S/PV.2026 Security Council

I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey in which they ask to be allowed to participate in the discussion of the question before the Council. In accordance with the provisions of Article 3 1 of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, I propose to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vole. At the invitution of the President, Mr0 Christophides (Cyprus) Mr. Papoulias (Greece] and Mr. Tiirkmen (Turkey) took places at the Council table.

I should also like to inform the Council that I have received from the representative of Turkey a letter transmitting another letter addressed to the President or the Council by Mr. Vedat Celik, in which he asked to bc allowed to speak in the course of the debate. I propose, if there arc no objections from members of the Council, to invite Mr. Celik to make a statement at the appropriate time, in accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rulesol’ procedure. It was so decided.

Before calling on the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, the first speaker on my list today-and it gives me pleasure to welcome him amongst us-1 should like to pay a tribute to Archbishop Makarios who died suddenly on 3 August last.

Mr. President, I wish to thank you first of all for your condolences on the loss of our President, Archbishop Makarios. 6. Since the Turkish aggression against Cyprus in July and August 1974 and the continued occupation of 40 per cent of its territory by the Turkish forces, the General Assembly and the Security Council have repeatedly dealt with the Cyprus problem. Both the Assembly and the Council have established the framework within which a just settlement of the problem should be reached. The Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 3212 (XXIX) and resolutions 3395, (XXX) and 31/12, on which only Turkey cast a negative vote. Among other resolutions, the Council adopted, also unanimously, resolution 365 (1974), by which it endorsed resolution 3212 (XXIX), and resolution 367 (1975), by which it established the process of negotiating procedure between the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in Cyprus-the Greek majority of 80 per cent, and the Turkish minority of 18 per cent. These and other resolutions called on al] states to respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, called for the cessation of all foreign interference and demanded the withdrawal of all foreign troops without delay and the urgent return of 7. Of all the provisions of the resolutions on Cyprus, Turkey has chosen to pay lip service only to the one which referred to the negotiations. The preference shown by Ankara for that provision has been dictated by ulterior motives. It has been trying to obscure the prime provisions of the resolutions which demand the withdrawal of its troops from Cyprus and the return of the refugees to their homes-.-provisions which Turkey chose to ignore-by claiming that such withdrawal and such return are subject to the outcome of the negotiations. The purpose of the negotiations, however, is clearly and unambiguously stated in the resolutions. The negotiations are concerned only with the internal aspects of the problem and not with the withdrawal ol‘ the foreign troops and the return of the refugees to their homes, which, in accordance with the resolutions, should precede and not follow the talks. For how could the people of Cyprus, of whatever origin, by themselves bring about the cessation of the aggression and occupation of their country by a foreign Power and in what way could they be expected to negotiate freely their future, with the presence of a powerful army of occupation on their territory and with the agonizing problem of 200,000 refugees’? 8. At the same time, Ankara-which dictates the Turkish Cypriot position in the negotiations-has never allowed a constructive and meaningful dialogue to develop. The aim is obvious: in that way, Turkey is enabled to consolidate its position in the occupied area by creating faits accomplis and to head off pressures for concessions by misleading the world into believing that it is genuinely seeking a solution to the Cyprus problem through the Cyprus problem through the intercommunal talks. 9. All talks and negotiations have so far, two and a half years after their commencement, demonstrably failed to comply with the essential requirements for negotiations under the relevant resolutions, and inevitably they havt produced no results, The only purpose they served was to assist Turkey in its efforts to cover up its faits accomplis by putting forward the pretence of not disturbing the talks. 10. Last February, a climate of some optimism regarding the solution of the problem was created following two meetings between the President of the Republic, the late Archbishop Makarios, and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Denktag. At their last meeting, held on 12 February in the presence of the Secretary-GeneraI, certain guidelines were agreed on, and this was considered at the time to mark a breakthrough in the intercommunal talks. It was agreed that the common objective was the creation of an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal federal state, where funda- 11. My Government had serious doubts at the time whether the Turkish Cypriot leader had agreed to the guidelines genuinely and in good faith or for tactical reasons, in an effort to neutralize the various pressures exerted on Turkey to show reasonableness and moderation in order to make progress in the talks possible. Nevertheless, the Greek Cypriot side, in its desire for such progress, took the far-reaching decision to submit at the Vienna talks a map providing for a bi-zonal solution of the territorial aspect of the problem. In this respect, I would remind the Council that the Turkish side had been alleging that the main obstacle to progress in the negotiations was the Greek Cypriot side’s refusal to accept a bi-zonal federation. The map was submitted, after assurances were received from Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, through third parties, that the Turkish Cypriot negotiator would respond positively to such a map and that he would give a clear indication of his side’s position on the territorial aspect. 12. The acceptance of a federal system and the decision to present a map at Vienna on the basis of a bi-zonal solution of the territorial aspect, were indeed great concessions on the part of the Greek Cypriot side. This good will and moderation, however, foundered on the Turkish intransigence. The Turkish Cypriot negotiator, in breach of the prior assurances given by Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, failed to give any indication of his side’s views on the territorial aspect of the problem. He stated: “I have not come to Vienna either to give anything back or to indicate what we intend to keep.” Furthermore, in violation of the agreed guidelines, which clearly speak of a federation within which the unity of the State would be safeguarded, his proposals on the constitutional aspect of the problem in fact provided for the creation of two separate, loosely connected States. At the most, the Turkish proposals aimed at a loose confederation. 13. The Turkish attitude in the talks proves, beyond any reasonable doubt, that Ankara-which, as I have already mentioned, dictates the Turkish Cypriot stand in those talks-is not genuinely interested in reaching a settlement through them. Since the adoption of resolution 367 (1975), which established a process of intercommunal negotiations, there have been several rounds of talks at Vienna and in New York. Yet, for one reason or another, under one 14. Ankara does not look for a just solution of the Cyprus problem through the intercommunal talks, but it does find convenient a semblance of negotiation, for it uses the . negotiating process as a smoke-screen to mislead world opinion, exploiting the intervening time for the creation of faits accomplis and the consolidation of the cle @to situation created by the use of force. 15. Since the commencement of the intercommunal talks, Ankara and its army of occupation, in close collaboration with the Turkish Cypriot leadership, its puppet, proceeded to an illegal declaration purporting to establish what it calls a “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” and to the introduction of a so-called constitution under which Greek-Cypriots are considered as aliens, wllile Turkish colonizers are considered as citizens, of the bogus “State”. 16. During the same period, the army of occupation, through tactics of deprivation, humiliation, harassment and physical violence, expelled from the area under its control almost the bulk of the Greek Cypriot population that had remained in the Karpas area following the second phase of the Turkish invasion in August 1974. Further to that, Ankara massively imported into the occupied area tens of thousands of settler-colonizers from Turkey and implanted them in Cyprus for permanent settlement. The houses, the lands, the shops, the factories, the hotels and all the belongings of the 200,000 Greek Cypriot refugees-one third of the population of Cyprus-who by force of arms are prevented from returning to their ancestral homes and lands, were distributed to the colonizers and to Turkish Cypriots from the south who were moved to the north, whether by persuasion or otherwise, in pursuit of Ankara’s political objectives. In addition, churches were looted and desecrated, archaeological treasures were either destroyed or sold abroad, and Greek names of towns, villages, streets and locations were replaced by Turkish names in an effort calculated to change artificially the age-old character of the area. It is also significant to mention that the postal address of the so-called “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” is Mersin, a province of Turkey, and that its currency is the Turkish lira and not the Cyprus pound. 17. Ankara’s sinister plans against Cyprus are becoming more and more manifest every day, Its plans are to wipe out any trace of Greek Cypriot presence in the occupied part of Cyprus, to partition the island and to annex, de facto, the occupied area, thus satisfying, for the present, its geopolitical objectives. All its illegal and inhuman actions arc motivated by this over-all objective, and no denials by Turkish officials or Turkish ambassadors can conceal Ankara’s real plans, for its actions speak lounder than its words. 18. Various tactics are employed by Ankara in the pursuit of these objectives. One of these tactics is the creation of faits accomplis, step by step, known as the “salami” tactic, 19. The Turkish Government’s decision to proceed to the colonization of the new town of Famagusta, as announced by the Turkish Premier, Mr. Ecevit, on 20 July 1977, and given tangible expression by an on-the-spot visit by the then Deputy Prei-Ger of Turkey, Mr. tiunes, has been the climax of the Turkish policy of faits accompIis and of Ankara’s contempt for and disregard of the United Nations resolutjons on Cyprus. This new Turkish provocative move, if allowed to proceed, can only be the coup & gr&c to the intercommunal talks. 20. It is a wc!.l established fact that the new town of Farnagusta-which did not fall within the planned Attila line but whose inhabitants fled in terror before the advancing Turkish tanks-was cordoned and scaled off by the Turkish army, following the second phase of the Turkish aggression in August 1974, and nobody was allowed to enter, on orders from the Turkish military commander. The general impression was justifiably created, and indeed cultivated by Ankara, that the new town of Famagusta would remain closed and be returned to its rightful inhabitants. 21. At the United Nations, it was the general expectation that this development would take place in November 1974 and, when this did not rnaterialize, that it would take place at the commencement of the intercommunal talks in 1975, as Ankara’s first step for the settlement of the Cyprus problem. Reversing this general understanding, the Turkish Premier, Mr. Ecevit, according to Reuters, stated on 20 July 1977, after a Cabinet meeting, that his “caretaker Government was starting preparations to revive the modern section of the Cypriot port city of Famagusta, which had been closed off since the Turkish intervention of 1974”. He further stated that “because the area was kept closed, the impression was given that Turkey had put it in a display window as a During the following days, the then Turkish Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Gunes, toured the new town of Famagusta and gave the green light for the coloni;ration and settlement of the city. This was yet another indication that all important decisions in the occupied area of Cyprus are taken by the Turkish Government in Ankara and not by the Turkish Cypriot leadership. 22. Since the return of Farnagusta to its rightful owners is one of the basic prerequisites for any agreed settlement of the Cyprus problem-and this is well known to the Turkish Government-the announced colonization of Famagusta and the commencement of this process lead to the indisputable conclusion that Turkey is not aspiring to a solution of the Cyprus problem through the talks. This move of Turkey’s gives serious reason to doubt whether Ankara ever realIy intended to make any concessions in the intercommunal talks and puts in serious question its sincerity towards those whom it had been assuring that it would eventually return the new city of Famagusta to its rightful owners. 23. Despite the assurances given in July by the Turkish Government, in response to representations made to Ankara, that it would not proceed with the colonisation of the cordoned-off city of Famagusta and that the decisions of the Ecevit Government were not binding on the new Turkish Government, the Turkish army in mid-August opened for settlement part of the cordoned-off city known as the Constantia area. The Greek Cypriot-owned Constantia hotel in the area was opened as a catering institute and plans were announced to populate, as from 1 September, 100 nearby apartments and adjoining shops. The Greek names and street signs within the Constantia area were removed and were replaced by Turkish names. Even more ominous is the fact that .I. F. Kennedy Avenue-and that is not a Greek name-the main thoroughfare of the new city of Famagusta, which is outside the Constantia area and stretches all along the entire length of the new city, has been renamed “Sanjar Pasha Kadesi”, and 20 street signs with this new name have been Fixed along the avenue. Furthermore, in recent weeks, Turkish workers have been observed within the enclosed new city busily engaged in repairing traffic lights and telephone booths, in an obvious effort to make the city ready to receive its new illegal occupants. 34. The foregoing information emanates from reliable sources on the basis of first-hand information, as well as from authoritatively reported statements made by Turkish and Turkish Cypriot officials. I am certain tha the United Nations Secretariat will be able to confirm the information if asked to report to the Council. 25. To enable the Council to assess better the ominous situation, I will quote from some of the statements to which I have referred and from certain press reports. 26. The Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Denktaa declared on 23 July 1977: “Varosha is within the Turkish Federated State. It CalnOt be left as a ghost town. it will be utilized by our According to another statement, made by Mr. Kotak, who calls himself “Minister of the Federated Turkish State of Cp-LlS”, “Plans for the colonization of Famagusta were made, and the relevant works begun, when Mr. Ecevit was in power (in 1974) and were completed during Mr. Irmak’s premiership. In the first phase, refugees were settled in the western neighbourhoods of the town.” Mr. Gunes stated on 24 July 1977: “While I was acting as the Turkish Government’s representative, we dealt mainly with the problem of Maras (Varosha).“-otherwise known as Famagusta-“The decision to open Maras to the people will now be implemented. . . . Everybody thought that the Maras quarter of Magosa (Famagusta) was outside the Turkish Cypriot sector. This erroneous conviction has probably changed during my visit.” The so-called Mayor of Famagusta, Mr. Bora Atun, said on 3 August 1977 that he “would continue to help the Turkish Federated State authorities in rehabilitating displaced Turkish Cypriots in Varosha”. 27. On 13 Atlgust 1977, it was published in the Istanbul daily Giimzydin that the new town of Varosha would be “opened to tourism and settlement in the forthcoming days”. The same newspaper reported on 17 August that the first out of eight sectors into which the new town of Famagusta had been divided by the authorities, namely, the one around the Constantia Hotel, was open to the public for settlement, and it said, “repair operations are speedily going on in the other sectors of the town”. The so-called Minister of Housing and Rehabilitation of the Turkish Federated State, as it is called, Mr. Naki Atun, confirmed on I8 August that Varosha had been divided into eight sectors and announced that the “town sector around the Constantia Hotel, including a loo-flat block, would be opened officially on 1 September 1977”--that is, tomorrow, 28. On 16 August 1977, the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. De&tag, addressing Turkish Cypriots and Turks at Famagusta, “emphasized the decisiveness prevailing in connexion with Famagusta and stated that Varosha is of equal importance to the Turkish Cypriot community as Kyrenid and Nicosia, and concluded by declaring that not even an inch of their territory will be given to the Greek Cypriot side”. 29. An extract from the 15 August 1977 edition of 772~ ~!hUZdUJ7 Times is also most revealing in this respect: I‘ . . * the Greek-owned Constantia Hotel, just south of the old walled city in Famagusta, was opened as a “In fact, the Denktaa administration started popuu lating Varosha a long time ago. Before the conflict, about 5,000 Turkish-Cypriots used to live in the old part of the city . . . “Bora Atun, the city’s , . . mayor, said Famagusta’s Turkish Cypriot population is now ‘around 25,000’. He said the majority lived on the outskirts of Varosha in formerly Greek homes. Around two-lifths of the town had thus been populated. The remainder, he said, was the row of hotels along the beach and the shopping and residential area behind it. “ . * . “The administration has divided Varosha into eight districts which, officials say, will be opened step by step”-the usual tactic of Turkey-“as repairs progress. The Constantia Hotel-cum-catering institute and its surroundings are the first step, they say.” 30. I have just received a cablegram containing a statement made by Mr. CIglayangil on 30 August-that is, yesterdayon the question of Famagusta. His statement reads: “It is inappropriate for the Greek Cypriots to request a special session of the United Nations Security Council with refercncc to the Maras Varosha district. It is difficult to guess at the purpose of the recourse to the Security Council in connexion with the Maras district of Cyprus, as there is no change other than the opening of the Constantia Hotel, undergoing repair for the past two years, as a school of hotel management. It is inappropriate for the Greek Cypriots to resort to the Security Council on this pretext.” But then it continues: “This is a district under the administration of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. This district is no different from other districts of the Turkish Federated State.” 3 1. Let me remind the Council in this respect that, from the very moment of its inception, the purported setting up of this bogus State which is recognized by no one was repudiated by the Council by its resolution 367 (1975) and was condemned by the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries. The implications of Mr. ($@ayangil’s statement are self-evident, in that it clearly implies that there is no intention not to proceed with the announced colonization. Turkey’s responsibility as occupying Power for Famagusta, as well as for the rest of the occupied area in Cyprus, is evident, as also are its intentions to proceed whenever it deems proper with the colonization of the new city of Famagusta. 32. It is in the light of the ominous developments to which I have referred that my Government has asked for an emergency meeting of the Security Council, in the expectation that the Council will take prompt and effective “The Secretary-General is concerned at the statement made by Mr. Ecevit, while still Prime Minister, concerning proposed steps in relation to Varosha. Such steps, if implemented, would certainly create a serious situation and would have a negative effect on the future of the negotiating process.” 33. Before deciding urgently to raise this issue before the Security Council, my Government had exhausted all available diplomatic means to save the city of Famagusta from the threat of colonization. My Government resorted to the Council only after it became abundantly clear, on the basis of the available evidence, that the gradual but systematic colonization of Famagusta had commenced and after repeated representations to Ankara failed to produce the intended results. 34. In all candour and seriousness, I must give a solemn warning that the threatened colonization of Famagusta, if allowed to proceed, will deal a mortal blow to the prospects for a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem. The fact that the area at issue is not so large in size--although, of course, in this area 50,000 people live-and that no actual fighting is involved must not be allowed to obscure the grim situation which will amount to the extension and accentuation of the existing aggression, in flagrant violation of international law, the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the European Convention on Human Rights-to which both Turkey and Cyprus and signatories-and the Helsinki Conference Final Act. Indeed, this situation presents striking similarities to and involves the same issues and principles as, on the one hand, the process of bantustanization in South Africa and, on the other, the settlements in another area under foreign occupation in the immediate vicinity of my own country, which justifiably evoke strong protests and condemnations on the part of many countries and in many organs of the United Nations and elsewhere. 35. It is my submission that this body has both the right and the obligation to take effective measures to see that its own resolutions and respected and implemented and to ensure that the situation is not allowed to deteriorate fufiher and result in a breach of peace in Cyprus and in the region, The situation in Cyprus is very critical and fraught with grave dangers for peace in the whole region. The Cyprus Government believes that there is no room for further delay in the implementation of General Assembly resolutions 3212 (XXIX), 3395 (XXX) and 31/12 and of Security Council resolution 367 (1975) if peace in Cyprus is to be secured, 36. If further tolerance of the illegal and arbitrary Turkish actions is shown, this will complicate the problem to the extent that it will become insoluble, with dire consequences to peace and security in the whole area. Preventive’ “Expr’esscs tk hope that the Security Council will consider appropriate steps for the implementation of its resolution 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974”. 37. My Government therefore appeals to the Security Council urgently to discharge its responsibilities under the Charter and adopt such effective measures as are warranted by the situation which would, first, reverse the process of colontiation of the new city of Famagusta and, secondly, cnsurc the immediate and effective implementation of the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus, and particularly those provisions Which call upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, call for the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs and demand the withdrawal from Cyprus of all foreign troops and the return of the refugees to their homes under conditions of safety. 38. It is only through such effective action, both with regard to the broader aspects of the problem of Cyprus and more specifically with reagdrd to the immediate issue raised by the Famagusta situation, that the Council, as the guardian of international peace and security, will have met its responsibilities. The wronged pcoplc of Cyprus are anxiously waiting.

The next speaker is the representative of Greece on whom I now call.

Mr. President, allow me to extend to you my delegation’s warmest congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council. Your eminent qualities, your prestige and your great experience in United Nations affairs are for LIS a guarantee that you wilI conduct the debate successfully. My delegation and I are happy to see the representative of France, a great country with which Greece has historical ties of close and deep friendship, presiding over the Council. I should also like to thank the Council for having allowed me to participate in the discussion. 41. Addressing ourselves to the delegation of Cyprus, we should like to pay a tribute to the memory of the first President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, whose loss has been felt by the entire international community. 48. Unfortunately, that is the intolerable situation in Cyprus. As if that situation were not already intolerable enough, the President, of the caretaker Government of Turkey, Mr. Ecevit, stated on 20 July this year: 42. The Council is meeting just two months after the series of meetings in June this year, during which the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus was rencwed by resolution 410 (1977). It has been necessary for the Council to convene again at such short 43. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, Mr. Christophides, just submitted to the Council-and in a very convincing manner by providing specific proof-the reasons which have prompted the Government of Cyprus to have recourse to the Council. On behalf of my Government, I should like to state that this request is fully endorsed by Greece. 44. I shall not repeat what has already been said so eloquently by Mr. Christophides. I would nevertheless beg the Council’s indulgence, for I must draw its attention to the alarming situation created by the Turkish attempt to confront LIS with a new fait accompli by colonizing the town of Famagusta. 45. Indeed, we are forced to note that three years after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, which resulted in the military occupation of 40 per cent of the territory of the Republic and the creation of an enormous problem of refugees whose numbers exceed 200,000, Turkey, instead of abiding by the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions has, first, stepped up its violations of international law and human rights and its aggression against the non-aligned Republic of Cyprus, secondly, deliberately placed new obstacles in the way of negotiations and peace and, thirdly, exacerbated the Cyprus crisis, which, as recognized by General Assembly resoiution 3 l/l 2, is endangering international peace and security. 46. I shall deal briefly with these three points. 47. There is no need to enter into a lengthy explanation as to why Turkey’s actions in the occupied zone of the island run counter to international law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The expulsion by terror of the inhabitants from their ancestral homes and the seizure of their property re in themselves a grave breach of the provisions of the Charter and the norms and principles of the international community. These acts run counter to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of civilians in Time of War. They are also in flagrant violation of the specific provisions of paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 3395 (XXX), which requests the parties to refrain from all unilateral actions, including changes in the demographic structure of Cyprus. “My caretaker Government is starting preparations to revive the modern section of the Cypriot port city of Famagusta, which has been closed off since the Turkish intervention of 1974. Because the area was kept closed, 49. Later, the present Government of Turkey, continuing to employ the “salami” tactic, began to occupy buildings in the city and to rename streets, starting with J. F. Kennedy Avenue which became General Sanjar Avenue. Moreover, statements were made to the effect that the systematic colonization of the city would begin on 1 September. We are truly astonished at the ease with which the Turkish side feels free to appropriate enormous Greek Cypriot investments and the properties which housed and provided a living for a Greek Cypriot population of approximately 50,000-that is, a quarter of the present number of refugees-just as if there were no international order, just as if property rights were not recognized, just as if the military force of the occupier could replace all notion of legality. One would think that we were living not in the world that the Charter of the United Nations wished to ensure for all peoples but in the dark ages of the past. 50. This brings me to my second point: the effect of the Turkish actions on community negotiations. It would be no exaggeration to say that that effect could truly be wholly disastrous. It is well known that the intercommunal negotiations on the problem of Cyprus should lead, inter da, to a settlement of the basic question concerning the territorial aspect, which is linked to the return of the refugees to their homes. The five rounds of intercommunal negotiations held at Vienna since April 1975 under the auspices of the Secretary-General, and the new series of intecommunal negotiations which took place between 31 March and 7 April last, are nothing more than an effort to encourage the Turkish side to inter into serious negoliations on the territorial aspect of the island-something which the Turkish side has always avoided doing, under various pretexts that are well known to the Council. 51. Instead, the occupying Power has tried to perpetuate the faits accomplis in Cyprus and to create, by delaying tactics, so-called irreversible situations. The fate of the sealed-off town of Famagusta represents a cardinal element in the intercommunal negotiations. In colonizing Famagusta, the Turkish side would only be expressing its will to deprive from the outset these negotiations of any meaning and to render any future dialogue pointless. The Secretary-GeneEd himself immediately recognized the danger of the Turkish action in this statement made on his behalf on 22 July: “The Secretary-General is concerned at the statement made by Mr. Ecevit, while still Prime Minister, concerning proposed steps in relation to Varosha. Such steps, if implemented, would certainly create a serious situation and would have a negative effect on the future of the negotiating process.“’ 52. We really wonder if the Turkish side is not trying to Set up insurmountable obstacles to intercommunal negotiations in order to make them impossible. For our part, we 1 Quoted in Euglish by the spcakcr. 53. Rut it would be a grave mistake if we believed that a solution could be imposed on Cyprus by force and by the presence of a foreign army of occupation and the intecnational community made to accept a situation that would be in flagrant contradiction to the principles of the Charter, particularly that which stipulates the non-admissibility of the acquistion of territory by force, as well as of the principles of the Helsinki Declaration. That could mean postponing indefinitely the settlement of the question of Cyprus and making even more acute a situation that United Nations resoIutions already consider as endangering internationa1 peace and security. In order to avoid this eventually, we trust that the Council will condemn any attempt at the colonization of Famagusta, or of the rest of the militaryoccupied zone of Cyprus and that it wilt demand, in taking the necessary steps, that the Turkish Government-since it is that Government that is responsible for the future of the occupied territory--should desist from any action of this kind and abide by the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, with a view to achieving a peaceful settlement of the problem.

The next speaker is Mr. Vedat Cclik, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement. 55. Mr. CELIK: Mr. President, I should like to thank you and every member of the Council for having given me the opportunity today to present to the Council the views of the Turkish Cypriot side on the issues that we are now discussing. 56. WC have just heard two fairly lengthy statements by the Greek Cypriot representative and the representative of Greece regarding what they consider to be the prevailing situation in the island. Under the circumstances, it leaves me with two alternatives: either to make a lengthy statement, taking up each and every issue that they have raised and presenting in &tail the true facts in each cast, or to confine myself to a brief presentation of the realities as they exist in Cyprus, giving the Council an opportunity to make a sound appraisal or what the actual situation on the island is today. 57. In view of the fact that at previous meetings of the Council and of the General Assembly we have always listened to the two representatives saying the same things and making the same unfounded allegations, and considering that we have answered each and every allegation made, I intend now to take the second alternative and to be as brief as possible. 59. We are no doubt all aware that there is no fighting in Cyprus. There has not been any fighting there for over two years now, and the fact that there is substantial stabilization with regard to the security situation has been confirmed by the last report of the Secretary-General /S/12342/ of 7 June 1977, as well as by a Security Council resolution, resolution 410 (1977) of 15 June last. There is no danger to lift, there is no threat to peace in the region, nor has there been any advance or movement foward by the Turkish Cypriot armed forces. llence, there can be no question of a change of the status qtlo aMe. Why therefore was it deemed necessary to call this meeting of the Council’? 60. The answer to this question may, I think, be best perceived from a recent policy statement made by the acting Greek Cypriot leader, Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, on 20 August 1977. During an interview with the French News Agency, he said: “Our target is to keep our problem always in the focus of international attention and to secure the exertion of maximum pressure on Turkey”. That was a confirmation of his earlier statement, made during a speech he gave at Nicosia on 22 June 1977, that “The Cyprus problem must remain alive in the conscience of the people and arouse international interests”. 61. Therefore the ulterior motive of the Greek Cypriots in calling a meeting of the Security Council is quite clear. Evidently the present recourse has been prompted by internal political considerations. It is, however, unfortunate that the long-term interests of Cyprus as a whole arc being sacrificed by the Greek Cypriot leaders for short-term personal political gains. 62. Apparently the pretext for this meeting is the implementation of the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus and the alleged mass colonization of Maras, otherwise known as Varosha, a town situated wholly within the borders of the Turkish Federated State and under our jurisdiction. 63. It is not the first time that the Greek Cypriot representative has brought up the question of the implementation of past resolutions. Our views and position on this subject have already been amply put on record on various occasions in the past. I have no intention, therefore, of repeating in detail what I have said earlier and put on record. It suffices here merely to restate that these resolutions were adopted in our absence without a fair hearing being given to the Turkish Cypriot side, and in most cases they cannot, therefore, reflect the true situation on the island. Many of them have been affected, amended or rcndercd obsolete by subsequent developments in Cyprus as well as by the agreements mutually accepted during the . . 65. The Turkish Cypriot side has always been and Still iS in favour of the intcrcommunal talks. We hope that, despite recent developmeld in the south which have caused a temporary interrUpti in the negotiating process, it will be possible for the talks to resume on a mutually agreed date in the near future, and it is our ardent hope that this time they may be more constructive and fruitful. 66. It is interesting that my distinguished colleague from the south, Mr. Christophides, hardly dwelt on this issue today; maybe he knowns and appreciates that even the present recourse to the Council is incompatible with the professed readiness to resume talks. Constant Greek Cypriot recourse to international forums, including the Security Council, is, as I have said, incompatible with, and does not create a climate suitable for, such negotiations. 67. It is also pertinent to note here that the continued imposition of economic blockades by the Greek Cypriot administration against the Turkish Cypriot community and the inflammatory statements that are being made by its leaders have not helped the creation or a climate suitable for normalization. Furthermore, our proposals aimed al bringing the two communities together and encouraging co-operation between the two administrations, such as the establishment of a joint transitional government and our offers to tun some common services jointly, have all unfortunately been rejected by the Greek side. 68. As regards hllaras, or Varosha, we completely fail to understand why the Greek Cypriot side has chosen to create such a clamour over this issue. The fact is that Maras is situated within the borders of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and is subject to the exclusive control and jurisdiction of the Turkish Cypriot authorities. Our rights over this area cannot be made the subject of bargaining with the Greek Cypriot side. Nevertheless, I should at this point and in these circumstances like to inform the Cout~cil that there is no “mass colonization” or resettlement of Maras in progress, as has been claimed by the Greek Cypriot representative and on which this present recourse is based. 69. The use of one single hotel building in the north of the area as a catering institute, preparations for which began more than two years ago, and the allocation of various houses and apartments in the vicinity to the staff and pupils of the institute should not warrant an e,mcrgency meeting of the Security Council. The Greek Cypriots must realise that the Cyprus problem cannot be solved by undue recourse to the United Nations and to other international forums every now and then. The Cyprus problem can best be solved through meaningful negotiations between the two communities. 70. As I have already stated, the Turkish Cypriot side is always ready and willing to start negotiations with a view to finding a realistic solution. A realistic solution would be one which recognized for the Turkish Cypriot community, the suffering party until now, rights equal to those of the Greek Cypriots; it would be a solution that would ensure 71. The Way towards a SOhtion will inevitably be long alld arduous. However, with patience and perseverance, there is no reason WhY a mutually acceptable solution cannot be found for QPIUS in the near future, 72. I regret to =Y that the statement the Council heard just now from Mr. Cluistophides does not leave much room for optimism, because at this late hour he stjll prefers to refer to “1tli~lOrititX” and “n~ajorities” in Cyprus, and he still tries t0 rClJreSent the Cyprus problem as one between Ckk CYPWS and Turkey. The Cyprus problem is an hmmnu~a~ problem, and it can be solved only through negotiations on an equal footing between the two cornmunitics.

The next speaker is the representative of Turkey, on whom I now call.

Mr. President, first of all I wish to say that it is a great privilege for me to take part in a meeting of the Security Council presided over by you. Your diplomatic experience and skills are widely appreciated and I am sure that under your wise guidance the Council will be able to conclude its deliberations in a way that will not hinder but, on the contrary, enhance the possibilities of substantial and productive negotiations between the two communities in Cyprus. 75. I must say that I deeply regret the statement made by my colleague the representative of Greece. He is indeed ill-advised to refer to violations of human rights by Turkey or to give lessons on civilized behaviour. It is already a historical &ct that the main culprit in the continuing tragedy of Cyprus is Greece itself. The record of Greecefull of violence, military invasions and aggressions, hits accomplis, attempted murders and untold intrigues against Cyprus-should have restrained the representative of Greece. 76. 1 must say that the Greek Cypriot request for an urgent meeting of the Security Council is, to say the least, puzzling. The Council discussed the situation in Cyprus in detail only two and a half months ago. It did so on the basis of the report of the Secretary-General, who pointed out that the island enjoyed quiet and calm. This is what the Secretary-General said in his report: “The situation in Cyprus was quiet during the period under review, especially since the meetings between the leaders of the two communities that were held on 27 January in the presence of my Special Representative and on 12 February 1977 under my personal auspices. Thus, three years arter the events of 1974, a substantial trend towards stabiljzation of the security situation has developed and is being maintained.” /S/12342, Par@. 51.1 77. one may ask what has happened since 15 June to justify a request for an urgent meeting of the Council. The answer is “nothing”. The island continues to enjoy unprecedellted calm and tranquillity. The only imPortant event that marked that period was the death of ArchbIshop 78. It is easy to convene a meeting of the Security Council, but it will be very hard to prove that there has been a serious deterioration of the situation in the island. As a matter of fact, the only evidence that the Greek CYPrjotS have been able to muster is the decision by the authorities of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus to use an old hotel in the south of Famagusta as a centre for hotel management. In putting forward such an incredible com- Plaint they seem to forget that the north of the island is under the control and administration of the Turkish Cypriot community and the south under that of the Greek Cypriot community They do not seem to understand and realize that whatever the Turkish community Is doing in the area under its control is none of their concern. 79. So far as Turkey is concerned, our position has been formulated in a statement by our Foreign Minister which has already been quoted by the representative of the Greek Cypriot community, Mr. Christophides. I do not see how he can take issue with that statement. He objects to the statement to the effect that the area is under the control and administration of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and is in no way different from the other areas under the control of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. That is a fact, and the Foreign Minister could have said nothing else in this respect. I should have thought that Mr. Christophides’ attention would rather have been focused on what Mr. Caglayangil said before that sentence when he pointed out that there had been no changes in the area except for the opening of the Constantia Hotel, which has been undergoing repairs for the last two years, as a catering institute. 80. Despite the preposterous and ludicrous nature of the Greek Cypriot allegations, the Turkish community, in its desire to prevent a new obstacle to a resumption of the intercommunal talks, has acted with the utmost restraint and moderation, The representative of the Turkish Cypriot community, the Minister in charge of foreign affairs in the Government of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, has just explained that there is no resettlement or rehabilitation in progress in the tourist complex in the Maras region. His willingness to gjve information in this respect, despite the gross interference In the internal affairs of the Turkish community by the Greek community, is new proof of the dedication of the Turkish Federated State of CYpms to the search for a peaceful settlement. Indeed, Mr. Celik ho reiterated that the Turkish community was firmly supporting the mission of good offices entrusted to the Secretary-General and was ready for a resumption of the intercommunal talks on a date to be agreed upon by both communities. The Turkish Government will COntinUC to support fully the mission of the Secretary-General witllin its present framework, We earnestly hope that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General at Nicosia will be able to pave the way for substantive progress in the next round of talks. The meetirzg rose at 12.55 p. m. HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva. COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES Les publications des Nations Unies sont en vente dans les librairies et les agences depositaims du monde entier. Informer-vous aupr& de votre libraire ou adressex-vow R : Nations Unies. Section des ventes. New York ou Geneve. ICAIC IIOJIY’lRTh HBAANMR OPI’AHH 3AlWiM OB%EAIIHEHHhIX HAI&MH COMO CONSECUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas estin en venta en librerfas y casas distribuidoras en todas partes de1 mundo. Consulte a su librero o dirijase a: Naciones Unidas. Section de Ventas. Nueva York o Ginebra.