S/PV.7758 Security Council

In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Germany, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey and Viet Nam to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Emmanuel Roux, Special Representative of INTERPOL to the United Nations; Mr. Gregory Koblentz, Associate Professor and Director of the Biodefence Graduate Programme of George Mason University; and Mr. Kim Won-soo, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following to participate in this meeting: His Excellency Mr. Ioannis Vrailas, Chargé d’affaires ad interim of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations; His Excellency Mr. Ahmed Fathalla, Permanent Observer for the League of Arab States to the United Nations; and His Excellency Mr. Gonzalo Koncke, Permanent Observer of the Organization of American States to the United Nations. I propose that the Council invite the Permanent Observer of the Observer State of the Holy See to the United Nations to participate in this meeting, in accordance with the provisional rules of procedure and the previous practice in this regard. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2016/712, which contains the text of a letter dated 15 August 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting a concept note on the item under consideration. I wish to warmly the Secretary-General, His Excellency Mr. Ban Ki Moon, and give him the floor.

I thank you, Sir, for hosting this debate today. The elimination of all weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) is one of the most important obligations entrusted to the international community. We can take some comfort from our success in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The multilateral infrastructure, including the load-bearing pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and instruments including resolution 1540 (2004), is robust and tested. However, at a time when we face greater dangers than ever, the disarmament agenda has stalled in several areas. I call on all States to focus on one overriding truth  — the only sure way to prevent the human, environmental and existential destruction that these weapons can cause is by eradicating them once and for all. To attain that shared dream, we, the international community, must ensure that the disarmament and non-proliferation framework is universally and completed implemented, and is resilient and versatile enough to grapple with a changing environment. The elimanation of weapons of mass destruction is one of the founding principles of the United Nations. It was the subject of the first General Assembly resolution. It has been a top priority for me. In 2008, just one year into my tenure as Secretary-General, I released my five-point proposal to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons in the hope that it would spur further action by the international community. Eight years have passed, but the need for urgent action has not diminished. The Council has also played its part. In 2009, it convened a historic summit on non-proliferation (see S/PV.6191). In adopting resolution 1887 (2009), Council members emphasized the Council’s primary responsibility to address nuclear threats and its willingness to take action. But we are all aware that challenges to the disarmament and non-proliferation architectures are growing. The global strategic context is more fluid and dangerous than ever. Technological advances have made the means of production and methods of delivery of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials cheaper, easier and more accessible. Vicious non-State actors that target civilians for carnage are actively seeking chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. It is therefore particularly disappointing that progress on eliminating nuclear weapons has descended into fractious deadlock. We see the reappearance of some of the discredited arguments that were used to justify nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Those arguments were morally, politically and practically wrong 30 years ago, and they are wrong now. In this environment, the global community expects the Council to demonstrate the same leadership as it did in 2009. To build on resolution 1887 (2009) and to develop further initiatives to bring about a world free of weapons of mass destruction. It is time to refocus seriously on nuclear disarmament. The outcome of the Open-ended Working Group on Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations demonstrated that there are many possible approaches to this task. While more needs to be done to bridge the divide within the international community, I am encouraged that all States agree that our collective efforts must complement and strengthen the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, including the NPT. The next review cycle of the NPT — the only treaty-based commitment to nuclear disarmament  — will begin in May 2017. For nearly five decades, the Treaty has been a bulwark against nuclear proliferation. I call on all to address the issues that plagued the 2015 Review Conference in a spirit of compromise, with full respect for agreed objectives, common values and core principles. Moving on to biological weapons, in the wake of the very serious outbreaks of Ebola, MERS and yellow fever, I am extremely concerned that the international community is not adequately prepared to prevent or respond to a biological attack. The impact and consequences of a biological attack on a civilian target could far exceed those of a chemical or radiological attack, but investment in the international architecture dealing with these different types of WMDs is not commensurate with their possible effects. For example, there is no multilateral prevention and verification agency for biological weapons, as there is for nuclear and chemical threats and risks. States parties to the Biological Weapons Convention have an opportunity to discuss how to enhance preparedness at the BWC Review Conference in November. I also call on the Council to consider how to strengthen resolution 1540 (2004) to ensure that non-State actors cannot acquire these horrific weapons. For 12 years, the resolution has tried to provide a barrier to the threat and risk of WMDs being use by non-State actors, which is a very real threat. The comprehensive review mandated by resolution 1977 (2011) provides an opportunity to fine-tune resolution 1540 (2004). I urge the Council to use today’s meeting to be proactive in ensuring that the resolution continues to be fit for purpose. I will now say a few words about new global threats emerging from the misuse of science and technology, and the power of globalization. Information and communication technologies, artificial intelligence, 3-D printing and synthetic biology will bring profound changes to our everyday lives and benefits to millions of people. However, their potential for misuse could also bring destruction. The nexus between these emerging technologies and WMDs needs close examination and action. As a starting point, the international community must step up to expand common ground for the peaceful use of cyberspace, and particularly the intersection between cyberspace and critical infrastructure. People now live a significant portion of their lives online. They must be protected from online attacks, just as effectively as they are protected from physical attacks. Disarmament and non-proliferation instruments are only as successful as Member States’ capacity to implement them. I encourage Council members to use this debate to devise effective solutions so that all States can fully implement their disarmament and non-proliferation commitments. Throughout my tenure as Secretary-General, the elimination of weapons of mass destruction has been an urgent priority. I urge all Member States to recommit themselves to taking action. The stakes are simply too high too ignore. I wish the Security Council a fruitful debate.

I thank the Secretary-General for his statement. I now give the floor to Mr. Roux. Mr. Roux: On behalf of INTERPOL, I would like to commend Malaysia for convening this timely high-level debate on the challenges in addressing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I would also like to thank the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), with Spain as its Chair, and its Group of Experts for their continued efforts to tackle this important issue and for cooperating so closely with INTERPOL. The possible use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials by terrorist groups, criminals and other non-State actors has become one of the most significant challenges for national Governments in ensuring the safety of their citizens, as well as their national security. Organizations such as Al-Qaida, Aum Shinrikyo and other extremist groups have in the past expressly announced their intention, backed by real attempts, to develop, acquire and deploy weapons of mass destruction against civilian populations. Several emerging dynamics have made the threat more imminent than ever. I shall cite three. First, the complex architecture of today’s terrorist organizations and their methods of operation in a globalized world have a direct impact on the CBRN threat. The increasing cross-border movement of foreign terrorist fighters is allowing terrorist organizations to reach out to a wider range of recruits in a targeted fashion, giving them access to advanced CBRN expertise. We received a concrete indicator of this when a Da’esh laptop, owned by a Tunisian chemistry and physics student, was seized in Syria in August 2014. It contained a 19-page document on how to develop biological weapons, including bubonic plague, and also included instructions on how to test the weapons on mice. More recently, the Brussels attacks of March 2016 raised concerns when Belgian officials discovered that Da’esh operatives had been secretly videotaping one of the country’s senior nuclear scientists. The incident led to the evacuation of two nuclear power stations and the reinforcement of security at all others. Officials feared that Da’esh was working to breach Belgium’s nuclear security and would launch a dirty bomb to follow the Brussels airport bombing. Secondly, the accessibility of CBRN materials and technology is increasing as actors develop new combinations of materials and constantly discover new technological and scientific advances. Technology that was once perceived as sensitive military-grade expertise is now becoming available to a broader audience. It is a matter of fact that, in the past few years, researchers have recreated a number of viruses in the laboratory, including SARS-like viruses, prompting fears that terrorist organizations might exploit the same technique to synthesize more deadly viral agents as biological weapons. Also to blame in making CBRN materials more accessible is the complexity of controlling the transfer and use of dual-use CBRN materials. For example, chlorine, a basic chemical freely available in legitimate markets and most commonly used in water treatment facilities, is currently a common additive that terrorist actors mix with classic explosives in the Middle East and South-East Asia. A recent home search of the suicide attacker who detonated a bomb outside a bar in Ansbach, Germany, on 24 July revealed sophisticated bomb-making materials and chemicals, possibly meant for another deadly attack. Thirdly, CBRN attacks have cross-border impacts with global implications. These broad impacts make the prevention and containment of CBRN attacks almost impossible for one agency, one ministry or one country to manage alone. The lack of coordination among relevant stakeholders creates loopholes that could be exploited by terrorists to carry out successful attacks and maximize the number of casualties. In 2010, in response to the growing concern over the illicit trafficking of CBRN materials, INTERPOL launched a comprehensive CBRN terrorism prevention and response effort to support its 190 member countries. This decision was unanimously endorsed by the INTERPOL General Assembly in Hanoi, leading to the establishment of a specialized unit on CBRN threats within INTERPOL’s Counter-Terrorism Directorate. In accordance with INTERPOL’s mandate and Constitution, we focus exclusively on threats from non-State actors. This encompasses not only terrorist groups, lone wolves and other criminals, but also includes those individuals that traffic in CBRN materials across borders. Suppliers, middlemen, buyers and smuggling networks all fall within this spectrum. Our CBRN activities are fully integrated within INTERPOL’s newly released counter-terrorism strategy covering the years 2016 to 2020. INTERPOL’s activities range from data analysis, multi-agency capacity-building and training workshops to regional cross-border field operations. One specific example of these analysis activities is Project Geiger. Project Geiger collects information on cases of the illicit use of radiological and nuclear materials and analyses trends and risks of such attacks. As part of this effort, INTERPOL maintains a database of over 3,500 incidents collected through its secured channels. Since 2010, details on 44 suspects involved in nuclear trafficking have been shared through INTERPOL, including those convicted of trafficking in highly enriched uranium. Another example of our CBRN data analysis- related activities is Project Watchmaker, which focuses on chemical threats and targets individuals involved in their manufacture. It coordinates the exchange of technical data and the forensic signatures of bomb- makers. This information is then included in a specific database that currently contains over 1,000 bomb- maker profiles. Project Watchmaker has resulted in 749 INTERPOL Notices being issued, including 176 Red Notices, which are international arrest warrants, and 67 INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices, issued for individuals targeted by Security Council sanction committees. However, just sharing this information makes no difference if it is not accessible to authorities on the ground. Providing access to information to front-line law enforcement officers is the one of the key added values of INTERPOL. INTERPOL assists international law enforcement in tracking cross-border movements of individuals involved in the illicit trafficking of CBRN materials. It does so by giving national police agencies, including those at border points, direct access to INTERPOL’s databases and notices and designing and coordinating multi-agency cross-border operations. Let me offer only two brief examples of projects that encompass our multi-agency capacity-building, training and cross-border field operations. The first, INTERPOL’s Chemical Anti-Smuggling Enforcement (CHASE) Operation, is a model of global efforts to counter international smuggling of chemicals used to manufacture chemical and explosive devices. It increases the capacity of police, customs, border, immigration and security agencies to work together. In a practical application of the skills developed through the CHASE training initiatives, INTERPOL coordinates cross-border multi-agency operations in the field. The second is Project Stop Trafficking of Nuclear Elements. It provides operational and technical resources to Member Countries in two ways: a capacity- building phase, to train law enforcement officers in the necessary skills, including evidence collection, investigation, and prevention; and an operational phase to help put those skills into practice in the field. This includes an international operation conducted at border points in which officers run checks against INTERPOL’s criminal databases. In the past few years, INTERPOL has become a key international partner in the implementation of the global strategy to counter the illicit trafficking of CBRN materials. INTERPOL has established close ties with its relevant international stakeholders — such as the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, EUROPOL and the European Union CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative, which includes the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute — as part of an inter-agency approach. We believe that consolidating partnerships through the establishment of legal frameworks and the implementation mechanisms is crucial to the sustainability of these integrated efforts. That is why resolution 1540 (2004) should continue to provide the umbrella under which initiatives are launched harmoniously and through which countries’ needs can be met by matching them to assistance providers. Given the global impacts of CBRN attacks, it is especially important that we ensure the proper implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) on both the national and regional levels. The global, multi-agency architecture to combat the threat of CBRN terrorism requires stronger shared political will. That is why I would like to especially thank Malaysia for convening this important meeting, which provides an excellent opportunity to foster political goodwill. This global response also requires intensified coordination among the relevant international stakeholders and increased financial support to initiate and implement projects with tangible and sustainable results. INTERPOL’s policing capabilities have proved to greatly benefit member countries, especially on the ground. Frameworks such as resolution 1540 (2004) play a crucial role in promoting better sharing of information regarding CBRN incidents through INTERPOL’s secure communications. Systematic and effective use of INTERPOL’s analytical and operational capabilities will certainly help intercept trafficked CBRN materials and prevent their use by criminals, terrorists and other non-State actors.

I thank Mr. Roux for his briefing. I now give the floor to Mr. Koblentz. Mr. Koblentz: I thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to provide a briefing on how advances in science, technology and international commerce are increasing the risk posed by the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons to non-State actors. Since resolution 1540 (2004) was adopted, in 2004, it has emerged as one of the most important tools the international community has to prevent the proliferation of CBRN weapons to non-State actors. Since 2004, however, there have been amazing advances in science and technology, including technological breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, robotics, 3D printing, autonomous vehicles, nanotechnology, gene editing and synthetic biology. Those advances have created unparalleled opportunities and capabilities to manipulate objects in the physical world and in cyberspace, and even our DNA. The combination of these emerging technologies led the World Economic Forum in 2015 to declare that we were at the beginning of a fourth industrial revolution. This new industrial revolution is characterized by its global scope, an exponential rate of innovation and the convergence of the chemical, biological, physical and digital worlds. This new industrial revolution has the potential to create huge benefits for productivity and for prosperity and to transform our systems of economics and governance. But the fourth industrial revolution has a dark side. The same scientific discoveries and technologies fuelling this new industrial revolution have the potential to be misused by non-State actors to cause harm. Klaus Schwab, Executive Chair of the World Economic Forum, warned: “As this process takes place and new technologies such as autonomous or biological weapons become easier to use, individuals and small groups will increasingly join States in being capable of causing mass harm. This new vulnerability will lead to new fears.” (The Fourth Industrial Revolution,” Foreign Affairs, December 2015) It would be far more preferable to predict how these emerging technologies could be misused and take steps ahead of time to mitigate these risks than to wait to respond after these new technologies are used to cause harm on a large scale. I submitted a paper that describes five advances in science and technology that increase the risk of CBRN- material weapons proliferating to non-State actors. I have time to discuss these developments only briefly this morning, so I will refer the Council to the full paper for more details. The first area of concern is unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). UAVs are no longer so expensive or sophisticated that they are restricted to a handful of States. Indeed, several terrorist groups, such as Hamas, Hizbullah and the Islamic State, already fly their own UAVs. The ability of UAVs to collect intelligence over highly secure facilities has proliferation risks. For example, in 2014, unidentified UAVs flew over reactors in France and Belgium for unknown purposes. Earlier this year, an unidentified UAV was seen flying over a United States Navy base that hosts several strategic- missile submarines. Future versions of UAVs could be turned into flying improvised explosive devices. These drone bombs could fly over ground-based defences and precisely target critical areas of nuclear facilities or sites that store toxic industrial chemicals. Finally, UAVs could one day be used to deliver weapons of mass destruction directly. While these commercially available UAVs are unlikely to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons, the low-speed, low-altitude, low- payload capacity of UAVs is well suited for delivering chemical and biological agents against civilian targets. Another emerging technology of concern is 3D printing, because 3D printers are machines that print physical objects layer by layer, using special inks made out of plastic or metal. Because 3D printing is highly automated, it takes much of the skill out of fabrication. The versatility of 3D printing has led to predictions that the market for this technology will reach $30 billion by 2022. As technology advances, more-capable machines are becoming more widely available to more people. Already, amateurs have used 3D printers to create plastic handguns that can be smuggled through X-ray detectors and into buildings and secure facilities. Scientists have used 3D printers to print micro-reactors that can synthesize chemicals on a small scale. 3D printers create new opportunities for non-State actors to engage in do-it-yourself proliferation. If they are unable to buy controlled items on their own, they may be able to print them themselves one day. Non-State actors such as terrorists or criminals interested in acquiring CBRN materials are increasingly turning to a special part of the Internet called the Dark Web. The Dark Web can be accessed only by using special encryption software that hides the location and identity of its user. The Dark Web hosts numerous markets that offer a range of illegal goods for sale, such as guns, drugs and even chemical and biological weapons. In 2014, the United States arrested two individuals who sold the toxins ricin and abrin to customers in North America, Europe and Asia. Ricin is a Schedule 1 chemical weapon under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The global reach and anonymity of the Dark Web provides non-State actors with new means of doing business to acquire dual-use equipment and materials. Most of these markets avoid traditional financial systems, and instead rely on digital currencies like bitcoin to conduct transactions. Such transactions are encrypted, which provides anonymity to both the buyer and seller. This poses special challenges to anti-money- laundering and counter-terrorism financing regulations. There is also a growing risk that non-State actors could use malicious software, or malware, to conduct cyberattacks on facilities that produce or store nuclear, biological or chemical materials. These non-State actors could be disgruntled insiders, hacktivists, criminals or terrorists. The widespread use of digital and automated industrial control systems in such facilities and their connection to the Internet create special and growing vulnerabilities. This year, the non-governmental organization Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) started including cybersecurity as one of the measures in its Nuclear Security Index, and the results were sobering. It found that 20 countries that possessed weapon-usable nuclear material or that had nuclear power plants did not meet even the most basic requirements of cybersecurity. We should not just be one click away from a cyber- Chernobyl. Finally, the last area of scientific knowledge I want to discuss is that of gene editing, a relatively new development in the field of the life sciences. In 2013, scientists created a powerful new tool for genetic engineering called CRISPR, for clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats. CRISPR allows scientists to modify the genome for practically any organism more precisely, more cheaply and more reliably than ever before. The versatility and ease of use of this tool has given rise to the term “gene editing”. Gene editing is poised to make great contributions to human health. But at the same time, the United States Director of National Intelligence has warned that the deliberate or unintentional misuse of this technology could have grave economic or national security implications. Although these technologies differ greatly in many respects, they share seven key characteristics that pose a special challenge to the implementation of the objectives of resolution 1540 (2004). First, these technologies have dual uses; they can be used either for peaceful or for harmful purposes. Secondly, these technologies are disruptive. They are powerful enough to be able to transform entire industries, economies and fields of science. Due to those two characteristics, these technologies are highly sought after by non-governmental organizations, corporations and Governments for their scientific, commercial and humanitarian applications. The third feature of these technologies is that of diffusion. Thanks to advances in international commerce, new technologies can now be diffused faster and farther afield than ever before. The fourth feature is that all these technologies rely to some degree on a digital component that makes controlling them even more difficult. For example, 3D printers use a digital blueprint called a “build file” to programme the machine on what to produce. Such files take up less space on a computer than a typical television episode, which means they are easily transferable via the Internet, email and other means of communication. The fifth feature is that of decentralization. Decentralization means there has been a shift in the global distribution of scientific innovation and industrial capacity. No longer is that concentrated in the West; it is now more widely distributed to a more diverse group of nations around the world. The sixth feature is deskilling. The level of expertise needed to utilize these technologies has been reduced, making them more widely available and more accessible to a larger group than ever before. The seventh characteristic is the rise of the do- it-yourself (DIY) movement. These are amateur innovators who use open-source platforms to build virtual communities dedicated to create an application of those new technologies. There are vibrant transnational DIY movements devoted to UAVs, 3D printing and synthetic biology. The combination of those seven characteristics is what makes it such a challenge to prevent these emerging technologies from being misused by non-State actors. Despite the potential for these advances in science and technology to increase the risks of the proliferation to non-State actors, we should also keep in mind that they also provide opportunities for mitigating those risks and preventing them from occurring. Unmanned aerial and ground vehicles can be used to detect CBRN weapons, for border security and for bomb disposal. Biometrics and radio-frequency ID chips can be used to improve physical security and inventory control. Big Data can be harnessed to improve export controls, and improved sensors can detect the production, transportation and use of CBRN weapons. The international community faces a continuing challenge of encouraging innovation and maximizing the benefits of these new technologies, while simultaneously mitigating the risks that they pose to international security. I hope the Security Council will take advantage of the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004), of which this open debate is an important contribution, to update the resolution and to take into account the impact of scientific discoveries, technological breakthroughs and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors.

I thank Mr. Koblentz for his briefing. I now give the floor to Under-Secretary-General Kim Won-soo. Mr. Kim Won-soo: At the outset, I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to address the Security Council today and to congratulate Malaysia for hosting this timely debate. Secretary- General Ban Ki-moon just provided us with a strategic overview of the global challenges posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD). I would like to add a few words about the challenges posed by chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials and on Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). The international community has made sound progress in trying to prevent, investigate and respond to CBRN threats and risks. Resolution 1540 (2004) has enabled the international community to make advances in addressing the proliferation of WMDs to non-State actors. That includes through better reporting, adding or reinforcing legislation, assistance benefits, regional cooperation and national action plans. Similarly, the Secretary-General’s mechanism for investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological weapons has demonstrated its utility in responding to allegations of chemical-weapon use. I hope that when the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Joint Investigative Mechanism submits its report to the Council tomorrow it will fulfil its mandate to identify the perpetrators of such horrific acts. The Nuclear Security Summit process has contributed to raising awareness of, and preparedness against. the dangers posed by nuclear and radiological terrorism. But much more still needs to be done. This is a long journey. In this journey, today’s debate and the ongoing comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2014) are important landmarks. If we ask ourselves whether the international community is prepared to address the full scope of CBRN threats and risks, unfortunately the answer is not yet. We have significant gaps in a number of areas. The Joint Investigative Mechanism is one example of a body that needs to fill the gap in identifying the perpetrators of chemical-weapon attacks. I want to highlight two points that the international community must examine in the international architecture. The first point relates to biological threats and risks. With the increasing reports of terrorist groups seeking to acquire biological materials, we need to ensure that the investment in preventing biological incidents is commensurate to the threat and risk. Both the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004) and the Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction to be held in November are opportunities to consider how those instruments can be strengthened and enhanced to provide crucial prevention and preparedness. The second issue is how the international community should respond if prevention fails. Despite our concerted prevention efforts, a CBRN attack may happen  — with repercussions that are likely to go beyond the remit of a concerned international agency. or the capacity of the attacked country. As Mr. Koblentz indicated, the repercussions of such an attack would be multiplied by exploiting new technological advances, such as genetic engineering and unmanned aerial vehicles, just to name two. Subsequently, it would almost certainly become a complex international health and humanitarian emergency, disrupting law and order. It would require the coordination and deployment of a wide array of agencies at the national, regional and multilateral levels. In such an event, the international community would likely turn to the United Nations, as was the case in the recent response to the Ebola virus. We have made some progress in developing investigative mechanisms, but any international response will go beyond an investigation. The international community needs to think hard about what to do in advance of such an eventuality. In conclusion, I want to reiterate the Secretary- General’s key point, namely, the need for accelerated action in disarmament and non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction. The ultimate way to reduce the risk of a non-State actor using a WMD is through their complete and irreversible elimination. Achieving a world free of weapons of mass destruction is the collective responsibility of all States. Overcoming divisions in approaches requires inclusive dialogue, commitment, flexibility and creativity by all States. Today’s debate is a demonstration of Security Council members’ commitment to pursuing the crucial challenge of preventing WMD proliferation. We hope that Council members will continue to show such leadership until we have achieved our shared goal of a world free of weapons of mass destruction. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs is at the disposal of Council members to provide whatever assistance is required.

I thank Mr. Kim Won-soo for his briefing. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs of Malaysia. At the outset, I wish to thank the Secretary-General for his participation today and for his remarks. Malaysia highly values the Secretariat’s role in facilitating synergies and in coordinating and supporting cooperation among the various United Nations entities, Member States and intergovernmental institutions in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) to non-State actors. The Security Council, consistent with its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, has a key role to play in this regard. I wish to also thank Mr. Roux, Mr. Koblenz and Mr. Kim Won-soo for their respective briefings, which have shed much light on the different aspects of the topic under discussion. We are honoured by the large number of delegations participating today, attesting to the importance of concerted international action to preventing WMD proliferation to non-State actors. It is my hope that our deliberations today will contribute towards that end. My delegation aligns itself with the statement of the Non- Aligned Movement to be delivered by the representative of Iran. Resolution 1540 (2004) is admittedly a historic contribution of the Security Council in the field of non-proliferation of WMD. We commend Spain, as Chair of the Committee established pursuent to resolution 1540 (2004), for its effective stewardship of the comprehensive review process. My delegation is of the view that, in so doing and while acknowledging the threats posed by terrorist groups, the thrust of the resolution in preventing WMD proliferation by States and non-State actors should be maintained. We should acknowledge the equally significant contributions of several international and regional arrangements or initiatives in addressing WMD proliferation, especially by non-State actors. Collectively and through various national, regional and international approaches, we have certainly made great strides and achieved significant progress in responding to this multifaceted, complex issue. We should move forward by further strengthening global efforts in the light of the emerging threats and challenges in this regard, in particular in the field of science and technology, information and communication technologies and international commerce. As such, we call on the 1540 Committee to regularly review the scientific, technological and international commerce advancements on related controls under resolution 1540 (2004). That would ensure synergy in merging the implementation of States’ obligations, taking into account the exponential risk of the misuse of these advancements. I do not wish to repeat here the elements concerning the purpose, context and challenges that the presidency has elaborated in our concept note for this debate (S/2016/712, annex), nor either should I recapitulate the points that my delegation and other delegations made at the Council’s open consultations concerning resolution 1540 (2004) in June. Instead and in line with the action-oriented nature of today’s debate, I wish to offer my observations and proposals. My delegation believes that States, in accordance with their international obligations, should strengthen their respective law enforcement and national legislation, in particular by enacting effective export and transshipment controls, which should include proliferation financing. Due to the fact that many States have different national priorities and capacities, not all States have been able to enact such laws, resulting in a lack of universal control concerning WMD proliferation to non-State actors. In addition, some States remain constrained by a severe lack of technical expertise and resources in ensuring the effective fulfilment of their obligations. Therefore, the United Nations, in accordance with Chapter VIII of its Charter and other relevant regional and international initiatives, should avoid duplication and instead work in synergy in rendering the required assistance in all aspects to States. I believe that such an expedient approach would optimize the limited resources of the States and institutions concerned. The international community has long designated non-State actors, in particular terrorist groups, as our number one enemy. However, it is unfortunate that a central, universal coordination mechanism that is inclusive of parliamentarians, industry, academics and the civil society in addressing the challenges they pose is currently non-existent. This has resulted in numerous regional and international institutions and initiatives, with similar or competing interests, pursuing the same objectives but with different approaches or agendas. That perplexing situation should be redressed immediately. Pending the formation of a central, universal coordination mechanism, States will have to continue addressing the increasingly complex challenges posed by non-State actors through various measures peculiar to their national or regional interests and imperatives. In that regard, my delegation supports the proposal for the United Nations to develop a structured track of dialogue at all levels, including parliamentarians, industry, academics and civil society, aimed at raising greater awareness, with a view to generating the necessary impetus for a solid global movement against WMD proliferation to non-State actors. The global security landscape has changed dramatically. It is evolving rapidly beyond comprehension, presenting us with a multitude of new challenges. Today, no nation can claim immunity to WMD proliferation or attacks by terrorist groups. Recent incidents concerning the use of chemicals as weapons against civilian populations by certain parties in Syria, as well as the acquisition of chemical stockpiles by terrorists in Libya, which was eventually addressed through the adoption of resolution 2298 (2016), highlight the real danger and threat posed by non-State actors to peace and security. These developments reqire us to respond to the questions of, not if, but when and where such incidents will recur, with irreversible consequences, and of what should we do and how we should do it. It is indeed unfortunate that geopolitical considerations at play in certain regions are compounding the preventive or remedial efforts of the United Nations and the international community at large in addressing the challenges posed by WMD proliferation and their use by non-State actors. There have been instances where States were allegedly complicit in this respect, in blatant disregard to the sacrosanct purposes and principles of the United Nations. States are duty-bound to avoid complicity in the commission of such heinous acts. The first and second preambular paragraphs of the Charter of the United Nations state, in part, “[w]e the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war ... [and] to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained ... and for these ends ... to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security”. I am convinced that we remain resolutely cognizant of our cardinal collective obligations as truly a United Nations, and therefore are prepared to jointly summon the courage to ultimately bring forth enduring peace and security. It is worth recalling that, 20 years ago, the International Court of Justice, in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, handed down on 8 July 1996, unanimously concluded that “[t]here exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” (A/51/218, annex, p. 267) In conclusion, we have to admit that the existence of WMDs, in particular nuclear weapons, is a threat to our peace and security and to the survival of humankind. Ultimately, my delegation looks forward to a WMD- free world. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I shall now give the floor to the other members of the Security Council. I give the floor to His Excellency Mr. Kiyoshi Odawara, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan.

I would like to welcome Malaysia’s timely initiative to convene this open debate on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), amid the comprehensive review of the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Before turning to the issue of non-proliferation with regard to non-State actors, I would first like to refer to North Korea’s nuclear test in January and its series of ballistic missile launches, including the most recent launch, which fell into Japan’s exclusive economic zone on 3 August. Those blatant violations of Security Council resolutions pose clear challenges to the global non-proliferation regime and cannot be condoned for any reason. Japan strongly urges North Korea to refrain from further provocations and to comply faithfully and fully with the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 2270 (2016), as well as other commitments, and calls upon all Member States to redouble their efforts to fully implement and enforce the relevant Security Council resolutions. Those efforts are crucial, and their significance and impact must not be underestimated. We must strongly support the work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and ensure that the Committee and its Panel of Experts can function effectively. Let me now move to the issue of preventing WMD proliferation with regard to non-State actors. Resolution 1540 (2004) is a cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime because it requires States to prevent proliferation and establish domestic laws, regulations and effective measures for that purpose. However, we should also recognize that the global situation has dramatically changed since that resolution was adopted, in 2004. Increased globalization has greatly increased the risk of the proliferation of WMDs. Indeed, we have witnessed cases where non-State actors have used WMDs to advance their goals. The ongoing comprehensive review presents a golden opportunity to identify the challenges facing the current non-proliferation regime and discuss how we address them. In that regard, Japan would like to propose two specific points. First, export and border controls are essential for the prevention and detection of proliferation activities. The review process has pointed out that the implementation of paragraph 3 of the resolution, which calls for establishing domestic controls such as export and border controls, has fallen far behind the implementation of paragraph 2, which calls for prohibiting the proliferation activities undertaken by non-State actors. We underscore that clear definitions of the restricted items and activities are the key to facilitating the implementation of the obligations under resolution 1540 (2004). Japan is therefore of the view that requiring the establishment of national control lists in accordance with a Security Council resolution is a good step towards enhancing the non-proliferation regime. Secondly, another observation from the review process pointed out that the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) is currently unable to effectively match offers and requests for technical assistance. One of the prime reasons is that requesting States do not necessarily recognize their own needs. In order to address that situation, Japan would like to strongly suggest that the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts be given a mandate to propose and initiate dialogue with requesting States in a more proactive manner. That would enable the Committee and the Group of Experts to serve as consultants mediating between donors and recipient countries by identifying actual needs based on clear information acquired through direct interaction with the requesting State. The security environment today requires us to take effective measures to tackle the threat of the illicit use of WMDs by non-State actors. Once again, Japan would like to emphasize that the strengthening of the global non-proliferation regime, with resolution 1540 (2004) as its cornerstone, provides the foundation for international peace and security.

The full text of my statement is in electronic format and is also available at the documentation counter next to the Conference Officer. I will be reading from a summarized version of my statement. I would like first to highlight the relevance of this debate, as the risk of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) challenges global security and human existence itself. Regrettably, the proliferation of such weapons has not abated, as has been shown by the actions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the use of chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq. In 2004, the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, entitled “A more secure world: our shared responsibility” (see A/59/565), noted that the United Nations was created to prevent war but acknowledged that the greatest threats would result from, among other factors, the proliferation and possible use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons and from terrorism. It stated that the threats would come from both State and non-State actors. It also stressed that the technological revolution offered unprecedented opportunities for cooperation, and an unprecedented potential for destruction. That visionary analysis made possible the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), which marked a turning point in the non-proliferation architecture. The analysis was subsequently backed by facts, such as the existence of a smuggling network of nuclear-weapon technology and evidence of the intentions of terrorist organizations to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Twelve years later, that analysis remains valid, while scientific and technological advances have developed more rapidly than the response capacity of States. The globalization of commercial, logistic and economic transactions makes it harder to control proliferation activities, and makes it easier for terrorists to take advantage of transnational criminal networks to access weapons of mass destruction. We are not exaggerating when we say that the main threat is the link between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. We must therefore act swiftly, and the Security Council has a key role to play. International conventions and the adoption of standards by the relevant institutions are also important tools. The statements made today have highlighted some of the risks we face. I echo the views expressed and will not repeat them. Moreover, the specialized reports show a sustained increase in nuclear and chemical incidents, whereas biological incidents have been more sporadic. Nonetheless, the variety of agents used and the rapid scientific and technological developments in this field are very worrisome. The biological sector is the area needing more attention, particularly in the absence of a relevant organization. One additional challenge is the lack of a unified incident database. To prevent, we know that we must know what it is that we are trying to prevent. To that end, my delegation proposes that the Security Council consider the development of such a database. On the other hand, terrorism has intensified. Terrorists are more determined than ever to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Chemical weapons have been used in Syria and Iraq, and there are reports warning about the real risk of attacks employing weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, internal instability in countries and situations of conflict are breeding grounds for proliferation by terrorist groups, as has been recognized by the Libyan and the Iraqi authorities, among others. In that regard, I would highlight the Council’s swift response, through resolution 2298 (2016), to Libya’s request to have its chemical weapons arsenal destroyed, as well as the active role of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) in assisting Iraqi authorities in the implementation that resolution, which is a key instrument in preventing the proliferation of weapons of that nature. The magnitude of the challenges we face is enormous, but it is not too late. Now is the time to act. Initiatives such as the Nuclear Security Summits and the eighth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention are contributing to bolstering the international non-proliferation regime. The Security Council plays a primary role in that process as the main guarantor of international peace and security. I would now like to mention two areas. First, the conclusions reached by the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) should inform our thinking on how to reinforce the non-proliferation system. I believe the work of JIM has demonstrated the deterrent power of a system of accountability for the use of weapons of mass destruction, the need for States to have reliable inventories and means to protect their chemical and biological stocks, and the need for the Security Council to be proactive in crises where sensitive materials could be improperly used. We believe it is necessary to reflect on how to incorporate the capacities to investigate WMD incidents into current efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation architecture. We believe we should consider greater interaction between the preventive role of resolution 1540 (2004), on the one hand, and investigation and accountability as a both a preventive and deterrent mechanism, on the other. Finally, the process of the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004) should facilitate an update of the framework set up by the resolution, with the ultimate aim of preventing non-State actors from using weapons of mass destruction, as it is apparent that threats have not decreased. Ultimately, this process should allow us, at the very least, to take five positive steps. First is to reinforce the capacity of the United Nations to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, while achieving greater coordination among the components of the non-proliferation system. Secondly, we should develop a more focused approach, for example, by attending more carefully to the biological and chemical sectors. Thirdly, a more proactive approach to avoid major crises should be promoted. Fourthly, assistance to States should be improved. And, finally, we must achieve greater transparency in the fight against proliferation, while actively involving civil society.

We welcome the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mr. Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, as President of the Security Council. We are grateful for his convening of this meeting on the issue of non-proliferation and Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). We listened very carefully to today’s briefings, and we thank the Spanish chairmanship of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) for its active and focused leadership of that subsidiary body of the Council. The global non-proliferation architecture is based on three components: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention and, of course, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The Russian Federation participates very actively in all of them. Resolution 1540 (2004) is yet another pedestal of non-proliferation. It is a reliable bulwark against weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of non-State actors. Achieving its full-fledged and universal implementation is a pressing objective for the international community. Our discussions here today will serve as a significant contribution to the current comprehensive review of the implementation of the resolution. We note the positive momentum in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) during the period covered. We understand that not all steps have been taken and that a great deal of work lies before us, but it is important to continue in this spirit without artificial pressure, mindful of the capacities of individual States. It is clear that there continues to be broad scope for improvements within the framework of the current mandate, which requires no radical changes. The resolution enshrines the concept of cooperation, not coercion. That notion should be safeguarded. We understand the need to find new responses to new challenges. We support the strengthening of the counter-terrorism component of non-proliferation. In the light of the continuing terrorist activity by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and other terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria, the significance of resolution 1540 (2004) only grows. Reports regarding non-State actors gaining access to chemical weapons require detailed investigation and a response by the Security Council. It is unacceptable that non-State actors should be provided assistance in accessing weapons of mass destruction. We concur with the view that there is a need to more actively use national and regional components in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Best practices must be studied and educational seminars for focal points must be organized. Their value added is obvious. At the end of June, Russia organized just such an event in Kaliningrad, under the aegis of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. The response of the participants was most positive. The capacities of regional and international organizations must be enlisted, and their plans of work should be tailored to States’ requests. We also advocate the involvement of academia and the business community. Of course, all such actions should be under the leadership and control of State structures. Russia is interested in strengthening the non-proliferation regime and will spare no effort to that end. We have repeatedly heard of the use by fighters of ISIL and other groups of industrial chemicals and even military toxins. There are reports regarding terrorist access to the technologies and infrastructure necessary for the manufacture of chemical weapons. The threat of chemical and biological terrorism is growing and is increasingly transcending borders. The pressing need to bolster the fight against acts of terrorism is so high that the toolkit of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), despite its important role, is simply insufficient. That is precisely why Russia, at the Conference on Disarmament, took the initiative of proposing the elaboration of an international convention against chemical and biological terrorist attacks. Such a new convention could combine the elements agreed upon by the international community during the past few years. In particular, it should include provisions regarding the criminalization of acts falling within its scope, determine jurisdictions, define the appropriate level of judicial response and implement the principle of extradite-or-prosecute, and so on. It is clear that the conventional concepts of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation are gradually diluting. In essence, this field is taking on a new shape and acquiring new dimensions, namely, counter-terrorist ones. The emergence of ISIL’s industrial capacities for manufacturing chemical weapons and the threat of their proliferation across the whole of the Middle East attest to the timeliness of Russia’s initiative to elaborate just such an international convention on combating acts of biological and chemical terrorism.

We thank the delegation of Malaysia for convening today’s open debate and welcome you, Mr. Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs of Malaysia, for presiding over this important meeting. We also thank the briefers for their important insights on this critical issue, and the Secretary-General for his remarks and contribution to the discussion on the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) falling into the hands of non-State actors, armed groups and terrorists; on the measures aimed at tackling these threats and the responsibilities of States to reinforce operational control mechanisms of weapons and equipment related to WMDs; in adopting appropriate legislative frameworks for preventing the proliferation of WMDs to non-State actors, armed groups and terrorists; on States’ response to international cooperation and the provisions of resolution 1540 (2004) with respect to reporting on national and regional measures taken for the resolution’s implementation; and on the review under way of resolution 1540 (2004) towards strengthening international commitments in preventing and confronting such threats. In that regard, we commend Spain as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) for its stewardship of the comprehensive review process of the resolution. The Government of Angola is deeply concerned about ongoing challenges and conflicts on the African continent and elsewhere. We avail ourselves of this opportunity for an incursion into a subject correlated to the matter under discussion since, more than this somewhat virtual exercise, the real issue in contemporary conflicts is that weapons are easily obtainable, cheaply purchased through criminal networks and largely supplied by States to non-State actors, armed groups and terrorists in a dangerous game of influence and power, spreading destruction, anarchy and chaos. Small arms and light weapons are the real weapons of mass destruction in the conflicts in Africa, in the Middle East and elsewhere. Furthermore, they are at the root of developments conducive to the use of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors. Given the massive destructive character of these weapons, we are of the view that the regime impeding the traffic and supply of small arms and light weapons to non-State actors should be strengthened, and identical restrictive measures should be applied, pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). We furthermore think that the definition of non-State actors in resolution 1540 (2004) should be broadened and applied to a larger scope of non-State actors than those defined in the resolution. Angola is a State party to major international instruments relating to weapons of mass destruction, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. We are devising and implementing the relevant legislation and institutions that would allow for more effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), domestically and regionally, in order to enhance cooperation and collective efforts to ensure that all chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials, equipment and technologies on the African continent are used exclusively within the tenets of the law and for peaceful purposes. As a means of fulfilling its commitment to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and to the non-proliferation regime, and in response to increasingly frequent reports of attempts by terrorist groups to produce or obtain biological agents and pathogens, as well as the use of chemical agents in certain conflicts, the Angolan Government has redoubled its efforts to create an effective, institutionalized national mechanism to address such threats. Currently, Angola is working on drafting legislation to establish a national authority for weapons of mass destruction — a body to be coordinated by the Ministry of National Defence and whose main purpose will be to assist in formulating national action plans and in preparing national implementation reports on the country’s capacity relating to the control of WMDs. Greater interaction with neighbouring States is key for facing a most pressing challenge to the countries of Africa, specifically on questions related to cross-border movements, controlling illicit trafficking and the need to reinforce national and regional security and increase technical assistance from the 1540 (2004) Committee and other subsidiary organs of the Security Council dealing with counter-terrorism. Finally, we are of the view that the effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) has to be coupled with significant progress in the prevention of conflicts and the resolution of protracted ones, not outright interference and inflaming of conflicts through the supply of weapons to non-State actors and oppressive unreliable regimes. The root causes of terrorism have to be addressed as well as the serious socioeconomic and political difficulties faced by the countries of the region. If the growth of terrorism and its recruitment appeal are to be curtailed, the issues of unemployment among young people and corruption must be duly addressed, while development and good governance must be top priorities in countries affected by conflict and terrorism.

Ukraine wishes to express its gratitude to the Malaysian presidency for organizing today’s useful debate. We also wish to thank today’s briefers for their valuable insights. While fully aligning myself with the statement to be delivered later today by the Chargé d’affaires of the Delegation of the European Union, I would like to make some comments in my national capacity. For 12 years now, resolution 1540 (2004) has been playing a crucial role in strengthening global and regional non-proliferation efforts. Its objective of prevention makes the resolution a unique and valuable tool. Ukraine has always been actively engaged in the global process of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) non-proliferation and disarmament, making historic contributions in this endeavour. We have consistently supported effective multilateral efforts aimed at preventing and combating the proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction. As a State with past possession of nuclear-weapons and a full-fledged party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Ukraine is strongly committed to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and exerts every effort to prevent non-State actors from acquiring materials and technologies that could be used as weapons of mass destruction. With a view to tackling the growing threat of the proliferation of WMDs globally, we support initiatives aimed at further strengthening the role and potential of resolution 1540 (2004) for the long term, such as the recent establishment of the Group of Friends of resolution 1540 (2004). Reaffirming its commitment to the resolution in the framework of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., Ukraine joined the initiative named “Promoting full and universal implementation of resolution 1540 (2004)”. It is also worth mentioning that during the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, held in The Hague, Ukraine joined a similar effort and made its valuable contribution to its implementation. Together with the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), we organized a workshop on the assessment of implementation and the role of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) in achieving the aims of non-proliferation and disarmament, which took place in Kyiv in November 2013. A year later, the OSCE, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, the Ukrainian Chemists Union and the International Centre for Chemical Safety and Security in Poland, with the support of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, initiated a national round table on capabilities in field of chemical safety and security and the development of an integrated chemical safety and security programme in Ukraine, including promotion of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). That effort resulted in the comprehensive review and an integrated programme of chemical safety and security in Ukraine. We also fully support the work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), in particular in coordinating international efforts aimed at ensuring the proper implementation of that resolution. Ukraine consistently provides the Committee reports on its national legislation, including updates on our export and border controls and the physical protection of the relevant sensitive facilities. We work continuously to improve our technical capabilities aimed at monitoring, detecting and preventing illegal trafficking in chemical, biological and nuclear materials. In particular, relevant work is being systematically carried out with a view to enhancing the efficiency of the relevant monitoring systems at the State border checkpoints. The use of mobile radiation-monitoring systems that provide monitoring of green control is also being expanded. Let me also mention that a State plan on the interaction between the central and local authorities in cases of sabotage committed on nuclear facilities, nuclear materials and other sources of ionizing radiation during their use, storage or transportation and on nuclear waste has already been approved in Ukraine. I think that it is quite natural that, against such a backdrop, Ukraine cannot and will not tolerate any breaches of the principle of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We would echo the statement of the delegation of Japan with regard to its deep concern about the gradual, persistent, irresponsible and highly provocative actions on the part of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which pose a threat and continue to undermine the security situation on the Korean peninsula, as well as undermining regional peace and stability. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the Council and the broader international community to restore respect for its norms, to ensure fulfilment of respect for the international commitment and obligations, as well as to prevent further violations. The issue of the full and universal implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) is one of the priorities of Ukraine as an elected member of the Council. We welcome the constructive and results-oriented approach taken by the Spanish chairmanship during the comprehensive review of the resolution’s implementation, which is to be completed by the end of 2016. It is important that that endeavour also focus on ways to ensure that the relevant international legal norms are fully respected and implemented by all States. Today, however, the full implementation of the resolution is being undermined by one of the members of the 1540 Committee. The Russian Federation committed not only an act of military aggression against a sovereign State Member of the United Nations — Ukraine — but also, having violated all the relevant international rules and norms, invaded certain nuclear sites in Ukrainian territory, namely, in Crimea. The occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the ongoing Russian aggression in the east of Ukraine have left the low-enriched uranium research reactor in Sevastopol without due control on the part of the Ukrainian national regulators, as well as two nuclear repositories and more than 1,200 radionuclide sources. It is worth recalling that resolution 1540 (2004) established an obligation, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, for all Member States to develop and enforce appropriate legal and regulatory measures against the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, in particular to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors, and to abstain from providing of any financial help to them. By carrying out military aggression against Ukraine and providing illegal armed groups with modern weapons and financing them, Russia has brutally violated that obligation, which it assumed voluntarily under resolution 1540 (2004). In particular, it has destroyed the security system of the industrial sites and plants situated in the territories of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine that contain chemical, biological and radioactive materials. To be precise, according to the data of the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine, in the temporarily occupied territories of eastern Ukraine alone, the Russian aggression has left 65 enterprises that use sources of ionizing radiation without proper controls. Furthermore, because of external aggression, Ukraine has lost its State border control over some areas of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions bordering Russia. As a result, some parts of the Ukrainian border can be used by smugglers to illegally transfer into, or through, the territory of Ukraine chemical, biological and radioactive materials from Russia. That overall situation poses a real threat to the non-proliferation regime and, without a doubt, violates the key principles of resolution 1540 (2004). In that regard, we have time and again urged all States to seek to influence the Russian Federation in all possible ways in order to stop its aggressive and hostile actions against Ukraine and finally to abide by its obligations in accordance with resolution 1540 (2004). In conclusion, let me reiterate Ukraine’s unwavering commitment to universal respect for and integrity of the global non-proliferation regime.

I thank His Excellency Mr. Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, for presiding over today’s meeting of the Security Council. I also thank the Secretary-General and all the speakers for their valuable briefings. At the outset, I wish to thank the Malaysian presidency for its initiative to convene this open debate on the non-proliferation of weapons of massive destruction, which is of particular importance for the Council’s work and constitutes a key forum for the ongoing exchange of ideas and viewpoints with regard to the global review process of resolution 1540 (2004) as we seek to address that threat, which faces all of us. Uruguay, as a non-nuclear-weapon State, as a member country of the first nuclear-weapon-free zone, which was established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and as a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is committed to strengthening of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Uruguay’s accession to the normative multilateral framework is greatly complemented by its foreign policy, which promotes and favours the need to continue to make progress in universal and transparent negotiations with a view to achieving comprehensive and complete disarmament under a strict international regime. Faithful to our commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation, Uruguay has signed and ratified the majority of the existing international and regional treaties on that subject and has fulfilled its reporting obligations to the relevant Security Council committees as they pertain to non-proliferation. In addition, we provide information on an ad hoc basis to the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee. Uruguay has promoted the establishment of nuclear- weapon-free zones as an effective way to achieve the goal of the full elimination of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean is an example of the promotion of international peace and security. In addition to being a country that, throughout its history, has never received material to fabricate nuclear weapons nor has it acquired such arms to ensure its survival as a State, we share the legitimate concern of the vast majority of the international community that we should ensure the existence of genuine measures to protect us when threatened by the possible use, or the threat of use, of these weapons, whether by States or by non-State actors. That is why we encourage the international community to undertake all feasible efforts to make it possible to achieve the goal of nuclear non-proliferation. Uruguay understands that, until such a time as nuclear weapons are completely eliminated, the greatest political priority should be assigned to negotiations that will lead to the approval of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on negative security assurances, so that we can faithfully meet our obligations and ensure that there is no distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear States. It is also important to bring about the effective implementation of multilateral treaties that have as their goal to eliminate or prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and the importance for all States parties to those treaties to fully implement them in order to promote international stability. In that regard, we would encourage all Member States to fully comply with their obligations and to respect their commitments with regard to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation in all their aspects with regard to all weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. Uruguay expresses its firm condemnation of the launches and continuing provocations by North Korea, which further escalate tensions on the Korean peninsula and constitute a clear violation of Security Council resolutions and a threat to international peace and security. Likewise, we reiterate the need for, and appropriateness of, continuing to work towards a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The best preventive tool that we have today is resolution 1540 (2004). That is why we believe that today’s discussion will contribute in great part to the process of the comprehensive review of the resolution, which is being conducted under the leadership of Spain by the Security Council Committee established in accordance with resolution 1540 (2004). Uruguay is extremely concerned about the growing threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors could acquire, develop or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems or traffick those weapons, which could have unpredictable and devastating consequences for humankind. The existence of those groups and their close relationship with weapons of mass destruction, the rapid advances in science and technology and the current bloody conflicts serve to further alert us to the danger of their use by non-State actors. The use of chemical weapons in Middle Eastern countries shows just how dangerous that threat is. That is why we need to take urgent measures, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, leading to effective responses to threats to international peace and security caused by non-State actors. Cooperation and the exchange of best practices among States in the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are essential to counter the illicit trafficking by non-State actors in nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems and related materials, as well as intensifying the coordination of efforts at national, regional, subregional and international levels, as appropriate, in order to strengthen the response to this serious global threat. Transparency in the work of the 1540 Committee is very important. The high visibility of the open consultations during the Committee’s work in June is proof of that, and that is why we urge the ongoing promotion of measures and activities that involve the participation of all Member States in pursuit of strengthening and improving the implementation of that resolution. Likewise, the need to bolster assistance and collaboration among States, between the 1540 Committee and States and between 1540 Committee and the relevant international, regional and subregional organizations to help States implement resolution 1540 (2004) is essential. Resolution 1887 (2009) is another pillar of the non-proliferation regime. In paragraph 23 it refers to the need for the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). In the same way, States should take all the appropriate measures, in accordance with their national legislation and national authorities and consistent with international law, to strengthen export controls, to control access to intangible transfers of technology and to information that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, to prevent the financing of proliferation and the transport of such materials and to protect sensitive materials. Uruguay will be part of all initiatives that will lead to the successful comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004) and the strengthening of the functions of the 1540 Committee.

I wish to remind all speakers to limit their statements to no more than four minutes.

We thank Malaysia for organizing this important open debate. The past two years have been troubling ones for efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The threat of the acquisition and use of such weapons by non-State actors is no longer a hypothetical question. We have seen credible allegations of the use of toxic chemicals as weapons against civilians in Syria, by both non-State actors and by a State party to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, have demonstrated that they are capable and willing to use such weapons. Insecure stockpiles in countries experiencing conflict have heightened the risk of dangerous weapons or precursors falling into the wrong hands. The increasing accessibility of information and rapid advances in science and technology have brought WMD capabilities within reach of many dangerous non-State actors. It was precisely to prevent such outcomes that resolution 1540 (2004) was adopted. That resolution was the Security Council’s first attempt at a comprehensive response to the risks relating to non-State actors. It imposed obligations on all Member States regarding implementation, monitoring and reporting. The comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004) currently under way is therefore very timely. It provides an opportunity to consider whether the existing regime is adequate and effective, and how it can be strengthened. New Zealand agrees that consideration should be given to a new draft resolution later this year to update the resolution 1540 (2004) framework in the light of the review. New Zealand will continue to focus on three main objectives. First, we want to ensure that the resolution 1540 92004) framework is fit for purpose and capable of meeting emerging threats and challenges. Secondly, we support a sharpened strategic focus by prioritizing the work of the Group of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) towards issues and regions of identified risk, vulnerability and need. In that regard, New Zealand supports empowering the Group of Experts to proactively identify and approach States to propose in-country visits. That would better ensure resources are targeted to activities and regions where they can have the greatest impact. Such visits would of course still require the consent of the host country. New Zealand also supports a more flexible approach to engaging States with low risk profiles. While we recognize the importance of universal implementation of the regime established by resolution 1540 (2004), we caution against an approach that measures success simply by counting the laws enacted or the reports submitted. Thirdly, we need to ensure that the compliance burdens are both necessary and realistic, especially for small States. That requires restraint in imposing new obligations, as well as a willingness to consider flexible approaches. There is little sense in taking a rigid, one-size-fits all approach to States that do not produce, store or act as transit points for sensitive materials. Similarly, we see little value in imposing additional reporting requirements and new universal legal obligations that are not realistic or justified for small States with limited capacities. Exploring flexible, pragmatic approaches for such States, such as reducing reporting for low-risk States and affording a greater role for regional organizations, could help smaller States improve their implementation while reducing compliance burdens. Focusing outreach and support in complementary areas such as counter-terrorism, border security, non-proliferation and export controls can also help small States. That is the approach New Zealand has taken in supporting the implementation efforts of our partners in our region, most recently in a workshop we hosted for Pacific Island countries with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the Pacific Islands Forum secretariat, the Financial Action Task Force, the Asia- Pacific Group on Money Laundering and the 1540 Committee Group of Experts. Reform of the current assistance mechanism is also important for small States. The input of the Group of Experts is critical in helping to develop clear requests for support. We would support a review of whether the current composition of the Group is adequate for that purpose. The recent actions of non-State actors in Syria and Iraq in making and using chemicals as weapons has raised questions regarding the adequacy of current international frameworks. For example, while the Chemical Weapons Convention clearly prohibits the use of chemical weapons by anyone, including non-State actors, there is currently no explicit requirement for States parties to the Convention to report chemical weapons-related activities by non-State actors in their territory to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Nor is there a duty on States parties to investigate such activities. We welcome the ongoing discussions in the OPCW on options for addressing this issue. We also welcome the OPCW establishment of a rapid response assistance team for dealing with alleged incidents. There may also be scope for the Council to complement these efforts. For example, we would see merit in considering steps the Council might take to encourage and support States to monitor, investigate and report possible chemical weapons activities by non-State actors within their jurisdiction, as well as to reaffirm the various investigative tools available to the international community. We could also consider ways to ensure regular reporting to keep the Council fully apprised of incidents of chemical weapons use by non-State actors so that it can respond appropriately. In addition, consistent with its recent decision with respect to Libya, the Council could signal its commitment to considering authorizing the transfer of chemical weapons or precursors to other States for destruction in situations where they have been seized from non-State actors or are at risk of falling into their hands. That would, of course, have to be done in close cooperation with the OPCW. Finally, we echo the comments made by the Secretary-General and High Representative Won-soo that we must restart progress on the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda. It is only through complete and verifiable nuclear disarmament that we can be sure to eradicate nuclear-related weapons of mass destruction and to eliminate their chances of being used.

We welcome your presence here today, Sir, to preside over this open debate. We welcome all the efforts of the Malaysian presidency to organize this meeting and thank you for the concept debate for this discussion (S/2016/712, annex). This meeting is taking place at a time of very difficult international circumstances with respect to the spread of terrorist groups and non-State actors, especially in the Middle East, and the ensuing risk of their obtaining chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction. We must work to prevent such a disaster at all costs. Over the past 12 months, the world has become even more complex and dangerous than in the past. Security challenges have emerged at the international level in a horrifying way. Terrorist groups have expanded their scope of action. Chemical weapons have been used by Da’esh and other terrorist groups in the Middle East, causing widespread destruction and suffering in Iraq and possibly in Syria. There is a danger of this threat spreading to Libya, given the ease with which terrorists seem to move and travel from Syria and Iraq. We may one day see Da’esh and other terrorist groups move from Libya to the Horn of Africa. We note that last month the Security Council adopted resolution 2298 (2016), concerning the destruction of Libya’s chemical weapons, so as to minimize the danger of such materials falling into the hands of terrorist groups, especially Da’esh. However, the mere fact that terrorists possess the necessary knowledge and are able to travel to Libya poses a threat to the region and the world at large. The merging security threats facing the international community require sustained attention if we are to prevent terrorist entities from acquiring and using such materials. We all know that modern technologies  — such as 3-D printing, the dark net, genetic modification, drones and many other scientific technologies and developments  — are all dual-use in nature and pose a potential deadly threat to humankind as a whole. The main concern now is to determine how to address the danger posed by these materials were they to fall into the hands of terrorists. In that respect, 2016 is a pivotal year for the efforts of the United Nations and, more specifically, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). The Security Council is currently reviewing all measures adopted since 2004 to assess our current position and to attempt to create a comprehensive and effective model for a future free of weapons of mass destruction, where such weapons would have no chance of falling into the hands of terrorists. That is why we believe that the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004), superbly led by Spain, should be based on two tracks. First, we need a strategy to strengthen cooperation with international, regional and subregional organizations, including in the framework of technical assistance, the exchange of information and experiences, and capacity-building. We must of course remain mindful of the specificities of the mandates of multiple organizations. Council members know that one of the most significant obstacles to the effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) is the lack of an implementation mechanism. In that regard, we call for the establishment of focal points in every organization to build a global interactive network in which all actors would play a full role in unifying content, methods and objectives at all levels. Secondly, we must cooperate and coordinate at the national level between Governments and national public and private organizations. That is of critical importance, especially with respect to exporting States. There is a need to enhance awareness-raising programmes in the technical and legal fields and to disseminate best practices so as to ensure that dangerous materials do not fall into the hands of terrorists. In conclusion, I should like to reiterate that Egypt has spared no effort at the national, Arab, African and international levels in participating in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and the follow-up resolution 1997 (2011), especially in its role as coordinator of the Working Group established pursuant to resolution 1566 (2004). We also recall that the best way to guarantee that terrorists will not acquire such weapons is to eliminate them from the world. We therefore call upon the international community to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East so as to strengthen international peace and security for the good of all humankind.

We wish to congratulate you, Sir, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs of Malaysia, for having convened this important debate, and we also thank your delegation. We also very much appreciate the concept note (S/2016/712, annex) that was submitted to guide delegations with regard to addressing this issue. We also want to welcome Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and thank him for his relevant contributions to discussions on this matter. We would like to thank Mr. Emmanuel Roux of INTERPOL, Mr. Gregory Koblentz of George Mason University and Mr. Kim Won-soo, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, for their important contributions in addressing this issue, which is particularly important to my country. Weapons of mass destruction pose a serious threat to international peace and security, and are therefore among today’s greatest and most urgent challenges. The actions perpetrated by terrorist groups and non-State actors show their intentions to use weapons of mass destruction as a means to achieve their criminal goals. The use of such weapons is no longer a hypothetical construct, but a reality, as evidenced by the recent allegations concerning the use of improvised chemical weapons in the Middle East. In that regard, terrorists groups, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham, participate in illegal commercial activities that ensure them a wide range of resources, and they have shown the ability to recruit individuals with the skills to develop a programme for the development of weapons of mass destruction. The need to contain the risk of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors has increased considerably with the evolving nature of terrorism — and has become even more acute with the advances in science, technology and international trade. Those advances have altered the traditional patterns of proliferation. Over the past 12 years, scientists have made discoveries in the fields of artificial intelligence, robotics, the Internet, self- driving vehicles, 3D printing, meta-data, virtual reality, virtual currency, nanotechnology, genetic engineering and biotechnology. All of those technologies have a dual use: they can be used for peaceful purposes but also can be used as agents of destabilization. The Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) was set up to address the illegal markets for the exchange of goods and knowledge that could be used by non-State actors to develop weapons of mass destruction, and as such, it has a very relevant role to play in preventing the use of new technologies that run contrary to the purposes of peace and development. However, the Committee’s resources, capacities and engagements are limited. Because of that, it must find an area of ​concrete and realistic action. Otherwise, it risks seeing its effective functioning compromised. In the nuclear and chemical areas, the work of the Committee is redundant, given the mechanisms of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). In the area of ​customs control, the World Customs Organization (WCO) is better suited to offer assistance. The work of United Nations agencies such as the Office on Drugs and Crime and non-governmental organizations such as the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre sometimes exceed the potential contributions of the Committee. The limited availability of resources, which are allocated by donors, also seriously hampers its ability to provide international assistance efficiently that takes into account the needs and priorities of the receiving State. Through its qualified Group of Experts, the Committee can play an important role in helping States develop a comprehensive national plan to prevent non-State actors from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction. Each agency and organization provides assistance only in its respective area of expertise: the IAEA in the nuclear area, the OPCW in the chemical area and the WCO in the area of ​customs. But States do not have the necessary assistance at the international level to design and implement a coherent strategy to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors. The 1540 Committee has been active for some years. It is therefore time for it to make that task its main function. The Committee could also make significant contributions in the biological area and in providing advice on the implementation of export controls, where there are no organizations or agencies responsible for that function or where those that do exist are very weak. But we need to assess whether or not it has the capacities necessary to carry out that role efficiently, or if it needs to be reinforced. Similarly, in order to maximize its effectiveness, the Committee must take into account the context in which the resolution is implemented. For example, a significant number of countries throughout the world do not produce or export materials that could be used to create a weapon of mass destruction. Accordingly, the work of the Committee should focus on the implementation of those aspects of the resolution that are related more specifically to each individual country. The development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical and biological weapons have been banned, as manifested by the existence of the conventions that regulate such materials. However, to date we do not have a similar convention in the nuclear area. Therefore, if we want to prevent such weapons from being acquired by non-State actors, it is imperative that we have the commitment of the nuclear and the non-nuclear-weapon States and those that have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to fulfil basic nuclear-weapons-control and nuclear disarmament agreements. Above all, we believe that a road map for nuclear disarmament should be developed and that it should be verifiable and irreversible, according to a pre-established timetable. We are concerned that almost 50 years after the signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and thirty years after the end of the Cold War, there are more than 20,000 nuclear warheads that are at risk of being used. It is regrettable that the two measures that are perceived as the steps essential for nuclear disarmament and have been the focus of the attention of the international community for years, namely, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the negotiation of an internationally verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons, are stalled. In July 1996, the International Court of Justice unanimously declared in an advisory opinion the obligation of States possessing nuclear weapons, under Article VI of the NPT, to conduct negotiations on nuclear disarmament in good faith. However, the security doctrines of the major nuclear-weapon States continue to give such weapons top priority, not by advocating their elimination but by arranging for their modernization. Making progress in the full elimination of nuclear weapons requires the commitment of everyone, including those countries that are not parties to the NPT. Just as we were able to make progress in areas of particular interest to the international community for the purposes of peace, security, development and human rights, we must also be able to achieve nuclear disarmament. Only then will we be able to genuinely confront the use of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors.

My delegation welcomes seeing you, Sir, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs of Malaysia, preside in person over the 7758th meeting of the Security Council, which your country has judiciously chosen to dedicate to the crucial issue of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I would therefore like to thank and congratulate the delegation of Malaysia for having taken this initiative, which will undoubtedly allow us to further deepen our reflection on the issue and intensify our already steadfast mobilization within the framework of the full review of resolution 1540 (2004), whose eponymous Committee Spain is chairing so effectively. I would also like to thank Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon for his briefing, as well as Mr. Emmanuel Roux, Special Representative of INTERPOL to the United Nations, and Mr. Gregory Koblentz of George Mason University, who in their outstanding briefings laid out fully the scale of the multidimensional challenges we face in the area of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and associated materials. The delegation of Senegal aligns itself with the statement to be delivered shortly by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. This debate could not be more topical, given the risk of nuclear, biological, chemical proliferation. It is aggravated by several factors, among them the crisis in the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the resumption of a frenetic arms race with weapons that are increasingly advanced and miniaturized, vulnerabilities made possible by scientific and technological progress and by information and communication technologies, and industrial and trade globalization. We must face those challenges in the global context of terrorism and violent extremism, including in the vast Sahelo-Saharan region. Those challenges underpinned the adoption of resolution 1977 (2011), which tasked the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) with conducting an in-depth review of the state of progress of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). The resulting process has included a number of cycles of consultation with all Member States, international, regional and subregional organizations, as well as civil society. The Senegalese delegation is of the view that the culmination of the process took place during the official public consultations on 20 and 22 June here in New York, during which the essential recommendation was to redirect actions and strategies towards a more comprehensive, coordinated, cohesive and sustainable approach aimed at ensuring international peace and security in the face of the multiple challenges posed by proliferation. Senegal hopes that the concrete, practical and appropriate measures proposed by Member States will be effectively put in place with a view to facilitating the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). An analysis of the data regarding Africa shows some ongoing progress in the implementation of those measures, particularly in the drafting of appropriate legislation and the submission of implementation reports. Congratulations are in order, but we must recall that those measures must be improved, specifically through the implementation of national legal frameworks on biological weapons. Such measures are still missing in several African countries, and they must be accompanied by effective internal control mechanisms dealing with sensitive materials and technologies. My delegation notes the political commitment of the African Union to ensuring that its member States implement the resolution, which is best reflected through the Review and Assistance Conference on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), held in Addis Ababa in April. That is why the delegation of Senegal calls for the strengthening of the proposed cooperative operations between the Committee and African States, most of which have enjoyed its support in the effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). In that spirit, we will be able to make strides, particularly in the context of improving assistance procedures for identifying and analysing needs for material assistance as well as the maintenance of continued dialogue on assistance with interested subregional, regional, international and non-governmental organizations. Such an effort obviously requires building the capacity of the Committee and its experts. In a similar vein, Senegal supports the establishment of national focal points and calls upon Member States that have the necessary resources to contribute to that effort. Senegal believes that the establishment of a permanent mechanism to improve the interaction and coordination between those who provide and those who benefit from assistance is crucial so as to avoid duplicating work and identify best practices in that regard. An approach of that nature will clearly require ongoing commitment and considerable long-term financing. Senegal, for its part, is not only a party to nearly all international counter-terrorism conventions, but in 2006 it also ratified the Pelindaba Treaty for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. Domestically, Senegal adopted, among other legislation, Act 2006- 36 on 16 October 2006, banning the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and providing for their destruction, which is entirely consistent with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Three years later, my country adopted a law on nuclear security and radiation health. In the area of biological weapons, draft legislation is being drawn up that will incorporate the relevant provisions of the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, as well as those set out in resolution 1540 (2004). At the institutional level, Senegal has in place a national commission on nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, a radiation health and nuclear safety authority and a nuclear, radiological, biological, chemical group attached to the national firefighters brigade. Senegal recently adopted a voluntary five-year plan of action for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Relevant international organizations and other interested sectors within international civil society, including the industrial and commercial sectors, have an important role to play in the fight against proliferation. Their contribution in the form of organizing workshops on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and providing assistance is significant, especially in African countries. That role was highlighted at the meeting held in Abidjan in February at the behest of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. That meeting afforded an opportunity for legislators from various African countries to note the challenges relating to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in Africa and to reflect on how to bolster national legal frameworks set up in order to implement resolution 1540 (2004). As the briefers this morning amply demonstrated, the rapid progress in science and technology, the march of globalization and an ever-changing business environment are new elements that could be exploited by ill-intentioned non-State actors in order to acquire weapons of mass destruction. It is imperative to tailor existing measures or to adopt new ones so as to definitively prevent them from doing so. Therefore, in connection with the fight against the proliferation of chemical weapons in Syria, Senegal welcomes the implementation of the Joint Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations for the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic, charged with identifying people, entities, groups and Governments guilty of using chemical weapons, including chlorine gas. The success of its mandate is a good example of cooperation and assistance in that field. The delegation of Senegal hopes that 1540 Committee will continue to focus its efforts on facilitating the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), on assistance, cooperation and awareness- raising regarding the specific obligations stemming from the resolution. In conclusion, I would like to reiterate the firm commitment and unflagging willingness of Senegal to spare no effort in contributing in its national, subregional and international capacities to the global fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

I would like to thank the Malaysian presidency for organizing this open debate on a topic as important as that of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I also thank the Secretary-General as well as the various speakers — Mr. Emmanuel Roux, Mr. Gregory Koblentz and Mr. Kim Won-soo — for their briefings. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery poses a serious threat to international peace and security. North Korea is ardently pursuing its forced march along the path of nuclear- and ballistic-missile programmes. Pyongyang conducted its fourth nuclear test on 6 January and launched an unprecedented number of ballistic missile over the past few months, each time improving the technologies it needs to acquire deliverable nuclear weapons. As the Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan just pointed out, those destabilizing actions in violation of Security Council resolutions are a clear challenge to the non-proliferation regime, which is the cornerstone of our collective security. In Syria, allegations of the use of chemical weapons by the regime have continued since the beginning of the conflict, despite the Security Council’s resolutions and its unanimous condemnations. The recent chemical attacks on 1 August in Saraqeb and 10 August in Aleppo, airdropped from helicopters, have again killed a woman and two children. The conclusions of the report of the Joint Investigation Mechanism expected this week are therefore eagerly anticipated. The Council will then have to shoulder its responsibilities and take the necessary measures, as it committed to doing in resolution 2118 (2013). The perpetrators of these attacks will be held to account. The ban imposed on the use of these inhumane weapons must be restored. Allegations of their use are compounded by remaining uncertainties regarding the Syrian Government’s declaration on its chemical programme to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons: the possible existence of residual capabilities on Syrian territory only increases the risk of the proliferation of such weapons and their falling into the hands of terrorist groups. The comprehensive implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) requires us to remain vigilant on this issue. The lack of transparency shown by a State party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction weakens the global non-proliferation regime. In the context I just described, the risk of the proliferation of nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical materials and their falling into the hands of terrorists groups is unfortunately no longer some distant potential risk, but rather an imminent threat. Reports reaching us from Iraq and Syria on the use of chemical weapons by Da’esh underscore the reality of the threat. The security of radioactive sources in the territories controlled by this terrorist group is also of grave concern. Twelve years ago, the international community and the Security Council responded to this risk by adopting resolution 1540 (2004). The resolution, together with the Committee responsible for monitoring its implementation, marked a decisive step in preventing the risk of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of non-State actors. Resolution 1540 (2004) now constitutes one of the essential tools available to Member States in the fight against this threat, and undeniable progress in its implementation has been achieved. Today, the majority of States throughout the world has adopted measures aimed at transcribing the provisions of the resolution into their national legislation. Whether this concerns the physical protection of sensitive materials, the strengthening of border controls or the setting up of export-control mechanisms, the international community is vigilant in preventing nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical materials from falling into the hands of terrorists. Furthermore, the main international, regional and subregional organizations have adopted strategies to implement and promote the measures set out in the resolution. France, too, is shouldering its responsibilities. Within the framework of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), we coordinate the working group on assistance, which constitutes an essential component of the Committee’s work aimed at developing countries. France actively supports its partner States, including through substantial financing, in order to help them repatriate to France sources that might otherwise become orphaned. Today, independent assessments by the 1540 (2004) Group of Experts show that the implementation of the resolution has progressed throughout the world and in all areas. But, as Mr. Koblentz stated, the threats are evolving as well, and new challenges await us. The comprehensive review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), which is currently under way under the leadership of Spain, should provide an opportunity for us all to tailor and strengthen our tools to better combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the risk of their falling into the hands of terrorists. France supports strengthening the operational role of the 1540 (2004) Committee, as well as of its expertise and the matching of requests for and offers of assistance. Furthermore, France believes that the security of radioactive sources should be strengthened throughout the world, particularly with regard to highly active sealed sources. That is the aim of the joint declaration proposed by France at the Nuclear Safety Summit in Washington, D.C., this year, which was supported by 28 States. It is also the goal of the draft resolution to be submitted to the First Committee of General Assembly. Indeed, the theft of such materials, although infrequent, is highly troubling, and there could be serious consequences if such materials are acquired by terrorists. I would like to conclude on a hopeful note: the comprehensive review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) affords us a unique opportunity to strengthen our collective security, to better prevent the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and to strengthen the protection of sensitive materials and goods. We hope by the end of this year to achieve more rigorous and effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). I would once again assure the Security Council of France’s commitment in this area.

I would like to thank Malaysia for organizing today’s meeting, as well as to especially thank you, Mr. Hamidi, for being with us here today. Your presence, Sir, underscores the significance of the issue. It is important to recall the achievements that the Security Council has made in the area of non-proliferation, including through the framework of resolution 1540 (2004), which focuses on non-State actors. But we must also focus on what the Council must do to confront the proliferation threats that certain States, including Syria and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, pose to the international community. Since 2004, resolution 1540 (2004) has become the foundation of our global non-State-actor counter- proliferation architecture. It has helped prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and the abuse of legitimate trade and scientific cooperation for such purposes. Nonetheless, the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery remains real and continues to evolve, as one of our briefers today, Mr. Gregory Koblentz, detailed this morning in a very interesting, but also very sobering, statement. State and non-State actors continue to use chemical weapons in the Middle East, and nuclear and radioactive material has been stolen or appeared for sale on the black market. Meanwhile, the bright promise of synthetic biology also comes with attendant perils, and the increasing availability of drones expands the potential for their being used to deliver biological, chemical and radiological materials. While most countries have taken many steps to implement their obligations under the resolution, persistent and important gaps remain. The United States has strongly supported a robust second comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004), due for completion at the end of this year. We greatly appreciate Spain’s leadership throughout the review. We believe that resolution 1540 (2004) is of fundamental importance to international security. In fact, the United States has taken the lead and is looking for ways to revitalize the resolution framework. In our view, it is important for all countries to engage in that effort. We have been an active participant throughout the comprehensive review, submitting 25 proposals during the open consultations on resolution 1540 (2004) in June. We believe those proposals will strengthen resolution 1540 (2004) in the areas of implementation, assistance, cooperation and outreach. For example, we have urged the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to share more openly the information that Member States provide about non-proliferation efforts. We also want to see the Committee improve its communication plan to make the information more accessible to Governments and to the public. That is especially relevant in today’s discussion, because we hope that, with our combined efforts, we can work to make resolution 1540 (2004) an even better vehicle for clamping down on evolving non-State actors and WMD threats. The WMD proliferation threat remains ever-present. The situation in Syria, for example, only underscores that we need to pay attention to both non-State actors and States that are operating in defiance of global non-proliferation norms. In fact, recent events in Syria highlight that the use of chemical weapons by both State and non-State actors threatens our collective security. As we have stated before, the United States condemns in the strongest terms any use of chemical weapons. Yesterday in the Council (see S/PV.7757), I noted that 21 August marked the three-year anniversary of the gruesome chemical weapons attack in Ghouta, Syria. The United States remains determined to pursue accountability for that attack. Syria is a State party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the use of chemical weapons by the Al-Assad regime violates the Convention, as well as resolution 2118 (2013). We have made clear our assessment that the Al-Assad regime has repeatedly used chlorine as a chemical weapon against the Syrian people. We remain deeply concerned that such attacks appear to be continuing, including some this past month that media reporting indicated involved the use of chlorine dropped from helicopters. Against that backdrop, we look to the final report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism later this month. Those responsible for the use of chemical weapons in Syria must be held accountable for their actions. But Syria is not the only place where we face non-proliferation challenges with respect to State actors. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which has conducted four nuclear tests in this decade and is the only State to test a nuclear weapon this century, continues to ignore the Council’s repeated calls to stop such actions  — which are without question a threat to international peace and security. Just in the past week, a Japanese newspaper reported a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea statement that they had reprocessed nuclear fuel into plutonium and were producing the highly enriched uranium necessary for nuclear weapons. The Security Council has adopted five resolutions, most recently resolution 2270 (2016) in March, imposing sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The full implementation of the resolution will disrupt the illicit activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including disrupting the repatriation of currency from prohibited arms sales that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea uses to fund its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. Despite those challenges, when Member States have been unified and determined in their efforts, we have been able to make important progress towards addressing non-proliferation, including with respect to non-State actors. More generally, the Nuclear Security Summits have been key venues for dialogue, where the United States has led international efforts to improve nuclear security. From the first summit, in Washington, D.C., in 2010, to the fourth Summit, concluded this year, more than 50 world leaders and four international organizations have worked together to prevent nuclear terrorism and to counter nuclear-material smuggling, thereby catalysing efforts to secure and eliminate nuclear and other radioactive material. We share the concern voiced today about the use of chemical weapons by Da’esh/ Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. To combat that threat, the United States believes we need to apply the multifaceted tools we have within the existing international framework to include the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and resolution 1540 (2004), which, among other things, obligates States to secure chemical weapon-related materials. In addition, we should utilize, and where necessary bolster, the existing capacities of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to address the threat from non-State actors’ use of chemical weapons. The universal implementation of, and adherence to, the CWC, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Terrorist Bombing Convention and resolution 1540 (2004) is the best defence against the development of chemical and biological weapons and their acquisition and use by non-State actors. Finally, we fully understand the desire to do everything we can to combat the spread of chemical and biological weapons, but we believe that proposals that call for the establishment of a new convention on the suppression of chemical and biological terrorism are misleading and are founded on the false premise that there are legal gaps in the existing international framework to combat the use of chemical and biological weapons by non-State actors. In conclusion, we look forward to working with everyone in the coming months to thoroughly evaluate what more can be done to address the range of the WMD proliferation challenges we all face, including proliferation by non-State actors.

China appreciates Malaysia’s initiative in convening today’s open debate. We welcome the presence here today of Mr. Hamidi, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs of Malaysia, to preside over this meeting, and we would like to thank Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon for his briefing. Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and their means of delivery is of critical importance to international peace and security. Thanks to the persistent efforts of the international community, there is a growing international consensus on non-proliferation, with non-proliferation mechanisms improving by the day and cooperation in that respect steadily moving forward. However, grave challenges remain on the non-proliferation front. Certain hotspot issues related to non-proliferation drag on and defy an easy solution. The universality of international norms on non-proliferation is yet to be achieved. Advances in science and technology have lowered the bar for proliferation. There is an increased risk of non-State actors, terrorists in particular, acquiring WMDs and related materials. The unstable security environment makes some countries feel more threatened, which in turn increases the risk of proliferation. How to properly respond to the non-proliferation challenges and the non-proliferation process is an important task facing the international community. To that end, China wishes to put forth the following points First, with regard to establishing an enabling international and regional environment, the issue of non-proliferation is highly complex. Historical grievances, regional conflicts, security concerns and terrorism, among other factors, have made it more difficult to find a solution. The fundamental way out is to discard the Cold War mentality and to build a fair and just security landscape, based on joint contributions and shared benefits; to adopt a new concept of common, integrated, cooperative and sustainable security; and to strengthen international and regional cooperation, thereby eliminating the factors that drive proliferation. Secondly, with regard to developing and strengthening the international non-proliferation regime, thanks to tireless efforts over the years, the international community has set up an international non-proliferation regime that is guided by the Charter of the United Nations and legally anchored in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty, and complemented by other relevant non-proliferation mechanisms. That regime constitutes an important pillar for the maintenance of international peace, security and stability. We should adhere to multilateralism and the principle of consensus through consultation in working together to properly maintain and develop the existing international non-proliferation regime. Thirdly, with regard to properly addressing regional non-proliferation hotspot issues, all parties should stay consistently engaged in the process towards the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, remain committed to the maintenance of peace and stability of the peninsula, continue to seek solutions through dialogue and consultation and avoid any provocative action that could escalate tensions. Non-proliferation cannot be used as a pretext to beef up military deployment, step up a military presence and scale up military exercises. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear issue was achieved through hard work. The relevant parties should intensify mutual political trust and faithfully fulfil the relevant obligations to ensure the steadfast implementation of the JCPOA for far-reaching results. Fourthly, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime. Its universality, authority and effectiveness should be enhanced on a continuous basis. The goals related to the Treaty’s three main pillars, namely, nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, should be promoted in a comprehensive and balanced manner. The nuclear-weapon States should fulfil their nuclear non-proliferation obligations in earnest and reduce the role of nuclear weapons. While honouring their obligations in non-proliferation, all countries are entitled to peacefully partake of the fruits of the development of the related technologies. We need to establish and refine the relevant international norms on non-proliferation in the light of the evolving dynamics of counter-terrorism and take substantive measures to prevent WMDs and related materials and technologies from falling into the hands of terrorists. Fifthly, with regard to giving fresh impetus to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), the resolution, which was the first of its kind devoted to non-proliferation to be adopted by the Security Council, reflects the consensus among States on the issue of non-proliferation. In the context of the new challenges facing the non-proliferation effort, the international community should adhere to the mandate of the resolution to the letter and conduct a comprehensive review of its implementation. That comprehensive review should focus on the issue of preventing proliferation by non-State actors and should be conducive to maintaining State leadership in the prevention of proliferation, to making the assistance provided by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) more productive and to strengthening capacity-building in developing countries for the implementation of the resolution. As a participating builder of, and a contributor to, the existing international system, China is firmly opposed to the proliferation of WMDs and their means of delivery, fulfils its international non-proliferation obligations with rigorous discipline and is an active player in both international and regional cooperation. China supports efforts to build nuclear -weapon-free zones. We have ratified the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia and have resolved all outstanding issues related to the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Southeast Asia, which we look forward to signing as early as possible. China is supportive of the early convening of an international conference for a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. The implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) is high on China’s agenda. We have been actively involved in the comprehensive review process and the work of the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts. In September 2015, China hosted an event in cooperation within the 1540 Committee, namely, training for the focal points in the Asia-Pacific region, which is an important contribution to enhancing capacity-building in the countries of the region for the implementation of thae resolution. In the current circumstances, countries around the world are evolving into a community with a shared future and converging interests, but facing a common peril and safety issues. An effective response to non-proliferation challenges requires unreserved cooperation across the international community. China will continue to work with the international community and do its part to help improve and develop the international non-proliferation regime for the maintenance of international peace and security.

I join others in thanking the Malaysian presidency for this opportunity to exchange views on resolution 1540 (2004). I also thank the Secretary-General and all the briefers for their fascinating insights. The threat of toxic, poisonous or nuclear materials falling into the hands of non-State actors, particularly terrorists, is a top priority. It requires the closest cooperation among all Member States, as well as civil society and industry. And yet, let us be honest, this is a complex and technical subject, and we struggle at times to bring to it the attention it deserves. Resolution 1540 (2004) is not exactly a household name, but it does have a far-reaching impact, and the briefers did a very good job today at explaining how far-reaching the new technologies could be, both as a positive for most people in the world and as a negative when used by terrorists or others intent on utilizing those technologies to develop or to deliver weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, let us be clear about why we are focusing so much on the resolution. Resolution 1540 (2004) boosts the peace and security of all States. Its full implementation means action, namely, adopting laws, securing of borders and safeguarding sensitive materials. We must never forget those tangible, real world impacts of our work. I have no doubt that, without resolution 1540 (2004), the world would be an even more dangerous place. That is why this year’s comprehensive review matters. The review process has already given us some powerful food for thought about the progress and challenges of implementation for States. We now know that since 2010 there has been a 17 per cent increase across all non-proliferation measures of the resolution undertaken by States worldwide. But we also know that we are only halfway in our efforts. We must work towards full, universal fulfilment of those obligations. We know that all regions have increased implementation, with the fastest growth rates occurring in Africa and Eastern Europe. And yet there are also marked differences between regions, with some much further from full implementation than others. We also know that all sectors — nuclear, chemical and biological — have seen enhanced controls since 2010. However, the biological sector lags behind globally, with about 10 per cent fewer recorded measures than the nuclear sector. Those are all important non-proliferation facts. They should shape the next steps that we take. Working through the 1540 Committee, so ably chaired by Spain, the Council must now decide how to act. The United Kingdom looks forward to examining four areas for concrete progress by the end of this year. The first is ensuring meaningful analysis of how resolution 1540 (2004) is being implemented as a component of the global non-proliferation architecture, including by assessing each region and sector. The second is exploring how resolution 1540 (2004) can be more effectively implemented in the light of the new and emerging challenges that we heard about, including both evolving terrorist threats and technological developments such as 3D printing and drones. The third is strengthening the 1540 Committee’s process for matching requests with offers of assistance. And the fourth is revisiting the structure and mandate of the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to ensure that they have the technical, human and financial resources they need, including considering a longer- term mandate. We look forward to discussing all those issues with all States. Resolution 1540 (2004) offers tools for States to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Tragically, the situation in Syria shows what happens when prevention fails. The world today continues to witness horrifying attacks in Syria involving chemical weapons, including numerous credible allegations of their use both by State actors and by non-State actors. If proved, the Al-Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons will be in direct contravention of international law, and must be universally condemned. As Mr. Kim Won-soo told us, in the coming days the Council will review a historic and vital report by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Mission into allegations of chemical weapons use in Syria. The United Kingdom is determined to hold those responsible for those crimes to account. We will review the report very carefully. It will be a first step towards international justice. We owe it to the victims to examine unflinchingly the hard evidence before us and follow up until there is full accountability for all those responsible for all uses of weapons of mass destruction. Finally, allow me to echo the grave concerns expressed by the representative of Japan and others about the unacceptable nuclear and missile technology tests conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The United Kingdom unconditionally condemns those activities and expresses firm solidarity with Japan and all those in the region that face those dangerous provocations.

The representative of the Russian Federation has asked for the floor to make a further statement.

I apologize to all of those present in the Chamber, Minister Lajčák and Ambassador Lodhi, for requesting the floor again. I will be very brief. Today’s meeting was supposed to be a serious, substantive discussion on strengthening international efforts to prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of terrorists. In his statement, the representative of Ukraine made a deliberate attempt to devalue today’s discussion by bringing up baseless accusations against Russia. I believe they came, understandably, as a complete surprise to most of those present in the Chamber. There is no room for such conduct in the Security Council. Theirs was a classic attempt to justify their own actions and to shift responsibility for the problem onto others. The Ukrainian party has deliberately moved away from conscientiously implementing the Minsk agreement and is counting on a military solution to an internal Ukrainian conflict.

The representative of Ukraine has asked for the floor to make a further statement.

I also apologize for taking the floor again. I will be very brief. Out of respect for the presidency, colleagues around the table and the broader United Nations membership, I will confine myself just to a few brief points. First, we do not intend to engage in a debate at this table about obvious facts that are clear to everyone but the culprit State. Instead of reacting to the multiple allegations of various types on the part of the aggressor State, let me just say that the Ukrainian delegation and State fully stand by the statement that we delivered. Secondly, the threats to the regime established by Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that we mentioned in our statement originate from the Russian aggression against Ukraine, which started with the attempted illegal annexation of Crimea and continued with Russia’s intervention and fuelling of conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine. In our view, that of course has a direct bearing on the subject of today’s debate, as well as on the Security Council’s mandate.

I wish to remind all speakers to limit their statement to no more than four minutes in order to enable the Council to carry out its work expeditiously. Delegations with lengthy statements are kindly requested to circulate their texts in writing and to deliver a condensed version when speaking in the Chamber. I would also like to appeal to speakers to deliver their statements at a reasonable speed in order that interpretation may be provided accurately. I wish to inform all concerned that, given the long list of speakers, we will be carrying on the open debate right through the lunch hour. I now give the floor to His Excellency Mr. Miroslav Lajčák, Minister for Foreign and European Affairs of Slovakia.

Let me express my gratitude to you, Mr. President, and to your country, Malaysia, for convening today’s open debate. It provides a great opportunity for all of us to discuss and share our views, particularly on the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004). Allow me also to express my great appreciation for Spain’s initiative, as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), in organizing the formal open consultations in June that addressed the comprehensive review of the status of implementation of the resolution. We found that meeting to be very timely and beneficial and conducted in the spirit of cooperation and transparency. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is one of the major threats to international peace and security. It has been further aggravated by an increased risk of such weapons falling into the hands of terrorist groups and other non-State actors. It should therefore be our highest priority to avoid and prevent such dangerous events from happening. In that regard, I wish to highlight the centrality and contribution of resolution 1540 (2004). Together with the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and their implementing mechanisms and agencies, resolution 1540 (2004) has become a significant component of the robust global security architecture. It is also an efficient tool for tackling the non-proliferation challenges connected with various militant and terrorist groups. Its ongoing comprehensive review process provides an opportunity to work together towards its enhanced functioning. But how can that goal be achieved? Preventing non-State actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction cannot be accomplished by a single country alone. Collective efforts and international cooperation are therefore required. Security for of all of us is interdependent. We are only as strong as our weakest link. We are therefore convinced that we should adjust and improve the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) to the fullest extent possible. Countries that have difficulties with their national implementation and reporting mechanisms should have access to adequate assistance. We should foster and utilize regional expertise and capacities and ensure their availability to the countries that need it. Assistance should be cooperative and goal-oriented and respect the countries’ needs and the interests of the international community. Furthermore, the 1540 Committee and its Panel of Experts should have all the necessary resources at their disposal. That is a prerequisite for the effective and efficient fulfilment of their tasks. It is crucial to take advantage of the rapid developments and breakthroughs in science, technology, finance and commerce. Non-State actors exploit new technologies to pursue their illicit activities and often have enough financial and human resources to avoid existing export-control mechanisms. We must therefore keep our national export-control mechanisms up-to- date and dedicate sufficient financial and personnel capacities to them. We should also reach out to industry and civil society to raise awareness and create a true partnership in our efforts to prevent the proliferation of sensitive items to non-State actors. Slovakia’s strong commitment to resolution 1540 (2004) was underlined by our chairmanship of the 1540 Committee during our non-permanent membership of the Security Council in 2006 and 2007. As a former Chair, we know at first hand how challenging that work is. We therefore fully support Spain in its efforts, including the establishment of the Group of Friends of resolution 1540 (2004). Slovakia is proud to be one of the founding members. Slovakia has also been active in promoting domestic legislation on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). We introduced a wide range of legislative, executive and enforcement measures before and after April 2004. We have developed an effective national export-control system. As an integral part of the strong European Union export-control regime, it is regularly updated to reflect contemporary non-proliferation developments and requirements. Let me assure Council members that Slovakia remains fully committed to its disarmament and non-proliferation obligations. We stand ready to continue to help and assist the international community in combating proliferation threats and challenges. Finally, allow me to reiterate my appreciation for the convening of this open debate and to wish Malaysia a successful conclusion of its Security Council presidency.

I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan.

I thank you, Sir, for convening today’s open debate, which is timely, as it coincides with the ongoing process of a comprehensive review of the mechanism under resolution 1540 (2004). That process should benefit from the views of the broader membership. We hope that the diverse views expressed by Member States during the formal open consultations held by Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) will be taken on board. The global disarmament landscape presents a gloomy picture. The principal reason for that is the lack of progress made by the nuclear-weapon States in the fulfilment of their legal nuclear disarmament obligations. That has negatively impacted on the non-proliferation regime. Disarmament and non-proliferation are inextricably linked. It is unrealistic to expect progress on one without movement on the other. A key challenge to long-held non-proliferation norms and rules is the granting of discriminatory waivers to some and the making of exceptions out of power or profit considerations. Granting such waivers carries obvious proliferation risks. Those special arrangements are not only discriminatory and denote nuclear double standards but also open up possibilities for the diversion of material intended for peaceful uses to military purposes. They contravene non-proliferation rules and also undermine regional strategic stability. We should not forget that the fulfilment of non-proliferation objectives is a shared responsibility, and we are only as strong as the weakest link in the chain. Improved matchmaking by the Committee, thereby making it more responsive to requests for assistance from States, is therefore imperative. Resolution 1540 (2004) has made useful contributions to the advancement of non-proliferation goals. The success of the resolution owes less to its use of Chapter VII provisions of the Charter of the United Nations than to the cooperative approach that it has engendered to promote its implementation. We are cognizant of the fact that the challenges in addressing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), their means of delivery and related materials are imposing. Differences in State capacities, such as gaps in legal and regulatory frameworks, the lack of effective export-control mechanisms, border management capacities and the lack of human and technological resources for effective implementation, all compound the difficulties. We also recognize the importance of staying one step ahead of non-State actors that seek access to WMDs. Some of the suggested solutions, such as making radical changes in the regime established by resolution 1540 (2004), could, however, take us farther away rather than closer to our shared objective of addressing proliferation challenges. Let us take the example of the submission of national reports. As of April, 17 States had not yet submitted even one report. Then there are others, including my own country, that have submitted several. Rather than casting aspersions on the intentions of States that could not report, we need to understand their shortcomings and assist them. Creating additional reporting obligations would only add to reporting fatigue, without any real impact on achieving universal reporting. It is of paramount importance that the voluntary nature of visits to States and national action plans, as envisaged in resolution 1977 (2011), be preserved. In order to ensure that the comprehensive review helps Members States better manage challenges with regard to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), its final product needs to be realistic, generally acceptable and practical. It should take into account the existing provisions of resolution 1540 (2004). To change the focus of the resolution from a preventive mechanism, aimed at thwarting access by non-State actors to WMDs, to an instrument with a mandate for which it is ill-equipped would be an error. Also, obligations under the resolution should not be interpreted in a manner that impinges upon the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency or of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Let me turn briefly to what my country has done to implement resolution 1540 (2004) and to fulfil its non-proliferation obligations in general. Pakistan has elaborated and implemented a comprehensive export- control regime, fully harmonized with those of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group. Exemplary measures have been taken to strengthen nuclear safety and security. We have also actively participated in the Nuclear Security Summit process. Our ratification of the 2005 amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and our declared adherence to NSG guidelines are among the recent steps that we have taken. Under resolution 1540 (2004), we have submitted four national implementation reports. We have also declared a unilateral moratorium on further nuclear testing and have reiterated our willingness to translate that unilateral moratorium into a bilateral arrangement on non-testing with India. Those credentials, among others, clearly establish my country’s eligibility to become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. We expect that a non-discriminatory, criteria-based approach will be followed in the extension of NSG membership.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the States members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NAM). I express my appreciation to the Malaysian presidency of the Security Council for convening this open debate. I will deliver a shortened version of my statement on behalf of NAM. The full version will be submitted for the record. NAM member States express grave concern over the threat posed to humankind by existing weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and underline the need for their total elimination. NAM further calls upon all States to support international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Noting the adoption of the relevant resolutions by the Security Council, NAM underlines the need to ensure that any action by the Council does not undermine the Charter of the United Nations, existing multilateral treaties on weapons of mass destruction, international organizations established for that purpose, and the role of the General Assembly. NAM further cautions against the continuing practice of the Security Council to utilize its authority to define the legislative requirements for Member States in implementing Security Council decisions. In that regard, the Movement stresses the importance of having the issue of non-State actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction addressed in an inclusive manner by the General Assembly, taking into account the views of all Member States. Reaffirming that nuclear disarmament remains its highest priority, the Movement stresses the importance of ensuring that efforts aimed at nuclear non-proliferation are carried out in parallel with simultaneous efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament, which, as a multilateral legal obligation, should also not be made conditional on confidence-building measures or other disarmament efforts. NAM expresses deep concern about the slow pace of progress towards nuclear disarmament and the lack of progress shown by the nuclear-weapon States in accomplishing the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals in accordance with their relevant multilateral legal obligations. Accordingly, the Movement calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their multilateral legal obligations on nuclear disarmament and to implement the unequivocal undertaking that they provided in 2000 and further reiterated in 2010, so as to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Concerned at the improvements made in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons under the military doctrines of some nuclear-weapon States and at the strategic defence doctrines of the nuclear-weapon States, including the NATO Alliance Strategic Concept, which has not only set out rationales for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, but also maintains unjustifiable concepts on international security based on promoting and developing military alliances and nuclear-deterrence policies, NAM strongly calls upon them to exclude completely the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from their military and security doctrines. In that context, NAM also stresses the need for effective measures to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction, as reaffirmed by General Assembly resolution 69/27, on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. Reaffirming the absolute validity of multilateral diplomacy in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, NAM reiterates its determination to promote multilateralism as the core principle of negotiations in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. NAM highlights the importance of focusing international public attention on the dangers of nuclear weapons and the advantages of nuclear disarmament for development, as well as for international peace and security. Welcoming United Nations meetings and activities for the commemoration of 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, NAM invites Member States, the United Nations system and civil society, including non-governmental organizations, academia, parliamentarians, the mass media and individuals, to commemorate and promote that International Day through all types of educational and public awareness- raising activities. The Movement reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Highlighting the role of nuclear-weapon-free zones, NAM calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to ratify the related protocols to all treaties establishing nuclear- weapon-free zones, withdraw any reservations or interpretative declarations incompatible with the object and purpose of those zones and respect the denuclearized status of the zones. In that context, member States of the Non-Aligned Movement reiterate their full support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and as a priority step to that end and reaffirm the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Pending its establishment, they demand that Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) nor declared its intention to do so, renounce its possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the NPT without preconditions or further delay, place all of its nuclear facilities promptly under the full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in accordance with resolution 487 (1981), and conduct its nuclear-related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime. NAM States party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction emphasize its important role in the international legal architecture related to weapons of mass destruction and, in particular, in the total prohibition of all biological and toxin weapons, and reaffirm that the possibility of any use of bacteriological agents and toxins as weapons should be completely excluded, and the conviction that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of humankind. Moreover, NAM States party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction reaffirm the effective contribution of that Convention to international and regional peace and security, which can be enhanced through its full implementation. They express their serious concern that certain possessor States parties have not met their obligations regarding the deadlines for the total elimination of chemical weapons, and therefore urge all possessor States parties to take every necessary measure to ensure their compliance with their detailed plans for the destruction of chemical weapons remaining after the final extended destruction deadline of 29 April 2012 in the shortest time possible, in order to uphold the credibility and integrity of the Convention. Finally, NAM member States condemn the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, which reinforces the absolute necessity of eliminating all chemical weapons. In that regard, they acknowledge the accession of the Syrian Arab Republic to the Convention and its commitment to implementing its obligations. Furthermore, they encourage the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to honour its commitment to eliminating the country’s chemical weapons programme. In conclusion, I would like to reiterate the willingness of the Movement to cooperate with other partners in addressing the threats posed to humankind by the existing weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons.

I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico.

At the outset, I would like to thank the Secretary- General and other high-level representatives for their participation in this debate. We welcome the fact that the Security Council is addressing the topic of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as non-proliferation is one of the gravest risks to international peace and security. Mexico reaffirms its historical and staunch commitment to nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as its commitment to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) as a crucial mechanism for coordinating the efforts of the international community to take on the challenge of enforcing the non-proliferation regime, and particularly for impeding non-State actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction or their components through the trafficking of related materials or dual-use goods. Mexico hopes that the comprehensive review of thr resolution will lead to commitments that strengthen the non-proliferation regime and will yield a work plan in that field. Security in the twenty-first century should be approached from a multidimensional perspective that includes the consideration of public health, biotechnology, epidemiology, monitoring and early warning, the regulation of dual-use materials, and intergovernmental technological and scientific development and cooperation. Mexico considers it vital that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction establish synergies with other relevant bodies and mechanisms so as to pave the way for its full and effective implementation and bring about sustainable public policies, which would prevent that technology and type of weapons from falling into the hands of unauthorized actors. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction and its monitoring authority, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, have managed to lead the international community to a historic landmark — we are on the brink of physically eliminating all chemical weapons worldwide. Nevertheless, despite the success of those efforts, we have seen with great concern the use of toxic chemical substances against the civilian population of Syria in the context of the armed conflict in that country. Those facts and other recent events in Libya underscore that the best way to ensure that weapons of mass destruction will harm no one is to pursue their total ban and elimination. We need greater coordination and regulation of States parties and relevant international organizations in order to prevent non-State actors from gaining access to biological materials and toxic chemical substances. We must also promote a prevention and response approach in case those actors try to utilize chemical substances or pathogens as weapons of mass destruction. The ability of terrorist groups to evolve and adapt to the efforts of the international community to contain and counteract their impact on peace and security, including in the area of non-proliferation, has heightened the importance of efficiently addressing the underlying causes of terrorism. Accordingly, 10 years after the adoption of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, we have seen how it has become a genuine instrument for coordinating cooperative efforts by the international community to prevent and combat this scourge in a holistic way. However, we must at last adopt a comprehensive convention on international terrorism, which would have a positive impact on efforts to meet the challenges posed by non-State actors to the non-proliferation regime. Efforts to strengthen national capacities against the risks associated with weapons of mass destruction must be also be addressed in a holistic manner and without overlooking the need to strengthen nuclear security. Mexico therefore reaffirms that nuclear safety can be understood only within the broad context of indivisible security for all, which must be enshrined in the full implementation of existing international commitments on nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and safeguarding of the inalienable right of States to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

I now give the floor to the representative of Kazakhstan.

I thank the Deputy Prime Minister and you, Sir, and commend the Malaysian presidency for focusing today’s debate on the global fight against the proliferation of all types of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), which are posing one of the greatest threats to international peace and security and human survival. We also appreciate the tireless efforts of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in this area. For well-known historical reasons, I will concentrate on the nuclear sector in my statement, as issues of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security are the main foreign-policy priorities of Kazakhstan. My country is currently the Chair of Working Group I of the United Nations Disarmament Commission on recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. I would therefore like to address some of the key points raised in Malaysia’s well- prepared concept note (S/2016/712, annex). Kazakhstan selected nuclear-security and non-proliferation issues as one of the four main pillars of its campaign for an elected seat on the Security Council for the period 2017-2018, and it will remain a priority for us even after our term has expired. Indeed, nuclear terrorism poses one of the greatest challenge to the security of all nations. It is clear that the role of the Council should be greatly enhanced to help strengthen, universalize and effectively implement all the key instruments such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, as well as such Council resolutions as 1540 (2004), 1718 (2006), 2270 (2016), 2231 (2015), inter alia, as well as all policies and mechanisms. All United Nations entities need to regularize and institutionalize their work undertaken with regional organizations, as well as specialized agencies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and INTERPOL. Multilateral and bilateral support should focus on capacity-building, training and exercises, stronger counter-smuggling programmes and enhanced border controls, as well as WMD forensics. We commend Spain for its active chairmanship of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and for its contribution to the goals of the global non-proliferation movement. The more secure a country feels, especially through positive and negative security assurances, the more likely it will be to abandon weapons. Serious attention should be given to controlling technology transfer of the means of delivery of WMDs. Long-range missiles, cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles are also matters of grave concern. In the current biennium 2016-2017, Kazakhstan is chairing The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and intends to submit a relevant draft resolution at the seventy-first session of the General Assembly. We also need to support multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, the IAEA, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty Organization, which are charged with verification and upholding compliance and must be supported by regional and subregional mechanisms, civil society and mass media. We all need to improve policy coordination, export control and States’ ability to work together to prevent, detect, assess, respond and mitigate possible use of WMDs and the resulting destruction. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones strengthens global nuclear non-proliferation. Kazakhstan, together with other countries in the Central Asia region, established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their region. Having seen the great benefits of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, we support the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMDs. My country can claim be the first country ever to close a nuclear-test site. It later also renounced the world’s fourth-largest nuclear arsenal. This year, on 29 August, we will celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear- test site  — also the date designated by the General Assembly as the International Day against Nuclear Tests. An international conference devoted to the anniversary will be held in Astana from 28 to 29 August, and a commemorative meeting of the General Assembly devoted to the International Day against Nuclear Tests will be held in New York and hosted by the President of the Assembly on 31 August. Kazakhstan currently co-chairs, together with Japan, the Article XIV Conference of the CTBT. As we celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the CTBT this year, we call on all States to fully implement the action plan for facilitating the entry into force of the CTBT in 2015-2017. To that end, President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, in his recent security paradigm document entitled “Manifesto: The World. The 21st century”, proposes a 2045 global strategic initiative plan to eliminate the root causes of war and conflict and create a nuclear-weapon-free world by the United Nations centenary in 2045. Kazakhstan considers the adoption of the Universal Declaration on the Achievement of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World by the General Assembly last December to be the first step. It also calls for ending political conflicts, reducing poverty and promoting development assistance and human rights. Since security and development are interconnected, President Nazarbayev also called for transferring 1 per cent of the defence budgets of Member States to the special United Nations Sustainable Development Goals Fund. In conclusion, we call on all States to promote confidence and trust in order to reach comprehensive, general and complete nuclear disarmament, create a powerful global anti-nuclear movement and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

I now give the floor to the representative of Guatemala.

First of all, I would like to congratulate the Malaysian delegation on assuming the presidency of the Security Council and to express our appreciation for the concept note (S/2016/712, annex) that is guiding our discussions today. As a country strongly committed to disarmament and non-proliferation, Guatemala welcomes the convening of this open debate. Resolution 1540 (2004) plays an important role in the international non-proliferation regime, as it seeks to enhance the focus on the commitments in terms of non-proliferation without affecting its direct relationship with the fulfilment of the obligations of all States with the other disarmament pillars, including the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In the current complex international environment, it is imperative that all Member States fulfil their obligations in preventing the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials, as well as their acquisition by non-State actors and ensure that States possess the necessary resources and capacity to that end. The universal, comprehensive and balanced implementation of the resolution is possible only if all Member States play a key role and the Committee fully implements its mandate. As expressed during the formal open consultations held in June, it is essential that the review of resolution 1540 (2004) be carried out in the broadest and most transparent and inclusive manner, including an in-depth analysis of its implementation to date with a view to identifying successes, as well as shortcomings and gaps, in order to focus efforts and resources on areas that have lagged behind, particularly through improved outreach and assistance mechanisms. In our view, assistance and information exchange are the two key elements remaining in the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). In that regard, in addition to continue seeking ways to improve and advance its role as facilitator, the Committee should consider the possibility of moving beyond that function and seek ways to expand and develop a more direct role, perhaps by directly providing assistance or via dialogue among the donors and recipients of assistance, or even by creating its own training programmes in capacity- building for States. Just as it is important to establish a close relationship with States, it is necessary to continue strengthening and fostering communication and cooperation with specialized regional and international organizations to ensure the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). In that context, we would like to highlight the role of the Regional Centres of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. In our region we welcome the role of the Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Organization of American States in assisting the States that so request in establishing national action plans, reforming legislation in accordance with the resolution and capacity-building in various Government agencies, inter alia. Moreover, we appreciate the efforts of the Chair of the Committee in establishing more flexible communication channels with Member States, including, for example, by setting up national and regional focal points. Guatemala is committed to the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). During our term as a non-permanent member of the Council, we held the role of coordinator of the 1540 Committee Working Group on monitoring and national implementation. Furthermore, in addition to providing its third national report and updated matrix pursuant to resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006), Guatemala requested technical assistance from the Committee in developing a national plan of action for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and in several ongoing legislative processes. Finally, we must remember that the best way to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and prevent them from falling into the hands of non-State actors is to ensure that they no longer exist. In that respect, it is unacceptable that nuclear weapons are the only weapons of mass destruction that have not yet been prohibited. Guatemala, via its long-term commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation, supports the multilateral efforts currently under way to initiate negotiations towards a legally binding instrument prohibiting nuclear weapons, which threaten the very existence of humankind, and in that regard we reaffirm our unequivocal commitment to the cause of a safer world in which weapons of mass destruction — nuclear, chemical and biological — no longer exist.

I now give the floor to the representative of Singapore.

It is a pleasure to see the delegation of Malaysia, and to see you, Sir, in particular, presiding over the Security Council. I thank Malaysia for convening this open debate. I also endorse the statement made earlier by the representative of Iran on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. Singapore has no significant nuclear material or facilities, but we take our international responsibilities seriously. Singapore regards nuclear proliferation as a very serious matter. We are concerned that the threat of nuclear proliferation is being compounded by the threat of terrorism and illicit activities by non-State actors. In that regard, I wish to make three points. First, all countries need to strengthen their national legislation and internal processes to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly to non-State actors. As a global trans-shipment hub, Singapore is committed to working with other countries to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and combat illicit trafficking. In Singapore, we have upgraded radiation screening technology at our ports and tightened our export-control regime. We regularly review and update our export-controls list to ensure that our system is in line with international practice. Our financial institutions are regularly subjected to review to ensure the proper implementation of the controls necessary to prevent proliferation financing, as part of their compliance obligations. Secondly, we have to strengthen intraregional and interregional cooperation to build capacity and prevent any loopholes in the international counter-proliferation framework. In that regard, Singapore participates actively in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum meetings and other regional seminars on export controls and non-proliferation. We also continue to work with the European Union Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative in Southeast Asia. Singapore also participates at the annual Asian export- control seminars held in Japan, which is a good platform for the sharing of experiences in counter-proliferation. Thirdly, we need to support and strengthen international efforts aimed at addressing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Singapore plays its part in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). We have hosted two PSI exercises to date and look forward to hosting a third exercise in September. We have adopted the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering recommendations to combat proliferation financing. Singapore also hosts the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation, which fosters information-sharing among countries to counter transnational threats and networks that exploit new technology. As a responsible member of the United Nations, Singapore has faithfully taken action to implement the resolutions adopted by the Security Council on non-proliferation. We contributed to the open consultations on the review of resolution 1540 (2004) in June, and will continue working with all United Nations States Members to implement the resolution. Let me conclude by saying that Singapore believes that the international counter-proliferation regime is only as strong as its weakest link. It is therefore essential that we work collectively to create an effective global framework to counter the threat of nuclear proliferation. Singapore is fully committed to playing its part by working closely with other countries at the regional and global levels.

I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia.

We thank you, Sir, and the Malaysian delegation for convening this important debate, and would also like to thank the briefers for their valuable comments. Indonesia associates itself with the statement made by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. The Hibakusha are a heartfelt testament to the destruction of life because of weapons of mass destruction. In the wake of the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and with the adoption of first General Assembly resolution of the then new United Nations, which sought to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy, it was thought that never again would humankind be at risk of such suffering. While the building of a multilateral structure and machinery to control nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction was largely successful, those weapons, unfortunately, continue to exist and are being modernized at an unprecedented level. As a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, and having ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty, Indonesia is deeply concerned that, while it and many other countries have steadfastly upheld the collective global norms against nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, some countries have continued to shirk their responsibilities by retaining such weapons or taking refuge under nuclear-security umbrellas. As it considers resolution 1540 (2004) to be essential, Indonesia has supported it and will continue to do so. Non-proliferation is one side of the coin, while the other is complete disarmament. Both are necessary for international peace and security. The flawed concept of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots” is morally indefensible and promotes the legitimization of such weapons; as long as they exist, proliferation risks will remain. As highlighted in the President’s concept note (S/2016/712, annex), my delegation firmly believes in maintaining and bolstering, where necessary, measures to ensure that nuclear weapons, knowledge on their manufacture and delivery and related materials will never proliferate. Similarly, we must remain vigilant with regard to actions on the part of non-State groups. However, the issue of the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by non-State groups must be considered by all Member States inclusively. Our actions must flow from multilaterally negotiated treaties. A vital point on which to focus is capacity-building assistance for States in establishing injunctions, whereby no space in their territory would be available to terrorists for engaging in their despicable activities. Nuclear safety and nuclear security must rest with individual States. Any multilateral norms, guidelines or rules on nuclear security should be pursued within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) framework. As Indonesia detailed many of its actions in the context of resolution 1540 (2004) during the formal open consultations in June, I will now simply underline that Indonesia’s commitment to the issue is demonstrated by its vigorous adherence to, among others, the treaties and instruments I have mentioned. Through various national laws and programmes, we have instituted comprehensive measures against the development, acquisition, manufacture, possession, transportation, transfer or use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems. At the national level, an inter-ministerial working group coordinates the implementation of all national regulations on chemical, biological and nuclear safety and security. Our national nuclear energy regulatory agency, known as Bapeten, continues to strengthen its monitoring systems and control capabilities regarding our peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In the context of the national monitoring system, we have recently set in place, in cooperation with the IAEA, seven radioactivity portal monitors in our main sea ports. We are currently also in the process of finalizing a draft law on biosecurity. Regionally, Indonesia is actively participating in various Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) forums on export controls and non-proliferation. I would like to reiterate the significance of capacity- building and cooperation in the context of the various elements of resolution 1540 (2004). The Committee established purusant to that resolutionshould focus more on that area. Moreover, countries and the relevant international organizations with the requisite capacities bear a special responsibility in the provision of assistance, particularly technical and financial. My delegation reiterates its call for the immediate establishment of a fund dedicated to supporting Member States in the implementation of their resolution 1540 (2004) obligations. In conclusion, Indonesia would like to underscore that, as long as a single nuclear warhead or other weapon of mass destruction exists, the threat to humankind, by design or by accident, along with the devastating humanitarian consequences, persists. My delegation welcomes the adoption, last week, of the outcome of the Open-ended Working Group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear- disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons, as mandated by General Assembly resolution 70/33, which brings us a step closer to commencing the negotiation of an international legally binding instrument for the prohibition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, which would lead to their total elimination. Let us move forward boldly to realize the collective vision of a world without nuclear weapons. Present and future generations will not forgive us if we fail in our responsibility to prohibit and eliminate nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Together, let us exercise our political will, discharge our commitments and work resolutely to bring peace, stability and security to humankind.

I now give the floor to the representative of Chile.

We thank Mr. Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs of Malaysia, for convening and earlier presiding over this important open debate on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We also appreciate the briefings by the Secretary-General and invited speakers. Chile reaffirms its commitment to supporting multilateral efforts aimed at non-proliferation and the prohibition of the use and possession of all weapons of mass destruction, and we continue to promote the debate in a broad, transparent and democratic multilateral space in line with our foreign policy. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) forms the cornerstone of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and its universalization and balanced implementation should be based on its three pillars. We welcome the fact that the Open-ended Working Group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons, which recently completed its work in Geneva, has recommended, by an overwhelming majority, the start of negotiations on a legally binding instrument banning nuclear weapons with a view to their elimination, thereby complementing the NPT. We expect advances in that process and look forward to the possibility of concluding an instrument that would ban the only weapons of mass destruction that have never been explicitly prohibited, despite the fact that they violate elemental norms of international humanitarian law. With respect to chemical weapons, we urge universal adherence to the Convention that regulates and condemns their use under any circumstances, including by non-State actors. Moreover, the combined threat of biological knowledge, a global health emergency and the possible use of toxin agents by non-State actors calls for the urgent creation of a verification mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention. We expect progress in that area at the next Review Conference on the Convention, which is to be held in November this year. The threat of non-State actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction is more prevalent than ever before, and States must therefore redouble their efforts to meet the obligations of resolution 1540 (2004). In conjunction with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, we are organizing the first training course for focal points in the Latin America and the Caribbean region for the resolution. The course will be held in Santiago from 24 to 28 October, and we hereby invite the States of our region to participate through their focal points. In 2017 we will organize, along with Argentina, the second iteration of the bilateral exercise on cross-border radiation safety known as “Paihuén” with the support of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Finally, we are completing the steps towards being accepted as a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement on export controls relating to arms and dual-use technologies, which will allow us to improve our import and export standards regarding military and dual-use material in alignment with the standards expected from resolution 1540 (2004). We also support the ongoing comprehensive review of the resolution. Finally, our country supports the human security paradigm that places the individual at the centre of its priorities, with human rights and international humanitarian law forming the basis of our understanding of security, as we will continue to do especially in this area. We express our gratitude to Malaysia as President of the Security Council and to Spain as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) for their leadership and determination on this matter of crucial importance to the international community.

I now give the floor to the representative of Iraq.

At the outset, I would like to express our sincere congratulations to the Minister for Home Affairs of Malaysia on his country’s assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. We also express our congratulations and thanks to the Permanent Representative of Japan for his wise conduct of the Council’s work last month, and to Spain in leading the work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Access to weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups is one of the main dangers seriously threatening international peace and security. No country in the world can face or avoid such threats alone. Cooperation and coordination are necessary among all parties in the international community to face those threats effectively and combat the production and illegitimate transfer of nuclear materials and weapons of mass destruction. Our common responsibility requires that we establish a legally binding international legal framework to prevent the dual use of, or access to, such materials on the part of non-State parties. We stress the importance of resolution 1540 (2004), which we consider to be the most effective means available to take international measures to face the danger of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. In that context, I would like to stress that we have regularly briefed the Secretariat on the Government of Iraq’s implementation of the provisions of resolution 1540 (2004) through executive and legislative measures aimed at preventing access to weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups. We again stress our resolute support for all international efforts aimed at preventing terrorist groups from accessing weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, as well as trafficking in such weapons or the materials used in their production, in implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and other relevant international resolutions. Iraq also stresses the importance of promoting relevant national and international legislation in that regard. Article 9 (a) of Iraq’s Permanent Constitution stipulates that the Government of Iraq shall fully implement its international commitments in the area of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. It also prohibits all means of their development, manufacture, production or use. Iraq has therefore subscribed to all international treaties and agreements in the area of weapons of mass destruction, as well as conventions, agreements, protocols and international resolutions against terrorism. We make every effort and take the necessary steps to prevent any deviation in the peaceful uses of such materials, thereby complying with our commitments under the relevant international instruments. Iraq urgest all States Members of the United Nations to fully implement the provisions of resolution 1540 (2004) by adopting robust, effective measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. In view of the increasing terrorist threats and the possibility of the use by terrorist groups of such weapons, we call for the further enhancement of international and regional cooperation in this area so as to contain and fully eliminate the threats by providing the necessary know- how, technical assistance and capabilities to all States parties to enable them to detect such weapons and the materials used in their manufacture. In conclusion, we emphasize our determination to continue working at national, regional and international levels in promoting and strengthening our ability to prevent the non-proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

I now give the floor to His Excellency Mr. Ioannis Vrailas, Chargé d’affaires of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations. Mr. Vrailas: I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU) and its member States. The candidate countries Turkey, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania; the country of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina; as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, align themselves with this statement. First of all, allow me to thank the President for organizing this open debate on an important topic and for the concept note (S/2016/712, annex) prepared by the presidency. Indeed, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies to violent, extremist armed groups and non-State actors is a key concern for the entire international community. The European Union is gravely concerned by the possibility of non-State actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Ongoing reports and allegations of chemical weapons being used in Syria and Iraq are gravely concerning in that regard. Such risks add a further critical dimension to the current international security context  — one characterized by more acute and diffuse threats, in which the distinction between international and internal security is blurred. It is vitally important to enhance international cooperation, both in the framework of the United Nations and among all Member States, in order to address those challenges. Moreover, the European Union calls on all States that have not yet done so to become party to the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and all other international instruments against terrorism listed by the Secretary-General. Resolution 1540 (2004) remains a central pillar of the international non-proliferation architecture and its importance has become even greater in today’s challenging context. Since the beginning, we have been a staunch supporter of the robust and effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), with the objective of strengthening global efforts in that regard. The EU has carried out a number of projects with a view to continue promoting the full implementation of the resolution and to provide assistance to third countries in complying with their obligations under resolution 1540 (2004). In June, the EU submitted a report entitled “EU support to the full and universal implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540”. The report demonstrates the strong and consistent commitment of the EU and its member States to the resolution during the past decade and sets out our proposals on how that instrument should develop in the future in order to adapt to the new security challenges. I will not set out in detail all the elements contained in this report, but let me draw the attention of the Council to a couple of points relevant to today’s meeting: First, Council members will notice throughout the report the strong EU commitment to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), both internally within the EU and on the international scene. I would point, for example, to the EU-funded chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risk mitigation Centres of Excellence initiative, launched in 2010. With 8 regional secretariats and 54 partner countries, it has been very successful in strengthening national and regional CBRN governance. Another example is the robust EU export control regime, which is directly applicable and binding for all EU Member States. EU legislation is updated regularly to take into consideration technological developments and the latest decisions of the relevant international non-proliferation regimes and export control arrangements. The EU has also developed a dedicated EU P2P export control programme for dual-use items, worth €30 million, since 2004 and aimed at helping authorities in 34 States in six regions to strengthen their export control regime and to better comply with their obligations under resolution 1540 (2004) . In close collaboration with EU member States, the EU continues to implement CBRN action plans and to strengthen CBRN security throughout the EU. Likewise, the EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, known as Horizon 2020, encourages novel solutions to protect critical infrastructure and fight crime and terrorism. On the international scene, the EU and its member States continue to strongly support such various regimes as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as the global partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction. In light of new technological advances, current challenges and future threats, the upcoming Review Conference of the BTWC will offer an important opportunity to explore ideas and agree on specific decisions and actions to ensure the continued relevance and effectiveness of the Convention in a fast changing world. My second point is on assistance. The process used by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) for matching requests with offers of assistance should be improved. The 1540 Committee should have the technical, human and financial resources it needs to effectively fulfil its responsibilities. It should support States in developing strong, detailed assistance requests. Consideration should be given to providing the 1540 Committee with a permanent or longer-term mandate, reflecting the long-term nature of proliferation challenges. The 1540 Committee should strengthen its engagement with assistance providers, including with the EU and its member States and other donors participating in the global partnership. The comprehensive review will likely result in new needs and assistance requests. It is important that donors respond accordingly by making the best use of available resources and considering mobilizing additional resources, including contributions in kind. A third and last point is a very important one for the EU  — outreach to the private sector and to civil society. The 1540 Committee should promote an active role for industry, including through close coordination with relevant EU programmes, the Wiesbaden process, the Botticelli project and other industry initiatives. Such efforts should include a broad range of countries, regions, sectors, sizes — especially small and medium- sized enterprises  — and types of players, including suppliers, exporters and transporters. Outreach to industry and the financial sector should in particular aim at encouraging companies to set up internal compliance programmes; encouraging cooperation between Governments and industry/the financial sector, for instance when drafting legislation or implementing strategic trade controls; and addressing the challenges posed by cross-border supply chains. Increased outreach should also target civil society at large, as well as academia, national parliaments and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, to raise awareness of the resolution and its legal requirements. This year marks the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004) , and we expect it to reaffirm the centrality, importance and authority of the resolution in the multilateral non-proliferation architecture. The review should also be used to strengthen support for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts. The EU and its Member States believe that the future development of resolution 1540 (2004) should take account of new and emerging trends in nuclear, chemical and biological security. The 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts should be in a position to effectively support States in implementing the resolution in light of these trends. As a result of the comprehensive review, the EU and its Member States favour a strong restatement of the Council’s support for the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including, potentially, through a further Security Council resolution.

I now give the floor to observer of the League of Arab States.

At the outset, allow me to offer our sincere congratulations to Malaysia on its assumption of the presidency of the Security Council this month. I express our appreciation for the convening of this high-level open debate on the critical issue of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I also wish to thank Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Mr. Roux, Mr. Koblentz and Mr. Kim Won-soo. I should like to convey Arab disappointment and displeasure vis-à-vis the failure of the 2015 Review Confererence of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) — a failure sought to maintain the interests of one State non-party to the Treaty, although it alone in the Middle East possesses nuclear weapons. The real problem is the lack of political will to implement a resolution adopted more than 20 years ago, on which we have seen no genuine progress. The League is deeply concerned that nuclear weapon-States are developing and updating their nuclear weapons, and continue to rely on them in their military defence doctrines, counter to the provisions of article VI of the NPT. It has been repeatedly stressed in the international demands set forth in various forums that the role of such weapons in State security policies must be reduced. The latest such demand was made in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, although the nuclear-weapon States have not committed to its implementation. The technologies to develop these weapons have become increasingly sophisticated. In that regard, I join previous speakers in recalling that the NPT is the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation architecture. All Arab States are party to the Treaty and call on the international community to rid the world of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The 1995 resolution on the Middle East was adopted through compromise and consensus. It has been partially implemented through the permanent extension of the NPT, although the critical element that led to the agreement — the elimination of all nuclear weapons in the Middle East — has been ignored. Nuclear weapons are more lethal than any other WMDs. In the absence of measures to prevent their use, while it remains very easy to obtain lethal weapons of all sorts, the objective is not merely non-proliferation but indeed to rid the entire world of weapons that threaten its very existence. The 1995 resolution was merely one practical step to that end. Whereas the Middle East is today ravaged by conflicts in which hundreds of lives are lost every day, the non-proliferation of WMDs is essential to containing and resolving such conflicts peacefully. Developments on the ground must not be used as a pretext for double standards or allowing the only nuclear State of the region to remain outside the NPT regime, which prevents the Treaty from attaining universality and ridding the region of nuclear weapons. These fears were heightened when Israel attained the chairmanship of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly — given its record of numerous violations of international law and relevant resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)  — and led Arab States to abstain in the voting on the resolution concerning Israeli nuclear capabilities at the IAEA General Conference. In that regard, the League calls on the depositaries of the NPT to discharge their responsibility for implementing the resolution on the Middle East by pressuring Israel to accede to the Treaty and subject all its facilities to international control. The League of Arab States calls on all States to agree as soon as possible, and before the 2020 NPT Review Conference, to rid the Middle East of all nuclear weapons. We call on States that have resorted to double standards to review their current position in order to reach a regional balance in the Middle East, which in no circumstances can be struck in the presence of WMDs. In that regard, until an agreement can be reached to rid the Middle East of WMDs, including nuclear weapons, the Arab States must review the policies and positions they have maintained for four decades in support of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. We must reconsider all means necessary to ensure regional security in a region that cannot endure any further destabilization. In that respect, I refer to the declaration issued by the League at its Summit in Nouakchott on 25 and 26 July, in which it renewed its appeal for Israel to be compelled to accede to the NPT and subject its programmes and facilities to international control, and in which Arab Foreign Ministers called for a review of the various issues related to the elimination of nuclear weapons and other WMDs. In conclusion, I pay tribute to the Open-ended Working Group on Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations for its recommendations concerning nuclear disarmament upon the conclusion of its activities in Geneva on 19 August, where participating States adopted clear proposals for the launching negotiations on a legally binding treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons in 2017.

I now give the floor to the observer of the Organization of American States.

I am honoured to participate in this open debate of the Security Council on behalf of the Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS). At the outset, I thank the President of the Security Council for his initiative to address an issue of such importance as the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially in the context of the review of resolution 1540 (2004). OAS thanks the Kingdom of Spain for its strong work as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to ensure a broad and inclusive review of the resolution based on consensus  — a critical task to which this open debate will undoubtedly contribute significantly. Since the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004) more than a decade ago, the Organization of American States, through its Secretariat for Multidimensional Security and the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE), has directed its efforts towards a regional framework of cooperation to enable the effective implementation of the resolution by member States, taking their needs into account and promoting the strategic partnership between the OAS and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), its Group of Experts and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. The Organization of American States is endowed with the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism, which is the basic legal instrument that ensures the best complement between universal and regional treaties and other sources of obligations in force in the matter, such as the aforementioned resolution. One of the most prominent aspects of resolution 1540 (2004) is that concerning export controls of dual-use materials, equipment and technologies. The Latin American and Caribbean region is dynamic, with diverse levels of economic growth and activities that contribute significantly to international trade. Faced with this reality, the OAS seeks and promotes a good export control system that also acts as an incentive for more prosperous and secure trade and investment, which play a crucial part in the economic growth of its countries and is relevant to other strategic areas, such as the financial, tourism and services sectors. Having appropriate regulatory and institutional frameworks to promote trade and investment also strengthens border controls, security and air, land and martime transport and its critical infrastructure . OAS is convinced that there is a shared responsibility among States, international organizations, the private sector, the scientific sector and society as a whole in, first, preventing non-State actors from acquiring dual-use material for criminal ends; secondly, promoting greater understanding of the benefits of promoting secure trade and investment as the engine of community growth; and thirdly, increasing the capacities of all stakeholders to achieve these purposes. Since 2014, OAS has promoted the development and implementation of national action plans in the Americas as tools that complement national architectures to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. CICTE also promotes ongoing awareness of resolution 1540 (2004) throughout the hemisphere. Currently, OAS is supporting the efforts of 10 countries of the region in that field, including Panama, with its strong commitment to the fight against proliferation, manifested in its willingness to host the next regional conference on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and to assume the CICTE chairmanship for the period 2017-2018, in addition to hosting, together with OAS, a side event on non-proliferation on the margins of the seventy-first session of the General Assembly. I conclude by sharing some suggestions based on our regional experience. The cooperation of regional organizations should be instrumental in contributing to the fight against proliferation and terrorism. The legal dimension, by defining offences related to the proliferation and financing of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the enactment of laws on strategic trade and export control, should become a key component in the efforts of States parties. The implementation of the resolution should reconcile the needs of international security and strategic and safe trade. The efforts deployed by the CICTE and the OAS to that end should not be seen as isolated; rather, they are linked with the four strategic pillars of the OAS  — democracy, human rights, comprehensive development and multidimensional security  — all of which falls under the established banner of promoting increasingly expanded rights for a greater number of people. Let me conclude my remarks by expressing the full confidence of the OAS in the idea that today’s open debate will make a vital contribution to the success of the review of resolution 1540 (2004) and its future in the fight against proliferation, to which the organization I represent remains fully committed.

I thank Mr. Koncke for his briefing. I now give the floor to the representative of Morocco.

My delegation wishes to thank Malaysia for its initiative to hold today’s debate on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), a theme at the top of the international agenda in view of its importance for collective security. The delegation of the Kingdom of Morocco aligns itself with the statement made by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a threat to international peace and security. The Kingdom of Morocco shares the conviction of the international community, which remains concerned about the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors might acquire weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, develop or use them or engage in the trafficking thereof. The terrorist threat has been exacerbated to the point of jeopardizing the stability and territorial integrity of States. Similarly, efforts by terrorist groups to use WMDs have increased. This is the real threat that reinforces the need for the full and universal implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). The adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), in 2004, reflected a shared determination to step up the fight against the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and their delivery systems, and in particular to prevent their acquisition by non-State actors. The contribution of resolution 1540 (2004) to the non-proliferation regime, a unique instrument by virtue of its scope and the universal support it enjoys, is undeniable. The 10-year extension of the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) in 2011 reflects the shared determination to pursue the objectives of the resolution, which has filled international law gaps, in particular by introducing a comprehensive approach to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Kingdom of Morocco strictly complies with its obligations under all the relevant international instruments on WMDs and their means of delivery, including resolution 1540 (2004). The reports submitted regularly by Morocco highlight the efforts of the Kingdom to fulfil its obligations. Morocco also participates in the process and international efforts to fight against proliferation and to promote a culture of safety through training, practical exercises and exchange of experience and best practices, such as the Nuclear Security Summit, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Centres of Excellence for reducing nuclear, radiological, bacteriological and chemical risks. In that context, Morocco, together with Georgia and the Philippines, established a Group of Friends that aims to heighten awareness and promote and coordinate international efforts in the area of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear risk reduction. Morocco, which currently chairs the Group of Friends, invites all Member States to a high-level event on CBRN risks and counter- terrorism, to be organized by the Group in cooperation with the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute on 29 September. Morocco will also host, in cooperation with the 1540 (2004) Committee, the first meeting of African national contact points. The Kingdom of Morocco has always stressed the need for international cooperation and appropriate technical assistance to bolster national capacities on non-proliferation of WMDs and their means of delivery, especially in Africa. Only active international cooperation based on the principles of solidarity and shared responsibility can enable an effective and universal application of the provisions of resolution 1540 (2004) and the relevant multilateral instruments. The assistance mechanisms in place should be strengthened to be able to meet the expectations of States in need and to effectively help them to fulfil their obligations. I would also point out that, without the contribution of enhanced regional and subregional cooperation, national efforts will remain inadequate. I cannot conclude without reaffirming that the international community should accelerate its efforts to bring about the total elimination of WMDs as the ultimate guarantee against their proliferation, use or acquisition by non-State actors. The international community must safeguard the credibility and effectiveness of the relevant instruments by fulfilling all international obligations, including those related to disarmament. It is equally important in that context for the international community to move seriously towards delegitimizing nuclear weapons, the only type of weapon of mass destruction not to be subject to prohibition through an international legal instrument.

I now give the floor to the representative of Italy.

I would like to thank the briefers and our colleagues from the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and its Group of Experts for their excellent work in facilitating the comprehensive review of the resolution. Italy aligns itself with the statement made by the observer of the European Union and with the European Union report in support of the full and universal implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Italy is concerned about the proliferation risk posed by non-State actors. All Member States, international organizations and institutions should constantly update their response to these developments by improving transfer controls for sensitive materials and by enhancing the role of information and communications technologies and social media in countering terrorist narratives. We welcome the increase in the number of national reports and voluntary national implementation action plans. We are also pleased to recall that last year Italy deposited its instrument of ratification to the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Significant progress has also been made on the ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. We believe that the cooperation among Member States and the 1540 (2004) Committee should be enhanced. An increasing number of States are inviting the Committee, together with the Counter-Terrorism Committee, to conduct visits, which is another positive sign of States’ commitment in this field. In that regard, I would like to recall the Committee’s visit to my country last year. Italy promoted the Nuclear Security Summit Gift Basket on Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres in support of the work of the Centres of Excellence in enhancing nuclear security worldwide. Every year we organize the International School on Nuclear Security at the International Centre for Theoretical Physics, in Trieste, which trains professionals from countries of the developing world on the international legal framework on nuclear security. To counter the risk of the proliferation of chemical weapons, Italy has conducted several chemical security programmes in collaboration with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), whose inspectors are often trained at Italian chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence centres. Italian chemical industries participate widely in the OPCW Associate Programme, training experts from other countries in various industrial operations in order to facilitate industry-related implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Italy has also contributed to the Joint United Nations-OPCW multilateral operation that safely and security transported and destroyed Syrian chemical agents, including providing the United Nations-OPCW Joint Mission with in-kind and financial assistance. Finally, we made a voluntary contribution to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe project on the regional implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), concerning the comprehensive review of chemical safety and security in Ukraine. Italy believes it would be appropriate to continue to focus on four main areas. First, we invite those States that have not yet submitted their first national report to do so as soon as possible. Secondly, we need capacity-building initiatives in States that lack the necessary means, which should be supported by providing the Committee with appropriate technical, humanitarian and financial resources. Thirdly, the active involvement of the private sector, civil society, national Parliaments and academia should be encouraged in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), while cooperation with industry representatives would strengthen control on dual-use material transfers. Fourthly, border controls and the protection of sensitive materials and goods experts are key tools for fighting the proliferation, smuggling and trafficking of weapons of mass destruction. The European Union expert control regulation, which is legally binding and directly applicable to all Member States, is a valuable example of border-control policy aimed at curbing illegal trafficking. In conclusion, Italy reiterates its support for a renewed commitment by the Security Council to preventing and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Italy remains fully committed to further enhancing it by participating constructively in all relevant international organizations and initiatives, as well as through active engagement by Italian industry, civil society and academia.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Philippines.

The Philippines is indeed proud to see a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in the Security Council presidency for the month of August. The Philippines congratulates the Malaysian presidency for convening this open debate, which will deepen our discourse on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The prevailing global security environment, characterized by persistent inter- and intrastate conflicts and frequent violent extremist activities, makes it even more incumbent upon us to find urgent and concrete measures that will ensure that weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) are not propagated and never used. The mere existence of those destructive weapons makes the world highly vulnerable to their use, whether by intent, miscalculation or accident. It is therefore imperative to remain focused on the ultimate goal of ridding the world of those weapons. The international community has made great strides in the area of non-proliferation with the adoption and implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and other related initiatives, such as the Nuclear Security Summit process, which complement other existing global legal instruments. The changing face of international conflict, however, necessitates tougher measures and stronger international cooperation that will guarantee effective implementation by each individual State. In that regard, we welcome the open consultations on the comprehensive review of the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) convened by Spain last June. We look forward to the outcome of the review in December, when we will have identified and recommended ways and means to improve the resolution’s implementation. Resolution 1540 (2004) encourages all States to prepare, on a voluntary basis, national implementation action plans. More than a decade since the resolution’s adoption, we have come to realize that the national action plan is a vital, indispensable tool if States are to be fully prepared to address the proliferation of WMDs. The Philippines has in place its own chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) action plan aimed at reducing the threat of, and damage from, CBRN incidents of accidental, natural or intentional origin, including terrorist acts. Our CBRN national action plan provides a unified approach to build the capacity of the Philippines to respond to the risks associated with CBRN materials. To make our CBRN national action plan more effective, we recently signed into law a bill to further strengthen our regime against the proliferation of WMDs in our country. The Strategic Trade Management Act will stop the spread of WMDs through responsible management of trade and investment in strategic goods and the provisions of related services. We consider strategic goods as products that, for security reasons or due to international agreements, are considered to be of such military importance that their export is either prohibited altogether or subject to specific conditions. Such goods are generally suitable to be used for military purposes or for the production of WMDs. Our law requires establishing a national strategic goods list to describe specifically the strategic goods subject to authorization. The list will be in conformity with international commitments and non-proliferation obligations pursuant to bilateral and multilateral treaties, international conventions and international non-proliferation regimes. Many Member States have pointed to the necessity of international and regional cooperation being key in our fight against WMDs. For countries that do not yet have the highest level of detection capability to intercept WMDs, continuous assistance in training and resources from regional and international partners will be essential. We also urge the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) to put in place an improved matchmaking system to ensure prompt and effective response to requests for assistance. Finally, the Philippines has banded with 14 other Member States to further promote CBRN risk mitigation and security governance in the United Nations. As mentioned earlier by the representative of Morocco, in late September the Group of Friends of CBRN Risk Mitigation and Security Governance will host a high- level side event that will focus on CBRN risk mitigation in the context of combating terrorism. The Group, which has grown to 15 members, stands ready to work with the 1540 Committee and other like-minded groups to focus the spotlight on the risks of CBRN materials falling into the hands of terrorists.

I now give the floor to the representative of Canada.

I have four main points to make today on the challenges that we face in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and their means of delivery. First, on Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), the resolution has contributed greatly to international peace and security over the past 12 years. However, more must be done to ensure that it is fully implemented by all Member States and adapted to emerging challenges. As part of the 31-member Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, Canada has helped partner countries meet their resolution 1540 (2004) obligations, including by providing more than $1.2 billion over the past decade to prevent the proliferation of WMDs and related materials. Unfortunately, as we underscored during the open consultation on the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004) in June, assistance requests received through the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) almost always lack the specificity required for willing countries to provide assistance. If resolution 1540 (2004) is to be fully implemented, the Committee should establish an implementation support unit dedicated to helping Member States develop detailed and actionable assistance requests. (spoke in French) Secondly, with respect to enhancing nuclear security, Canada is strongly committed to maintaining our own robust domestic regime and providing international assistance. At the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, Canada committed $42 million for nuclear and radiological security worldwide, and, along with Spain and the Republic of Korea, spearheaded the adoption of the joint statement on promoting the full and universal implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). To continue implementing those nuclear-security commitments, Canada is proud to be convening the first meeting of the Nuclear Security Contact Group on the margins of the International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference to be held in September. Thirdly, the full implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention will greatly help to prevent non-State actors from acquiring chemical and biological weapons. All Member States should ensure effective national control of chemical and life-science research to prevent its use for terrorist purposes, while realizing its important peaceful benefits. We call on all Member States to join those important conventions and demonstrate their commitment to preventing the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons. (spoke in English) Finally, let me underline Canada’s commitment to progressive and pragmatic efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, draw down existing stockpiles and eliminate them verifiably and irreversibly. Such a step-by-step approach includes the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty that bans the production of nuclear explosive materials  — which is the next logical step in advancing non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament goals. Ending fissile material production will clearly help counter WMD proliferation. We strongly believe that the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty should commence as soon as possible, and we will continue to work towards that goal.

I now give the floor to the representative of Belgium.

I thank the President for organizing this debate, which is timely in the context of the current review of resolution 1540 (2004). Belgium aligns itself with the statement made by the observer of the European Union. As a member of the Group of Friends of resolution 1540 (2004), we wish to stress the importance and relevance of that instrument in the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly their manufacture, possession and use by non-State actors. Today, that struggle must take into account the evolution of the risks posed, in terms of both the hardware and propaganda used and its ongoing geographical proliferation. My country calls for the full implementation by all States of all of the provisions of resolution 1540 (2004) and for its strengthening. While progress has been observed in the adoption by States of legal frameworks, those measures sometimes still lack implementation. It is also important that all organizations involved in the implementation of the resolution coordinate their efforts, seek constructive synergies and avoid duplication of effort. The fight against terrorism has a multidimensional character, and we can only welcome the adoption by the General Assembly of the Global Strategy against Terrorism, revised in June, and call for its implementation. The definition of new legal provisions to take into account recent technical and technological developments and to prevent the financing of terrorism should also be encouraged. Awareness of the private and civil-society sector is also essential, as is, more specifically, outreach to the academic world. In that regard, my country launched an awareness campaign in the academic and research sectors regarding the risks of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the role of academic and scientific research in that context. The issues of the maintenance and transport of weapons of mass destruction deserve greater focus. The adoption by the Security Council, on 22 July, of resolution 2298 (2016), on the chemical weapons found in Libya, is welcome. Another challenge concerns export controls, the fight against traffickers and border security. Finally, international cooperation is the catalyst needed to strengthen resolution 1540 (2004) in its preventive aspects. My country is committed to the concept of peer review. In the framework of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Biological and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, the Benelux countries organized a peer review conference in 2015, the results of which were shared with other States parties to the Convention in view of the upcoming eighth Review Conference in November this year. The objective is to improve the implementation of the Convention at the national level, build trust among partners, share best practices and strengthen the debate on international verification of compliance with the Convention. The review of resolution 1540 (2004) must also enable progress through joint efforts aimed at strengthening the national structures of each State.

I now give the floor to the representative of Peru.

Peru welcomes the presidency’s convening of this meeting and would like to reiterate its commitment and full support for the Security Council’s robust efforts aimed at promoting dialogue and cooperation to confront the threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery. Since the founding of the United Nations, the international community has promoted the building of a comprehensive international legal regime on disarmament, specifically nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The ultimate solution for preventing proliferation lies in achieving the goal of total elimination and prohibition. With respect to the international legal regime, we note a synergy among the mandates of the main international instruments on the subject. Specific conventions accord with the provisions of resolution 1540 (2004) in seeking to prevent access by terrorists to weapons of mass destruction. The adoption of resolution 1540 (2004) was a historic milestone in addressing new threats to international peace and security associated with the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons to non-State actors. Peru was a sponsor the resolution because we believed that it was necessary at the time, as it is now, to act urgently to promote the international and full universalization and implementation of multilateral treaties to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as to encourage States to adopt effective national legislation to control the illicit transfer of such weapons, their delivery systems and related materials. We believe that it is necessary that States continue along the path towards adopting measures to prevent the financing of prohibited activities related to weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials, including with regard to the physical protection of, and accounting for, materials related to weapons of mass destruction, all the while ensuring their safe production, use, storage and transport. My country is firmly committed to efforts aimed at achieving complete disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, as well as their delivery systems. We therefore support the enhancement and universalization of legally binding multilateral agreements in that area, having taken various administrative and criminal measures to effectively fulfil the obligations under resolution 1540 (2004), mainly in the areas of border and customs control, controlling air and maritime spaces, and intelligence, in order to prevent the illicit production of, and trade in, weapons of mass destruction. In that regard, Peru has adapted its domestic legislation to the standards set out in resolution 1540 (2004), as was shown in the latest reports submitted by my country on its level of compliance with it. My country urges all States to support international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and calls for taking and strengthening national measures, as appropriate, so as to prevent non-State actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and materials and technologies related to their production. In conclusion, my delegation believes that the maintenance of peace and security is a task that requires the participation of the international community as a whole. In that regard, Peru remains firmly committed to the overall architecture of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We call upon all Member States to intensify their efforts in that area. You can count on Peru, Madam President, to continue to do its part in this collective effort.

I now give the floor to the representative of Germany.

Let me express our gratitude to the Presisdent for convening this open debate on non-proliferation. I would also like to align myself with the statement made by the observer of the European Union. While it is undisputable that substantial progress has been made in the 12 years since the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), there is no doubt that the risk of non-State actors acquiring, developing, trafficking in or using weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and their means of delivery remains high. Unfortunately, it is a risk that can quickly become a reality, as the use of chemical weapons by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham in Syria, particularly in Iraq, has clearly shown. We therefore urge all States to continue to work towards the aim of full implementation, bearing in mind the importance of a global, multilateral and binding approach to non-proliferation. Germany reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the full and universal implementation of the obligations deriving from resolution 1540 (2004). That of course includes enhancing the security of nuclear materials worldwide. Germany continues to encourage and assist other States in implementing resolution 1540 (2004). We have done so, for example, by sharing experiences and identifying effective practices. Against the background of recent proposals to intensify efforts to combat the use of chemical weapons by terrorists, we need to carefully examine the contribution that resolution 1540 (2004) can make in that context, while working closely with other forums, such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The key to preventing such acts is without any doubt the national implementation of Security Council resolutions and other obligations. We need to think more carefully about ways to enhance the implementation of the relevant resolutions. Resolution 1540 (2004) requires States to take a number of specific measures, adopti and enforce effective laws and establish export controls of dual-use goods and technologies. At the same time, we need to keep in mind that, in a globalized world, the involvement of the private sector is vital for successful non-proliferation. After all, it is the private sector that must implement many of the rules and laws. Against that backdrop, Germany initiated the Wiesbaden process in 2011, which focuses on private sector engagement in the context of resolution 1540 (2004). To date, four international industry outreach conferences have taken place. Industry representatives from diverse sectors, such as the aviation, biosecurity, banking, finance, electronics, energy, public-health, pharmaceutical and transportation sectors, have shared best practices in export control and compliance. We are proud that Wiesbaden has become a brand and that the issue is part of the agenda on this resolution. Listening to concerns and proposals of industry representatives has helped and will facilitate more effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) — first, by strengthening export controls, secondly, by controlling access to intangible transfers of technology and, thirdly, by controlling information that could be used for WMDs and their means of delivery. The fourth Wiesbaden Conference, held in November 2015, aimed at contributing to the comprehensive review by focusing on lessons learned from past conferences. There are three outcomes that I would like to mention in particular: first, ways and challenges to effectively implement compliance programmes within enterprises; secondly, the creation of industry networks, especially to help small- and medium-sized enterprises to comply with all national regulations and requirements; and, finally, the establishment of regional forums. Moreover, on a broader scale, Germany is engaged in fighting the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons. We are of the opinion that it is crucial to raise awareness of illegal procurement activities and dual-use risks among enterprises in the biotechnology and chemical industries. As producers of products that are critical owing to their dual-use risk, enterprises play a key role in the implementation process of resolution 1540 (2004). Let me conclude by stressing that Germany stands ready to broaden the scope of the Wiesbaden process by addressing the issues of biosecurity, chemical and nuclear security, transport, brokering and export control.

I now give the floor to the Permanent Observer of the Observer State of the Holy See to the United Nations. Brother Carroll: The Holy See commends the presidency of Malaysia for bringing this topic to the attention of the Security Council and the entire international community. At the very outset, my delegation wishes to reiterate the Holy See’s constant and firm opposition to the production and use of weapons of mass destruction. Any act or weapon that aims indiscriminately to destroy entire cities or extensive areas, together with their inhabitants, is against all international humanitarian law and merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation. While treaties and conventions have been reached to ban chemical and biological weapons and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, human genius continues to invent new ways of annihilating humankind. For instance, conventional weapons are becoming increasingly less conventional as technological advances elevate their power to destroy to the level of weapons of mass destruction. For that reason, the Holy See recommends that discussions on weapons of mass destruction go beyond the traditional categories of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons to include devastatingly powerful conventional weapons used to perpetrate war crimes and crimes against humanity. Military forces, rebels, terrorists and extremist groups use, with greater frequency, ever-more powerful conventional weapons, showing scant regard for civilian immunity, discrimination or proportionality. Indeed, humanitarian disasters that continue to unfold in real time before our very own eyes show us that schools, hospitals and other civilian infrastructure are blown up by the incessant use of powerful conventional weapons. The tens of millions of refugees and displaced persons send an important message in the Chamber today: We must flee or die as our cities and communities are entirely devastated, not by nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, but by powerful conventional weapons. These tragedies call for the international community to strictly implement all legally binding treaties and instruments on the prohibition and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and urgently call us to review existing classifications and definitions of what constitutes a weapon of mass destruction. In this very Chamber and in other forums, the Holy See has repeatedly called on weapon-producing nations of the world to severely limit and control the manufacture and sale of weapons to unstable countries and regions of the world, where the likelihood of their illegal use and of falling into the hands of non-State actors is real and present. The proliferation of weapons, regardless of whether they are conventional or of mass destruction, simply aggravates situations of conflict and results in huge human and material costs, thereby profoundly undermining development and the search for lasting peace. Indeed, non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament underpin global security and sustainable development. Without them, the achievement of the much-vaunted 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development will be seriously jeopardized. Double standards in the implementation of treaties and conventions on the prohibition and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction can only encourage disregard for the very same treaties and conventions on the part of those who are aggrieved or discriminated against. The discrimination between countries with and without weapons of mass destruction cannot be a permanent situation. If it is unthinkable to imagine a world where weapons of mass destruction are available to all, it is reasonable to imagine, and to work collectively for, a world where nobody has them at all. The international community must therefore appeal and act with one voice to ban all weapons of mass destruction. This objective requires the continued advocacy and cooperation of all, because much remains to be done. There is no doubt that every step towards banning weapons of mass destruction is a giant step towards achieving the goal of a better world.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea.

I would first like to thank Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs Ahmad Zahid Hamidi and the Malaysian presidency for organizing this important open debate. We appreciate this opportunity for the Security Council to focus on promoting the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and to reaffirm its resolve against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). I would also like to join others in thanking Secretary- General Ban Ki-moon, Special Representative Roux, Mr. Koblentz and Under-Secretary-General Kim Won-soo for their briefings. Since its adoption in 2004, resolution 1540 (2004) has been an important part of the global security architecture. It has helped enable the international community to meet emerging security challenges coming from the possibility of non-State actors using WMDs for terrorist purposes. Yet it can and should play a greater role in the face of daunting challenges. Rapid advances in science and technology have increased accessibility to WMDs and related materials by non-State actors. International terrorists groups, such Al-Qaida and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), are watching for loopholes in the non-proliferation regime. On our efforts to secure the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), I would like to make three points. First, we must further cement partnerships with regional and international organizations, academia and civil society. In particular, the role of industry is essential in preventing WMD proliferation, as it is often at the front line of dealing with sensitive and dual-use items. In that regard, the Republic of Korea will host the first regional Wiesbaden Conference in Asia for industry outreach on resolution 1540 (2004). The Conference aims to enhance communication between Government and the private sector and to strengthen regional implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). We will share the results of the conference with the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) with a view to contributing specific recommendations from industry. Secondly, we must enhance the 1540 Committee’s role in providing assistance to Member States. This is crucial for the broad spectrum of obligations to be effectively met. As noted during the formal open consultations in June, the number of assistance requests from Member States has been declining, and the responses to those requests modest. We need to strengthen the matchmaking role of the Committee to support national capacity-building in collaboration with various regional and international organizations. Thirdly, we need a more coordinated and holistic approach to countering WMD proliferation. Identifying new trends in the security environment and responding in a timely manner cannot be achieved by the 1540 Committee alone. In that regard, we welcome the 1540 Committee’s efforts to coordinate with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2254 (2015). Before concluding, I would be remiss if I did not mention the threat posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear programme. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continues to defy the international community by refusing to end its pursuit of a nuclear-weapon capability. That was demonstrated by its fourth nuclear test, on 6 January, and the 17 ballistic missile launches conducted this year. North Korea’s persistent violations of international obligations, including Security Council resolutions, call into question its qualification as a United Nations State Member. We must take united action to ensure that North Korea complies with its obligations. Once again, I would like to reaffirm the Republic of Korea’s commitment to the full and universal implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). We will continue to support and work closely with the 1540 Committee.

I now give the floor to the representative of Cuba.

The increasing challenges to the maintenance of peace and security is a legitimate concern of the international community. The possibility of attacks being carried out using nuclear, chemical and biological materials cannot be ruled out. Such risks cannot be eliminated by applying a selective approach limited to horizontal proliferation while ignoring vertical proliferation and general and complete disarmament. In that regard, we oppose measures that prohibit or restrict the legitimate right of States to gain access to and use nuclear energy, biological agents or chemical substances and the technologies and knowledge associated with them, whenever such use is for peaceful purposes. We are deeply concerned about the threat posed by the existence of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. We regret that the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) ended without an agreement. We also regret the lack of political will shown by certain nuclear-weapon States and others protected by the so-called nuclear umbrella. As a result, it has proved impossible to put an end to the serious situation of parties’ non-compliance with the provisions of the Treaty and the agreements reached at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. Contrary to the provisions of the NPT and the calls from the overwhelming majority of the international community, multimillion-dollar plans have been launched to modernize nuclear arsenals and create new means of delivery. With new and modified nuclear warheads, modern intercontinental ballistic missiles, hypersonic systems and sophisticated drones, our planet will not be a safer world. In Cuba, in accordance with the international obligations that we have assumed under the NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention and the International Atomic Energy Agency, all of our programmes in the nuclear, chemical and biological fields have a strictly peaceful character and are directed to the socioeconomic development of the country. Similarly, the Cuban State has adopted a set of measures to ensure that no terrorist acts, which we condemn outright, are committed in the country, nor do we permit the organization or financing of acts of that type against other States. In connection with the review process of resolution 1540 (2004) that is taking place this year, Cuba has stressed that the resolution should include a reference to the imperative of total and complete disarmament and the link between non-proliferation and disarmament. Cuba supports the urgent start of negotiations aimed at reaching agreement on an inclusive nuclear-weapons convention that ensures the prohibition of such weapons as well as their irreversible, transparent and verifiable elimination. Cuba is meeting its obligations and commitments under the relevant international treaties to which it is a party. The full implementation of the relevant international instruments is an effective way to prevent the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, Cuba believes that international cooperation in the implementation of the obligations and commitments, as well as technical assistance, without conditions or discrimination, plays a key role. We believe that resolution 1540 (2004) must, as a priority, preserve its non-proliferation component. Cuba believe that the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) should play an important role in assisting States in its implementation, which is the purpose for which it was created. The actions of the Security Council must not undermine existing multilateral treaties on weapons of mass destruction, international organizations established in connection with those treaties or the role of the General Assembly. We reaffirm our conviction that the only absolute guarantee for preventing the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction, including by terrorists, is the complete and immediate elimination and prohibition of all nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth. No measure will be fully effective in preventing the occurrence of terrorist attacks with weapons of mass destruction as long as such weapons continue to exist.

I now give the floor to the representative of South Africa.

South Africa welcomes the convening of today’s open debate on the challenges we face in addressing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), their means of delivery and related materials. The subject of today’s open debate is very important and relevant, particularly in the wake of the continuous threats to international peace and security posed by the continued possession, use and threat of use of WMDs and their means of delivery. Such threats are further compounded by the ever- increasing chances that such weapons could end up in the hands of non-State actors. South Africa associates itself with the statement made by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. I would like to share South Africa’s perspective on the topic before us. Since 1994, South Africa has been steadfast in its commitment to multilateralism in addressing the peace and security challenges facing the global community, including the horizontal and vertical proliferation of WMDs and their means of delivery. South Africa reaffirms that no cause could ever justify the use or threat of use of weapons of mass destruction anywhere, by anyone or under any circumstances. While significant progress has been achieved in the elimination of biological and chemical weapons through the universalization and implementation of the conventions prohibiting biological and chemical weapons, progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons continues to lag behind. Significantly, nuclear weapons remain the only WMDs yet to be subject to a global prohibition. Regrettably, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which constitutes the foundation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, continues to be subject to significant tensions resulting primarily from the non-implementation of the nuclear-disarmament obligations under article VI of the Treaty and the related commitments made at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences. The three international Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons held since 2012 and the Open-ended Working Group of the General Assembly to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons, which was convened in Geneva this year, provided inclusive platforms for the international community to explore options for taking forward multilateral nuclear-disarmament negotiations aimed at achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons. In that context, the Open-ended Working Group has now recommended to the Assembly that it convene a conference in 2017 to commence negotiations on a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons. While such a treaty may not achieve immediate results, it could, as an interim step, address a glaring gap in the international legal architecture on the legality of nuclear weapons. Such a treaty would also strengthen the NPT and underline the urgency of accelerating the implementation of nuclear-disarmament obligations and related commitments. With regard to biological and chemical weapons, South Africa remains committed to the universalization of the relevant instruments and to the full implementation of all legally binding obligations. With the upcoming 2016 Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention, South Africa will work constructively towards an outcome that would strengthen the Convention and its balanced implementation, including through an enhanced inter-sessional process and an appropriately resourced implementation-support unit. In terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention, South Africa welcomes the progress made towards the destruction of chemical weapons around the globe. In that regard, we welcome the progress made in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons and facilities. We furthermore welcome the progress made by the Russian Federation and the United States of America, which are scheduled to complete their destruction activities in 2020 and 2023, respectively. We share the concern of the international community with regard to the threat posed by non-State actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction. In that regard, we remain committed to the strengthening of transfer controls, as called for in resolution 1540 (2004). We recognize the need for international assistance and cooperation, especially for States that may not have the requisite resources to give effect to their obligations. South Africa participated in the formal consultations on the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004), which were ably organized by Spain in June. We look forward to the review outcomes, which we hope will strengthen the resolution and provide an added dynamic in tackling the challenges of WMD proliferation, particularly with regard to non-State actors. Over the years, South Africa has strengthened its implementation capability through comprehensive national legislation focused on WMDs and their means of delivery, which includes the establishment of the Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. That Council is responsible for coordinating the national implementation of our international WMD obligations and regulations and for monitoring compliance across all the relevant stakeholders. Our domestic legislation is subject to continuous review, which takes into account new technological developments and experiences in national implementation. South Africa remains ready to continue to play its part in assisting countries in our region and beyond in strengthening national controls over sensitive items that may contribute to the development of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. While dealing with the the challenges I have mentioned, it is imperative that no unwarranted restrictions be imposed on the inalienable right of Member States, particularly developing countries, to use any related materials, equipment and technologies for peaceful purposes. In that regard, the opportunities provided by nuclear technologies in the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals, particularly in areas such as food security, public-health technologies and clean energy, cannot be overlooked. Furthermore, the exchange of scientific information, equipment and materials for peaceful purposes is greatly needed in Africa to deal with the spread of infectious diseases, which could derail socioeconomic growth and development if not adequately addressed. South Africa’s experience with the implementation of WMD regimes has demonstrated that the challenges of WMDs and their delivery systems can be addressed through the following ways. First, we must strengthen national legislation and implementation capabilities. Secondly, we need to accelerate the provision of capacity-building and technical expertise, especially to developing countries, including those in Africa. Thirdly, we must strengthen international cooperation with other related international organizations. Fourthly, we need to ensure adequate and predictable funding for the relevant international organizations and implementation-support structures to enable them to implement their mandates. Fifthly, we must strengthen cooperation between regional organizations and the relevant multilateral organizations. Sixthly, and lastly, we need to enhance cooperation with civil society and the private sector. In conclusion, the threat of WMD proliferation can be dealt with effectively only through increased international cooperation and assistance and the strengthening of the relevant multilateral instruments and institutions. Non-proliferation is not a goal in itself, but a means towards the goal of a world free from the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Selectivity and discriminatory practices will not serve our collective interests in strengthening international peace and security. What is required is a faithful and balanced implementation of the various international legally binding instruments.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands.

I join my colleagues in expressing my appreciation to Malaysia for organizing this timely and important debate. The prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and related materials and technologies to violent, extremist armed groups and non-State actors is of crucial importance to global security. Such proliferation represents a threat that requires strong national and international mechanisms and calls for effective international cooperation. It is therefore essential to maintain its prominent place on the international agenda. The Kingdom of the Netherlands is, and will remain, a dedicated international partner in that regard, which we hope to demonstrate further if elected as a member of the Council in 2018. I align myself with the statement made earlier today by the observer of the European Union. Let me take this opportunity to highlight some of the activities and priorities of the Netherlands. I will focus on three issues, namely, nuclear security, inclusiveness and resolution 1540 (2004). On nuclear security, the prevention of nuclear and radiological terrorism has been one of our top priorities for the past several years. We took active part in the Nuclear Security Summit process and hosted the meeting in 2014 held in The Hague. The Summit process led to significant progress in reducing the amount of weapons-usable nuclear material in circulation. It strengthened the international nuclear-security architecture and enhanced international cooperation in that field. In addition, the Summits themselves served to raise awareness at the highest political levels of the nuclear and radiological terrorism threat. As the Summit host in 2014, we sought to contribute actively to translating the Nuclear Security Summit political commitments into concrete actions. In the same vein, the Netherlands is currently the international coordinator for the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The Initiative has been instrumental in enhancing national capabilities through practical and effective international cooperation, which seeks to prevent, detect and respond to nuclear terrorism. My second point concerns inclusiveness. Through the initiatives and activities I have just mentioned, a robust network of political, judicial, intelligence and technical contacts has been established. Collaboration within and across Governments has been enhanced. Other relevant groups have also become more engaged, including industry and civil society. That engagement is essential to our efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction  — a point made so clearly by our colleague from Italy earlier today. Going forward, we believe it is necessary to take steps to maintain such networks and to sustain close and effective international cooperation. My third point concerns resolution 1540 (2004). The Kingdom of the Netherlands remains firmly committed to the full and effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), which we see as a central instrument for preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors. The comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004) offers a very welcome opportunity to strengthen that implementation, and we greatly appreciate the leadership of Spain in that regard. We pay tribute to the open and inclusive nature of the review process, as set up by Spain. Especially commendable is the involvement of the wider membership. Enhancing the effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) requires the sustainable enforcement of national laws and regulations. That concerns not just law enforcement, but also export controls, physical protection and control of the financial channels used by non-State actors to proliferate weapons. Challenges clearly remain when it comes to effective implementation. From our perspective, we see three ways to strengthen the implementation mechanism. The first involves providing technical assistance, the point raised by our South African colleague, who spoke just before me. The further provision of technical assistance is quite crucial. Secondly, we must promote regional collaboration so as to prevent implementation gaps. And, thirdly, we need to promote active engagement with industry, the private sector and civil society. In conclusion, although much has been accomplished to prevent the spread of WMDs, related materials and technologies, much more remains to be done. We should maintain momentum in raising awareness of the threats and challenges in that regard. Together we should devise and implement the measures needed to combat the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism threat. Only by working together, all of us, can we be truly effective. The Kingdom of the Netherlands looks forward to continuing to work closely with partners on this issue as part of peace, justice and development.

I now give the floor to the representative of Sri Lanka.

Let me take this opportunity to join other speakers in commending the Malaysian presidency for convening this timely open debate on the challenges we face in addressing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials. We express our appreciation to Mr. Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs of Malaysia, for presiding over the meeting this morning, and to the Secretary- General for his opening remarks. The need to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is now more urgent than ever. As the menace of terrorism, with the increasing threat of destabilization of established States, continues to confront the international community, there is the danger that weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related material will fall into the hands of non-State actors, with unthinkable consequences. Our urgent attention must be focused on this grave issue. There is a dire a need to enhance the coordination of efforts at national, subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to that serious challenge and the threat it poses to international security. Resolution 1540 (2004), a key component of the global non-proliferation architecture, underlines the importance of promoting dialogue and cooperation among States in addressing the threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery. This open debate is an important step in that direction. Strengthening the disarmament treaty regime is essential to ensure a rules-based regime for nuclear disarmament. In that connection, we wish to recall, and reiterate our support for, the key recommendations of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission of 2006, specifically with regard to the paramount value of multilateralism and the overall importance of treaties and international law in achieving the goal of disarmament. Apart from the key instruments in the field of disarmament, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), there is the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which address specific situations involving access to nuclear material by non-State actors. They provide a comprehensive normative framework for international cooperation to address this challenge. We also welcome the work carried out by Spain as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) in the comprehensive review of the resolution. This debate will no doubt make rich contributions to that ongoing comprehensive review process, which is expected to come up with proposals by the end of the year for Member States to strengthen the implementation of the resolution. The review process must address new challenges that have arisen, such as the utilization of information and technological developments, particularly on the Internet, for proliferation purposes. The challenges that developing countries face with regard to capacity- building and training needs in their efforts to achieve the objectives of resolution 1540 (2004) must also be addressed. Sri Lanka’s commitment to the elimination of the threat posed by nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is reflected in the international treaty obligations we have undertaken in the field of disarmament. We believe that a transparent, sustainable and credible plan for multilateral nuclear disarmament is required in order to achieve the ultimate goal of a world free of weapons of mass destruction. Their total elimination is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of these weapons. All States have an obligation to negotiate in good faith to achieve the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. We wish to reiterate the centrality of the international treaty regime, including the NPT, as well as the Action Plan of the 2010 NPT Review Conference and the 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and the importance of adherence to all other principal legal instruments in that field.

I now give the floor to the representative of Bangladesh.

My delegation expresses its appreciation to the presidency of Malaysia for convening this open debate. Bangladesh aligns itself with the statement delivered earlier by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. The potential consequence of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), especially nuclear weapons, falling in the wrong hands is only too vivid to require reiteration. That possibility has become more and more real as terrorists and other non-State actors continue to choose their targets without discrimination, and accordingly keep evolving their modes of operation to carry out their heinous acts. Such evolving trends require us to devise innovative, well-coordinated and foolproof mechanisms to effectively prevent the illicit use or transfer of weapons of mass destruction and their means of production and delivery. The adoption by consensus of General Assembly resolution 70/36, entitled “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction”, has been a right response within the United Nations framework. It is critical that there be in-depth and evidence-based discussions on that, involving all Member States, in order to coordinate international and national efforts, as appropriate. Focus should be placed on identifying gaps in national response that may be addressed through customized international cooperation. The current review of resolution 1540 (2004) can be quite critical in that exercise. Bangladesh recognizes the seminal importance of resolution 1540 (2004) and its successor resolutions in ensuring the non-proliferation of WMDs. The varying levels of capacity among Member States, as identified through voluntary national reports, deserve to be addressed with a sense of priority. One response to that effect would be to consider further strengthening the capacity-building mandate of the panel of experts concerned. We believe the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. In general, the NPT has significantly helped limit the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.However, the ongoing reality is that tens of thousands of nuclear weapons continue to threaten humankind, while billions of dollars are being spent to modernize them despite pressing development needs and challenges all over. Bangladesh therefore favours a balanced approach, that is, nuclear non-proliferation pursued in tandem with nuclear disarmament. We have no doubt that nuclear weapons are wrong weapons. Far from securing us, they only endanger our lives. We therefore consistently stress the total elimination of those weapons in order to provide an absolute guarantee against the use, either by design or by accident, or threat of use of such weapons, and also against the danger of their falling into terrorists’ hands. We cannot help but note with concern that all nuclear-weapon State parties to the NPT officially envisage relying on large, modernized nuclear forces as a central component of their security postures for decades to come. Once again, we urge them to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals in fulfilment of their relevant multilateral legal obligations and to cease all plans to further modernize, upgrade, refurbish or extend the lives of their nuclear weapons and related arsenals. As an important building-block to that effect, we call for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, pursuant to the mandate given by General Assembly resolution 68/32. Unfortunately, the CD has been overshadowed by inertia for more than a decade. That must change. Otherwise, there will be initiatives to find solutions through parallel means, such as last year when the General Assembly adopted, by an overwhelming majority, a resolution calling for convening an open-ended working group to take forward the negotiations on nuclear disarmament . Bangladesh supported the resolution and has continued to attend the working group session this year. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, we underscore the importance of an effective, non-discriminatory and legally binding framework for negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. We support the establishment of nuclear- weapon-free zones in all parts of the world, including in areas where currently no such arrangements exist. The recurring outbreak of epidemics and pandemics makes us all the more aware of the potentially deadly consequences of the use of biological weapons. Bangladesh joins the call for resuming multilateral negotiations aimed at concluding a non-discriminatory, comprehensive and balanced legally binding verification regime to further strengthen compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention. We remain committed to the cause of the complete cessation of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. We join calls for the universalization of the Chemical Weapons Convention and for all possessor State parties to ensure the elimination of their existing stockpiles in a time-bound manner at the earliest possible date. Promoting peace and justice is one of the fundamental goals underlying the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The challenges of disarmament and international security have become increasingly complex and intertwined as countries, regions and the world as a whole have evolved. We must invoke the spirit of multilateralism more to revitalize the United Nations disarmament machinery, and thus contribute to international peace and development through effective arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament.

I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil.

I thank the President for organizing this open debate. Let me also thank the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, the Special Representative of INTERPOL and Mr. Koblentz for their briefings, and let me congratulate the Secretary-General for a particularly eloquent and sharp intervention. Brazil firmly believes that the mere existence of weapons of mass destruction constitutes the greatest threat to humankind, and therefore to international peace and security. The possibility that such weapons might fall into the hands of non-State actors, particularly terrorists, is a matter of special concern. Resolution 1540 (2004) is a valuable tool in addressing the issue and complementing the main multilateral legally binding instruments in the field. Brazil actively participated in the discussions leading to the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004) and to its first review, resolution 1977 (2011), as a member of the Council. Since then, we have been firmly committed to its implementation, as shown by the matrix prepared by the Panel of Experts. The Brazilian Federal Constitution forbids the conduct of any non-peaceful nuclear activity on Brazilian territory. Brazil is party to all the major treaties and conventions in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, such as the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. We are also members of export control regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. We have incorporated into our national legislation all obligations deriving from those instruments, as well as those from flowing from resolution 1540 (2004), and we have submitted national reports to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Brazilian legislation clearly safeguards the peaceful applications of sensitive and dual-use goods and items, especially in activities related to industry, research and development. In that context, the Brazilian Government promotes constant and structured outreach to inform the private sector on applicable restrictions and controls. Brazil has also been following with interest the current comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004), and took part in the open consultations convened in June by the 1540 Committee Chair, Ambassador Román Oyarzun Marchesi of Spain. We were particularly pleased that strong emphasis was placed on international cooperation and assistance, which in our view are key to ensuring the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). We acknowledge the important work that has been carried out by the 1540 Committee and its Panel of Experts in that respect, and we expect that this important issue will be addressed with a sense of priority in the outcome of the comprehensive review. Notwithstanding the importance of resolution 1540 (2004), circumscribing international efforts exclusively to countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is insufficient. Disarmament efforts are essential to any effective strategy to avoid those weapons being acquired by non-State actors  — for, as long as weapons of mass destruction continue to exist, there will be those interested in acquiring or developing them. Over the past 50 years, the international community has adopted multilateral, legally binding instruments that ban some categories of those lethal armaments, such as biological and chemical weapons. The NPT, in its article VI, establishes an obligation “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”. We remain frustrated, however, by the absence of political will and leadership on the part of States possessing nuclear weapons to initiate similar negotiations aimed at the complete elimination of such weapons, with clear benchmarks and timelines. Last week’s ground-breaking results of the Open-ended Working Group on taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations were most encouraging. Its recommendation to the General Assembly to convene a conference in 2017  — open to all States, international organizations and civil society  — to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, can place the nuclear disarmament agenda on a new path, thereby overcoming its protracted deadlock. Time and again, the international community is offered the argument that security concerns hamper the objective of disarmament. That is a false dichotomy. Relying on nuclear deterrence doctrines and strategies undermines the medium- and long-term security of all States. The risk that non-State actors may wish to acquire nuclear weapons is only one among many examples of such long-term security challenges. As the Secretary- General himself once said, “there are no right hands for wrong weapons.” It is imperative that the international community take decisive steps to achieve the common and long- overdue nuclear disarmament objectives.

I now give the floor to the representative of Ecuador.

The Ecuadorian delegation thanks Malaysia, as President of the Security Council for the month of August, for convening this open debate on the challenges posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Articles 15 and 416, respectively of the Constitution of Ecuador “prohibits the development, production, possession, sale, import, transport, storage and use of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons” and “condemns the development and use of weapons of mass destruction”. Those firm constitutional principles apply both nationally and internationally. That is why my country has the legislative tools and appropriate regulations in place to prevent proliferation and combat illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems, thereby fulfilling its obligations under resolution 1540 (2004). Ecuador is proud to be a part of the first densely populated area  — Latin America and the Caribbean — to be declared free of nuclear weapons, created by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, as well as part of a region of peace, as solemnly declared by the Heads of State and Government of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States at the 2014 Summit in Havana, as reiterated in Costa Rica in 2015 and in my country’s capital, Quito, in 2016. However, we must point out that the danger of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is inherent in their continued existence, particularly nuclear weapons. As long as those weapons exist, the danger of them falling into terrorists’ hands will remain high. As noted by the Secretary-General in 2013, “there are no right hands for the wrong weapons”. They are not only wrong, but also a danger to the very existence of humankind, as was shown by the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the seventy-first anniversary of which was observed this very month of August. We must therefore take great care that the important debate on the non-proliferation of such weapons, whether by State or non-State actors, does not obscure the need to achieve nuclear disarmament, especially as we are now more aware of the serious humanitarian impact of any detonation of a nuclear weapon, whether intentional or accidental. From that perspective, the nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to prevent the proliferation  — whether vertical or horizontal — of such weapons, as well as to ensure their elimination. Ecuador of course rejects the understanding that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons gives a few States the monopolistic right to possess such weapons indefinitely. While my country does not aspire, and never has, to possess nuclear weapons, it is aware of the responsibility it shoulders as a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in particular under article VI, within the framework of the Working Group on nuclear disarmament established by the General Assembly in resolution 70/33. The group met in Geneva this year and proposed, along with other countries  — including your own, Sir, Malaysia  — that in 2017 the General Assembly launch the negotiation process for a treaty banning nuclear weapons. Just a few days ago, on Friday, 19 August, the Working Group formally adopted that recommendation, which will be submitted for consideration by the Assembly through the First Committee at the next session. The delegation of Ecuador will continue to firmly support that proposal, as we are convinced that just as the international community has banned chemical weapons and biological weapons through legally binding instruments, nuclear weapons should also be banned through a treaty as part of a process that is open to all and cannot be blocked by anyone. Ecuador is therefore fulfilling its commitments on this matter, not through speeches but through actions. No one can be under the illusion that a treaty banning nuclear weapons will lead immediately to their elimination. But it is essential to make clear the legal standard that such weapons are contrary to the law regardless of who possesses them. The implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention is important. The provisions of resolution 1540 (2004) must be broadened and implemented. However, from its perspective, Ecuador insists that only the full elimination of weapons of mass destruction will ensure their non-proliferation.

I now give the floor to the representative of Israel.

The threat that the world faces from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) is greater than ever. Advances in science and technology, combined with the evolving nature of terrorism, present challenges never seen before. And nowhere is the threat more real than in the Middle East, where failing States have transformed the region into a breeding ground for terrorists who now control vast areas of territory and dominate large populations. For the people of Israel, the scale of the danger posed by the combination of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction is not abstract. Israelis have lived with conventional and unconventional threats for decades, and the prospect of terrorism is a daily reality. Israel understands the grave nature of the threat and views the prevention of the proliferation of WMDs as a matter of paramount importance for the international agenda. In our time, we have witnessed the shocking erosion of the absolute prohibition against the use of the world’s most horrific weapons. We now live in a world in which the premeditated use of chemical weapons on innocent civilians is no longer even treated as breaking news. Nowhere is that trend more evident than in Syria. And there can be no mistake: the primary responsibility for the widespread use of chemical weapons in Syria lies squarely at the feet of the Al-Assad regime. That is the same regime that has been killing, attacking and besieging its own people, supported by Iran and its terror proxy Hizbullah. Last August, the Security Council established the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) in response to the conclusions of the fact-finding mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which found “compelling confirmation” that a toxic chemical had been used “systematically and repeatedly” to attack Syrian villages. The JIM was given the mandate to investigate and to identify those responsible for the use of those lethal chemical weapons. Over the course of the past year, as the teams were on the ground working to assign attribution for that heinous war crime, the Syrian regime brazenly continued to use toxic chemicals against its own population. Zaher Sahloul, a Syrian-American doctor who regularly treats the injured in Aleppo and has briefed the Council, said, “Using chemical agents without accountability has become the new normal in Syria”. In fact, just two weeks ago, Syrian Government forces conducted air strikes on the Zabadieh neighbourhood of the besieged city of Aleppo, in an attack that was widely reported to have included the use of chlorine gas. We cannot allow that to become the new normal. Al-Assad’s actions are not only in violation of international law and an affront to humankind itself, but they also increase the chances of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of non-State actors. The systematic use of chemical weapons by the Al-Assad regime has made WMD-related material and know-how widely available, paving the way for non-State actors to achieve such horrific capabilities. Make no mistake: the regime’s actions lead to further cracks in the WMD non-proliferation regime. At a time when terrorist groups are increasingly emboldened and practice unspeakable acts of cruelty on a regular basis, the consequences of Al-Assad’s actions should be clear to everyone in the Chamber. In the face of those dire threats, the international community must show resolve and take determined action to counter the proliferation of WMDs. Israel views resolution 1540 (2004) as an essential tool in that collective effort. This year, we have an opportunity to review the achievements of the resolution and look ahead with renewed dedication for the full implementation of its provisions. A positive trend has been evident over the years, as a growing number of States have increased their measures for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Most prominent have been the legal actions that States have undertaken to prohibit the activities of non-State actors with regard to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery. As we look to the challenges ahead, Israel believes there are practical and legal steps that can advance the effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Let me mention three steps that can readily be put into practice. First, States must have at their disposal the tools and the infrastructure necessary to meet their commitments under the regime established by the resolution. States must be further encouraged to report, update existing reports and designate a national focal point to be responsible for reporting and coordinating the national implementation of the resolution. Secondly, Israel believes that cooperation with the academic community is key. Strengthening outreach to the academic world can achieve a balance that preserves the independence of academic institutions while safeguarding sensitive technology and know-how against unintentional leakage to non-State actors. Finally, here at the United Nations, we see room for increased coordination among the relevant bodies. For example, expanding the cooperation of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and its Group of Experts with United Nations bodies with regard to terrorists and WMD proliferation will help the Committee to better equip States to deal with threats in their own territories. The issue under discussion today is a matter of the highest priority for the State of Israel. Let me conclude by outlining the steps that Israel has taken as part of our robust policy aimed at preventing the proliferation of WMDs. As detailed in the reports submitted by Israel to the 1540 Committee in 2004 and 2012, Israel has taken wide-ranging legal and practical steps intended to curb proliferation. At the national level, Israel has implemented counter-proliferation measures through legislation and practices that are strictly enforced by the relevant authorities. Those measures include, inter alia, gathering and sharing intelligence, improving border controls, developing advanced detection and identification devices, enhancing the security of facilities and the relevant dual-use materials and strengthening export controls. That multipronged strategy is part of Israel’s comprehensive approach to preventing the proliferation of non-conventional weapons, as well as to preventing terrorists from acquiring such weapons. As part of the international community’s ongoing efforts, Israel is fully committed to acting with determination against this threat. Finally, allow me to comment with regard to what we have heard today with regard to the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. Israel’s long- held vision of a more secure and peaceful Middle East requires that all regional States engage in a process of direct and sustained dialogue to address the broad range of regional security challenges. Such a dialogue, based on the widely accepted principle of consensus, can emanate only from within the region, and address in an inclusive manner the threat perceptions of all regional parties with a view to enhancing and improving their security. Direct contact, combined with trust and confidence-building, is an essential basis for the creation of a new security paradigm in a region that is increasingly fraught with wars, conflicts, disintegration of national territories and human suffering.

I now give the floor to the representative of Panama.

Panama would like to begin its statement in this open debate by welcoming the wise initiative of the Malaysian presidency to convene this event to exchange views on something of ever-increasing importance and on the challenges we face as a global community in ensuring the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), their delivery systems and related materials. We would like to first thank the Secretary-General and the initial briefers for their contributions, from both the tactical and academic points of view. My country aligns itself with the statement delivered earlier by the representative of Iran on behalf of Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. In our national capacity we would like to add a few additional remarks. Panama is proud to belong to the only region in the world that is free of nuclear weapons. As a feature of our foreign policy, we have committed, in all forums, to the non-proliferation of all nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, as we are convinced that they pose the greatest threat to international peace and security. My country believes that the ability to live in a world free of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons is an ethical imperative. Thereby, we consider disarmament to be an essential component of efforts to promote not only international peace and security but development as well. Forty-nine years after the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, we should recognize that the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean has been a reference point in various parts of the world for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and we hope that trend will continue. Today we reaffirm our unwavering commitment, adopted in 1967 with the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, as well as with the ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty and, more recently, the resolutions of the Security Council, particularly resolution 1540 (2004). In step with the review opportunities offered by the conventions, such as the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference in November, and as Panama does not have an army nor weapons of mass destruction, we have reiterated our support for efforts that tend to yield more encouraging results that are in line with their stated objectives. Coinciding with your concept note (S/2016/712, annex), Mr. President, my country is aware of emerging trends of proliferation of technological and scientific progress and international commerce, and as Mr. Koblentz noted this morning, this fourth industrial revolution, which implies greater democratization of those advances, makes them more vulnerable to the threat that non-State actors will obtain and exploit them. Hence the importance of resolution 1540 (2004), through which, in this multilateral forum, we pledge to stop weapons of mass destruction from reaching dangerous non-State actors. To that end, and with a view to better contribute to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), Panama has worked consistently to adopt a national plan and to effectively regulate dual-use materials in order to prevent chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials from being diverted to non-State actors, to the detriment of commerce and safe investments and humankind itself. Panama has been firm in its call for the immediate cessation of recent tests, and we have reiterated that the development of WMDs and their use is an act against peace and international cooperation that only aggravates tension among States and regions, threatening their political stability and seriously jeopardizing the peaceful coexistence of their peoples. Making strides towards a more peaceful, secure world is a collective global responsibility. Noting the importance of regional coordination efforts and their positive impact on the world, I am pleased to share that in December, along with the Organization of American States, Panama will host the regional high-level conference on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). That will be a prelude to Panama’s assuming the presidency the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism in 2017. There we hope to continue the work of capacity-building and strengthening cooperation, which are both necessary to face this significant challenge. In today’s world, with the growing relevance of gender equality, I wish to point out the need to consider the role of women in the promotion of peace and in disarmament efforts. While scientific studies have shown that women and children are the most affected by radioactive exposure, thanks to their being highly vulnerable in conflicts, they should not be seen merely as victims but as part and parcel of the resolution and decision-making process. Additionally, it is essential to recognize the danger represented by the production and possession of nuclear weapons when they are seen as political tools to ensure the distribution of power in the world. The strategy of nuclear deterrence is but a myth by which, in reality, we are exposing ourselves to a great danger. We must recognized it as such and assume the corresponding responsibility if we are to achieve a sustainable world. Finally, Panama would also like to highlight the pressing need to raise public awareness of the importance of bringing about a world free of threats, a world in which Governments, civil society, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, academia and social media are called on to promote education as a tool for peace that leads to security, disarmament and the non-proliferation of WMDs. Along those lines, I wish to stress the multidimensional focus of security linked to human rights and development. The non-proliferation of WMDs through the effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) is indisputably the path to true sustainable development that will ensure a safer world. The Security Council’s efforts and, more important, the commitment of Member States, are therefore fundamental to achieving that objective.

I now give the floor to the representative of Costa Rica.

Costa Rica would like to thank you, Mr. President, and your delegation for having convened this important debate. Our country is firmly committed to the international legal system and believes that global disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction can, and should, be achieved through dialogue and the negotiation of legal instruments. Over the years, a number of proposals and measures have been put forward to make progress in this area. We have banned nuclear tests, but the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has not yet entered into force. We have attempted to ban the production of fissionable material, but we have not yet been able to begin the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, which has been paralysed for years and does not have universal membership. We have called for greater transparency with regard to arsenals, for the verification of any arsenal reductions by the International Atomic Energy Agency and for the cessation of programmes to upgrade arsenals; however, bilateral and unilateral verification processes continue to be the norm. We also adopted resolution 1540 (2004), which imposes a number of binding obligations on all Member States, including, inter alia, the duty to refrain from providing any support to non-State actors who might attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery. However, implementation still faces many challenges. All of those steps and objectives are very important for some States, but not for all. And yet the international community has not given up on its attempts to achieve a world without nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, and even less on achieving that objective with the benefit of sophisticated verification and control systems. Costa Rica is a small, democratic, disarmed and civilian-based country. The multilateral system and international law are our only means of defence. We know quite well that peace and security as a global public good can be achieved, in part by honouring the Charter of the United Nations, in particular Articles 10 and 26, as Costa Rica has been advocating for decades. As a country without an army, we possess no weapons of mass destruction. In our legislation there is a ban on devices that produce asphyxiating, poisonous, paralysing, irritating or tear-generating gases. We have also banned the use, production or introduction into the country of gases, chemicals, toxic or deadly viruses or bacteria that could lead, inter alia, to irreversible physical or mental consequences. Precisely because we have sufficient credentials and, above all, the moral authority flowing from those customs and practices, we reiterate our call to the international community to avoid an increase in the number of new States that possess nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, which might be acquired either through the use of their own technology or through technology that they have acquired from other States. In addition, we must continue working to eliminate the increase in the quantity and quality of nuclear and other types of weapons by States that already possess such weapons. Finally, we must avoid at any cost an increase in the number of States that possess weapons of mass destruction as a result of the evolution of the civilian use of nuclear and other technologies. As mentioned in the concept note (S/2016/712, annex) that provides the basis for today’s discussion, globalization and technological development facilitate the efforts of the international community to reduce new risks and threats. However, such tools can have unintended effects: they can also foster the danger that, in the long run, such weapons might end up falling into non-State hands. It is therefore necessary to strengthen international mechanisms for controlling the technology and materials needed to develop such weapons. We must also redouble efforts to prevent terrorist groups from acquiring any type of weapon of mass destruction and ensure that the export and import of materials, equipment and technology needed to develop such weapons is subject to control. We stress the importance of compliance with Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations, which provides for the Security Council to submit to Members plans “for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments” with a view to “the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources”. We are convinced that a world without weapons of mass destruction is the only way to achieve humankind’s main objectives, namely, peace, security and sustainable development. That is why we will continue to work towards what is a utopia for some, but an achievable goal for us, namely, a world free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

I nowg give the floor to the representative of Nicaragua.

First of all, Nicaragua wishes to congratulate Malaysia for its excellent stewardship of the Security Council this month and for convening today’s debate on an issue as important as the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). My delegation aligns itself with the statement made by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. Nicaragua has always stressed the importance of further progress towards total and complete disarmament, including not only nuclear weapons but also other conventional weapons of mass destruction, the use of which violates the fundamental principles of international law and international humanitarian law. It is unjustifiable and unacceptable that, despite the recent adoption of a new agenda for development for the next 15 years, spending is increasing on the means to develop, upgrade and test weapons of all kinds, while every day less is being spent to promote the lives and development of human beings. While millions of people are suffering the effects of the economic crisis, poverty, hunger and disease, global military expenditures are increasing at an astounding rate. We would like to reaffirm Nicaragua’s position of peace and solidarity in favour of the non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction. We affirm the role of the General Assembly and its resolution 70/36 on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. We firmly believe that the only guarantee for preventing the use or threat of use of weapons of mass destruction and their non-proliferation to non-State actors is the total and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Our urgent wish and priority is to have a world free of nuclear weapons. We welcome and celebrate the date of 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons and the efforts that truly contribute to that end. We also reaffirm that all efforts to ensure nuclear non-proliferation must go hand in hand with nuclear disarmament efforts. Nicaragua strongly believes that, by establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, the non-proliferation regime will be strengthened, with international peace and security being an important contribution to the achievement of nuclear disarmament. We recall the crucial importance of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Declaration of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace. In that regard, we regret the failure in 2012 to hold an international conference for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. We reiterate that such a conference is an important and integral part of the final outcome of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We urge the parties to hold that conference as soon as possible. Nicaragua attaches special importance to compliance with the NPT as the only legally binding instrument of international consensus in the global system of non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of atomic energy. Nicaragua condemns any use of chemical weapons or other weapons of mass destruction and is firmly committed to the Chemical Weapons Convention and to strict compliance with its provisions. We recognize the explicit political will of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the assistance provided by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which led to the successful programme to achieve the destruction of all chemical weapons in Syria and the completion of an extraordinary plan under exceptional circumstances.
Resolution 1540 (2004), unanimously adopted by the Security Council, affirms that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery constitutes a grave threat to international peace and security. We should focus on improving its implementation so as to bring about, above all, greater assistance and cooperation among States. It is vital to respect the nature, integrity and objectives of resolution 1540 (2004) and its methods, which were designed to achieve positive results. Nicaragua rejects the use of double standards by some countries that claim to be in favour of the eradication of terrorism and support the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of biological and chemical weapons to non-State actors, while at the same time they undertake warlike acts, on the pretext of a war against terrorism, and/or campaigns geared towards toppling legitimate Governments, as well as picking on specific countries for purely political interests. At the same time, they ignore the nuclear capacities of other States. The proof of this is the military doctrine of the NATO countries to use nuclear weapons as a security policy, which remains intact. While they threaten with their missiles, they are also developing new strategies to be able to place them in outer space. We have often highlighted the deadlock in the disarmament machinery. Nevertheless, we must be able to resolve the real problem: the actual political will of certain States to make real progress, in particular when it comes to nuclear disarmament.

I now give the floor to the representative of Turkey.

Let me begin by thanking you, Mr. President, for organizing this debate on the challenges in addressing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), their means of delivery and related materials. Turkey aligns itself with the statement made by the observer of the European Union. I shouldl ike to make the following remarks in our national capacity. The security policies built upon WMD capabilities do not guarantee the safety of any country or region, but instead increase insecurity and instability. As a country that has never had an intention to pursue a WMD programme, Turkey firmly opposes the development, production, stockpiling and use of such weapons. We have consistently advocated the elimination of all WMDs. Furthermore, the presence of chemical and biological weapons around our borders, by State and non-State actors alike, constitutes a source of security concern for us. With that understanding, Turkey strongly supports the universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. Turkey cooperates with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Sub-Working Group on non-State Actors of which was recently revitalized. The current instances of the use of WMDs serve to reinforce the calls for a resolute and global approach. No country is immune from the risks of the proliferation of WMDs in the hands of non-State actors. Without enhanced international cooperation, we cannot address those challenges. The Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), which is now a central component of the global security architecture, is one of the greatest tools at our service in efforts against proliferation. I would like to reaffirm Turkey’s strong commitment to the full and effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Turkey has been working with the 1540 Committee since its inception and contributes to its work. We are also a member of the recently established Group of Friends of Resolution 1540 (2004). Turkey has in place the necessary legislation to implement resolution 1540 (2004) and abides, by and participates in, all the relevant international legal instruments and the voluntary ad hoc mechanism on non-proliferation and export controls. We also attach importance to collaboration between the 1540 Committee and other United Nations bodies, such as the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, and international organizations and mechanisms, such as INTERPOL and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Just as the international security environment today differs greatly from that of 12 years ago, the risks flowing from nuclear proliferation to non-State actors is also greater and calls for more coherent and robust international cooperation. The comprehensive review process of resolution 1540 (2004) provides a valuable opportunity to strengthen the implementation of the resolution and address the new challenges caused by the proliferation of WMDs to non-State actors. Following its tradition of close cooperation with the 1540 Committee, Turkey will actively contribute to the comprehensive review process of the resolution. This open debate has been particularly timely in the sense that the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism is expected to publish its final report tomorrow, identifying, pursuant to resolution 2235 (2015), those responsible for, or related to, the use of chemical weapons in Syria. I wish to reiterate here our expectation that those who committed those grave crimes, as well as those who were linked to them, be held accountable for their actions. That, followed by the measures that the Security Council undertook in its relevant resolutions, would constitute the right message to all those concerned, namely, that the use of chemical weapons will not go unpunished. That would be the greatest service to the international community’s efforts against the proliferation of WMDs. Before I conclude, let me say that we categorically reject the allegations of the representative of the Syrian regime, which lost its legitimacy long ago. We have once again observed in this debate attempts to divert attention from the enormous destruction and human suffering caused by that regime. My country’s track record complies with the non-proliferation and export control regimes, and its counter-terrorism efforts are well established. Turkey will continue to support the efforts at preventing impunity for the perpetrators of inhumane practices, including the use chemical weapons, which are a clear affront to international law.

I now give the floor to the representative of India.

I thank you, Mr. President, for convening this debate on an issue of continuing concern for the international community that requires constant vigilance and genuine cooperation among Member States to address the challenge effectively. We also thank the briefers for updating us on the current trends that are relevant to this issue. We are fully cognizant of the catastrophic dangers that the transfer of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors and terrorists could entail. Clandestine proliferation networks must be rolled back and their resurgence prevented. The global community must join hands in eliminating the risks related to sensitive materials and technologies falling into the hands of terrorists and non-State actors. In that regard, India has enacted a number of effective laws and regulations and has put in place institutionalized administrative mechanisms to prohibit access to weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and non-State actors. Since the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), more than a decade ago, India has taken additional steps to further strengthen its existing legislative and regulatory mechanisms for exercising control over weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. India is committed to maintaining the highest international standards with reference to the control of nuclear, chemical, biological and toxin weapons and their means of delivery. India has strong, law-based national export controls consistent with the highest international standards. India has filed reports regarding resolution 1540 (2004) and hosted the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) in New Delhi in 2012. Earlier this year, India joined the Missile Technology Control Regime and The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. The focus on non-State actors should in no way diminish State accountability in combating terrorism and dismantling its support infrastructure and its linkages with weapons of mass destruction. India believes that the primary responsibility for ensuring nuclear security rests at the national level, but national responsibility must be accompanied by responsible behaviour, as well as sustained and effective international cooperation. India participated in the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C., earlier this year. We welcome the outcome of the Summit and view the Summit process as having catalysed significant progress on nuclear security through international cooperation. Our recent steps taken to strengthen nuclear security include the setting up of a counter-nuclear-smuggling team and joining the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation. India has also offered to host an event in 2017 as part of an initiative to combat nuclear terrorism. The goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons can be achieved by a step-by-step process underwritten by a universal commitment and an agreed multilateral framework that is global and non-discriminatory. That was reiterated by our Minister for External Affairs, Mrs. Sushma Swaraj, speaking in the General Assembly last October (see A/70/PV.22), when she stated that India was aware of its responsibilities as a nuclear-weapon State and that its support for that goal was undiminished. All States that possess nuclear weapons can make a contribution by engaging in a meaningful dialogue in order to build trust and confidence by reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs and security doctrines. We believe that increasing the restraints on the use of nuclear weapons is not only an essential first step, but is also necessary in the current complex international environment to enhance strategic trust globally. The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention are examples of global non-discriminatory treaties for the complete elimination of the respective categories of weapons of mass destruction. They also fulfil an important non-proliferation function. India has fulfilled its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. We look forward to a successful eighth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention in November. In that regard, India will organize a regional workshop in New Delhi early next week, from 29 to 30 August. In conclusion, may I say that all States should fully and effectively implement the obligations arising from the disarmament and non-proliferation-related agreements or treaties to which they are parties. Furthermore, the essential role of the United Nations on issues of disarmament must be preserved. In particular, it is important to enhance confidence in the United Nations disarmament machinery, consisting of the General Assembly, the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament. The Security Council has a role, as specifically provided in the relevant disarmament-related instruments and treaties and in the Charter of the United Nations. Taking forward disarmament and non-proliferation issues globally requires a genuine commitment to multilateralism and to building common ground. India remains committed to those objectives of global disarmament and non-proliferation and is willing to work with other Member States to advance those objectives.

I now give the floor to the representative of Australia.

As others have noted, a range of events over the past year remind us of the ongoing threat to peace and security posed by the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Non-State actors are becoming increasingly sophisticated and creative in their ability to source sensitive information and materials relevant to the delivery and design of WMDs. Today, we are all faced with the global mobility and connectivity of terrorist groups. We know that those seeking WMDs will exploit the weakest link to pursue their goals. That has been demonstrated not only by non-State actors but also by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, whose proliferation activities we strongly condemn. In the face of those threats, the Council’s leadership and global cooperation are essential. We need to work together to bolster non-proliferation norms, strengthen export controls, continue to share information and support developing countries’ non-proliferation efforts. Export control regimes and multilateral counter-proliferation efforts must adapt and remain relevant, capable and equipped to succeed. Resolution 1540 (2004) remains a centrepiece of the international non-proliferation regime. It has established and reinforced the strong international norm that proliferation involving non-State actors is unacceptable. Australia welcomes the attention that Spain, as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), has given to revitalizing the implementation of the resolution, including by helping to mobilize resources and expertise to assist States in strengthening their national practices. We need to strive for the universal implementation of the resolution in order to maximize the impact of our collective endeavours. During the 1540 Committee’s open consultations convened by Spain last June, Australia offered three main thoughts on how the resolution could be strengthened. We supported, first, extending the mandate of resolution 1540 (2004), given that the fight against proliferation is an ongoing one; secondly, better leveraging of linkages with other United Nations instruments and multilateral non-proliferation and export regimes, including the Australia Group; and, thirdly, practical measures identified in the United States non-paper for the 1540 Committee to monitor, coordinate and share experience in assistance provision. We look forward to continued cooperation with the Chair of the 1540 Committee in finalizing the comprehensive review of the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) at the end of this year. During the June open consultations, we also drew the attention of Member States to our hosting, in partnership with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, of the first Asia-Pacific regional training session on the Secretary-General’s mechanism for investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological weapons. We can confirm that the training will be held in Canberra from 17 to 28 October. Member States from the region will be joined by INTERPOL, the World Health Organization and the World Organization for Animal Health. Australia supports the training as a practical mechanism for coordinating counter- proliferation and counter-terrorism efforts. The International Atomic Energy Agency must be supported in its central role in the global nuclear security architecture to coordinate nuclear security activities among international organizations and other initiatives. We should all access and utilize existing mechanisms, such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The focus of the Global Initiative on achieving operational and practical outcomes is its core strength. Its guidance documents have been pivotal in informing Australia’s national approaches in the area of nuclear security, such as nuclear detection capability and radiation monitoring at the border. In conclusion, weapons of mass destruction and their potential to fall into the wrong hands threaten global peace and security. Malaysia’s initiative today in convening this open debate and the determination of Spain to re-energize the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) are very timely and welcome indeed. Australia, too, will continue to play an active role in support of our collective interests to halt the potential for WMD proliferation and use.

I now give the floor to the representative of Viet Nam.

I join previous speakers in thanking the Malaysian presidency for convening this important meeting to discuss the challenges that Member States face in addressing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I thank the Secretary-General for his valuable insights, as well as Mr. Kim Won-Soo, Mr. Emanuel Roux and Mr. George Koblentz for their informative briefings. My delegation associates itself with the statement delivered earlier by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. Today’s debate is being held as the world continues to face the dire threats posed by terrorism related to weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and their proliferation. Their very existence, especially nuclear weapons, remains a danger for international peace, security and stability. This debate is also opportune as the demand for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear technologies, materials and equipment for peaceful purposes continues to grow as countries strive for sustainable development. Viet Nam believes that addressing WMD proliferation must be coupled with substantive progress in WMD disarmament, particularly towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We underline the importance of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones, including the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, and the need for nuclear-weapon States to accede to their respective protocols. At the same time, non-proliferation efforts should not hinder the legitimate rights of States to acquire, produce and use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN)- related materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes. Viet Nam has consistently been committed to WMD disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, and strongly advocated for the peaceful use of CBRN- related materials and technologies. Viet Nam is party to, and complies fully with its obligations under, all key WMD disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement and its additional protocol. Viet Nam seriously implements the relevant Security Council resolutions and participates in related initiatives, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative. As a concrete example of its efforts, Viet Nam completed the conversion of fuel at its only research reactor, from highly enriched to low-enriched uranium. That was done in close collaboration with the Russian Federation, the United States and the IAEA. For the past 12 years, resolution 1540 (2004) has played an important role in the international community’s efforts to prevent WMDs, their means of delivery and related materials from falling into the hands of non-State actors. Viet Nam welcomes the upcoming review of the resolution. As a member of the Group of Friends of resolution 1540 (1040), we look forward to engaging in the deliberations. As the President suggested, it is essential that we identify and address the challenges that States face in implementing resolution 1540 (2004) and other non-proliferation commitments. Viet Nam’s experience has revealed many challenges. In our view, there is a need for increased international cooperation to raise the awareness and understanding of the threats posed by WMD proliferation and to strengthen the capacity of States, in particular of developing countries, in implementing their respective obligations and commitments. That may include building the necessary national databases, enhancing capacity to tackle transnational and new types of crimes, providing technical assistance for stronger import- export control and supporting the application of security and safety standards in the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials and technologies. Care must also be taken to avoid placing undue burden on States in those efforts. International efforts to address the proliferation of WMDs and related materials require renewed political commitment, as well as enhanced partnerships and cooperation, including with the United Nations and the relevant international organizations, such as the IAEA and OPCW. Viet Nam remains strongly committed and will fully cooperate with the international community towards a world free from all weapons of mass destruction.

I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina.

First of all, I want to thank the delegation of Malaysia for convening this open debate. The United Nations, and the Security Council in particular, has repeatedly stressed that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses a threat to international peace and security. The Council sent a clear message in 2004 by adopting resolution 1540 (2004), which provides a response to the growing risk of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of, and be used by, non-State actors. The resolution was a milestone in for the first time putting all Member States on an equal footing in the field of non-proliferation and establishing common standards for the national monitoring of sensitive technology exports. Since its adoption, Argentina has joined the consensus in the Security Council because it strengthens the capacity of multilateral institutions and strengthens the United Nations as the appropriate forum in responding to challenges to international security. Argentina submitted its first report on 26 October 2004, and subsequently updated it. The latest is currently being drafted. We have demonstrated an undeniable commitment to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To date, we are the only Latin American country to have joined the five export- control regimes, namely, the Australia Group, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Missile Technology Control Regime. The Argentine Republic is convinced that an effective system of export controls must be based on four basic pillars. The first is a national system for the issuance of transparent and standardized lisences. The second is the effective implementation of existing legislation applicable to export controls. The third is promoting corporate awareness about the importance of this system for industrial development and the safety of international trade. And the fourth is close regional cooperation. With regard to our region, it is important to highlight the unwavering commitment to non-proliferation by the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, which have been pioneers in establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. This year marks the twenty-fithth anniversary of the Mendoza Declaration, signed on 5 September 1991 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, later also joined by Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay. Through that declaration, our countries committed themselves to refrain from developing, producing, stockpiling, transferring or using chemical and biological weapons. Resolution 1540 (2004) has been an opportunity to deepen cooperation among Latin American and Caribbean countries in order that all the countries of the region can access the necessary technology and capacities to respond to current non-State threats. Argentina provides assistance and training for the identification of sensitive items both at the regional and subregional level, as well as in the context of South-South cooperation with African countries. Our commitment to region is clear. Argentina will continue offering assistance to countries that request it. Argentina views the global review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) from its traditional two-fold perspective. The first is respect for the right to the development and peaceful use of advanced technologies, while the second is the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — whether nuclear, chemical or biological — and their means of delivery and related technologies. Argentina highlights the sovereign right to the development of advanced and sensitive nuclear technologies, such as chemical, biological and pharmaceutical technologies, as well as nanotechnologies, with Government and private coordination, as an tool to achieve the development of our industries. At the same time, Argentina actively cooperates with the efforts of the international community in the field of disarmament with a view to achieving a world free of weapons of mass destruction and to further the principle of an absolute prohibition on their development, possession, acquisition, transfer or use. As a country strongly committed to non-proliferation and elimination of weapons of mass destruction, Argentina welcomes the comprehensive review process on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) with a view to establishing the foundation for continuing joint efforts to address the risk of non-State actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their Means of delivery and related technologies.

I now give the floor to the representative of Poland.

Poland aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union. I should like, however, to make several remarks in my national capacity. Allow me to thank the President for convening this crucial open debate and for preparing an excellent concept note (S/2016/712, annex). Poland strongly supports the strengthening of the global non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Bilogical and Toxin Weapons Convention. Resolution 1540 (2004) plays a pivotal role by reinforcing the architecture by encouraging cooperation in the area of non-proliferation. Its significance is even more striking against the backdrop of emerging threats posed by non-State actors. Such threats have become dangerous in recent years with the growth in the capabilities of some terrorist organizations, most notably the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham, to produce and use toxic substances as weapons. For the past two years, Poland has conducted a comprehensive review of its national procedures for interdicting weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The main goal was ensuring reliable decision-making processes for scenarious involving detecting illegal transfers of WMD materials. Equally important was making certain that all national institutions were aware of their responsibilities in such cases. That work led to the development of a document on a national interdiction mechanism, which aggregates all our international obligations on non-proliferation, including United Nations and European Union sanctions and tools for their implementation. At the regional level, jointly with Croatia, we carried out a voluntary peer review of the national implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Poland traditionally undertakes efforts to strengthen and support the enforcement of chemical non-proliferation instruments, while promoting a chemical-security culture and enhancing the security of chemicals in transit. Within the global partnership, we have contributed to that work by co-chairing, together with Ukraine, the chemical security sub-working group from 2012 to 2015. One of its most visible outcomes was the development of the integrated chemical security and safety programme in Ukraine under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The ongoing comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004) provides a unique opportunity to take action on a broad spectrum of issues related to international security. Poland supports the work carried out to date by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and looks forward to the conclusion of the review, which will reaffirm the Committee’s central role in the global non-proliferation architecture. We would like to take this opportunity to commend Spain for its tireless efforts in guiding us all through that crucial process, aimed at a concrete outcome in December. It is important to maintain a dialogue between the 1540 Committee and the various non-proliferation mechanisms and export control regimes. That is already happening in the case of the Missile Technology Control Regime. There are numerous global initiatives the objectives of which are in line with those of the 1540 Committee, such as the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Nuclear Security Summit, the Australia Group, the Union European Union Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Proliferation Security Initiative. We believe that there is a large scope for building closer ties and synergies between those groups and the 1540 Committee, which is the only universal forum with the potential to focus diverse expert knowledge. The threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors is global, and no country will be able to prevent it from happening without close cooperation with other partners. The sharing of best practices and peer reviews are essential to minimize those threats throughout the world. Poland stands ready to share its experiences and assist interested countries in the preparation and conduct of 1540 peer reviews or national review decision-making procedures for preventing the proliferation of WMDs to non-State actors. In conclusion, let me assure the Security Council that we join others in the Chamber who call for effective and committed implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and for enhanced efforts aimed at combating the threats posed by international terrorism.

I now give the floor to the representative of Slovenia.

I join the previous speakers in welcoming the decision of Malaysia organize this important and timely debate on challenges in addressing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Slovenia aligns itself with statement made earlier on behalf of the European Union. Allow me to make some additional comments in my national capacity. Resolution 1540 (2004) remains one of the most important instruments of the international non-proliferation architecture. Let me express the firm determination of the Government of Slovenia to support the efforts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect and respond to WMD terrorism. In order to neutralize those threats, there should be ongoing and relentless engagement by the relevant national structures in the area of security, while also effectively addressing safety issues. Slovenia is fully committed to the resolution 1540 (2004) and has joined the Group of Friends of resolution 1540 (2004). We regularly report on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). So far, we have provided three national reports. As we carry out the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004) this year, we are preparing the next review of our own national report. We stand ready to contribute to a successful outcome of this year’s comprehensive review — which is being led by Spain, which we congratulate for its excellent work — with the aim that it will deliver positive and tangible results. Resolution 1540 (2004) has become even more important in the today’s context, when we bear in mind that the potential acquisition and use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials by terrorist groups presents a clear threat to international peace and security. Slovenia therefore believes that the international community must stand united against that threat by improving the effectiveness of resolution 1540 (2004) at the 2016 comprehensive review, which can be achieved only through enhanced international cooperation within the United Nations among Member States, different regional and international organizations and civil society, academia, and national Parliaments. Slovenia is committed to treaty-based nuclear disarmament and arms control and advocates the universal adherence to and the full implementation of all non-proliferation and disarmament treaties and conventions. Slovenia also firmly believes that the proper way to combat effectively the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is through the universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. I would also add to those other very important international instruments in this area, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, international export control regimes and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which this year marked its tenth anniversary. We should also spare no effort to initiate the fissile material cut- off treaty negotiations as soon as possible. The International Atomic Energy Agency plays a crucial role in finding adequate solutions to nuclear security and in offering technical assistance to those who need it in implementing those solutions. During our upcoming third membership in the Board of Governors for September 2016 to September 2018, Slovenia will constructively engage in the work of the Board. In conclusion, as an active country in the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, Slovenia hosted the twelfth annual NATO WMD conference last May. The emerging threat of the acquisition, production and use of WMDs was also among the discussed topics, and we believe that the conference contributed in a meaningful way to our mutual endeavours and efforts to fight the peril posed by non-State actors, including terrorists.

I now give the floor to the representative of Nigeria.

I thank the Malaysian delegation for convening this important debate. I commend the Secretary-General for his remarks made earlier this morning. I also would like to thank the briefers for their incisive briefings and for sharing their thoughts with us. Nigeria aligns itself with the statement made by the representative of Iran on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on this subject. At the outset, I wish to reaffirm Nigeria’s commitment to the ideal of a nuclear-free world. We regard the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and their means of delivery as a grave threat to our collective security. That indeed is a global challenge, which requires a concerted and sustained effort on the part of the international community, including the Security Council. We are deeply concerned about the potential for the immediate, indiscriminate and massive death and destruction that could be caused by the detonation of any nuclear weapon. The long-term effects of such an action on human health, the environment and other vital economic resources could endanger the lives of both present and future generations. We furthermore express deep concern about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and call upon all States to comply, at all times, with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law. Nigeria reiterates its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We regard the NPT as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. As no country is immune to the dangers posed by nuclear weapons to our common security, it is essential that we all remain committed to the globally agreed ideals set out in the NPT and other relevant instruments. We recognize the right of any party to pursue a peaceful nuclear programme. However, that must be pursued within the ambit of the NPT and other relevant international instruments. We stress that efforts aimed at nuclear non-proliferation should dovetail with simultaneous efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament. Nigeria is concerned about the slow pace of progress towards nuclear disarmament and the lack of progress by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the task of the total elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. We call on the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their multilateral legal obligations on nuclear disarmament. We appreciate the role of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) in assisting States and international institutions in the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions, especially by considering requests from States regarding the provision of technical assistance in the energy and extractive industries. That allows States and institutions to implement the relevant Council resolutions. Nigeria reaffirms its view that resolution 1540 (2004) and its effective implementation remain a key component of the global architecture for countering the danger posed by the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We continue to believe that the establishment of effective precautionary measures and systems to address potential nuclear, chemical or biological proliferation is a collective responsibility incumbent upon all Member States. We must all take the lead. We recognize the relevance of the Secretariat in facilitating, coordinating and supporting cooperation between and among the various United Nations entities in preventing the proliferation of WMDs to non-State actors. Indeed, the Security Council, consistent with its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations, must continue to play a vital role in that regard. In conclusion, I wish to restate Nigeria’s conviction of the validity of multilateral diplomacy in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. We shall continue to advocate for multilateralism as the core platform for negotiations in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation.

I now give the floor to the representative of Algeria.

I would like to thank Malaysia for the convening of this open debate with the presence of His Excellency Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi. Algeria hopes that this meeting will blaze a trail not only in fulfilling and following up on resolution 1540 (2004), but also in the general endeavour of disarmament, which we see as a shared and common responsibility. My country is fully committed to the statement made by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, but I would like to stress the following points. First, we look forward to examining in depth the review to be concluded by the end of the year on strengthening and following up on resolution 1540 (2004). Second, we see that next step as part of the disarmament architecture in all its aspects. We clearly underscore that it is our common duty to make sure that no weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), no technology and no trade end up in the hands of non-State actors. Third, it is the firm conviction of my country that the elimination of WMD is the surest way to prevent the threat they pose to all of humankind, as stated 70 years ago during the first session of the General Assembly. Fourth, we legitimately look forward to seeing established an appropriate balance between the need for peaceful uses of technology for development and socioeconomic progress and the concern to protect ourselves from any misuse of those technologies by uncontrolled or improper sources. Fifthly, it is evident to us that the review should clearly indicate the right to have access to such technologies for peaceful purposes and the ways to define precisely international cooperation and appropriate funding. Sixth, the common defence and security policy of the African Union clearly sets out all those objectives and position, including strong support to resolution 1540 (2004) resolution and great expectations from international cooperation in all fields linked to combating weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the African Commission on Nuclear Energy, established by the Pelindaba Treaty, is today an impressive reality that ought to be supported. In that regard, we specifically recall resolution 1977 (2011), and in particular its paragraphs 10,15 and 17, and we expect Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) to set the practical steps for regional cooperation. Seventh, we understand that the general actions for the achievement of those goals need further and stronger encouragement. However, it must be said that we expect more. In particular, in some cases, such as with regard to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the nuclear- weapons States owe it to the world to start to fulfil their commitments to disarmament and to allow equitable access for the peaceful uses of associated technologies. In the prolonged absence of such fulfilment, the relevance of the Treaty might be questioned. We do not see those commitments as amorphous promises, but as clear international legal obligations. Eighth, the path charted by the international community with regard to chemical and biological weapons should set the example for the nuclear threat. My country deeply regrets that we are not even at the starting point for the establishment of a nuclear- weapon-free zone in the Middle east  — an issue that impeded any positive outcome at the latest NPT Review Conference. Ninth, let me reiterate the importance of negotiation processes and multilateral mechanisms, all of which must be strengthened and respected. They remain the most appropriate frameworks  — in particular the Conference on Disarmament and the General Assembly. Lastly, Algeria, which will chair the First Committee during the seventy-first session of the General Assembly, will spare no effort for the accomplishment of the overall goals of security and disarmament as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. Our deep conviction continues to be that eradicating the threat of all nuclear, biological and chemical weapons must be based on the complete elimination of the weapons themselves, so as to prevent the doomed fate they pose to all humanankind

The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic has asked for the floor to make a further statement. I now give him the floor.

We are entirely bewildered by the hypocrisy of the representative of Israel’s accusations. The Arabic proverb is quite apt: if you are guilty of vices, you should hide. Everyone knows that Israel introduced terrorism into our region. Israel has introduced its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons into the Arab region. Without its support and that of certain countries with great influence in the Security Council, Israel’s nuclear-weapons programme would have disappeared long ago. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel threatened to use nuclear weapons against Egypt and Syria. And Israel has used various types of weapons of mass destruction in its aggression against the peoples of the region. The Committee established pursuant to resolution Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) works to ensure that biological, chemical and nuclear weapons do not fall into the hands of non-State actors. However, Israel has offered all kinds of assistance in the form of weapons, munitions and intelligence to terrorist groups in Syria, especially to Da’esh and Jabhat Al-Nusra and affiliated groups. In doing so, as usual, it is in violation of all of the Council’s resolutions concerning counter-terrorism. Israel is not party to any treaty on weapons of mass destruction. If that proves anything, it is Israel’s hypocrisy in its possession of many types of weapons of mass destruction. The Council must assume its responsibility to prevail upon Israel to put an end to all its military, chemical and biological weapons programmes. Turning to the statement made by the representative of the Turkish regime, everyone knows, and reports of the Council themselves note, that sarin gas was trafficked from Lybia into Turkey on a commercial aeroplane and that terrorists supported by the regime used those weapons in the city of Gaziantep, a Turkish town now known as Turkish Tora Bora. We demand that the Turkish regime repudiate those facts instead of hurling accuations against the Syrian Government, which has demonstrated to the entire world what the former has done in terms of arming, training, supplying and providing other assistance and access to international terrorism  — Islamist terrorism coming from Turkish territory. The relevant reports on counter-terrorism, including those of the 1540 Committee, are replete with facts that underscore the hypocrisy of the Turkish regime and the support and assistance it provides to terrorists when it comes to using chemical weapons on Syrian territory, originating on the Turkish border. The allegations made by the representative of the Turkish regime that his country has no weapons of mass destruction are completely false: tactical nuclear weapons of a nuclear Power are based on Turkish territory.