S/PV.1792 Security Council

accordance with decisions taken by the Council pnviqus meetings [/77Yl/r-~7Wsr~- mc~tingsI, L I - _ intend, with the consent of the Council, lo invite the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania, India and Mauritius to participate. without the right to vote, in the Council’s consideration of the question of the situation in Cyprus. 2. The PRESIDENT ttrurrslutiun frunr Russiun): In view of the limited number of places available at -the Council table. I propose lo invite the nprcscntatjvcs of Yugoslavia, Romania, India and Mauritius to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber, on the understanding that they will be invited to take a place at the Council table when it is their turn to make a statement. 3. The PRESIDENT ttrunstution /iour Russiun): As members of the Security Cou&il have uircady been informed, this urgent mcctine of the Council has been convened ut such a iutc hour at the request I 5. In view of the need for the prompt adoption of a draft resolution on this item as a result of the situation in Cyprus and in connexion with the events relating to the Cyprus question, I understand that the members of the Council arc ready to vote on the English text of the draft resolution, without waiting for it to be translated into the other official working languages of the Council. I I. Since the passage of resolution 355 (19741. the Secretary-General has reported developments to the Council at regular intervals, and in particular he submitted an interim report on IO August [g///433]. The work which was envisaged for UNFICYP by the Geneva Declaration under its paragraph 3 (a), namely. the establishment of a security zone at the limit of the areas occupied by the Turkish armed forces, god off to a slow start. The first task, as we saw it, was to try to establish a cease-M line that would be accepted by all parties, The work was, if I use a neutral phrase, hampered by alterations in troop dispositions, even while the process of demarcation was continuing. However, by 8 August a clc JircW cease-fire line had been agreed, subject to a number of reservations, even though it could not be held in every respect to be the line obtaining at the time of the rignaturc of the Geneva Declaration on 30 July. 6, In accordance with the aforc-mentioned understanding I intend, if there is no objection, to put dti resolution S/i i446/Rev. I to the vote now. The drqfl rrrolution M*US adopted manlmously,t 7. The PRESIDENT trrctnskrtion .fnm Russim): The Security Council will now hear those rcprcsentativcs who have indicated a desire to speak after the vote. ii. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): It is almost exactly two weeks since the Security Council last met on Cyprus (I78Yth rrrccttng] and adopted resolution 333 (1974). I make no apology, Mr. Prcsident, for having been one of those instrumental in summoning the Security Council to a meeting, even though it is now 3.35 in the morning. I did so because it seemed to my delegation and my Govemment important that there should be a firm, II clear, an unambiguous and a speedy resolution adopted by the Council expressing its view upon the events that have taken place in Cyprus and in Geneva in the last few days. 12. One difkulty in securing acceptance of the ccaselire line was the contention that the recommendations in paragraph 3 of the Geneva Declaration should be implemented as a whole and that insuffMnt progress was being made on paragraph 3 (h), namely the evacuation of the Turkish enclaves by Greek or Greek Cypriot forces. 13. It was against this background and in this atmosphere that the Geneva conference resumed on 8 August. As a first step. the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom instructed omcials to report on the problems of the exchange of prisoners, the demarcation of the cease-fire line and the evacuation of Turkish Cypriot villages. The Secretary-Gcneral’r representative was invited trl participate as an observer at that initial meeting and in subsequent plenary meetings. 9. 1 do not want tonight to raise the temperature more than is perhaps necessary, I certainly do not wish to say anything which would exacerbate a situation which is already grave. But members of the Council will know that fighting has restarted in Cyprus 14. There then followed a wcricn of billttcrcll consultations, which included the rcprcscntativcs. of IS. On the evening of 10 August it was possible to hold u meeting with the representatives of Cyprus as well as the three Foreign Ministers. No decisions were reached, but it was agreed that Mr. C&ides and Mr. Denktaf would continue the discussions between themselves. 16. The following day it was announced that the National Guard would evacuate II number of Turkish villages which were occupied or surrounded by it. The Greek Cypriot authorities also agreed to release a number of Turkish prisoners. 17. During the following two day?, discussions continued on possible new constitutibnal arrangcmen& cithcr of a cantonal nature or based on two autonomous areas under one unitary State. In the luttcr stages of the conference, however, the Turkish rcprcacntativc tabled proposals for a clearly defined Turkish Cypriot zone covering 34 per cent of the island, together with a demand for a constructive reply to these proposals within a short deadline. I regret to say that attctipts to secure an extension of this deadline for consideration of this proposal and of counter-proposals submitted by Mr. &rides met with no success at all. The Greek Cypriot counter-proposal conceded administrative autonomy and some grouping of Turkish villages but excluded the possibility of a geographical zone or of population movcmcnts. Against that background, the final meeting searching for a way out of the deadlock lasted for seven hours yesterday. This was unsucccssfuL und the conference broke down at 2.15 a.m, Geneva time toduy, 14 August. 18. At the conclusion of the conference Mr. Clcridcs stressed that he did not rcjcct the Turkish proposals and was prepared to consider them with an open mind if he were allowed 48 hours. The Turkish rcprcsentnrives wcrc unable to agree to that rcqucst. The conference. thcreforc, dispcncd, but the Greek. the Greek Cypriot und the United Kingdom detcgutions expressed their wiltingncas to return tomorrow, Thursday, and the Turkish Cypriot representative cxprcssed lrimihlr willingncs$ if the Turkish Govern- 19. In the aforc-mentioned circumstances WC thought that it was right to seek an urgent meeting of the Council and to put on record how the conference has failed. We wish to stress that diplomatic means of resolving this problem have not been exhausted, and for that reason 1 hope 1 have been studied in my approach this evening und moderate in my language. I also wish to express the hope that negotiations may bc resumed at a very early date, if possible on Thursday. As 1 have already indicated, my Government. the Greek Government and the Greek Cypriot Govcmmcnt*-and, I understand, even the Turkish Cypriot community--would be prepared to accept this. 20. With that object in view, my delegation submitted the draft resolution that has now been adopted by all the members of the Council. 21, I would appeal to the Government of Turkey to stop the fighting in Cyprus. I would appeal to it to make a reality of resolution 3S3 (1974). which it has accepted. It is not possible for this Council or for any set of negotiators to solve the centuriesold enmity between Greece and Turkey and between Greek and Turk in a matter of days, but what we had hoped to achieve in Geneva and what we hoped thd Security Council might help to achieve was that by i resolving the problems of Cyprus we should find a way of at least lessening the enmity between thqsc two nations. 22. Mr. MVGGO (United Republic of Cameroon) ~tntc~rprmtion jiim Frcndt): My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution that the Council has just adopted. This support means, first, that my delegation wishes to confirm the positive vote it cast at the time of the adoption of resolution 353 (1974). It means also that my Government firmly supports thC principle of rcspcct by all Member States for the indcpcndcncc, sovcrcignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. Finally, in voting for the draR resolution that the Council has just adopted my delegation expresses the hope that the Geneva negotiations on Cyprus will resume very shortly within the framework laid down by resolution 333 (1974). without overlooking the provisions of the present resolution. 23. The PRESIDENT f trrrns/trthn jhm R~rssCtrrr): I call on the rcprcscntntive of Grcccc. 2 Suhscqucntly. the United Kin&m dclrpnrion whmmcd I mdillcotion whcrchy the wurdq “lhe Gnck Cypriol Govcmmrnl” would bc rcpluccd hy the word\ “the Orcck Cypriuts”. 25. At that meeting I expressed the hope that after those developments human lives would bc spat-cd in both camps. Since then, human liycs have been lost in both camps, and more human lives arc being lost at this very moment and will be lost in the days to come. 32. A second cease-fin was signed in Geneva on 30 July, effective 2200 hours Geneva time. The fighting went on, as cvcrybody in the world knows and as I myself informed the Council at its meeting of 31 July with respect to the Turkish attack against the villages of Lapithos and Karavas. Those villages have, of couruc, fallen since, and the Turkish forces arc well west of them. 26. 1 ICC from the report of the Secretary-General (g//MJIAtM2l] that among the casualties arc rive members of the Finnish contingent and four members of the British contingent, who have been wounded. I cxprcss the sympathy and gratitude of my Govcmmcnt to the representative of the United Kingdom and to the Government of Finland. 33. In any case. the overwhelming fact is that the territory held by Turkey at the date and time of the first cease-tire has tripled. I put that before the Council for its judgcmcnt. and I do not even have to prove it. Maps have been published not only in this country but all over the world, in all newspapers and in all magazines-maps in beautiful colours: diffcrcnt colours for the first cease-fire. different colours for the second cease-fire. different colours for today. 27. The prestige of the United Nations and the Security Council has suffered and will suffer, 28. I do not have to go into the details of the continuous Turkish violations and the step-by-step enlargement of the occupied territory. They arc too many, and they have been fully reported by the world press. 1 feel I do not need to convince anybody. Howcvcr, in spite of the tragedy of the moment, 1 must mention certain dates. 34. The expulsion of the Greek population from the occupied area went almost parallel with the expansion of the territory held by Turkey. Again, all this was fully rcportcd all over the world, and I shall quote from the Secrctary-Gcncral’a report of 5 August: 29. The invasion started in the early hours of 20 July, and. in the words of the rcprcscntutivc of Turkey. it met with fierce rcsistancc. Who offered the resistance? The National Guard, which is the name given to the army of Cyprus. helped by all Greek Cypriots who could carry arms and the 650 Greek officers who wcrc there to train the National Guard. Those officers were incorporated in the National Guard. Everybody knew it. They had to fight alongside the Guard, and they did fight. And. by the way, I suppose that most of them have been killed. “Most of the male population of the Greek Cypriot villages were taken prisoner and escorted by Turkish troops into the areas of Boghaz Gcunycly and Orta Keuy. Some of the women and children of many villages were eventually told to leave their villages und to cross the lines into territory controlled by the National Guard. Others were transported, without their possessions. to Nicosia by bus and set free with instructions to cross the green line into the Greek Cypriot sector of the city,” [Sl~~.~S.VArld.IS, pcrrcr. R f b)) lf anybody had any doubt as to the Turkish intentions, I suppose he now has the proof. But cvcn that proof is no longer needed. In Geneva. everything was said. There arc no longer nny doubts. 30. There was a time when WC had mote troops in the island. always at the invitation of the Cyprus Government. and everybody will rcmcmbcr that, bccausc of the continual Turkish threats. those troops wcrc withdrawn after an arrangement with Turkey in 1967. -3% And so I come to the Geneva conference. My Government went to the l first Geneva conference in conformity with resolution 353 tt974). It was the Security Council which sent my Government to Geneva. Its first preoccupation was to atop the fighting. 31. The fierce lighting, as my Turkish collcaguc called it, went on for two and a half days, and in ?ccognizcd the importance of rctting in train, as a matter of urgency, measures to adjust and to rcgularizc within a reasonable period of time the situation in the Republic of Cyprus on a lasting basis, having regard to the international agreements signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960 and to resolution 353 (1974) of the Security Council. They were, however, agreed on the need to decide first on certain immediate measures”. (See gl/lJM] 36, That means that the Declaration makes a clear distinction between measures which arc urgent and measures which arc immediate. The immediate measures on which there is a need to decide first -those arc the actual words of the Declaration, and I cmphasitc the word %rst”-&c: first, the ccasc=flrc; secondly, a security zone, the evacuation of Turkish enclaves, policing by UNFICYP of mixed villages and the exchange of prisoners and civilians. Then the Declaration deals with the urgent problem of finding a lusting solution acceptable to all parties. 37. What happened after the Declaration was signed is known by everybody. but I have some numbers members probably do not know. Thirty-five quart kilometres inhabited by 1 I.000 people-mainly Greek Cypriots-were added to the territory occupied by the Turkish army on 30 July at 2200 hours. 38. I received a few hours ago an order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Army in Cyprus, dated 30 July, the day of the signing of the Declaration. This order had fallen into the hands of the Greek Cypriot army, and I shall read it out: “28th Infantry Division Partisan Siklik. 3 July. Operation Order. “1, Situation. Enemy position as discussed during briefing and indicated on the map. “2. Mission: the 28th Division, having the objective of extending and ensuring the security of the area occupied. will attack on 30 July and occupy a line running from Hill 1023 west of Lapithos, Bassi, Sisklipos village.” 39. It is a very long order and I am not going to read it all out. It says, “Necessary preparations will have to be made”. All this was an order given to the Turkish aoldicrs on 30 July, the day the Geneva Declaration was signed. 41, I read from paragraph 3 of the Sccrctary- General’s report of 12 August: “In the evening of II August, UNFICYP headquarters was informed by the National Guard that they were prepared to begin withdrawal from Turkish enclaves which had been occupied by ‘Greek or Greek Cypriot forces’. The following Turkish Cypriot villages were evacuated Sunday evening: Alckhtora. Evdhimou, Ayios Thomas, and Plataniskia, all in Limassol district, and Mandria and Kouklia in Paphos district, On I2 August, the National Guard evacuated the Turkish sectors of Lamaca/Scala and Paphosl Ktima. In accordance with the role of UNFICYP pursuant to Security Council resolution 353 (1974) UNFICYP has assumed responsibility for the protection of those areas.” (S//M&M/.20.] And all this before any arrangements were made on the security zone, cvcn before any decisions wcrc taken on how the supervision of this buffer zone would operate-the arrangements and decisions envisaged in subparagraph 3 b) of the Geneva Declaration us immediate measures. 42. Another reason which made by Foreign Minister decide to attend the second Geneva conference in spite of the Turkish bad faith was his belief that it was urgent to take measures for the exchange 01 prisoners. military and civilian, and of the numerous Greek Cypriots in the Turkish occupation zone. It is astonishing, and characteristic of the Turkish methods and intentions, that, after imposing all possible measures of protection for the Turks in the non-occupied parts of the island, including the keeping of order by Turkish Cypriot police. Turkey “Within the Turkish-controlled area, UNFICYP activities am csntrcd on humanitarian and relief mcasurcs in Kyrcnia and - certain surrounding villages, cspccially Bcllapais. These activities include the delivery of food to a considcrablc number of 8mall isolated groupa.:’ [S///433. J 44, This situation is unbelievable, and it is unacceptable to my Oovcmmcnt. The Turkish authorities have even refused to allow 500 women. children and old men to rctum to their homes in the occupied zone. 43. I now come to the search for a lasting scttlcmcnt in the island. This is the most Intcrcsting, the most unbelievable and the most ?hocking part of the confcrcnce. It started when the three participants became tive with the addition of rcprcscntativcs of the Cypriot Government and of the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Foreign Minister proposed the division of the island into separate geographical zones and demanded that a decision bc taken for any constitu= tional negotiations to bc based on this principle. The Acting Prcsidcnt of Cyprus and the Greek For&n Minister remarked that Cyprus was an independent and sovereign country, a Member of the United Nations, and that it was not up to the Geneva conference to dictate its constitution to Cypnrs. The United Kingdom Foreign Minister declared that the United Kingdom did not feel that it had any right to interfere in the constitutional problem of Cyprus. WC tried to suggest that if Turkey invaded Cyp~s to protect its Constitution, as the Turkish Oovcmmcnt contends, it did, it would then bc only reasonable to take the Constitution as it is, the Constitution based on the I960 Treaty of 0uarantcc5 rcfcrrcd to in the Geneva Declaration, cvcntually accept whatever modifications had been accepted up to this time by both ‘parties, and try to agree on other modifications that would make it moth practical under the present circumstances. That was flatly rcjectcd. 46. Now I would like to make I point hcrc. WC have never accepted that the Trcuty of Guarantee gives Turkey the right to invade Cyprucr for whutevcr reason, and t do not think that thcrc urc many in the United Nations who rcccpt this prcdominunce of a treaty over the Charter. But if WC wcrc to accept for a moment this un-United Nations-if -se 47. In spite &f al1 this, the Geneva confcrcncc started ycstcrdcly examining constitutional proposals under the Turkish threat that if the Turkish conception of geographical partition was not accepted military operations would rcsumc in the island. This is the precise reason why the buffer zone has not been rcccptcd until this moment in spite of the fact that. in accordance with the Geneva Declaration, it was one of the immediate .mcasurcs to bc taken, right aficr the ccasc-fire, hccuusc the road to further advance should remain open to the Turkish Army. 48. Let us have a look at the ditY’ercnt proposal%. I quote from the Turkish Cypriot proposal: “The Republic of Cypnrs shall he tin independent binational State. The Republic shall be composed of two fcdcratcd States with full control and autonomy within their respective geographical boundaries. The area of the Turkish Cypriot State shall cover 34 per cent of the territory of the Republic falling north of the pncral line starting from Lcfka and going through Nicoriu to Famagusta.” This was, of course. rcjcctcd. 49. You may usk why 34 per cent of the territory? The Turks arc only 18 per cent of the popukttion. I have the answer. Flccausc the Turkish army is thcrc. SO. Mr. Cleridcs was drafting his counter-proposal when the Turkish Foreign Minister came out with a proposal of his own, not from Cyprus but from the mother country. This is the Turkish propasul: “The Republic shall comprise two autonomous zones, one Turkish und the other Greek. The Greek Cypriot zone shall be composed of two districts. The arca of the autonomous Turkish Cypriot zone will hc cquivalcnt to approximately 34 per cent of the territory of the Rcpublio.” -The word “ctpproximatcly” in hcrc--“The Administration of each of the autonomous zones shall have complctc control over itu geographical Uml.“’ * . This was on the basis of take it or lcavc it. until midnight. Some more time was finally. and with - It will up to the Council to decide which of the three projects is closets to resolution 353 (1974). It may possibly rind even Mr. Clerides’ proJect far away from it. Sl. The Government of Cyprus was not able to accept the Turkish constitutional proposals in Geneva. The Government of Greece takes the attitude that no sovereign, independent State could accept such proposals at gun point from an outside country. It will bc up to each Member of the United Nations to take a position on this issue. The situation is extremely serious. For Cyprus itself it is dramatic. For the United Nations it calls for a reappraisal of its lundamcntal purposes. 52. The Group of Non-Aligned Count&s at the United Nations issued a declaration the other day. 1 quote from that declaration: “The tragic situation of Cyprus is a grave warning to all non-aligned countries and calls for their united action. The threat to the independence and security of one non~aligned country is a threat to the security of ull of them.” I. for my part, would agree. 53. As Greece and Turkey arc the two countries moqt cla(rely connected with Cyprus I should like to clobc by referring to clear written indications of the And I repeat, that WC are ready to take out of Cyprus the Greek officers and any other military personnel in the island any time. together with the Turkish army. 54. 1 now quote from The Wushlngron Post of I I August. It is a telegram from Ankara: “In Ankara a high Government official said that Turkey is determined to press for acceptance of its plan for a Cyprus solution even at the cost of renewed fighting on the island. ‘There will not bc a third round of Geneva talks’, said the official. ‘WC will get peace, either in Geneva talking, or in Cyprus fighting’ ‘*. 55. WC all know a bit of history, and WC all know what is meant by gunpoint diplomacy. Those of us who arc old enough can remember Hitler and Munich. We had hoped they were past experiences. I will not go into the final hours of the Geneva conference, as I think they wcry very plainly explained by the representative of the United Kingdom, As a matter of fact, what Mr. Clerldes said was: “Give me time to consider your proposal”. But it was not possible; time was not given; and fighting is going on.

The failure, which we hope is only temporary, of the negotiations in Geneva has led the dclegationaof Greece. Cyprus and the United Kingdom torequest the urgent meeting of the Council. 57. Even before we had enough time to meet. the Turkish Air Force had bombed certain targets, particularly Nicosia, caust-r many casualties and wounding nine soldiers of the United Nations Force, This was reported to us two hours ago in a report of S8. By this time tomorrow-now, even at this very moment-the war could spread over Cyprus and once again affect populations which have already been seriously harmed, Aware of the dramatic nature of this situation, the nine countries of the European Economic Community met yesterday evening while , negotiations were still continuing: they decided to make a new and pressing approach the Governments of Ankara and Athens. 64. The United States is convinced that only through such negotiations can a settlement emerge which will restore constitutional government to Cyprus and peace and stability in the eastern Mediterranean. 39. As I speak, I do not know whether that approach was made in both capitals. It was essentially a solemn appeal to the two parties to pursue the course of negotiation, to the exclusion of any other means. The nine countries, the text adds, feel that they must give both parties a most rolemn warning of the responsibilities that would k incurred in the eyes of the European Community by the one that resorted to military action at the risk of starting a conflict, with incalculable consequences. 65. As the Council is aware, the United States has lent its total support to this process. My Oovemment did this because of its close relations with its allies, Onece and Turkey, because of its commitment to the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. because of its concern for the welfare of the Cypriot people of both communities and, also, but not least, because of its overriding concern for peace in the area. 66. WC have given our full support to the valiant and tireless efforts of the United Kingdom, a guarantor Power under the London-Zurich agreements, to bring about a measure of common understanding at Geneva which would point the way towards a new constitutional arrangement in Cyprus which takes into account the new realities. In this role we have ken in constant touch with all of the parties io as to do whatever we could to encourage the negotiating process. 60. Speaking now on behalf of my Oovemment, i would say that WC sincerely deplore the cxcessivc haste with which the Turkish Government interrupted last evening’s negotiations, and particularly the military action which the Turkish forces have just kgun, War is not the way to solve the diMcult problems separating the two communities on Cyprus. On the contrary, it can only complicate and delay a solution, without any of the parties concerned finally king able to gain the least benefit. 67. The United States has taken heart from the restoration of constitutional government in Orcece, so ably kd by Prime Minister Caramanlis. The areek Oovemment has pursued with diligence the search for arrangements to restore constitutional government in Cyprus. As a guarantor Power, Greece has legitimate interests which must k fully ncognited. 61. Here I must recall the rule that as lbng as negotiations arc acceptable to one of the partners-and the request for a X-hour postponement was not a refusal to negotiate-the other should abstain from making it impossible to carry on the negotiations. Also I must concur with the urgent appeal which our colleague from the United Kingdom addressed a few moments ago to the Turkish Government. 6% We also pay a tribute to the people of Cyprus. of both communities, who have endured many hardships in the past month. l 62. However for the time king, the Council, which has the major responsibility for peace. the maintenance of world had to act.- I had at least to require full implementation of resolutions 353 (I9741 and 354 t 1974) and, particularly, respect of the ceasefire throughout the island-in other words, an end to the fighting which is how going on. It had also urgently to appeal to the parties to resume negotiations without delay: and. in conclusion, it had to state that it would remain seized of the situation. This has been done. and I hope its appeal will be heeded. 69. The Acting President of Cyprus. Mr. Clcrides. and the Turkish Vice-President, Mr. Denktag, have both made major contributions in this complicated process of negotiation. 70. Turkey also has legitimate interests which must k fully rccognized. My Qovemmcnt made clear yesterday in a public statement its view that the position of the Turkish community on Cyprus requires considerable improvement and protection, as well as a greater degree of autonomy.

My delegation deeply regrets that almost a month after the adoption of resolution 353 (1974) we have found it necessary to meet once again in thir hall to consider 71. My Government considers that it is the duty of the Council to do everything in keeping with rcsolu- 72. The duty of the Council is simply this: we must call for an immediate end to the fighting and WC must call for the earliest resumption of negotiations. My C3ovcmmcnt pledges that it will continue its own efforts towards the end that the voice of reason will again be heard and the voice of the cannons will once more be stilled.

I call on the representative of Cyprus.

The situation in Cyprus-and it is Cyprus which is really the suffering party-is very criticat. It is a situation that goes beyond mere words. The salient fact-apart from all the other aspects-is that WC have in Cyprus at the present moment a Power with a military force of some 40.000 men, a Power which by reason of its mcmbcrship of a strong military alliance possesses the means to attack a small, undefended, unassisted country, a country that is independent, a country that is a Member of the United Nations, a country that is entitled to all the rights of independence, freedom and territorial integrity. a country that has the right of protection under the Charter, which force shall not be used by one d rovides that another. tate against 75. If we examine all the circumstances. we see that the situation in Cyprus today is not merely comparable but almost identical to the situation before the Second World War of a rmall country that was attacked on exactly the same grounds: the protection of a minority. Everyone knows that those grounds were merely a pretext for destroying that country and its indcpcndence. Any encyclopcdia-again I must turn to an cncyclopedia-will ahow the real purposes that Hitleritc Germany had in mind when it purported to be protecting the rights of the German minority in Czechoslovakia. At that time the big Powers found it more convenient not to oppose the aggnssordespite the fact that under the Covenant of the League of Nations it was their obligation to protect that small country. But they preferred to trifle with the rights of a small country in order to appease the aggressor. For many reasons they found it more convenient to side with the aggressor than with the victim. 76. But there is in the very structure of the cosmos a power that is called the moral power: crime and retribution. In the case of the abandonment of the small country to which I have just referred, the retribution did come-but it fell on all mankind, through the Second World War. 78. Every cruel means of war has been used, including napalm bombs. Turkey has been in command of the air. There has been no other Power disputing Turkey’s domination of the air and the seas. Cyprus has no fleet, no air force, and no anti-aircraft guns. Would ,anyone have thought it possible that the international community would atand and watch this crime being committed, without turning a hair? That would have seemed unimaginable, particularly in the present age, the age of the United Nations, the age of the Charter. It is true that the League of Nations had a Covenant, but that Covenant contained no principles: it was merely an arrangement for keeping the peace. At that time war had not been prohibited; war was still considered a normal process. The Charter brought the change that war was to be treated as a crime and that force was not to bc used by one country against another except in the exercise of selfdefence. Therefore, under the Charter Turkey is committing a crime, because it is Rot acting in self-defence but in naked aggression. 79. WC have been striving for so many years to find a definition of aggression. Well, hcrc it is: this is the picture of aggression, Could this be described as anything else but direct aggression? 80. Under paragraph S of resolution 353 (IW4), a conference was to be held, and indeed it wus held. But there are four paragraphs that precede paragraph 5 of that resolution. namely the paragraph that called on Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom to enter into negotiations for the restoration of peace in the area and constitutional government in Cyprus. What did those four other paragraphs provide for? First, there is the paragraph calling upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. Turkey is supposedly one of the countries which is to cntc. rnto negotiations for the restoration of peace in the area and was one of the guamntors-the irony of the situation--of the independence. territorial integrity and security of Cyprus. Now that country is called upon, as is every other State, to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. 81. We do not have to go very far to ret what the, degree of respect Turkey has for the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus-no further than what is happening tonight. even if we forget cvcrything clmc. 82. What is happening tonight? I have hen before me H cable that reached me just a littlc white a80 from 83, What is the situation that unfolds bcforc the Security Council out of this picture? Where arc WC? Arc WC in the days bcforc the ScCond World War? Is there no Charter? What is the meaning of signing the Charter? What is the meaning of having a Charter? What is the meaning of having the United Nations and the Security Council if we have no respect for the principles of the Charter and if WC have no human feeling when such a crime is committed in cold blood? I have no doubt that our very affable and smiling colleague, the representative of Turkey, will find many ~XCU~C~ for it. Surely he will have many ~XCUSCS and many unproven stories. I can assurc members that the Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus have had more rights than the Greek Cypriots have had. They have had freedom of movement all over the island when the Greek Cypriots were prevented by force by the Turkish Cypriots in the cxcrcisc of that right on over 100 public roads. including main communication roads. It is a strange thing that the 18 per cent minority has had such force as to prevent the majority from moving in the island, yet that is a fact, It has been commented on rcpeatcdly.by the Secretary-General in a number of his reports that the Turkish Cypriots could move everywhere-and I could easily quote the documents. Yet, in order not to create trouble and in order not to USC force, there was no effort by the Government to free those public roads. 87. What is the Treaty of Guarantee? What dots it say and how can this Treaty of Guarantee remain valid, with Turkey as a member when Turkey behaves in this way? The two other members may nmain guarantors, but not Turkey. The Treaty of Guarantee clearly provides for the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus: it also provides that there should bc no annexation or union with either Greece or Turkey or any other country, and no partition. 88. In the event of a breach of the provisions of that Treaty. the three guarantor countries undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. WC have not heard any invitation by Turkey to Greece and the United Kingdom to consider serious representations or measures to cnsurc observance of those provisions. Article IV of the Treaty says: “In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible. each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action, with the sole aim of m-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.” It speaks here of concerted action, and concerted action is explained in the same article as **measures &ccssary to ensure observance”. If that concerted action may not prove possible-which means peaceful representation measures-theli separate action is possible, but not violation of the Charter and such violtrtions and aggression as would create the present situation. Therefore I submit that this Treaty of Guarantee has been tom to pieces by Turkey. Now, whether the other guarantors would like to take that tom Treaty of Guarantee and put the pieces together is another question, but Turkey has been not only the aggretPor uguinst Cyprus but also the aggressor against the Treaty of Guarantee. If the Treaty of Guarantee had been respected. we should not have reen the situation existing today-if it had ken interpreted in its real sense of representations or other peaceful measures for reestablishing the situation, and not by the use of force and aggression in violation of the Charter. 84. Wcrc the Germans in Czechoslovakia sufferhut? L.ct us see what the encyclopaedia says about that: “They were by no means an oppressed minority, but Hitler, conforming to Naxi grand strategy, through Hcnlcin. insisted they were”. He actually and ofticially naked for autonomy for the Sudetens. It is the same thing. In Cyprus the Turkish Cypriot leadership is prompted by Turkey in the same way as Henlein wus prompted by Hitler, seeking under the guise of autonomy to destroy the independence of Czechoslovakia. In this case it is for the destruction of the independence of Cyprus and for no other reason. US. Turkey is not concerned with the welfare of the Turkish Cypriots. I can assure members it is not. It is only concerned with grabbing a part of Cyprus. That is the clear situation that WC have to face. And it wants to grab it how? By partitioning it, and then 90. I want to say only a few words with regard to resolution 353 (1974). which is rcafftrmed. Apart from the call for respect for the sovcrcignty of Cyprus, it calls for a cease-fire-a call which has not been respected-it demands an immediate end to foreign military intervention and it requests the withdrawal without delay of foreign military forces in Cyprus. Those four conditions should have been implemented whollydr in part at least with regard to withdrawalbefore the negotiations started. The parties should have gone to the negotiations with a cease-fire operating and with immediate cessation of intervchtion and then discussed the situation. But what happened? This is the other salient point in this situation. WC have an enormous country destroying open cities in violation of all international legal order and The Hague Convention of 1907-bombing open towns and civilian populations. Not only that but we have had the other characteristic. again regrettably reminding us of Hitler and his tactics, of ncgotating at gunpoint. It demands at gunpoint that its terms be accepted. What are the terms? To make a State within a State in Cyprus: something wholly unworkable and unacccptable; that State. the Turkish State, is to be 34 per cent of the total area, whereas the Turkish population is only 18 per cent. So that is another characteristic of the arrogant attitude of Turkey. It has insisted on both occasions to have negotiations at gunpoint. saying: “I will continue and intensify my aggression against Cyprus unless you accept my terms within so many hours”-24 or 36. 91. That is the situation that the Security Council has to meet effcctivcly in the event that Turkey apnin does not comply. 92. The PRESIDl2NT ttrtrrrslutio~r $wrr Hwsxbtr~: I cnll on the reptcscntcltivc of ‘I urkcy.

I do not wi(rh to deny the seriousness trf the circumcltances which hilvc Icd the Security Council 94. From the very beginning of the second stage it became apparent that the substantive probicma which seemed to have been defined when the Declaration was adopted were interpreted in a way which was totally different by the signatories and later by those who had been invited to join in the negotiations. The autonomy which seemed to have been accepted cvcn at that time-according to the description of the representative of the United Kingdom of his views of what occurred last weekapparently was not as clearly accepted as it had seemed from a perusal of the document which had been signed in Geneva. Who to believe and what to believe? 93. Reference has been made to the fact that all the diplomatic resources had not been exhausted. It seems that when one is at the end of a table where one is supposed to be sitting as a judge and one can resort to the subterfuge of last-minute delays it is easy to say that all diploma& resources have not been exhausted. It is not the same when thcsc negotiations have been going on, these diplomatic means being used for over a decade while the international community turned a deaf car to the appeals of the community which was driven to despair in Cyprus-and I am speaking of the Turkish Cypriot community, no matter what was said by Mr. Rossides. who seems to have a much more optimistic view of the conditions in which that community was attempting to live. 96. One of the things that was already revealing in Geneva, and which remains so today, is the fact that. for example, the representative of the United Kingdom spoke-and I shall quote his words in his own laqguagc--of the “Greek Cypriot Government” and the “Turkish Cypriot community’*. If that is not a lapsus, it would seem to indicate a mentality thut would explain. at least partially, the failure of the meetings’ in Geneva. And the fact that that was deliberately repeated by the representative of Greece confirms any doubts I might still have on that point. 97. The representative of Greece spoke of the Cypriot army. I should like to ask him some qucutions, but let me ray 1 am not expecting on answer ut this very late hour. What is the Cypriot army? On what basis was it established? In the breach of what ugrcemcnts solemnly agreed to? In the vic~lution of what Constitution that had already twxn cast to the ground und trampled upon? Was ‘it the aumc Cypriot army of a country which is supposedly non-tlligncd of which u new Greek gcncml from Athens hna just been uppointcd commander by Jccrcc? I #am saying ull this to ahow you that the !#I. The representative of Orcccc spoke of Orcck villages in the Turkish occupied tone. The rcprcscnta- I/VC of Onccc spoke of an occupied zone, of Turkish occupation, which, he raid. had grown by leaps and bounds. I should like to ask him, whether the Turkish villages that wore rubjugatcd, dortroyed and made uninhabitable do not take up any apace in the Cypriot territory? Is the occupation of those villager not occupation because it ia a Orcck island at leant in the eyes of the Orccks in Athens and in Cyprur? How many times, has the’tcrritory rubjugatcd by tho Orccks been expanded? Does geomctrys apply only when it is a question of Greeks and not when it is a question of Turks in Cyprus? 99. All this may explain why the Turkish negotiators in Geneva did not consider that all the ahilly shnllying and refusals to comply with the demands qtipulatcd in the text accepted in Ocnovcwhich I think all came from Orccco of the Grcckr in Cyprus-were unimportant and could bc disregarded. They did not consider that the essence was the ccasc-fire, with which Turkey should comply-while the rest. of course, could wait. However that might bc. the 6amc Geneva Declaration rcferrcd-and this is what I havo been leading up to-to the basic problem, which should be paramount because it is only on the basis of rccurity that the 6cttlcmcnt of the substantive issues might convince the Turks that it would realty be possible to build a lasting peace in Cyprus and also to apply all the other provisions of the Gcricva Declaration, 103. I would have prcfcrrcd my Omck colleague to make no mention of the Onok mtugccs in an island where tho Turks, in the world.6 eyes, wcrc living as rcfttgces but did not attract much attention at a timo when the situation on rho island was no thmat to world peace and tranquillity, AB far as the pcacc and tmnquility of the Turks was concerned, them was always some way to settle the problem. It was only when they decided that the Turks 6hould no longer live as mfugccs in their own country that the problem reached it6 present state of acuteness. 104, The mpnscntativc ofC3mccc hen raid that the Turks were overreaching themselves in claiming 34 per cent of the territory as the basis for establishing an autonomous administration to be set up as the basis of a viable constitution for Cyprus. 1 believe 1 can explain this figure. which may seem strange to those who am unfamiliar with the Cypriot problem -and CM knows then arc many who do not undcntand the problem of Cypnrs in general or in detail. Before they wem dispossessed of their land in Cyprus during the last 10 yean, and before they were forced to take refuge in the enclaves, the Turks owned 34 per cent, at least 34 per cent, of the land and of the villages when they made a living by practising agriculture. The land rcgistrics of the municipalities, if they have not been changed or falsified in recent years, arc evidence of this. But this certainly is not the mason for the failure of the negotiations. The failum was due to the basic philosophical concept, the mfusal to mcognizc that the Turkish Cypriots have been and should remain masters of their island to the 6amc degree as the Circcks. . 100. And now to return to what occutrcd In Geneva last week, this time 1 think the game was, on the one hand, non-application of the Geneva Declaration as a whole, and. on the other, r&sal to discuss the aubstuncc. Mr.’ Clcrides began by refusing to hold talks with the guarantor Powers as ouch, because his personal interpretation of the Declaration cnablcd him to adopt this deviant. approach. And yet if Mr. Clcrides was then, it was at the invitation of those Powers, it seems to mo. 101. Mr. Clcridcs-unless it was the reprcscntativc of Greece-requested a return to the 1960 agreement, which by the way implies that he had violated that ugrccment. But the Constitution can take it; whenever the violators of tho Constitution find it to their advantage to do so, they revive it and it ccascs to be a dead letter. However, in 1960 the Constitution included a number of provisions which, had they been applied-and I am only too willing to bclicvc Mr. Rossidcs when he 6ays the intention was to npply them in good faith-Gould have meant WC 105, I will not go into the details of the nc~tiations, because I do not feel that we arc competent to.do so. I must, however, emphasitc that if during 106. Much has been made of the non-alignment of Cyprus, to which my areek collcaguc seems very much attached, That non-alignment is hardly compatible with two basic Oreeks from Cfrcccc and t c Clrccks in Cyprus, I? sftions taken by the Filrt of all, in order for the Orcck Cypriot8 and Cyprus as a whole arc to become a truly non-aligned State. the army of that island should no longer be under the command of a Power which is, juridically speaking, foreiOn to that island. As re~rds the withdrawal of forces, the representative of Greece used the word5 “together with the Turkish army. ARer a presence of 13 years, I thank the rcprcsentative of Greece for his @enerosfty. However, I notice incidentally that nothing is said about the tremendous flghtfng potential that has been created in Cyptus by Oreece, by all the Greeks, in violation of all kgaiity. 107. As regards thz fbture status of Cyptus, despite the fact that certain circumstances have compelled us (0. place troops on the island, I once wafn solemnly state my country’8 firm attachment 10 the 108. In reply to Mr. Rossidcs I must tell him once again that, personally, I do not ncognizc his right to speak on behalf of the Turkish community. That rayf;;;ity has never been represented in the United * 109. This is ail that I would have to say if he had not made certain comments which require a very brief reply. I can make this reply in five minutes. 110. Fint of all, I rhould like to; mention his insistence-contrary to ail logic and to all hfstorfcrli and political reality--on speaking of a “minority” while refer&# to the profound nature of a conflict and the diff~cuitfes we Turks arc having in finding a solution. I rhould have been very pleased to discover so late in history and so early this morning that Mr. Rossfdcs and his administration finally bciievc that the principle of pum sum scn*unrkr fr ucrosanct, because they rtatcd that we had violated certain arranaemcnts or certain treaties, certain constitutional provisions, which apparently had been unilaterally denounced and considered as so many rcraps of paper-following Hitler’s cxempie, which he has rcferrcd to so ofien today-by Archbishop Makarios. I Il. In conclusion, allow me to reiterate that if the appeals contained in paragraph 3 of the resolution just adopted by the Council are really considered by Cfrcccc and by the representative of the Greek community in Cypnrs with all the seriousness called for by negotiation84 emphasfzc the word “negotfatfons”-rather than as delaying tactics or a refusal to deal with the basic problems-then my Government will be very happy to comply with this resolution. 112. The PRESIDENT mmskutknr ,frorrr Rmsim): Since thcrc arc no further names on the fist of speakers, I should like to speak in my capacity as representative of the UNION OF SOVlET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. 113. The Council has met urgently at this late hour in order to consider egafn the very dangerous situation which has arisen in Cyprus. The Geneva negotiations have failed. Military operations have resumed on the island, and they have claimed further vicrfm(r 114. Despite the threo resolutions adopted by the Council on Cyprus, the situation in Cyprus has in no way improved, but, rather, has becomo even more complex. As the Soviet delc#ation has already pointed out at previous meetings of the Security Council, the Council, as a result of the actions of certain circles, has not only been unable thus far to ensure implementation of resolution 353 (19741, adopted 24 days ago. but is now facing a situation which requires the adoption of more resolute, more urgent and more effcctivo measures for the immediate implementation of all tho provisions of that resolution, which Is the basis both for putting an end to foreign military intcrvenlion in Cyprus and for a political settlement. Not a singlo one of the basic provisions of that resolution is being imptomcnted; the fighting has not only not ceased, it has resumed on an even broader scale. Foreign military intervention against a sovereign State. tho Republic of Cypnrs, which is a Member of the United Nations and a non-aligned country, is continuing and expanding, Not only have foreign forces not been withdrawn from the island, but their numbers are increasing. The military occupation of the territory of Cyprus is expanding. . 11% The lawfit Government of the Republic of Cypnts. headed by President Makarios, and all its institutions continue to be unable to function or to exercise full authority throughout the island. As has already been observed, the burning question continues to be whether or not tho Republic of Cyprus, tr Member of the United Nations, is an independent sovereign Stare, 118. As it once ugain considers the Cyprus question as an urgent matter rind under conditions in which hostilities have been resumed. tho Council must also take into account tho demands of the non-aligned States Mcmbcrn of the United Nations. They constitute the overwhelming mdority of the membership of the Organizalion. In the declaration adopted by those countries on 6 August, they appealed for the immediate and full implementation of resolution 353 (1974) und emphasized that “delay in the withdrawal from the Republic of Cyprus of all foreign military personnel poses a direct threat to international peace and security and to the sttkbility of the eastern Mediterranean region”. 119. Consequentfy, the withdrawal of foreign forces and military personnel from the territory of the Republic of Cyprus is the key to the solution of the problem bccuusc the implementation of this requirement can ensure peace, security and territorial integrity for Cyprus. This alone will ensure the maintenance of that coumry’y sovereignty, and the countries of the eastern Mediterranean region and atl those who cherish the cause of Cyprus and the cause of peace will then be able to live in peace without anxiety over the possibility of the outbreak of a new military conflict, the emergence of a new hotbed of war which might easily spread fur beyond the borders of that smut) island. I 16. Events confirm the correctness of the evaluation made in the statcmeht of the Soviet Government to the effect that certain NATO circles are trying to put nn end to tho existence of an independent Cyprus by means of direct military intervention. Thcsc circles arc making the independent statehood and territoriat integrity of Cyprus an object of cynicat bargaining for the purpose of strengthening their military and strategic positions in the eastern Mediterranean. Events have shown that they are trying to present the world with a fait accompli in the purtitioning of Cyprus. 120. The Security Council must urgently put an end lo all outside intcrfercnce in the internal affuirs of Cyprus and ensure tho immediate withdrawal of ntl foreign forces from the islund. 117, The States which are perpetrating military intervention against the sovereign Republic of Cyprus have not only litiled to hecil the rppcnl~ of the 121. To&y in the Security Council WC arc ell witnesses to the fuilurc of the two Geneva confcrenccs concerning Cyprus. No mutter how many uttcmpts ure “Any decision which was not in conformity with the Interests of the Cypriot people could only ICAd to further aggravation of the situation and to fresh conflicts.” [g///JW.l 122, I do not think that anyone here today would dare to dispute this statement. The collapse of the Clcnava negotiations is the direct result of attempts to solve the Cyprus question within the narrow circle of NATO, That approach proved to bc completely Ill-founded. It is contrary to the interests of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of cypnls. 123. The second reason for the falIurc of the Geneva negotiations is the disregard for the demands of all peace-loving States that all measures be taken immediately for the implementation of resolution 3S3 (1974) in its entirety. Now we have to observe once again that, not only has time been lost, but it has also become necessary to enlist the assistance of the Security Council, which should actively intervene in the prevailing situation and attempt finally to achieve immediate implementation of resolution 353 (1974). 124. We note with gnat satisfaction that today’s ~!iOlUtiOn. while not sufflCiCntly strong, WAS adopted by all IS members of the Council. This calls for A greater tale for the Council in settling the Cyprus question. The Council should take the settlement of this question into its own hands. Attcmpts.to deal with this matter within the narrow circle of NATOcountries have been a complete failure. In this conncxion, among other mcasurcs, it is urgently necessary and advisable to dispatch to Cyprus a mission composed of members of the Council: the Soviet Union continues to insist on this. More effective action on the part of the Council is also being demanded by the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations--the powcrRt1 group of non=aligned countries. The declaration of those countries, to which I have already rcferrcd. states: “The tragic situation of Cyprus is A grave warning to all non-aligned COUntfiCs and catis for their united action. The thrcnt to the independence And security of one non.nligncd country is u thrcut to the security of all of them.” This is absolutely true, However, this could huvc been avoided through the timely adoption of the mcasurcs proposed by those countries. including the mcusurct 12% In supporting the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus and the status of the Republic as A non-aligned State, the Soviet Union is guided by considerations of principle. These derive from the very essence of Soviet foreign policy-a policy of repulsing aggression and protecting the lawful rights of all pcopies, both great and small, a policy of peace and international detente. Those who are striving to maintain an independent Cyprus and to guarantee peace and security in that region can count on the understanding and co-operation of the Soviet Union. 126. The proposal by the Soviet Union-contained, AS you will recall. in its draft resolution iS///.tY/i-is still before the members of the Council. As proposed by the delegation of the Soviet Union, the Council should again consider the adoption of effective measures to guarantee the independence of Cyprus And the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces And military personnel present in Cyprus in ViOiatiOn of its sovereignty, independence And territorial integrity. 127. Although it voted for the resolution just adopted by the Council, because of the obvious need for its speedy adoption, the Soviet delegation wishes to state that it would have preferred a stronger resolution providing for more effective measures. The Soviet delegation said this also at today’s informal meeting of members of the Council. The Soviet Union firmly advocates Complete implementation of resolution 353 (1974): it favours immediate and complete impiementation of ell parts And provisions of that rcaolution. As has ‘already been stated and agreed. we rcscrvc the right to submit proposals along these lines at a later stage. 128. And now, AS PRESIDENT, I call on the representative of Cyprus.

I shall try not to take up too much of the Council’s time, but I must reply to certain statements made by the rcprcscntativc of Turkey. 130. When Turkey invaded Cyprus on 20 July, its Prime Minister issued a statement to the effect th:rt Its pUrFOsC WAS COmplctCly pcACCfUl. thut cvcryonu should keep quite calm because ifs only aim was to rc-catnblish the constitutionality of C‘ppru~. Of conr%C, 1 am not suying that WP bclicvcd thut rrultcment for a moment. But Ict us (rce whlrt wus the Jcg~cr of good faith of our neighbour Turkey in i\$uing that statement. It insisted that its conGcI.g+ UI*S ubovc 131. Yet, at the meeting of 10 August in Geneva, when the Greek Cypriots proposed that there should be a blcommunal Council of Ministers with proportionate rcprcscntation for the Turkish minority, the Turkish aide rcjcctcd that proposal. They rejected the proposal because they wanted a geographical division of the territory as a means towards partition, with nil the disastrous consequences that that would entail for the people of Cyprus. That shows the remarkably bad faith of Turkey. lit fact, it did not accept a return to constitutionality. In fact, it did not invade Cyprus with peaceful aims. On the contrary, its aim was the destruction of the independence of Cyprus, the destruction of the Treaty of Guarantee, the dcstmction of every treaty and every agrcemcnt cntcrcd into by Turkey in respect of Cyprus, It rcfuscd to comply with the first cease-fire and the second cease-fire. both of which it had accepted. Instead of beginning to withdraw its forces, it brought in even larger forces, until it now has about 40.000 men on. that little island: and it is constantly bringing in arms, tanks, and so on, for the purpose of carrying on a war against the people of Cyprus. And when I say “the people of Cyptus”, I mean all the people of Cyprus. for the Turkish Cypriots arc also suffering from this war. 135, Cyptus has followed a policy consistent with its principles, which arc the principles of the Charter. It has %llowed a policy which has always been constructive towards peace, towards world understanding and towards the progress of humanity in the right dircctlon, which is not war and which is not the use of force, but the very opposite of that-in other words, everything that is entailed in the concept of non-alignment. 136. The PRESIDENT ~trrrnslrtbn jhrnt Rttssiun): I call on the nprcsentative of Greece.

I am not going to take much of the Council’s time at this late hour. My Turkish colleague made several refercnccs to my 1 statement. I do not really think there is any need to answer him. His statements differ from mine because he has different policies from mine, and his position is well known to all members of the Council, just as my position is well known, 138. 1 shall confine myself to replying to what he said about the Geneva conference by quoting the following from a dispatch of Agcncc France Pressc dated today: 132. The real purpose of the war is the aggrandizcment of Turkey through a colonialist, imperialist policy in respect of Cyprus. That is the reality. 133, The ~rcprcsentativc of Turkey, in saying that Cyprus is not non-aligned. is entirely wrong. It is not for him to decide whethcror not Cyprus is non-aligned. It is non-aligned in its policy and it has been so all along in the United Nations. It is not the few oficcrs from Grcccc in the National Guard that dctcrminc anything bccausc the National Guard does not formulate the policy of Cyprus. “In Geneva it looked as though Turkey had decided to USC military methods in the diplomatic field”.‘ 139. I should like to refer to only one point in the statement of the representative of Turkey. In my statement I referred only incidentally to the 34 percent of the territory of Cyprus which Turkey is demanding for the autonomous part of Cyprus. In thinking of Cyprus, WC do not think in lcrms of percentages. Turkey of course does. Rut t did not quite understand the point he was making when he said that he is intercstcd in the Turkish populatlon of the i3land. Is he interested in terms of humon beings or in terms of real estate? 134. 1 believe we have had a discussion of the whole problem here. whcrcas what is nebdcd is to stop the fighting in Cyprus so that thcrc can bc cool discussion. It seems to mc that cool and cffcctive discussion is not possible in the Geneva confwcncc of the guarantors for obvious reasons wbch have been demonstrated hcrc and in Cyprus. Thcrcforc. we wish to have the United Nations more involved in this problem and in its solution. Conncqucntly, we would gladly set a mission from the United Nutions go to Cyprus. examine the situation and take a grcatcr intcrcst in the solution of the problem. Indeed, Cyprus is a Mcmbcr of the United Nations and ltr guamntce and protection is the United Nations it(rctf--the Security Council and the United Nations 140. The PRESIDENT (trctttslrtth frortt Rtrssktrtj: I call on the rcprcscntutive of Turkey. 141, Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): I shall bc very brief. In answer to the question put by my coflcaguc from Grcccc. I would say: both. 142. in answer to Mr. Rosnldcs, I would again request him to refrain. if possible. from speaking on behalf 143. The PRESIDENT ~trmsltrrlttn ,/htttr Rttssitrn): I call on the representative of Cyprus.

With respect to the statement made by the representative of Turkey that he does not permit me to speak on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots. I think he is not entitled to dictate who rcprcscnts the Turkish Cypriots, unless he claims that he rcprcscnts them. The Turkish Cypriots arc part of the island of Cyprus und I can speak on behalf of the bulk of the Turkish Cypriots but not on behalf of the agents of Turkey. I know that the bulk of the Turkish Cypriots have also suffered from these actions of Turkey. though obviously not to the same extent. 145. I should like to point out also that the rcprcscntativc of Turkey seems to dispute the accuracy of my statement. Does he dispute the bad faith of Turkey in speaking about constitutionality. pretending to support constitutionality. but rejecting anything that 146. The PRESIDENT ~trrrtr.drrlttn jhtr Rttssirtr): I call on the representative of Turkey.

I do. Tlw tttcvtitt~ R~SC crt 6 a.m. . .