S/PV.7837 Security Council

I should like to take advantage of the presence of the Deputy Secretary- General, His Excellency Mr. Jan Eliasson, most likely for the last time at a meeting of the Security Council during his term of office, to say a few words on behalf of the Security Council. A lot has been said about Jan Eliasson, all positive. It has been recalled that he always carries a copy of the Charter of the United Nations, that Chapter VI is his favourite, that he is undoubtedly a citizen of the world and that he knows the field work and the Headquarters of the Organization like few others. The Council has benefited from his extensive experience and has enjoyed his support, vision and commitment over the past four years. He has been an extraordinary professional  — loyal, imaginative, headstrong and tireless — and always open to listen to world leaders as well as to ordinary citizens, thereby giving the most human face to the United Nations. During the nearly 40 years he has been associated with the Organization, and despite having seen the worst kind of horror in conflicts all around the world, he has never lost his idealism and conviction that a better future is within our reach. With his enthusiasm and perseverance, he has pushed for and encouraged us to bridge the gap between the world as it is and the world as it should be. For all those reasons, on behalf of the Council, I wish to convey our deepest gratitude and appreciation for the dedication and courage with which he has served “we the peoples”, and to extend to him our warmest wishes for prosperity, health and success in the new phase that he is about to start. Adoption of the agenda Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction Preventing catastrophe: A global agenda for stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors Letter dated 1 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2016/1013)

In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria,Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malta, Montenegro, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugalthe Republic of Korea, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, the Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr Kim Won-soo, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs; Mr. Brian Finlay, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Stimson Center; Mr. T. James Min, Vice-President, International Trade Law and Head, Global Trade Law Practice Group of DHL Global Business Services; Mr. Ahmet Üzümcü, Director General, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; Mr. Raja Raja Adnan, Director of the Division of Nuclear Security, International Atomic Energy Agency; Ms. Alison August Treppel, Acting Executive Secretary for the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism of the Organization of American States; Mr. Juan Manuel Vega Serrano, President, Financial Action Task Force; Mr. Ham Sang-wook, Chair, Missile Technology Control Regime; Mr. Song Young-wan, Chair, Nuclear Suppliers Group; Mr. Emmanuel Roux, Special Representative, International Criminal Police Organization; Mr. Paul Bekkers, Director of the Secretary-General’s Office, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; and Ms. Julia Blocher, Research Officer, New York Office, United Nations University. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite His Excellency Mr. Téte António, Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations, to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite His Excellency Mr. Jacek Bylica, High Representative Special Envoy for Non-proliferation and Disarmament, European Union, to participate in this meeting. I propose that the Council invite the Permanent Observer of the Observer State of the Holy See to the United Nations to participate in this meeting, in accordance with the provisional rules of procedure and the previous practice in this regard. There being no objection, it is so decided. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to warmly welcome the Deputy Secretary- General, Ministers and other representatives present in the Security Council Chamber. Their presence today underscores the importance of the subject matter under discussion. Members of the Council have before them document S/2016/1052, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Uruguay, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Viet Nam. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2016/1013, which contains the text of a letter dated 1 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting a concept note on the item under consideration. The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

The draft resolution received 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 2325 (2016). I now give the floor to the Deputy Secretary-General.

I thank the Security Council and the Spanish presidency for arranging today’s debate, and I congratulate them on adopting resolution 2325 (2016) by consensus. I am indeed honoured to be here today in what is my final appearance before the Security Council. I cannot thank you enough, Mr. President, for your extremely generous and warm words directed to me. From my side, I can only thank all the members of the Council for their friendship and cooperation over the almost five years that I have exercised my functions as Deputy Secretary-General, although I have occupied other functions in earlier parts of my United Nations career since 1980, when I started mediating between Iran and Iraq, together with Prime Minister Olof Palme. I have been very grateful for and highly treasure the dialogue that we enjoy with practically every representative here today, on both the personal and the professional levels. I think that this element of personal trust and relationships is highly important in this organ. Sometimes when tensions are very high in the world outside, we need to keep our cool here and try to do our best under difficult circumstances. I am a great friend of Chapter VI, but I also say that sometimes we need Chapter VII to remind us of what could happen if we do not do the right thing under Chapter VI. In order to prove that, I have to pull out the Charter from my briefcase. It is there, and it will remain there even when I leave for my home country, Sweden, next week. Again, I thank everyone so much, and I will follow events very closely, not least in the Security Council. To hear those words in this Chamber is a great honour for me. I also want to thank the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and its Group of Experts, under the leadership of Ambassador Román Oyarzun Marchesi, for their work on the important subject under consideration today. Preventing non-State actors from acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction is among the most important responsibilities of the international community. The Nuclear Security Summits, the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the close engagement of the Council on allegations of chemical weapons use have all played an important role in keeping us safe. The Secretariat has also played its part. In 2012, the Secretary-General convened a high-level meeting to strengthen legal frameworks against nuclear terrorism. After the accident in Fukushima, Japan, he chaired a high-level event to emphasise the connection between nuclear safety and security. In 2013, he launched the investigation into the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. Yet in our rapidly evolving global security environment, gaps will continue to open. We have seen the rise of vicious non-State groups with no regard for human life. They actively seek weapons of mass destruction, I am sure, and those weapons are increasingly accessible. We have seen that in the use of chemical weapons by Da’esh in Syria and Iraq. There are legitimate concerns about the security of large stockpiles of weapons-usable fissile material outside international regulation. Scientific advances have lowered barriers to the production of biological weapons, and emerging technologies, such as three-dimensional printing and unmanned aerial vehicles, are adding to threats of an attack using weapons of mass destruction. We must also be aware of the growing nexus between weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and cybersecurity. Malicious actions in cyberspace have real-world consequences. Non-state actors already have the capacity to abuse cybertechnologies to create mass disruption. The nightmare scenario of a hack on a nuclear power plant, causing the uncontrolled release of ionizing radiation, is growing. To stay ahead of this technological curve, the international community needs robust defences that are nimble and flexible. Preventing weapon of mass destruction attacks by a non-State actor will be a long- term challenge that requires long-term responses. Tools such as resolution 1540 (2004) need to be fit for purpose, and I am pleased to see the comprehensive review calling for greater efforts to build the capacities of all States. After all, this is a threat to our collective security. We all need to boost our ability to respond. A biological attack would be a public health disaster. Yet, there is no multilateral institutional response capability. The Council also has a role to play in holding those that use chemical or other inhumane weapons accountable. There can be no impunity. This is a complex web of global threats and risks that requires a sophisticated global response. We must take advantage of every opportunity to strengthen our collective defences. In that regard, the Review Conference of the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention was in many ways disappointing, and I count on all States to work together to prevent potential disasters. I also count on the Council to lead. In closing, let me emphasise that it is not simply a case of letting these weapons fall into the wrong hands. There are no right hands for wrong weapons, and weapons of mass destruction are simply wrong. There is only one sure way to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and that is their complete elimination. We live in a world that is overarmed and where peace is underfunded. On behalf of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, I urge all States to fulfil their commitment to building a world free of all weapons of mass destruction.

I thank the Deputy Secretary-General for his briefing. I now give the floor to Mr. Kim Won-soo: Mr. Kim Won-soo: At the outset, I too would like to thank the Spanish presidency of the Security Council for organizing this open debate and allowing me to brief the Council. I congratulate the Security Council on its adoption of resolution 2325 (2016), endorsing the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004). My deep appreciation also goes to the Government of Spain, and in particular Ambassador Oyarzun Marchesi, for their tireless work in chairing the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) for the past two years. Under Spain’s stewardship, resolution 1540 (2004) has been enhanced as a bulwark against the possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors. I also congratulate the Plurinational State of Bolivia for taking up the chairmanship of the 1540 Committee in anticipation. Bolivia has big shoes to fill, but we also hope that it will take the work of the 1540 Committee to a much higher level. The Deputy Secretary-General has just given us a sharp reminder that the threats and risks of a non-State actor acquiring a weapon of mass destruction are not receding. How to tackle these threats and risks is a decision for Member States to make, but I would like to highlight three priorities. The first is biological weapons. The resolution just adopted recognizes the growing threats and risks associated with biological weapons. The need to address these threats and risks is all the more important given that the recent Review Conference of the Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention fell short of expectations. There is much more work to be done in implementing preventative measures for biological weapons. One near-term step, as reflected in the new resolution, could be to enhance the information sharing mechanism on biological threats and risks between States, international organizations and regional organizations. For our part, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs will continue to strengthen the Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, in line with the recommendation of the 2013 lessons- learned exercise. The Mechanism is the only instrument at our disposal to investigate if a biological instrument occurs. The second is disruptive technology. I welcome the resolution’s call for Member States to take into account the rapid advances in science and technology and to control intangible transfers of technology and information. The international community cannot afford to lag behind a technological curve. The 1540 Committee could build on the request made in resolution 2325 (2016) and hold an open meeting next year on technological and scientific issues. Such a meeting could address the following two issues. First, emerging technologies and scientific development could have potential weapons of mass destruction capabilities or can be adapted as a means of delivery must be assessed; and secondly, we must consider how to prevent their misuse while safeguarding peaceful applications. The 1540 Committee could also utilize its interaction with the industry through the Wiesbaden process, in order to further elaborate how the private sector can self- regulate to prevent the misuse of technology. That might include the development of industry codes of conduct and ethical standards on dual-use technologies with proliferation risks for weapons of mass destruction. The third priority is capability. Since the last comprehensive review, the 1540 Committee and its Expert Group, in partnership with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, our Office, have substantially expanded their outreach. In the last five years, 188 States have participated in those outreach activities. That is a significant achievement but it is not enough, given the growing threats and risks, as well the needs of Member States. Unfortunately, our capacity to respond to requests for help from Member States is declining. Donors have been generous, but the gap between the needs and the available resources is growing. We commend the call of resolution 2325 (2016) on all States to voluntarily contribute to the United Nations Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities. We want to reiterate our readiness to better match donors with recipients. We intend to raise the quality of assistance alongside the quantity. Last, but not least, are the institutional issues. As recognized by the Council, the 1540 Committee needs institutional support that is fit for purpose in our fast-changing security environment. We must ensure that the resources at the disposal of the Committee, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Expert Group — through both a regular budget and voluntary funding  — are being used in the most efficient and effective way possible. For that purpose, our Office will do our best to support the Chair and the members of the Committee in their assessment of how to make the best use of the available resources, including streamlining support structures. Today’s debate is a welcome reaffirmation of the gravity with which the Security Council treats the threats and risks posed by weapons of mass destruction. We count on Council members to continue to safeguard international peace and security, not only by announcing preventative measures through resolution 1540 (2004), but also by looking ahead at response challenges in the eventuality that prevention fails. The consequences of an attack would be disastrous and we must be prepared. I would like to close by repeating the Secretary- General’s many calls, and the Deputy Secretary- General’s call made this morning before my statement, that the ultimate guarantee against any use of a weapon of mass destruction is through their total and irreversible elimination.

I thank Mr. Kim Won-soo for his briefing. I now give the floor to Mr. Finlay. Mr. Finlay: It is a great honour for me to address this special meeting of the Security Council. Since 2004, my organization — the Stimson Center — has had the distinction of supporting the work of six successive Chairs of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). In those 12 years, hastened largely by the forces of globalization, it is astonishing to reflect upon the breadth of advancement witnessed around the globe. For millions, these advances have made the world a far more hospitable place. In the past 12 years, Governments and non-governmental actors alike have conspired to help cut the world’s extreme poverty rate in half. More girls are in school, fewer children are dying as a result of preventable illness, and the world continues to make advances against the scourge of global diseases like malaria and HIV/AIDS. Further, despite the horrific and headline-grabbing conflicts of today, the inexorable arc of conflict and violence is bending, however gradually, toward peace. Those accomplishments trace their lineage to our growing global interconnectedness and the successful efforts of this organ and others to steer the forces of globalization towards universal benefit. Sadly, positive advances in science and technology, along with the democratization of modernity around the globe, have also hastened non-State actors with ill intent, at worst facilitating access to the world’s most dangerous weapons and technologies of mass destruction. In that regard, resolution 1540 (2004) has provided a near unprecedented rallying point for global efforts to prevent terrorist acquisition of these heinous weapons. In a global security environment experiencing a poverty of optimism, the resolution and the 1540 Committee have demonstrated an enviable return on our joint political and financial investment. I believe that when the history of our time is written, the Committee’s efforts on our behalf will be recognized as a glowing example of what is best about the human spirit  — a willingness to accept our common and interconnected interest in peace, security and mutual prosperity. Regrettably, even as globalization has extended the benefits of prosperity, so too has it fundamentally altered the drivers of proliferation and insecurity. Today, the value of global trade has doubled, driving access to nefarious technologies to distant corners of the globe. In the past 12 years, private capital flows have doubled, opening new opportunities for malicious actors to conceal illicit financial flows. Today, 47 per cent of the world’s inhabitants have access to the internet and, prospectively, illicit intangible technology transfers — up from just 12 per cent in 2004, and we have witnessed a steady increase in nuclear, biological, and chemical incidents around the globe — including notably, by non-State actors. Accordingly, it is clear that despite the progress Committee 1540 has engendered, our central challenge remains unmet. However, it is not a moment for despondency. Rather, it is a clarion call to celebrate our successes in the face of overwhelming challenges, and to redouble our efforts with the clear-eyed knowledge that a weapon of mass destruction incident anywhere in the world will have both sweeping security and economic ramifications for every State represented in the Chamber. The Government of Spain should be deeply proud. Under your leadership, Mr. President, the Council has widened interest in and access to the resolution by constituencies beyond national Governments once thought tangential to the objectives of the resolution. That is an extraordinary accomplishment. Yet, even as we celebrate these advances, there are two key priorities that remain unaddressed. First, it is clear that the institution of the United Nations, in the face of this impossible mandate, is wildly overburdened. With a global mandate, the 1540 Committee and nine experts cannot hope to keep pace with the evolving proliferation landscape, nor the activities and demands of 193 Member States. In the course of that review, the Government of Canada presented a proposal calling for targeted implementation support of the 1540 Committee. Assistance can come not only from official entities  — law enforcement, customs and border control agencies — but also from legal specialists, civil society analysts, industry leaders and, as we have seen, even student scholars who represent the next generation of global leadership. I believe that civil society could present a no-cost additive support mechanism that would work with national authorities to identify critical risks and capacity gaps, develop actionable requests for assistance from Member States, and work with the Committee to match those requests with donors or even provide that assistance directly. Secondly, it has become trite to note that the proliferation threat has grown, but we have yet to concede that no Government — not even a confederation of like-minded Governments  — can hope to address the inexorable march towards proliferation. Only by inculcating civil society, industry and the general public with shared values and a recognition of mutual benefit can we hope to meet the tide of proliferation concern. Here, too, there is progress. The Government of Finland paved the way with an innovative whole-of- society approach to implementing the resolution, particularly in countries of the Global South. Their dual-benefit approach allows for a better pairing of assistance offered in the name of resolution 1540 (2004) with other higher-priority security and development objectives of Member States. The Government of Finland’s approach should be scaled and replicated, and Helsinki should be commended for its innovation. In closing, we know that the world can change in the blink of an eye. I commend this organ for doing what it can, where it can to keep the world’s most dangerous weapons out of the world’s most dangerous hands.

I thank Mr. Finlay for his briefing. I now give the floor to Mr. Min. Mr. Min: I thank you, Sir, for the kind invitation to address Security Council members and other representatives on the important topic of furthering the mandates of resolution 1540 (2004), focused on non-State actors. I want to especially thank the Mission of the Kingdom of Spain to the United Nations for its kind facilitation of my participation today. It is an honour for me to be here to share some of my thoughts on the role of the private sector in this endeavour to further the work of resolution 1540 (2004) and the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead. My views today are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of my employer. As many of those present know, Deutsche Post- DHL Group is a global leader in mail and logistics, and its various business divisions provide services ranging from express delivery services, warehousing, mail, air and freight forwarding, customs brokerage, aviation, and so on. DHL operates in practically all countries and territories throughout the world, servicing every imaginable sector of the world economy. Such international presence and reach pose challenges in an environment where there is conflict, political tensions and non-State actors who seek to harm global peace and security. While businesses are in some sense agnostic when it comes to international political objectives, global businesses benefit from international stability, trade and economic integration. While a business’s goal is to maximize profit for its shareholders, the reality in the twenty-first century is that a multinational company cannot be profitable or increase its brand value in the long run if it ignores international norms, legal requirements and potential risks to global security. To achieve the aspirations laid out in resolution 1540 (2004), cooperation just between national Governments is not enough. With the advancement of technology driven by the private sector and the quickly evolving supply chain and its modalities, such as the growth of non-asset-based service providers, the private sector is a key component of the fight for global peace and security. The private sector and the public sector must work together in combating illicit activities by non-State actors. In that regard, the Government of Germany’s efforts with the Wiesbaden process, which we have participated in, is a model for facilitating dialogue between the public and private sectors. Given the limited time, I would mention only that various documents that contain detailed information have already been transmitted by the German Government regarding best practices for public-private dialogue, as well as measures, such as internal compliance programmes, that businesses should adopt. What the Wiesbaden process has taught us is that it is only dialogue and the sharing of information and best practices that can reduce misunderstanding between the public and private sectors and highlight the crucial role that the private sector plays in that arena. There needs to be more dialogue similar to the Wiesbaden process, with more private sector participation and in more regions of the world. Businesses such as DHL have a unique vantage point and opportunity to cooperate with the public sector to ensure that logistics services are not used for illicit activities by non-State actors or if they are, to mitigate the risks to the global order. While it should never be the role of private businesses to be a proxy of law enforcement, businesses are on the front lines of economic activity and thus can and should have strong internal compliance programmes to prevent their products and services from being used by malicious non-State actors. For example, DHL has instituted a global transactional screening system whereby lists of restricted individuals and entities designated by the United Nations or national Governments are used to reduce the chance of providing DHL services to those who seek to harm global security. Such a process is expensive, requiring vast information technology systems, software and specialized personnel. But in the end, it is important for companies like DHL to reduce such risks because ultimately such measures can avert business disruption and detrimental impact to the world economy. One of the challenges that faces private industry in the context of resolution 1540 (2004) is that despite the high level of participation among Member States, there are differing requirements and standards, such as in export-control laws. For a global business, divergent and varying requirements among Member States add cost, confusion and, often, complex conflicts of laws. To maximize the effectiveness of the objectives of resolution 1540 (2004), uniform or harmonized regulatory requirements among key markets, to the extent possible, make it easier for multinational businesses to comply and to cooperate with the public sector. Such efforts as the Waasenaar Arrangement, while not universal, do set the global standards for the classification of dual-use goods for licensing and export-control purposes. That type of uniformity is highly welcomed by multinational businesses that must contend with multijurisdictional issues. In conclusion, although it is a cliché, the technological and economic advancements are getting faster and faster. But with that is also a global supply chain that is ever more complex, yet more integrated and specialized. It is harder than ever before for national Governments to combat the illicit activities of non-State actors on their own. It requires more cooperation across borders and, more importantly, between the public and private sectors.

I thank Mr. Min for his briefing. On behalf of all the members of the Security Council, I should like to thank our briefers for their useful and informative reports. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Spain. It is an honour for me to preside over this high-level open debate on halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors. Furthermore, this topic holds particular value for me because reminds me of my time as Permanent Representative of Spain to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Chairman of the Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties. With the adoption of resolution 2325 (2016), Spain has concluded the work entrusted to it by the Security Council as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) during 2015 and 2016. We undertook the task with a sense of responsibility and transparency, in the context of the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004). The work was intensive. We consulted with Member States, international organizations and civil society. We had the support of members of the Committee, the Group of Experts and the Secretariat. The broad support for the resolution, for which I thank all of its sponsors, is the result of that collective work. I extend my gratitude to the briefers at this meeting: the Vice-President of DHL and the President of the Stimson Center. Their briefings show the irreplacable role that businesses and the academic world play in fighting proliferation. The United Nations was born with the purpose of banishing the suffering caused by the scourge of war. Unfortunately, we are still far from achieving that goal. The Organization cannot relent in that endeavour. We must prevent conflict and, failing that, ensure compliance with international humanitarian law. We are alarmed by the proved use of weapons of mass destruction in the twenty-first century. We are disturbed that non-State actors and terrorist organizations are able to access those types of weapons. If they have those weapons, they will use them — as we have witnessed in Syria and Iraq. Their barbarism knows no bounds. That certain risk led to the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), 12 years ago, which was a great service provided by the Security Council to the whole of the international community. The two threats addressed in resolution 1540 (2004) are continually evolving and on the rise. Terrorist groups adapt their procedures in order to acquire technology and sensitive materials. Traffickers develop new techniques to avoid national and international inspections, thereby exacerbating the risk of proliferation. We could not remain impassive. The resolution that we have just adopted is a substantive and timely reaction. We are taking a great step towards establishing a comprehensive agenda that can help to prevent a catastrophe of global proportions. Spain promoted the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004) in order to bolster the effectiveness of the prevention of proliferation by non-State actors. The report presented by the Committee puts forward a series of recommendations to strengthen the 1540 system and lays the foundations for a comprehensive agenda to achieve the effective and full implementation of the objectives set out in 2004. Resolution 2325 (2016) is the culmination of that work. It substantially improves the effectiveness of resolution 1540 (2004) without modifying its preventive and cooperative approach. The resolution compels us to better coordinate and strengthen the tools to deal with the threat we are considering. It calls upon States and the Committee to focus their efforts on the sectors that require the most attention and to bear in mind new proliferation risks. It highlights the value of national plans and the visits of the Committee. It also addresses the need to bear in mind the particular circumstances of States in implementing measures against proliferation. Other innovative aspects of the resolution include a firm commitment to transparency in the work of the 1540 Committee through meetings open to all Member States and the use of the communications media. It highlights the recognition of the role of parliamentarians and civil society in fighting proliferation. The resolution will leave a significant legacy with regard to support. It seeks to avoid duplication and facilitates the channelling of offers of, and requests for, assistance — for example, through regional conferences. It strengthens the capacity of the 1540 Committee to provide direct assistance. Furthermore, the resolution calls for voluntary contributions, as without adequate funding many of the new measures would not be viable. With regard to coordination, the resolution requests the 1540 Committee to report annually to the Council on its work and to evaluate how the effectiveness of the special political mission that supports the Committee can be improved. That evaluation will allow the United Nations to acquire a number of tools that are more in line with current challenges. It also urges the relevant committees of the Council to reinforce their cooperation in order to face the threat of terrorism, and to report in that regard. Experience has taught us that it is not enough to simply adopt good texts, which today’s resolution undoubtedly is. As political agreement is important, so is compliance with what has been agreed upon. This resolution will remain a dead letter without firm and active commitment from all of us. We cannot allow inaction. We owe it to our citizens and to the coming generations, which cannot be exposed to the plans of organizations that seek only destruction. It is essential that we maximize our vigilance so that we do not have to relive the indescribable horrors that are caused by the use of weapons of mass destruction. Spain will spare no effort. Firm support for the work of the 1540 Committee will continue to be a constant element in the foreign policy of my country. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I shall now give the floor to the other members of the Council.

At the outset, I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for having taken the initiative to organize this open debate on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which is a timely issue. The meeting allows us to consider together the actions aimed at preventing non-State actors from accessing weapons of mass destruction. We also thank Mr. Jan Eliasson, Deputy Secretary-General; Mr. Kim Won-soo, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs; and Mr. James Min, Vice-President of DHL, whose excellent briefings have enabled us to clarify our work and enrich our discussions. Resolution 2325 (2016), just adopted unanimously, provides an ideal framework — if it is fully implemented — to effectively combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and, above all, access by non-State actors to those weapons. Paragraph 27 of resolution 2325 (2016) seems particularly relevant in that regard, in that it requests the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and the various sanctions and counter-terrorism committees to reinforce their cooperation. This can be done through information-sharing, coordinating State visits pursuant to their specific mandates, technical assistance activities and in all other cases with scope for cooperation. In any case, it remains more crucial today than ever to make a comprehensive inventory of all sources of weapons of mass destruction throughout the world in order to systematically secure or destroy them. Important measures have certainly already been taken, but we must recognize that there remains much to be done in this domain. The comprehensive review of the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) undertaken this year was therefore particularly timely in that it allowed Member States, relevant international and regional organizations, and also civil society to refocus their actions and strategies on a more global, coordinated and coherent approach so as to sustainably address the various challenges faced by international peace and security. Recommendations contained in the report of the review have led to the proposal by Member States of concrete, practical and appropriate measures that, if properly applied, could greatly contribute to the resolution’s implementation.. Senegal believes that, in an interdependent world where our interests are closely linked, strengthening cooperation in areas such as border control, monitoring financial flows and online networks, and legal assistance are more crucial than ever to the development of an appropriate strategy to prevent and combat proliferation if we wish to avoid weapons of mass destruction falling into the wrong hands, as noted earlier. This requires a synergy of efforts of all actors involved and the sharing of experiences. Analysis of data concerning the African continent shows continued progress in the implementation of measures established in resolution 1540 (2004), particularly in relation to developing appropriation legislation and the presentation of implementation reports. In this context, it is important to recall the political commitment of the African Union in support of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by African States. This commitment has led notably to the organization of a review and assistance conference on the resolution’s implementation, in partnership with the 1540 Committee, held in Addis Ababa in April. It is important to continue such cooperation initiatives between the Committee and African countries, most of whom having benefitted from its support in implementing resolution 1540 (2004). Furthermore, with regard to this aspect of international cooperation and assistance, we encourage Member States with the ability to do so to help train national focal points, and we take this opportunity to thank Morocco for its willingness to organize training for African national contact points. In this vein, my delegation is pleased to highlight the regional approach adopted by the Committee in its programme of work. This was evident at the first interparliamentary meeting held in Abidjan in February on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), which was attended by more than 70 African legislators from 18 States and where Senegal had the honour of representing the 1540 Committee. The meeting provided an opportunity to consider the main aspects related to the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in Africa and to reflect on ways to strengthen national legal frameworks established to implement the resolution. This type of initiative should be replicated throughout all regions of the world, given the vital role that parliamentarians play in developing and adopting relevant legal frameworks to prevent nuclear, chemical or biological weapons from falling into the hands of non-State actors, especially terrorists. We must also pursue efforts in areas such as the improvement of assistance procedures; an inventory and analysis of assistance requirements; and dialogue on assistance with interested international, regional and subregional organizations and even non-governmental organizations and civil society. This requires the strengthening of the capacities of the Committee and its experts in order to allow them to adequately carry out assistance activities in countries who have expressed need. Similarly, the Security Council should consider ways to strengthen the systems for early warning and prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors, including by strengthening coordination between members, monitoring the implentation of the provisions of resolution 1540 (2004) and analysing proliferation risks. We also reaffirm the need to create a sustainable mechanism to improve interaction and coordation among those who request and those who provide assistance, as noted previously, in order to avoid duplication and identify best practices in assistance in order to maximize their benefits. The immediate challenge therefore consists of better coordinating existing tools in order to limit the possibility of non-State actors engaging in proliferation activities. I reiterate Senegal’s willingness and commitment to spare no effort in the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. My country has taken measures to meet its obligations under resolution 1540 (2004), including the establishment of a national coordination mechanism to detect the activities of non-State actors in order to promote cooperation among relevant national actors and human and technical capacity-building programmes of the national commission for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and the authority entrusted with radiological protection and nuclear safety, which are tasked with ensuring the implementation of national policy in those fields and whose missions revolve around the three essential axes of regulation, monitoring and public information. Senegal, having signed and ratified nine conventions on nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, has deemed it necessary to set up a national commission in charge of monitoring these agreements and all issues related to them. The national commission allows us to stop treating these issues in a fragmented way and to manage them in accordance with our international commitments. It also authorizes the regular monitoring of these agreements and relations with international organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. The national commission brings together all ministerial departments concerned with these activities and assists the competent authorities in formulating, monitoring and implementing national policy on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. In conclusion, Senegal will continue to fulfil its obligations and observe its commitments on this matter. We are convinced that through cooperation and mutual efforts, shared experiences and expertise, we will be able to better understand these threats and thereby develop coherent, holistic and global strategies to address them effectively.

We start by congratulating Spain on its leadership of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and on our common effort to ensure that the non-proliferation regime that the Committee oversees is able to respond to today’s challenges. My country has a long and proud record of activism in relation to the threat and risks of nuclear weapons. We have long understood what it would mean for the world, even in our remote part of the Pacific, if the doctrine of mutually assured destruction were carried to its illogical conclusion. We have seen the effects  — security, health, environmental and social  — of the testing of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific. We knew that those threats and risks would multiply if the numbers of parties possessing nuclear weapons were to grow. Put simply, our safety and security — and the safety and security of most United Nations Members — depend on the effectiveness of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). These are the reasons why New Zealand was and remains a staunch supporter of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, even as we lament the failure of nuclear-weapon States to live up to their commitments to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament. They are also the reasons why New Zealand is a strong supporter of the 1540 regime, which seeks to address the risks of terrorists and other non-State actors acquiring nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and other WMD. They are the reasons why we have supported the efforts led by Spain to upgrade and expand the 1540 regime to make it more efficient and responsive to today’s realities. We are disappointed that some Council members — some permanent members — have limited the full realization of what had been proposed. Today, the materials, expertise and technology relating to weapons of mass destruction are more accessible than ever before. The Internet readily provides to anyone information previously held in closed scientific and military communities. Three-D printers mean that specialized equipment can be developed anywhere, and drones bought in a store or online can provide the means of delivery for a WMD attack. Terrorist organizations, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, have acquired the materials and know-how to manufacture chemical weapons and have used them in combat. That was one of the very threats that the 1540 regime was set up to prevent. We need to consider how we can curb such developments, while also being ready to deal with new proliferation risks as they emerge  — as they surely will. That requires both early action and sustained commitment over the long term. One of the frustrations we have encountered during our term on the Council  — and one we met again in the negotiations on today’s resolution  — is the extraordinary aversion of some Council members to ideas that would seem like simple common sense in any other context. We as a Council are worried about the risk of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists or would-be terrorists. We know that one of those risks arises when a State may not have the systems or the capabilities to deal with that threat and would benefit from more active cooperation. Yet in the resolution we were unable to endorse the simple proposition that this Council might take the initiative to offer such cooperation through the 1540 Committee. I understand that the objection is that such an offer might be construed as inconsistent with State sovereignty, or an unwarranted intrusion into the internal affairs of the State concerned. That is very frustrating. If the Council continues to constrain itself with such overly sensitive notions of sovereignty and non-interference, it risks becoming increasingly ineffective and irrelevant. Such an attitude is seriously at odds with the many strong calls, including by the Secretary-General-elect, for a much greater emphasis on prevention. An issue of particular importance to New Zealand in today’s resolution is the acknowledgement that a risk- based approach is appropriate when considering the implementation of the 1540 regime. Our Pacific region is nuclear-free and strongly committed to preventing the spread of those weapons. But the small island developing States (SIDS) of the region do not produce or export sensitive materials, so the proliferation risk in their cases is low. Pacific SIDS also have small administrations with limited capacity to enact and implement complex 1540 legislative requirements, which are often not directly relevant to them. We recognize that mandatory Council resolutions must apply to all Member States and that, in the case of the 1540 regime, our non-proliferation efforts are only as good as the weakest link in the chain. But it is neither sensible nor realistic to impose the same administrative and reporting burdens on a country like Tuvalu or Nauru — countries with populations of 10,000 people, with no shared borders or proliferation-sensitive industries — as we do on much larger countries, such as France or the United Kingdom, Ukraine or Egypt, or even Uruguay or New Zealand. We are pleased today’s resolution urges the Committee to prioritize efforts towards specific risks and towards countries and regions that are the most vulnerable to proliferation. New Zealand restates its commitment to global disarmament and nonproliferation efforts and our support for the 1540 regime. We have been active in helping our Pacific Island partners understand and implement their obligations. We have been a strong advocate of working through regional bodies, such as the Pacific Islands Forum, and we stand ready to continue to play our part over the long-term. In concluding, we commend Spain for today’s debate and its work to make the Council’s non-proliferation regime more effective.

At the outset, I want to thank you, Mr. President, for convening this meeting. I pay tribute to Spain and to your ambassador here in New York for their excellent leadership of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) over the last two years. Preventing nuclear, chemical and biological materials falling into the hands of non-State actors, especially terrorists, has never been more relevant for international peace and security and for this Council. Therefore, I welcome wholeheartedly the unanimous adoption of resolution 2325 (2016) signalling the strong support within this Chamber in tackling that scourge. Sadly, the nightmare scenario of terrorists using these horrific weapons is no longer hypothetical. We need only to look to the village of Marea in northern Syria. As the sun set on 21 August last year, the people of Marea thought they had survived a near miss by artillery. By the morning, they were covered in burns and blisters, bewildered and terrified. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons- United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism would later determine that they had been shelled with sulphur mustard gas. As the people of Marea learned so tragically that day, whether in Syria, Iraq or anywhere else, terrorists like Da’esh will use such weapons to horrific effect, given the opportunity. Sadly, their use is not restricted to terrorists; the Al-Assad regime has also used chemical weapons to horrific effect, in violation of so many international norms and conventions, and must be held accountable. So worldwide, it is vital that we prevent non-State actors from ever acquiring such materials in the first place. That is what resolution 2325 (2016) is all about. The resolution we have adopted today completes a comprehensive review of the tools we have at our disposal to fulfil this important duty. It is more than 12 years since the Security Council acted unanimously under a Chapter VII mandate to tackle these proliferation threats. That mandate remains as strong and vital as ever, but by stepping back and examining in detail global implementation by States, we have been able to properly take stock of progress. We can certainly celebrate the significant advances that have been made. States have enacted new laws, introduced stronger export controls and improved the security of dangerous materials. More States than ever have reported on the steps they have taken under resolution 1540 (2004). However, we must also recognize that there is still a long way to go to secure the full implementation of that resolution. States have taken less than half of all possible measures. The gaps are much wider in some areas than others, and we welcome the statement in the report that calls on States to take urgent action to adopt measures to account for and secure materials related to biological weapons. It is imperative that the resolution be implemented in full, but we should target our efforts where they are most needed and will have greatest impact. The resolution in front of us responds to that evidence and offers a set of well-informed, strategic and targeted new recommendations for States. This is the most substantive review of 1540 undertaken by this Council since 2004. It offers a guideline that will serve us well until the next review in 2021. I would like to highlight four key areas in particular. First, the resolution calls upon States to take into account the evolving nature of proliferation risks and advances in science and technology. We need to future-proof this resolution by staying aware of the real-world developments that could create vulnerabilities in a State. That means making sure that advances such as cyber, 3-D printing and drones are not exploited for malicious purposes. Secondly, this text also offers meaningful guidance on challenges to implementation. For the first time, it highlights specific implementation areas in need of work, such as enforcement, prohibitions, proliferation finance and intangible technology transfers. We have also broken new ground for the Council by calling on States to adopt effective national control lists for sensitive materials, which is a vital step in an effective non-proliferation regime. Thirdly, the resolution also strengthens cooperation and information-sharing between the wide range of international organizations that are working to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I would commend in particular the open-door offer to civil society, including academia and industry to share their insights with the United Nations experts responsible for monitoring this regime. Finally, the resolution requests the 1540 Committee to review the efficiency and effectiveness of the special political mission that supports its work. We should take this opportunity to ensure that the support structures at the United Nations have the expertise and capabilities they need to support States in their implementation efforts. We look forward to a report on that in 2017. I would like to reiterate the United Kingdom’s strong support for the full and universal implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). We owe it to the people of Marea and to so many other victims of such terrible weapons that we succeed in our efforts. The review process in 2016 and the resolution that we have just adopted take us closer to achieving that vital goal. The United Kingdom looks forward to working with the whole United Nations membership, international organizations, civil society and industry to make that a reality.

We commend Spain for convening today’s meeting on a critical issue of extreme concern for the international community and welcome Mr. Alfonso Dastis Quecedo, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Spain, who is presiding over this important meeting. We also thank Deputy Secretary-General Mr. Jan Eliasson, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, the President of the Stimson Center and the Vice-President of DHL for their important contributions to the debate. Resolution 2325 (2016) that the Security Council has just unanimously adopted is yet another landmark document to strengthen cooperation in addressing the threat of terrorists and non-State actors acquiring, developing, trafficking or using nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, while endorsing the 2016 comprehensive review on the status of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). The theme selected by the Spanish presidency for today’s debate  — “Preventing catastrophe: a global agenda for stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors” — is very timely. Let me also commend Ambassador Oyarzun Marchesi and his team on his leadership at the helm of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) over the past two years. In that respect, multilateral efforts, cooperation partnerships and the sharing of best practices in the pursuit of positive security acquis and resolution 1540 (2004), which was ground-breaking when adopted in 2004, translated a renewed awareness and international community resolve to address that threat. Since its adoption, significant progress has been made in applying a collective response, as demonstrated by most Member States through the submission of reports and the implementation of legislative and operational measures in compliance with the resolution. Over the years, the 1540 Committee has made a tangible contribution to progress on the resolution’s implementation. The timely extension of the 1540 Committee mandate through resolution 1977 (2011) further contributes to the institutionalization of the Committee, which became an essential part of the international non-proliferation effort. As the comprehensive review highlights, there has been a general increase in the number of measures undertaken by States to prevent non-State actors and terrorists from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction. The dialogue between the 1540 Committee and the Member States has further promoted State ownership of anti-proliferation strategies. The challenge encountered by the Committee has been the decrease in the number of assistance requests by States — a situation that requires greater attention and resources in order to enable the assistance mechanism to deliver an effective response. With regard to international cooperation, the Committee notes the importance of the provision of technical assistance through regional and subregional organizations  — a factor that would improve the assistance mechanism being provided, with the aim of more sound implementation of the resolution. While lagging behind in implementing the provisions of resolution 1540 (2004), there is a concerted effort by African countries to improve their performance. In that regard, in April the African Union (AU) held a conference on the implementation of the resolution in Africa with support from the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and the 1540 Committee. The conference also focused on addressing the assistance requirements presented by AU members and submitted its views and contributions for inclusion in the 2016 comprehensive review. The Republic of Angola is deeply concerned about the issue of disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It is a State party to the main international conventions on weapons and disarmament, in particular the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the Pelindaba Treaty, which establishes Africa as a nuclear- weapon-free zone; and more recently, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. In that connection, a multisectoral commission for the follow-up of international treaties and conventions on weapons and disarmament has recently been created, acting as a focal point for the Angolan Government on the matter and operating under the coordination of the Ministry of National Defence. The commission has carried out various training courses, with a view to exercising greater control on the proper use of chemical and biological agents and their precursors. It works with academia and communities to raise awareness on the issue. The Angolan Government has promoted training at home and abroad, in partnership with other States and international organizations with emphasis on the seminar on the prohibition of chemical weapons held in September in Angola and Brazil as part of the Angolan-Brazil mentorship programme. The seminar for the legal drafters of the Chemical Weapons Convention was held recently in Rwanda and aimed especially at Portuguese-speaking African countries, in partnership with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Finally, I would like to emphasize that Angola does not own or produce weapons of mass destruction. It advocates greater sharing of information and know- how among States on the use of such technologies for peaceful purposes and assistance to States in matters of the national implementation of international legal instruments and the dissemination of the values of peace, stability and peaceful coexistence among people.

Ukraine welcomes the adoption of resolution 2325 (2016) and appreciates the efforts of the Spanish presidency on the comprehensive review on the status of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Ukraine fully aligns itself with the statement to be made on behalf of the European Union and would like to make the following remarks on its own behalf. The Ukrainian delegation would like to stress that the statement to be made on behalf of the Community of Independent States at today’s meeting does not apply or refer to Ukraine in any way whatsoever. We are very grateful to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and his team for their active leadership on that issue. We are also grateful to the Group of Experts for their fundamental work in preparing the report on the comprehensive review, a document that describes the progress made in the implementation of the resolution during the past five years and clearly identifies areas for improvement. It also includes recommendations for further action to be taken in order to achieve full compliance with the requirements of resolution 1540 (2004). I must note that the results thus far have been achieved under extremely difficult conditions. On the one hand, there is threat of access to and the use of weapons of mass destruction and related materials by non-State actors, which has today become a complex reality. On the other hand, Member States have varying interpretations of resolution 1540 (2004) and differing approaches to strengthening the existing tools under the resolution. Since the beginning of its participation in the Security Council, Ukraine has supported Spain’s ambitious objective to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of resolution 1540 (2004) and strengthen its unique ability to adapt to new challenges and threats in the field of non-proliferation. We congratulate our Spanish colleagues on successfully completing that historic process. Ukraine is among the majority of States in both the Security Council and the United Nations that recognize the need to take urgent measures to strengthen the existing system for halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Resolution 1540 (2004) plays a key role in that regard in preventing the use of chemical, biological and nuclear materials by non-State groups, in particular by terrorists. Today the potential use of weapons of mass destruction is the greatest threat facing humankind. Nevertheless, many significant challenges remain that must be addressed in order to avoid a situation in which the world’s most dangerous materials might fall into the wrong hands, either intentionally or as a result of underestimating potential risks. Resolution 1540 (2004) complements existing international regimes for the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery by providing a new dimension to the issue in the context of combating illicit trafficking in the relevant materials and by prohibiting their acquisition by non-State actors. In that regard, we welcome and commend the conclusions of the comprehensive review, which clearly demonstrate various areas of progress made in implementation, both with respect to the various types of weapons of mass destruction and with respect to the various obligations set out in resolution 1540 (2004). That approach will assist in defining the specific areas for each stakeholder in which national or regional efforts should be intensified. Ukraine was once a nuclear-weapon State, while, at the same time, a full State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, as well as all export-control regimes. In those capacities, Ukraine remains fully committed to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and exerts every effort to that end. We reaffirm our strong support for resolution 1540 (2004), as we did at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, held in Washington, D.C. There, we joined the initiative of the Republic of Korea, Canada and Spain entitled “Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)”. At the same time, despite measures taken by Member States to reduce proliferation risks, the world is witnessing increasingly complex threats in that area. Risks can arise not only as a result of inadequate national legislation, but also owing to the rapid development of science and technology and electronic commerce, along with a lack of understanding of such threats among those in academia, industry and civil society. Moreover, international legal prohibitions have little relevance to terrorists and criminals. Unlike States, non-State actors pursue their hostile intentions and are prepared to take unconventional and highly unpredictable actions. In addition, the erosion of the existing world order, continuing and unresolved violations of international law and ongoing conflicts in various parts of the world continue to weaken the overall chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security architecture. Over the past decade we have heard that chemical and biological components are potential weapons for terrorists, other non-State actors and so-called rogue States. Regrettably, that statement turns out to be true, as in recent years there have been reports of cases of the alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria. In that respect, Ukraine joins others in vigorously condemning any use of weapons of mass destruction. The deepening of effective interactions among States and the building of synergies among all stakeholders, including the relevant international, regional, subregional and non-governmental organizations and civil society, represent a crucial and urgent task on the international agenda. In that context, we believe that the Council’s 1540 Committee will redouble its efforts in accordance with the recommendations of the comprehensive review and with resolution 2325 (2016), which we have just adopted, in order to improve the mechanism for providing assistance to States and to facilitate prioritizing the needs in that area. In conclusion, I would like to reiterate our intention to engage constructively with all concerned partners so as to ensure fruitful results from the comprehensive review and further strengthen the global architecture regarding the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

We welcome the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Spain, Mr. Alfonso Dastis Quecedo, who is presiding over this meeting of the Security Council, and we appreciate the convening of this open debate on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and on resolution 1540 (2004). We also thank the Spanish chairmanship of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) for its effective and dynamic leadership of that subsidiary body of the Council. The country now holding the Council presidency has been tasked with an important and complex mission, namely, to lead the comprehensive review of the progress in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). As we see it, the Spanish diplomats have done an outstanding job in fulfilling that task. A substantive final report has been prepared, which notes the successful progress made by countries in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) over a five-year period. The Security Council has just unanimously adopted resolution 2325 (2016), which determines the road map for the future work of States, the 1540 Committee and other relevant actors for the period up to 2021. The Russian Federation has actively and constructively spoken out in all non-proliferation platforms. Combating the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a priority of Russian foreign policy. We are interested in finding common positions with our partners in order to promote the non-proliferation agenda as soon as possible. The global non-proliferation architecture is based on three pillars, namely, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Resolution 1540 (2004) also occupies a special place in that architecture. It is aimed at establishing a lasting legal and enforcement barrier in order to prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of non-State actors, including terrorists. The main outcome of the comprehensive review, as we see it, shall be to confirm the relevance of all the stipulations set forth in resolution 1540 (2004) and to confirm the preventive nature of resolution 2325 (2016) and its reasoning, which is based on cooperation. Another important conclusion is the need to maintain the positive momentum in implementing resolution 1540 (2004) and the readiness of everyone to work thoroughly over the long haul, given the long-term nature of this process. We understand that the process will require concentrating our attention and all the internal resources of Member States and cooperating with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). In the context of the resolution that we have just adopted today, the Russian Federation is ready to consider ways to make additional efforts to identify more active dynamic methods of work in order to achieve the goals outlined by the 1540 Committee. An innovative aspect of the new resolution is the appeal to States and to the Committee to consider, where applicable, the evolution of the risks related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the rapid development of science, technology and international trade, which can be used by non-State actors for proliferation. What is most important is that those subjects should be closely linked to the tasks surrounding implementation. Also, the new resolution proposes to more actively engage national and regional bodies in implementing resolution 1540 (2004), including the exchange of best practices, holding training seminars for focal points and regional forums and conferences on facilitating those issues. The benefits of such events are obvious. This past summer Russia held a seminar for focal points in Kaliningrad under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. We are exploring the possibility of continuing that practice. The resolution also focuses a great deal of attention on assisting countries that require assistance. Russia is providing assistance to member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States by regularly organizing seminars under the auspices of the Russian Federal Service for Technical and Export Control, which we intend to continue. We also welcome the resolution’s focus on making greater use of the capabilities of international and regional organizations and on getting them to coordinate their work plans with the efforts of the 1540 Committee and the needs of States. We also support the involvement, where it is warranted, of academia and the business community. Of course, all of that should take place under the leadership and oversight of Government offices. In the light of the ongoing terrorist activity in Syria and Iraq by Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (ISIS) and other terrorist groups, that have learned how to produce chemical weapons and are actively using chemical weapons , the importance of resolution 1540 (2004) is only increasing. The 1540 Committee, in the framework of its mandate, will continue cooperating with the Counter-Terrorism Committee on those issues. Violating resolution 1540 (2004) is unacceptable. Reports of non-State actors acquiring access to chemical weapons require thorough investigation and rapid reaction by the Security Council. We have often heard about the use of industrial chemicals or chemical warfare agents by ISIS fighters and other terrorist groups. There is evidence of terrorists having access to technology and infrastructure that enables them to produce chemical weapons. The threat of chemical and biological terrorism is reaching a wider scale and becoming transboundary in nature. It is extremely urgent to combat acts of terrorism. The tools provided by resolution 1540 (2004) fulfil a very important function, yet those instruments and the instruments of other resolutions, focused on their specific subjects, are clearly inadequate. In that regard, we need a global, comprehensive and holistic approach. Guided precisely by such considerations, Russia proposed an initiative, at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, to develop an international convention to combat acts of chemical and biological terrorism. We note with satisfaction that that initiative is gaining more and more proponents. We call on our partners that have not made up their minds yet to once again consider the Russian proposal and respond to it in a positive manner. Russia is interested in strengthening the regime set up to ensure the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and will do everything possible to achieve that and will actively cooperate with its regional and international partners.

At the outset, we would like to thank Mr. Alfonso Dastis Quecedo, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Spain, and the Spanish presidency for organizing today’s important open debate. We would also like to thank the Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Jan Eliasson; the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Kim Won-soo; and Mr. Brian Finlay and Mr. James Min for their statements. We would also like to congratulate the delegation of Spain and its team, and specifically Ambassador Román Oyarzun Marchesi, for the excellent work they have done at the healm of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Over the past two years, Ambassador Oyarzun Marchesi has shown incredible leadership in moving forward the work of that Committee. We also want to congratulate Spain for the successful and transparent negotiation proces that led to the adoption of resolution 2325 (2016) today, of which we are a co-sponsor. The threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors is a source of deep concern to the international community, in particular given the use of chemical weapons in Iraq and Syria by Da’esh. Those risks are increasing, given the fact that over the past 12 years there have been rapid developments in new technologies. While such new technologies may improve the quality of life of the world’s population and generate prosperity and well-being, it is worth noting the extent to which they can be used by non-State actors, including terrorists, to maximize their capacity to produce, acquire, transfer, transport and use weapons of mass destruction. All those new technologies share a series of characteristics that make them particularly dangerous. They are dual-use technologies and can be used for non-war purposes, but also for perverse purposes. It is also worth noting that, thanks to the growth of international trade and digitalization, such new technologies are becoming more widely disseminated. The risk is greater when Governments, intelligence services and large technology corporations allow the flow or transfer of such technologies to violent non-State actors. That is why the adoption of resolution 2325 (2016) is so important to reducing that risk. Drones are among the technologies that have seen significant development in recent years. The drone industry has developed at such a rapid rate that the old regulations restricting the proliferation of such devices have become obsolete. Even in their military applications, they have become an instrument making it possible to violate the sovereignty of countries and to secretly carry out military operations and select attacks. In addition, the drones that are currently being used for civilian purposes can also be used to disperse deadly chemical and biological agents. With the development of new drones that have the capacity to carry more weight, we can imagine the increased use of drones as improvised aerial explosive devices by non-State actors. In fact, we know that the Islamic State already has drones, and it is using them to carry out sporadic attacks on the ground. Among those technologies, there is also the so- called dark web, with hundreds of millions of web pages that are beyond the reach of common citizens and are being used by big corporations, intelligence services and State actors, among others. The information available in that network, which is used to host multiple markets for illegal goods, including weapons and chemical and biological substances, includes information that violates countries’ security. Moreover, in taking into account that the deep Web allows for a variety of non-State actors, including terrorists, to communicate among themselves securely and exchange goods and services, we realize that we are facing a dangerous vehicle for the use of weapons of mass destruction. Unfortunately, non-State actors, as well as certain Powers and intelligence services, continue to use information and communications technologies to promote the destabilization and overthrow of Governments through the Internet, which is conducive to the proliferation and expansion of terrorist groups, such as Da’esh and others. The international community must therefore strengthen measures to prevent information and communication technologies from being used for purposes contrary to international peace and security and development, in the understanding that this effort would not impinge in any way on right to freedom of expression and opinion in a responsible manner and in accordance with relevant international legal instruments. We are convinced that the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) can be truly effective only to the extent that it contributes to the development and strengthening of the capacities of all States rather than only those of a privileged few, and to the strengthening of mechanisms of interaction and cooperation with regional and subregional organizations. Technical and financial assistance that has been requested by States is the main pillar of resolution 1540 (2004), and we must work together to ensure that it is truly in sync with the needs of countries, particularly those of developing countries. However, it is important to bear in mind that resolution 1540 (2004) is only one element of the architecture of the non-proliferation regime and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction that complements the legal framework in the area originating from the relevant conventions such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Despite such progress in that area, further efforts are needed to strengthen the agenda of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in order to prevent terrorist groups from using those systems. The development, stockpiling, production and use of chemical and biological weapons were banned by the international community many years ago. Nevertheless, to date we do not have a similar convention in the nuclear domain. In that regard, it is necessary to point out that the most effective measure to prevent nuclear weapons from reaching the hands of violent non-State actors, including terrorist groups, is through the complete elimination of such nuclear arms. Latin America and the Caribbean have championed the cause of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, as attested to by their status as the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a populated part of the world, as stipulated in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, ratified in 1967, as well as its declaration as a zone of peace made during the second Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States in Havana in 2014. All of that underscores the firm commitment of Latin American and Caribbean countries to disarmament with the goal of contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security. We therefore believe that this debate is of particular importance in moving forward the work in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation wherein multilateral diplomacy has been affected by the lack of concrete progress. In that regard, we hope that in the near future a nuclear- weapon-fee zone can be established in the Middle East given the political and military complexity of that region in particular. In conclusion, we point out that, as we have been able to ban chemical and biological weapons, and as we continue to work together to ensure that weapons of mass destruction never fall into the hands of non-State actors, including terrorists, we must not let up in our efforts to achieve the prohibition of nuclear weapons. We  — and, in particular, nuclear- weapon States and those who have not acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty  — must all commit to adopting a convention that prohibits, once and for all, the development, stockpiling, production and use of these weapons of mass destruction.

I am particularly pleased to hear so many members of the Council speak in the Spanish language, including in the statement by our Ukrainian colleague. At the outset, I congratulate on Spain on its leadership of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and on holding today’s debate. Before I begin, I would also like to join the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Spain in his remarks concerning the Deputy Secretary General and his briefing. I would also like to thank Mr. Kim Won-soo, Mr. Finlay and Mr. Min for their participation today. The work of your delegation, Sir, that led to our adoption of today’s resolution 2325 (2016) was an outstanding example in terms of transparency and inclusivity. The text was provided to Member States well in advance so that they could easily reach consensus during negotiations. To speak in the Chamber on the use or the threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction forces us to recall the pre-eminence of international law and the obligations and rights of States recognized in the Charter of the United Nations. Cautious and collective action through multilateral instruments is the best assurance for every one and all of us. In adopting measures to prevent the use or the threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction, Member States have the obligation to strictly live up to their obligations under international law and the provisions of the Charter. Uruguay has implemented foreign policy that focuses on the need to make progress in universal and transparent negotiations with a view to achieving general and comprehensive disarmament under a strict international regime. The Deputy Secretary-General, I believe, summarized that need very well when he said, “There are no right hands for wrong weapons.” Uruguay is deeply concerned by the growing threat of terrorism and the risk of non-State actors obtaining, developing or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, or their delivery systems given their unpredictable and devastating consequences. This debate is therefore most timely, given the very serious threat to international security. To counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, it is essential to undertake the utmost efforts to achieve the goal of disarmament and non-proliferation. It is essential to adopt urgent measures to provide effective protection against the use or the threat of the use of such weapons by States and non-State actors, but always in conformity with the Charter and international law. In that regard, Uruguay urges all Member States fulfil their obligations, regarding arms control, disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. We commend and encourage the work and progress of United Nations agencies, including the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the International Atomic Energy Agency in that area. The best preventive tool we have now is resolution 1540 (2004). It is the primary legally binding instrument that covers the three categories of weapons of mass destruction. My delegation wants to emphasize that international cooperation and assistance are essential to effectively implementing measures contained in resolution 1540 (2004). The resolution that we have adopted today unanimously is a clear demonstration of the commitment to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and contains valuable references to the need of assistance and cooperation that must be implemented rapidly. Increased coordination of efforts at the national, regional, subregional and international levels, as appropriate, is also essential in order to strengthen the response to this serious challenge. States are responsible for taking all appropriate measures in accordance with their national legislations and in line with international law to strengthen export controls, monitor access to intangible technology transfers and information that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction. Transparency in the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) is another issue that we consider essential. We urge the Committee to continue promoting forums for dialogue and activities that involve the participation of all Member States in order to strengthen and improve the implementation of the resolution. Uruguay will begin work on the development of the national action plan for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), with the technical assistance of the 1540 Committee and the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism, within the framework of its programme for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) in the Americas. On a personal note, my next statement in the Security Council will be next year, when the terms of Angola, Malaysia, New Zealand, Spain and Venezuela will have ended. I take this opportunity to thank them on behalf of my delegation for their excellent work and valuable contributions, which we hope to build on. We will continue to work together in the coming year.

I would like to thank Spain for convening this very important meeting and join others in thanking the briefers for their excellent briefings. I welcome today’s unanimous adoption of resolution 2325 (2016), which was co-sponsored by Japan. We appreciate the strong leadership of Spain in this regard. Bearing in mind today’s agenda item, “Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”, I would like first to touch upon the most serious issue in this field — nuclear and ballistic missile development by North Korea. This is a blatant violation of Security Council resolutions and represents a clear challenge to the global non-proliferation regime. It is simply not unacceptable. Japan strongly urges North Korea to refrain from further provocations and to comply fully and faithfully with the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 2321 (2016) and 2270 (2016), as well as its other commitments. We must recall that resolution 2321 (2016) notes the complementarity of its obligations with those of resolution 1540 (2004). In discussing how to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), we must consider what is happening in the real world. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons/ United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism reached the clear conclusion that chemical weapons were in fact used in Syria, which we strongly condemn. The proliferation of WMDs is not a hypothetical threat. As has been mentioned often today, we should not overlook the danger of malicious actors benefitting from rapid advances in science, technology and international commerce for proliferation purposes. Strengthening the global non-proliferation regime is an urgent and ongoing task. Japan appreciates the adoption of resolution 2325 (2016), which contains important provisions that will help strengthen the global non-proliferation regime. I would like to focus here on two points in particular. The first point concerns the development of national control lists. Resolution 1540 (2004) prescribes various mandatory domestic control measures, but it is essential to specify which items are to be controlled in order for those measures to be effective. The resolution adopted today addresses this point by calling upon States that have not done so to start developing effective national control lists. I would like to take this opportunity to urge all States to undertake effective measures as soon as possible to actually intercept proliferation activities whenever they are committed. My second point involves a concrete description in resolution 2325 (2016) of the role to be played by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) in implementation assistance. Regrettably, the Committee receives many assistance requests that fail to specify actual needs, and the Committee’s match- making role is not functioning well. The new resolution attempts to address that situation by directing the Committee to help States formulate requests with specific details of the necessary assistance. I would like to invite States seeking assistance to utilize the 1540 Committee’s expertise to better formulate their requests. At the same time, the Committee should intensify its efforts to elicit concrete responses from donors, for example by proactively sharing specific assistance needs with other donor communities, such the G-7 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. To conclude, today’s security environment requires the international community to reinforce measures to tackle the threat posed by the proliferation of WMDs. Today’s adoption of resolution 2325 (2016) is an important step forward. Japan will continue to actively support the strengthening of the global non-proliferation regime, with resolution 1540 (2004) at its core.

At the outset, allow me to thank the Spanish presidency for organizing this open debate on a key issue, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly by non-State actors. I would also like to thank the Deputy Secretary- General for his presence today, his statement and his commitment to the overarching challenge of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. I also thank the other briefers, and note that France associates itself with the statement to delivered on behalf of the European Union. France thanks Spain for introducing resolution 2325 (2016), which it co-sponsored, and welcomes its unanimous adoption. It represents an important step that we took today in our common fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I would also like to pay tribute to Spain’s commitment and outstanding work as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), which successfully conducted a comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004). The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery remains a major threat to international peace and security and one of the primary challenges of our times. Despite some progress, the non-proliferation regime continues to face extremely serious challenges. We are acutely concerned about the relentless development of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic programmes. The two nuclear tests and the numerous ballistic missiles this year have confirmed Pyongyang’s determination to acquire a vectorized nuclear weapon, which constitutes a violation of Security Council resolutions. Such destabilizing actions represent a grave and deliverate challenge to the non-proliferation regime and international security. France, like the Council, has strongly condemned them. In Syria, we are now confident that the Syrian Arab Army, like Da’esh, has not hesitated to use chemical weapons against civilians on at least four occasions. New and alarming allegations of the use of chemical weapons continue to emerge. These, too, are particularly serious and unacceptable violations of the non-proliferation regime that cannot be tolerated. The Security Council must draw the logical conclusions and shoulder its responsibilities on the issue. The uncertainties surrounding Syria’s declaration to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) serve only to increase our concern. The possibility that stocks and capacities may remain on Syrian territory increases the risk that toxic chemicals may spread and be used by terrorist groups. In that context, it is vital to ensure the continuation of the work of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM), which has been unanimously endorsed by the Council. It sends a strong message to those responsible for using chemical weapons in Syria. The taboo on the use of these inhuman weapons must be re-established. In that context, strengthening the international community’s efforts is more crucial than ever and should be a priority for us. The Council’s adoption in 2004 of resolution 1540 (2004) was a decisive step. Twelve years later, that resolution, and the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to ensure its implementation, are now essential tools. As the rigorous review of the resolution that was conducted this year showed, its implementation is making progress. Many States have already adopted measures to translate the resolution’s provisions into national law. The international community is working to prevent proliferation-sensitive material from falling into terrorists’ hands. In addition, the main international, regional and subregional organizations have adopted strategies to implement and promote the resolution’s provisions, and in that regard, the European Union has established solid plans of action. We must capitalize on those achievements and continue to adapt to the evolving threats and new challenges we face. To do that, we must begin by strengthening the implementation of our existing tools in order to better combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and especially to prevent sensitive materials from ending up in malicious hands. We can do that not only by pursuing the Committee’s awareness- raising and assistance activities and strengthening the existing international instruments, but also by fully implementing our commitments under resolution 1540 (2004). In that regard, in 2011 France passed a law modernizing its national legal framework for combating proliferation, criminalizing proliferation activities and punishing their financing. Next, we must adapt our response to the changing nature of the threat. In that regard, resolution 2325 (2016), which we have adopted today, is a significant step. It strengthens the resources at our disposal and, in particular, covers the risks of the growing exploitation of technological, scientific and commercial advances for the purposes of proliferation. It identifies how important it is that we focus more on the financing of proliferation and the safeguarding of sensitive materials, and on instituting rigorous controls on the export of such materials. It expands the Committee’s crucial role in assistance, improving the ways it interacts with the United Nations committees that deal with terrorism and affirming its interaction with the JIM. It improves the basis for dialogue with States by establishing a better balance between requests for and offers of assistance. I recall that efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the risk of their falling into terrorists’ hands are also going on in other forums. This year, at the latest Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., France made a determined commitment to tackling the issue of security for radioactive sources with its introduction of a joint statement that is now open to all States wishing to be associated with it. Together with Germany, we also recently introduced a draft resolution in the General Assembly on the subject, and the International Atomic Energy Agency’s second International Conference on Nuclear Security, which has just ended, has also enabled us to address this crucial issue. France also supports the work of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Given the gravity of the challenges we face, we must do all we can to prevent the normalization of the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction. When those are the stakes, the entire non-proliferation regime is thrown into question. The Council’s recent adoption of resolution 2321 (2016) on North Korea demonstrated that we will not tolerate that. Our unanimous adoption of today’s resolution affirms our mobilization on the issue. I am therefore hopeful that the Council can continue to display its unity every time the problem of the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction is at issue. When it comes to this subject, weakness and divisiveness are not an option. It is a question of our responsibility.

I would like to join other Council members in welcoming Foreign Minister Dastis Quecedo to the Council and thanking him for presiding over this important debate, which testifies to Spain’s strong commitment in championing the cause of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). I would also like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to Deputy Secretary-General Eliasson and to thank him and all of today’s briefers for their participation. We value the insights they give us into their areas of expertise. Today’s meeting is all the more significant because it is the culmination of the comprehensive review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), which is itself an important contribution to the global WMD non-proliferation agenda. The importance of resolution 1540 (2004), particularly its role in preventing non-State actors from acquiring, developing, trafficking in or using nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, needs no further elaboration. Nonetheless, it is widely recognized that developments over the past few years, especially in science and technology, have opened up new fronts and challenges to the effective implementation of the 1540 regime. We should recall that during the open debate on the same subject in August (see S/PV.7758), there were urgent calls for the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to review the scientific, technological and international commercial advances relating to relevant controls under the resolution. We are pleased that resolution 2325 (2016), adopted today, has taken that into account, in addition to its emphasis on cooperation with international, regional and subregional organizations and on transparency and outreach approaches to relevant actors from civil society, industry and academia. Against that background, Malaysia sponsored and voted in favour of today’s resolution in a demonstration of our resolve and support for reinforcing a preventive system that seeks to ensure that WMDs  — nuclear, chemical or biological — do not fall into the hands of non-State actors. We firmly believe that it makes an important contribution to strengthening our collective efforts to counter the grave threat to international peace and security posed by non-State actors’ potential acquisition of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials. In responding to the call in the concept note (see S/2016/1013, annex) for sharing practical measures and best practices, I would like to share some of Malaysia’s experiences at the national level with implementing resolution 1540 (2004). At that level, our implementation comes within the framework of our 2004 Strategic Trade Act, which institutionalizes efforts to control the export, transshipment, transit and brokering of strategic items and other activities that could facilitate the design, development and production of WMDs and their delivery systems. So far the law has proved resilient and effective, as it has allowed the Government to act preventively in dealing with suspected proliferation activities within our jurisdiction and territory that contravene resolution 1540 (2004). In cooperation and coordination with relevant partners and stakeholders, the Government of Malaysia takes the lead in developing and strengthening measures, including at the facility level, aimed at ensuring the effective management of information related to procedures and protocols for protecting radioactive and nuclear materials and facilities. We share the view that enhancing coordination and engagement, including with parliamentarians, industry, academia and civil society, is of crucial importance. In this regard, we believe that the industry-focused Wiesbaden Conference is a good model, which could be adopted to better engage and involve other stakeholders. The Government of Malaysia continues to build mutually supportive relationships with our national industry in an effort to strengthen strategic trade management. This is done through various collaborations that allow for exchange of good regulatory practices. Mindful of the fast pace of developments in the various relevant fields, a review of the Strategic Trade Act is currently under way to revisit and update certain provisions relating to brokering, penalties, and the financing of weapons proliferation and terrorism, inter alia. Industry feedback is also taken very seriously and is a key element in the ongoing review. Our debate today is a reflection of the realistic, balanced and practical commitment to collectively addressing the threat of WMD acquisition by non-State actors. Where there is collective determination, obstacles can be overcome. We remain encouraged by the strong, positive and enduring interest by the international community in the initiatives, approaches and contributions of Member States that reflect thinking outside the box with a view to formulating possible non-traditional responses to new challenges in non-proliferation. I wish to conclude by reaffirming Malaysia’s commitment to working together with Member States and the international community in strengthening global non-proliferation efforts and in contributing to our collective obligation to bring forth enduring peace and security.

At the outset, I would like to thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain, Mr. Alfonso Dastis Quecedo, for presiding over today’s open debate. I also thank Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson, Mr. Kim Won-soo, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs. and the two other for their respective briefings. Efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and impede the acquisition and use by non-State actors and especially terrorists of WMDs and related materials and technologies are conducive to the maintenance of international and regional peace and security and are therefore consistent with the common interests of the international community. China wishes to put forward the following proposals. First, we should address both the symptoms and the root causes to eradicate the proliferation problem. Countries need to foster a new vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustained world security, abide by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, build a fair and just security architecture by all and for all, and thereby root out the threat of proliferation. Secondly, we should value multilateral mechanisms and consolidate and develop the international non-proliferation regime. Countries need to uphold multilateralism and the principle of consensus. We need to keep alive the pivotal role played by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. We should maintain the authority and effectiveness of the international non-proliferation regime and avoid double-standards. Thirdly, we need to balance security and development in pushing for solution to non-proliferation problems. There is a need for the relationship between non-proliferation and peaceful use to be properly handled, while ensuring the right of all countries, especially developing countries, to use and share relevant science and technology in a peaceful manner. Efforts also need to be made to prevent any country from attempting to undertake proliferation activities on the pretext of peaceful use. Fourthly, we should strengthen international cooperation to form synergy in addressing new challenges. We need to find solutions to regional hot- spot problems peacefully, by political and diplomatic means. There is a need to establish sound international norms on non-proliferation to prevent the WMDs and related materials and technologies from falling into the hands of non-State actors, especially terrorists. Resolution 1540 (2004), which has epitomized the consensus of countries on non-proliferation, facilitated international non-proliferation cooperation and helped to prevent non-State actors from acquiring WMDs and related materials and technologies, is a significant milestone. China attaches great importance to its implementation and actively participates in the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and its Group of Experts. Since the beginning of this year, the 1540 Committee has conducted a comprehensive review of the implementation of the resolution by States and the work of the Committee over the past five years and has analysed the progress and shortcomings in the implementation of the resolution and made recommendations on the way forward. China has responsibly and constructively participated in consultations on the draft resolution voted on earlier and the comprehensive review, joined the consensus on the comprehensive review, and co-sponsored and voted in favour of the draft resolution. Resolution 2325 (2016), which was adopted unanimously today, and the comprehensive review will help move forward the international non-proliferation process. China wishes to make the following proposals on strengthening the follow-up implementation of the resolution and on improving the work of the 1540 Committee. First, we must strictly abide by the mandate of the resolution and based on the main thrust to prevent non-state actors from engaging in proliferation activities, ensure national ownership in non-proliferation efforts and maintain the Committee’s facilitating and coordinating role in the implementation of the resolution. Secondly, we must enhance the relevance and effectiveness of assistance projects to focus on meeting the assistance needs of developing countries. A combination of multiple measures is needed to assist developing countries with their consent in strengthening their capacity-building for the implementation of the resolution. Thirdly, countries need to take effective and viable measures tailored to their different national conditions and political systems to effectively strengthen the implementation of the resolution and carry out exchanges and cooperation in this regard. Fourthly, we need to identify the future development direction of the 1540 Committee mechanism, further improve the efficiency of its work, maintain its function to promote the non-proliferation efforts of States through cooperation, and avoid being reduced to a mere a non-proliferation-related investigative mechanism or an export-control mechanism. We in China firmly reject the proliferation of WMDs and their means of delivery and reject the acquisition and use of WMDs and related materials and technologies by non-State actors, especially terrorists. We must strictly abide by our international non-proliferation obligations, take an active part in international and regional non-proliferation cooperation and work hard to facilitate political solutions to hot- spot proliferation problems. China supports the United Nations in playing its due role in the area of non-proliferation. China will continue to work with the international community to make positive contributions to the promotion of international non-proliferation efforts and to the maintenance of international peace and security.

I would like to express our appreciation to Spain for holding today’s important debate on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and non-State actors. We welcome today’s unanimous adoption of resolution 2325 (2016), which we had the privilege to co-sponsor. We extend our particular thanks to Ambassador Oyarzun Marchesi and his team for their excellent work over the past two years, especially in guiding the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) through its second comprehensive review of the resolution 1540 (2004). The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their potential use remain the gravest of threats to international peace and security. As we convene here today in one of the world’s most populous metropolitan areas, we must remain mindful of what our world could look like if a successful WMD attack were perpetrated on this population or one like it. We must remain vigilant against those who have demonstrated their clear intent to use these weapons on civilians. We must emphasize that preventing such an attack is vital and necessary. We must acknowledge that effective prevention cannot be achieved without effective collaboration among States and other relevant institutions. The role of the Security Council is central to that effort, and resolution 1540 (2004) provides the international community with one of the most valuable tools for pursuing it. The second comprehensive review has reinforced the importance, urgency and relevance of resolution 1540 (2004) and its implementation. The review was inclusive. It gave voice to many dozens of States, international and regional organizations and, in a major improvement over the 2009 review, academia, civil society and industry representatives — all of whom play a role in implementing the resolution. The comprehensive review has shown us in vivid terms that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their use is a persistent and expanding threat. We know that State and non-State actors have used chemical weapons in Syria. It was documented clearly for us in August and October by the United Nations-Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Joint Investigative Mechanism. As we have stated before, the United States condemns in the strongest terms any use of chemical weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, and it is in all of our interests to do so. There are today robust and multifaceted tools available to combat the threat of use of chemical and biological weapons by non-State actors. In addition to its proposals in resolution 1540 (2004), the United States recently presented several proposals under the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention to strengthen those tools even further. We urge Member States to support those proposals so that we can collectively strengthen our efforts to combat the threat of non-State actors’ use of chemical and biological weapons now, not later. The proposal for a convention on the suppression of chemical and biological terrorism is founded on the faulty premise that there are legal gaps in the existing international framework to combat the use of chemical and biological weapons by non-State actors. In fact, the problem is inadequate implementation of the existing framework. Through diplomatic efforts, the United States bolsters efforts to prevent non-State actors’ use of chemical and biological weapons — by sponsoring bilateral programmes that enhance the security of weapons of mass destruction applicable expertise, material and infrastructure worldwide. Together, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions and resolution 1540 (2004) provide the foundation for combating the use of weapons of mass destruction by State and non-State actors. What the threat calls for is not a new legal mechanism, but more effective and dedicated implementation of the existing instrument that form this comprehensive foundation. The comprehensive review has illustrated for us that the pathways of these weapons and materials can be permeable and go in more than one direction. We have seen that non-State, actors such as private-sector companies, can contribute to illicit State programmes for weapons of mass destruction under sanction by the Security Council. For example, we know that there can be vulnerabilities in national export control regimes, which can be exploited by outside States seeking to proliferate. The Council has decided that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and that States shall take and enforce effective measures to prevent proliferation. It can be comfortable to think of resolution 1540 (2004) as a resolution that addresses only the proliferation threats posed by non-State actors, but that is a dangerous oversimplification. Resolution 1540 (2004) applies equally to both State and non-State actors, which leads me to an important point about implementation. The comprehensive review yielded a range of valuable insights for enhancing the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) to better address the increased risks. Among its contributions, the report of the 1540 Committee drew attention to the rapid developments in science and technology affecting the proliferation environment and highlighted the importance of those developments in our preventive responses. The report emphasized the need for States to better account for and control vulnerable materials and to better enforce resolution 1540 (2004) within their respective systems. The report updated its information on the implementation of the resolution for all 193 States Members since the first time since December 2010. Based on those results, and others, we see the comprehensive review process as a meaningful success. Now that the comprehensive review is concluded, we look forward to working with our colleagues to evaluate what more can be done within the framework of resolution 1540 (2004) to prevent the proliferation of WMDs, including to our through non-State actors. On a particular note, we would welcome a discussion in the Council on optimal approaches to the enforcement of obligations under resolution 1540 (2004). Our new resolution 2325 (2016), which incorporates the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the 1540 Committee based on the comprehensive review will promote the implementation of the resolution in the coming years by providing better guidance to the 1540 Committee and the international community. We commend Spain for the substantial achievement of the resolution’s adoption today. The existential threat we all face from these weapons, and from those who would use them, cannot be overstated. This resolution makes meaningful progress towards countering that threat.

Egypt welcomes the unanimous adoption of resolution 2325 (2016). Allow me to express our sincere appreciation to the Government and the delegation of Spain for their leadership of the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004). Today’s resolution is a well-deserved result following the efforts by the members of the Committee, including Spain’s membership and chairmanship. The timing of the conclusion of this comprehensive review coincides with increasing security challenges posed by armed groups and terrorist groups, including their proven use of chemical materials as weapons. We cannot exclude the possibility that such groups could obtain technologies to develop other weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The situations in the Middle East, North Africa and the Sahel face genuine threats from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and other terrorist organizations using WMDs in terrorist attacks against targets both in those regions and beyond in Europe and elsewhere. Terrorism recognizes no physical borders or moral strictures. Therefore, our main concern must remain comprehensively combating terrorism, including by preventing terrorists from obtaining or developing dangerous materials by successfully recruiting people with specialized knowledge on technologies related to chemical, nuclear, biological and radiological applications. The comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004) included important debates on ways to further the current regime in order to make it more responsive to those challenges. We should therefore streamline our ambitions on the scope of the regime by refining the nature of the commitments emerging from the comprehensive review so as to safeguard their preventive nature while avoiding impractical mechanisms and instead focusing on developing cooperation mechanisms with national Governments, international organizations, regional organizations and non-governmental organizations, as well as improving awareness-raising activities and transparency. We should respond to emerging dual-use technologies. We should close the funding gap by using the trust fund of the Office for Disarmament Affairs related to the activities of the 1540 Committee. In conclusion, Egypt will spare no effort in promoting the working methods of the Committee and developing its performance in order to ensure the faithful implementation of resolution 2325 (2016). We are committed to pursuing our national efforts to develop our response to contemporary challenges. In that regard, I stress our belief that the one and only way to prevent terrorists from obtaining weapons of mass destruction is to rid the entire world of all such weapons in all their forms. That is the goal we shall continue to work towards, in cooperation with our partners in the United Nations.

I wish to remind all speakers to limit their statements to no more than four minutes in order to enable the Council to carry out its work expeditiously. I take this opportunity to remind speakers that the presidency will use the flashing lights on the collars of the microphones to prompt speakers to bring their remarks to a close. Delegations with lengthy statements are kindly requested to circulate the texts in writing and to deliver a condensed version when speaking in the Chamber. I wish to inform all concerned that we will be carrying on this open debate right through the lunch hour, as we have a large number of speakers. I now give the floor to Mr. Üzümcü. Mr. Üzümcü: It is a great honour for me to address the Security Council. I welcome the adoption today of resolution 2325 (2016), concerning the mechanism established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). I thank you, Sir, for the kind invitation to me to attend this important meeting. As an all-encompassing treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) seeks to achieve its goals not only through core disarmament and non-proliferation measures, but also by engendering international cooperation and offering assistance and protection against chemical weapons. These pillars of the Convention translate in turn into several programme areas. I will confine my remarks to the parts of our mandate that most directly support the objectives of resolution 1540 (2004). Today, 94 per cent of the world’s declared chemical weapons have been destroyed under international verification. That amounts to more than 65,000 tons of the deadliest poisons ever produced, including Syrian and Libyan chemical weapons. An entire class of weapons of mass destruction is now at the threshold of being completely eradicated. That would be an unprecedented achievement in the history of disarmament. Apart from clearly contributing to global security, the possibilities for non-State actors gaining access to military-grade stockpiles have been virtually eliminated. The objective of banishing a category of weapons will remain elusive, however, without related measures to prevent their re-emergence. The Convention therefore creates obligations in the context of non-proliferation that broadly translate into two main areas: industrial verification and data reporting, on the one hand, and the promulgation and enforcement of national legislation, on the other. Industrial inspections are an essential part of our mandate. Since 1997, 3,400 such inspections have been carried out in over 80 States parties. More specifically, in the context of resolution 1540 (2004), many of the measures contained in its operative paragraphs that deal with chemical weapons correspond to the obligations that States parties have already assumed under the Convention. The effectiveness of legislative and other regulatory measures and of the internal structures that administer them is critical to preventing non-State actors from gaining access to materials that could aid the development of chemical weapons. Full compliance at the national level with the obligations arising from the Convention provides a good measure of protection against proliferation. In that regard, through a range of programmes that are regularly conducted by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), we have assisted our States parties in fulfilling their obligations. In particular, the OPCW secretariat reviews drafts of implementing legislation and provides comments thereon in order to ensure that the drafts meet the requirements of the Convention. Our internship programme for legal drafters is aimed at enhancing the technical skills of participants so as to enable them to complete a draft of national implementing legislation. The OPCW secretariat has actively focused on offering practical, on-site assistance tailored to the need of States parties that have requested it. A mentorship programme facilitates the transfer of best practices between States. These activities have produced concrete results. Some 118 States parties have adopted legislative and administrative measures to implement the provisions of the Convention that are the most pertinent to its object and purpose. Thirty-two States parties have adopted implementing measures that cover some of the initial measures. Forty-two States parties have yet to adopt implementing legislation. For States parties that possess declarable industrial facilities, additional measures are required under the Convention. Criminalizing activities that the Convention prohibits and establishing measures that would enforce those rules accords entirely with the objectives of resolution 1540 (2004). Controls on transfers of scheduled chemicals are an important aspect of the Convention’s non-proliferation regime. Such activities are regulated under article VI of the Convention and are mentioned in paragraphs 3 (c) and (d) of resolution 1540 (2004). Hundreds of thousands of tons of scheduled chemicals are traded internationally every year for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. it is evident that this perfectly legitimate trade needs to be monitored and controlled. OPCW works closely with customs authorities and the chemical industry, and that cooperation is making further progress through certain new arrangements. We also count on the invaluable support of the chemical industry worldwide, which has fully understood the importance of preventing any misuse of chemicals. The Scientific Advisory Board of the OPCW, composed of 25 eminent experts, provides its recommendations for mitigating the proliferation risks emanating from scientific and technological advances. The threat posed by terrorists represents an ever- present danger. We know from recent investigations that Da’esh has in fact used chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq. The international legal framework offers several avenues for enhanced cooperation and coordination by international organizations in the context of counter- terrorism. The OPCW Open-ended Working Group on Terrorism regularly regularly reviews the opportunities for enhanced interaction and coordination between the concerned international entities, including the 1540 (2004) mechanism. We also have an active partnership with the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force. Together with the International Atomic Energy Agency, OPCW co-chairs the Working Group on Preventing and Responding to WMD Terrorist Attacks. Early next year, OPCW will host a tabletop exercise, with the participation of various organizations, to test an inter-agency mechanism to respond to a chemical terrorist attack. The mechanism will enhance the interoperability of relevant organizations for an effective response. We believe that the newly established OPCW Rapid Response Assistance Mission will provide an important capability to the mechanism. We must continue to strengthen our cooperation in order to fully implement our legal obligations, whether they originate in international treaties, such as the CWC, or instruments such as resolution 1540 (2004). OPCW remains ready to further strengthen its cooperation with relevant international institutions, relevant communities and civil society in order to ensure that non-State actors do not reach out to weapons of mass destruction.

I now give the floor to Mr. Raja Adnan. Mr. Adnan: At the outset, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) welcomes the opportunity to address the Council at this important meeting. The IAEA’s mission is Atoms for Peace and Development, and nuclear security at the IAEA addressed activities by non-State actors. The IAEA contributes to global efforts to achieve effective nuclear security in States by establishing current, comprehensive and complete global nuclear security guidance. It supports implementation of that guidance through peer reviews and advisory services, and assists in the form of capacity-building, including education and training. It leads and enhances international cooperation in nuclear security, in response to IAEA policy-making organ’s directions. The IAEA further facilitates initiatives in nuclear security and in organizing information exchange meetings with other organizations. It strengthens the international cooperation and coordination of assistance in a way that underpins the use of nuclear energy and applications. It also assists in adherence to, and the implementation of, nuclear security related international instruments. A key nuclear security instrument is the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), which finally entered into force in May, 11 years after it was adopted. In that regard, all countries are encouraged to adhere to the Convention and its Amendment. Reports to the IAEA’s Incident and Trafficking Database indicate continued reports of nuclear material, such as highly enriched uranium and other radioactive material, including sealed sources out of regulatory control — most notably lost or stolen. Such incidents continue to occur and States must remain vigilant. The fact that criminals have obtained high-enriched uranium, albeit far less than the amount required to make a nuclear weapon, indicates that there is interest in such material. Additionally, the potential for missing radioactive sources being used in a radiation dispersal device cannot be ruled out. In order to specifically address those issues, the IAEA, in consultation with States, has developed a top tier nuclear security fundamentals document containing the objective and essential elements of a State’s nuclear security regime. That and three corresponding guidance documents provide recommended requirements for the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities, physical protection of other radioactive material and associated facilities, and nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control. In addition to those recommended requirements, the IAEA will continue to develop many implementing guides to support Member States. Last week, the IAEA held the International Conference on Nuclear Security, where there were extensive discussions that are relevant to today’s debate. It brought together some 2,000 participants, including more than 45 ministers from over 130 Member States. The Ministerial Declaration that was adopted welcomed the positive impact of the IAEA’s increasing nuclear security efforts, inter alia, highlighting the collective commitment to improve nuclear security at the national, regional and global levels; being vigilant about the threats, having concrete measures to protect against malicious acts involving nuclear or radioactive material; and, being cognizant of the need to support the central role of the IAEA. Each State carries full responsibility for nuclear security within its borders. However, nuclear security in a State may also depend on the effectiveness of the nuclear security regime in other States. Therefore, continued collective vigilance is essential as threats — including insider threats and cybersecurity  — evolve. Upon request by States and subject to available resources, the IAEA provides practical nuclear security assistance by identifying national priorities based on threat assessments and a gradual approach to implementation. Nuclear security assistance is also provided through mutually agreed individual national Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSPs). Planned activities have to take account of technological developments to make sure that they represent the state-of-the-art response. The assistance provided through those plans is approved by the IAEA policy-making organs. The current plan runs from 2014 — 2017. Under the plan, we draw up guidance to assist States to meet their respective international obligations, which includes the CPPNM and its Amendment, resolution 1540 (2004) and others. Next year, a new nuclear security plan 2018 -2021 will be developed and considered by the IAEA’s policy- making organs for approval. The recommendations of the recent International Conference on Nuclear Security will contribute to that new plan. I would like to end by making a few points about cooperation with resolution 1540 (2004). We encourage States to share their INSSP with the cerp 1540 (2004) as we believe that doing so helps the State to demonstrate how it is meeting the obligations relating to nuclear material, as set out in the resolution, and to identify any assistance that it is receiving or may require. We invite 1540 experts to attend our information exchange meetings and, with the agreement of our Member States,our regional INSSP meetings so those experts can discuss and promote the resolution. We provide those experts with the information that we have already provided or are planning to provide a State that has approached the Committee for assistance. In doing so, we reduce duplication and unnecessary effort. We look forward to continuing that close relationship in the years ahead.

We thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Kingdom of Spain, Mr. Alfonso Dastis Quecedo, for presiding over and convening this important debate on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We also welcome the briefings made by the Deputy Secretary-General and other invited speakers. Resolution 1540 (2004), adopted unanimously on 28 April 2004, is a milestone to which Chile contributed, as it was then a non-permanent member of the Security Council. It is the first Council resolution that, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, established concrete measures to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery among non-State actors. The terms and objectives of resolution 1540 (2004) remain fully in force because, as threats evolve, it is necessary for States to develop effective measures to combat them. In that regard, we wish to highlight the final report of the 2016 comprehensive review of the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) — under the leadership of Spain, as Chairman of the Committee  — as well as the adoption today of resolution 2325 (2016), which our country has co-sponsored and which reflects the results and recommendations of the aforementioned report. We are convinced that strengthening national capacities, assistance and cooperation are essential to advancing the implementation of the resolution. That is why Chile has made a significant effort at the level of national agencies to adopt the necessary measures for its implementation. In keeping with our commitment to the United Nations and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), Chile hosted a training course for focal points and contacts in Latin America and the Caribbean, held in Santiago from October 24 to 28, and attended by experts from 21 States of the region. It is important to stress that the use of chemical weapons or toxic chemicals has gone from being a threat to a worrying reality, as confirmed by the investigations carried out by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), as well as by the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigation Mechanism (JIM). We hope that their findings will have a deterrent effect on those who intend to continue to use chemical weapons in the future. Our country’s commitment to addressing the challenge of preventing the resurgence and use of chemical weapons is tangible insofar as the work we do through our mission to the OPCW in the areas of prevention, responsiveness and legal issues, under the heading of the Sub-Working Group on Non-State Actors and in close collaboration with the Director-General of that organization. To conclude, I would like to emphasize that our country is making ongoing efforts to establish effective national controls with a view to combating the trafficking in weapons of mass destruction and dual-use material. In that regard, we are grateful for the support shown by the 1540 Committee, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, partner countries and especially the Organization of American States, a key regional body in the area that has facilitated and supported such efforts. We also thank the leadership of Spain and the excellent work it has done during its presidency of the 1540 Committee.

I now give the floor to the representative of Colombia.

I align myself, Sir, with all the delegations that congratulated your country on its work in the Security Council over the past two years. I am convinced that Spain has left its mark in carrying out its duties as President and through its leadership of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), as well as on the women and peace and security agenda. As the President highlights in his concept note (S/2016/1013, annex) for this debate, the risk of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) by non-State actors, particularly terrorists, poses the greatest threat to international security. We are convinced that, in order to prevent a catastrophe, States must lend their assistnace to the 1540 Committee and other relevant bodies in order facilitate national-level implementation of the resolution, by helping countries to develop their action plans, encouraging the timely presentation of national reports and fostering the exchange of experiences. In our region, for example, we are engaged in an exercise of peer review that will take place next year in conjunction with Chile, with the support of the Office for Disarmament Affairs United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism. It is necessary to offer that same type of support to also strengthen the legal systems, focusing on the implementation of the resolution, not just in preventing the acquisition of WMDs, but also in ensuring the accounting and physical security of related materials. With regard to nuclear weapons, in order to comply with resolution 1540 (20040, all of our actions must lead to the absolute eradication of nuclear-weapon arsenals in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible fashion and within a multilaterally agreed upon and defined time frame. As far as chemical weapons are concerned, it is necessary to promote education and outreach among industry, academia, universities and research centres on the responsible uses of chemicals, as noted here, as well as the obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. In terms of biological weapons, we firmly believe that we need to strengthen and implement policies on import and export controls and transshipments of dangerous goods, thereby carrying out rigorous assessments end-users in order to avoid potential diversion of said materials. I would very briefly like to share three proposals that could bolster the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). We could complement the existing international legal framework on disarmament and non-proliferation by fostering synergies between the provisons of those instruments and resolution 1540 (2004) and the development of complementary processes at the global and regional level that would avoid a duplication of efforts. It would be of benefit to broaden the geographical composition of the 1540 Committee with a view to enriching the debates, proposals and considerations that are part of the internally workings of the Committee. Furthermore, we must promote activities for education, as mentioned this morning, and outreach among industry, academia, universities and research centres on the responsible use of chemical and biological material and nuclear energy, as well as on the obligations from the main international instruments in those areas. Finally, it is my pleasure to inform the members of the Security Council that my country’s commitment to this issue is of high priority, and for that reason Colombia co-sponsored resolution 2325 (20106), which we adopted this morning.

I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden.

Sweden aligns itself with the statement to be delivered later on behalf of the European Union. I would like to make the following additional remarks in my national capacity. As the scenario of terrorist organizations gaining access to weapons of mass destruction has become a disconcerting reality, the objectives of the Security Council laid out in resolution 1540 (2004) take on new relevance and urgency. This open debate is very timely and important, and we pay tribute to the Spanish chairmanship of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). We welcome the report of the Committee, and we were pleased to co-sponsor resolution 2325 (2016), adopted this morning. We look forward to championing its implementation as a member of the Security Council for the coming two years. Before embarking upon today’s subject, I would like to state what is perhaps obvious, that is, that there is a close connection between the lack of disarmament when it comes to weapons of mass destruction and the risk that such capacities could fall into the wrong hands. We must therefore redouble our efforts to reach tangible results in the field of disarmament. Sweden is deeply concerned by the reports of the United Nations and Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) with regard to the use of chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq and by the OPCW Director-General’s assessment that the terrorist group Da’esh may have the capacity to produce chemical weapons. We are disappointed with the outcome of the recent Review Conference of the Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, which we believe could have been more ambitious and robust. That is particularly regrettable as we face the real threat of terrorist organizations with access to weapons of mass destruction, and rapid advances in science and technology. Nuclear security also remains a concern. We have been an active partner in the Nuclear Security Summit process, which reached its conclusion in Washington, D.C., earlier in the year. We need to remain vigilant and must continue to engage within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Sweden welcomes the successful outcome of the ministerial conference on nuclear security held earlier this month. We hope that the upcoming review cycle on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the negotiations of a treaty banning nuclear weapons will contribute to the enhancement on nuclear security. We have taken a number of measures at the national level to engage on the topic of today’s debate. We have made a substantial special voluntary contribution to the United Nations Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities, part of which is earmarked for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). We also recently made a significant contribution to the Joint Investigation Mechanism (JIM) and the missions of OPCW in Syria, as well as the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund. We continue successful nuclear security cooperation with Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, and we have recently engaged with health institutes in Tajikistan and Zambia in the field of biological security. Turning to the contents of the report of the 1540 Committee, we strongly agree with the recommendations regarding the significance of national control lists in implementing resolution 1540 (2004). However, it is important that we do not limit our vigilance to items and materials. Knowledge and information also constitute important factors in the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. We share the report’s conclusions on cooperation with regional and subregional organizations, and we are concerned with the challenges described in the report as pertains to the shortages in assistance match-making as an important task as we move forward. The threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors is a matter of grave concern, and one with which the Council must remain fully engaged. Following the excellent work of the Spanish presidency, my team and I look forward to working closely with our Bolivian friends and colleagues in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and the implementation of the recommendations of the comprehensive review over the coming years.

I now give the floor to the representative of Italy.

Italy aligns itself with the statement to be made by the observer of the European Union. In addition, we fully support the statement to be made by the representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, in the light of our cooperation that will unfold over the next two years in the Security Council. We welcome, of course, the adoption of the report on the comprehensive review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), as well as resolution 2325 (2016), adopted today, of which we were a co-sponsor. As the only universally binding instruments covering all types of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), those resolutions are among the pillars of the global non-proliferation architecture and provide essential tools for countering the growing threat of terrorism. The increase in the number of national reports and voluntary national implementation action plans, as well as the inclusion of resolution 1540 (2004) elements into the daily work of international and regional organizations, are very good news. Accurate and timely reporting is a crucial instrument for achieving concrete long-term results. As such, we recognize that capacity- building aimed at improving reporting is essential. We are concerned by the proliferation risks posed by non-State actors that are increasingly making use of new technologies, scientific developments and international trade networks. In that regard, the outcome of the recent Review Conference of the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention is disappointing. At the Security Council last August, the Secretary-General recommended that the international community must invest more in tackling the risk of the proliferation of biological weapons, which get less attention than do nuclear and chemical threats. With regard to non-State actors, the resolution 1540 (2004) architecture is an important tool, in our view, useful in order to remedy such a shortfall. Similarly, more attention should be paid to the protection of critical infrastructure relevant to the non-proliferation of WMDs from the risk of cyberattacks. In that regard, resolution 1540 (2004) can also provide a useful framework. As a responsible non-proliferation actor, Italy ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. The increasing number of ratifications this year provides further opportunities for international cooperation in the areas of prevention and criminal investigations. Supporting that momentum, we recently hosted a meeting in Rome of the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Synergies among the relevant international and regional bodies are crucial, so as to avoid gaps in the non-proliferation regime and its architecture. As the next Chair of the Group of Seven in 2017 and of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, Italy will focus on improving synergies among the Group of Eight Global Partnership Working Group and the mechanisms of the 1540 Committee. Likewise, border control and export controls are crucial instruments in the fight against the proliferation, smuggling and trafficking of WMDs. In November, we organized a table-top exercise on that issue in Rome, within the framework of the Mediterranean track of the Proliferation Security Initiative. We also fully applied the European Union export-control legislation, which provides a valuable example of a border-control policy that is aimed at curbing proliferation. Finally, education, training and institutional capacity deserve special attention when it comes to the effective implementation of the resolution. Every year, Italy organizes the International School on Nuclear Security at the International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, in collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Furthermore, inspectors from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) are often trained at Italian chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence centres, and the Italian chemical industry participates widely and effectively in the OPCW Associate Programme, training experts from other countries in various industrial operations, thereby facilitating industry-related implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. We thank Spain for its leadership in effectively steering the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004), and we stand ready to offer our full support to the incoming Chair, Bolivia. Through our chairmanship next year of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), we will also work to broaden cooperation on the issue of non-proliferation.

I now give the floor to the observer of the European Union. Mr. Bylica: I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU) and its member States. The following countries align themselves with this statement: Turkey, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia. In accordance with the President’s request, the full text of the European Union statement will be circulated in writing, and I will deliver only a condensed version now. The European Union welcomes the timely, unanimous adoption of resolution 2325 (2016), which was co-sponsored by all 28 EU member States. The new resolution reiterates the decisions and requirements of resolution 1540 (2004) and re-emphasizes the importance for all States to implement the resolution fully and effectively. The EU and its member States believe that resolution 1540 (2004) remains a central pillar of the international non-proliferation architecture. The resolution must continue to be the cornerstone of the global agenda for stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to and by non-State actors. Resolution 1540 (2004) has become even more important in the current context, which is characterized by acute and diffuse threats, in which the distinction between international and internal security is blurred. The future development of the 1540 Committee should therefore take account of new and emerging trends in nuclear, chemical and biological security. We are pleased to see that the comprehensive review on resolution 1540 (2004) and the report prepared by the 1540 Committee, under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Oyarzun Marchesi and his team, reaffirm the centrality, importance and authority of resolution 1540 (2004) in the multilateral non-proliferation architecture. In June, the EU submitted to the 1540 Committee a report entitled “European Union support to the full and universal implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)”. That report demonstrates the strong and consistent commitment by the EU and its member States to resolution 1540 (2004) over the past decade. That includes the very substantial and long-standing EU support to the Global Trust Fund, which is managed by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). Earlier in 2016, the EU and its member States carried out targeted outreach towards the States that have yet to submit a first report to the 1540 Committee. That EU outreach effort might give rise to EU follow-up support action at the request of the countries concerned. The EU now stands ready to adopt in the coming weeks a new, ambitious funding scheme designed to help implement the outcome of the comprehensive review. It will take the legal form of a European Council decision under the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. Based on our fruitful cooperation in the past, we will again ask the Office for Disarmament Affairs to perform the role of implementing partner for that project. We will seek to promote reinforced cooperation between UNODA and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. We are also keen to foster closer cooperation between EU-funded projects implemented by UNODA and those implemented by the European Commission through the EU Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Centres of Excellence. That initiative is a capacity-building programme with over 55 partner countries and eight regional Centres of Excellence, and is financed under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, with a budget of around €250 million for 2010-2020. Another means of supporting the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) is the robust EU export- control regime for dual-use items. The EU has developed a dedicated export-control programme for dual-use goods, costing €30 million, in order to help the authorities in 34 non-EU States to strengthen their export-control regimes and better comply with the their obligations under resolution 1540 (2004). At the international level, the EU and its member States continue to support such treaties and regimes as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We also continue to support the Group of Eight Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and a number of other initiatives. The risk of non-State actors, particularly terrorists, using weapons of mass destruction is a major threat to global security. However, as the threat level increases, so does the awareness and the international community’s response. Throughout 2016, in addition to the comprehensive review on resolution 1540 (2004), several other initiatives were taken, such as the fourth Nuclear Security Summit, the work of the United Nations-mandated Joint Investigative Mechanism, which attributed the use of chemical weapons in Syria to the Syrian armed forces and Da’esh, and last week’s International Atomic Energy Agency Nuclear Security Conference, to name but a few. The EU participated proactively in all those efforts. The EU Global Strategy, issued in June 2016, will provide the foundation for us to continue, and even step up, our efforts in the coming years. We will continue supporting the multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control treaties and regimes. We will use every means at our disposal to assist in resolving proliferation crises, as we successfully did on the Iranian nuclear programme. In conclusion, I wish to reaffirm the readiness of the EU and its member States to implement, in a proactive manner, the outcome of the 2016 comprehensive review as well as the new resolution. We will do so in close cooperation with the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts and the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, in partnership with all United Nations States Members and with other non-governmental stakeholders. The use of nuclear or biological weapons by non-State actors, particularly terrorists, would indeed be catastrophic. Unfortunately, the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons has already concluded that a non-State actor has used chemical weapons in Iraq, and the Joint Investigative Mechanism has attributed to Da’esh at least one chemical weapon attack in Syria. That is completely unacceptable, but by working together we can succeed in preventing the worst-case scenario from happening.

I now give the floor to Ms. Treppe1. Ms. Treppel: It is an honour to be here this morning at this open debate of the Security Council on behalf of the Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS). I would like to begin by thanking you, Mr. President, for promoting discussion on the importance of preventive mechanisms for countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) by non-State actors, particularly in the context of the just-concluded review of resolution 1540 (2004). The OAS would also like to take this opportunity to recognize the Kingdom of Spain for its very capable leadership as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Since the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), more than a decade ago, the Organization of American States, through its Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE), has focused on promoting a regional framework for cooperation among its member States to ensure the effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) throughout the Americas. As we have also been tasked with implementing resolution 1373 (2001), as well as the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism, the OAS is uniquely positioned to promote both global and regional instruments at the hemispheric level. We know, however, that the successful implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) is a responsibility shared among States, international organizations, the private sector, the scientific sector and society as a whole. It is for that reason that I would like to acknowledge our strategic partnerships and strong collaborative relations with other organizations, especially the 1540 Committee, its Group of Experts and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). The OAS is pleased to see the focus that the recently approved resolution 2325 (2016) places on the role of regional organizations and regional collaboration, and in that spirit the OAS celebrates the agreement reached with the Office for Disarmament Affairs to designate, with financial support, an OAS 1540 Regional Coordinator for the Americas. I am also pleased to report that the OAS is working with the UNODA Regional Office in Lima to organize a regional 1540 conference early next year. The OAS is committed to increasing dialogue and strengthening political outreach and awareness among the countries of the hemisphere. Since 2014, we have been promoting the development and implementation of national action plans in the Americas to complement existing national legislative frameworks for combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Currently, CICTE is supporting the efforts of 10 countries in the region in this critical area, including Chile, the Committee’s current Chair, and Panama, which, as Vice-Chair and host of the upcoming CICTE annual meeting, has designated the prevention of proliferation of WMDs and terrorist financing as the key topic for debate. Furthermore, the Government of Panama, together with Spain and the OAS, sponsored a non-proliferation side event in the framework of the seventy-first session of the General Assembly in September. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will continue to pose a growing threat to international peace and security. The more complex and asymmetrical the violence, the greater the risk of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction. We know that in most Latin American and Caribbean countries the human, financial and material resources allocated for emergency preparedness and response are limited. While the humanitarian impact of WMDs is undeniable, few if any countries currently have the capacity to address the humanitarian consequences of an attack caused by a weapon of mass destruction. In the interests of time, I will not go into detail here, but my written remarks set forth a series of measures that we believe Member States should take into account to enhance their 1540 frameworks and prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and related materials to all non-State actors. We believe that regional bodies play a very important role in addressing proliferation and terrorism, so allow me to conclude my remarks today by reaffirming OAS support for existing non-proliferation and arms control systems, as well as our commitment to improving their effectiveness throughout the Western Hemisphere. Because the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) must reconcile international security and strategic trade needs, the OAS will also continue to encourage the enactment of legislation that supports both non-proliferation objectives and commercial interests and that criminalizes offenses related to the proliferation and financing of weapons of mass destruction. Thank you again, Mr. President, for this opportunity. The OAS reiterates its firm commitment to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and has every confidence that this open debate will make important contributions to its ongoing review.

I now give the floor to His Excellency Mr. Téte António, Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations. Mr. António: I would like to start by thanking Spain for inviting the African Union to this very important debate, and also Minister Alfonso Dastis Quecedo for making the journey to New York. I would also like to thank all the ministers and high-level representatives who have come to the Security Council to debate on a very important item for the African continent. I thank Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson for his briefing, and I welcome all the other briefings made this morning, which were very insightful. The regional dimension is certainly a very important one if we are really to tackle this question and achieve tangible results. As the Council knows, with the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty, Africa is a nuclear-weapon-free region. The African Union has always been committed to global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. As early as 1964, the first Summit of the Organization of African Unity adopted the landmark Cairo Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. That Declaration formed the basis for and origin of subsequent efforts that culminated in the adoption of the Treaty of Pelindaba, which established the continent as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. It is indeed our view that nuclear-weapon-free zones remain an instrumental approach to strengthen global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament norms and consolidate international efforts towards achieving the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). I wish to take this opportunity to underscore that the African Union remains strongly committed to the three pillars of the NPT, namely, disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology, which are all mutually reinforcing and equally fundamental for the authority and effectiveness of the regime. The adoption of resolution 1540 (2004) added a critical and important tool to the global disarmament and non-proliferation framework. That tool responds to the changing challenges in the international security environment and the growing range of actors within it. With the evolving threat of terrorism and transnational organized crime, the need to have a robust, effective and transparent approach to prevent non-State actors from acquiring, proliferating or using weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery becomes a necessity and requires collective responsibility. The threats and risks that resolution 1540 (2004) aimed to address more than 10 years ago remain omnipresent. The increasing terrorist attacks in different regions and intelligence reports from various States indicate that terrorist groups continue to seek the material and the technology to construct and deploy weapons of mass destruction. For those reasons, the resolution continues to enjoy international consensus and support, especially in Africa. In that regard, following the adoption of resolution 1977 (2011) — which extended the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) — the twentieth ordinary session of the Assembly of the African Union, held in January 2013, adopted a decision calling for the full and effective implementation of the resolution. It also requested the Commission of the African Union, in collaboration with the 1540 Committee and the relevant regional and international partners, to support Member States’ efforts to that end. The AU Commission has undertaken a number of activities to give political and practical support to the implementation of the resolution. Those activities, combined with the indispensable technical support provided by the 1540 Committee and partner States and organizations, have contributed to achieving significant progress in implementing the resolution. Such a statement cannot be made without duly recognizing the strong commitment of Member States themselves and the leading role they have taken in achieving that progress. Indeed, without national ownership and leadership, no effort will produce a long-term, sustainable impact. Assistance is a key component in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Many African countries continue to face challenges that impact their ability to dedicate the human and financial resources required to implement the regional and global disarmament and security frameworks, including resolution 1540 (2004). Therefore, we believe that we need to capitalize on the mandate of the 1540 Committee and resolution 2325 (2016), adopted today, and on the expertise and resources of partner States and specialized agencies in order to ensure that gaps and challenges faced by Member States are well provided for through a consolidated, well-structured and mutually agreed process. In conclusion, allow me to state that the African Union Commission reaffirms its commitment to collaborate with the African Commission on Nuclear Energy, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty Organization and the 1540 Committee in order to enhance the capacities of its member States to prevent, counter and respond to the global agenda to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors.

I now give the floor to Mr. Serrano. Mr. Serrano: Financing is an essential component of proliferation. Therefore, financial measures are one of the most effective tools to counter proliferation. Preventive measures make it difficult for criminals to raise or transfer funds, thereby reducing the capacity of proliferation networks. Financing intelligence provides advanced warning of attempts to illegally transfer sensitive goods or materials. Shipments can be discovered and interdicted on the basis of suspicious transaction reports by financial institutions. Every movement of goods has an associated financial transaction. Financial investigations can follow the money trails to look behind transactions and declarations, analyse proliferation networks and identify facilitators. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is a global standards-setting body for combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation, with a total of 198 jurisdictions included in the global network. The FATF was established in 1989 to combat money laundering associated with drug trafficking and has expanded its role since then. In 2001, we developed effective tools to fight terrorist financing. From 2008, in response to the increased threat of proliferation, the FATF took up the task of combating proliferation financing. Since then we have analysed how proliferation networks use financing and have adopted international standards to that end. The FATF standards set specific requirements to give effect to Security Council resolutions, including targeted financial sanctions to counter proliferation and terrorism. Standards are enforced through rigorous peer-review and follow-up procedures, which have greatly increased the number of jurisdictions that comply with the requirements. That gives the Security Council more effective tools. It is important to underline that the role of the FATF in countering proliferation goes beyond targeted financial sanctions. We have built the infrastructure needed to combat the financing of proliferation with criminal laws and investigative powers, due diligence and suspicious transaction reporting by financial institutions and transparency requirements regarding the control of corporate vehicles and legal arrangements. We apply measures that weaken the ability of non-State actors to maintain facilitation networks and to raise or spend money. The FATF provides guidance on cooperation and coordination, both domestically and internationally. To sum up, the FATF standards provide a comprehensive basis to combat the financing of proliferation by both State and non-State actors. However, we still face important challenges. Some countries simply do not have the capacity to exercise effective controls. We need to support those countries. Many more countries do not understand the risks, or do not fully exploit the opportunities of financial intelligence to counter proliferation. More work is needed to link up the relevant authorities in each country. Finally, at the global level, we need to ensure that emerging financial technologies can develop without being exploited for the purposes of terrorism or proliferation. One of the priorities of the Spanish presidency of the FATF is therefore to establish a partnership with the international community to ensure that new technology and developments properly manage associated risks. The financial measures that the FATF promotes are an important tool against proliferation. We stand ready to support further progress under the leadership of the Security Council.

I now give the floor to the representative of Jamaica.

On behalf of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) secretariat, I would like to register my thanks to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), and in particular the Permanent Mission of Spain for convening this high-level meeting on resolution 1540 (2004), with a focus on threats related to non-State actors and the possible use of weapons of mass destruction. From the inception of the CARICOM regional programme, which seeks to assist CARICOM member States to effectively assume their obligations under resolution 1540 (2004), the 1540 Committee has stood foursquare in support of our efforts, both in terms of its overall engagement and its support for regional initiatives that focus on implementing strategic trade legislation and regulations, and on regional initiatives to build necessary capacity within the Caribbean to prevent proliferation. As for the leadership of the Caribbean Community and for entities within the region that focus on the prevention of trade in and use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons and related materials, I can say with certainty that ongoing cooperation with the 1540 Committee remains a cornerstone of our continuing regional effort to combat proliferation, both within the Caribbean and in the hemisphere at large. Without question, regional progress in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is inextricably linked to the economic viability of CARICOM member States. Indeed, we have borne witness to the impact of poverty, privatization and marginalization and its influence on promoting radicalization, both within the region and around the world. Fighting terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction can be successfully waged only by fully appreciating the intersection between such corollary realities. Those realities are not absent from the Caribbean, as has been exemplified by the involvement of Caribbean nationals as foreign terrorist fighters in the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, and on the side of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. While that may be fading in our collective memories, we are all too cognizant of the region’s susceptibility to external shocks, including those occasioned by acts of terrorism, as was the case with the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001. Notwithstanding the fact that such events took place far away from the Caribbean and occurred in the United States, the economic impact on the region and the reverberations felt in regional markets resulted in the loss of over $900 million in revenue and thousands of jobs, particularly in the tourism and hospitality sectors, within the first year after the attacks It is for that reason that terrorism and the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials has continued to be of significant importance to CARICOM member States over the past 15 years, even as regional Governments have been grappling with the influx of small arms and light weapons, as well as the deleterious impact of the continuing drug trade and spiralling gun-related crime, which has ensued from that confluence of events. Given the increasing competition for critically needed economic space and resources to effectively deal with such challenges within the security realm, it is fundamental that initiatives aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, reducing trade in strategic goods and related technology and promoting the adoption of important correlated security measures, such as the implementation of effective export controls, receive greater levels of support from the international community. CARICOM remains grateful for the assistance that has been provided by the United States, Canada, Australia, the Republic of Korea and the United Kingdom, among other countries, but it is not nearly enough. In order to place non-proliferation firmly and securely within the contemporary regional security vernacular and to elevate it to actionable levels within CARICOM member States, engagement on the matter cannot be piecemeal or sporadic. It requires sustained interaction with both policy and enforcement entities within the region and the provision of equally sustained material support going forward. CARICOM therefore views today’s high-level deliberations as a significant and encouraging step forward in that regard, and is confident that its outcome will strengthen the region’s ongoing efforts to advance its objectives within the non-proliferation realm. Let me also emphasize that the involvement of industry, academia and civil society in this discourse is commendable, as there is the need for an all- hands-on-deck approach so as to fully achieve the objectives of resolution 1540 (2004), effectively combat non-State actors and simultaneously enhance security and aid national development, particularly in the global South. I would therefore observe that today’s debate has particular relevance to the Caribbean, given the expansion of a regional process first initiated in October 2013 in Freeport, Bahamas, at the symposium entitled “Public and Private Sector Avenues to Building Maritime and Port Security Infrastructure and Facilitating Secure Trade in the Caribbean through the Implementation of resolution 1540 (2004)”. That gathering of CARICOM States, facilitated by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, the CARICOM resolution 1540 (2004) implementation programme and the Stimson Center, was fundamental in charting a way forward to encourage greater cooperation with industry and Governments in the region, both in implementing resolution 1540 (2004) and in fostering an agenda for joint action on improving port security and on aiding development. With the initiation of the Freeport process, CARICOM member States agreed to deepen their cooperation aimed at meeting their obligations under resolution 1540 (2004), through increased public-private collaboration aimed at addressing security vulnerabilities at ports within the Caribbean region and at combating the transit, transshipment, export, re-export and brokering of strategic goods and dual-use materials. The Freeport process has led to new and unprecedented cooperation aimed at strengthening port and border security and at undertaking important mandates under paragraph 3 of resolution 1540 (2004). It has also resulted in a new partnership among CARICOM, the World Customs Organization and the United States National Nuclear Security Administration, focusing on strategic trade-control enforcement and will be expanded to other designated CARICOM member States through 2017. In conclusion, let me reiterate that CARICOM member States are cognizant of the emerging vulnerabilities posed by chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials to the safety and security of the region’s maritime space and are fully aware of those attendant risks that can jeopardize the achievement of secure trade and commerce. Activities within the context of the CARICOM 1540 programme underscore the continued commitment felt by CARICOM members to implement resolution 1540 (2004) and signals a prevailing commitment to non-proliferation, which will necessitate even greater levels of support by the international community to fully achieve such important objectives. Once again, let me register my profound thanks to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). We trust that this dialogue will result in a renewed engagement to realize even more meaningful gains in the 1540 implementation process and serve to enhance regional security and strengthen non-proliferation, while also enhancing the ability of CARICOM and other Member States to effectively confront threats posed by proliferators and non-State actors alike.

I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan.

Today’s debate is timely as it coincides with the conclusion of the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004), which will provide useful guidance for Member States in their implementation of the resolution. Pakistan has been a consistent supporter of the objectives of resolution 1540 (2004), and our commitment to its implementation has remained second to none. It is in the interests of all States to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to States as well as non-State actors. During the open consultations conducted under the comprehensive review, we, along with many other States, stressed that its emphasis should be on an effective, comprehensive and balanced implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by all States, across the board, rather than on expanding its scope. Resolution 2325 (2016), adopted today, reflects the balance required to make the mechanism more effective. Improved matchmaking by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), making it more responsive to requests by States for assistance, is imperative. In that regard, we welcome provisions along those lines in resolution 2325 (2016). Closer cooperation between the Security Council and international and regional organizations is needed in order to coordinate activities so as to avoid duplication and to focus on the most important areas. Resolution 1540 (2004) has positively contributed to the advancement of non-proliferation goals. Its success owes less to its representing action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations than to the cooperative approach that it has engendered aimed at promotinng implementation. The resolution stresses the importance of engagement with States and recognizes the voluntary nature of country visits, which are to be conducted at the invitation of States. That is expected to enhance ownership of the resolution’s implementation. We would also like to highlight the resolution’s provisions that none of the obligations in resolution 1540 (2004) should be interpreted in such a way as to alter the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Let me underscore Pakistan’s commitment to its non-proliferation obligations, including the steps taken for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Pakistan has submitted four national implementation reports under the resolution. Our fifth report on its implementation will be submitted shortly, and, next February, we will organize a seminar on promoting better implementation of the resolution at the regional level. Pakistan has elaborated and implemented a comprehensive export-control regime that is fully harmonized with those of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group. We have also declared voluntary adherence to NSG guidelines. Pakistan is participating in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database. We have effectively participated in and contributed to the Nuclear Security Summit process. Our ratification of the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and our adherence to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines are among the recent steps that we have taken. Pakistan has been an active partner of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism since its inception, in 2007, and has contributed to the development of its guidelines. We declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and offered to translate that into a bilateral arrangement on non-testing with India. Those credentials clearly establish Pakistan’s eligibility to become a member of the NSG. The grant of waivers to long-standing non-proliferation regimes and rules carries obvious proliferation risks and undermines regional strategic stability. It is therefore critical that an equitable, non-discriminatory and criteria-based approach to promoting civil nuclear cooperation and membership in export controls regimes, in particular that of the NSG, be adopted.

I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil.

The mere existence of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to humankind, and therefore to international peace and security. The possibility that those weapons might fall into the hands of non-State actors, particularly terrorists, is a matter of special concern, as the recent use of chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant demonstrates. As a member of the Security Council at the time, Brazil actively participated in the discussions leading to the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), and we have remained firmly committed to its implementation. The international community must maintain a balance between development and security, without obstructing the legitimate right to development and the use of technology for peaceful purposes. It should be highlighted, moreover, that States have the primary responsibility for control over the tangible or intangible goods that leave or enter their territories. Our Constitution forbids the conduct of any non-peaceful nuclear activity in Brazilian territory. Brazil is a party to all of the major treaties and conventions in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. We have incorporated into our national legislation all obligations deriving from those instruments, as well as those based on resolution 1540 (2004). Brazilian legislation clearly safeguards the peaceful applications of sensitive and dual-use goods and items, especially in activities related to industry, research and development. The Brazilian Government promotes ongoing and structured outreach in order to inform the private sector of applicable restrictions and controls. Brazil has followed with interest the current comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004), which has just been concluded, and took part in the open consultations convened in June by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). As the comprehensive review’s final report recognizes, the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) is a long-term task that will require continuing efforts at the national, regional and international levels. We are pleased that both the final report and resolution 2325 (2016), which was just adopted, also attribute a key role to international cooperation and assistance to the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). We acknowledge the important work carried out by the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts, particularly in trying to match cooperation offers and requests. In order to address some of the shortcomings in that process, countries in a position to do so should help countries in formulating their assistance requests. Brazil has taken part in cooperation and assistance initiatives that contribute to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), particularly in the drafting of national legislation on chemical and biological weapons and related materials. Notwithstanding the importance of resolution 1540 (2004), confining international efforts only to the countering of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is ineffective. Disarmament measures are indistinguishable from any reasonable strategy to prevent those weapons from falling in the hands of non-State actors. Over the past 50 years, the international community has succeeded in adopting multilateral legally binding instruments that ban biological and chemical weapons. In the light of the unimaginable suffering that such weapons are capable of inflicting, it is perplexing that the same approach has not been applied in the case of nuclear weapons, as clearly mandated by article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In October, the General Assembly’s First Committee took a decisive step in filling that gap. General Assembly First Committee draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41, adopted by more than two thirds of the delegations present and voting in the Committee, calls for the convening of a conference in 2017, open to all States, international organizations and civil society, to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination. Time and again the international community has been confronted with the argument that security concerns hamper the objective of disarmament. That is a false dichotomy. Relying on nuclear-deterrence doctrines and strategies undermines the medium- and long-term security of all States. The risk that non-State actors may wish to acquire nuclear weapons is only one among many examples of such long-term security challenges. As the Secretary-General himself once said, and the Deputy Secretary-General repeated earlier today, “there are no right hands for the wrong weapons”. It is imperative that the international community take concrete steps to achieve long-overdue nuclear disarmament.

I now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria.

Allow me to begin by thanking Spain for organizing this open debate on such a timely and pertinent issue. I would also like to congratulate you, Mr. President, and both teams, in New York and in Madrid, on an exemplary job done in leading the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) over the past two years and in the conduct of the comprehensive review on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Bulgaria aligns itself with the statement made earlier by the observer of the European Union. I would like, however, to highlight a few aspects of significance to my country. Since its adoption, in 2004, resolution 1540 (2004) has played a central role in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors, as the only global legally binding instrument in that field. Nowadays, the rise of terrorism and the growing risk of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by non-State actors makes the need for its full implementation more relevant than ever. In that regard, new scientific and technological developments must be taken into consideration and adequately addressed. The results of the comprehensive review demonstrate that, despite the achievements, a lot remains to be done by Member States. The unanimous adoption of resolution 2325 (2016) earlier today and the large number of sponsors  — my own country, Bulgaria, is one of them — should be interpreted as a reaffirmation of the commitment of Member States to fully implement resolution 1540 (2004). Prevention is of the essence. As the saying goes, States need to be successful 100 per cent of the time, while terrorists need to succeed only once. The objective of resolution 1540 (2004) is prevention, and measures to that end will be effective only if they are fully implemented at all levels  — national, regional and global. Bulgaria has been a strong supporter of resolution 1540 (2004) since its adoption. At the national level, we have put all the necessary legislation in place in that regard. However, having legislation in place is not sufficient  — its enforcement is of much greater importance. Our efforts are therefore geared towards further strengthening coordination and information exchange among implementing agencies. Enforcing the legislation is one of the elements that we find of particular importance for the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Bulgaria is in the process of developing a national strategy for countering weapons of mass destruction, in which significant emphasis will be placed on preventing the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by non- State actors. The submission of national reports is another aspect that merits attention. It is essential that all States provide such reports. They allow for the identification of areas that might need further strengthening and can serve as a great tool in assessing needs for assistance. In that regard, the newly strengthened role of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) in facilitating technical assistance could only but be aided by national reports. Bulgaria has submitted several reports on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including updated information in 2015. Besides efforts at the national level, we are of the view that improved cooperation between the 1540 Committee and the three counter-terrorism committees would be of great benefit for achieving the objectives of the resolution. It is important to take into consideration other initiatives whose objectives are also aimed at countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and whose activities contribute to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative. Bulgaria actively participates in both initiatives, and in 2017, within the framework of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, Bulgaria will host a seminar on developing programmes and exercises in nuclear security. Furthermore, the recognition of the positive role that parliamentarians, civil society, academia and industry play in the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) is also an element to be welcomed, as efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors can be successful only if all act in concert. I would like to conclude by reaffirming Bulgaria’s commitment to the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).

I now give the floor to the representative of the Philippines.

I congratulate Spain on assuming the presidency of the Security Council. We also thank you, Mr. President, for convening this high-level debate on preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors. The Philippines recognizes the threat posed to peace and security on the domestic and international fronts by non-State actors acquiring, manufacturing and using weapons of mass destruction. In order to mitigate those risks, the Philippines continues to put in place legislative and other measures so as to make the environment difficult for non-State actors to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Those measures include the following. First, the Philippines has enacted its Strategic Trade and Management Act of 2015, which, together with the Human Security Act of 2007, provides a legal framework to regulate the trade in dual-use items and ensure that the Philippines is not used as a transshipment point for such items. Secondly, we are considering amending the Human Security Act to include nuclear terrorism and penal provisions contained in the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Thirdly, we will be setting up a Philippine nuclear regulatory authority under the proposed comprehensive nuclear regulation act, which will regulate the nuclear, security and safety aspects of the peaceful utilization of ionizing radiation sources. Fourthly, on an operational level, in order to detect any illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials within and across our borders, the Philippines has installed 20 radiation portal monitors at major ports and compels users to submit a transport security plan before transporting radioactive material. In adopting a whole-of-nation approach, the Philippines continues to consolidate its efforts to mitigate the risks to its domestic security posed by non-State actors, by working together with the various agencies in Government and with the private sector and civil society. On the international front, the Philippines believes that the threat posed by non-State actors acquiring, transporting or using weapons of mass destruction requires a collective and coordinated global response. In that context, the Philippines continues to actively engage with partners in the international arena to enhance its capacities and share its national experiences. The Philippines hosts the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Risk Mitigation Centre of Excellence Regional Headquarters for South-East Asia and has developed a proactive Philippine national CBRN action plan. It is also a founding member of the Group of Friends of CBRN risk-mitigation and security governance, which, in line with its goal of raising awareness of CBRN mitigation, co-hosted a side event last September at Headquarters on CBRN risk-mitigation in the context of combating terrorism. At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), the Philippines, as Chair of APEC’s counter-terrorism working group, is pursuing efforts to address the foreign-terrorist-fighters phenomenon. In the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Philippines actively participates in discussions in that regard through the ASEAN Regional Forum, which the Philippines will chair next year. The Philippines is now an active member of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. That web of partnerships synergizes with our domestic efforts, as well bilateral and regional engagements, on CBRN issues. In conclusion, one has to recognize that non-State actors have been quick to adopt new technologies that make it easier for them to acquire, transport and use weapons of mass destruction. States must therefore keep up with those developments and step up efforts to prevent non-State actors from doing so and protect our populations from the threat of a nuclear, chemical or biological catastrophe. We must continue to enhance our cooperation with each other, with the private sector and with civil society so as to combat that threat as one global community.

I now give the floor to the representative of Poland.

Poland aligns itself with the statement delivered earlier by the observer of the European Union. I would like to present some remarks from our national perspective. Poland strongly supports the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Since 2004, we have submitted five national reports on the implementation of the resolution. Recently, we actively participated in a comprehensive review on the status of its implementation. We also had the honour to join the co-sponsors of resolution 2325 (2016), which was adopted earlier today. We particularly welcome the provisions of the new resolution that relate to the delivery of more effective assistance by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to States, enhancing cooperation between the 1540 Committee and other United Nations bodies and international institutions and drawing on expertise from industry and the scientific and academic communities. Such an inclusive approach will contribute to building more secure societies. We join others in calling upon all States that have not yet done so to present their first national reports on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). The threat of the proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors continues to be grave and requires urgent action. In particular, significant efforts remain to be taken to address existing gaps in national implementation by some States that need to make the production, use, storage and transport of materials related to chemical and biological weapons more secure. The reports by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism have confirmed that toxic chemicals have been used as weapons in Syria by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, and we repeatedly hear of new allegations that terrorists are still trying to use them. Biological agents also pose a deadly threat to our societies. The recent eighth Review Conference of the Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention proved that States must put much more effort into suppressing biological challenges. The resolution adopted today accurately states that more attention should be given to enforcement measures against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and to the strengthening of international export and transshipment controls. Poland has therefore completed a comprehensive review of its national procedures for the interdiction of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials. As a result, a document on the subject entitled “National Interdiction Mechanism” was agreed and is now ready to be adopted by the Polish Government — most probably by the end of this year. That mechanism aims at the effective implementation of our international obligations on non-proliferation, including United Nations and European Union sanctions. It also includes guidelines to ensure that, in the event of any action to interdict the suspected transport of WMDs, all national authorities concerned will be ready to react promptly and appropriately, working in conjunction with international partners. As a follow-up to that work, Poland is now considering its accession to the Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. Let me conclude by thanking the Spanish team for its excellent work in chairing the 1540 Committee over the past two years, and by wishing the best of luck to Bolivia as the next Chair of the Committee.

I now give the floor to the representative of Germany.

At the outset, let me express our gratitude to you, Sir, for convening this open debate and for the excellent work done during the comprehensive review on resolution 1540 (2004). While aligning myself with the statement by the observer of the European Union, I would like to make the following three points. First, in the aftermath of the attackas of 11 September 2001, the Security Council developed a vision of a safer world in which humankind was to be spared from the terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However, that vision has been severely compromised in recent years. Since 2013, the repeated use of chemical weapons in Syria, both by Government actors as well as by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), has dramatically increased concerns about the use of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors, as has ISIL’s use of chemical weapons in Iraq. Holding those responsible for such heinous acts accountable remains a major challenge for the international community. Secondly, besides international frameworks, conferences and national regulations, responsible involvement by the private sector is vital for non-proliferation to be successful in a globalized world. After all, it is the private sector that must implement export-control and non-proliferation legislation, under Government supervision of course. Against that backdrop, Germany, with the support of many other Member States, initiated the Wiesbaden process, which focuses on private-sector engagement in the context of resolution 1540 (2004). Listening to the concerns and concrete proposals of industry representatives is instrumental in identifying practical measures that we can adopt to prevent non-State actors from obtaining or using WMDs. Thirdly, for Germany, resolution 1540 (2004) continues to be an essential pillar of the multilateral non-proliferation architecture, as well as an important tool for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors. Germany supports resolution 2325 (2016), which was adopted today, and especially welcomes its aim to strengthen the role of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), especially by further improving the matching mechanism. We also welcome other initiatives aimed at further strengthening resolution 1540 (2004) in a long-term perspective, such as the work of the Group of Friends of resolution 1540 (2004), in which Germany actively participates. We encourage all States to fully fulfil their obligations under resolution 1540 (2004). That means adopting and enforcing effective national legislation. It also means establishing and implementing export controls on dual-use goods and technologies. Germany stands ready to assist other States in doing so, including, for example, by sharing experiences and identifying effective practices. Submitting an initial first report to the 1540 Committee is an essential first step in identifying national strengths and weaknesses in that matter. My country will continue to support targeted outreach towards States that have yet to submit a report. Let me conclude by stressing that Germany, together with partner nations and international organizations, will continue to actively contribute to reducing the global risk of WMD terrorism. We stand ready to implement the outcome of the 2016 comprehensive review on resolution 1540 (2004).

I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico.

Mexico commends you, Sir, for holding this open debate and for Spain’s bold leadership in the comprehensive review on resolution 1540 (2004). The comprehensive review on resolution 1540 (2004) took place in the context of historical developments in several areas of multilateralism, which shows us that when there is a political will, relevant, sensitive and efficient diplomacy is possible. The paradigm shift represented by the adoption by the Security Council and the General Assembly of the concept of sustainable peace as a process and goal for all illustrates that we are witnessing a new era for the United Nations. Since the founding of the Organization, Mexico has pointed out that a secure and peaceful international system must be based on international cooperation and the full application of international law, not on the possession of weapons,and even less so on the existence of weapons of mass destruction. The 1540 regime is valuable because, within its framework, the most important obligations pertaining to international security, disarmament and non-proliferation must be fulfilled, in particular those under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, among other relevant instruments. The full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) is a task that requires continuous and joint efforts on the part of the international community. Current technological advances and commercial interaction can facilitate access to weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors, thereby creating challenges for all of us. What does not exist cannot proliferate. Weapons of mass destruction should simply not exist. We must prohibit all of them without any exception. Mexico will continue to call for the prohibition and elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, based on an equitable and nondiscriminatory approach, so as to prevent the humanitarian impact of those instruments of war. Nuclear-weapon States must fulfil their obligations under the NPT and take unequivocal steps towards their elimination. The year 2017 will be crucial in complementing and strengthening the disarmament, non-proliferation and, above all, nuclear-arms prohibition regimes by beginning with negotiations on a legally binding instrument on that issue. On 14 February 2017, we will celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which led to the establishment of the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated region, which, in turn, led the way for the establishment of five nuclear-weapon-free zones in the world. That is a crucial contribution to international peace and security of the world that fills Mexico and all the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean with great pride. With regard to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the work of the Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and its Sub-Working Group on Non-State Actors is noteworthy. Mexico commends the OPCW for its support to Libya and the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism for identifying those responsible for using chemical weapons in Syria. It is a priority matter to prevent a humanitarian tragedy resulting from biological weapons, given the potential risk owing to the availability and accessibility of the scientific know-how. Mexico welcomes the report on the comprehensive review on resolution 1540 (2004) and its recommendations and strategy on the subject for the coming years. We support the work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and welcome the outstanding work being carried out by its Group of Experts in developing useful tools for the full implementation of the resolution. At the national level, we have worked in coordination with the responsible agencies to update our national report on the implementation of the resolution and the matrix. Those tools contribute to transparency and confidence-building, and they also serve as a resource for the exchange of information and the dissemination of good practices in the area. We have reported on the promulgation of laws and the development of normative frameworks and control measures pertaining to chemical substances. We have also provided information on the safety and security of radiological, chemical and biological materials. Five years ago, Mexico took the decision to close the door to the transfer of goods and technology of dual-use that could be used for unauthorized purposes or fall into the hands of unauthorized end-users, including non-State actors. We continue to strive to improve our export- control policies so as to comply with our legally binding commitments, as well as with the voluntary and political obligations assumed upon becoming a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group and of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. We have developed a national action plan for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), on which much work remains to be done. The approach based on international cooperation is also a strength of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), because it allows direct dialogue with States to be carried out when making visits at their request. The 1540 Committee has established itself as a platform of cooperation to facilitate assistance. We must continue working towards that end by strengthening the mechanism for dealing with requests for specific needs and offers of assistance in specific areas. Likewise, the frank dialogue that the 1540 Committee has developed with international organizations, academia and industry in the pursuit of compliance with the resolution is commendable. My country will continue to work actively for initiatives that contribute meaningfully to multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, such as resolution 1540 (2004).

At the outset, allow me to congratulate you, Mr. President, on the excellent work that you and your team have done in conducting a comprehensive review on resolution 1540 (2004). I would also like to emphasize the opportunity that the review has given Member States to be able to voice their opinions and convey to the Council their ideas regarding the process of the review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), in particular through the open consultations organized in June. Spain’s initiative to create the Group of Friends of resolution 1540 (2004) deserves special mention. In addition to generating a valuable exchange among its members, it has allowed us to follow the most important aspects of the review process throughout the year. We look forward to Spain’s leadership in continuing to drive the activities of the Group, of which Argentina is a member and to which we hope to add even more countries. There are myriad painful cases in which international terrorism has given ample evidence of its capacity for destruction. The use of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors has stopped being an abstract or theoretical problem in recent years and has highlighted the need for Member States to redouble their efforts to prevent terrorist groups from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction, their related materials and their means of delivery. For Argentina, resolution 1540 (2004) represents, in terms of its scope and legal nature, the most robust response by the United Nations to the problems posed by weapons of mass destruction and access to them by non-State actors. Since its adoption 12 years ago, Argentina has addressed that resolution by striving to preserve the balance between our traditional commitment to non-proliferation and our reaffirmation of the sovereign right to the peaceful use and development of advanced technologies, including nuclear, chemical, biological or pharmaceutical technologies, or nanotechnology. Both of those principles are enshrined in the text of resolution 1540 (2004) and have been reaffirmed in resolution 2325 (2016), which was adopted this morning by the Council and which Argentina co-sponsored. In that respect, on 26 October 2004, with its first national report followed by successive updates, the last of which is in the process of being drawn up, the Argentine Republic, as an active member of the five non-proliferation regimes, as well as the Proliferation Security Initiative, has demonstrated its unwavering commitment to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Member States must redouble their efforts to strengthen and update their national export-control systems, which we believe should be based on four fundamental pillars. The first pillar is a transparent and standardized national licensing system. The second pillar is the effective compliance with current legislation applicable to export control, including aspects of brokering and transshipment. The third pillar is the promotion of corporate awareness of the importance of industrial development and the security of international trade. The fourth pillar is close regional cooperation. With regard to regional cooperation, I wish to emphasize that Argentina is a provider of assistance under the framework of resolution 1540 (2004) and conducts capacity-building activities for the identification of strategic goods at the subregional and regional levels, as well as in the field of South- South cooperation with African countries. Our commitment to our region of Latin America and the Caribbean is inescapable, and we will continue to provide assistance to those countries that request it, in accordance with paragraphs 19 and 20 of the resolution that we just adopted. Moreover, Argentina welcomes the new resolution’s recognition of the positive role played by civil society, including industry and the academic world, as well as its recognition of the key role that parliamentarians play. All of those groups are fundamental in implementing the obligations that emanate from resolution 1540 (2004). We believe that it is vitally important to ensure that dual-use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials are properly protected, far from those actors who would not hesitate to use them to terrorize and sow panic and destruction. It is illusory to think that we live in safety while such materials lack proper protection and international regulations are not being applied at a global level. In order to achieve our objectives and face the challenges imposed by the current international context, it is essential to have appropriate institutional support. In that regard, my country welcomes paragraph 9 of the new resolution, which calls on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to analyse the effectiveness and efficiency with which it fulfills the mandate of its special political mission with a view to strengthening that mission and assuring that it is fully ready to carry out its duties. We look forward to the report on the results of that evaluation, which the Committee will provide next year. There are several challenges facing the future of resolution 1540 (2004) and its implementation. First, there is the challenge of addressing the global threat posed by non-State actors, which is made particularly complex by the associated proliferation risks. Secondly, there is the challenge of ensuring the better channeling of requests for assistance in order to enable concrete and effective responses. Thirdly, in relation to universalization, we believe that those States that, for various reasons, have not yet submitted their first national report, should be encouraged to do so, and that they should assisted to do so, if they so request. Fourthly, challenges regarding new technologies, particularly in terms of legislation and export controls, must be analyzed and incorporated into the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Lastly, a major challenge will be to develop and consolidate a network of contact points at the regional and global levels. Allow me to conclude by congratulating Spain on the work that it has carried out over the past years in its capacity as Chair of the 1540 Committee, as well as by extending Argentina’s determined contribution to assisting the next Chair of the 1540 Committee.

I now give the floor to the representative of Hungary.

At the outset, let me congratulate the Spanish presidency on convening this timely debate. The tireless efforts of Madrid to advance the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) are also very much appreciated. We would like to welcome today’s adoption of resolution 2325 (2015), which Hungary co-sponsored. I align my statement with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union. Hungary has traditionally been active in the field of non-proliferation, export controls on sensitive technologies and materials and, more recently, the fight against terrorism. That is why we have already taken various legislative and executive measures to ensure compliance with resolution 1540 (2004). Furthermore, we are continually reviewing our policies with a view to identifying what further action may be necessary. The threat of non-State actors and terrorists using weapons of mass destruction (WMD), whether nuclear, chemical or biological, is one of the greatest facing the international community today. Its scope is not limited to a specific country or region, but rather has global ramifications. Non-State actors have already demonstrated some capability for acquiring and using WMDs. The chemical weapons used by Da’esh in Syria and Iraq serve to underscore how important it is for the international community to broaden and deepen its understanding of such actors. We clearly have more work ahead of us if we are to understand how such actors operate in every area of WMD proliferation. Building and maintaining WMDs still requires specialized knowledge and infrastructure. However, with technology advancing rapidly and opening up new possibilities, the international community has an obligation to monitor non-State actors engaging in proliferation activities, and it should also emphasize the sharing of relevant information on such groups. Particular attention should be paid to unstable and failed States. The possession by such States of WMDs is obviously exceedingly worrying, since there is a significant risk that they may end up in the hands of non-State actors. It is therefore vital to monitor related equipment and parts of weapons, as well as other dual-use items that may fall into the hands of unstable and failed States. The comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004) rightly emphasizes assistance and regional and international cooperation. As its means and capabilities allow, Hungary provides active assistance to partner countries both within the framework of the European Union and on a bilateral basis. In that context, I would like to highlight the assistance we have given to Bosnia and Herzegovina in joining the Wassenaar Arrangement. We believe that such activities contribute to improving the practical implementation of the resolution.

I now give the floor to Mr. Ham Sang-wook, Mr. Ham Sang-wook: It is a pleasure to address the Security Council today on behalf the 35 partners of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). I would like to discuss the Regime’s efforts and what we can do together in the area of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The MTCR and Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) have been complementing and reinforcing each other since that milestone resolution’s adoption, in 2004. The resolution provides a binding international norm under the Charter of the United Nations, and some of its provisions are directly relevant to the work of the MTCR. It not only recognizes efforts by multilateral arrangements such as the MTCR, it also stipulates that States should establish national export controls in order to prevent the proliferation of WMDs, their means of delivery and related materials. There can be no doubt that the resolution has led to more countries enacting export control legislation, as we can see from the comprehensive review report of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). For its part, the MTCR has played an important role since 1987 as the only export control regime for means of delivery. In 2002 its mandate expanded to include preventing terrorists from acquiring missiles and missile technology. Two aspects of its work are particularly important to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). One is its work on updating the MTCR technical annex list of controlled items. Thanks to the efforts of technical experts to keep the list up to date, the annex serves as an international benchmark for export controls on means of delivery. A growing number of non-partners of the MTCR now adhere to the annex, and it is also cited in certain Security Council resolutions. The second significant aspect of the MTCR’s work is its efforts to engage with non-partners. We are conducting outreach activities with various entities, including non-MTCR partner States, international organizations and industry and academic actors. The Regime hopes to enhance awareness through such outreach on export controls and to reduce the capacity gaps between nations. What can the MTCR and the 1540 Committee achieve together in the future? The Committee’s report points out that, despite some progress, it is clear that significant effort will be needed to address the gaps in export controls in many States. I believe that the MTCR can be helpful in two ways. First, it can share its expertise, experiences and best practices with States Members of the United Nations through further exchanges with the 1540 Committee. From the first contact, in 2005, between our two bodies until the latest, which occurred last year, we have been talking to each other, but we still have room for further cooperation. We would like to continue to participate in the 1540 Committee’s meetings, while the Committee could also consider taking part in the future in our biennial technical outreach meetings, in order to deepen our mutual understanding. Member States may also find the MTCR’s adherence policy helpful in implementing the resolution. When a State declares its full adherence to the MTCR, the Regime invites it to technical outreach meetings and provides it with select materials presented at the MTCR licensing and enforcement experts’ meetings. In addition, the MTCR meets with adherent States to give them updates on the Regime, and those countries are listed on its website and in its public statement. I believe that becoming an adherent is the easiest and best way for Member States to improve their implementation of missile-related export controls. Ultimately, the MTCR guidelines and resolution 1540 (2004) share the same goal — stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery worldwide. It is more important than ever that we cooperate in order to achieve that common goal. I would like to conclude by reaffirming the MTCR’s continued support for resolution 1540 (2004).

I now give the floor to Mr. Song Young-wan. Mr. Song Young-wan: I would like to thank the Spanish presidency for inviting me to address the Security Council in my capacity as Chair of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). This is a welcome opportunity for the NSG to further strengthen its cooperation with the United Nations and continue the tradition of consultations with the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). As we know, the Council’s adoption of resolution 1540 (2004) was motivated in part by an egregious case of nuclear proliferation. The discovery of a far-reaching proliferation network that provided nuclear technology, expertise and designs to at least three countries revealed gaps in the international non-proliferation regime that were exploited by non-State actors. Resolution 1540 (2004) aimed at closing those gaps by obliging all States to take binding steps to prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, by terrorist groups and criminal organizations. Consequently, the work of the 1540 Committee and the NSG is complementary and mutually reinforcing. For its part, the NSG seeks to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of two sets of guidelines, the first for the export of nuclear material, equipment and technology, and the second for transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials, software and related technology. The purpose of the NSG guidelines is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to limit the risk of such proliferation by controlling transfers that could contribute to the making of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The guidelines not only assist NSG participating Governments in implementing paragraph 3 of resolution 1540 (2004), but have also found application outside the Group. In fact, NSG guidelines and control lists increasingly represent the global standard for nuclear and dual-use nuclear-related trade. The final document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons makes reference to them, and they are cited in the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Model Additional Protocol. Moreover, NSG watch lists have been adopted by United Nations sanctions committees, where they are used to trigger catch-all controls for shipments to certain countries. In addition, 15 NSG outreach partners have harmonized their national controls with the guidelines and control lists, and several more are in the process of harmonization. All told, approximately 80 States Members of the United Nations implement nuclear- export control lists. Since the key objective of today’s high-level meeting is to reflect on the practical measures that Member States and other actors can take to prevent non-State actors from acquiring or using WMDs, let me simply state the obvious: the NSG guidelines could be used by any State as part of its efforts to establish an effective export-control system consistent with international non-proliferation norms, including the obligations under resolution 1540 (2004). The NSG welcomes voluntary adherence to the guidelines by non-participating Governments and works hard to ensure that the guidelines and control lists remain relevant, keep pace with emerging and evolving technologies and reflect the growing and globalizing supply chain. In order to promote adherence, the NSG troika, which is composed of the current, previous and future Chairs of the Group, engages in outreach with interested States. With regard to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), although the NSG as an organization is not in a position to provide technical assistance, 40 NSG participating Governments have registered with the 1540 Committee for the purposes of offering their expertise and experience to States requesting assistance. In addition, individual requests for assistance are circulated to participating Governments for consideration. Moreover, a number of participating Governments have outreach programmes in place that give effect to the provisions of resolution 1540 (2004) by further developing and enhancing export- control systems with partner countries. In 2014, the NSG informed the 1540 Committee of the publication of a document entitled “Good Practices for the Implementation of Brokering and Transit/Transhipment Controls”, authored by Germany with the help and support of a number of participating Governments. The document outlines good national practices intended to assist interested States considering introduction or further development of national controls on brokering or transit/transshipment and was published on the 1540 Committee’s website. The comprehensive review notes that closer engagement to coordinate activities with relevant international, regional and subregional organizations is needed to avoid duplication and to focus on areas most in need of action. The NSG stands ready to engage fully in productive discussions with the 1540 Committee and other interested parties in order to achieve our common goal of strengthening the international non-proliferation regime.

I now give the floor to Mr. Roux. Mr. Roux: On behalf of INTERPOL, I would like to commend Spain for convening this timely high-level open debate. I would also like to thank and congratulate the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), with Spain as its Chair, as well as its Group of Experts, for their relentless efforts during the comprehensive review process, crowned by the production of the final report on the 2016 comprehensive review and the adoption of resolution 2325 (2016). During the most recent open consultations of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), last June, INTERPOL emphasized that the threat of the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials by terrorist groups, criminals and other non-State actors was real and had today become one of the most significant challenges to public safety and security on a global scale. This alarming reality was affirmed in the final report on the 2016 comprehensive review, which refers to the “increasing risks of proliferation in relation to non-State actors arising from developments in terrorism”. More disturbingly, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons recently confirmed that Da’esh had used chemical weapons in Iraq and developed a programme to make improvised chemical weapons. In 2010, in response to the growing concern about the illicit trafficking in CBRN materials, INTERPOL launched a comprehensive CBRN terrorism-prevention and response effort to support its 190 member countries. Since then, INTERPOL has been supporting its member countries in countering non-State-actor-based CBRN threats, in accordance with its mandate and Constitution. Our activities range from data analysis, multi-agency capacity-building and countermeasure programmes, to regional cross-border operations, resulting in the arrest of traffickers and the seizure of illegally trafficked CBRN materials. In a clear sign of committing to sustainably assisting its 190 member countries in the prevention of and response to CBRN terrorism, INTERPOL has identified the following four actionable objectives in its recently adopted global counter-terrorism strategy: first, to facilitate intelligence-sharing and threat analysis among member countries on subjects and modus operandi linked to CBRN incidents; secondly, to enhance the capacity of our member countries to prevent and respond to CBRN by assisting them in establishing countermeasure programmes; thirdly, to design and coordinate cross-border intelligence-led inter-agency operations to intercept the illicit trafficking in CBRN materials; and, finally, to maintain and develop strategic CBRN partnerships on a global scale. INTERPOL will continue to adopt a dual-track global engagement policy to maintain and establish sustainable bilateral partnership frameworks with relevant international partner agencies and further consolidate its integration within major relevant multinational frameworks. Against that backdrop, we were particularly pleased by the reference made in the final report to the enhanced cooperation between INTERPOL and the 1540 Committee. Indeed, INTERPOL has been regularly exchanging official letters with the 1540 Committee, outlining the terms of their collaboration and establishing respective points of contact. We believe that further strengthening of the points-of- contact network would only benefit the enhancement of interaction and coordination between the Committee and international organizations. Since the launch of INTERPOL’s CBRN capacity, most of the activities conducted have been supporting the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), making INTERPOL an active 1540 assistance provider agency. In the light of the adoption of resolution 2325 (2016), INTERPOL is looking forward to consolidating and continuing to play its role within the framework of a strengthened assistance mechanism, a mechanism that makes resolution 1540 (2004) the main global umbrella under which relevant activities are given priority, new initiatives are systematically launched and successful matchmaking opportunities between donors and assistance providers ultimately result in concrete and effective support to member countries.

I thank Mr. Roux for his briefing. I now give the floor to Mr. Bekkers. Mr. Bekkers: A large-scale chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear incident would not just affect the physical infrastructure of the affected State, but would also have widely catastrophic implications reaching beyond national borders. Non-State actors do not act under the lawful authority of any State, and therefore do not abide by the same international commitments that States do. Other delegations have also pointed that out this morning. Resolution 1540 (2004) addresses that critical gap in the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by specifically targeting non-State actors. Through the years, the resolution has become an important component of the global security architecture. In order for Security Council resolutions to remain relevant, their practical implementation at the national level is crucial, and that is where regional organizations under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations remain extremely valuable. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the largest regional security organization, with 57 participating States. Its comprehensive approach to security encompasses political, military, economic, environmental and human aspects. As such, it is ideally placed to address the needs of its participating States in their national implementation of the resolution. As an example of the importance we attach to resolution 1540 (2004), our quarterly magazine includes a special section on the resolution — unrelated to the fact that this high-level debate it being held. Since 2011, the OSCE has been actively supporting its participating member States with the implementation of the resolution. Let me therefore highlight some of the most important achievements in this field. First, the OSCE created an informal group of friends on resolution 1540 (2004), co-chaired by Spain and Belarus, and appointed a coordinator on non-proliferation issues. Secondly, we established a directory of resolution 1540 (2004) points of contact within the OSCE. Currently, 51 of the 57 participating States have officially appointed their point of contact to the OSCE. The directory has been shared with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Thirdly, annual meetings of the point of contacts were held in 2014 and 2015. The first point-of-contact training in the OSCE area, held in June in Kaliningrad, was hosted by the Russian Federation, which the Russian representative referred to this morning. Fourthly, in order to directly support the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts, as well as to effectively utilize the expertise and resources of both organizations, in 2011 the OSCE and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) concluded a memorandum of understanding. This year we signed a cost-sharing agreement with the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific. Fifthly, and most important, the OSCE, together with the 1540 Committee and UNODA, directly assisted 15 OSCE participating States in the development of their national implementation action plans on the resolution. Those plans have proved to be a helpful national coordination tool, as well as a transparent and effective mechanism for obtaining donor support. We will continue to do so in the OSCE. In conclusion, the OSCE believes that strengthening the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), and in particular strengthening the role of the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts, could positively contribute to preventing non-State actors from obtaining weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, at the formal open consultations here in New York, we have presented our recommendations in order to strengthen the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). We very much look forward to the final report from the 2016 comprehensive review.

I now give the floor to the representative of India.

I thank you, Mr. President, for organizing this debate on an issue of serious concern for the international community. We also thank the briefers for their very significant input. We welcome the adoption today of resolution 2325 (2016), which aims to enhance the architecture of resolution 1540 (2004) by promoting its full implementation through increased cooperation, assistance, transparency and outreach mechanisms. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery to non-State actors continues to constitute one of the biggest and most serious threats to international peace and security today. As a victim of terrorism for more than three decades, India is cognizant of the catastrophic dangers that the transfer of WMDs to non-State actors and terrorists could entail. It is imperative that the international community come together to eliminate the risks related to sensitive materials and technologies falling into the hands of terrorists and non-State actors. On its part, India is fully conscious of the responsibilities that come with the possession of advanced technologies and is committed to maintaining effective law-based controls to prevent the transfer of weapons of mass destruction to terrorist activities and to maintain effective domestic controls to prevent WMD proliferation. Through the years, India has enacted effective laws and regulations and has institutionalized an array of administrative mechanisms to prohibit WMD access to non-State actors and terrorists. After the adoption in 2004 of resolution 1540 (2004), India took additional steps to further strengthen its existing legislative and regulatory mechanism for exercising control over WMDs and their means of delivery. Meeting new proliferation challenges requires new approaches for evolving a more cooperative and consensual international security order that effectively addresses genuine proliferation concerns and differentiates between responsible States whose actions strengthen non-proliferation and those that weaken the realization of those objectives. India is party to all 13 universal instruments accepted as benchmarks for a State’s commitments to combat international terrorism. India welcomes the entry into force of the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) this year. Alongside the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and resolution 1540 (2004), the amended CPPNM would strengthen the global nuclear security architecture and enhance international cooperation and coordination. As we continue efforts to achieve universal adherence and reporting to those instruments, we must not forget the urgent task of closing out negotiations on a comprehensive convention on international terrorism at the United Nations, which has been under discussion since 1996. Such a delay hints at a lack of collective will on an existentialist issue that has become the most serious threat to world peace since 1945. India’s Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership has steadily strengthened its portfolio of programmes and activities, with a particular focus on nuclear security, and has conducted more than 30 international and regional programmes involving more than 300 participants from approximately 30 countries. In February 2017, India will host in New Delhi the Implementation and Assessment Group meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. India has supported the general objectives of resolution 1540 (2004). The resolution is in line with the General Assembly resolution on measures to prevent terrorists from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction, which was initially presented by India in 2002 and has been adopted by consensus every year since then — and is currently being co-sponsored by more than 70 Member States. That broad support reflects the ongoing concerns of the international community with respect to the risks posed by terrorists gaining access to WMDs and sensitive materials and technologies. The resolution enumerates a number of measures at the national and international levels to address that threat. India has always expressed its readiness to offer assistance to other countries in capacity-building and in fulfilling their obligations under resolution 1540 (2004) and has organized several regional workshops in that regard. The resolution has contributed to greater awareness among States of the need for effective measures at the national level to prevent terrorists and non-State actors from gaining access to sensitive materials and technologies. The monitoring of its implementation by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) is facilitated by States reporting their implementation measures. Providing assistance and cooperation to States that request it is a key element of the implementation process. Such assistance programmes should be suited to national or regional requirements. We welcome the fact that resolution 2325 (2016), adopted today, focuses on enhanced cooperation with other terrorist sanction regimes and hope that it will lead to strengthening international cooperation and prevention mechanisms. India has contributed to international efforts in enhancing nuclear safety and security standards through various United Nations initiatives. The international community should continue to exercise the utmost vigilance to prevent terrorist groups from gaining access to WMDs and related materials and technologies.

I now give the floor to the representative of Kazakhstan.

Resolution 2325 (2016), adopted today, is a most significant and historic resolution, co-sponsored by more than 60 United Nations States Members, including my country, and is the most noteworthy follow-up to resolution 1540 (2004). We commend the immense progress achieved, but acknowledge the many strides still to be made. We find that countries vary in their response and ability to adhere to the resolution’s expectations. My delegation therefore proposes the following measures. First of all, we must exercise strict control over the implementation of national commitments, since not all States execute evenly the commitments. Secondly, we must strengthen our close and continuous interaction with both the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) as well as with wider United Nations membership, through sharing technologies and experiences that are not only positive but also negative, so that we may avoid repetition in other countries or regions. There is an obvious need for greater outreach by the 1540 Committee and its experts to not only support its implementation but also to enhance capacity-building to enable countries to formulate their long-term national action plans for achieving the aims of resolution 1540 (2004) with enhanced domestic legislation, compliance with other related non-proliferation regimes and counter-terrorism instruments. Focus should also be placed on related trade controls; illicit trafficking, non-proliferation and disarmament; and international counter-terrorism instruments. We therefore support the idea of developing inter-agency coordination with proper frameworks and mechanisms. Thirdly, it is evident that we will also need to work closely with national points of contact in each county, as well as focus on strengthening a network of such contacts. As funding for travel will be limited, innovative strategies will have to be adapted. Since scientific achievements in the nuclear field are accelerating rapidly, I wish to highlight Kazhakstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s initiative to establish a United Nations register of scientific developments leading to the creation and advancement of weapons of mass destruction, which would track those negative scientific discoveries. Much progress can also be achieved through the creation of online training modules, to be offered on the 1540 Committee website and available in various languages for different categories of Government personnel, such as law- makers, executives, law enforcement officials, border control agents and criminal prosecutors. Fourthly, the 2016 review process has proved the need for identifying and articulating assistance for country-specific needs. Hence, we recommend greater outreach in Africa, the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East and Latin America, in a true spirit of understanding and partnership among countries. Fifthly, such collective action would also imply working closely with the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and other control, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, such as the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and other entities. As incoming Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, we are ready to substantively implement provisions on enhancing ongoing cooperation among the 1540 Committee, the 1267 Committee and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism. In conclusion, we call for multilateral confidence and trust in order to create a powerful, global anti-nuclear movement and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We need to rise above our national interests when it comes to the common good for all people and the planet.

I now give the floor to the representative of Estonia.

Estonia aligns itself with the statement made on behalf of the European Union. First of all, we would like to commend the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), the Permanent Representative of Spain, and all members of the 1540 Committee for their dedicated work on the comprehensive review process. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank Spain for its excellent work during its term in the Security Council, including promoting the objectives of non-proliferation and counter-terrorism. We cannot agree more that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery constitute serious threats to international peace and security. Those threats are continually evolving and include the use of developments in science, technology and international commerce by non-State actors for proliferation purposes. As proof of that new phenomenon, we have confirmed information by the United Nations-Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Joint Investigative Mechanism that toxic chemicals were used as weapons in Syria by both the Syrian Government and Da’esh, and there are new allegations that terrorists used chemical weapons in Iraq. Resolution 1540 (2004) remains the fundamental pillar in the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We welcome the report of the 1540 Committee on the comprehensive review, as well as resolution 2325 (2016), which Estonia also co-sponsored. We are particularly pleased that the resolution reflects new and emerging risks and developments in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and stresses the need to continue enhancing cooperation between the 1540 committee and other relevant Security Council Committees, such as the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism. It is also important that the resolution underlines the importance of a dialogue between the 1540 Committee and Member States, including visits to States, and points out the involvement and crucial role of civil society, industry and academia in the effective implementation of the resolution. Estonia attaches great importance to its commitment to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destructions, as evidenced through its implementation of the resolution 1540 (2004). We support multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control treaties and regimes and we are commited to their full implementation. We will continue to contribute to a number of global and regional non-proliferation initiatives, such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative. We will also continue supporting the resolution by sharing our experience and knowledge in the area of export control of dual-use items. In conclusion, I would like to reaffirm Estonia’s readiness to proactively implement the outcome of the 2016 comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004).

I now give the floor to the representative of Israel.

The threat that the world faces today from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors is greater than ever. Advances in science and technology, combined with the evolving nature of terrorism, present challenges never seen before. For the people of Israel, the scale of the danger posed by the combination of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction is not an abstract notion. Israeli citizens have lived under conventional and unconventional threats for decades, and continue to face the threat of terrorism on a daily basis. Therefore, Israel understands the grave nature of that threat and views the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors as a matter of paramount importance. The situation in our troubled region is further aggravated by the reckless actions of certain States that increase the threat of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction. For its part, Iran continues to promote subversive activities throughout the region through its support for terrorist organizations, which includes supplying weapons, financial and political support and military training, while in Syria the Al-Assad regime continues its unrelenting use of chemical weapons, brutally attacking and maiming its own population. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons- United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism concluded that the Syrian regime was responsible for four chemical weapons attacks on civilians. The Joint Investigative Mechanism report (see S/2016/738) shows a persistent and worrying pattern of using chemical weapons. Let us be clear — the Syrian regime’s use of chemical weapons is neither an isolated incident nor an aberration of conduct. Those are not the actions of an unruly individual; chemicals are a weapon of choice for the regime and reflect a modus operandi of the Syrian authorities, which have set up specific military units for those purposes. The systematic tactical use of chemical weapons by the Al-Assad regime has been emulated by terrorist organizations and incentivized non-State actors to obtain the material and know-how required for the production and use of those horrific capabilities. The Joint Investigative Mechanism report’s findings leaves no room for mistake. It should be clear to everyone sitting in the Chamber today that the primary responsibility for the widespread use of chemical weapons in Syria lies squarely at the feet of the Al-Assad regime. We have all seen the full extent of the vile actions of that regime. In the past few days, Al-Assad’s troops, supported by Iranian-backed militias, have been cold- bloodedly executing innocent women and children in Aleppo and preventing frightened civilians from escaping to freedom. Throughout the past five years, the Al-Assad regime has been committing unspeakable atrocities all across Syria  — executing, starving and besieging its own people, with the help of Iran and its terror proxy, the terrorist organization, Hizbullah. The dire consequences of Al-Assad’s actions are clear. Not only are they responsible for the erosion of the absolute prohibition against the use of chemical weapons, but they also create further incentives for others to violate that prohibition. The international community must unequivocally condemn the use of chemical weapons in Syria and act with resolve in order to address that issue. Against that troubling backdrop, now more than ever it is imperative for the international community to step up its efforts to prevent the spread and use of weapons of mass destruction. Israel views resolution 1540 (2004) as an essential tool in our collective efforts. Each country’s implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) will help protect other countries from potential proliferators, including terrorists, by ensuring that they do not have access to the world’s most dangerous weapons. In the reality we are facing today, in which States and terrorist organizations alike use weapons of mass destruction, we have a shared duty to increase efforts to better monitor weapon-of- mass-destruction-related materials and ensure the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Israel is committed to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and co-sponsored resolution 2325 (2016), adopted here today. As detailed in the reports submitted by Israel to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) in 2004 and in 2012, Israel has taken wide-ranging legal and practical steps intended to curb proliferation. Israel will continue to act determinedly to support global efforts to eradicate the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors.

I now give the floor to the observer of the Holy See. Monsignor Kassas (Holy See) (spoke in Arabic): The Holy See thanks the Spanish presidency for organizing this important debate. The involvement of non-State actors in wars and conflicts has increased lately and had a horrendous effect on civilian populations, most especially women, children, the elderly and the disabled. Non-State actors use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) with impunity and in total lawlessness, showing little or no regard for civilian immunity, proportionality or the distinction between combatants and non-combatants. The staggering number of refugees and forced migrants worldwide bears witness today to the devastation wrought by WMDs and frightfully potent conventional weapons. My delegation reiterates the Holy See’s consistent and firm opposition to the production and use of weapons of mass destruction. Any act or weapon that aims indiscriminately to destroy entire cities or extensive areas, together with their inhabitants, is contrary to all international humanitarian law and all civilizational ideals, and merits unequivocal, unqualified and unhesitating condemnation. The Holy See notes with grave concern that technological advances in the destructive power of weapons systems produce ever more frightening catastrophes for innocent civilian populations. Just a little more than a week ago, Pope Francis observed: “We say the words ‘No more war!’, but at the same time we manufacture weapons and sell them to those who are fighting”. This gifting and selling of arms take place at different levels. Some States supply arms to client States even in the knowledge that they will be used to perpetrate mass atrocities, suppress fundamental human rights and turn back the development of entire peoples and nations. Transactions are often carried out through international crime syndicates, which, as Pope Francis stated last week, is “an easy way to grow rich, but the price is very steep: blood”. Fighting and defeating the illegal and criminal arms trade is fundamental to preventing non-State actors from possessing and using weapons of mass destruction and thus to prevent the atrocities they would commit with those weapons. Strengthening relevant laws and conventions at the multilateral, bilateral and national levels is a necessary step in the right direction. Business as usual with regard to policies concerning weapons of mass destruction and all weapons systems must be replaced with a new global ethic. Profits, geopolitical advantage at any cost and the logic of fear and mistrust must be replaced by addressing the wider security, political, economic and cultural dynamics that lead State and non-State actors alike to seek security, legitimacy and power in the production of weapons, rather than in expending their resources to promote socioeconomic development, diplomacy, political participation and respect for fundamental human rights. The Holy See has repeatedly called on weapons- producing nations to severely limit and control the manufacture and sale of weapons and ammunition to unstable countries and regions of the world where the likelihood of their illegal use, or their falling into the hands of non-State actors, is a real and present danger. The proliferation of weapons, regardless of whether they are weapons of mass destruction or merely conventional, simply aggravates situations of conflict and results in unimaginable human suffering and material costs, profoundly undermining development and the search for lasting peace. Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament underpin global security, respect for human rights and sustainable development. Without such principles, the achievements of the much vaunted 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development would be in serious jeopardy. Without them, catastrophes that could have been prevented will continue to occur. Without greater international and regional cooperation, in particular, among weapons manufacturing States, to control and limit the movement of weapons of mass destruction, it is simply an illusion to speak of a global strategy to stop the proliferation of such weapons.

I now give the floor to the representative of Slovenia.

First of all, I thank Spain for its efforts in convening today’s meeting. We also welcome the adoption of resolution 2325 (2016). Slovenia also aligns itself with the statement made by the observer of the European Union earlier today. I would now like to make some additional remarks in my national capacity. Slovenia supports the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect and respond to the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) for terrorist purposes. The response to that threat must be coherent and comprehensive by using all instruments at our disposal for effective action, as also emphasized in this year’s review of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. I will briefly touch upon the practical measures adopted by my country to prevent non-State actors from accessing WMD technology. Slovenia submitted its fourth national report on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) last month and joined the Group of Friends of resolution 1540 (2004) to help to encourage greater transparency in the resolution’s implementation. We believe that a regional approach prevents duplication and overlapping, creates synergies and enhances the effectiveness of a response compared to an individual response. Due to its geographic position, the region of the Western Balkans will remain in Da’esh’s sights as a possible transit and logistics route between Europe and Syria or Iraq, including for the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction and that is why it remains in our particular focus. As a practical measure, we have expanded the Slovenian-led Western Balkan Counter Terrorism Initiative, which links individual initiatives in that area with the integrity of the integrative internal security governance concept, which includes measures against serious and organized crime, as well as those on border security. As a country with an operating nuclear power plant, a research reactor, a central storage facility for institutional waste and more than 1,000 sources of ionizing radiation, Slovenia attaches great importance to nuclear security. Several ministries in my country are involved in nuclear security matters, all in the first line of defence against the illicit trafficking of radioactive and nuclear materials. We highly value the central role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the global nuclear security framework. Slovenia is a member the Board of Governors for the third time since our independence. We also welcome the entry into force of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which specifically refers to the protection of nuclear facilities and material in use, storage, as well as transport and provides for expanded cooperation among States. In conclusion, I wish to reassure the Council that Slovenia will continue to implement resolution 1540 (2004) as well as the recommendations of the comprehensive review and we call upon all States to do the same.

I now give the floor to the representative of Australia.

Australia welcomes the opportunity to participate in today’s high-level open debate on stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors. From the outset, we would like to thank Spain for its leadership and the inclusive approach it has taken to the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004). We congratulate Spain on compiling a thorough report and were pleased to co-sponsor resolution 2325 (2016) adopted today. Our initial assessment of the report is that it makes a number of important conclusions and recommendations. We support the Committee’s continued efforts to ensure the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including by working with international, regional and subregional organizations. We agree that the Committee should also work closely with civil society, industry and academia. The report and the resolution adopted today rightly underline the potential proliferation risks posed by rapid advances in science, technology and international commerce and the threat posed by non-State actors in accessing weapons of mass destruction. It was therefore disappointing, indeed difficult to comprehend, that the recent Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) failed to agree an intersessional programme, which would have included the review of new developments in science and technology and their potential dual-use applications. Progress in such fields will not wait for the decision-making processes of Member States parties and the threat of use of biological weapons is a reality that we all face. Recalling the advice of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs to us during the June consultations on resolution 1540 (2004), BWC States parties did however step up their thinking on preparedness and response. Australia’s skills training course held in October under the auspices of the Secretary-General’s mechanism was timely, strengthening regional capacity to respond to potential use of a biological weapon. Such mechanisms are useful in meeting the objectives of resolution 1540 (2004), particularly given their strong deterrence value. We believe that the BWC Review Conference outcome does not in fact reflect the desire of States parties to strengthen the Convention, but we need to carefully consider its implications and ensure that the BWC continues to be the key multilateral reference point for combating the real and growing risk of the use of biological weapons. We equally need to note the findings of the comprehensive review report on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and measures relating to biological weapons. We have been similarly hard pressed in addressing the threat posed by the use of chemical weapons, including by non-State actors. Prevarication and lack of consensus on issues can only send the wrong message to potential proliferators. We were pleased, therefore, that the Council unanimously agreed to extend the mandate of the United Nations-Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Joint Investigative Mechanism. Once again, Australia commends Spain for its exemplary leadership as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and in carrying out the comprehensive review. We look forward to welcoming Spain, as outgoing Chair of the Committee, to the next Australia Group meeting to address participants on the capacity-building and assistance measures available under resolution 1540 (2004).

I now give the floor to the representative of Slovakia.

I thank Spain for its efforts in the Security Council over the past two years. (spoke in English) Today’s open debate on reinforcing the preventive system to avoid the use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons by non-State actors, particularly terrorists is a great opportunity to stress the key importance of this topic to our common security. We commend Spain for its strong engagement on resolution 1540 (2004), including by establishing the Group of Friends of the resolution. The Group has proved to be an important forum contributing to steering ideas and soliciting views on the comprehensive review. Slovakia is proud to be one of its founding members. Slovakia fully aligns itself with the statement delivered by the observer of the European Union. Allow me to make some remarks in my national capacity. There is no doubt that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a major global threat to international peace and security. It should therefore be our utmost priority to avoid and prevent weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists and other non-State actors. According to the non-profit The Investigative Project on Terrorism, the deadly toll of terrorism around the globe has jumped nearly eightfold in the past five years. A study has found that an average of nearly 30,000 people per year have been killed by terrorists since 2010, when the death toll from terrorism was about 3,200. The authors of the study say that the exponential increase shows two troubling trends: more attacks are taking place and tend to be deadlier than ever. Furthermore, while current terrorist attacks have been horrific, security experts fear the fallout we could see if any of the terrorist groups were to carry out a major attack using any type of weapon of mass destruction. It is possible. We already know that ambitious, violent groups and individuals  — such as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and Al-Qaida and its affiliates — are trying to find the materials they need for an attack using weapons of mass destruction. Preventing them from doing so is challenging but highly necessary. It is not just a matter of strong domestic controls over those technologies. It is a matter of improved and strengthened international cooperation. In that regard, I wish to highlight the importance, centrality and contribution of resolution 1540 (2004). It has become a significant component of the robust global security architecture and an effective tool in tackling the non-proliferation challenges related to non-State actors. The comprehensive review process has provided us with the opportunity to work together towards its enhanced functioning. We highly welcome the conclusions and recommendations of the comprehensive review report. It is a firm basis for the non-proliferation agenda in order to achieve the full implementation of the resolution. We also welcome today’s unanimous adoption of resolution 2325 (2016) as a further solid contribution to global non-proliferation efforts. Slovakia is proud to be one of the sponsors. Three words  — prevention, awareness and assistance  — are key to our efforts. Based on the comprehensive review, we see it as essential in the upcoming period to intensify our efforts to prevent non-State actors from exploiting new technologies. We should also reach out to industry and civil society to raise awareness and create true partnerships in safeguarding sensitive items. Countries with difficulties in national implementation and reporting should have access to adequate and tailored assistance. I am pleased to inform the Council that Slovakia has submitted to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) its updated 2016 national report, together with a detailed, up-to-date matrix. Both documents reflect the current state of domestic laws and regulations for the implementation of the resolution. Since issuing our last national report, we have introduced a range of legislative, executive and enforcement measures. Through the adoption of necessary legislation on dual-use items, we have further strengthened our national export control system. In addition, Slovakia also contributes to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) through its participation in multilateral initiatives, such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Within the Global Initiative framework and in close cooperation with our United States and Canadian partners and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, in January 2017 Slovakia will co-host, in Bratislava, a legal framework workshop entitled “Vigilant Marmot”. The workshop consists of three goals: first, addressing challenges in adopting and updating national legal frameworks for nuclear security; secondly, highlighting obligations under international legal instruments against radiological and nuclear terrorism; and thirdly, considering practical models for implementing those obligations. To conclude, let me assure those present that Slovakia remains fully committed to its disarmament and non-proliferation obligations and stands ready to continue to assist the international community in combating proliferation threats and challenges.

I now give the floor to the representative of Kyrgyzstan.

The States members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are convinced of the exceptional importance of the issue of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their means of delivery and related technologies and materials. Today, as the issue grows in relevance it is becoming a priority goal of the world community in general and regional organizations in particular. We are convinced that it will be possible to effectively countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction only through the joint efforts of the international community as a whole and coordinated actions and measures undertaken by States and international and regional organizations. In that regard, we underscore the importance of a comprehensive approach to preventing the proliferation of WMD, which in our view must be based on strengthening all non-proliferation regimes, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the Chemical Weapons Convention; the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction; resolution 1540 (2004), and effective national export control systems. We note the timely and relevant nature of resolution 1540 (2004), which is a unique instrument providing a comprehensive approach to the non-proliferation of WMD in the context of non-proliferation to non-State actors, including terrorists. We support the outcome of the comprehensive review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), which is aimed at increasing the effectiveness of national efforts in that area and optimizing the interaction of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) with participants in the process, first and foremost States and international and regional organizations. The States members of CIS believe it important to fully and effectively implement all provisions of resolution 1540 (2004) through voluntary plans of action on the implementation of the resolution. States members of CIS cooperate in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and are open to further cooperation with the 1540 Committee and the relevant specialized international and regional organizations, as needed. We are convinced that through the joint efforts of CIS and international organizations, under the coordinating role of the 1540 Committee, we will be able to increase the efficiency of our implementation of the resolution. CIS member States welcome innovative approaches, in particular conducting regional training courses for national contact points and peer reviews of resolution implementation with the aim of exchanging experiences and national practices. CIS member States, noting the generally positive trend with respect to implementation of provisions, underscore the importance of remaining up to date as we take into account the specific features and real expert and financial capacities of each country. We stand ready to cooperate with all interested parties in strengthening the international weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation regime.

I now give the floor to the representative of Guatemala.

We are living in complex times overshadowed by the terrorist threat. It is imperative that all Member States fulfil their obligation of preventing the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related material, as well as their acquisition by non-State actors, and ensuring that States have the necessary resources and capacities to meet those obligations. As we have seen, the threat of terrorism has no respect for borders and no country or region is immune from a potential attack. Resolution 1540 (2004) is the bedrock of the international non-proliferation regime. We wish to underscore in particular its preventive and cooperative nature as it seeks to bolster adherence to its provisions in the area of non-proliferation, without downplaying its direct link to compliance on the part of all States with the obligations emanating from the other pillars of disarmament, including the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Guatemala is firmly committed to full compliance with resolution 1540 (2004). In addition to having submitted our third report and updated our matrix, as required under resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006), Guatemala has requested technical assistance from the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to develop a national action plan for the implementation of the resolution. Various relevant legislative steps are also under way. Last month, members of the 1540 Committee’s Group of Experts paid their first visit to my country to help us begin drafting the national action plan. Representatives of various governmental bodies met with the Panel and together identified the key elements to be included in the plan. The recently completed comprehensive review process of resolution 1540 (2004) identified areas where implementation of the resolution can be improved. It also recognized some elements and practices that are already being implemented, such as the important role being played by the Group of Experts in terms of training. While we would have preferred a more ambitious and far-reaching outcome of the review, we would like to highlight some of the recommendations contained in the report, which we think represent a step in the right direction. The universal, comprehensive and balanced implementation of the resolution will be possible only if all Member States play a central role and have the resources to do so. In terms of ​assistance, during the open formal consultations that took place in June, Guatemala, like other delegations, recommended that the Committee expand its role beyond that of matchmaking, going so far as to put together its own assistance and capacity-building programmes for States. In that regard, we welcome the invitation to the Committee to develop, together with relevant international organizations, projects to help States meet their obligations under resolution 1540 (2004). In addition, we welcome the decision to pursue the regional approach in general and to continue to strengthen and foster communication and cooperation with specialized regional and international bodies in order to achieve full implementation of the resolution. We welcome in particular the role played by the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean and the role played by the Organization of American States in assisting States that seek their support in establishing national action plans, bringing their legislation into line with the resolution and building capacity in various relevant Government bodies, among others. With regard to the Committee’s resources and administrative structure, we regret that it has not been possible to make progress in strengthening the special political mission that supports the Committee’s work. We hope that the Committee can soon reach agreement on this important issue, in particular given the success of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate. Finally, the best way to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to stop them from falling into the hands of non-State actors is to ensure that they no longer exist. An important first step is their legal prohibition; the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention are examples of how that can be done. However, the worst and most deadly weapons, which imperil the very existence of humankind — nuclear weapons — are the only weapons of mass destruction that have not been prohibited. Faced with this unacceptable risk, my country is committed to furthering multilateral efforts currently under way to begin negotiations on a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons.

I now give the floor to the representative of Ethiopia.

I would like to start by commending the delegation of Spain for convening this meeting and for its excellent leadership in facilitating the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and the preparation of the comprehensive review report. We also welcome the unanimous adoption of resolution 2325 (2016). Ethiopia has been taking all the necessary measures to implement resolution 1540 (2004), including by strengthening the legal and administrative framework to prohibit the manufacture, acquisition, possession, development, transport, transfer or use of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors. However, we note with great concern the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to international peace and security and to humankind. No doubt advances in science and technology and innovation increase the possibility of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of non-State actors, as indicated in the comprehensive review report. Ethiopia views the issue of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction under the agenda of the 1540 Committee from the broader aspect of the total ban and elimination of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The objectives of resolution 1540 (2004) could be best achieved through gradual control and the reduction of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, leading towards a total elimination and ban of weapons of mass destruction. It is to be recalled that the first resolution adopted by the General Assembly (resolution 1 (I)) had the objective of eliminating national armaments, atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction. Seventy years after the establishment of the United Nations, nuclear weapons remain one of the weapons of mass destruction for which there exists no customary or conventional international law prohibiting their use. It is imperative for the international community, including the Security Council, to work towards the adoption of a comprehensive and universal legal framework on the prohibition of the production and use or the total ban of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Much more needs to be done to ensure the universal accession to and full implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Such measures will significantly decrease and eliminate the risk of their proliferation into the hands of non-State actors and terrorist groups. Ethiopia welcomes the progress registered in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) since the last comprehensive review in 2011. Ethiopia also welcomes the convening of the first regional assistance conference in Addis Ababa in April. The use of such regional meetings as a platform for matchmaking between States and assistance providers could be further strengthened to establish an effective international cooperation framework. In this regard, Ethiopia welcomes the identification of a set of recommendations in the comprehensive review report, including recommendations for the Committee to adopt a regional assistance approach, including through the holding of regional and subregional assistance conferences. We further encourage members of the Security Council and relevant actors to work toward the full implementation of those recommendations. In our view, this would contribute to the achievement of the objectives set out in resolution 1540 (2004). I wish to conclude by reiterating Ethiopia’s continued commitment to contribute our share for the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), the recommendations outlined in the comprehensive review report and the broader objective of the maintenance of international peace and security.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands.

The Kingdom of the Netherlands aligns itself with the statement made by the observer of the European Union. I will read out a shortened version of my statement, in view of time constraints. My full statement will be available via PaperSmart and on Twitter. Let me begin by paying tribute to the energy, leadership and vision of Ambassador Oyarzun Marchesi for the way he has structured the work on this issue. We also pay tribute to the energy and the work of his Deputy Permanent Representative, his staff and the Group of Experts for their outstanding work. The open debate we are having today is a fitting manner to close the comprehensive review of 1540 (2004). Today’s debate illustrates the inclusive way in which Spain has conducted the review. We have engaged all Member States, both the members of the Council and the non-members of the Council in the General Assembly. This was a best practice and should be followed by all of us. The great number of co-sponsors, including the Kingdom of the Netherlands, is a testament to the effective way you, Mr. President, have handled this. I would also like to underline the statement made by the representative of Italy. Realizing the goals of the resolution is of crucial importance in the coming period and, together with Italy, during the split term 2017/2018 year in the Security Council, we are committed to working hard on the realization of these goals. Let me make three points in this context with regard to implementation, nuclear security and the threat of biological weapons. First, with regard to the need for the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), we really need it on a global scale and we need it to be comprehensive. We need it to be comprehensive by Member States, but also by international and regional organizations and industry. With so many actors, we need coordination to ensure efficient and effective implementation and to prevent overlap or competition by different organizations. In that regard, the work done by the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts is indispensable. Furthermore, at the national level, we have a great instrument at our disposal: the national action plans. They help improve the effectiveness and efficiency of technical assistance and international cooperation. It is a truly forward-looking instrument that will help us put more emphasis on action rather than reporting. We therefore strongly encourage Member States to use national action plans. My second point concerns nuclear security. We are all aware of the horrendous effect that a terrorist attack using nuclear or radiological weapons would have. In order to address such a threat, nuclear security is key. It is a prime example whereby the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) can count on a solid international organization. Of course, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a crucial role to play in that regard. We need close cooperation between the IAEA, Member States and the 1540 Committee to strengthen nuclear security worldwide. The outcome of the Nuclear Security Summit in March sets an ambitious goal of how the ensure nuclear security. Let us work together to make that a reality. My third point concerns biological weapons. The possibility of a biological attack by non-State actors is real, and we need to address that threat more comprehensively and urgently than ever. The international framework needs to be strengthened. It should be updated given the rapid pace of technological development in the biological sciences. Resolution 2325 (2016), which was adopted today, provides a good platform for making progress in that regard. We therefore strongly encourage all partners to integrate that fully in their efforts to implement today’s resolution. In conclusion, let me reiterate our deep thanks to Spain for its outstanding effort and inclusive approach with regard to the review. It led to outstanding results and sets an example with regard to substance and process. And, together with Italy, we stand ready to offer our full support to the incoming Chair, Bolivia, for the swift and effective implementation of this very important resolution.

I now give the floor to the representative of Peru.

I am grateful for the invitation to participate in this open debate, and I congratulate the Spanish presidency on its outstanding leadership as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) over the past two years. Peru reiterates its commitment to and full support for the hard work of the Security Council to promote dialogue and cooperation to confront the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and their delivery systems. The adoption of resolution 1540 (2004) was a historic milestone in addressing the new threat to international peace and security in the context of the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons among non-State actors, in particular terrorist groups. In keeping with its long-standing traditional approach, Peru co-sponsored that resolution because it believes that we must act urgently towards promoting the universalization and comprehensive implementation of multilateral treaties aimed at preventing the proliferation of WMDs and ensuring that States implement effective national legislation allowing them to check the unlawful transfer of that category of weapons, their related components and delivery systems. More than ever, States need to strengthen measures to prevent the financing of prohibited activities related to weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials, as well as maintain an account of the quantity and physical protection of components related to weapons of mass destruction, thereby ensuring security with regard to their production, use, storage and transport. My country has fulfilled its commitments concerning nuclear security, radiological security and the physical protection of nuclear materials and has adopted a number of administrative and penal measures aimed at the effective implementation of the measures contained in resolution 1540 (2004). It has also initiated a technical assistance project with the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, headquartered in Lima, to implement resolution 1540 (2004). In that vein, Peru has rigorously adapted its internal legislation to the standards established in resolution 1540 (2004), as we have shown in the submitted reports on our level of compliance with the resolution. We note with concern the existence of non-State actors attempting to develop, obtain, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems to advance their interests. We welcome the fact that the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004) has created a dynamic of cooperation and prevention among States, primarily identifying ways for greater and better scientific cooperation and technology transfer, and specifying in particular the role of civil society, the scientific and academic communities, private enterprise and non-governmental organizations in the areas of capacity-building and delegation of the obligations assumed by States in the framework of resolution 1540 (2004). Finally, my delegation emphasizes that the maintenance of international peace and security is a task that requires the participation of the international community, in general. I reaffirm Peru’s strong and constant commitment to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

I now give the floor to the representative of South Africa.

My delegation joins others in thanking you, Sir, for convening this timely and relevant open debate under the item “Preventing catastrophe: A global agenda for stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors”. My delegation welcomes and appreciates the leadership demonstrated by Spain as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and as the facilitator of the 1540 comprehensive review process this year. South Africa is looking forward to the release of the report that we hope will strengthen the resolution and provide an added impetus in tackling the challenge of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Allow me to share South Africa’s perspective on the theme before us. South Africa is of the view shared by the majority of States Members that have expressed grave concern about the catastrophic consequences of use or the threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction, including by non-State actors. South Africa reaffirms that no cause could ever justify the use of WMDs anywhere, by anyone or under any circumstances. In that context, since the dawn of our democracy in 1994, South Africa has remained steadfast in its commitment to muitilateralism in addressing peace and security challenges facing the global community, including the horizontal and vertical proliferation of WMDs and their means of delivery. South Africa reiterates its view that, given the existential threats that I have described and that are succinctly outlined in the concept paper (see S/2016/1013, annex), the only guarantee that WMDs will never be used by anyone is their total elimination and the legally binding assurances that they will never be produced again. We therefore encourage all Member States to participate constructively in the United Nations Conference to begin in 2017, which will negotiate a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons. The global threats and challenges of the use and continued existence of WMDs can be addressed in a balanced, non-discriminatory and comprehensive manner within the relevant multilateral instruments and organizations, including those covered by resolution 1540 (2004). However, that requires the clear commitment and necessary political will of all States to faithfully fulfil their obligations in a non-selective manner. Furthermore, while dealing with the challenges posed by WMDs, it is imperative that no warranted restrictions be imposed on the inalienable right of States Members, particularly developing countries, to use any related materials, equipment and technologies for peaceful purposes. In that context, the opportunities provided by such technologies, for example in the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals and particularly in such areas as food security, public health and clean energy, cannot be overlooked. Regarding the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), over the years South Africa has strengthened its implementation capability through comprehensive national legislation focusing on WMDs and their means of delivery, which includes the establishment of the Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, whose role is to coordinate the national implementation of our international WMD obligations and regulations, and to monitor compliance across all relevant stakeholders. The Council has also played an invaluable role in assisting countries of our region and beyond in strengthening their national controls, legislation and capacity over sensitive items that may contribute to the development of WMDs. South Africa’s experience with the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) has demonstrated that the challenges of WMD proliferation can be overcome by, first, strengthening national legislation and implementation capabilities, including export controls; secondly, building capacities and strengthening technical expertise, especially in developing countries, including in Africa; thirdly, strengthening international cooperation with other related international organizations and agencies; and fourthly, strengthening coordination with regional organizations, such as the African Union, that play a critical role in supporting the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Ultimately, South Africa’s experience has illustrated that the transparent, irreversible and verified elimination of WMDs and measures prohibiting their production, transfer and use remain the most effective means to address the threats posed by such weapons. In conclusion, the challenges and threats posed by the proliferation of WMDs and their possible use by non-State actors require the increased cooperation of the international community. Equally important are the strengthening and increased capacity of relevant multilateral institutions and instruments. Non-proliferation is not a goal in itself, but a means towards a world free of WMDs and their means of delivery. Therefore, selective and discriminatory practices will not serve our collective interest in strengthening peace and security. What is needed is a balanced implementation of the various international legally binding instruments.

My delegation welcomes the Spanish presidency’s initiative to convene this meeting and expresses its appreciation for Spain’s work as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Morocco welcomes the adoption of resolution 2325 (2016), which the Kingdom co-sponsored. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses a threat to international peace and security. The Kingdom of Morocco shares that conviction with the international community, which remains concerned about the threat of terrorism and the risk of non-State actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery, developing them, trafficking them or using them. The adoption of resolution 1540 (2004) reflected the common desire to strengthen the fight against the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, and in particular to prevent their acquisition by non-State actors. The scope of resolution 1540 (2004), which is unique in its purview and the universal support it enjoys among non-proliferation and counter-terrorism regimes, is undeniable. The 10-year extension of the mandate of the 1540 Committee in 2011 reflected the shared determination to pursue the objectives of resolution 1540 (2004), which has filled shortcomings in international law. Since 2011, the terrorist threat has been exacerbated to the point of jeopardizing the stability and territorial integrity of States. Similarly, the efforts of non-State actors, particularly terrorist groups, to resort to weapons of mass destruction have increased. It is that genuine threat that reinforces the need for the full and universal implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Morocco shares the conclusions and recommendations of the 1540 Committee’s review of resolution 1540 (2004) and encourages the Committee to pursue its efforts to assist Member States in fulfilling their obligations under the resolution, with the valuable support of its Group of Experts. Morocco believes that only active international cooperation and appropriate technical assistance  — based on the principles of solidarity and shared responsibility and focused on the mobilization of resources, the exchange of information and best practices  — can help to strengthen national capacities for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), especially in Africa. The existing assistance mechanism should be further strengthened to meet the expectations of States that need it. It should also be able to effectively support States in the implementation of the resolution. Morocco therefore welcomes the relevant recommendations of the Committee, including those relating to the strengthening of the assistance provided directly by the Committee to Member States that request it. I also reiterate that without the contribution of enhanced regional and subregional cooperation, national efforts will remain insufficient. While supporting the 1540 Committee’s relevant recommendations, Morocco believes that the Committee should take measures to facilitate and encourage coordination, particularly at the subregional level. That is dictated by the importance of proximity and shared borders in the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials. The 1540 Committee should also further develop its cooperation with relevant international organizations and agencies. For example, the Group of Experts could further engage with those organizations regarding requests for assistance. The Committee should also promote the exchange of experiences, both in New York and at the regional and subregional levels through, for example, meetings of national focal points. To that end, I take this opportunity to announce that in early March 2017 Morocco will organize, along with the 1540 Committee and the Office of Disarmament Affairs, a meeting of the national points of contact, which will focus on training and coordination. I particularly emphasize the recommendations aimed at strengthening transparency and the involvement of Member States. I note with satisfaction the Council’s request to the Committee, in the operative part of the resolution adopted this morning, to hold periodic meetings open to all Member States. The Committee could improve its dialogue with Member States by continuing the current practice of public information meetings and open debates of the Council, as well as by organizing special and thematic meetings. That would allow Member States to express themselves directly and collectively consider the challenges and opportunities associated with the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). In conclusion, Morocco will continue to fulfil its obligations pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and will continue its fruitful cooperation with the Committee.

We thank you, Mr. President, and your delegation for convening this important debate. As an unarmed democracy, Costa Rica considers disarmament and non-proliferation to be fundamental pillars of its foreign policy, as they contribute to the well-being and survival of humankind. Therefore, such topics are always of the highest relevance to us. My country recognizes the fundamental responsibility of States, consistent with their respective national and international obligations, to maintain the effective security of all nuclear, chemical and biological material under their control, including material used for military purposes. We firmly believe that the best tool available to nuclear-weapon States to increase nuclear security within their territories is precisely a reduction of non-civilian material, thereby contributing to the laudable and broader goal of achieving general, complete, verifiable and enduring nuclear disarmament for the sake of both its citizens and the rest of humankind. Once again, we iterate our support for negotiating a universal legally binding instrument prohibiting nuclear weapons, with a view to their complete and verifiable elimination. We therefore welcome the adoption by the First Committee of the General Assembly of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41, entitled “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations”, with a view to establishing and maintaining a nuclear- weapon-free world. Globalization and technological development can help the international community to limit new risks and threats. However, these tools are a double-edged sword, since they also allow for the possibility that in the long term weapons of mass destruction may fall into non-State hands. We must therefore continue to work to promote the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by all States; continue to seek cooperation in order to facilitate that implementation; research and develop mechanisms for monitoring and reporting implementation; improve awareness of the information gathered and its availability to States; encourage the exchange of information on best practices and national legislation that can assist other States; strengthen international mechanisms for controlling technology and the materials needed to develop such weapons; and redouble efforts to prevent terrorist groups from acquiring any weapons of mass destruction and to control the export and import of the materials, equipment and technology needed to develop them. We continue to call for compliance with Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations, which states that the Security Council shall promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources. We firmly believe that a world without weapons of mass destruction is essential if we are to achieve humankind’s chief objectives, that is, peace, security and sustainable development. Our great challenge lies in effectively implementing all the international instruments created for that purpose, including resolution 2325 (2016), adopted this morning, and of which Costa Rica was a sponsor. In Costa Rica, from the President to the relevant institutions, we are working and coordinating our efforts to achieve a more robust national nuclear security strategy, in accordance with the instruments of the International Atomic Energy Agency, international standards and recommendations for best practices. Similarly, in the first quarter of 2017, with the assistance of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and other international organizations, we will be reviewing Costa Rica’s current legislation in order to improve the application of our obligations under resolution 1540 (2004). As a country without an army, we do not possess any weapons of mass destruction and our laws prohibit anything that when activated produces asphyxiating, poisonous, paralysing, irritating or tear gases, as well as any substance that has irreversible physical or mental effects. That is why we will continue to work until a world free of nuclear weapons and mass weapons of mass destruction  — for some a utopia but for us an attainable goal — becomes a reality.

I now give the floor to the representative of Bangladesh.

Bangladesh would like to thank the Spanish presidency of the Council for organizing today’s high-level open debate, and the briefers for sharing their valuable insights. We believe that the action-oriented and balanced approach of resolution 2325 (2016), adopted today, will help Member States to further consolidate their frameworks for complying with resolution 1540 (2004). In that regard, we would like to emphasize four points. First, today’s resolution correctly recognizes that the task of implementing resolution 1540 (2004) is a long-term undertaking. It is therefore crucial to support its implementation in a context-specific and with a common but differentiated approach. The regular sharing of best practices, including through the points- of-contact network, would be particularly useful. Secondly, the wide differences in implementation among Member States will continue unless meaningful financial and technical assistance is provided to overcome the structural constraints that many States face. Our delegation would have preferred to see the review of resolution 1540 (2004) result in a more institutionalized and predictable approach to such assistance. Failing that, we expect Member States and relevant entities that are in a position to do so to redouble their efforts to provide concrete, needs-based assistance to interested States that request it. The Group of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) should continue to help Member States to better identify and articulate their needs. Thirdly, today’s resolution makes a strong case for further enhancing the 1540 Committee’s cooperation and interface with relevant international, regional and subregional entities. We would like to emphasize the importance of avoiding duplication and to reaffirm the suggestion about facilitating assistance and sharing expertise on a regional basis. The competent regional entities may be encouraged to support interested States in further strengthening their national export control measures pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Fourthly, my delegation highlighted some of our ongoing and future national initiatives at the formal open consultations organized by the 1540 Committee in June. While we remain seized of those initiatives, we would like to note the rapid advances that have been made in science and technology that are susceptible to abuse or the risk of proliferation by non-State actors, including terrorists. We call on the 1540 Committee to help enhance our information and knowledge base about the evolving risks, especially those requiring our pre-emptive action. The threat of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of unauthorized non-State actors has rightly been called a catastrophe. As a responsible member of the international community, Bangladesh remains committed to stepping up its efforts to help prevent such situations and their potentially grave consequences.

I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia.

We are grateful to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain for convening today’s important high-level open debate and for his statement. We also thank the Deputy Secretary-General and the other briefers for theirs. Indonesia, as a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on Chemical Weapons and the Biological Weapons Convention, as a member of the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, and as a party that has ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, welcomes today’s focus on countering the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by non-State actors. In that regard, Indonesia would like to thank the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) for its presentation of its first five-year comprehensive report, covering the period from 25 April 2011 to 24 April 2016. We are grateful to the Committee’s successive Chairs, Vice-Chairs and other support staff for their hard work in producing the detailed report. While we are still reviewing its contents, some trends seem clear. The report acknowledges that States’ reporting has increased and that most States have enhanced their measures prohibiting activities by non-State actors relating to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery. Indonesia stresses, and the report itself underlines, that the 1540 Committee plays a vital role in facilitating matchmaking, particularly in view of the discrepancies between countries’ economic and industrial capabilities. The report’s recommendations for improving the delivery of tailor-made assistance are very important. We would therefore appreciate hearing from the Committee about the factors that resulted in a drop in the total number of requests submitted for assistance in the period under review by comparison to those submitted before 2011. We also note the Committee’s observation that funds in the United Nations Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament, managed by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, have been used mainly for outreach activities, including those related to visits to countries, and less for projects more directly linked to implementation. It would be useful to hear the Committee’s views on how it and other relevant entities can further assist countries in need of support for preparing project proposals. Meanwhile, we reiterate our call for the immediate establishment of a fund dedicated to supporting Member States in implementing their obligations under resolution 1540 (2004). We believe it is extremely important to have intensified support from the Committee and its Group of Experts, including through close cooperation with national points of contact for resolution 1540 (2004), along with adequate support from other relevant parts of the United Nations system. The Committee’s report and the concept note (see S/2016/1013, annex) for today’s debate point out that the threat of WMD proliferation by non-State actors is likely to be exacerbated by the rapid advances in science, technology and international commerce that could make the risk of their misuse more probable. While it is right and important that States should take robust measures to counter any WMD activities by non-State groups in this environment, Indonesia believes that what is of the essence is the fundamental question of whether States have sufficient capacity to ensure that their authority will prevail in every area throughout their territory. Only when States are in proper control of all their regions can national authorities ensure that WMD, criminal and terrorist activity by non-State actors is dealt with and effectively deterred. Therefore, countries requiring assistance in building enforcement capacity in their territories need to receive full support. As my delegation has stressed in various United Nations forums, it is crucial that the Security Council and other relevant United Nations system entities step up their principled prevention, credible political solutions, and dialogue and mediation in order to help resolve conflicts peacefully. Lasting peace and stability will go a long way towards bolstering conflict- affected countries’ focus and energies in thwarting all WMD activity by non-State elements in their countries and regions. Indonesia also stresses the importance of the peaceful use of nuclear energy for development and the need for robust international support to that end. The 1540 Committee’s observation that there is a positive correlation between the use of nuclear energy and implementation rates of 1540 obligations is noteworthy. Indonesia fully supports the aims of resolution 1540 (2004), but it also believes that the issue of WMD acquisition by non-State groups must be considered by all States Members of the United Nations in an inclusive manner. Our actions should flow from multilaterally negotiated instruments. At the formal open consultations in June, Indonesia outlined in detail many of its actions in the context of its implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Suffice it to say that Indonesia’s deep commitment to the issue is demonstrated by its vigorous adherence to, inter alia, the treaties and instruments that I mentioned previously. Through various national laws and programmes, we have instituted comprehensive measures to counter the development, acquisition, manufacture, possession, transportation, transfer or use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems. Regionally, Indonesia is actively participating in various Association of Southeast Asian Nations forums on export controls and non-proliferation. In closing, Indonesia would like to underscore that, as long as a single nuclear or other weapon of mass destruction exists, the threat to humankind of its use, by design or accident, will persist. Just as we are seeing detailed reports and matrices on progress in non-proliferation, it is imperative that there be the same emphasis on nuclear-disarmament obligations. The lackluster approach on the latter and the flawed notion of nuclear haves and have-nots is morally indefensible and unsustainable. It negates the delegitimization of these weapons and invites proliferation. All countries must exercise their responsibilities to make the world safe and peaceful for all. To that end, Indonesia calls on nuclear-weapon States in particular to show political will and contribute constructively to ensuring that negotiations advance toward the realization of a universal and legally binding instrument for the prohibition of nuclear and other WMD, leading to their total elimination.

I now give the floor to the representative of Ecuador.

First of all, I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for convening today’s debate on a subject of universal concern, namely, the proliferation and possible use by non-State actors of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological or radiological weapons. At the same time, we commend Spain for its successful chairmanship of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), especially during the process of the comprehensive review of its implementation. The Constitution of Ecuador expressly condemns the production, possession, commercialization, importation, transfer, stockpiling and use of weapons of mass destruction regardless of who does it. For this reason, Ecuador is developing the legislative and regulatory framework appropriate for preventing the proliferation and illicit trafficking in these weapons and their delivery systems. The National Assembly of Ecuador is about to approve, as a step prior to ratification, the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, thereby reiterating our commitment to fighting sabotage and smuggling of nuclear materials and their possible use for terrorist purposes. Ecuador played an active role in the recent international conference on nuclear security convened by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which organized the meeting as the right forum for addressing challenges in the field of physical nuclear security in an inclusive manner, where all IAEA member States were represented and expressed their ideas and their commitments. Ecuador is concerned that in forums with limited participation outside the framework of the United Nations or its specialized agencies and bodies in which only a few States participate, issues of universal interest, such as nuclear security, are addressed. As long as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons remain in the possession of States, there is a risk of their use. For this reason, when we speak of weapons of mass destruction and the risk of their proliferation to non-State actors, we cannot overlook the primary responsibility of States to fulfil their obligations under the various international, universal or regional instruments in this sphere, including their destruction, without forgetting that the 85 per cent of existing nuclear material in the world is for military purposes. By its very nature, then, it is outside international nuclear-security agreements. Nor can we forget that the sole category of weapons of mass destruction that is not prohibited by a universal legally binding instrument are nuclear weapons. For this reason, Ecuador, along with other States, sponsored resolution A/C.1/71/L.41, which was adopted in October in the First Committee by almost two-thirds of the United Nations membership, which called for the start of a negotiation process in 2017 on a treaty banning nuclear weapons with a view to their complete elimination. In so doing, my country is fulfilling its obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We urge all States, beginning with nuclear-weapon States and States possessing nuclear weapons, to participate in these negotiations that will have authentically inclusive nature. As long as stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction exist, the risk of their being used for criminal or terrorist purposes is high. So the best guarantee that this does not occur is to completely eliminate them.

I now give the floor to the representative of Belgium.

Belgium fully supports the statement made by the observer of the European Union, and I wish to make the following remarks in my national capacity. At the outset, I welcome the outstanding background work carried out by the delegation of Spain during the comprehensive review process of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Twelve years after the adoption of that resolution, we must face reality. For the first time, non-State actors have used weapons of mass destruction, in Syria and Iraq. What must we do with this reality? In the immediate term, we must improve the implementation of relevant provisions and commitments, including through greater international cooperation. In this regard, Belgium welcomes the unanimous support of the Security Council for resolution 2325 (2016), which it adopted today. First of all, with respect to chemical weapons, the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons needs to be improved. To date, only 118 States parties have sufficient national legislation in this area. We must therefore pay greater attention to making sure that all States abide by their obligations. We must also unequivocally condemn any views of weapons of mass destruction regardless of where or by whomever they are used. For that reason, the Security Council must be unanimous in its condemnation of any use of chemical weapons in Syria, whether by Da’esh or by the Syrian regime. The use of chemical weapons cannot go unpunished, and concerted international action in that regard is important. Secondly, with respect to the nuclear aspect, it is of paramount importance to secure the existing sensitive material and to reduce its quantity. On its part, Belgium has considerably reduced the quantity of sensitive nuclear material in its territory. We have created a new specialized police unit at the federal level in order to ensure a permanent armed response capacity at our nuclear sites. Until it is fully rolled out, those sites are currently secured by military units. Our nuclear experts are at the forefront of international efforts to design and test various types of fuels that could eventually replace highly enriched uranium in our reactors used for cutting-edge research. That is also a contribution to non-proliferation. Radioactive sources are also equally vulnerable and could be diverted for nefarious purposes. We must therefore support new medical and industrial technologies that would enable us to significantly replace or reduce the use of those sources. We will continue to support the nuclear security work of the International Atomic Energy Agency, including financially. Thirdly, with regard to biological weapons, we regret that the eighth Review Conference of the Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention did not succeed in making a qualitative leap at the very moment when we are seeing growing threats. But we must not give up; the collective and individual challenge before us is too important. Recent experience has shown that proactive and creative initiatives can support the aims of the Convention where diplomatic negotiations are lagging behind. One example would be peer-review exercises, a new approach that could help boos confidence in conformity with the Convention. In conclusion, initiatives could also be developed at the industrial and academic levels, including drafting codes of conduct and boosting biosafety, including by devising new standards.

I now give the floor to Ms. Blocher. Ms. Blocher: Allow me to extend the thanks of Mr. David Malone, Rector of the United Nations University, for the invitation to participate in this open debate. Rector Malone regrets not being able to attend in person, as he is meeting with the University’s Global Governing Council this week in Tokyo. The United Nations University, established by the General Assembly, exists to contribute through collaborative research and education to efforts to resolve pressing global issues and to do so by functioning as a bridge between the academic community and the United Nations. Our Charter, given to us by the General Assembly more than 40 years ago, mandates us to work with academia worldwide to address pressing global problems of human survival, development and welfare. It is hard to think of a more pressing global problem of human survival than the risks entailed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Resolution 1540 (2004) provides an important framework for cooperation in the crucial global effort to prevent non-State actors from obtaining weapons of mass destruction, one of the most pressing security challenges of our time. The occasion of this year’s comprehensive review of the status of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), conducted under the able Spanish chairmanship, provides an opportunity to step back and assess how the United Nations response to this threat could be strengthened. Academia has a special role to play in assisting Member States in that important work. The worldwide academic community has undertaken significant research in the physical sciences and has helped to disseminate technical knowledge, skills and data. It can also help by identifying areas of vulnerability and devising recommendations on how to adjust response mechanisms. Since the 2009 comprehensive review, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) has made a concerted effort to engage scientific expertise. In April, the United Nations University was fortunate to be asked to contribute to the effort, in cooperation with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, through the organization of a formal dialogue between the 1540 Committee and academia and civil society. In June, the dialogue continued on the margins of the formal open consultations on the comprehensive review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Looking forward, we see important opportunities for the Security Council to benefit from ongoing and systematic engagement with academia and civil society on these issues around the world. We also believe that academic partners can provide valuable assistance to Member States in their efforts to promote transparency and awareness-raising on the purpose and content of resolution 1540 (2004), as well as States’ ensuing obligations. We hope Member States and the Security Council will avail themselves of these resources in the months and years ahead. The need for effective action is so great that such opportunities must be carefully exploited. Allow me once again to express my thanks for the opportunity to address the Council here today.

I thank Ms. Blocher for her briefing. I now give the floor to the representative of Georgia.

At the outset, let me express our gratitude to the Spanish presidency of the Security Council for convening this open debate and for its successful chairing of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). We welcome the adoption of resolution 2325 (2016) today, which we also co-sponsored. Georgia aligns itself with the statement delivered earlier today by the observer of the European Union. I wish to convey the following remarks in my national capacity. The risk of nuclear terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related materials and technologies have become major challenges to our common security. The chance of such weapons falling into the hands of unauthorized actors is indeed alarming. In fact, the acquisition of those technologies and materials may be a bigger challenge than an actual WMD. Increasing threats emanating from terrorist groups make the possibility of exploitation of security vulnerabilities with criminal intent highly probable, while some actors have already demonstrated readiness to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction, as demonstrated in the reports by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons- United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. Political commitment is crucial to all of us in developing the policies, strategies and systems to strengthen security at all levels. In that regard, full compliance with the obligations under international arrangements such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, resolution 1540 (2004) and others must stand out as a priority for the international community. Georgia is a non-nuclear State, a status we achieved after the removal of 1.83 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from the Breeder-1 Neutron Source Facility in December 2015. Repatriating highly enriched uranium was a step in response to the communiqué of The Hague 2014 Nuclear Security Summit. However, the threats posed by the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons and materials, as well WMD-related technologies, remains a subject of serious concern for Georgia, not the least due to our close proximity to a region that poses a high risk of proliferation. In that regard, Georgia has been taking various measures while implementing CBRN national actions plans. In recent years, several attempts to smuggle nuclear and radioactive materials via Georgia’s occupied regions were detected and duly prevented by our law enforcement agencies. During the 2006-2016 decade, 25 cases of illicit smuggling of radioactive materials were intercepted, 11 of which were from the occupied territories of Georgia. However, in the absence of an international presence inside those regions, it has become virtually impossible to conduct any type of verification activities on the ground, thereby increasing the risk of the proliferation of WMD-related materials. Georgia actively cooperates with the European Union and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, within the framework of the European Union Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Centres of Excellence Initiative, to promote an integrated CBRN approach across the area covering South-East Europe, the Caucasus, Moldova and Ukraine. With the aim of contributing to the success of the project, the CBRN Regional Secretariat was opened and successfully functions in Georgia. To promote CBRN-related topics at the United Nations, the Governments of Georgia, the Kingdom of Morocco and the Republic of the Philippines have established the United Nations Group of Friends on CBRN Risk Mitigation and Security Governance. The Group of Friends is a consultation and dialogue forum aimed at integrating the CBRN component into the international security architecture, sensitizing States to the importance of mitigating CBRN risks, and fostering regional cooperation on CBRN challenges. It also promotes the activities aimed at building capacity and developing capabilities between and among partner States and the implementation of the resolution 1540 (2004). It is our belief that through promoting such joint efforts we can succeed in advancing a robust preventive system against the proliferation of WMD.

I nowgive the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea.

At the outset, I would like to commend the leadership of Spain for both organizing this timely open debate and delivering the 2016 comprehensive review report. With the target year of 2021 fast approaching for achieving full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), this retrospective yet simultaneously forward-looking review is critical to assessing how far we have come over the past five years. In this regard, my delegation is honoured to co-sponsor resolution 2325 (2016). Since its adoption in 2004, resolution 1540 (2004) has successfully mobilized the international community to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by non-State actors, with nearly 10,000 measures in place in the 1540 matrices this year. This means that more than 500 measures have been adopted by each Member State, which is a significant achievement indeed. However, challenges from non-State actors, including terrorist groups and violent extremists who seek to obtain WMD materials and their means of delivery for malicious purposes, continue to arise at breakneck speed. Recent advancements in science, technology and international commerce have lowered the threshold for these actors. Increasing reports of the potential detonation of dirty bombs and other attempts to acquire nuclear materials by dangerous actors alarm us every day. Recently, the use of mustard gas by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant in Syria was identified by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. Against this backdrop, I would like to make the following three points for further consideration in our joint efforts in combating WMD proliferation to non-State actors. First, it is essential to raise awareness of resolution 1540 (2004) by enhancing our outreach activities. Indeed, given the extensive nature of the obligations imposed by the resolution, ensuring a strong link between each and every stakeholder, including the industry, academia and civil society, will certainly be key to success. In that regard, in recent years the Republic of Korea has actively supported the outreach events held by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) in Phnom Penh, London, Seoul, Kathmandu, Wiesbaden, Santiago and Addis Ababa through its contribution to the Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities. Last September in Seoul, we successfully hosted the first regional Wiesbaden Industrial Outreach Conference, which was attended by public and private sector participants from Asia, Europe and the United States. Secondly, the Security Council is not alone in promoting resolution 1540 (2004), and we should maximize synergetic effects by enhancing cooperation with and building upon the achievements of various international organizations and initiatives. This year, my Government is privileged to concurrently chair both the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. This is unprecedented in the history of export-control regimes. The Republic of Korea views this double chairmanship as a token of trust from the international community for our commitment and capability to reinforce the non-proliferation regime, and therefore feels a great sense of responsibility. In these capacities, we will continue to work closely with the 1540 Committee to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Thirdly, while ensuring full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), we must also scale up our actions to enable that prevention mechanism to better respond to the evolving nature of threats posed by non-State actors. Expanding our current non-proliferation architecture to encompass cyberterrorism or radiological threats, which are of growing interest to violent extremists, among others, is essential to moving the ongoing process forward. For example, the Nuclear Security Summit process has significantly advanced the concept of nuclear security as a public good and endowed the United Nations and its specialized agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), with a central role in further strengthening nuclear security. As the Chair of the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit and the 2016 IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security, Korea remains committed to working closely with the international community to harness the political momentum and channel it into concrete actions that directly strengthen ongoing efforts under resolution 1540 (2004) to prevent nuclear terrorism. Faced with the imminent threat posed by the nuclear and missile programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as well as the consequential threats of its WMD proliferation, the Republic of Korea attaches great importance to the global non-proliferation regime. With two nuclear tests conducted this year alone and technical advancement in its delivery means having been accelerated through 24 test launches of various types of missiles, North Korea is now nearing the final stage of nuclear weaponization. As such, North Korea’s nuclear programme is the single gravest threat to the international non-proliferation regime. Given Pyongyang’s track record in the illicit arms trade and blackmarket smuggling, a cash-stripped country like North Korea could certainly be a willing supplier of WMD materials or technology to non-State actors. I would like to underscore the fact that only through the denuclearization of North Korea can we dismiss this proliferation concern, and that will be critical to achieving the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). In closing, I would like to assure the Security Council that the Republic of Korea remains committed to the full and universal implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). We will continue to work closely with the 1540 Committee in the future.

I now give the floor to the representative of Thailand.

At the outset, I would like to congratulate Spain on its assumption of the presidency and on organizing this debate. As a hub of transport and commerce, the Kingdom of Thailand is committed to addressing the threats to our collective security posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. There is a genuine risk that these weapons may fall into the wrong hands. Given the importance we attach to the issue, we have decided to join other Member States in co-sponsoring resolution 2325 (2016), adopted today. In addition to the immediate havoc caused by their use, the existence of these weapons fuels mistrust, exacerbates conflicts and upsets the delicate international security landscape. The Kingdom of Thailand fiunly believes that in order to sustain peace and security, States must step up both disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. As such, we continue to exert every effort to implement international measures and obligations with rigour. We have the following practical approaches to share today. First, as an active participant in various initiatives, including the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Nuclear Security Summits, and as a State party to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, among others, we firmly believe that increased coordination and collaboration among initiatives and implementation efforts can benefit and optimize our joint efforts. In this regard, we welcome enhancing ongoing cooperation among the counter-terrorism- related committees of the Security Council. To this end, we also urge closer coordination between the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and other entities and initiatives, including the International Atomic Energy Agency, to ensure that gaps are filled and redundancies of efforts eliminated. Secondly, as States are in different situations regarding threats of weapons of mass destruction and have different resources and capacities, international cooperation and assistance, particularly for developing countries, is essential to strengthening the non-proliferation regime. We welcome the constructive role of the 1540 Committee and the sharing of good- practices, technical cooperation and assistance among Member States. Thirdly, Member States must ensure effective national implementation, as no international cooperation can bear fruit without robust implementation within the country through an appropriate legal framework. Also, each State has its own specificities with regard to its national implementation, which must be taken into account. As for the Kingdom of Thailand, earlier in August the Nuclear Energy for Peace Act was promulgated and will enter into force on 1 February 2017. The new Act focuses not only on nuclear security, including the physical protection of nuclear material, but also on nuclear safety and safeguards. In October this year, the National Legislative Assembly of Thailand approved the Counter-terrorism and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Financing Act, which will be enacted in the near future. In September this year also, the Thai Cabinet approved the draft Trade Controls on WMD-related Items Act, which will regulate the export of dual-use items in accordance with national and international legal regimes. The National Legislative Assembly of Thailand will soon consider the draft Act. We also need inter-agency coordination and engagement with civil society, industry, and academia. The Ministry of Commerce of Thailand continually organizes workshops and seminars to educate and engage the private and academic sectors on the control of dual-use items. Just yesterday, an memorandum of understanding between the Ministry of Commerce’s Department of Foreign Trade and multiple academic and research institutions was signed to support the network of WMD-related entities. We believe that the engagement of those stakeholders in the resolution adopted today is a step in the right direction. Lastly, we must also strengthen regional cooperation, as the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime in any State also depends on the effective implementation in the neighbouring countries. To that end, Thailand is a proponent of promoting regional cooperation in the work of the 1540 regime. An example of note is the joint cross-border exercise between Thailand and Malaysia on the detection of nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control, held in October this year, which aimed to combat smuggling or illicit cross- border transport of such materials. The ultimate goal of the Kingdom of Thailand is to attain a world free of weapons of mass destruction. In order to reach that goal, non-proliferation should be pursued in parallel with disarmament efforts. The international community should make their best efforts to secure the world by prohibiting all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, while ensuring that related materials and technologies benefit society through their peaceful uses. The long-term task towards that lofty goal will require political will and the commitment of all States. The Kingdom of Thailand is fully supportive of such an endeavour.

I now give the floor to the representative of Panama.

Allow me first to welcome the presence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Kingdom of Spain, Mr. Alfonso Dastis Quecedo, and to congratulate the Spanish presidency on drawing attention once again to the great importance of and growing concern raised by the risks of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction across the world, particularly when they are in the hands of non-State actors. We are pleased to see the leadership shown by Spain, particularly by Ambassador Oyarzún, in forming the Group of Friends of Resolution 1540 (2004)— and Panama was a part of that initiative — as well to congratulate Spain on achieving resolution 2325 (2016), which was adopted today by consensus here in the Council and which my country co-sponsored with a view to contributing to improving the effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Panama is fully committed to strengthening the disarmament and non-proliferation regime, regardless of who may possess such weapons and their delivery systems, because we believe that they constitute in and of themselves an ongoing threat to peace, security and humankind itself. We are honoured to belong to the first nuclear-weapon-free zone, which was instituted in Latin America and the Caribbean in 1969 through the entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. That commitment to non-proliferation was ratified in 1999, when Panama acceded to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which is a key piece in the disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. Twenty years after its adoption, there is still an urgent need for its universalization and entry into force through a compromise reached by all States without exception. In that regard, I am pleased to share that Panama has been elected Chairperson of the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission for 2017, and in that capacity we will push for the Convention’s entry into force. We pay particular attention to resolution 1540 (2014) because, as stated in the concept note before us (see S/2016/1013, annex), it is currently the only legally binding instrument available to us in the multilateral structure, and in our case it is of high value to promote strategic and secure trade and investments that avoid having chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear material diverted to non-State actors for criminal purposes. Panama does not produce, import, handle and store nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, but we are fully aware of the emerging trends in the proliferation of scientific and technological advances and in international trade and of their greater democratization, which makes them more vulnerable to the risk of possession and exploitation by non-State actors. That is why Panama has just adopted and strengthened practical measures at the global, regional and national levels. Given the importance of joint regional efforts and their positive impact on the international community, last September, alongside Spain, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism of the Organization of American States, Panama held a side event to promote greater understanding of cooperation in export control and how to promote safe and strategic trade and investments by addressing the risk posed by non-State actors in the collection, proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction. More recently, in November, we organized a regional conference under the rubric “Nuclear terrorism  — a global challenge”, with the participation of some countries that are not even from our region. The aim was to strengthen the capabilities and cooperation we need to prevent, detect and respond to nuclear terrorism. In 2017, my country will assume the chairmanship of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism, a platform we intend to use to continue to strengthen the constructive and cooperative work that we think is key to tackling this terrible challenge. At the national level, with a view to contributing to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), we are working on the effective regulation of dual-use material, and we are also coming up with a national inter-agency plan for prevention, preparedness and response with regard to threats and incidents involving chemical, biological, radioactive, nuclear and explosive agents. We are also aware that our geographical position, coasts on two oceans and the connection advantages that Panama offers also pose a challenge when it comes to security. We have worked to achieve a stronger institutional structure and modern legislation that enables us to prevent, combat and punish financing of terrorism and financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, Panama is part of the Global Container Control Programme, an initiative of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the World Customs Organization, which is being implemented to enable sending international alerts and to carry out joint operations to minimize the use of containers at sea for illegal uses. My Government strongly condemns the recent nuclear tests. We have reiterated that the development of weapons of mass destruction and their use are acts against peace and international cooperation, which can only aggravate tensions among countries and regions, threaten their political stability and seriously jeopardize peaceful coexistence between peoples. Allow me to conclude by stressing that for my country, it is an ethical imperative that we should live in a world free of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, since their humanitarian impact is irreversible and unquantifiable. We share the global responsibility to progress towards a more peaceful and safer world with a multidimensional approach to security tied to human rights and development. The non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through the effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) is the cornerstone for preventing disaster and for genuinely sustainable development that guarantees a safer world. The efforts of the Security Council and, even more, the commitment of Member States are fundamental to achieving a world free of the threat of radiation.

I now give the floor to the representative of Afghanistan.

At the outset I wish to convey our appreciation to the delegation of Spain for organizing today’s high-level open debate, under the agenda item “Preventive catastrophe: A global agenda for stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors”. The risk of non-State actors, especially terrorists, using weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear weapons, is one of the biggest threats to global peace and security. While no major, large-scale attack of that nature has yet happened, terrorists have shown the intent and capacity to develop and use WMD. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the international community to effectively address the possible threat of the use of WMD by non-State actors, in all of its aspects. While some progress has been made in adopting measures to prevent the proliferation of WMD by non-State actors, the rate and variability of that progress confirms that accomplishing the objective of the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) is a long-term task that requires continued efforts at national, regional and international levels. It also requires constant and enhanced support from the Security Council, as well as the provision of technical assistance to States that require the same, especially for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and voluntary national plans of action. Afghanistan, surrounded by a number of nuclear countries, has maintained a consistent policy of calling for the total, worldwide elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. We have done so knowing that a world free of WMD translates into a safer and prosperous world for current and future generations. Afghanistan, as a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Comprehensive Nucear-Tes- Ban Treaty, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, stands in full support of all initiatives aimed at the realization of a world free of weapons of mass destruction. In addition, Afghanistan joined the Group of Friends of resolution 1540 (2004) on 9 August and the United Nations Group of Friends on Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation and Security Governance on 23 March. Afghanistan is committed to fulfilling its international obligations and remains dedicated to achieving the aims and objectives of the international treaties and instruments to which it is a State party. In conclusion, my delegation calls upon all Member States to support international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and urges them to strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture.

I now give the floor to the representative of Turkey.

Let me begin by thanking you, Mr. President, for organizing this open debate. We also appreciate the transparent conduct of the comprehensive review process of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Turkey takes note of the report on the 2011- 2016 comprehensive review. We welcome the progress made in the implementation of the resolution. Also, we concur that full implementation is a long-term task requiring strong efforts at the international, regional and national levels. I would like to reiterate Turkey’s strong commitment to the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). To that end, we are willing to further increase our support to, and collaboration with, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and its Group of Experts. We have contributed to the work of the Committee through national implementation reports and matrices. With the same understanding, Turkey co-sponsored resolution 2325 (2016), which was adopted this morning. We are fully aware of the growing risks of the acquisition, production and use of such weapons by non-State actors, particularly in view of the scientific advances in sensitive technologies that are increasingly available through cybernetworks. Turkey has in place the necessary national legislation to fully implement its obligations under the provisions of resolution 1540 (2004) and all relevant international legal instruments, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, as well as the voluntary ad hoc mechanisms on non-proliferation, prevention of the financing of terrorism, and export controls. Turkey also collaborates closely with the Security Council Counter- Terrorism Committee, the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities and the sanctions regimes, whose work is complementary to that of the 1540 Committee. Since its adoption, resolution 1540 (2004) has been a key cross-cutting mechanism of international non-proliferation efforts. The 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts fulfil a crucial oversight and mentoring role in identifying implementation gaps and capacity requirements for Member States, providing assistance and match-making, as well as raising awareness through public outreach activities. Growing proliferation concerns and the scale and trends of global commerce place unprecedented responsibilities on Member States. Therefore, we welcome the Committee’s recommendations aiming at better assistance to Member States, particularly in areas such as export and trans-shipment controls. Yet the recommendations pertaining to enforcement of prohibitions, national control lists and other possible measures should be considered in their proper contexts, especially in the light of the Committee’s recommendation for reducing unnecessary compliance burdens. In every part of the world, transit trade and transshipments are usually the most susceptible links in the chain of export control, in terms of diversion. Turkey prioritizes adopting applicable methods to reinforce transit controls in order to strengthen export controls. Needless to say, it would be unfair to levy the whole burden of controlling goods on transit countries alone. More effective and equitable burden-sharing is needed. We therefore reaffirm the importance of strengthening controls at the origin. The use of chemical weapons in our region constitutes a particular source of concern for Turkey. As a country that has never had any intention to pursue a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme, Turkey firmly opposes the development, production, stockpiling and use of such weapons by State or non-State actors alike. Following the sarin gas attacks in eastern Ghouta in Syria in August 2013, the Security Council adopted resolution 2118 (2013) to eliminate the Syrian regime’s chemical weapons programme. As the gaps, discrepancies and inconsistencies in the regime’s declarations and relevant submissions on its chemical stockpiles remain unresolved, its non-declared WMD capabilities and the use of non-listed chemical agents for chemical attacks continue to be a serious source of concern. Furthermore, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, in its third and fourth reports, established the liability of the Syrian armed forces in three cases that have been under investigation. The Mechanism’s findings confirmed that the Syrian regime has not fulfilled its obligations and continued to use chemical weapons after the adoption of resolution 2118 (2013). The Mechanism also found Da’esh responsible for the chemical weapons attacks in Mare’a in 2015. The use of chemical weapons is a crime against humanity and a war crime. As such, we cannot allow that to become the new normal. That is why there needs to be accountability and prosecution. Before I conclude, I wish to reiterate our call upon the Security Council to take measures in accordance with its resolutions 2118 (2013), 2209 (2015) and 2235 (2015).

I now give the floor to the representative of the United Arab Emirates.

The United Arab Emirates is grateful for Spain’s leadership on this critically important security issue. The United Arab Emirates thanks the briefers for their insight on the evolving challenges in and the opportunities for strengthening global non-proliferation efforts. Previous speakers have highlighted the alarming links between terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and cybersecurity. As a member of the Group of Friends of resolution 1540 (2004) and a sponsor of resolution 2325 (2016), we welcome all efforts to improve implementation, such as increasing cooperation, assistance and transparency, as well as outreach mechanisms. We affirm our full commitment to that core international security instrument and welcome Spain’s efforts in organizing this open debate. At the national level, the United Arab Emirates has enacted robust legislation to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the illicit use of related materials, in implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Ultimately, however, as we all know the only conclusive strategy for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors, including terrorists, is to eliminate these weapons entirely. The next priority must be to strengthen the compliance of States with their existing disarmament and non-proliferation obligations. When those international norms to halt the development and testing of nuclear and ballistic capacities, for example, are violated, they threaten the integrity of the entire system. This is extremely dangerous, and a world without weapons of mass destruction controls is too terrifying to contemplate. This is why we must work collectively to defend and secure the entire disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. We call on States, such as North Korea, to fulfil their international legal obligations in this regard. In our own region, the United Arab Emirates reiterates the primary importance of declaring the Middle East a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass distraction. It regrets the failure to convene a conference in 2012 on this issue. Additionally, the United Arab Emirates renews its call on Israel to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is the only State in the region that has not done so. That would contribute greatly to increased stability and security in the Middle East. Despite the efforts of the international community in Syria, there is substantial evidence that chemical weapons have been used against innocent civilians with horrifying consequences. Those responsible for the use of these WMDs must be held accountable. Furthermore, despite the agreement on its nuclear programme 18 months ago, Iran’s international posture has provided cause for great concern. Although we had hoped for a new chapter, the United Arab Emirates must continue to express its concerns regarding Iranian nuclear activity and the development of its ballistic missile programme. We remain deeply alarmed by Iran’s aggressive rhetoric and blatant interference in our region. We call on Iran to ensure its full compliance with international obligations and responsibilities as a matter of urgency. Additionally, when a country directly contributes to the proliferation of conventional weapons to sanctions entities and individuals, including non-State actors, it also provides a potential pathway for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors. This is important to note in the case of Iran, a State sponsor of terrorism in our region. From Hizbullah in Lebanon and Syria, to Houthis in Yemen and terrorist groups in Iraq, this is unacceptable and has critically to destabilized our region. Concerted action must be taken to shut down the provision of support and weapons to these terrorist entities immediately. These urgent priorities compel the United Arab Emirates to conclude its participation in this debate by offering three concrete recommendations. The United Arab Emirates welcomes the existing efforts by the Security Council and calls for, first, greater pursuit of violations of and the enforcement of sanctions on the proliferation of all banned weapons, including conventional ones. These channels are a gateway for the transport of weapons of mass destruction and must be eliminated. Secondly, there must be effective verification and increased accountability for any party that deploys WMDs. Thirdly, there must be stricter compliance by all States with their responsibilities under international law, as well as consequences when these obligations are violated.

I now give the floor to the representative of Canada.

I would like to thank Spain for convening this open debate and for its efforts on the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004). Canada recognizes the grave threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons to non-State actors. For this reason, we reiterate our strong support for the full and universal implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and are pleased to co-sponsor resolution 2325 (2016) adopted today. Canada has long been a supporter of global efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related materials. We have invested more than $1.2 billion in this domain over the past decade. Moreover, we will invest $63 million in the coming year, including up to $6 million in dedicated 1540 (2004) related programming. (spoke in English) As a complement to resolution 1540 (2004), Canada is engaged in a range of efforts to reduce the threat of WMDs, including the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism in Syria, the Global Health Security Agenda, and the Nuclear Security Contact Group, among others. Additionally, Canada is leading efforts to end fissile material production, a clear and practical step towards countering WMD proliferation. Canada supports recommendations to encourage and strengthen regional and subregional implementation and assistance approaches. To this end, Canada is funding a regional 1540 (2004) implementation coordinator for the Caribbean Community and is engaged in cooperation and capacity-building in the Caribbean through the Proliferation Security Initiative. The promise and potential of resolution 1540 (2004) lie in its continual rejuvenation. We must evolve and adapt to new and emerging risks, technologies and threats. The comprehensive review has confirmed that, despite progress, full and universal implementation remains a challenge, with deficiencies in capacity, matchmaking and assistance mechanisms. In this regard, we welcome measures in today’s resolution that call for more detailed, specific assistance requests, revised tools and templates, and a strengthening of the role of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). All of these will facilitate effective assistance to States in the fulfilment of their obligations and therefore combat WMD proliferation.

I now give the floor to the representative of Jordan.

At the outset, allow me to thank you, Mr. President, for convening this important meeting and to congratulate you on the important and substantial work undertaken by Spain in the course of its membership of the Security Council and at the head of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), which has been effectively and positively reflected in the Council’s work during the past two years. I also wish to thank Deputy Secretary-General Eliasson; Mr. Kim Won-so, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs; and Mr. Bryan Finley and Mr. James Min for their briefings. The danger posed by the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by non-State actors is alarming, in particular given the work of terrorist groups throughout the world, starting with the Middle East and continuing through Africa and Europe. These groups use different means to effectively plan and implement their work. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has stated that the terrorist group Da’esh is using mustard gas in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. We must therefore examine the capacities of these terrorist groups, which kill and terrorize people in order to achieve their goals. Jordan has taken concrete steps to implement resolution 1540 (2004). We have enacted a number of national laws, enforced effective measures and developed national regulations to control and prevent chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. We have submitted three reports on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). I would like to refer to the workshop for States members of the League of Arab States on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), which was hosted in June by Jordan, with the assistance of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. The workshop included the participation of representatives of 15 Arab States, donor States, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), the Group of Experts and 11 regional and international organizations, as well as representatives of the private sector and civil society. We exchanged views, discussed practical difficulties in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and developed a road map on how to overcome them. We also discussed cooperation among Member States and regional and international organizations in strengthening national capacity- building. My delegation welcomes the report of the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004), which we hope will pave the way for the implementation of the resolution and contribute to capacity-building. We support the recommendations contained in the report, in particular with regard to the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) through focused approaches to be implemented by the Committee and by maintaining the important cooperation between the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism and the 1540 Committee in order to update information concerning the capabilities of terrorist groups and their ability to use WMDs. We emphasize the need for continued cooperation between the 1540 Committee with other relevant international organizations, in particular the International Atomic Energy Agency and INTERPOL, as well as the international initiatives on combating nuclear terrorism and the international partnership to counter the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We stress the need for States to strengthen cooperation across their own sectors, such as the industrial and parliamentary sectors, civil society and the academic sector. During its term on the Security Council as a non-permanent member, Jordan was vehement in its efforts towards calling attention to the work of the 1540 Committee in its belief of the need to facilitate its success. We emphasize the importance of the continuation of the Committee’s work and cooperating with it to achieve a world of stability, peace and love.

I now give the floor to the representative of Algeria.

At the outset, my delegation would like to express its appreciation for the convening of this important high-level open debate dedicated to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The adoption of resolution 1540 (2004) has contributed to facilitating the implementation of important measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery among non-State actors. However, we stress that its full implementation by all States is a long-term task that will require continuous efforts at national, regional and international levels. As a State party to the main treaties related to weapons of mass destruction, Algeria reaffirms its long-standing position that the only guaranty against use or the threat of the use of these weapons by non-State actors is to eliminate them once and for all. Algeria remains committed to resolution 1540 (2004) and has, in that regard, regularly submitted its national reports in accordance with its provisions. My delegation would like to emphasize the following points. First, we look forward to examining in depth the review just concluded as clearly stated in resolution 2325 (2016), which was adopted this morning, with a view towards strengthening and following up on resolution 1540 (2004). Second, we view that step as part of the architecture of disarmament in all its aspects. We firmly underline that it is our common duty to make sure that no WMD, no WMD technology and no WMD acquired through trade end up in the hands of non-State actors. It is the firm conviction of my delegation that the elimination of WMDs is the surest way to prevent the threat that they potentially pose to humankind in general, as was stated 70 years ago during the very first session of the General Assembly. Third, we truly look forward to seeing an articulated an appropriate balance between the need for the peaceful use of technologies aimed at development and socioeconomic progress and the concern to protect ourselves from their misuse by unchecked or inappropriate actors. Fourth, it is evident to us that the review should clearly indicate the right to access those technologies for peaceful purposes and define precisely what constitutes international cooperation and appropriate funding. Fifth, the African Common Defense and Security Policy of the African Union clearly defines all those objectives, lends strong support to resolution 1540 (2004) and greatly counts on international cooperation in all areas linked to combating WMDs. Moreover, the African Commission on Nuclear Energy established by the Pelindaba Treaty is today an impressive reality that should be supported. In that regard, we recall resolution 1977 (2011), and in particular paragraphs 10, 15 and 17, and we expect the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to take practical steps going forward for regional cooperation. Sixth, we understand that the actions needed in general to achieve those goals require additional and strong encouragement. However, we believe, particularly in certain cases,  — as set forth in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) — that nuclear-weapon States owe it to the world to begin fulfilling their commitment to disarmament and to allowing equal access to the peaceful use of the related technologies. In the case of the prolonged delay of that fulfilment, the relevance of the Treaty could be questioned. We do not consider those commitments to be promises on shaky ground but indisputable international legal obligations. Seventh, the path taken by the international community with regard to chemical and biological weapons should set a similar example pertaining to their nuclear counterparts and the threat that they pose. My delegation deeply regrets that we are not even at the starting blocks for the establishment of a nuclear- weapon-free zone in the Middle East, which is an issue that prevented any positive outcome of the most recent NPT Review Conference. Eighth, let me reiterate the importance of the negotiation process and multilateral mechanisms. They all have to be strengthened and respected. They remain the most appropriate frameworks, in particular the Conference on Disarmament and the General Assembly. Finally, my delegation, which is chairing the First Committee of the General Assembly at its seventy- first session, is sparing no effort towards achieving the general goals of disarmament enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. Our deep conviction continues to be that the elimination of the threat of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons must be based on the complete elimination of those same weapons to prevent the otherwise doomed fate that otherwise would lie in store for all humankind.

I now give the floor to the representative of Armenia.

Armenia expresses its appreciation to the Spanish presidency of the Security Council for initiating the present open debate and for the outstanding concept note (see S/2016/1013, annex). We also thank the Deputy Secretary-General and the other briefers for substantively enriching this debate. Armenia also welcomes the unanimous adoption of resolution 2325 (2016), which it co-sponsored. We are all witness to the growing risks of the acquisition by non-State actors, such as terrorist and other criminal groups, of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear weapons and related lethal threats to global security. Non-State actors, such as terrorist and other criminal groups, have been using globalization to their advantage in their sinister pursuit to obtain knowledge and skills in the areas of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. Several existing groups may have generated financial resources to achieve that end. While technical barriers may still prevent them from producing the related sophisticated means of delivery, nevertheless, given the deadly nature of such weapons, even crude, low-level attacks using toxic or radiological materials would have deeply disturbing fatal consequences. It is imperative to advance stronger national nuclear control and counter-proliferation capacities coupled with enhanced international cooperation to resolutely and effectively address threats posed by non-State actors, such as terrorist and other criminal groups. Armenia attaches great importance to reinforcing nuclear security both at the national and international level through the ratification and implementation of international legal instruments, as well as the establishment of robust national legislation. It is noteworthy that, in 2015, we adopted amendments to the respective Government decrees on the approval of the licensing procedure for the import and export of radioactive materials, the rules for the physical protection for radioactive materials and the concept of the physical protection and security of the Armenian nuclear power plant and nuclear materials. Those measures are aimed at complementing the implementation of the provisions of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment. Armenia has fully implements its international obligations under resolution 1540 (2004). The national action plan of Armenia for the period 2015-2020 outlines a series of concrete steps, ranging from reviewing national measures that have already been implemented to the coordination of ongoing and anticipated activities. We are also active in counter- proliferation initiatives, such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative. The Government of Armenia is continuously working with its international partners at bilateral and multilateral levels to further enhance its national capabilities in countering nuclear smuggling. In managing and addressing risks of the acquisition and the use of radiological, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons by non-State actors, such as terrorists and other criminal groups, it is of vital importance to acknowledge their dynamic, non- static nature. Rapid technological progress may work to the advantage of those pursuing sinister goals, while national and international actors should take every effort against acting slowly on the uptake in policymaking and respective legal and practical risk resistance measures against proliferation. Such concerns require further study as part of the threat assessment on radiological, biological, radiological and nuclear materials. All efforts at national and international levels to address such threats should take these realities into consideration.

I now give the floor to the representative of Belarus.

The non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a priority for Belarus in the area of international security. Adopted more than a decade ago, resolution 1540 (2004) is more needed than ever as a mechanism for ensuring and strengthening international security. We believe that, above all, the best way at the national level to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) involves an effective mechanism for counteracting the illegal trade in WMDs and related materials. Belarus pursues a consistent and responsible policy in this area and is party to all major international agreements on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We became the first State to voluntarily renounce the possession of the nuclear weapons inherited after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1996, exactly 20 years ago, we completed the full removal of nuclear weapons from the territory of Belarus. Belarus remains committed to resolution 1540 (2004). In 2012, Belarus, in close cooperation with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and the Office for Disarmament Affairs, adopted a road map for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) at the national level. Special attention was paid to export control, as well as to the control of biological materials. A number of measures enshrined in the road map have already been incorporated in our national legislation. For example, Belarus has in place a multilayer system of export controls that allow us to efficiently counteract the spread of WMDs and related materials. When developing that instrument, we took into account best practices in the nuclear sphere. In 2016, we adopted a new edition of our laws on export control, a well as a new edition of our laws on the sanitary epidemiological welfare of our population. This document includes, inter alia, improved rules on the storage, transport and procedures regarding pathogenic microorganisms that fall into risk groups 1 to 4 of the World Health Organization. Belarus is open to active cooperation with States in the region of Eurasia on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). A prime example of that cooperation was the trilateral meeting for a peer review between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan supported by Belarus, on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), which was held in the 2+1 format in Minsk in 2016. That review was the second event of its kind in the OSCE region — in the whole world, for that matter  — and the first meeting to be held in a trilateral format. We intend to continue provide assistance to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and other States in the implementation of such a vitally important international tool, namely, resolution 1540 (2004). We are planning to hold another seminar for members of the Commonwealth of Independent States on the implementation of this resolution. The first such seminar was held in 2013 in Minsk. It produced informal recommendations on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).

I now give the floor to the representative of the Democratic People’s Republic fo Korea

At the outset, let me join previous speakers in expressing my gratitude for the successful efforts made by the Spanish presidency in convening this meeting. First of all, I strongly and totally reject the remarks made by some delegations — including Japan France and South Korea — who have picked up the issue of self-defence and nuclear deterrence of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, an act of encroachment upon the sovereignty of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. As far as I know, the main agenda of this meeting is stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors. Notwithstanding the disregard of that agenda, some delegations have picked up the issue of the nuclear and ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea once more. It does nothing but show the sinister political aims to increase the pressure against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in this forum. The issue of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula is the product of hostile policies of the United States towards the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. As we have stated previously, if the United States had not been hostile to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and threatened our country with its nuclear weapons, then the issue of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula would not exist. Additionally, the Korean peninsula would not have turned into a global hotspot. The nuclear threat and blackmail of the largest nuclear Power against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is reaching an extreme juncture. Joint military exercises by the United States and South Korea took place recently in the southern half of the Korean peninsula, simulating a real war with the participation of hundreds of thousands of armed forces, including special forces an strategic nuclear assets, aimed at decapitating the leadership of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and occupying Pyongyang, as well as introducing nuclear strategic bombers to Guam in the wake of the official decision on the development and deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense anti-missile system in South Korea and after bringing them into the Korean peninsula and its vicinity. With strategic assests that include nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, the United States is driving the situation on the Korean peninsula towards an extremely explosive situation. It is the consistent stance of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to fundamentally remove the danger of nuclear war posed by the United States by relying on its own powerful nuclear deterrence and defending regional and global peace and security. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea possesses nuclear deterrence as a self-defence measure to protect its State and social system in the face of the constant nuclear threat that emanates from the United States. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will hold steadfast in its strategy of bolstering up its own nuclear forces. Finally, as a responsible nuclear-armed State, and as we have already declared, our Republic will not use nuclear weapons first, unless the forces of aggression that are hostile towards us violate our sovereignty with their own nuclear weapons. We will faithfully observe our commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which we made before the international community. We will continue to strive for global denuclearization.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

I wish to join other speakers in thanking the Spanish presidency for organizing this debate. At this meeting, the representative of the Israeli regime once again levelled unfounded allegations against Iran that we categorically reject. We believe that this was another futile attempt to deflect attention from the threat posed by the Israeli regime, which is the embodiment of the nexus between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. First of all, we believe that the Israeli statement was the output of a dangerous, paranoid, deperate and wandering mind that is not even cognizant of what this Security Council debate is all about. That latter point is also applicable to the statement made by the representative of the United Arab Emirates. Unlike the Israeli regime, Iran has categorically rejected the development, stockpiling and use of weapons of mass destruction and is a committed party to all international instruments banning such weapons. Therefore, Iran’s interest in and commitment to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are unequivocal. Unlike the Israeli regime, Iran has supported regional and international efforts to achieve the universality of the international treaties banning weapons of mass destruction. As is well known, in 1974 Iran proposed the establishment of a nuclear- weapon-free zone in the Middle East. It was strongly supported by the international community and numerous resolutions and decisions were subsequently adopted by the General Assembly and review conferences of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) towards its realization. But the Israeli regime, which is not a party to any international treaty banning weapons of mass destruction, is the only obstacle in the way of the establishment of the zone and continues to block all international and regional efforts to fulfil that goal. Council members may all recall that the 2015 NPT Review Conference was unfortunately unable to adopt a final document, mainly due to an external factor — the pressure of a non-party to the NPT, the Israeli regime, on certain States parties that ultimately objected to the adoption of a final document. That happened because the final document contained a decision on a nuclear- weapon-free zone in the Middle East. As a victim of terrorism and the use chemical weapons, Iran is fully cognizant of the catastrophic dangers that transfers of such weapons to terrorists could entail. We are deeply concerned about the relationship between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. That is why we emphasize that the international community must join hands in eliminating that risk by compelling the Israel regime to accede, as a non-nuclear-weapon party and without any condition or further delay, to the NPT and other major treaties banning weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the hands of the Israeli regime — which is born out of terrorism and maintained by committing terrorist acts, occupation, aggression and genocide  — pose the most dangerous threat to regional and international security and the viability of the international NPT regime. I would also like to react very briefly to the statement made by the representative of the United Arab Emirates. First of all, the accusations of the Emirates representative are absurd, hypocritical and farcical for the following reasons. First, while they are busy accusing Iran of interfering in the domestic affairs of other countries, the jet fighters of the United Arab Emirates are busy bombing innocent civilians in Yemen and the civilian infrastructure of that impoverished country. Such inhumane acts amount to war crimes. Secondly, the United Arab Emirates and other partners have exported a host of extremist takfiri ideologies for decades, and continue to do so, and are funding and arming terrorists in Iraq, Syria and many other places. The similarity between the statements made by the representative of the United Arab Emirates and some of its partners, on the one hand, and that delivered by the Israeli representative, on the other, is not a pure coincidence. It is a sign of the growing coordination and cooperation against Iran and the Palestinian people. It is not a pure coincidence that the United Arab Emirates is increasingly silent on the Israeli crimes in Palestine  — a silence that could be tantamount to betraying the Palestinian cause. Finally, we know that the United Arab Emirates and some its partners in the Persian Gulf region are depressed over the nuclear deal that put an end to the fabricated crisis. We also know how hard they attempted to impede the road to that deal, to no avail. What the United Arab Emirates officials are doing and saying is the expression of their frustration over the fruition of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. They in fact tried to escalate their provocations against Iran in order to neutralize the detente that the deal brought about in the region.

I give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.

The delegation of the Syrian Arab Republic fully supports the international trend towards building an international community free from the use or threat of use force, under the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and based on stability, peace and equality. We reaffirm our readiness to participate in any genuine, serious international effort of good will to achieve that objective, particularly with regard to preventing terrorists from possessing chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials. Based on its conviction that the use of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, is unethical and to be rejected and condemned; on its firm support for efforts to declare the Middle East a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction, first and foremost nuclear weapons; and its desire to prove to the world at large that it is committed to standing up against any use of chemical weapons, the Syrian Arab Republic has acceded to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. In 2003, when we were a non-permanent member of the Security Council, we sponsored a draft resolution declaring the Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. However, all our efforts at the time were met by the threat of a United States veto. Ever since it acceded to membership of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Syrian Arab Republic has been committed to all accession requirements and all resolutions of the OPCW Executive Council. We have met all our obligations, often prior to their deadlines. We have cooperated in all the joint work affiliated with the OPCW and the United Nations, as has been commended repeatedly by both organizations and public opinion worldwide. Some countries have sought today to fish in troubled waters by referring to the two reports of the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM). We would like to raise a question in that regard: Have those delegations paid sufficient attention and thoroughly read and analysed both reports, or did they simply skip to the pages of conclusions in order to serve their politicization of this file and attempts to use it in the context of their exploitation of the United Nations to attack the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. As we have previously reaffirmed — and here we wish to address those delegations that heed only their own biased views and narrow minds — my country has extensive comments on the structural gaps in the JIM reports, which we have submitted to the Security Council in two formal documents. Among those comments, to name only a few, is the fact that neither report presents any real evidence that chemical weapons were actually used in the incidents in which my country was referred to. My country calls upon the Security Council to shoulder its responsibility to prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of the armed terrorist groups in Syria, which have in many incidents used toxic chemical materials against civilians as well as the army of the Syrian Arab Republic. Those toxic materials had been infiltrated into Syria through the borders of neighbouring countries, particularly Turkey. We have informed the Security Council and its specialized committees about those and other incidents on many occasions. However, no real measures have been taken against those countries that have actually been party to transporting such toxic materials to the armed terrorist groups.