside. That attack injured 35 people and harmed dozens more. The Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons welcomed the assistance provided by the Syrian Government to the Investigation and Identification Team, which he described as the first cooperation of its kind for Syria since the fall of the former regime and as a milestone in and a valuable contribution to the process of international accountability. The Syrian authorities continue to cooperate with the Team in order to achieve progress on the investigations and to hold accountable all those involved in chemical attacks against the Syrian people. In keeping with the Syrian Government’s transparent and open approach, the Syrian National Authority took immediate action when units from the Syrian Ministry of Defence found 75 old, empty cylinders suspected of having contained toxic chemicals at an abandoned military site. The Authority immediately informed the OPCW Technical Secretariat and confirmed its readiness to provide all necessary facilities to deal with these cylinders, explaining that it had reported the existence of these empty and abandoned cylinders as part of its national declaration. It proposed the idea of transferring some of them to OPCW headquarters in The Hague, as a success story highlighting the transparency, openness and spirit of cooperation and partnership between Syria and the OPCW. However, at the time, the Technical Secretariat decided to wait for some time for reasons that it explained were related to security and safety. Unfortunately, owing to a lack of cooperation, the ensuing delay led to the transfer of those empty and abandoned cylinders by those cleaning the site to a scrap metal yard outside the site in which they were found, where they were dismantled and destroyed as scrap metal. The persons who carried out that work were exposed to significant health risks as a result. Upon learning of this, the national authorities promptly contacted the Technical Secretariat and, accompanied by a Technical Secretariat team, went to the site at which the cylinders were located. There, they confirmed that the cylinders were intact but destroyed, and they took all necessary security and safety measures. Syria affirms that it is handling this matter with the utmost seriousness and care and that it has already provided the Technical Secretariat with essential information, including interviews with all the persons who dismantled the cylinders and the command of the relevant military site. Audio recordings of and correspondence between these persons were also provided, along with samples from the site to which the empty and destroyed cylinders were transferred. What happened with the cylinders highlights — in a manner that leaves no room for doubt — the fact that international support, capacity-building and prompt action are needed to make it possible to urgently and effectively deal with any information or materials that are uncovered. Without the support of the member States of the OPCW and Syria’s international partners, it will remain impossible to address the existing challenges effectively. In this context, we extend our thanks and appreciation to the friendly countries that, immediately following the fall of the regime and Syria’s liberation, extended a helping hand to Syria in dealing with its chemical legacy. We are pleased to announce that work is currently under way to formalize this cooperation within a comprehensive coordination framework that will be announced shortly here in New York. In conclusion, the chemical file has long troubled the world, including the Council, and sparked widespread outrage and condemnation of the crimes committed against the Syrian people. This file, which once represented a global shock, is no longer a symbol of tragedy. Rather, it has become an area of cooperation and partnership to address challenges and ensure the security and safety of Syrians and the region. This transformation embodies the spirit of the new Syria. Also as part of this new spirit, and to overcome the other legacy of the Al-Assad regime, Syria is, as we speak, in the process of organizing a side event in Vienna, highlighting the radical transformation in the captagon file, which, like the chemical file, has long troubled the region and the world. This is a message to the world that the page will be turned on these files once and for all, ridding our beloved Syria of this stigma and relieving the region and the world of these dangerous scourges.

I now give the floor to the representative of Türkiye.

I would like to thank the Deputy to the High Representative, Mr. Moore and Mr. Phillips for their comprehensive briefings. Over the past decade we have all witnessed how the instability generated by the former regime reverberated far beyond Syria’s borders. The violent repression of the Syrian people and the policies pursued during the Al-Assad era have left deep scars across the country and the region. Among the most painful legacies of that period is the chemical weapons file, which remains a dark reminder of the grave atrocities committed during the conflict. Addressing this legacy is essential not only for Syria’s recovery but also for regional and international security. In the new period following December 2024, the steps taken by the Syrian Government to engage on this issue are encouraging. We acknowledge the progress made on the ground thanks to Syria’s determination and the professionalism of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Technical Secretariat and its team, including in visits to numerous sites, the conduct of interviews and the collection of samples. With respect to incident in Aleppo concerning the handling of the cylinders that were discovered, we wish to underline the importance of effective communication between Syria and the Secretariat. We are also encouraged by the Syrian authorities’ commitment to ensuring accountability for chemical weapons attacks. In this regard, we take note of the fifth report of the Investigation and Identification Team on the chemical attack in Kafr Zayta in 2016 (S/2026/48, annex, enclosure), which concludes that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a Syrian Arab Air Force helicopter from the Al- Assad era dropped a chlorine cylinder that injured 35 people. We also note that this report marks the first instance of cooperation by the Syrian authorities with the Investigation and Identification Team since December 2024. We all recognize that the chemical weapons file is highly technical and operationally complex. After years of concealment, significant information gaps remain regarding the former chemical weapons programme. These gaps inevitably complicate verification efforts and operational planning. In this context, the need to strengthen national institutional capacity in Syria to address the chemical weapons file is evident. Progress may not be immediate. However, gradual, practical and wellcoordinated cooperation with Syria, aligned with the realities on the ground, can yield meaningful and sustainable results. Türkiye remains committed to contributing to Syrian-led international efforts aimed at strengthening preparedness and technical capacity to address chemical weapons-related challenges, in line with OPCW standards. In this regard, we recently hosted a technical workshop in Ankara, bringing together the Syrian authorities involved and a group of countries and their experts, as well as the OPCW Secretariat, to identify capacity gaps and discuss destruction, whether deliberate or expedited. The role of the OPCW in every stage remains important. We believe that a constructive and pragmatic approach will best serve our shared objective of achieving tangible progress on the ground. Engagement should therefore remain supportive, focused on practical outcomes and on gradually strengthening institutional capacity. At the same time, we must ensure that the already challenging working conditions on the ground are not further undermined by unwarranted acts of aggression from certain countries that risk complicating ongoing efforts, namely Israel. In closing, Türkiye reiterates its support for Syrian-led and Syrian-owned initiatives to identify, secure, declare and destroy chemical weapons-related materials in cooperation with the OPCW and other relevant stakeholders. We also encourage all Member States to support these efforts so that together we can advance to our shared objective of a region free of chemical weapons.