S/PV.937 Security Council

Itwaswithprofound shock and indignation that we learned on Monday of the assassination of the Prime Ministerofthe Republic of the Congo. Mr. Patrice Lumumba. the President of the Senate. Mr. Okito. and the Minister for Youth. Mr. Mpolo. The truth. which w. have suspected for a number of days, came into the open: an atrocious crime had been committed by the colonialists and their agents, and a powerful wave of indignation swept throughout the world. Voices of protest .and calls for justice are heard in all countries. The Go\"'ernment and the people of Poland condemn in most emphatic terms the murder of the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo and of two other leaders of the country. We offer our deepest sympathy and most sincere condolences to the people of the Congo and to the families of the assassinated leaders. a. The death of the Congolese leaders, tragic in itself. brings again into full light the tragedy of the Congolese nation. There are at present only two real forces in the Cpngo. first, the Congolese people and their national leaders. and second. the colonialists together with those who are ready .to serve their interests. These forces are clashing in amostpowerfuI conflict and no one cancalIthat conflict an internaI one. constitutional or otherwise, for it is the yearsold struggle of the Congolese people for freedom and national liberation from colonial oppression in whatever form it is being imposed upon them. . 3. Since July 1960 this struggle has entered into a new phase. The invasionoftlte Congo byBelgian troops that took place then was evidentlyaimed at overthrowing the true, independent Central Govel'nment and installing obedient and subservient régimes in a disintegrated country. But it soon beca..'lle obvious that a direct m1litary intervention might rally anti-colonial forces aIl over the world behind'the Congolese people and their Government, and that the strugglewiththese forces would have dangerous consequences for the aggressors. Therefore. instead of continuing direct m1litary action. the colonialists embarked on intervention from within the Congo. 4. What followed is weIl known. Katanga has beentorn off from the rest of the country and turned into a Belgian military stronghold. Renegadès and traitors like Tshombé.. Kasa-Vubu andMobutuarecontinuously supplied with arms. money and transportation. Thou- 6. How can anybody still claim that what is going on in the Congo has the character of an internaI conflict between political parties and personalities? This is a most ruthless struggle which is going onthere against the Congolese, a struggle which is organized, armed and financed by foreign colonial intel'ests. 7. The Polish delegation did not take the floor at the beginning of this debate, which started two weeks ago. We were familiar then with the efforts of some delegations to work out measures for the Cauncil's approval andwe were preparedto give our modest assistance in those endeavours which could bringpositive results both in the voting in the Council and in subsequent Implementation in the Congo. This attitude guided us also when, serving as a member of the Council, we oast our vote for the three resolutions approved last summer. The same attitudepromptedus lastDecember to propose, in the closing hours of the long debate in the Council, a compromise draft resolution CS/4598] which, li it had been approved, would have given freedom to all political leaders in the Congo and thus would have prevented the murder recently committed. Those who voted against it must now face,first of all, their own sense of responsibility and their own oonscience. 8. The latest offensive of the colonialists and their agents against the Congolese people calls for reappraisal of the whole situation in the Congo. 9. The Government of Belgium has already violated each and every one of the resolutions approved by the Seourity Council and by the GeneralAssembly. Therefore, more decisive and Immediate measures are necessary. That is why my Government fullysupports the statement of the Government of the Unionof Soviet Socialist Republics [Si4704] asking that the sanctions provided by the Charter of the United Nations be applied to Belgium as anaggressorwhich, byits actions, is creating threats to international peace. The Belgian troops and other personnel in the Congo should be immediately disarmed and speedily removedfrom that country. 10. Everybody is, 1 think, convinced now that there can be no peaceful solution for the situation in the Congo so long as the Belgians stay there. If they did stay, the strugglefor nationalliberationwould continue and would eventually be victorious, but ifaIl the members of theSecurity Council reaIly have the wellbeing of the Congolese at heart-as so many of them 11. l think it is equaUy obvious to aU that once. Belgian support for Kasa-Vubu, Tshombé, Mobutu, Kalonji and others were eut off, their days as political or military figures would be numbered. But here too the present situation caUs Îor more immediate measures, since the military bands under their command are moving to commit the crime of genocide against the people of the Congo. These bands should also be disarmed immediately. 12. These measures could and should have been implemented a long time ago. The resolutions approved last summer by the Security Council gave the Secretary-General a sufficient mandate for that. But it is true that the Secretary-General chose notto implement it and to refuse to give the assistance requested by the Central Government of the Congo. During lengthy debates on this matter at aU previous meetings of the Security Council, including the meeting of yesterday afternoon [935th meeting], and in the General Assembly, we have heard from him that the main principle of the policy which guides the so-calledUnited Nations operation in the Congo is neutrality and non-interference in internaI conflicts. But are the things which are taking place in the Congo internaI conflicts? If 80, why was the United Nations Force there at all? And a fundamental question to be answered is, how can one remain neutral in the face of a struggle between the colonialists and the Congolese people? No one cano And, indeed, the Secretary-Gener81 did not stay neutral either. The disastrous results ofhis policy are evident now in the Congo. 13. Recent events in the Congo, and in particular the assassination of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and his associates, have thrown a new light on the l'ole played in the tragedy of the Congolese people by Ml'. Dag Hammarskjold as the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Ignoring the decisions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly which provided clearly for rendering assistance to the only legal Government of the Republic of the Congo in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of that country, Ml'. Hammarskjold, aEl the Secretary-General of the United Nations, shielding himself with alleged neutrality, in fact favoured and helped the forces acting in the Congo on behalf of its former colonial rulers. This policy has led to the dismemberment and disorganization of the Congolese State. The policy adopted by Ml'. Hammarskjold has caused, allover the territory of the Corigo,lawlessness, chaos and violence culminating in the imprisonment, inhuman treatment and finaUy in the atrociouB murder of the great patriots and leaders of the Congolese nation. Events show unambiguously the cO'-responsibility of Ml'. Hammarskjold,as SecretarY"General, for the tragic events in the Congo. 14. In these circumstances, the Government of the polish P~ople's Republic is of the opinionthat the high office of Secretary-General can no longer be occupied by Ml'. Hammarskjold, since the stand b,e has taken 18. There is a deep sense of urgency feIt by all who want to serve the Congolese people. There is no time now for postponements, for long and meticulous analyses, for the problem of the Congo is a burning problem. To help the Congolese people is important, not only for their sake but in the interest of all other nations as weIl. Events there have wide repercussions in the whole of Africa, and the policies of the colonialists endanger international peace and security while at the same time making it more difficult to approach other controversial problems which require our attention. 19. Permit me to quote from the statement of the representative of the United States, made yesterday in the Council. These are Mr. Stevenson's exact words: "... we also declare that 'Africa for the Africans' means 'Africa for the Africans' and not Africa as a hunting ground for alien ambitions. We pledge our full and unstinted support against any attempt by anyone to interlere with the full and free development by Africans of their own Independent African future." [934th meeting, para. 38.] 20. These are important words. We should like to believe that they might forecast the policy of really assisting the people of the Congo and of the whole of Africa, from the Atlantic to the Red Sea, and from the Mediterraneanto the Cape of Good Hope, in freeing themselves from all forms ofcolonialism. Let us start 21. 1 want to thank you, Mr. President, and through you the members of the COWlcil, for permitting me to participate in this debate in the COWlciL

1 am grateful for this ùpportWlity of making the voice of the Republic of the Upper Volta heard in this important debate. My Governmellt believes that the question of the Congo should be retained on the agenda of the General Assembly. Everything that is to be said on this question should be heard by an the Members of the United Nations. 23. The problemhas become more serious. The situation in the Congo has deteriorated andwithit the situation of the United Nations in the world. It seems that the 8ecurity COWlcil is further away than ever from finding the point of agreement that will mark the beginning of a salutary solution for the Congo and for world peace. 24. The assassination of Patrice Lumumba and hiG companions is not an event likely to temper passions. Those who perpetrated the crime as weIl as those who aided and abetted it mt',de a serious miscalculation, and it is good that this should be said to the members of the 8ecurity COWlciL 25. The telegram which was sent to the 8ecretary- General by the President of the Republic of the Upper Volta, Mr. MauriceYaméogo [8/4697] isa true expression of the deep consternation andhorrüied indignation of the entire population of the Upper Volta at Mr. Lumumba's fate. President Yaméogo stated in particular: "We see in it a warning to aIl African States fighting for their independencell • 26. We wish the 8ecurity COWlcil to know that not even the wave of indignation and protest spreading throughout the world at this moment at the news of this hateful crime, and felt even in this COWlcil, can ever give the exact measure ofthe profoWld repercussions which this violation of African dignity by the forces of imperialism and colonialism, in league against our liberty, will have in the African States. 27. The Upper Volta has for its part taken note of this warning, which it regards as a proof that it acted wisely in accepting its Wlconditional independence in time. It also regards this warning as a proof that it is completely in the right in defending and strengthening this independence by rejecting any relationship of vassal to lord or any participation in a group whose members would not be given complete freedom to take the African road. 28. At the same time the Upper Volta deplores the weakness of the United Nations, whichhas beenWlable, in spite of the clear precepts of the Charter, to safeguard the independence and security of small nations wishing to throw off the yoke of an oppressor.What COWlt.ry in future will appeal for help to the United Nations if to do so means that six months later its patriots will be massacred before the eyes of the United Nations forces by the very people againstwhom assistance was sought? "Unfortunately, the rival blocs have tried, andare still trying, to recolonize the Congo (Leopoldville) either directly or indirectly through certainAÏrican and Asian States. The undersignedAfrican States and Madagascar denounce, before the conscience of the world, tills new forro of colonialism." 30. Those who are brazen enough to interpret texts tendentiously have naturally interpretedthis one to suit their purposes and have taken it to be a unilateral condemnation of the East and of the African-Asian countries. My country was, however, one of the sponsors of the text in question, and it may help to lift the veil of modesty thrown over the purityof the West if we state that the Congo was neither a Russian nor a Polish colony. Africa shaH not he used as a pretext for hypocrisy directed against its own interests. Africa ~s~w~~~~q~~~~E~m~~ West because that would not improve the chances of peace. There must be a United Nations with the small Powers acting as its conscience. This seems to be the only way to ensure the equilibrium and peace of the world. 31. When the Western Powers declare that the prestige of the United Nations must be protected, we may ask them qn whose support Katanga relies in repulsing all United Nations attempts at conciliation. It is all very weIl to say in a speech that the territorial integrity of the Congo is essential, but how much better it would be to take from Tshombé the right to wint money! 32. ls it conceivable that the world should gaze upon the horrible spectre of the murder of Lumumba and his friends while information is withheld on the circumstances of this drama whichhas aroused universal indignation? To what kindofapasshavewe come if, as we learn, the murderers were rewarded with 40,000 Belgian francs paid in <'ash, and the identity of these heroes will not be disclosed? 33. These are some of the mysteries which baffle and perturb African patriots. The Upper Volta will, however, keep its disappointment and indignation in check, since it is continuously aware that it is in the United Nations to help to construct. The danger which threatens the United Nations is the (janger which threatens the world. We do not support the Soviet Union in taking action which will bring down the whole edifice, however insecure its structure may appear. What we say to the Western Powers, however, is that not having the same reasons as the Soviet Union they bear an even greater share of guilt. 34. Why should the Belgians be allowed to counteract the goodwill efforts of the Secretary-General? If the United Nations is in danger in the Congo, it is the Western Powers which are responsible, sincetheyare covering up for Belgh(!, their ally, which does not wish the Congo to bf . ,dependellt. One cannot, for instance, decently assert that one wishes to have peace in the Congo and to safeguard the prestige of the United Nations if, under the pretext of respecting jndividual liberty, the mostreactionaryofits citizens are allowed 35. It is useless to denounce to right and left the dangers of war. Africa has nothing to lose materially; it has only its honour, whichitwillnever lose and will never besmirch. 36. That is why in this explosive century Africa has produced Lumumbas and patriots capable, despite the weakness of their position, oftellingthosewho possess bombs and rockets that their own country desires independence and that it intends to take it and to strengthen it.

The Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) has requested that it too he allowed to speakin this debate in the Security Council on the general situation in the former Belgian Congo not solely because we are a neighbour of that sister country nor because of the traditional bonds that unite us, but above all for the following reasons. 38. To begin with, the worldhaswatchedwithinterest the deliberations ofthe recent Brazzaville Conference, where the Heads of State ofMadagascar and the principal French-speaking African countries were gathered, and in the course of which the question of the former Belgian Congo was examined and li. judicious policy was adopted. We should therefore like to recall the solution which was put forward and recommended in the light of that examination. 39. Secondly, as a Member of the United Nations, my country wishes to take this opportunityto state clearly where it stands in the face of the intrigues which certain countries seem bent on pursuing in connexion with the Congo question, for we feel that in fuis competition, intentionally provoked by neo-conquerors, our place is no longer on the side-lines and that we must define our position boldly and unequivocally. 40. Thirdly, a clear and precise clarification is demanded of ur.. in connexion with certain references that have been made here to unfounded accusations against my country and especially against its President, Abbé Fulbert Youlou. Not havingbeentrnined inthe school of lies and slander, we shall speak frankly and candidly, without acrimony, leaving it to those who wish to do so to deny anything that we say by producing c.lear and irrefutable evidence. As for ourselves, wé prefer that the efforts and energies of all nations that want peace and freedom should be co-ordinated with the object of seeking a common solution to the Congolese problem-a solution which we would like to be reason,.. able, dispassionate and just. Itisnotbydint of insults, discourteous remarks or hostile attacks that any of us will succeed in restoring peace to the former Belgian Congo. 41. As for those countries whose object is to incite hatred and dissension, but whose overriding aim is weIl known to us-and here we mean the Soviet Union 43. On 19 December 1960, speaking in the General AssemblyY during the debate on the former Belgian Congo, l took occasion to calI upon the Assembly to reject in its entirety the draft resolution sponsoredby a number of countries whose contingentswere serving with the United Nations Force in the Congo, because it was my feeling that what was involved there was a purely African and essentially Congolese matter, and that the parties principally concerned should be left free to act and should be given the necessary time to reach an amieable solution to a problem which in the first place is their own concern. l also urged upon the Assembly to have confidence in the Heads of State who met at Brazzaville from 15 to 19 December in an effort to facilitate a reconciliation in the Congo. 44. Indeed, at the very moment when the General Assembly was debating the Congo question in December, President FulbertYoulou, recommendingthe mast judicious attitude that Africa could adopt towards the former Belgian Congo, declared before his colleagues gathered together at Brazzaville as follows: "Our conference must not be simply a gatheringof African Heads of State, but itmust aimat drawing up a charter and defining the basis for acommon African policy. "That is why the problem of the former Belgian Congo is an appropriate topic for discussion here. The Congolese crisis, which after aIl was a local crisis-a government crisis or, at most, a clash of personalities-is tending todayto become anobstacle to our unitY and, what is more, is serving as a spring-board for certain international intrigues which may weIl bring on a world confIict. l therefore calI upon you to take vigorous measures before it is too late. "Certain persons, unwittingly perhaps, are the principal cause of this situi:>.tiÛll. Theirpolicyis'such that we are led to fear the worst." 45. Such were the sagacious remarks of President Fulbert Youlou, who. in the first place, is not at aIl anxious to see a country situated immediatelyopposite hisown go up in flames. Moreover. in his eagerness to throw some light on the overcast atmosphere of the forIner Belgian Congo, he made thefollowingremarks to the Heads of State gathered at Brazzaville; "1 do not wish to enlarge upon the origins and causes of these disturbed conditions, ofwhicheveryone, l think, must be aware, but our dutY now is to put a stop to the Congolese tragedy. "You will surelyagreewithmethatcertainpersons have, as the result of recent events, become a common denominator of this crisis. They are guilty, but have we for that reason the right to pass judgement on them without giving them a hearing?" 47. When President FulbèrtYoulouspokethosewords at Brazzaville, there were present there not only the Heads of State who are familiar to you but also the Head of state of the Congo (Leopoldville) and a number of other Congolèse leaders ofvarious politicaltendencies. Although, for reasons which it is not necessary for us to go into, some leaders were prevented from attending that Conference, theirabsenceinnowayprevented the attendance of their respective politicalparties, which were represented on that occasion by persons no less distinguished. 48. It did not behove President Senghor, President Houphouët-Boigny, President Dacko or the Heads of State of Mauritania, Gabon or Chad, orthose of Cameroun, the Niger, the Upper Volta, Dahomey and Madagascar, to exert pressureonMr.Kasa-Vubutorelease one political leader or another who had been arrested for serious criminal offences. As far as my country is concerned, we have not yet become accustomed to interfering in the domestic affairs of an independent and sovereign state. 49. The Brazzaville Conference played its role-a disinterested and dispassionate role. Those takingpart in it carefully refrained from siding with one or other of the politicai factions in the Congo. They were content simply to show respect for law and justice, while advising all parties to combine their efforts and strive to the utmost in seeking a solutionto the crisis. That was the frame of mind which guided the actions of the Heads of state who met at Brazzaville. 50. Their principal aimwas to persuade allthe Congolese leaders, the leaders ofallpolitical tendencies and of all ethnic groups, that they must first of all meet together to seek a common gro11lldfor a solution. without which the safety and territorial integrity of the Congo would be gravely jeopardized. 51. The men of the Brazzaville Conference did their dutY worthily, never once giving the impression that they were interfering in the domestic affairs of the Congo. None here:::an question that; no one here can say that only those Congolese leaders enjoying the esteem and sympathyofPresident Fulbert Youlouwere invited. 52. In this matter mydelegation stands readyto listen to any rebuttal. We were not trained in the school of lies and' hatred, and that is why the Heads of State meeting at BrazzaYille, being alarmedatthedistressing situation in the former Belgian Congo and pitying the misfortunes suffered by so many of theë:::ongolese people, decided to unite their efforts to enlightenworld public opinion on the realities of the situation in that country. The objective analysis of that situation made at the Brazzaville Conference resulted in thefollowing declaration concerning the Congolese problem: "The undersigned African states and Madagascar welcome the efforts made by the United Nations to save the Congo (Leopoldville) from chaos and anarchy. They address their congratulations to Mr. Hammarskjold, Secretary-General ofthe United Nations, who, acting in the spirit ofthe Charter, has "The genuine independence of the Congo (Leopoldville) no doubt requires that the United Nations sMuld continue to provide it with technical assistance but it also requires that the United Nations should not seek to supplant the Congolese authorities: above all, it requires that no State shouldintervene, throughits soldiers or its diplomats, in the domestic affairs of the Congo (Leopoldville). liA political solution of the Congoproblemcanonly te found through a round-table conference bringing together the representatives of all parties without exception. If this democratic principle is not observed, there will be nothing but racialism and the cold war." 53. Those are the ideas which we put forward at Brazzaville for rebuilding a genuine and fraternal peace in the former Belgian Congo. Do you find there any hidden signs of hatred? Do you find any attempt to set the Congolese one against the other? Do you see some subtle political manœuvre designed to foster an ideological or other form of recolonizationoftheCongolese people? We did not. ofcourse, want to make our stand the object of a noisy and misleading publicity campaign, simply because, as l have said, wewere not trained in the school of lies, slander, hatred and lust for conquest; because, contrary to the ravings of c'ertain countries which have a big stake inthe former Belgian Congo, the decisions we took were entirely our own: because we are motivated by a sincere desire to help our Congolese brothers, through our advice, to become fully aware of the heavy responsibilities that lie upon them; and above all, because, being unable to tolerate the trampling underfoot ofgenuine democratic principles, we refuse to concern ourselves with the domestic affairs of that country in the belief that the Congolese authorities are alone qualifiedforthattask. 54. Immediately after the Brazzaville Conference, we learned that other African Heads ofStatewerehastening to organize another conference somewhere else in Africa. The purpose ofthis hastily convenedconference was again the former Belgian Congo, butletus look at the solutions put forward there for ending the crisis. They may be summed up as follows: unabashed interference in the domestic affairs of the Congo. And who were the Congolese invited to that conference?Just one group of people. In what atmosphere did the deliberations take place? In one where words were bandied about whose sound was far from conducive to bringing together men of good will. 55. When the proceedings of that mock conference were concluded, what a noise of tomtoms and other racket filled the air! Powerful radio transmitters vied with each other in an effort to convince public opinion of the validity and seriousness ofthe decisions adopted at that conference. A whole machinery for the distor- 56. Then, suddenly, there was the convening of the Security Council, not because a certain aircraft had landed with a substantial cargo of arms and munitions at Gemena, in Equator province of the former Belgian Congo, but simply because a meeting of the Security Council was regarded as necessary. The background of this affair is a secret for no one. 57. There is in this whole business one thing which disturbs my delegation. There is ever more and more talk about an additional draft resolution which would provide in essence for the neutralization oftheArmée nationale congolaise with a view to its being reorgantzed, while security and order in the Congo would be placed entirely in the hands of the United Nations, which would control aIl forces without exception. The possibility of coercion against certain groups that might refuse to accept the setting up of such a control is not ruled out. TheformationofaCongolese Government on as broad a basis as possible within a short time is also contemplated. The United Nations would take a more active part in the administration of the Congo. and so on. 58. Surely you will agree with us that this cannot be taken seriously. Assuming thatthis draft resolution is, in fact, submitted, do you not foresee the danger that this will mean for Africa? The result will be to sanction the division of Africa into two blocs, and that might bring other very -serious consequences in its wake. 59. 1.'1 its communiqué, the Brazzaville Conference asked that the United Nations should continuE: to provide the Congo with technical assistance, and it condemned any intervention, direct or otherwise, by any State in the domestic affairs of the Congo. 60. The promoters of the projected draft resolution to which l have just referred wish to bring about the neutralizatj.on, as they call it, of the Armée nationale congolaise, which means in other words to disarmthe soldiers of an army belonging to afree, sovereign and independent State which, in addition, is a Member of the United Nations. This would be a grave precedent to set. In other words, the promoters of this draft resolution clearly wish to foist United Nations intervention on the independent Congo. 61. This means that United Nations soldiers will some day shoot at Congolese on the pretext that they are composed of rebellious elements, or else by invoking the right of self-defence. 62. As to the formation of a Congolese Government on a broad basis, we are not sure whether that is a matter which concerns the impulsive promotersofthis draft resolution. 63. Then, to speak of entrusting the administration of the Congo to the United Nations, isthatnot tantamount to placing the Congo under United Nations trusteeship for an indefinite period when aIl ofushere are agreed that the country must he decolonized? 64. The Congolese tragedy has been due mainly to various ethnic and political factors. This must be 66. Was the travesty of a conference which was held elsewhere after that of Brazzaville aimed atforestalling the efforts of the Congolese to arrive at an understanding with each other? Does the United Nations wish to lend itself to this game so as to encourage the continuance of the Congolese crisis, which would then run the danger of eventually boiling over? -My delegation refuses, in advance, to countenance such a conception of things, because it is utopian, chimerical and dangerous. 67. The behaviour ofcertainHeads ofstatehas a great impact and in..fluence on the relations betweenpeoples. It is suificient for one Head of State to attack another Head of State for the relations betweentheir respective countries to deteriorate instead of remaining friendIy and cordial. President Fulbert Youlou has never addressed insulting remarks to anyone. We are a small country which seeks the friendship of other countries, and it is obvious that insults and slanders are not the most effective way of enlisting friendship. 68. In the territory of my country, there are communities of people drawn from many differentparts of the world. At Brazzaville as weIl as in other towns, there are Senegalese, Sudanese (who now calI themselves Malians)" Dahomans, Ghanaians and so forth. Among them are some who have been settled there since the beginning of the century, and who have sunk their roots in our soil. Among the younger Congolese generation, it is not unusual to find some whose fathers are Malian, Congolese or Senegalese and whose mothers are Congolese, or vice versa. None of them feel any uneasiness on this account. Infact, at Brazzaville certain political posts are opento non-Congolese, and the same is true at Pointe-Noire. There is even a Malian in the municipal council of Brazzaville. This situation is rare in some countries. This tolerant attitude has been accepted by the Congolese themselves, who thereby hope to set the example of that African unitY about which some people here talk, unconvincingly and only with the object ofdeceiving. The fact that we have allowed a number offoreign nationals to enter some of our local institutions does not mean that there is any shortage of capable Congolese. 69. Many Malians live in the Congo andregardthemselves as native sons of that country; they love and respect the President, Abbé Fulbert Youlou, who is _kindly disposed towards them, and they welcome him 70. For some timenow, Malihas givenus the impression of seeking quarrels all round, often over matters which do not concern it at aIl. We have observed that that country is beginning to compete zealouslywithits neighbour, Guinea, in its odd attitude, in its odd way of acting and, above aIl, in its arguments which are accompanied by a verbosity that is quite foreign to Africa. 71. We are aware that certain Malian leaders are extremely angry, but the reasonsfor their angry sentiments are not to be fOWld in the Congo (Brazzaville). President Youlou has never quarelledwith Ml'. Modibo Keita, nor with Ml'. Abdoulaye Maiga. If Mali wishes to find a good remedy fortheparticularcrisis through which it is passing, let its leaders remember that the best means of remedying a given political situation does not consist in slandering other countries or in a campaign of systematic lying. 72. On 19 January, at Bamako, President Keita made some very unpleasant remarks about my country and about its President. We were accused of complicityin the plot to liquidate the former Prime Minister of the Leopoldville Government. This attack was directed principally against President Youlou. 73. Here, at a meeting of the Security Council on 2 February [929th meeting], Ml'. Maiga, alluding to a newspaper article, tried to intenslfythe bad reputation which the President and Government of Mali are seeking to impose on my country and its President. We were said to have authorized the landing at our airport of several planes transporting arms and ammunition destined for Mobutu or Tshombé. It was even said that a hundred Belgiall. soldiers, comingfrom Brussels, had set up their headquarters at Brazzaville, and that Ml'. Spaak, Ml'. Foccart and President Youlou had come to an arrangementfor the transfer to Brazzaville of a substantial sum of money for certain purposes which may easily be imagined. 74. Such accusations need to be refuted. That sort of information, concocted to serve the interests of the cause at heart, can only have been drawnfrom tainted sources. In the first place, the idea of allowing suros of money, earmarked for gettingridofafellow Congolese, to pass through Brazzavillewould never enter the head of a great Congolese like Abbé Fulbert Youlou. It would be interesting, too, to know when, where and in what circurostances Ml'. Spaak, Ml'. Foccart and President Youlou met together in order to put this odious plan into execution. It would be especially interesting to have demonstrated here the process by which this diabolical operation was put into effect. 75. As for the numerous foreign aircraft said to have landed at Brazzaville with arms and ammunition for Mobutu's Armée nationale congolaise and Tshombé's ft gendarmerie", that piece of news was received at Brazzaville with such astonishment that we wondered whether the Mali leaders could still be in full possession of their senses. Who, it maybe asked, could ever 77. Let the representative of Mali take note that we have never, in the Congq, been the agents of a conspiracy against anyone apart from the fact that, a few years ago, we did lend considerable aid to Mr. Kasa- Vubu in his struggle against the Belgians in the Congo, that is to say, against colonialism. 78. How could President Youlou participate in a plot such as the one in which you are trying to implicate us when, every week, members of the Mouvement national congolaise-Lumumba cross over from Leopoldville to Brazzaville to discuss and arrange various matters with us? Only a week ago, Mrs. Lumumba herself was at Brazzaville. She and two other relatives of Mr. Lumumba had been staying therefor more than a month, and it was Abbé Fulbert Youlou himself who saw to their accommodation andmeals. Moreover, one of Lumumba's younger brothers has been admitted to the Savorgnan de Brazza Lycée at Brazzaville and is still there. 79. Evidently, the professional informers of Mr. Maiga and of bis President were most careful not to refer to that aspect of the situation, which is nevertheless a true one, beoause they did not want public opinion to be enlightened regarding the generous way in which the Congolese ofBrazzavillehadtreatedtheir Congolese brothers from the other side of the river. It would be interesting to see how far Mr. Maiga. Mr. Modlbo Keita, Mr. Diallo Telli and others could follow the example set by President Youlou. since they cannot tolerate in their own countrles the slightest opposition to thelr political ideals. 80. 1 say to Mr. Maiga and Mr. Diallo Telli that you have made a cynlcal attack on my eountry; you have tried to besmirch the name of President Youlou. In the Congo, gentlemen, we have taken good note ofall this, but we do not wish to harbour any resentment; on the contrary, we wish to help you in the difficulties which you are experiencing in solvingcertaindomesticprob':' lems. Of course, it is moral aid that we are prepared to .extend, because my country has brilliantly succeeded in achieving i~s unity through a union ofaIl Congolese. My country has no political exiles outside its borders. None have taken refuge at Conakry, Accra or Bamako to form, with other Congolese, a government-in-exile. The National Assembly of my country has just passed the budget. The s!tuationis suchthatwehave been able to abolish individual taxation for everybody. We live in peace. and our chief desire, our chief hope, is that our brothers on the left bank of the river will come to their senses and forget their quarrels so that. like us, they may live in peace and concord. 81. In this connexion, Mr. MaigaandMr.DialloTelli, allow me to offer you some friendly advice: it is al- Telli, 82. Before concluding, l would like on behalf of my Government and my country to welcome the presence in our midst of a great man from a friendly State, Ml'. Stevenson. The outstanding qualities of this distinguished United States citizen are well known to President Youlou. We had the pleasure of meeting Ml'. Stevenson in the Congo when he passed through Brazzaville, where he made an excellent impression during his brief stay. We are convinced that Ml'. Stevenson, through his tenacity and his profound understanding of affairs, will ensure that his countrywill not be grudging in its contribution to the cause of peace and harmony among the peoples of the world.

The representative of Guinea has asked to speak in exercise of the right of reply. l propose to give him thefloor afterwe have heard the representative of Ceylon, whose name is next on the list of speakers. 84. Ml'. WIJEGOONAWARDENA (Ceylon): We met on Monday under the shadow of a grave event reported from the Republic of the Congo. The man who had led his people to freedom and sought to preserve it under a parliamentary system of government was reported to be no more. Hewas dead, not because he was too old and therefore had to die at the end of a natural span of human life, but because he was so bursting with enthusiasm for his country and because he was a born leader of men. His survival seemed dangerous to the powers that be, who were bent on the pursuit of their own ends. And so it was that he was struck down, and with him two of his close associates. Thus were removed from the scene Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and his two colleagues, Ml'. Okito and Ml'. Mpolo. 85. Shocking as crime always is, these killings have given us a shock commensurate with the failure to measure up to standards of conduct expected of the society in which we are livingtoday. Shocking as these killings are as political crimes, they also stir in us emotions as individuals when we considerthemfroma purely human angle. Our sympathy goes out to the members of the bereaved families. If sympathy is a source of fortitude to these families in their sorrow, the realization that these men died for the ideals they cherished will also be a source of strengthto succeeding generations of their like-minded countrymen. 86. These killings, contrary no doubt to the expectations of those responsible for them, have not solved any problems. On the contrary, they have merely helped to add to the manifold problems facing the Republic of the Congo; they have further aggravated an already deplorable situation and brought the country to the verge of civil war. 87. Speaking in the Council 9n 2 February [929th meeting] l indicated what, inour view, were the essential prerequisites for an effective continuation of the United Nations operation in that territory as they appeared at that time. The latest developments in the Republic of the Congo have made it necessary for us, as a country following a poli ::'1 of non-alignment and judging issues on their own Ll,.,dts, to make a reappraisal of the situation impartially and objectively. 89. In the view of the delegation of Ceylon, the immediate objectives we should undertake in this Council in its present series of meetings are: first, the disarming of aIl armed forces outside the United Nations Command throughout the Republic ofthe Congo; second, the assumption of direct responsibility by the United Nations for the maintenance of law and order within that State; third, the immediate summoning ofParliament and the constitution of a new Government, as in our view with the deathofPrime Minister Lumumba there is now no lawfully constituted central government in the Republic of the Congo; fourth, the rendering of aIl such assistance as may be needed by the newly constituted Government for the discharge of its duties, both civil and military; füth, the immediate expulsion of aIl foreign military and paramilitary elements and political advisers not under the United Nations Command and the simultaneous expulsionofaIl mercenaries at present serving in the Republic of the Congo. 90. It is the view of the Ceylon delegation that it is essential that an investigation be undertaken to discover the circumstances under which Mr. Patrice Lumumba, Mr. Okito and Mr. Mpolo were murdered, and the persons responsible for the sad fate of these leaders. We feel that this investigation should be undertaken as early as possible. 91. Now l come to the subject of the office of Secretary-General, about which there has been so much criticism of late. While we do not hesitate to say that, as we have indicated before, we have not been entirely satisfied with the handling of the situation in the Republic of the Congo so far, as a member of the Security Council and of the United Nations we feel that it is not possible for us to divest ourselves entirely of the responsibility for any unsatisfactory functioningofthe office of the Secretary-General. At the same time we do realize that it was not possible to give the clear and precise instructions expected in a mandate to the Seoretary-General because of the differences of approach which exist between some members of the Security Council and which reflect the conflict that exists in the wider arena of world politics.

1 now calI upon the representative of Guinea, who will exercise his right of reply.

The representative of the Congo (Brazzaville) is certainly a very apt pupil. Inthe speech which he has just made, he attempted, modelling himself on other delegations, to make the discussionpersonal, but as on the previous occasion, my delegation will not follow him along that road. He referred in turn to the Casablanca Conference, the United Arab Republic, Guinea, Mali, the Soviet Union and a great many other things. 1 should like, on behalf of the Republic of Guinea, to reply to him very briefly as follows. 96. It is undeniable that one ofthe most characteristic phenomena in the process of decolonization in Africa since January 1960 has beentheestablishmentinvarious African territories and States ofwhat are in effect talking instruments serving the forces of colonization. .97. The substitution of insults for arguments is part of the technique of the psychological warfare officers from among whom so many technical advisers were recruited for the new African States. We shall not follow the representative of the Congo (Brazzaville) on that road either. 98. 1 should simply like to tell him how gratifying we find it that the colonialists are using against us their most valuable and best trained instruments. We shall confine ourselves, however, toanumberofquestions addressed to our brother representative of the Congo (Brazzaville), without any speech-making. 99. ls it true or not that, as we stated this morning, his Chief of State went to Elisabethville in the week during which the assassination of Prime Minister Lumumba and his companions was announced? 100. Is it true or not that subsequent to that visit he promised to send an accreditedplenipotentiary representative to Mr. Tshombé? 101. Is it true or not that in December 1960 he received Mr. Tshombé and Mr. Kalonji at Brazzaville with aIl the ceremony and honours due to Chiefs of State? 102. There is a further question. Is it true or not that, as we stated this morning and as aIl the members 103. The Members of the United Nations GeneralAssembly will remember in this connexion that in December 1960 the sarne country took the initiative in a similar manner with regard to the discussion of the Algerian problem, requesting that the discussion be postponed so that the conference of certain African Heads of state could be held at Brazzaville. We know what stand those states subsequently took in the AIgerian debate and how they voted. Ifthey intend to take the sarne stand on the Congolese problem as they took in the debate on the question of Algeria, they will be judged by Africa and by history. 104. Finally, we ask the representative of the Congo (Brazzaville) whether he will dare to deny before the Security Council and before the world that Brazzaville has been from the beginning the turn-table of aIl the subversive manœuvres in the Congo. Will he dare to deny that it is at Brazzaville that the money is received? We know that he asked us a short time ago to produce irrefutable evidence, but wealsoknowthatthe officers undertaking such operations do a neat job, as he is quite aware. The money comes in through Brazzaville and the troops arrive through Brazzaville. The whole operation is carried on from Brazzaville. Can he deny it? These are only a few of the questions that we should like to ask the representative of the Congo (Brazzaville). 105. We should like to have his answer,asthat would certainly enable us to lift here, for the benefit of aIl concerned, a particularly dark veildrawnover certain tragic realities in Africa. In putting these questions to him, however, we are convinced that between our brother from Brazzaville and ourselves there is only one obstacle, namely, colonization, and thatas soonas his country passes from the régime of conditional freedom to the régime of total freedom, there will be nothing to separate the Congo and Guinea, andwe shall meet again as brothers to build up our beloved continent in freedom and dignity. 106. Let me ada that if my colleague is not able to answer immediately, 1 do not object to his consulting his technical advisers.

1 calI on the representative of Mali in exercise of his right of reply.

Let me reassure the representative of the Congo (Brazzaville). 1 do not wish to make any further accusations. 1 said a short while ago that 1would refrain from going into details so that the Council would be able to seek a solution to the Congo problemforthwith.Afterwhatthe representative of Guinea has said, there is certainly very little that 1 could add. 1 shall accordingly forego taking up aIl the points raised by the representative of the Congo (Brazzaville) concerning the President of my country and myself. 109. 1 merely wish to state that it was not just an omission on our part ifwedidnotmention the fact that Mrs. Lumumba went to Brazzaville. She went there because she knew that only President Fulbert Youlou

l calI on the representative of the Congo (Brazzaville) in exercise of his right of reply.

l can understandwhythe representative of Guinea is angry. A short time ago, at the beginning of my statement, l named the States whose attitude appears to my country to be contraryto the objectives that we are aU seeking. l mentioned the Soviet Union and its satellites, the United Arab Republic, Guinea, Mali and others. l invite all those States to refute my statement, while at the same time l reserve my right to make clarüications at a future meeting. 112. Mr. N'GOUA (Gabon) (translated from French): Having been granted the formidable honour ofaddressing the Security Councilfor thefirst time. l should first like, on behalf of my Government and myself, to present our compliments to all members of the Council and in particular to welcome Mr. Stevenson, the new representative of the United States of America. It is my firm hope that Mr. stevenson and the new United States team will work towards a restoration of mental calm in the Congo as elsewhere, and will help to achieve the victory of the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter, a Charter which we have all accepted and which alone can guarantee international security. 113. The Government of Gabon is opposed to violence-to aU violence, physical, moral or verbal. The ever more frequent violence and intemperance of the language heard in this hall constitute a poor example for the young States recently admitted as Members of the United Nations, with aIl their hopes and also, it must be said, with aIl their illusions. OUr Organization is not the chosen place which it ought to be, the place where world peace could be built up in calm and confidence; unfortunately it seems to have become, so to speak, a sounding-box for the impassioned and unconsidered clamour of the market-place. We have arrived at an age of diplomacy by convulsion, which seems to be particularly valued by certain States. 114. Meanwhile, blood has flowed, and is stillflowing, in the Congo. The Government of Gabon pays respectful tribute to the victims-to all the victims-of the Congolese tragedy. It hopes, however, that aIl this blood will not have been shed in vain, and that it will not be used as a pretext for the hysterical unleashing of passions, for new reprisaIs and for a stepping-up of terror. The Ume is ripe for healing, for binding up the wounds. What has to be constructed is a new Congo-not simply, and after a fashion, a new Viet- Nam, a new Korea, a mere precarious and unstable 116. It would, however, be unfair not torecognizethe efforts made by the Organization and its Secretary- General to prevent the extension of the coldwar to the African continent. "Unhappy blue helmets", a wellknown journalist wrote recently, "unfortunate guardians of the peace, doomedto unite, against themselves, those who are at odds". Their task is indeed a grim one. But their efforts haveunfortunatelybeenthwarted by a mass of intervention-foreign intervention,overmultiplied, we think, and not always disinterestedwhose only result has been to plunge the unfortunate Congo into astate bordering onanarchy, and the world into amazement and division of view. 117. True to its policy of peace, the Government of Gabon is above aIl anxious to avoid the taking of any stand purely on emotion and passion. Tt hopes that the African states-particularly those of the Brazzaville Conference, which include three States bordering the Congo and therefore particularlyinterested in a peaceful solution of the problem-will be able to meet again quickly. The Government of Gabon is workingtowards that end. It would like to emphasize the danger of taking any decision, in what remains a purely African affair, before the African Stateshave had an opportunity of reaching agreement and making themselves heard. Like all the members of the Council, 1regard it as an urgent matter to settle the Congo problem, and 1. am fully convinced of the need for rapid action. But 1 am also sure that any attempt to subject the internaI affairs of the Congo to an extra-African settlement could only add to the present confusion and anarchy. Any hasty and precipitate solution not in line with the solution recommended by the Africans themselves would be doomed to failure. For an African p:roblem an African solution mu,_' he found. Gabon still firmly hop'es that, in this jungle of suspicion of which President Kennedy has spoken, it will be possible to establish a beach-head of co-operation and that common sense will, in the end, triumph.

Mr. President, the Government of Senegal is grateful for the opportunity to express, during this debate in the Security Council, its opinion on the grave problem of the Congo. 119. In the first place, on behalf of the Senegalese Government 1 should like to pay tribute to the memory 120. Tragic as the circumstances are, the members of the Council will understand that Senegal would like to take this opportunity of welcoming thè representative of the United States of America, Mr. Stevenson. Mr. Stevenson was already weIl known. in the highest circles of international political thought. for his remarkable work Putting First Things First. 121. In that book he speaks of three revolutions-the tecluiical, the economic and the ideological-resulting from the "population explosion" of our contemporary world which affects mankind today andwillcontinueto do so in the decades to come. He is heedful of the acceleration of progress inaIl fields. and ofthe speedup in the process of mants history. Adaptation to this new historical change means that something must be alteredj something must be given up. or aU will be lost. Mr. Stevenson, as Mr. Benites Vinuezaindicated [928th meeting). i8 one of the rare men endowed with what one might ~aU historical awareness. Throughhis contribution he brings a warning and a messagewhich the leaders of the modern world should ponder. l am sure that the presence in the UnitedNations of such an experienced diplomat will be of value in the search for a solution to the world's present difficulties. 122. l come now to the question of the Congo. The Government of Senegal has transmitted to the Presi~ dent of the Security Council a note verbale [S/4677] requesting that no final solution to the problem of the Congo should be adopted at the end of this discussion. Certain earlier speakers, anticipating my arguments, have attempted to misrepresent the intentions of the Senegalese Government by saying that our reason for making this request was to gain time. to give the French and Belgians time in which "to complete their crimes in the Congo". Unfortunately. we aU know the propen:sity of certain African Members of the United Nations to' indulge in constant propa!?:'l.nda and demagogy. But we thought that propagan.da and demagogy would have had the decency to be silent in the face of death-the death of Mr. Patrice Lumumba, which we regard as a deplorable crime. 123. There are, in fact, a number ofdifferent reasons why the Government of Senegal has made this request. 124. In the first place. the States which particip.ated in the Brazzaville Conference are now meeting with a view to drafting a plan which will be put before the United Nations as a feasible and effective plan for settling the Congolese crisis. We want these States to be given the necessary time in which to complete their discussions and consultations. That is the first reason why the Sanegalese Government has requested the deferment of any plan for a final settlement. 127. That is why we are asking that the States which were represented at the Brazzaville Conference be given time to submit, during the second half of the Assembly's fifteenth session, a settlement plan which the United Nations would then have to vote upon. 128. We think it will be easy to find a compromise, to reach decisions and to evolve measures which might take the form of instructions to the United Nations Conciliation Commission for the Congo-for there is a Conciliation Commission, which is in the Congo at this moment. Then,and only then, would it be possible to calI a round-table conference of all Congolese without exception, whatever their tendencies and whoever their leaders might be. The Congolese, with the assistance of the Conciliation Commissionitself provided with instructions bytheUnitedNations, in the light of the debate and of the steps taken after discussion of the plan submittedby the AfricanStatescould try, at that round-table conference, to find a solution which wouldbe acceptable to a11. Only then will the Congolese be able ta set up institutions, a Parlia... ment and a Government, whose authority will be respected in a11 the Congo's provinces. In defaultof this procedure, we think, no plan of settlement can result in anything but an unstable equilibrium. 129. These are the real reasons why Senegal has requested that this debate shouldnot end in some hasty measure, some solution which could only bring ephemeral results. In conclusion, therefore, l would ask the Council once again ta postpone the present debate until next March, so that the problem canbe discussed during the second part of the General Assembly's fifteenth session. 130. Mr. N'THEPE (Cameroun) (translated from French): First of all, may l be permitted to thank the Council, on behalf of my Government, for having al... lowed a representative of the Republic ofCamerounto take part in this debate. 131. Unlike the torrents ofviolent orvirulent rhetoric which the Council has heard during the debate on the Congo, my statement will be very brief. 132. The Congolese problem, which for seven months has been a constant source of anxiety to the world and the central theme in international news, has severely tested both the sense of African solidarity and the prestige of the United Nations in Africa. 134. Tt is to you brother Africans, youwho have come from the depths of Africa, that 1 shaU speak first. An African like yourselves, 1 make a pressing appeal to your conscience. Peace in the Congo must above ail be an African peace. The undeniably African nature of the Congolese crisis must have prior claim overyour ideological, not to say demagogic, viewpoints. It is primarily for us Africans to discover the bases for that peace. It is for us to seek out and safeguard the higher interest of Africa. 135. Africans, it is thanks to your disputes that the colonialism which you here denounce finds a foothold in Africa. You and aU the rest of us Africans must show these great Powers what Africa can achieve through unity and solidarity. 136. It is hateful and, indeed, shamefulto see here, in this assembly, an exhibition of whatour realweakness is. Only by disinterested African solidarity can we save the Congo and save Africa. 137. Through me, the President of the Republic of Cameroun, in a ringing appeal to aU African Heads of State, urges them to reach agreement, to forget their disputes and to undertake in aU honesty a crusade for peace in the Congo. It is upon them and their actions that the United Nations should rely with a view to providing the Congo with the help it needs for its selfconstruction and recovery. That is a responsibility devolving primarily upon us Africans, and no Head of State will have any excuse or right to divest himself of his obligations in respect of the Congo or of Africa. 138. It is an insult, historically, to asknon-Africans, outsiders, to supply the solutions for peace in the Congo. 139. For us, therefore, the disorder in the Congo must be laid at the door of those African Heads of State who wiU not accept the fact that ministerial changes are bound to occur under any régime and in any period in history, but who persist in the struggle for power in defiance of the elementary rules of democracy. 140. We believe that the persons responsible for the war in the Congo will be found to be those Heads of African States who, placing their faith in idols, support a particular Government or party in disregard of the 14 million Congolese to whom our brotherly aid is due. 141. We shall regard as responsible for adeterioration of the situation in the Congo those African.Heads of State who wish to have their own limanIl at the head of the Congolese Government and to that end deliberately provoke disagreement, by means of an imported ideology, at the expense of the future of the whole of Africa. 143. We are convinced that, if all the African Heads of State forthwith return to the path of reason, observe the rules of democracy, revise their oligarchie policy, refrain from encouraging rebellion and cease to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Congo, the Congolese crisis will be quickly brought to an end. AlI of them would then be doing useful work for Africa-which would be preferable to signing an act of war-as was the case at the Casablanca Conference. 144. As for you, the great Powers, it does you no credit that you should try to take sides in quarrels between Africans, exacerbate them, and incite Africans to exterminate each other. We read with indignation the statement to the effect that the Soviet Union was ready to supply military aid to a Congolese faction. May 1 recall the fact that the handwhich furnishes the weapon is as guilty as the hand which strikes. The Africans must be helped to live, but it is contrary to the principles of this Council, of this Organization, that they should be helped to kill each othel'• 145. Again addressing the great Powers, Iwould say: "Africa does not ask you to fight. Africa needs your disinterested help on the economic and social level; but that does not mean that you should seek to destroy its political freedom, or even its freedom pure and simple." 146. As for the United Nations, let it notwithdraw or show weakness. The Government of the Republic of Cameroun can only, once more, praise the Secretary- General for his disinterested efforts in the Congo. We think that the scope of the actionundertaken by the United Nations in the Congo far exceeds the resources placed at Ml'. Hammarskjold's disposaI. The Security Council and General Assembly resolutions to which some representatives have referred say nothing about the meanS on which their effectiveness must depend. 147. The United Nations must continue itsworkinthe Congo, while avoiding any interference in that country's domestic political affairs. We feel that the United Nations will not take over the powers of the Central Government established in the Congo andwill notmake the mistake of trying to disarm the Armée nationale congolaise, which would leave the country atthe mercy of rebellious forces over which the Organizationwould have no control and with which it would not be entitled to negotlate in disregard of the established national authority. 148. We shaH continue to assert that only the Congolese people is competent to choose betweenKasa-Vubu, Lumumba, Gizenga, Mobutu or any other leader. It is not for any other State, for any foreign Power, to impose on that people, by force, the authority of any particular man. 149. On behalf of my Government, 1 am instructed by the President of the Republic of Cameroun to request the Security Council, two weeks before the reconvening of the fifteenth session of the General Assembly, to make it possible for all Member States which have concerned themselves with the Congolese problem to 150. It would be unthinkable to give consideration only to the conclusions of the Casablanca C::onference and use them alone as a basis for a decision, without having ascertained the views of most of the other African States. 151. My Government therefore associates itself with the request, made here by several other speakers, for the adjournment of the debate untilthe Assemblymeets again. It is essential, for the effectiveness and prestige of the United Nations itself, thatthe Security Counci! should avoid becoming a mere resolutionvoting machine incapable of putting an end to the war in the Congo. 152. Let the Secretary-General be equipped with the means for continuing his work-that is the one decision we should like the Counci! to adopta 153. Such is the purpose of my brief statement on behalf of the Government of the Republic ofCameroun.

May 1first of aU say how grateful 1 am to.the President and the members of the Security Council for acceding to the request of ~y Government that my delegation be permitted·to participate in this debate. 155. The depth of our indignation at the recenttragic tum of events in the Congo is clearly reflected in the telegram which our Chief of State, His Excellency Ferik Ibr:ahim Abboud, addressed to the Secretary- General..Y The first sentence of that telegram reads: "In the name of the Republic of the Sudan, 1 condemn the atrocities committed in the Republic ofthe Congo under the very eyes of the United Nationsthese atrocities which have led to the murder of Mr. Patrice Lumumba in a way so planned as to indicate premeditation." 156. As indicated in that telegram, 1am authorized to calI for an immediate and thorough investigation by the Security Council so that those responsible for this hideous crime be exposed and duly punished. It is an international crime offending against the minimum requirelllents of civilized conduct and the mostfundamental human rights. The Secretary-General rightly described it as la revolting crime against principles for which this Organization stands and must stand". [935th meeting, para. 3.] In its discharge of this duty we will not expect the Security Council to be in any way deterred by the statement of the Minister for the Interior of the province of Katanga, which, ifit means anything, proves the complicity ofthe Katanga authorities in this calIous murder and sadly reflects on the sense of responsibility and moral standards applied by the authorities in Katanga. 157. Speaking before the General Assembly on19 September 1960, during the debate on the Congo at the fourth emergency special session, 1outlinedthe policy of the Government of the Sudan regarding the United 'li 5ubsequently clrculated as document 5/4731. "'First, it should render speedyfinancial assistance to the Congo to help its Government in facing the critical economic situation causedby the regrettable events that followed independence. This, we believe, is a matter of extreme urgency. "Second, it should reaffirm anew the principlethat foreign Interference outside the framework of the United Nations, of a political ormilitary nature, will not be conducive to the realization of the ultimate goal of United Nations policy in the Congo. This policy should, if 1 may repeat, have as its aim the preservation of the unity, territorial integrity and political independence ofthe Congo andthe promotion of the welfare of its people. "Third, the United Nations shouldbe entrustedwith the restoration and maintenance of law and order throughout the territory of the Republic. This, we believe, is an essential prerequisite for the achievement of the ultimate goal." y 158. We emphasized then our readinesstocontinueto render any assistance within our means to help the United Nations in performing that heavy task. We consistently abided by this policy and faithfully observed our obligations under the relevant Security Council and General Assemblyresolutions. Wecontributed what material assistance we could. We stood up in opposition to Interferencefrom outside the United Nations, whatever its form and whatever its source. May 1, in this connexion, recaU that, in the face of some distorted press reports, 1have recently issued a statement te> the effect that no transit to the Congo across the territory of the Sudan-whether by air or land-is permitted except at the request of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It was only a few days ago that we refrained from accedingto a request, from a philanthropie institution ina countrywithwhich we have most friendly relations, to allow transit of some medical and food supplies to certainareas in the Congo, on the simple-but, 1 trust, significant-ground that it had not come through the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 159. Towards the internaI conflict in the Congo we have maintained a policy of strict neutrality. We have no bias for or prejudice against any of the contending leaders of the Congo or the trends they represent or claim to represent. It may be recalled that during the 160. Our policy of neutrality and non-interfer~nce does not stem from any kind of indifference or lack of concern on our part. The exact reverse may be true. If 1 may say so without impertinence, of all the countries participating in this debate, with the onlyexception of the Congo itself, the Sudan is the one most directly affected by this cruel Congolese drama. Because of our common frontiers with the Congo, because of the great ethnic andblood relations between the Congolese and Sudanese peoples and because of many other strong ties between the two nations, we have always regarded the effective independence ofthe Congo, its security and the happiness of its people as an insurance-a necessary insurance-ofour own indepandence, our own security and the happiness of our own people. But, to bring about these desired ends in the Congo, we do not think that interferenoe from outside, however :well-meaning, is the best way. In fact, if it is a way at all, it ls the sure way to increased anarchy, to increasedbitterness, to fratrlcidal conflict and to the final liquidation of the Congo as aState. The ugly consequences of aH this will not stop at the frontiers of the Congo. It may not be an exaggeration to say that it will engulf the whole African continent. What such a prospect will mean for the peace and security of the world is not too difficult to imagine, and it is not for me to state. 161. We believe that the Congolese problem has an important human side to it, and that important aspect of it should be accorded its due weight. It is a great tragedy, born of what a journalist exploring the Congo once described as "the ultimate disgrace of colonialism". And it is a tragedy whose innocent victims are no less than the 14 million Congolese people. Any attempt, therefore, to exploit this heart-breaking situation for any political, ideological or material end will not only add to the proportions of the drama but will, in our belief, be morally wrong and should not be condoned or tolerated by the conscience of mankind. 162. 1 have feIt caHed upon to say all those things in order to put to rest certain misgivings regarding my country's policy revealed in the statements made to this Council on 7 Februa!"] [932nd meeting] by the representative of President Kasa-Vubu andthe representative of France. The representative of President Kasa-Vubu may, further, be reassured that no güts, whatever their description, from friendly countries and no pressures, whatever their source, will influence our adherence to what we regard as matters of principle. 163. Since the United Nations stepped into the Congo and since we were called upon to help, we have stood solidly with the United Nations. We are unshakably convinced that the United Nations is the onlyavailable means through which disinterested assistance can be 164. If those things are allowed to continue and if full assurance is not forthcoming that the primary objectives of the United Nations action will be realized within a definite period oftime, then the Sudan Government will find itself constrained to excuse itself from participation in the implementation of United Nations resolutions pertaining to the Congo, and may find it imperative to request the recall of Sudanese troops now serving in the Congo. In saying this, we do not mean to imply that the United Nations, led by the Secretary-General, is not doing its best. There may have been errors or miscalculations in the United Nations operation in the Congo, buttoexpectperfection from any human endeavour or infallibilityfrom human beings-even those endowed with Mr. Hammarskjold's unique attributes-is futile andunrealistic. In our religion, perfection and infallibility are attributes that can be conceded only to God. 165. We appreciate that in the Congo the United Nations has had to act against overwhelming odds, ranging from naked intervention to the most subtle kinds of interference. Unless something urgent and effective is done to obviate these odds, we honestly cannot see any use in our continued presence. If, for the reasons mentioned, we have to withdraw, l assure the Council that we shall do so with no little regret. We should like to remain in the Congo to help, but only so long as we are convinced that we are serving the interests of the Congolese people as deÎinedby the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. 166. We are anxious to see the United Nations peace. mission in the Congo succeed, for, ifthe United Nations should abandon the Congo because offailure, thatwould not only damage the whole prestige and authority of the Organization, but might calI into doubt the alIimportant and perhaps fateful question of its future utility. For the Congo, and probably for the rest of Africa and the small nations everywhere, such an eventuality may spell the greatest disaster. Ta the rest of the world it couldpresent only the sad wreckage of the hopes so trustingly built around this Organization. 167. As a prominent American leader put it, with all its defects and with all its failures the United Nations still remains man's best organized hope ta substitute 169. In this matter of foreign Interference, that of Belgium should receive special attention. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, inhisrepott of 2 November 1960 [S/4557] described the Belgian military and political influence in the province of Katanga as omnipresent, and the return of Belgian nationals and their penetration in the public life of the country as purposeful. The speedy and effective eradication of these omnipresent and purposeful Belgian influences from the political life of the country is, we believe, a condition sine qua non for the possible succ~ss of any plan intended ta bring about a measure of stability and normallife ta this unhappy land. For as long as Belgium is permitted to interfere, directly or indirectly, inthe affairs ofthe Congo, and as long as Belgians are permitted to indulge in a mischievous game of hide-and-seek with theworldOrganization, no effort at reconciliation will bear any fruit, andno plan to solve this heart-rending problem can be put into effect with the efficacy and speed which its enormity and gravity demande 170. We are candidlyoftheopinionthatinthis respect the friends and allies of Belgium could help greatly by bringing their persuasive influence ta bear on the Belgian Government. What Belgium has done, andwhat Belgium is doing, in the Congo will neither help the cause of peace nor in any way redound ta the credit of Belgium. Is it tao much ta ask of them that in their approach to the problem of the Congo they should try ta transcend considerations of group solidarity, if for no reason other than that this is, as has often been repeated, originally a human problem? 171. We do believe that if foreign Interference in the Congo, in aU its forms, is successfully wiped out, some of the drastic measures contained in some of the proposaIs so far advanced may not even prove necessary, and the task of the United Nations will, we know, prove far easier. 172. May 1 conclude by expressing agreement with the representative of India when he said that in order for the Security Counci! to be effective there should be a basic agreement among the big Powers? We believe that of aIl the pressing problems ofthe day whose solutions await such agreement amongthebig Powers, the Congo is a unique case where such agreement should and could be reached. This may be a challenge, but we believe it is a worthy one. The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.