S/PV.7169 Security Council

In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Guatemala, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, the Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey and Ukraine to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite His Excellency Mr. Jacek Bylica, Principal Adviser and Special Envoy for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament of the European External Action Service, to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2014/313, which contains a letter dated 2 May 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting a concept paper on the item under consideration. I wish to warmly welcome the Deputy Secretary- General, His Excellency Mr. Jan Eliasson, and I now give him the floor.

I want first to commend the Republic of Korea for convening this open debate on resolution 1540 (2004). Let us recognize that in its first 10 years, this landmark resolution has accomplished a great deal. Resolution 1540 (2004) has helped us make important inroads against the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The resolution has set in motion a great number of steps by Member States. Over 30,000 measures and actions taken by States to implement the resolution have been reported to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). This, of course, only tells part of the story. There have also been setbacks and disappointments, including the recent use of chemical weapons in Syria. However, through vigorous diplomatic and administrative action, and by agreement, over 90 per cent of Syria’s chemical weapons have been removed even as the conflict has continued and intensified. We note that some 20 countries have not submitted a report on their implementation efforts to the 1540 Committee. In most cases, these are countries facing serious economic or social difficulties. I encourage all Member States that have not yet done so to submit a first report in this anniversary year. If resolution 1540 (2004) is to work even more effectively, it must be a global commitment and a global enterprise. It is critical for every country to implement the resolution. Terrorists and traffickers tend to target countries whose customs, borders, trade, ports and airports are less well or poorly monitored or controlled. One promising trend is the preparation of voluntary national implementation action plans. At the recent Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, 32 countries released a joint statement reaffirming their commitment to submitting such action plans to the 1540 Committee. That was an important step forward. Looking ahead, we hope to see expanded regional cooperation in implementing the resolution, especially since States sharing borders often face similar challenges. Civil society also has a major role to play in moving the world closer to meeting the goals of resolution 1540 (2004), and through such joint efforts we can come closer to an even more ambitious vision — a world free of all weapons of mass destruction. Supporting the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) is a high priority for the United Nations and a key task for the Office for Disarmament Affairs. We all share an interest and a duty to prevent individuals and non-State groups from acquiring and using these abhorrent weapons. The effective implementation of this resolution requires a wide scope of measures ranging from legislation to law enforcement. It requires action on the part not only of Governments but also of industry and other relevant actors. In this year of its tenth anniversary, I appeal to all States and other stakeholders to continue their e fforts to implement this resolution. In closing, as the Secretary-General has said several times, there are no right hands for wrong weapons. Let us join together in the work against their proliferation with renewed resolve to ensure a world of greater peace and security in the years to come.

I thank the Deputy Secretary- General for his statement. The Council has before it the text of a statement by the President on behalf of the Council on the subject of today’s meeting. I thank the Council members for their valuable contributions to this statement. In accordance with the understanding reached among the members of the Council, I shall take it that the members of the Security Council agree to the statement, which will be issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/PRST/2014/7. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea. Ten years ago, the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004) by the Security Council marked a key milestone in our efforts to address the challenge arising from the nexus between the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and terrorism. As a binding international norm under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, resolution 1540 (2004) complements the existing non-proliferation regime, which had formerly been focused on States. The resolution reflects a fundamental shift in our paradigm regarding the international community’s response to the threat of WMD proliferation. Over the past 10 years, resolution 1540 (2004) has mobilized significant efforts across the globe to combat new WMD proliferation threats. The number of States that have implemented legislative measures to prohibit the proliferation activities of non-state actors has more than doubled during this period. At the same time, law enforcement and export control capabilities of these States have improved steadfastly in recent years. Despite past achievements, daunting challenges still lie ahead in an increasingly complex operational environment, given the rapid advances in science and technology. This is why, on the tenth anniversary of this landmark resolution, we should step up efforts to achieve its full and universal implementation. The presidential statement that we have just adopted sets an important goal of achieving the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by 2021, and maps out key areas that we should work on to achieve this goal. Building on the progress of the past decade, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) will report a comprehensive road map and strategy to the Security Council by 2016. In this regard, I would like to stress, in particular, three essential tasks that should underpin our future efforts. First, the 1540 Committee’s crucial role in monitoring the implementation of the resolution should be further enhanced. To date, 172 out of 193 Member States have presented their implementation reports. Considering the voluntary nature of the reporting, that is a remarkable achievement. In marking the tenth anniversary of the resolution, efforts should be redoubled to achieve the goal of universal reporting by Member States. Secondly, we cannot overstate the importance of capacity-building and assistance for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). As the saying goes, a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. However robust the security networks may be in many countries, it takes vulnerability and failing in just one country to spell insecurity for all. We should continue to strengthen the matchmaking role of the 1540 Committee to facilitate the provision of effective and tailored assistance to States. In addition to the efforts by the Security Council, we need to expand cooperation among all stakeholders, including the relevant international and regional organizations. For its part, the Republic of Korea has launched the International Nuclear Non-proliferation and Security Academy, which will contribute actively to the capacity-building efforts in the region. We will also contribute $1 million to support the activities of the 1540 Committee. Thirdly, we should promote synergy among resolution 1540 (2004) and other non-proliferation related norms and initiatives. Resolution 1540 (2004) imposes an extensive set of obligations that cut across a broad range of WMD-proliferation aspects, encompassing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, as well as their related materials and technologies. In today’s security environment, where non-State actors can easily have access to WMD-related materials and technology, non-proliferation and WMD security are indivisibly linked. The Hague Nuclear Security Summit, held last March, reinforced that important point, as more than 30 States announced the joint statement on promoting the full and universal implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Such coordination efforts should be expanded to other areas of WMD control. Today, North Korea’s nuclear-weapons programmes have exposed the weakest link in nuclear non-proliferation, along with nuclear security and safety. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is the only country in the world to have conducted nuclear tests in the twenty-first century. Notwithstanding the efforts of the international community, North Korea has continued to develop its nuclear weapons over the past two decades, and is now threatening to carry out its fourth nuclear test. If North Korea succeeds in acquiring nuclear weapons, it will seriously undermine the regime established by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and exacerbate tension and instability in North-East Asia. Further nuclear tests by North Korea must be prevented through concerted efforts of the international community. If we fail to effectively act upon such a clear and present threat to international peace and security, it will critically weaken the credibility of the Security Council, as well as the integrity of the Charter of the United Nations, which demands that all Members be peace-loving States. We must clearly warn North Korea that, if it challenges the international community with another nuclear test, it will be met with the most serious consequences. Having the honour of presiding over the Security Council today, I am pleased that we were able to adopt today’s significant presidential statement. As Chair of the 1540 Committee, the Republic of Korea will continue to lead efforts to realize the full and universal implementation of the resolution over the course of our remaining term. I look forward to participants’ constructive contributions on the development and future direction of resolution 1540 (2004) during today’s open debate. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I shall now give the floor to the other members of the Security Council.

Let me start by thanking you, Mr. President, for convening this important high- level open debate on non-proliferation as we mark the tenth anniversary of resolution 1540 (2004). We consider your presence here today, Sir, as a major commitment to the overall implementation of the resolution, which calls upon States to take the necessary measures in combating the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery. I also thank Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson for his briefing. Today’s debate is a great opportunity to take stock of our efforts in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) since 2004. It is evident that there was significant progress in the past 10 years and, more important, on raising awareness of the goals and the objectives and obligations of the resolution. We welcome the national reports submitted by Member States to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Rwanda is among the Member States to have fulfilled the obligations according to the pertinenent provisions of the resolution. We will continue to ensure its implementation within our borders and in our region. We urge States that have not submitted national reports and other required information to do so. We encourage all Member States to cooperate in identifying effective practices, experiences and lessons learned. Such efforts will further contribute to the development of a long-term vision and strategy for the effective implementation of the resolution. While we have accomplished raising awareness, there is still a major challenge when it comes to attempts to procure weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related material. Private entities are becoming more and more involved in the procurement business, as middle men and for private benefit. We must combat the illicit trafficking in WMD-related commmodities through a mechanism that consists of measures against originating parties, export licensing and control lists, private-sector internal compliance programmes, financial controls, international outreach and capacity-building. In view of emerging potential threats and risks, proliferators exploit legal loopholes to broker illicit transactions and cover up end-users; but they also take advantage of existing poor border-control mechanisms in some States, which allows diversion. We must tailor our efforts to address those challenges by setting up effective export-control systems, processes and methodologies, while utilizing the World Customs Organization, which has been an indispensible partner of the 1540 Committee with regard to the implementation of border control-related obligations. Let me also emphasize the need for raising the political will of Governments, well-defined legislation, information-sharing, inter-agency coordination, engagement with industry and international cooperation as crucial elements of essential control systems. Proliferation financing remains a key factor that contributes to the threat to international peace and stability. As most perpetrators of illicit trafficking strive to conceal their goods and the related financial transactions, there remain significant capacity issues in many States, which lack an extensive legal foundation on which to build non-proliferation measures. In that regard, we appreciate the work of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in collaboration with the 1540 Committee to prohibit the facilitation of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) through financing. From our perspective, targeted financial sanctions are crucial for the overall success of counter-proliferation efforts, taking into consideration the guidelines of the FATF framework. Rwanda believes that there is a strong link between the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, owing to the abuse of the controls on stockpiles and the dissemination of information and technologies, thus increasing the possibility for terrorist groups to gain access to and use such weapons. We reiterate the need to continue to enhance and strengthen cooperation concerning the prevention of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In the same vein, we reiterate our support for the 2004 Protocol to the Organization of African Unity Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. The Protocol obligates State parties to strengthen national instruments to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMDs and to cooperate with the international community in the implementation of continental and international instruments relating to disarmament and non-proliferation. Despite the progress achieved, we acknowledge that much work remains. Noting the tenth anniversary of resolution 1540 (2004), Rwanda seizes this opportunity to encourage Member States to redouble their efforts to fulfil their obligations and commitments related to non-proliferation requirements and initiatives. We reiterate our support for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and the work of the 1540 Committee. We support the relevant international, regional and subregional organizations. We also reaffirm our commitment to fully implement the resolution in areas where we have not already done so. To conclude, Rwanda commends the Republic of Korea, Chair of the 1540 Committee, for its leadership in the Council on the issue of non-proliferation and for introducing presidential statement S/PRST 2014/7, adopted today with the full support of Rwanda.

Chile thanks the presidency of the Republic of Korea for commemorating the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004). We also appreciate the presence of Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se in the Council. We appreciate the leadership of the Republic of Korea in this and all matters tied to international security. Chile supports the desire of Korean President Park Geun- Hye to provide renewed momentum towards a world free of nuclear weapons, starting with a completely de-nuclearized Korean peninsula. Resolution 1540 (2004), adopted unanimously on 28 April 2004, is an historic milestone that Chile helped to adopt, since at that time my country was serving as a non-permanent member of the Council. It was the first resolution of the Council which, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, addressed the threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons among non-State actors, filling a legal vacuum in the international system. The Council, continuing the course set by the adoption of resolution 1373 (2001) on global counter-terrorism efforts, took appropriate action on that occasion in the exercise of the powers conferred on it by the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. Today, as was the case then, the terrorist threat is real. The mere idea that non-State actors have access to weapons of mass destruction is a source of great concern, which was made clear at the latest Nuclear Security Summit of March 2014. In that context, Chile believes that the goal of resolution 1540 (2004) is still fully relevant. States must continue to adopt measures to preclude the financing of prohibited activities related to weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials, and to account for and secure materials related to such weapons, guaranteeing security in their production, use, storage and transport. Over the past 10 years, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) has succeeded in raising the international community’s awareness of the terrorist threat and the serious dangers posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It has done so by providing assistance in the areas of legislation, training and equipment, as well as by facilitating cooperation among various regional organizations and Member States, fostering better practices in general, in order to anticipate and reduce terrorist risks. So far, 171 countries have submitted their national implementation reports on resolution 1540 (2004). However, we must move on to the next stage, since new challenges show that the threat is still present, for example, in the area of financing terrorism. My country has consistently planned for the full and effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), in an effort in the context of a State policy that makes the maintenance of international peace and security one of the priorities of its foreign and defence policies. In that connection, Chile has duly adapted and harmonized its national legislation to meet the standards of resolution 1540 (2004), as reflected in the various implementation reports transmitted by Chile to the Committee since 2004. We recently informed the Committee of the designation of Chile’s focal point as we begin to update information, using the new matrix and preparing a national strategy, following the 1540 Committee guidelines. Chile remains firmly committed to the implementation of the resolution and, in a broader context, to the global architecture of non-proliferation and disarmament. Our participation in the recent Nuclear Security Summit is proof of that. We should also like to emphasize the importance that we attach to the dissemination of work being done by the 1540 Committee and to its facilitation of cooperation. From that perspective, we believe that, in order to avoid proliferation, it is essential for the institutions responsible for local and cross-border controls to be staffed with people trained in the relevant legal instruments. We emphasize, for example, the work being carried out by customs and border control police. In that regard, we reiterate the need for States with greater capacity in that area to share their experience and good practices. I would recall, among other initiatives at the regional and global levels, the seminar on legal and normative provisions governing international trade and security that was hosted in my country in both Santiago and Valparaíso in September 2009 in conjunction with the University of Georgia. We would also highlight the importance of providing advanced training to the relevant officials via seminars and workshops that encourage the sharing of experiences and practices geared to the needs of each State with regard to the treatment of non-proliferation activities. Such activities should also involve civil society across the most diverse possible spectrum, from academia to business. In that regard, we particularly welcome today’s presidential statement S/PRST/2014/7 on that point. Chile believes that resolution 1540 (2004) supports the effective implementation of the universal instruments on the issue of non-proliferation and reiterates its commitment to the objectives and goals that inspired that resolution. To conclude, I would like once again to thank the Republic of Korea for its leadership in this important sphere. Sir Mark Lyall Grant (United Kingdom): I welcome Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se to the Security Council today, and I thank the Mission of the Republic of Korea for organizing today’s important debate and for Korea’s leadership of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) as we work together towards the comprehensive review of the implementation of the resolution in 2016. I also thank the Deputy Secretary-General for his introductory statement. Ten years ago, we adopted resolution 1540 (2004). Since that day, non-State actors have not acquired weapons of mass destruction, indicating that the resolution has been effective. But we cannot rest on that as a measure of our success. We know that terrorist groups want to and intend to obtain weapons of mass destruction. As Thomas Jefferson said, “The price of liberty is eternal vigilance”. That is why States must continue to implement resolution 1540 (2004) with the same vigour and commitment as when we first adopted it. Universal compliance with resolution 1540 (2004) is an essential component of the international non-proliferation response. The United Kingdom therefore strongly supports the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and its work to achieve full implementation of the resolution. We will continue to do our part to bring that about. On 20 December 2013, the United Kingdom submitted our fourth national implementation report and our first national action plan to the 1540 Committee. Under our 2013 presidency of the Group of Eight’s Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction we hosted an outreach event for non-reporting States, involving two of the 1540 Committee experts. Some of the States attending have since submitted their first reports. The United Kingdom also supports the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in its work with a number of States. Through our Counter-Proliferation Strategic Programme Fund we have hosted outreach and awareness-raising workshops to help States develop domestic legislation that meets resolution 1540 (2004) requirements. That fund has also enabled us to collaborate with Canada and Indonesia to produce a national legislation implementation kit on nuclear security. We hope that other States find that kit useful in ensuring that their domestic legislation is in line with the requirements of resolution 1540 (2004). The value of the 1540 Committee’s Group of Experts cannot be underestimated. In addition to performing the vital role of collating requests and offers of assistance, the 1540 Committee and its experts conduct country- specific visits to grasp the challenges of national implementation and to guide States towards sources of assistance. That direct engagement has increased the number of reporting States. I encourage Member States to take the initiative to reassess their compliance with the resolution, for example with greater use of peer-to- peer review. I also encourage the Committee to work with a range of actors, including industry, civil society, academia and the private sector, to support States in their implementation of the resolution. Much has been achieved in the past ten years. To date, 172 States have submitted their national reports on the implementation of the resolution voluntarily, and the number of non-reporting countries continues to decrease. I take this opportunity to urge the 21 States yet to submit national implementation reports to the 1540 Committee to do so as soon as practical. Of those 21 States, 17 are in Africa. The reports are not as onerous as States may fear, and assistance is available in preparing them, including from the Panel of Experts and from regional partners. As we enter the second decade of the resolution, we must look for new and innovative ways to increase effective practices to support the resolution and to ensure that non-State actors never acquire weapons of mass destruction.

China appreciates the Korean initiative to convene this public debate commemorating the tenth anniversary of resolution 1540 (2004). China also welcomes Foreign Minister Yun to preside over today’s meeting of the Council. I also thank Deputy Secretary-General Eliasson for his briefing. As the first Security Council resolution devoted to non-proliferation, resolution 1540 (2004) is a milestone in the prevention of nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism. Over the past ten years, thanks to the joint efforts of the international community, the international consensus on non-proliferation has been deepened. International mechanisms for non-proliferation based on multilateralism have been improved. National capacity-building for non-proliferation has been scaled up. International cooperation and collaboration for non-proliferation have been growing deeper. China attaches great importance to the governance of non-proliferation at the global level. During the Nuclear Security Summit in the Hague in March, President Xi Jinping of China put forward China’s approach to nuclear security, which will make a significant contribution to the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to combating nuclear terrorism. President Xi Jinping also gave an important speech on the overall national security approach in mid-April, emphasizing that China must attach importance to both external and internal security. China must emphasize both development and security. China will pay attention not only to its own security but also to collective security. China will seek to form a community that shares a common destiny and will advocate that all parties involved seek mutual benefits and interests in common security. That position reflects China’s concept of international security and is the fundamental principle of China’s participation in international security affairs in general and in global non-proliferation governance in particular. As a permanent member of the Council, China has always taken a highly responsible approach to issues of non-proliferation. Starting with the two important links of legislation and enforcement and taking into consideration international practices, China has established a complete set of laws and regulations on export controls for nuclear, biological, chemical and missile materials and technology and has continued to improve the export-control mechanims in that regard. Over the past 10 years, China has actively participated in the work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). In accordance with the requirements of resolution 1540 (2004), it has submitted three national reports on implementation, which describe in detail the Chinese Government’s efforts to prevent and combat proliferation by non-State actors. China has also actively participated in non-proliferation exchanges and cooperation under the frameworks of resolution 1540 (2004), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum, and has endeavoured to fully integrate the resolution into its non-proliferation mechanism and legal system. At present, the international and regional security situation is facing profound transformation. Traditional and non-traditional security elements are interlinked. Non-traditional factors are increasing, while terrorism and extremism threats remain unabated. International non-proliferation efforts have a long way to go. In order to effectively combat and prevent nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism, the international community should seize the opportunity of the tenth anniversary of resolution 1540 (2004) to take stock of experience and lessons learned. In that regard, I wish to make the following three points. First, a comprehensive approach to address both the symptoms and root causes is necessary. Only by securing international and regional peace and security and achieving sound economic and social development in all nations will the hotbeds of terrorism and extremism be eliminated and the motivation of non-State actors in acquiring weapons of mass destruction be discouraged. The international community must work diligently to improve existing non-proliferation mechanisms, while fundamentally improving the global security environment at the strategic level. Secondly, multilateralism must be respected. The proliferation issue must be addressed via political and diplomatic means. Non-proliferation is linked to political, security and diplomatic issues, among many others. Disputes should be settled via diplomatic and political means by giving full play to the role of the United Nations and other international organizations. Confrontation, pressure or resort to the use of force will not lead to the settlement of an issue; but rather to escalation and spillover of conflict, thus increasing the risk of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Thirdly, efforts should be intensified to promote the full and effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). All parties should take effective measures to strengthen their internal management and their export control over sensitive materials and technology, strengthen enforcement measures and respond actively to proliferation risks related to globalization and the dissemination of information. All countries should implement resolution 1540 (2004) fairly and objectively. Discrimination must be eliminated to avoid interference with regular international trade activities. Strengthening global governance in the field of non-proliferation, promoting disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear materials and strengthening international security are in the common interests of the international community. China is ready to contribute its effort and wisdom and to join other countries in promoting the cause of non-proliferation and realizing the dream of the world’s peoples in the area of security.

Thank you, Mr. President, for your presence here today and for convening this important debate. I also thank Deputy Secretary-General Eliasson for his informative briefing. My Government is pleased to join in commemorating the tenth anniversary of resolution 1540 (2004) and in adopting a presidential statement (S/PRST/2014/7) regarding our continued commitment to the goals of that landmark measure. Over the past year, we have been reminded of the horror that can result when weapons of mass destruction are used. Resolution 1540 (2004) was designed to minimize that possibility through concerted international action to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological arms and their means of delivery, especially to non-State actors, including terrorists. In 2004, working with many of those present, my Government crafted a draft resolution specifying some 200 technical and legal obligations every State should undertake to make proliferation riskier for those who attempt it, and easier to detect and stop when they do. Since the resolution was adopted, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) has identified hundreds of additional measures that States on every continent have taken to prohibit weapons of mass destruction proliferation activities, secure sensitive related materials and combat illicit trafficking of such items in response to the obligations the resolution created. Fifteen international organizations and almost four dozen countries, including my own, have registered as assistance providers. When a country requests help in order to meet its obligations, we are prepared to provide it. Regional groups, such as the African Union, the European Union, the Organization of American States and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, have incorporated elements of the resolution into their mandates and daily work. Non-proliferation has also become a major goal of civil society. As Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon remarked last week, the resolution has become a key component of the global security architecture. Accordingly, I commend the efforts of the Council’s 1540 Committee, including its current and highly effective Chair, the Republic of Korea. Since its establishment, the 1540 Committee has done an excellent job of coordinating the global effort to implement that vital resolution. Looking ahead, we know that there remains much more that we can and must do. Stopping the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons is not one of those fields where a pretty good record is enough. The potential consequences of failure anywhere, and at any time, could be catastrophic. Recognizing that challenge, President Obama established the Nuclear Security Summit process. During the third Summit, held in March in The Hague, over 30 countries produced a joint statement calling for the full, global implementation of the nuclear security elements of resolution 1540 (2004) prior to the Council’s next comprehensive review in 2016 — a welcome sign that global vigilance is high and that we are determined to work cooperatively to protect our citizens. The imperative now is to continue moving forward with the tasks outlined a decade ago. Each State must identify its own vulnerabilities and gaps in implementation. Each must develop a plan for next steps, based on a clear sense of priorities for action. Any State that lacks the capacity to take needed measures should request help. States and organizations that are in the position to assist should do so. Everyone involved should be open to sharing useful information on a timely basis. The United States is committed to doing its part. As shown in its most recent report to the 1540 Committee, my Government meets or exceeds international standards in implementing all of its obligations. The report documents dozens of measures taken since 2004 that are designed to implement the resolution’s goals. On the financial side, the United States has contributed $4.5 million to the United Nations trust fund to support resolution 1540 (2004). That is in addition to numerous bilateral aid projects. We have also emphasized the importance of helping States draft effective laws to criminalize and prosecute activities that allow proliferation to take place. We are pleased that the 1540 Committee has begun working with parliamentarians, including the Inter-Parliamentary Union, to organize that assistance. The widespread availability of information is a defining characteristic of our age. There are many benefits to this, but one of the dangers is that people who wish to inflict great harm on others have access to the knowledge that would allow them to do so. That is especially the case with respect to biological agents, which are often able to reproduce themselves, meaning that a proliferator need only acquire a small amount of a pathogen to pose a large risk. For that reason, my Government proposes that special emphasis be placed on improving the design of national and global approaches to the problem of biosecurity, and one way to do so is to promote the global health security agenda. We recognize that terrorists and other proliferators will employ new technologies and methods to gain access to prohibited materials and to avoid detection in transporting and possibly using them. In response, we cannot afford to be complacent. The security system that was adequate five years ago may not be sufficient now, and today’s good system may be obsolete within a few years. In closing, I emphasize the global nature of the threat addressed by resolution 1540 (2004). That includes chemical weapons of the type so ruthlessly deployed against civilians in Syria, toxins sent through the mail in the United States, the complicity of some Governments in proliferation, including that of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and the knowledge that terrorist and militant groups in many parts of the world have actively sought to acquire the means to produce weapons of mass destruction. With that threat always before us, we must proceed with renewed vigour to implement resolution 1540 (2004) fully, cooperatively and urgently.

I thank the Republic of Korea and you personally, Mr. President, for holding this high-level debate, and for the Republic of Korea’s leadership on resolution 1540 (2004) and efforts to promote global non-proliferation. I also thank the Deputy Secretary-General. As we all know only too starkly, the threat of terrorist groups acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction is not a hypothetical or abstract one. In the years leading up to our adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), international terrorist networks, particularly Al-Qaida, had unmistakably shown their intent and ability to commit mass casualty attacks and had signalled their intent to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Clandestine networks had significantly increased the prospect of non-State actors acquiring the materials and means to follow through on their intent. The Security Council’s response through resolution 1540 (2004) is still decisive for the international non-proliferation regime. Our adoption of resolution 1977 (2011) in order to further instrumentalize the global norm against the proliferation and use of such weapons has been essential, and we have made progress towards the universal implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), but the threat persists and has assumed new forms. Between 1993 and 2013, almost 2,500 incidents were reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s nuclear and radioactive material Incident and Trafficking Database, including 16 incidents of illegal possession or attempts to illegally trade highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Others may have gone undetected. With today’s increasingly complex landscape of international trade, technology and financial linkages, new avenues for non-State proliferation are opening daily. As we have just been reminded by the previous speaker, measures to prevent deadly pathogens from falling into the wrong hands must keep pace with expanding medical research and biotechnology. Control regimes and multilateral counter-proliferation efforts must remain relevant, capable and equipped to succeed. So how can we continue to strengthen the implementation of the resolution and tackle existing and emerging gaps? There are a number of steps we should take. First, in an environment where funding and resources are hard to come by, it will become ever more vital to leverage links with other United Nations instruments and multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes. By inviting the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to participate in the workshop for Pacific island States that Australia is co-hosting with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in May, the Pacific region is strengthening the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction and controls on other materials and technology related to weapons of mass destruction more broadly. As Chair of the Australia Group, a multilateral export control regime, we welcome closer engagement between the 1540 Committee and the Group. The Group has now formally offered to the 1540 Committee assistance to interested States on the implementation of export controls related to dual-use chemical and biological agents and related equipment. Secondly, leveraging the role of industry and the private sector in preventing proliferation is crucial. The relevant sectors of industry must be made aware of the threats surrounding the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Industry must be a genuine partner in our efforts to inform and strengthen export controls, in controlling access to intangible transfers of technology that could be used for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and in helping prevent proliferation financing. Together with Germany, we have submitted an effective practices paper to the 1540 Committee on our common strategic approach to engaging industry in national export controls, which we hope will be useful to others looking to strengthen their export controls. Thirdly, we need to overcome the challenges faced by developing countries in implementing resolution 1540 (2004). Part of the solution is to better harness the link between security and development. For instance, export and border controls to detect and combat illicit trafficking in weapons of mass destruction can also aid in the prevention of small arms, drugs and wildlife trafficking. It can enhance a State’s disease surveillance network, support trade expansion and generate Government income. The case of Kenya leveraging 1540 Committee assistance to develop a comprehensive border management plan to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and arms and wildlife trafficking is an example of establishing synergies that will reinforce the relevance and sustainability of non-proliferation programming. There are also opportunities to better coordinate the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) with other Security Council obligations. Developing States, especially small developing States, need more coordinated guidance from the Council so that efforts to enact legislation and improve law enforcement helps them fulfil the range of Security Council measures to prevent terrorism, strengthen non-proliferation and implement relevant sanctions. Today’s presidential statement (S/PRST/2014/7) recognizes the need to enhance cooperation between the non-proliferation and terrorism Committees, and there is certainly an appetite among States for that, as shown by the first open briefing held in 2013 by those Committees with the Financial Action Task Force on counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism financing issues. Regions are themselves driving better coordination — and we need to leverage that  — and benefiting from it. The Caribbean Community’s focal point for resolution 1540 (2004) is now supporting Caribbean States in identifying and filling gaps in their legislation in order to enable them to implement all of the Security Council non-proliferation, terrorism and sanctions obligations. To conclude, we have identified just a few proposals to realize the universal implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) in the years ahead. Those are not new, comprehensive or easy options to pursue. This is why the Committee, as called for in the presidential statement we adopted today, should develop a precise strategy for effective implementation as part of the comprehensive review due in 2016. It is essential that we both close gaps in implementation and stay ahead of technological advances, to ensure that weapons of mass destruction materials do not end up in the wrong hands.

I welcome you, Minister Yun Byung-se, and congratulate you on your presidency of the Council. I would like to thank the Government of the Republic of Korea for its initiative in holding this open debate on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and I congratulate it on its leadership in implementing resolution 1540 (2004). I would also like to thank Mr. Jan Eliasson, the Deputy Secretary-General, for his statement. Today’s debate is timely, since it is taking place on the tenth anniversary of resolution 1540 (2004), which established a committee pursuant thereto whose main aim is to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, as well as any kind of activity on the part of non-State actors connected to such proliferation, particularly for reasons of terrorism. Unfortunately the current climate, featuring the re-emergence of global terrorism and fear that non-State actors may acquire weapons of mass destruction, is no different from earlier years, and in some situations has actually worsened. In the decade since the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), we have seen some significant achievements in its implementation. As speakers before me have said, 172 of the 193 Member States have submitted their national reports to the Committee. Dialogue between the 1540 Committee and Member States, including visits to the countries concerned, has intensified. The sharing of experiences and effective practices relating to implementation of the resolution between Member States and internation, regional and subregional organizations has increased. Cooperation between the Committee and the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, and the Counter-Terrorism Committee has been strengthened. Awareness-raising workshops and seminars have increased and proliferated around the world. Despite these commendable efforts on the part of the international community, Chad is concerned about the fact that a number of Member States have porous borders and do not possess effective security forces or border officials with the tools necessary to enable them to detect illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological materials and to confront terrorist threats. I should recall that in 2011 terrorist groups acquired arms from Libyan bases in order to invade a sovereign State, in this case Mali. What might have happened if they had been able to get their hands on nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or their means of delivery? Paragraph 14 of resolution 2118 (2013) established Member States’ obligation to inform the Security Council of any violation of resolution 1540 (2004), including acquisition by non-State actors of chemical weapons, their means of delivery and related materials. How can a State meet such an obligation if it does not have the capacity to effectively control its borders? We should stress the importance of strengthening the capacity of Member States’ security forces so as to ensure that their border controls are effective, as well as to promote synergy between non-proliferation and the fight against terrorism within the framework of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The continent of Africa is where terrorist groups have proved the most dangerous in recent years. The invasion of northern Mali by drug traffickers and the armed groups of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, the kidnappings and attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram in Nigeria and the asymmetric war waged by Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the Horn of Africa are all serious threats to the Sahel region. Chad therefore reiterates its commitment to working for the effective implementation of resolution 154 (2004). In conclusion, all strategies designed to combat the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction should include capacity-strengthening for countries that are exposed to that threat and without the means to deal with it.

We are pleased to welcome you, Minister Yun Byung-se, as you preside over the Security Council. We are grateful for your convening of this meeting commemorating the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), which laid the foundations for the international community’s collective efforts aimed at preventing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery from falling into the hands of non-State actors, especially terrorists. Russia was a sponsor of the resolution, which underlines the indisputable fact that the solution to the problem of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery continues to be controlled by the leadership of the Russian Federation. All of us, as responsible members of the international community, have a shared long-term interest in non-proliferation. And one of the most important tasks is achieving the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) in every country. In that contex, we note that the resolution considers all three WMD types — nuclear, chemical and biological — as a single issue, emphasizing that the danger of any of them falling into terrorists’ hands is equal. Over the past 10 years, much has been done to implement this legally binding international instrument, and 172 United Nations States Members have submitted their first reports on its implementation. The work to ensure international cooperation in providing effective national export control systems to countries that do not possess those essential resources continues, and Russia has been actively involved in it. In particular, in January 2013 we organized a regional seminar in Minsk on resolution 1540 (2004) for the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In Kazan, in June of that year, we held the fifth meeting of security chiefs on the problem of terrorism and on preventing WMD from falling into the hands of non-State subjects. In December 2013, the CIS countries held consultations in Moscow on export controls, and this April we conducted a special seminar on export control for the relevant CIS agencies. The Russian Federation has been a responsible party to the founding international legal instruments in the area of non-proliferation, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and other international treaties and multilateral mechanisms. We are constantly improving our own activities for implementing resolution 1540 (2004). and we plan to submit an updated national report soon. We are also playing an active role in the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons. A number of bottlenecks have appeared recently. Planned and systematic work by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) is often reduced to activity in such secondary directions as developing voluntary action plans and industrial and academic contacts, and in participating in various outreach measures. We see the basic work of the resolution being done at the level of regional and subregional organizations without adequate non-proliferation expertise. In our opinion, those trends could eventually weaken the 1540 Committee’s influence on processes linked to the resolution. In that connection, it is vital that the Committee effectively carry out its functions as the central coordinator of global efforts to implement the resolution and in defining the goals and priorities for those efforts. In order to do that, we believe it should focus its main efforts on countries that have not yet submitted their first national reports. Another important area of focus is the preparation for the holding in 2016 of the comprehensive review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). We believe that further practical steps for its implementation will be defined following the review. We look forward to a constructive and fruitful cooperation with all partners in the interest of a more effective implementation the provisions of the resolution.

I thank you, Mr. Yun Byung-se, for organizing this open debate on a topic that is of particular importance to my delegation. I would also like to thank the Deputy Secretary-General for his statement. Let me start by welcoming the adoption by the Council of presidential statement S/PRST/2014/7, which reaffirms the undiminished importance of resolution 1540 (2004) a decade after its adoption. Lithuania associates itself with the statement to be delivered later by the observer of the European Union. Terrorism continues to pose increasing threats to individual countries, as well as the international community as a whole. Motivated by extreme ideologies, characterized by diffused organizational structures and having no attachment to a clearly defined support base, modern terrorist groups and illicit networks turn to indiscriminate violence of a magnitude not previously imagined. To achieve their aims, those groups have increasing sought to capitalize on deep-seated and justified fears associated with the possible harm caused by nuclear, chemical and biological materials if used to attack nuclear facilities, poison water supplies or render entire areas uninhabitable. The traditional weapons of mass destruction regimes were established to address non-proliferation by States. As terrorist threats evolved, they were no longer sufficient to deal with the new international security environment. By adopting resolution 1540 (2004), the Council aimed to fill those emerging gaps by establishing universally applicable measures aimed at preventing weapons proliferation to non-State actors and ensuring that States take practical steps to prevent such proliferation through the adoption of effective national legislation and the establishment domestic controls. The resolution also established a universal means by which to create export control standards outside multilateral export control regimes. Since the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), Lithuania has been a consistent and dedicated supporter. Through a number of workshops held in Lithuania, we have sought to focus on the main elements of prevention, detection and response to illicit trafficking of chemical, biological and nuclear materials. Lithuania recognizes the need for a universal and comprehensive reporting under the resolution. We presented our initial report on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) in 2004 and we continue to provide regular comprehensive updates, most recently in November 2013. Let me now turn to strengthening global nuclear security as a crucial element of achieving the goals set by resolution 1540 (2004). The Hague communiqué, adopted at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, reaffirmed that strengthening nuclear security and preventing terrorists, criminals and all other unauthorized actors from acquiring nuclear materials remains one of the most important challenges in the years to come. It also welcomed the significant work undertaken by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) in strengthening nuclear security. At The Hague, Lithuania joined a statement on promoting full and universal implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), expressing commitment to its full and universal implementation and undertaking to consider a number of measures to that end. We also co-sponsored the initiative on strengthening nuclear security implementation, which is a significant step to ensure continuous improvement of the nuclear security regime worldwide. During the previous Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, Lithuania also announced its support for two important initiatives — activity and cooperation to counter nuclear smuggling, by Jordan, and nuclear security training and support centres, by the United States. Established in April 2012, the Nuclear Security Centre of Excellence in Lithuania is working towards increasing capacities of national and regional experts to counter nuclear smuggling and improve nuclear security culture. Over 400 experts have been trained so far, including through projects for officials from Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia and Moldova. Lithuania is committed to expanding its international cooperation in that field in the years to come. We believe that all would benefit from more cohesion and a communitarian approach to nuclear security. We are fully transparent in meeting all necessary nuclear safety and security requirements. Living in an interconnected world, we want to see more transparency and cooperation among States, especially with neighbours developing nuclear facilities. Any planned or existing nuclear projects in any State must be implemented via open, transparent and honest consultations with all affected countries and by constructively settling transnational issues and disputes to that effect. Ensuring the continued engagement of all States in implementing the goals of resolution 1540 (2004) should be Council’s key objective. Whether through outreach, encouraging the submission and updating of national reports, or through matchmaking between States seeking assistance and States able to provide it, the resolution must continue to be a useful tool for all States. At the same time, it is important to be very clear about what the States are required to produce and how their cooperation contributes to implementing the aims of the resolution. Overburdening States with numerous and complex reporting obligations will only result in reporting fatigue. It is also important for the Panel of Experts of the 1540 Committee to continue country visits and active participation in non-proliferation related events. Furthermore, the Committee should make further use of possible synergies with other Council bodies dealing with non-proliferation issues. We would encourage closer links between the 1540 Group of Experts, the panels of experts of the Committees established pursuant to resolutions 1718 (2006) on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and 1737 (2006) on Iran, as well as the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, in particular through making sure that all Council activities on non-proliferation are sufficiently reflected in their outreach. Finally, although the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004) is due in 2016, it is important to start preparations early, in order to ensure an inclusive and productive process. Let me finish by expressing once again our appreciation for the efforts of the Republic of Korea, as Chair of the 1540 Committee, in strengthening the implementation of the resolution and its universal application. Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein (Jordan) (spoke in Arabic): At the outset, allow me to extend to you, Mr. President, my delegation’s gratitude for your leadership and for your organization of this open debate on non-proliferation — a matter of considerable attention and importance — to coincide with the tenth anniversary of resolution 1540 (2004). Similarly, I thank Nigeria for its able leadership of the Council in April. I would also like to thank the Deputy Secretary- General for his comprehensive briefing. My delegation affirms that the important mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) fosters the Council’s work with regard to resolution 1540 (2004) in the areas of national implementation, supervision, the provision of assistance, cooperation, awareness-raising and transparency. A question comes to mind about facilitating the Committee’s mandate, which will come to an end in 2021. Is it not high time for our Council to grant the Committee a permanent mandate like other subsidiary bodies of the Council, taking into consideration the international community’s pressing need for the Committee’s work? On another score, is it reasonable for the Security Council to play a significant role, through its subsidiary bodies, in the imposition of effective sanctions on terrorists with a view to preserving international peace and security, even though no general mechanism exists to curb the smuggling of materials to be used in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction? It is time to think seriously about amending the Committee’s mandate to enable it to draw up a list of names of smugglers  — non-State actors, entities and individuals  — whose persistence in smuggling such materials has been proven and who have demonstrated no desire to refrain from that crime. It is well known that violence in one State may spill over borders into others. We are therefore duty-bound, as is the 1540 Committee, to move from a unilateral approach to tackling States’ adherence to and application of the resolution to a comprehensive approach to its implementation from an inclusive perspective. In that regard, the Council should in future follow up on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by building regional road maps for implementation by groups of States and not confine monitoring to implementation by individual States. We appreciate the efforts made by the Committee in facilitating the extension of assistance. We also appreciate the efforts made by States and international donor organizations in the provision of technical assistance. We urge those actors to continue their efforts given their benefits for recipient and donor States alike. If we may say so, such assistance should be considered as mutual assistance, given the shared nature of the security environment experienced by States. Jordan has made strides in adhering to the provisions of resolution 1540 (2004) and relevant subsequent resolutions. We have taken and enforced a number of legislative and practical steps at the national level to develop local controls designed to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Jordan has always favoured accession to relevant multilateral treaties on non-proliferation. We are looking into ratifying the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. In this connection, we welcome the outcomes and declaration of the international Nuclear Security Summit held recently in The Hague with the participation of 53 leaders, including His Majesty King Abdullah, in the light of Jordan’s pioneering role in this area. In conclusion, I wish to reiterate our profuse gratitude to you, Sir. I hope that this meeting will consolidate Member States’ commitment to enhancing efforts to implement resolution 1540 (2004).

We warmly welcome you, Sir, to the Council. I also wish to thank the Korean delegation for convening this debate on a matter of profound importance to international peace and security and for the excellent concept note (S/2014/313, annex) that has provided a good guide for our discussions today. I also thank Deputy Secretary-General Eliasson for his very succinct statement. Ten years after the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1540 (2004), it is appropriate that we take stock of the journey so far in its implementation, and indeed the way forward in terms of what remains to be done. The tenth anniversary should also serve as a reminder of the key security challenges of our time and the need to strengthen the use of this binding instrument to address the potential threat to international peace and security if terrorists and other non-State actors were to acquire weapons of mass destruction. As the second Council resolution to invoke Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations outside a country-specific context, resolution 1540 (2004) has been aptly described as filling a gap in international law by addressing the risk that terrorists might obtain and use weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, while the three main treaties pertaining to weapons of mass destruction  — the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) — address non-proliferation, they do not take into account the possibility of such weapons falling into the hands of non-State actors, especially terrorists. Therein lies the significance of resolution 1540 (2004), which can be said to complement the three global treaties. The resolution obliges all States to do three key things: to put in place internal controls to prevent the proliferation of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, their means of delivery and related materiel; to refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors attempting to develop or possess weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; and to adopt effective laws prohibiting non-State actors from possessing weapons of mass destruction, in particular for terrorist activities. In furtherance of these objectives, it is pertinent to say that resolution 1540 (2004) should not be seen as a stand-alone instrument. The increasing threat to global peace and security compels us to act in unison, including through the consolidation of existing non-proliferation mechanisms. We should strive to develop assets and resources at the national, regional and international levels to sustain the long-term vision of the resolution. As demonstrated through its extension in the adoption of resolution 1977 (2011), we should incrementally build on what has already been achieved while remaining adaptive to developing new strategies and a dynamic global security architecture, to meet new proliferation challenges. Resolution 1977 (2011), for example, emphasized cooperation with international, regional and subregional organizations. Such cooperation, we believe, presents an avenue for enhancing global engagement on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). The link between resolution 1540 (2004) and compliance with regimes such as those of the CWC, the BWC and the NPT, and in particular the contents of articles 1 and 2 of the NPT, cannot be overemphasized. It becomes compelling to forestall abuses in the exercise of article 4 of the NPT by calling on States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to accede to the Treaty and bring such facilities under the full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones across all remaining regions of the world is, we believe, important to preventing the vertical and horizontal proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Success in that direction would provide crucial components of transparency in the overall goal of achieving the objectives of the second pillar of the NPT, in pursuance of non-proliferation obligations. The ongoing third session of the Preparatory Committee for the ninth Review Conference, to take place in 2015, provides another opportunity to stridently deepen our resolve to extend the establishment of similar zones in parts of the world where they currently do not exist. Africa became a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 2009 when the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, better known as the Treaty of Pelindaba, entered into force. Among its other aims, the Treaty of Pelindaba seeks to prohibit the development, production, stationing and testing of nuclear explosive devices in Africa. It thus represents a significant step towards strengthening nuclear non-proliferation. As of today, all 53 members of the African Union (AU) have signed the Treaty. Morocco, which is not a member of the AU, signed the Treaty in April 1996. This implies that the Treaty of Pelindaba enjoys universal membership in Africa. The African Commission on Nuclear Energy is the body mandated to monitor compliance by States parties, and has worked assiduously to transform the compliance architecture of the Treaty of Pelindaba. In July 2002, at its thirty-eighth ordinary session, the Assembly of the Organization of African Unity took a decisive step in support of the global chemical weapons disarmament and non-proliferation regime by encouraging the universalization of the Chemical Weapons Convention in Africa. That position was reaffirmed in 2006 when the African Union Commission signed a memorandum of understanding with the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons so as to ensure the full and effective implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention in Africa. As of today, 51 African countries have signed and ratified the Convention. Similarly, in collaboration with South Africa as the then-Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), the African Union, assisted by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, in 2012 organized a workshop for African States on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). The workshop discussed how best to meet the obligations of African States to implement the resolution, given the constraints they faced, linked to their limited capacities and resources. Following the workshop, the African Union, at the twentieth ordinary session of its Assembly in January 2013, underlined the relevance of resolution 1540 (2004) and highlighted the challenges to its full and effective implementation in Africa. In December 2013, the AU held another workshop on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). One of the objectives of the event was to discuss challenges and identify opportunities to address practical issues relating to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), with the aim of equipping African States with the practical tools to enable them to achieve concrete progress in meeting their obligations. All these efforts demonstrate the genuine desire of the African Union to play a leading role in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). While we note the encouraging figures reflected in the voluntary submission of national reports by 172 Member States, we still see a need to consolidate the gains of the first decade by developing a viable Government and civil society partnership to aid various national action plans. An appraisal of the implementation of the mandate of resolution 1540 (2004) shows a measure of commitment on the part of Member States. It is worthy of note that numerous countries have adopted laws and regulations that comply with a substantial number of obligations contained in the resolution. These measures provide reference points and useful mechanisms for confidence-building measures. As we respond to the challenges of today, we must bear in mind that a proactive approach is needed if we are to develop a long-term strategy to deal with potential avenues for the illicit acquisition and use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons by terrorists and other non-State actors. We must be particularly vigilant with dual-use technologies that can be readily applied in ways that may threaten international peace and security. To ensure this, Member States must be kept abreast of emerging issues and maintain their commitment to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Nigeria welcomes the adoption today of presidential statement S/PRST/2014/7. It is indeed a suitable outcome of this important debate. It sends a strong message of commitment on the part of the Security Council to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). We owe a great debt to the delegation of the Republic of Korea for its leadership of the 1540 (2004) Committee, and pledge our continued support to the Committee.

Luxembourg commends the Republic of Korea for taking the initiative to organize this open debate on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004). Your presence, Sir, bears witness to the commitment of your country to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I also thank Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson for his briefing. I fully associate myself with the statement to be made by observer of the European Union. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and the risk that terrorists and other non-State actors may acquire such weapons pose an undeniable threat to international peace and security. To counter this threat, resolution 1540 (2004), adopted unanimously 10 years ago, establishes a legal obligation for all United Nations member “to take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials” (resolution 1540 (2004), para. 3). Since then, as other speakers have noted, many States have implemented such measures. They have often been assisted by other Member States or by international, regional and subregional organizations such as the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the International Atomic Energy Agency. In the area of assistance, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) plays a key role. As a clearinghouse, the Committee can bring assistance requesters and providers together. The Committee’s role is also essential to promoting the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) with the aim of achieving its universality. In this context, we welcome the progress made in raising the number of national reports to the Committee, which now stands at 172 out of 193, representing a rate of nearly 90 per cent. The submission and regular updating of national reports are important confidence-building measures in the fight against all types of weapons of mass destruction. Despite progress towards universalization, the challenges remain significant. Measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction should in particular be constantly updated and adapted to changing technologies, since such technological evolution can facilitate the acquisition of such weapons by non-State actors. To counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, close and effective cooperation between the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, and the Counter- Terrorism Committee is not only desirable but essential. Cooperation among the three Committees and their expert groups has helped to create mutually beneficial synergies. On 18 November, the Chairs of the three Committees participated  — alongside the Chairs of the Committees established pursuant to resolutions 1718 (2006), 1737 (2006) (2006) and 1988 2001), and the Chairman of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) — in a joint open meeting. The meeting sought to raise awareness among Member States of the measures imposed by the Council, and of the assistance that the Committees, their expert groups and the FATF could provide to Member States. It was an example of cooperation that could inspire the future activities of the 1540 Committee could. The importance of resolution 1540 (2004) as an essential tool in the field of non- proliferation was highlighted with the adoption on 27 September 2013 of resolution 2118 (2013) on the elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons programme. On that occasion, the Security Council determined that the use of chemical weapons anywhere was a threat against international peace and security. It also decided that Member States should immediately inform the Council of any violation of resolution 1540 (2004), so that it could take the necessary measures in that regard. Luxembourg is aware of the seriousness of the threat emanating from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For that reason, my country fully supports efforts towards the comprehensive implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Therefore, in late 2013, in the context of our chairmanship of the Forum for Security Cooperation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Luxembourg worked for the OSCE to increase its assistance to Member States in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). In our national capacity, Luxembourg is currently making efforts to reform its export control system in order to strengthen national mechanisms to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related technologies. By presidential statement S/PRST/2014/7, adopted this morning, the Council renews the commitment it undertook 10 years ago. It also recognizes the role of the 1540 Committee and the essential contribution that civil society, industry and the private sector have to make. To counter the global threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, we must indeed mobilize all energies.

The adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), 10 years ago, on 28 April 2004, was a historic breakthrough in the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. I wish to thank the Republic of Korea for having organized this high-level debate on the issue, as well as for submitting presidential statement S/PRST/2014/7, which we have just adopted. Resolution 1540 (2004) was a historic step for several reasons. For the first time, the Council involved itself in the issue of the risk posed by biological, chemical, nuclear and radiological weapons falling into the hands of terrorist groups or other non-State actors, thus constituting a threat to peace and security. Moreover, by framing the resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Naions, the Council decided to play its role as guarantor of international security and stability by demanding, in an unprecedented way, that Member States take concrete measures to prevent thе risk that weapons of mass destruction could fall into the wrong hands. Finally, by setting up the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), the Council gave itself the means to ensure ongoing follow- up to the resolution and to support cooperation among States to combat weapons mass destruction. Ten years after its adoption, we can see undeniable progress in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Today, a majority of the countries of the world have adopted measures to enshrine the provisions of the resolution in their national laws. In that regard, I welcome the work of the South Korean chairmanship of the 1540 Committee and its experts aimed at encouraging the few countries that have not yet done so to submit their reports to the Committee on the implementation of the resolution in their national legislation. Moreover, the main international, regional and subregional organizaions now have adopted strategies to implement and promote the measures set out in the resolution. Therefore, since 2004, the European Union has promoted the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). In July 2013, the Foreign Affairs Council of the Union adopted a new decision specifically addressing the resolution, allocating more than €1.5 million to supporting regional efforts to implement it. France is also taking on its responsibilities. In the 1540 Committee, we coordinate the working group on assistance, which is an essential component of the work of the Committee. In that context, France, along with its partners, is continuing efforts towards the holding of a conference in Paris on this subject, as we said we would. In addition, in all forums in which we participate, we advocate for the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and for strengthening measures under resolution 1540 (2004), including strict implementation. Despite the undeniable success of the past 10 years, much remains to be done. In order to address the issue of emerging technologies possibly being exploited by terrorists, all Member States should further strengthen export controls, prevent and suppress the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and secure sensitive goods and materials. In recognizing those challenges, at the Nuclear Security Summit held at The Hague at the end of March, France committed to launching an initiative aimed at strengthening the security of radioactive sources, including highly radioactive sources. Indeed, while fortunately infrequent, but nonetheless disturbing, cases of theft illustrate the need for better conceptualizing the security of such radioactive sources in order to avoid the fatal consequences of their possible use by groups or individuals. That is a matter of ensuring that such sources are not diverted for criminal purposes and that they continue to be used for purposes in which they render very important services  — in industry, agriculture, medical and health areas, university settings and for scientific research. France’s efforts include working to strengthen the international rules pertaining to minimizing the use of highly radioactive sources and establishing a group of exporters of radioactive sources to strengthen international cooperation to prevent loss of Government control over such materials. The proliferation activites of North Korea and its nuclear and ballistics tests, which we strongly condemn, illustrate the need to ensure the full implementaiton of resolution 1540 (2004). In the event of new provocations, North Korea would expose itself to new Security Council sanctions. In that context, I would add that the Republic of Korea and our friends in the region can count on France’s solidarity. Lastly, I would like to commend the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea for successfully energizing the work of the 1540 Committee since 2013, so as to guarantee the optimal implementation of the resolution throughout the world.

I would like to thank you Mr. President  — Minister Yun Byung-se, member of the Cabinet of the first woman President of the Republic of Korea, President Park Geun-Hye  — for your initiative in convening this meeting on an issue of such great importance for the international community, especially on such a meaningful date as the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004). I should also like to thank Mr. Jan Eliasson for his statement and his briefing. I also want to congratuate you Sir, for the excellent work being done by Ambassador Oh Joon and his team in the chairmanship of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), thereby continuing the outstanding work done by his predecessor, the fondly remembered Ambassador Kim Sook. Above all, Sir, I commend you for your national commitment behind the effort to achieve the universal submission of reports by Member States. You and your delegation have the full support of my country, both during your presidency of the Security Council as well as in the 1540 Committee. In addition, allow me to say that Argentina resolutely supports presidential statement S/PRST/2014/7, adopted this morning. As we mark 10 years since the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), this debate provides an opportunity to highlight the challenges as well as a chance for each of our countries to take stock in connection with this issue. Having already referred to this, I should also like to point to the constructive efforts that were long made by members of the Security Council, as well as by countries not serving on the Council, to arrive at resolution 1540 (2004). I should like to point out that our colleague Rosemary DiCarlo was working at that time with a great deal of commitment towards the adoption of the resolution. All permanent members of the Council have worked, and continue to work, on efforts to support those standards. I should like to emphasize the two pillars of my country’s approach, as a State policy, to resolution 1540 (2004). The first is respect for the sovereign right of States to the development and peaceful use of advanced technologies, and the second calls for disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Argentina has submitted its report on its activities related to the implementation of the resolution adopted in 2004, and has also described what it has done in subsequent years. In 2009, we were the second country to present a national action plan. We are currently working on updating that document. I would like, once again, to reaffirm the sovereign right of countries to the development and use of sensitive and dual-use technologies in advanced industrial sectors, including in nuclear, chemical, biological, pharmaceutical, space and nanotechnologies, among other areas, in coordination with the State and private sectors, in the case of my country, and as a means of achieving the development of our industries. Argentina is actively involved in the initiatives of the international community to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of any kind, and it upholds the principle of a total ban on the development, possession, acquisition, transfer or use of such weapons by State and non-State actors. As mentioned, Argentina has made significant progress in the peaceful uses of dual-use technologies. Even before 2004, we had implemented a series of national and international control measures. Following the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), my country expanded those measures in relation to non-State actors and joined regional and global actions in that area. Argentina is party to the legal instruments that constitute the pillars of the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention and the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. Argentina is convinced that an effective system of export controls must be based upon four fundamental pillars. First, we need a transparent and standardized national system for licensing. Secondly, there should be effective compliance with the current legislation applicable to export controls. Thirdly, we should promote corporate awareness of the importance of the system for industrial development and for security in international trade. Fourthly, there should be close regional cooperation. Reflecting its commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation, my country is the only one in our region that is part of the five control regimes for sensitive exports — the Australia Group, on chemical and biological material, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, in space technology, and the Wassenaar Arrangement in the field of conventional arms. We have hosted many events in our country, the idea being to ensure true cooperation on the regional and international levels on this agenda. At the national level, the lists and criteria that have come out of those regimes nourish the work of our national commission for the control of sensitive exports and military material, which has been in operation for over 20 years. In addition, Argentina has ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the amendment to article 5. We are in the advanced stages of legislative consideration of the adoption of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. In that regard, cooperation between the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the 1540 Committee has been valuable. In its commitment to the peaceful use of technology and non-proliferation, since 2010 and the inception of the Nuclear Security Summit, Argentina has actively joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. We are working to strengthen our capacity to control our ports and have become part of the Megaports Initiative. In the area of cooperation, we might mention what has been done in our region to generate a culture of security with trained human resources and the necessary infrastructure and equipment, all of which are necessary to bring about a culture of security. I would like to refer to the workshops we have held, within the framework of South-South cooperation, on the control of weapons and dual-use technology. A regional meeting for education about chemical weapons was held, and an Argentine programme was prepared for the responsible use of dual-use chemicals. Finally, within the framework of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, there will be in August a cabinet-level exercise, held with Chile, on the response to, and mitigation of, acts of nuclear terrorism. Other members of the Initiative will also be present. On the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), we believe that it is necessary to reaffirm that there are no good weapons of mass destruction, where some others are bad. As expressed by the Secretary-General in his statement of 28 April (see S/PV.7161), there are no right hands that can handle these wrong weapons. We believe that the significant efforts of the international community in the areas of physical protection, export controls and combating illicit trafficking in dual-use technologies will achieve only limited success globally as long as there remain stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. For that reason, we believe that there should be universal and strict compliance with the existing treaties by all States and under equal conditions. The only way to ensure that weapons of mass destruction do not fall into the wrong hands is through their total elimination.

I wish to remind all speakers to limit their statements to no more than four minutes in order to enable the Council to carry out its work expeditiously. Delegations with lengthy statements are kindly requested to circulate the texts in writing and to deliver a condensed version when speaking in the Chamber. I also wish to inform all concerned that we will be carrying this open debate right through the lunch hour as we have a very large number of speakers. I now give the floor to the representative of India.

At the outset, Mr. President and Minister for Foreign Affairs, I would like to welcome you and to express India’s appreciation for scheduling this discussion on a subject of great significance for us, our region and the world. I also would like thank the Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Jan Eliasson, for his comprehensive briefing on the subject. India has an unwavering commitment to international efforts to prevent non-State actors and terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and their means of delivery. We fully support all efforts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to implement its mandate. We are conscious of the dangers that transfers of such WMDs to non-State actors could entail. Given the evolving complex challenges emanating from non-State actors to international peace and security, such risks and our responses need to be tailored appropriately, and the 1540 Committee can play its role in that regard. The international community must join hands to eliminate the risks relating to sensitive materials and technologies falling into the hands of terrorists and non-State actors. The international response to the threat needs to be national as well as multilateral and global. India believes that meeting new proliferation challenges requires reinvigorated approaches in a variety of multilateral and global forums. The focus on non-State actors must not take attention away from national responsibility to curb proliferation. India supported the general objectives of resolution 1540 (2004). That resolution is in line with the General Assembly resolution entitled “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction”, adopted by consensus every year since it was first introduced in 2002, and now sponsored by more than 70 member States. As a member of the Security Council, India supported resolution 1977 (2011), which extended the mandate of the 1540 Committee for a period of 10 years. Following a commitment announced at the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, India, in cooperation with the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, organized a 1540 workshop on the theme “Building new synergies on nuclear security” in New Delhi on 30 November and 1 December 2012. Discussions at the workshop were substantive and focused on building new synergies for nuclear security. India has always expressed its readiness to offer assistance to other countries in capacity- building and in fulfilling their obligations under resolution 1540 (2004). Nationally, India has enacted a number of effective laws and regulations and put in place institutions and administrative mechanisms to prohibit WMD access to terrorists and non-State actors. After the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), India took additional steps to further strengthen its existing legislative and regulatory mechanism for exercising control over WMDs and their means of delivery. The WMD Act enacted in June 2005 provides for an integrated and over-arching legislation on prohibiting unlawful activities in relation to WMDs, their delivery systems and related materials. Amendments to the 1992 Foreign Trade Act passed in 2010 further strengthened our national export control system. India has never been a source of proliferation of sensitive materials or technologies. We are proud of our record in nuclear security and nuclear non-proliferation, but we are not complacent. India is committed to upholding and strengthening the physical security of nuclear facilities and materials. India is committed to maintaining effective national export controls consistent with the highest international standards, and is prepared to make its contribution as a full member of the respective multilateral export control regimes. Resolution 1540 (2004) has contributed to greater awareness among Member States on the need for effective measures at the national level to prevent terrorists and non-State actors from gaining access to sensitive materials and technologies. Reporting by States of their implementation measures facilitates the overview of implementation by the 1540 Committee. Measures for the implementation of the resolution should be undertaken by States based on their national practices and processes. Assistance to and cooperation with States requesting such assistance are key elements of the implementation process. Such assistance programmes should be suited to specific national or regional requirements. In conclusion, let me state that the 1540 Committee has also established cooperative relations with several international organizations. Consistent with their respective mandates, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons can contribute to the objectives of resolution 1540 (2004). We commend Ambassador Oh Joon for his stewardship of the 1540 Committee, and for the professionalism with which the Committee has been implementing its mandate.

I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan.

We thank Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson for his briefing this morning. We also thank Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se for presiding over today’s Council meeting and commend Ambassador Oh Joon for his very effective leadership of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Resolution 1540 (2004) establishes obligations on States to enact and enforce effective measures to prevent and suppress the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons to non-State actors. Over the past decade, it has filled a gap in international law to prevent non-State actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, helped create an elaborate architecture of national laws, regulations and administrative measures, and raised awareness about the complex nature of the threat we face. Enjoying the support of the wide membership, the resolution has placed the United Nations at the centre of the non-proliferation effort. The 1540 Committee has been a strong catalyst in preventing proliferation. It supports many treaty regimes and, even without being a treaty regime itself, ensures compliance through voluntary measures. The Committee has worked closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and is becoming an essential tool for the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, its 2005 amendment and the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. The three nuclear security summits have recognized the key role being played by the 1540 Committee to strengthen nuclear security. The 1540 Committee’s immediate challenge is to persuade some two dozen States to file initial implementation reports. The Committee plays an important part in mobilizing assistance. It should enhance its match-making role by mapping assistance needs and working as a clearing house between assistance providers and recipients. The Committee and its Group of Experts could focus even more sharply on outreach, awareness-raising and complementarity. Increasing awareness and encouraging action in the field of emerging cyberthreats, as well as advances in chemical agents and synthetic biology, should be given priority. In those areas, Governments, industry and research and academic institutions should work together. To broaden the base of ownership and deepen cooperation, the Committee should organize an annual, open and interactive briefing in New York. It is also advisable to enhance the Committee’s cooperation and coordination with the Councils’ subsidiary bodies, as well as with international, regional and subregional organizations. The possibility of non-State actors acquiring or using WMDs is a shared concern. Pakistan, as part of international efforts to address that contemporary challenge, has contributed constructively to advancing the aims of resolution 1540 (2004), including during our last two terms on the Security Council. Pakistan has put in place a comprehensive export control regime. The legislative, regulatory, administrative and enforcement measures of that regime are on a par with the standards followed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group. Our export control regime has an elaborate institutional set-up compromising a dedicated Strategic Export Control Division, an oversight board and a standing inter-agency coordination mechanism. The Strategic Export Control Division has twice notified and published national control lists, making them enforceable by Pakistani customs and other relevant agencies. Those lists, revised last in 2011, are classified on the basis of the European Union’s integrated system. Our national detection architecture includes the use of detection devices at several entry and exit points, as well as other random checkpoints to deter, detect and prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials. We have also established a centre of excellence that conducts specialized courses in nuclear security, physical protection, material control and accounting, transport security and personnel reliability. Our Parliament is considering a bill to strengthen and streamline our legislative and regulatory regime to meet our obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention. Our national authority for implementation of Pakistan’s obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention has been in place since 2000. Pakistan works closely with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in that field. As a party to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Pakistan has enacted an anti-money laundering law, established a financial monitoring unit in the State Bank of Pakistan to track suspicious financial transactions, and frozen hundreds of bank accounts. Pakistan has engaged international export control regimes. Pakistan fully qualifies to become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, where we can share our experiences and expertise and benefit from the good practices of other States. As we revive our economy, we look to international cooperation and assistance for nuclear energy under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

I give the floor to the representative of Brazil.

I thank you, Sir, for organizing this open debate. We appreciate the fact that the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea is personally presiding over today’s meeting. I also wish to thank Deputy Secretary-General Eliasson for his briefing. Brazil firmly believes that the mere existence of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to humankind and therefore to international peace and security. Throughout the past 50 years, the international community has succeeded in agreeing on multilateral legally binding instruments that ban some categories of these lethal armaments, such as biological and chemical weapons. We remain frustrated, however, by the absence of political will and leadership on the part of States possessing nuclear weapons to initiate similar negotiations aiming at the complete elimination of these weapons, with clear benchmarks and timelines. The possibility that weapons of mass destruction could fall into the hands of non-State actors, particularly terrorists, is a matter of additional concern. Circumscribing our efforts only to fighting proliferation amounts to a limited perspective, however. There is an urgent need for concrete action towards effective disarmament by States possessing weapons of mass destruction. Also, we remain convinced that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has to be tackled in all its aspects. The risks of vertical proliferation, especially of nuclear weapons, cannot be left aside. Today, cuts in nuclear arsenals are quickly offset by qualitative improvements in nuclear forces, by the modernization of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and by the roles ascribed to nuclear weapons in the national defence doctrines of States possessing these arsenals. As long as weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, continue to exist, there will be States and non-State actors interested in acquiring and developing them. Let me recall the Secretary- General’s words, issued at a conference in Monterey, California, in 2013, that “there are no right hands for wrong weapons”. That statement has also been quoted by previous speakers today, including in particular the Ambassador of Argentina. Despite the shortcomings of any strategy that does not contemplate the linkage between disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, Brazil is fully committed to its obligations in this field, including those arising from resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1977 (2011). The Brazilian Federal Constitution already forbids the conduct of any non-peaceful nuclear activity in Brazilian territory. Furthermore, my country is a party to all major treaties and conventions in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, such as the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We are also one of the promoters of the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and, in the framework of the zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic, we have been highlighting the benefits of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the southern Atlantic. We have incorporated into our national legislation all obligations deriving from those instruments, as well as those from resolution 1540 (2004), and we have submitted national reports to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). In this context, we value the important work that has been carried out by the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts in assisting States to promote match-making in cooperation and assistance, and other activities related to the implementation of the resolution. The tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), which falls close to the seventieth anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, as well as the forty-fifth anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, provides an opportunity to reflect on the achievements and challenges still ahead in the promotion of a safer world In this context, we reiterate our concern over the lack of consensus that has prevented us from further advancing in the disarmament forums, such as the Conference on Disarmament, for 18 years now, and in the United Nations Disarmament Commission for a whole decade. The NPT review cycle, for its part, has been characterized as a rolling-over exercise every five years by the nuclear-weapon States with respect to the implementation of their disarmament commitments. Brazil also expresses disappointment over the postponement of the conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, which should have taken place in 2012, and supports its convening at the earliest possible date. In conclusion, no effort on the non-proliferation front, valuable as it may be, will suffice without further steps in disarmament as regards all weapons of mass destruction. These processes are mutually reinforcing and must all be pursued with the same vigour by the international community.

I give the floor to the representative of Japan.

It is my great personal pleasure to see you, Sir, presiding over this important organ of the United Nations. In order to respect the time limit of four minutes, I will circulate the full text of my statement and deliver only the salient points. Japan joins others in celebrating the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), and commends the efforts of the Committee established pursuant to the resolution to strengthen its activities. We highly appreciate the concept note that the presidency kindly circulated to us (S/2014/313, annex) to streamline the discussion. Today, I would like to make comments related to the section “Looking ahead: challenges and ways forward” in the concept paper. In order to effectively raise awareness of the importance of non-proliferation efforts, in particular among high-level policymakers, we should keep in mind that some States believe that export controls impede trade and investment. They also believe that non-proliferation efforts may pose obstacles to economic growth, but we do not think they do. In this context, I would like to share what Japan has been doing in the Asian region, where awareness of the importance of export control is rising. At the commemorative summit meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Japan held in Tokyo in December 2013, leaders agreed to intensify efforts to implement relevant measures for non-proliferation, including cooperation in strengthening export control capabilities of ASEAN Member States. When Japanese Foreign Minister Kishida delivered a speech on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in January, he emphasized the strategic effects of export control. What he meant was that strengthening export controls would help foster confidence in the reliability of trade or investment among the States and companies involved. Export control would thereby create a favourable environment for economic growth, rather than impede trade and investment. With this in mind, Japan has been carrying out technical assistance programmes for capacity- building, and we will continue to expand these activities. Let me continue with our activities in support of resolution 1540 (2004). Japan has been hosting the Asian Export Control Seminar in Tokyo for more than 20 years. This year, we were pleased to enjoy the participation of the Panel of Experts of the 1540 Committee. We have also been organizing seminars under the rubric Turtle Bay Security Roundtable, here in New York, on non-proliferation and disarmament, in partnership with the Missions of Poland and Turkey. We held the sixth round of the Roundtable in March with the participants of many Member States and, again, of the Panel of Experts of the 1540 Committee. I would like to conclude my statement by reconfirming Japan’s continued commitment to being deeply involved in the long-term process and reiterating our strongest support for work towards the full and universal implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).

I now give the floor to His Excellency Mr. Jacek Bylica, Principal Adviser and Special Envoy for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament of the European External Action Service. Mr. Bylica: I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU). The candidate countries Turkey, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia; the countries of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidates Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association country Norway, member of the European Economic Area; as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Armenia and Georgia, align themselves with this statement. The European Union wishes to thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea for organizing and presiding over this important event. In accordance with your wish, Mr. President, I am limiting my oral remarks, while the full text of the EU statement is being made available in writing. At the outset, I would like to stress that, from the beginning, the European Union has been a staunch supporter of the robust and effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and subsequent resolutions 1673 (2006) and 1810 (2008), with the objective of strengthening global efforts to prevent the acquisition and use by terrorists of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and materials and their means of delivery. Today’s event represents a perfect opportunity to assess both the work that has been achieved and the great challenges that remain ahead of us. As the EU has a long history of supporting non-proliferation and disarmament, both politically and financially, the resolution allowed us to give our efforts another dimension. In December 2003, the EU adopted its strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, which, inter alia, spells out the objective of strengthening the role of the Security Council and enhancing expertise in meeting the challenges of proliferation. Following the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), a thorough re-examination of the EU dual-use regulation took place, which led to the entry into force in 2009 of a revised regulation, including export controls and controls on transit, brokering and transhipment issues, which served to fill any potential loopholes in former regulations. Within the EU, since 2000, export controls and dual-use goods have been regulated in our member States by community law, which has since then been repeatedly amended to respond to the growing and specific challenges in the field of export controls. In order to give more clarity and to contribute to a more common policy, the four export control regime lists  — the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Nuclear Suppliers Group  — were merged in 2009. That merger turned out to be a success, as it led to easier applicability and practical value. The merged list has therefore become an example followed and effectively implemented by many countries outside the EU. Looking outside of Europe, the EU strongly supports regional and national efforts towards the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including through information-sharing, enhanced cooperation with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and the provision of effective assistance to those States that require it. Since 2004, the EU has invested €17 million in an outreach programme in the area of non-proliferation and dual-use goods export controls with 28 partner countries, which aims to enhance the effectiveness of export-control systems for dual-use items. Two European Council joint actions have been adopted, in 2006 and 2008, respectively, and a new European Council decision was adopted in July 2013 in a total amount of €1.5 million. The EU long-term strategy is consistent with the three broad obligations under the resolution: the physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials; dual-use export control; and border security. The assistance clause has been recognized by the EU as a major dimension of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), and therefore was explicitly included in the most recent European Council decision on resolution 1540 (2004) . To develop its strategy on the ground and assist countries, the EU has defined its actions around five pillars, under which all the relevant fields of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) are covered: the subregional workshops with a focus on physical protection and accounting; country visits at a country’s request; experts’ meetings and events; the training of the relevant Government authorities and stakeholders in the private sector; and public relations efforts, for example, through the support for the publication of the electronic journal on issues related to resolution 1540 (2004). As those actions are implemented by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Office for their efforts and effective collaboration with the EU. In parallel with the European Council decision adopted under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, in 2009 the EU adopted a chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear action plan that consists of 133 internal measures to prevent, detect and respond to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats and risks. Approximately €100 million has been dedicated to the implementation of that package. The project, under the Instrument for Stability, also contributes to the objectives of resolution 1540 (2004) through its chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear centres of excellence initiative, which is aimed at reinforcing the institutional capacity of partner countries to fight such risks. We would also like to underscore the issue of adopting national action plans. In that regard, the EU welcomes the significant progress achieved. As for the EU, all our member States have reported on their implementation to the 1540 Committee, and a number have issued their national action plans. We encourage other United Nations States Members to follow those good examples, report to the 1540 Committee on measures undertaken to ensure the implementation of the resolution and consider adopting national action plans if they have not yet done so. We also encourage those States to take full advantage of the range of assistance available to help them to do so, if required. The EU also believes that the perspective of resolution 1540 (2004) and its implementation should not be limited to preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. That is the primary objective; however, measures taken to fulfil it offer numerous other advantages in a more holistic and comprehensive dimension. Capacities built with regard to border control serve well beyond the purpose of detecting one type of sensitive material or another. They significantly enhance and improve a country’s security, but also collective security in a broad sense. The EU recognizes the importance of cooperation with partners from other regions in that respect. As already mentioned, our action is guided in that respect by the 2003 EU strategy against proliferation, which is based on the promotion of effective multilateralism and the relevant international instruments and is carried out through specific cooperation and assistance projects with regional organizations. In particular, the EU welcomes the combined efforts undertaken with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Moreover, in 2011, the EU and the United States of America signed a joint EU—United States declaration in which they both committed to undertaking continuous efforts aimed at the implementation of resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1977 (2011). As the mandate of the 1540 Committee has been extended until 2021, we would like once again to recall our full commitment and continuous support to this issue. Our global struggle against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles is far from over. Numerous ongoing crises remind us that our actions in that field are needed more than ever. I would like to assure you, Mr. President, that you can count on the EU to continue these efforts, along with the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts.

I now give the floor to the representative of Guatemala.

At the outset, I would like to congratulate the Republic of Korea on having assumed the presidency of the Security Council for this month and for its dynamism, transparency and able leadership in chairing the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). We very much welcome the personal participation in today’s meeting by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yun Byung-se, and we thank the Deputy Secretary-General for his briefing. This open debate is an opportunity to assess the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) over the past 10 years and to contribute to the discussion on the best way to strengthen and consolidate its achievements and correct its failures. Resolution 1540 (2004) occupies a significant position in the area of non-proliferation, and is designed to strengthen the focus of non-proliferation commitments without affecting its direct connection to the fulfilment by all States’ of their obligations in the areas of the other pillars of disarmament, including the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Its aim is to ensure that all Member States comply with their obligation to prevent the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction and related materials and their acquisition by non-State actors, and to see that they have the resources and the capacity to do so. We also acknowledge the valuable work of the Committee’s Group of Experts and its efforts in the areas of outreach, awareness-raising, application, assistance and capacity-building, particularly through country visits. In addition to country visits, the Group of Experts participates in numerous workshops, seminars and events around the world. In a way, they are the face of the Committee, and the Group’s composition should therefore reflect the universal nature of this important resolution and take due account of broad geographical representation as a factor in integrating its investigations. Universal, general and balanced implementation of the resolution depends on Member States playing a central role and requires that the Committee fully comply with its mandate. We support the Committee’s efforts to fulfil its mandate by increasing the number of reporting countries, gathering experience concerning the resolution’s application and promoting international cooperation and assistance with its core activities. We believe that the two elements that are key to full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) are assistance and information exchange. In that regard, in addition to continuing to seek ways to improve and advance its role in facilitating assistance between donor countries and Member States that request it, it would be helpful to go beyond that one function and play a more direct role, through training or creating its own assistance programmess for States, for example. We also commend the efforts made to set up better communication mechanisms with Member States, such as through the establishment of national and regional points of contact. And country visits should involve other Committee members besides members of the Group of Experts. It is also important that close relationships be established with States. Communication and cooperation with specialized regional and international organizations should be established and encouraged in order to achieve full implementation of the resolution. In that regard, we would like to highlight the role of the United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament in this area. I will conclude by noting that in December 2013, Guatemala presented its third national report and updated matrix, in accordance with resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006), and thereby reaffirmed its unequivocal commitment to the cause of a safer world in which nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction no longer exist.

I now give the floor to the representative of South Africa.

South Africa welcomes the opportunity to participate in this exchange of views on issues related to resolution 1540 (2004) on this, the tenth anniversary of its adoption. In 2007, three years after the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), South Africa affirmed the fundamental principle underlying security from weapons of mass destruction (WMD)  — that as long as such weapons exist, the world will always be threatened by a weapons- of-mass-destruction catastrophe. Today, 10 years after that adoption, South Africa seeks to remind all States that there are no safe hands for these weapons. We also remain of the view that the challenges facing the international community in the area of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems can be effectively addressed only through inclusive multilateralism and reinvigoration of the relevant multilateral instruments and organizations. The relevant international regimes provide a clear recognition of the inextricable link between disarmament and non-proliferation, and set out the obligations of those possessing such weapons concerning their elimination, while upholding the right of all States to the peaceful use of relevant technologies. The threat posed by these weapons to international peace and security cannot be eliminated through non-proliferation measures alone. South Africa submitted its first report on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) on 31 January 2005. This and subsequent reports included a comprehensive overview of South Africa’s domestic legislation relevant to the control of material, equipment and technology related to weapons of mass destruction. While we are proud of our control system, we realize that no system is foolproof or can be static in a world of rapid technological advances. Reviewing and implementing additional measures is therefore an ongoing process. At the same time, we recognize that such measures should under no circumstances impose any unwarranted restrictions on the inalienable right of States to utilize material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes. One of the primary requirements of resolution 1540 (2004) is the submission of national reports. Given the challenges that have been experienced in this regard, in resolution 1977 (2011) the Security Council called on all States that had not yet submitted a first report to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) on steps they had taken, or intended to take, to implement resolution 1540 (2004), to do so. In the past three years, South Africa has played its part in facilitating progress towards the resolution’s implementation, including by chairing the 1540 Committee, during our non-permanent membership of the Council. In 2012 and 2013, South Africa hosted and participated in workshops in Pretoria and Addis Ababa on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). This year we hosted another workshop in Pretoria, following Gabon’s successful hosting of a similar event for French-speaking African countries in March. Another workshop is planned for Portuguese-speaking countries, to be held in Togo in June. Those efforts were all geared towards helping African States to meet their reporting obligations under resolution 1540 (2004). Although no African State possesses these weapons and most do not export or produce material and equipment that fall within the scope of resolution 1540 (2004), South Africa recognizes that any State could potentially be used as a point of transit or trans-shipment of goods that could be intended for non-State actors. However, it should be noted that there exists little incentive for such States, some of which are underresourced and overburdened in other areas of their development, to commit to onerous reporting standards. States should therefore identify any gaps they may have in their domestic controls and call on relevant international expertise if required. In this regard, it is important to note and respect the domestic legislation already in place in countries that effectively regulates all items related to weapons of mass destruction in accordance with their own particular circumstances. It is also important that in countries where such legislation is lacking, best practices can be drawn upon to empower them to take sovereign control of WMD non-proliferation, in conformity with their domestic legislation and in the interests of their development. South Africa notes that there are regional and subregional efforts to implement resolution 1540 (2004) and that activities have taken place within the Caribbean Community, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Central American Integration System. In that regard, South Africa welcomed the submission, in August 2011, of the African Union Commission’s point of contact for resolution 1540 (2004) and of the Commission’s statement on 1 May 2014 reiterating the Commission’s commitment to the implementation of the resolution on the continent. South Africa continues to support the African Union’s mandate as the primary international organization with the authority to oversee such matters on the continent.

I now give the floor to the representative of Germany.

At the outset, let me express our gratitude to the Republic of Korea for convening this open debate on non-proliferation. Germany aligns itself with the statement delivered by Special Envoy Bylica on behalf of the European Union and wishes to make the following remarks in its national capacity. Today’s anniversary is significant. On 28 April 2004, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1540 (2004), and, if I may add, the Council did so at the time under the presidency of Germany. After 10 years, the relevance of resolution 1540 (2004) is as high as ever. Attempts by non-State actors to acquire weapons of mass destruction and related material remain one of the most severe threats to global security and to humankind. In that context, we commend in particular the tireless efforts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) under your able leadership, Mr. President, as well as its 1540 Group of Experts. We acknowledge the important role of the Committee as a forum for assistance matchmaking in moving implementation forward. Germany continues to provide substantial direct support and assistance to other States’ implementation efforts, including through implementing the European Union’s assistance programme in the area of export controls. We welcome the efforts of the Chair to look at ways to enhance assistance as a key element of resolution 1540 (2004), and would be happy to see that aspect incorporated in a medium-term strategy yet to be elaborated. We also believe that promoting synergies with other counter-terrorism and non-proliferation bodies would be beneficial to enhance implementation. Let me highlight one aspect of particular relevance. The implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) needs the active involvement of all the relevant stakeholders. In that context, the role of industry and the private sector remains a central concern of the German Government. That is why two years ago we initiated the so-called Wiesbaden process in cooperation with the Secretariat. Wiesbaden, incidentally, is the name of one of Germany’s most beautiful towns in the neighbourhood of the Frankfurt airport, which is always worth visiting in the Rhine valley. It is there where Germany hosted two major international industry outreach conferences on resolution 1540 (2004). They were aimed at facilitating the Committee’s dialogue with industry and strengthening the partnership between Governments and the private sector. This year, we envisage a conference entitled Governance and Compliance Management. It will further explore how industry can complement States’ implementation efforts in various areas, such as biosecurity, chemical and nuclear security, transport, brokering and export control. We are confident that this first-ever dialogue process with industry provides valuable input for the Committee’s work, not only in view of its upcoming comprehensive review in 2016, but also for the Committee’s strategy and future priorities. Very much in the spirit of the Wiesbaden process and following the call of the 1540 Committee Chair, I am pleased to announce that Germany has just finalized, together with Council member Australia, a paper on effective practices on how to engage industry in the field of export controls. We hope that it will serve as a tool for reference and may guide or assist other States in their implementation efforts. Let me, once again reaffirm Germany’s strong commitment to the full and universal implementation of Council resolution 1540 (2004).

I now give the floor to the representative of Canada.

Allow me to thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to speak this morning. (spoke in English) The 10-year anniversary of any international initiative is a notable milestone. After a decade, the global community is well positioned to assess what an initiative has achieved and where further efforts are still required. We have reached that moment of reflection for resolution 1540 (2004). We have an opportunity to take stock of what the resolution has helped us accomplish to date and to reaffirm our commitment to do what is needed to achieve its intended objectives. The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons remains a serious threat to global peace and security. An attack using such weapons would have devastating consequences for the global community and would directly contradict the values of human dignity, as well as free and open societies. At the recent Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, our Prime Minister, The Honourable Stephen Harper, cited the responsibility of world leaders to take the necessary steps to ensure that an act of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism did not happen. As no country is immune to the effects of WMD terrorism, we must work collectively to prevent weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials from falling into the wrong hands. (spoke in French) That is the primary objective of resolution 1540 (2004), which the Council adopted unanimously a decade ago. As we mark the resolution’s tenth anniversary, Canada remains committed to its full and universal implementation. We are taking several tangible steps, including in collaboration with our partners, to advance that essential goal. At the recent Nuclear Security Summit, Prime Minister Harper announced that Canada and the Republic of Korea were leading a joint initiative on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). The initiative, which outlines a series of concrete steps that countries can take to advance the effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) both domestically and internationally, was endorsed by more than 30 Summit participants and the United Nations. We believe that this document, albeit focused on nuclear issues given the context in which it was prepared, can provide valuable direction to States in their efforts to implement the resolution, both within and beyond the nuclear security context. We will submit it to the Security Council for inclusion in the record of this debate. (spoke in English) Canada strongly supports the central role of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and its Group of Experts in the implementation of the resolution. We believe the extension of the 1540 Committee’s mandate to 2021, in resolution 1977 (2011), is an acknowledgement of the ongoing importance of our joint WMD counter-proliferation efforts. We must continue to provide support to help the 1540 Committee advance its work. That is in our interests, as well as those of future generations. Reporting is an essential element of the resolution. Canada has submitted three national reports on our national implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), in 2004, 2006 and 2008. We urge all States that have yet to submit their initial mandatory national reports to the Committee to do so as soon as possible, to ensure the universal implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Canada is working with partners, through multilateral organizations, to encourage countries to submit their initial national reports, and stands ready to provide assistance, as required, to help meet that objective. Canada also submitted in 2010 a voluntary National Summary Action Plan on resolution 1540 (2004). We plan to soon submit a forward-looking update outlining our ongoing domestic and international efforts to implement the resolution. We encourage all Member States to consider preparing and submitting such action plans as a way to outline their national priorities for 1540 implementation. It is also important that all countries identify a national point of contact for resolution 1540 (2004) as a tool to facilitate the resolution’s implementation. (spoke in French) Through its global partnership programme, and in furtherance of the voluntary commitments outlined in the statement to the Nuclear Security Summit and the call contained in the resolution itself, Canada is making a significant and tangible contribution to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) throughout the world through capacity-building activities in support of States requiring assistance in implementing provisions of the resolution. Canada is supporting six regional workshops and related follow-up activities to build capacity in States to implement international legal instruments related to nuclear security such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its amendment. We are also providing legislative assistance to countries in South-East Asia and Latin America to support the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and related treaties. We are working through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum and with the World Customs Organization to support efforts to counter illicit trafficking of weapons of mass destruction and related materials in the ASEAN region. As called for in resolution 1977 (2011), regional and subregional organizations have an important role to play in the effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). We encourage countries to consider the value of establishing and/or funding coordinator positions for resolution 1540 (2004) within regional and subregional organizations, as appropriate, in order to facilitate regional approaches to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including through relevant capacity-building events. (spoke in English) Ten years after its adoption, resolution 1540 (2004) remains a cornerstone instrument in the global effort to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Guided by the resolution, the international community has taken concrete and effective steps to enhance domestic legal and physical controls over weapons of mass destruction, their related materials and delivery systems, and has established mechanisms to prevent their illicit trafficking. Despite this progress, we must remain focused on achieving the full and universal implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Canada continues to take concrete steps towards achieving this objective and we encourage all Member States, in their respective national contexts, to do the same. It is only through concrete efforts to implement resolution 1540 (2004) that the international community will be able to effectively combat the ongoing and serious challenges posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. Maintaining global peace and security will depend on our ability to succeed in these efforts over the years to come.

I now give the floor to the representative of Switzerland.

I will deliver a shortened version of my prepared statement in the interest of time. I ask the Security Council to take note of my written text. At the outset, I would like to thank the Republic of Korea for having organized this open debate, which is of great importance because this is an issue that concerns all Member States. It goes without saying that Switzerland fully supports the objectives of resolution 1540 (2004) and its follow-up resolutions. The resolution, unfortunately, remains important in the light of the persistent threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and by their potential use by non-State actors. We should therefore continue our efforts to effectively implement the resolution. In that regard, I will briefly address three points. The first concers the importance of national implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and role of international instruments in that regard. Switzerland has for its part made its expertise availability to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to assist in the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. In the area of exports, Switzerland controls the transfer of dual-use items in a broad and systematic manner. The written text of my statement contains further detail. Secondly, international assistance can play a useful role in advancing implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). In that regard, in 2011 Switzerland, at Iraq’s request, provide such assistance in the area of bio- safety and bio-security. That cooperation also involved the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre, a non-governmental organization. Thirdly, regional organizations also have a role. For example, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), with Switzerland’s support, carries out awareness-raising activities, provides specific information and assists States in developing national legislation and national action plans. A few weeks ago, the OSCE Points of Contacts on resolution 1540 (2004) met in Vienna. While the implementation of existing provisions remains a priority, we must also anticipate new challenges, such as the implications of dual-use and convergence in the areas of biology and chemistry resulting from revolutions in the life sciences, and find meaningful ways to address them. While such advances have enormous potential for public health, biomedical science or agriculture, there is also growing risk of State or non-State actors exploiting such sciences to illicit ends. As current Chair of the Biological Weapons Convention, Switzerland is aware of such risks and will therefore launch a series of workshops focused on the implications of the convergence of chemistry and biology. We will inform the 1540 Committee regarding the results of that initiative. In conclusion, the international community must continue its efforts to manage the risks posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Their use could have severe humanitarian consequences and major repercussions for security, the economy and the environment. This also concerns the very existence of such arms: until they are prohibited and abolished, they will continue to represent a risk to peace and security throughout the world.

I too would like to take this opportunity to convey my congratulations to you, Madam, and the Republic of Korea, on assuming the presidency of the Security Council for this month. My delegation wishes to thank you for convening this timely open debate to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004) and for the useful concept note (S/2014/313, annex) to guide us in our deliberations today. I also wish to express my delegation’s appreciation to Deputy-Secretary-General Jan Eliasson for his statement. The adoption of resolution 1540 (2004) was in many ways a milestone for the Security Council. Ten years ago, the Council committed itself to combating the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery. By invoking Chapter VII powers, the resolution sent a strong political message that there was an urgent need to address this matter and reaffirmed, at the same time, that there were legal obligations for States to uphold. My delegation recalls that the sponsors of the draft resolution took the initiative to conduct informal consultations with the broader membership, in the course of finalizing the text. As Chair of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) at the time, Malaysia also conveyed the views and concerns of NAM member countries, underlining our collective support for international non-proliferation efforts. Ten years on, we have moved forward and it is indeed time to take stock of the current state of play and to forge a common understanding of the way forward. Malaysia is strategically located in one of the most important and busiest international shipping routes. Our reliance on international trade necessitates a robust and clearly defined approach to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). In 2010, we enacted the Strategic Trade Act in line with our commitments to ensuring that Malaysia is a safe and secure trading partner, while at the same time shouldering our responsibilities to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The legislation was also intended to protect Malaysian exporters from being exploited by proliferators and those who profit from such activities without, compromising legitimate trade in strategic items. In the control and monitoring of exports, the importation of in-transit and trans-shipped goods and the brokering of strategic items, the Strategic Trade Act specifically addresses major concerns related to global trade. They include re-exports, munitions trans-shipments and trans-shipments of dual-use controlled items to an end user situated in or acting on behalf of destinations of proliferation concern. In order to ensure effective implementation across the board, outreach programmes seek to help the business community as it deals with Government enforcement agencies. That has resulted in increased awareness of the obligations under the act, as well as high levels of compliance from the private sector. We realize that non-proliferation is a global concern that requires a global response. Therefore, Malaysia has also undertaken initiatives at the regional and subregional levels to complement and strengthen existing national efforts. In the past year alone, Malaysia hosted outreach events and capacity-building workshops, with a focus on related topics ranging from establishing a bio-risk culture and the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention to facilitating secure trade in the Asian-Pacific region. I wish to note as well that Malaysia has officially offered assistance to other Member States through the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). We will consider such requests in the areas of legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation and resources for fulfilling the provisions of the resolution. In that regard, my delegation wishes to suggest that Council members work with assistance providers within the larger membership to enhance the matchmaking mechanism under the resolution in order to ensure that such assistance is more effective. Malaysia is a participant in the Nuclear Security Summit, and more recently the Proliferation Security Initiative. We recognize that each approach has its benefits and drawbacks. We have also observed that international non-proliferation efforts do not exist in a vacuum. Indeed, one of the objectives of resolution 1540 (2004) is to bridge the gaps between the various measures. As such, my delegation is of the view that the 1540 Committee can play a useful role in coordinating its work with other multilateral non-proliferation initiatives. That is particularly important given the resource needs of developing States for full and proper implementation. In conclusion, let me once again underline Malaysia’s strong commitment to ensuring that weapons of mass destruction do not fall into the hands of non-State actors. We will continue to undertake efforts at the national, regional and international levels towards that end. In that regard, we reiterate our support for the work of the Security Council on non-proliferation. We hope that the Council will continue to take into consideration the views of countries in the global supply chain as well as those of other developing countries on this important matter.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.

I now give the floor to the representative of Morocco.

My delegation would like to commend the initiative of the Republic of Korea in organizing this high- level commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004). That adoption reflected the common will to step up the fight against the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery and, in particular, to prevent their acquisition by non-State actors. The contribution of resolution 1540 (2004) to the non-proliferation regime and the fight against terrorism is undeniable. The ten-year extension in 2011 of the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) demonstrates the shared determination to pursue the achievement of the resolution’s aims, which filled in several gaps in international law. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) is a threat to international peace and security. The Kingdom of Morocco shares the conviction of the international community, which remains concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk of non-State actors acquiring WMDs or their means of delivery. Morocco welcomes the role of the 1540 Committee in the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and supports its activities aimed at preventing non-State actors and terrorist groups from acquiring such weapons. The Kingdom of Morocco is a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the conventions on biological and chemical weapons. We neither have nor will we develop any weapons of mass destruction, and we have no programmes for ballistic missiles or other means of delivery. We have also subscribed to The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. Morocco plays an active part in international efforts and initiatives against terrorism and for non-proliferation. On 26 October 2004, Morocco submitted its report under paragraph 4 of resolution 1540 (2004) and has since updated it. Morocco’s efforts to complete its legal and regulatory arsenal relating to combatting proliferation and trafficking in equipment or material that could help non-State actors to acquire or use WMDs shows our steadfast commitment to working with the international community to combat terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs. Those efforts have helped to strengthen our legal and regulatory system under international norms and to establish a control system for the export of dual-use materials. Paragraph 7 of resolution 1540 (2004) recognizes that certain States may require assistance to implement the measures of the resolution. Morocco believes that only active international cooperation based on the principles of solidarity and shared responsibility, along with access to resources and the exchange of information and experience, will make it possible to bring about the effective and universal implementation of the provisions of the resolution. Moreover, the legal and technical obligations, the one-year extension of the mandate of the 1540 Committee and the invitation to States to develop national action and implementation plans are all aspects that require more active international cooperation. The existing assistance mechanism should be strengthened in order to be able to meet the expectations of States for appropriate assistance, particularly in Africa, and to support States in implementing the resolution. To conclude, I would like to emphasize that national efforts will not be sufficient without stronger regional and subregional cooperation. In that regard, the international community should speed up its efforts to seek the total eradication of WMDs as the ultimate guarantee against their use and acquisition by non-State actors.

I now give the floor to the representative of Italy.

Allow me to begin by thanking the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea for organizing and presiding over this important debate. I would also like to thank the Deputy Secretary- General, Mr. Jan Eliasson, and today’s speakers for their important contributions to the discussion. Italy aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union, and wishes to make several remarks in its national capacity. The adoption, 10 years ago, of resolution 1540 (2004) marked an important step forward in strengthening global efforts to prevent the acquisition and use by terrorists of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and materials, as well as their means of delivery. Since then, Italy has adopted legislation, regulations and policies to comply with the provisions of the resolution. Recently, at the third Nuclear Security Summit, held in The Hague, several States and international organizations gathered to move a step forward in strengthening nuclear security. On that occasion, a joint statement on promoting the full and universal implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) was presented by a large number of States, including Italy. It was a valuable opportunity to reiterate the importance of resolution 1540 (2004) and its comprehensive and cross-cutting scope, which goes beyond the nuclear domain. At The Hague we also submitted a gift basket: a joint statement on nuclear security training and support centres of excellence, which serves to reaffirm that education and training are crucial to the exchange of information and best practices among States, to the strengthening of capacity-building and security culture and to the maintenance of national high-level and well trained technical experts. Over the past few years, Italy has paid special attention to education, training and institutional capacity-building as essential elements of an effective safety and security infrastructure. The International School on Nuclear Security, established in 2010 by the International Atomic Energy Agency at the International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, will hold its fourth annual training course in 2014. We believe that such educational efforts should lie at the heart of any strategy that seeks to strengthen a global response to threats from weapons of mass destruction and to prevent non-State actors from gaining access to sensitive material and knowledge. Italy is a member of the Proliferation Security Initiative. It is also a founding member of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and participates in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. In 2013, within the framework of the Global Partnership, we co-chaired with the United States the centres of excellence sub-working group, which can play a critical role in strengthening the institutional capacity of States to mitigate the risks, including criminal activities, associated with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. The broader scope of resolution 1540 (2004) relates to major export-control regimes. The current Italian chairmanship of the Missile Technology Control Regime is also working to stress that connection.

I now give the floor to the representative of Colombia.

Today’s Security Council open debate commemorating the tenth anniversary of resolution 1540 (2004) provides an opportunity to reaffirm the need for us as States Members of the United Nations to fully comply with our obligations and commitments with regard to the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. We believe that international peace and security will be fully realized only once the world is free from weapons of mass destruction, from the threat that they represent and from the risk that they will be used by armed non-State actors or terrorists. Resolution 1540 (2004) not only complements international efforts to achieve disarmament, to ensure the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to strengthen the fight against terrorism, it also identifies a new threat, namely, the possession of such weapons, their delivery systems and related materials by non-State actors or terrorists. We therefore reiterate the importance of effective compliance with international legal instruments on weapons of mass destruction and the implementation of their main pillars, that is, disarmament, non-proliferation and the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and chemical substances. In compliance with paragraph 4 of the resolution, which provides for the presentation of reports on implementation measures adopted or to be adopted by members, Colombia has submitted three reports on its national implementation. The most recent report, submitted in 2013, sets out, among other things, details of the regulation of radioactive and/or nuclear materials in Colombia and of its compliance with Security Council resolutions on that issue. Resolution 1540 (2004) also establishes that international cooperation and assistance provided to States for effective implementation are crucial elements for prevention. In that context, Colombia has hosted, in previous years, meetings attended by representatives of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and various national authorities in order to deal with priority areas in the physical protection and management of nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological materials. During the meetings, national authorities reported on progress in their implementation of the resolution and noted the need for cooperation on various areas. Likewise, with the support of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and the backing of the Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation, my country organized in 2012 the a seminar for the Andean Community States on resolution 1540 (2004). Its objective was to discuss national and regional compliance with the resolution among representatives of the Andean countries and a select Panel of Experts, as well as to explore the possibility of assistance and international cooperation to strengthen capacity in that area. As a result of those two workshops, Colombia prepared, in coordination with its main partner in that regard, the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE), a national action plan, which included cooperation guidelines for strengthening its national capacity in implementing resolution 1540 (2004). My country plans to hold an event to launch the national plan in cooperation with CICTE and the 1540 Committee in the second half of this year. That activity will bring together Government authorities with jurisdiction in the matter and possible contributors and will seek to reiterate the importance of resolution 1540 (2004) and the responsibility of national institutions for its effective implementation. In the same way, the event will seek to raise the awareness of national institutions on the clear and concrete benefits of implementing the resolution and to inform the international community of national efforts to develop and strengthen institutional implementation capacities. The role of the national police has been considerable, given that it has achieved progress in establishing a response unit on weapons of mass destruction to deal in a timely and effective way with criminal acts involving nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical agents. The unit received support from the Governments of Canada, through the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the United States, through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as well as from international bodies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, in training personnel on identifying and responding to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. My country sees nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as part of a comprehensive process towards general and complete disarmament in all its aspects. Hence the importance for all bodies of the United Nations, within their respective competencies, and the international community to resolutely commit themselves to achieving concrete goals, such as the early entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty, stronger implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

I now give the floor to the representative of Finland.

It is my pleasure to thank the Republic of Korea for organizing such a timely and important event. Promoting the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) is a priority in managing all kinds of threats that result from the existence and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Finland fully aligns itself with the statement of the European Union and would like to add a couple of remarks from a national perspective. I will introduce the multi-benefit model used in our non-proliferation work and extend to all countries present an invitation to the next plenary of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. International cooperation to implement common decisions starts at home. Finland is one of the seven regularly reporting Member States that has submitted five voluntary reports on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) since 2004. In addition, Finland contributes to non-proliferation projects and cooperative activities in various regions, ranging from Latin America to East Asia. That effort is mainly based on a multi-benefit principle in allocating and using scarce resources. I will give just two examples, the first of which is that measures that facilitate the detection of and response to biological weapons will also improve disease surveillance and other national public health capacities. In that context, earlier this week Finland hosted the Helsinki Commitment Development Meeting as a part of the Global Health Security Agenda. Nearly 200 health security experts from over 30 countries gathered in Finland to discuss that initiative, which is relevant to the topic being discussed today. The aim is to strengthen our ability to prevent, detect and respond to emerging infectious diseases, whatever the cost. As a second example, we would mention that resources to detect the movement of terrorists across borders can also help in combating human trafficking, and vice-versa. Improving non-proliferation capacities in that way will also address other needs in a given country. On the basis of such a strategy with multiple benefits, we can promote both goals — security and development — with our partners. I want to recognize here the role of the Stimson Center, which is based in Washington, D.C., in designing that innovative model and applying it to projects that serve non-proliferation objectives. Finland has supported the work of the Stimson Center in advancing the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) is one of the efforts that serve the goals of resolution 1540 (2004). Finland is pleased that the GICNT takes place in good cooperation with permanent international organizations. The United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency and INTERPOL are actively involved in the GICNT as official observers. Finland has agreed to host its next plenary meeting in Helsinki in June 2015. The previous plenary was hosted with success by the Government of Mexico in 2013, and we strive to reach the same high standard as Mexico did in organizing our meeting. The priorities of the GICNT include nuclear detection, nuclear forensics and response and mitigation work. Our own national experience shows that sharing best practices and participating in exercises in the framework of the GICNT is useful and in our interest. I want to extend our thanks to the Republic of Korea for taking over the demanding task of coordinating the work of the GICNT in its Implementation and Assessment Group. Currently, 85 partner nations are involved in GICNT cooperation. We very warmly welcome those States who have not yet joined the Initiative to Helsinki next year. To conclude, let me once again thank you, Madam President, and your Government for your leadership in promoting resolution 1540 (2004). Finland looks forward to the comprehensive report that the 1540 Committee will submit to the Security Council in 2016. We hope that we will be able to offer some of our ideas and experiences and that they will be useful to the Committee in its preparatory work.

Before I give the floor to the next speaker, I would like to remind all speakers to limit their statements to no more than four minutes in order to enable the Council to carry out its work expeditiously. Delegations with lengthy statements are kindly requested to circulate their texts in writing and to deliver a condensed version when speaking in the Chamber. I now give the floor to the representative of Poland.

It is an honour for me to deliver this statement on behalf of Croatia and my own country, Poland. As we fully subscribe to the statement delivered on behalf of European Union, allow me to present a few remarks that both our countries share with regard to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Croatia and Poland have a long-standing and successful history of bilateral cooperation in the sphere of disarmament and non-proliferation. In the context of the United Nations, both our countries perceive resolution 1540 (2004) to be one of the most important elements of the global non-proliferation architecture. In that context, both Croatia and Poland have undertaken various initiatives aimed at promoting the goals and objectives of the resolution. In 2004, after the adoption of the resolution, both our countries took the obligations derived from that document very seriously. We remain aware of the impact that the implementation of the resolution has on international peace and security. To fully meet high non-proliferation standards, both our countries have undertaken measures aimed at increasing the capabilities of the relevant national law enforcement agencies in order to prepare them to respond to the challenges posed by the illegal smuggling of materials related to weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors. I would like to draw the Council’s attention to the following initiatives, which are among the various steps that both our countries have undertaken. First, in 2013, the Croatian Government adopted the National Strategy and Action Plan for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Strategy defines the general framework of actions by Croatia pertaining to the suppression of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It provides guidelines for strengthening the coordination and integration of the activities of State and public authorities and other legal entities in the Republic of Croatia and their cooperation with other States’ entities and international organizations. In 2010, Poland established an inter-ministerial committee for the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It defines Poland’s policy in the sphere of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and analysing proliferation trends, challenges and threats. The committee serves as a coordinating body for representatives from various ministries and agencies. As a result of our national experiences, both our countries introduced, in 2013, the concept of the resolution 1540 (2004) peer review, which is a bilateral framework in which to compare experiences and examine, jointly and on an interactive basis, the implementation of policies, approaches and practices related to resolution 1540 (2004). The basic idea behind the concept was to move beyond current implementation activities and simple awareness-raising towards country-specific dialogue and stronger mutual cooperation in implementation of that important resolution. We agreed that the peer review should be an evaluation carried out in order to enhance national implementation and identify effective practices. The peer review consisted of two visits by groups of national non-proliferation experts representing various ministries and agencies. Exchanges of ideas and relevant experiences in implementation of the resolution have proved to be a mutually beneficial process that has enabled participating States to learn from each other’s experiences. Both our countries are convinced that such bilateral cooperation provides an excellent framework for a more effective implementation of the resolution. The report summarizing the initiative will soon be submitted to the 1Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). We also stand ready to share our experience with all interested States. To that end, in cooperation with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Croatia will host a regional seminar on the peer review process in June 2014. The seminar aims at taking forward the peer review process of cooperation between Poland and Croatia and encouraging a regional and coordinated approach to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) in South-East Europe. It will bring together participants from the region, a number of countries interested in advancing peer review cooperation and representatives from regional and international organizations and civil society. In conclusion, let me stress once again that both Croatia and Poland perceive resolution 1540 (2004) to be one of the cornerstones of international security. As we speak, in the Chamber next door, the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is in the final days of its current session. We are truly convinced that a swift and comprehensive implementation of the provisions of resolution 1540 (2004) also serves the purposes of the NPT process. With the peer review mechanism developed by Croatia and Poland, which could easily be adopted by interested countries, we can enhance the global response to the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction.

I now give the floor to the representative of Spain.

I would first like to express my gratitude for the convening of this meeting on the occasion of the tenth nniversary of the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004). We are debating an issue of great importance for international security. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the Republic of Korea for its contribution to the discussion on non-proliferation in international forums, highlight its work as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and to wish it success in its presidency of the Security Council for this month. I would like to voice our support for the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union, to which we fully subscribe. On 28 April we marked the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004). As a member of the Security Council at the time, Spain contributed to it through its extensive accumulated experience in the fight against terrorism. In the years leading up to the resolution, the international community had witnessed the appearance of new threats linked to weapons of mass destruction. In particular, those were the potential use of technologies and related materials by terrorist groups and non-State actors, which represented a great challenge. The resolution offered an appropriate response, establishing a series of obligations under which States had to take steps, establish controls and develop legislation in order to prevent proliferation and physically protect nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological materials. Spain has complied with the resolution and worked in an effective manner in all of the following areas. We presented our first report in 2004, and we have updated it since. We have worked on the gradual review and development of our capabilities in order to deal with our security requirements. We have developed a broad legal framework aimed at preventing proliferation and the illicit trade of weapons and dual-use goods. We have developed national and international coordination efforts and appropriate technical capabilities. Spain is currently working on developing a national plan in accordance with the recommendations of the 1540 Committee. I would like to highlight the following priorities of the plan, which are developing and updating a legal framework; protecting critical facilities; controlling sensitive transfers, including that of intangibles, and the protection of transport protection; establishing intervention and response mechanisms in case of an incident; and international cooperation. Global threats require global responses. Spain has therefore made particular efforts in the area of international cooperation. First, to the extent that we are able, we have responded to requests for assistance channelled through the 1540 Committee. We have developed cooperation with various friendly countries for preventing nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological threats as well as for mitigating the consequences in case of an incident. As an example, this year, together with Mexico, we organized a seminar in Madrid on the various aspects of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), in which we had participation from countries of Latin America and the Caribbean as well as the support of the Committee’s Group of Experts, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the International Atomic Energy Agency. We have also intensified our cooperation efforts through multilateral forums. In that regard, I would like to emphasize Spain’s coordination efforts during three years in the technical programme of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which today includes 85 countries and four international organizations. That multilateral and bilateral cooperation has also resulted in an action plan for the prevention of threats relating to weapons of mass destruction, which we are currently developing with Morocco, with whom we recently carried out a joint exercise of response to a terrorist attack with a radiological impact. The risks and threats frequently evolve more quickly than States’ preventive activity can. Moreover, growth in the peaceful uses of nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical technologies, materials and installations increases the possibility that non-State actors, and terrorist organizations in particular, can gain access to such materials and installations and commit crimes, factors that might facilitate attacks with a huge impact that could result in serious human and material damage. One example is the vulnerability of certain critical facilities where, whether through conventional means or cyber systems, a terrorist group could cause incidents with serious consequences, including radioactive, chemical or biological impacts. Therefore, the security concepts that gave rise to resolution 1540 (2004) should be continually updated through the introduction of such elements as the protection of critical facilities against terrorist attacks, biosecurity and cybersecurity. Resolution 1540 (2004) represented a historic initiative in the international community’s commitment to combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and fighting terrorism. In that regard, the tenth anniversary is also a unique opportunity to reaffirm its principles and goals. Today, therefore, Spain wishes to express its commitment to those principles and goals, as well as to reaffirm its readiness to develop dialogue, joint efforts and cooperation with other countries and international organizations in order to confront our global security challenges decisively.

I now give the floor to the representative of Cuba.

Aware of the danger that the mere existence of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, poses to all humankind, Cuba remains firmly in favour of their prohibition and elimination. For Cuba, the prohibition and total elimination of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons is the only way to ensure their non-proliferation and to prevent them from falling into the hands of terrorists or from being used by accident or mistake. Cuba does not possess or intends to possess any weapons of mass destruction of any kind, and possessing them has never formed part of our national defence strategy. In Cuba, all programmes related to the nuclear, chemical and biological fields have always been strictly peaceful in nature and their benefits have been used solely for the welfare of the Cuban people and their socioeconomic development. All such programmes are continually and rigorously monitored by the relevant national authorities and subject to supervision by the competent international entities. Cuba rejects the selective focus and double standards that some countries attempt to impose in addressing issues related to disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control and their connection to the threat of terrorism. This focus promotes measures against horizontal proliferation while ignoring vertical proliferation  — that is, the improvement of nuclear weapons by States that possess nuclear weapons. It also ignores the goal of the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction. For its part, Cuba has an impeccable record in the fight against terrorism and has never allowed, and never will allow, terrorist acts against any country to be conducted, planned or financed on Cuban territory. Cuba is a party to 16 of the existing international conventions on terrorism and has complied strictly with its obligations under resolutions 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004) and other related Security Council resolutions. We reiterate our absolute rejection of all terrorist actions, methods and practices in all their forms and manifestations by anybody, against anybody and wherever they are committed, whatever their motives may be, including those actions in which States are directly or indirectly involved. We also condemn any action aimed at encouraging, supporting, financing or concealing any terrorist actions, methods or practices. We believe that the international community should not accept that, under the banner of an alleged fight against terrorism, certain States commit acts of aggression and interfere in the internal affairs of other States, execute or permit gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law or commit unilateral actions that are contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and the principles and norms of international law. We vehemently reject the arbitrary and unjustifiable inclusion of Cuba on the annual list of the State Department of the United States on so-called State sponsors of international terrorism, which was issued on 30 April. That absurd designation reflects the manipulation of the highly sensitive issue of international terrorism to make it an instrument of the policy against Cuba. We demand that our country be permanently excluded from that spurious, unilateral and illegitimate list, which violates the principles of international law, is an offense to the Cuban people and discredits the United States Government. International cooperation by all States in the framework of the United Nations and the relevant international treaties is the way to deal with the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists. In particular, the General Assembly, as the most democratic and representative organ of the Organization, is the appropriate body to comprehensively address that threat, without double standards and with true international cooperation in that area on the basis of mutual respect, sovereign equality and the principles and norms of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations. We reiterate the position of the Cuban Government against weapons of mass destruction and with regard to the prevention and confrontation of international terrorism. As a demonstration of our Government’s commitment to that issue, Cuba will soon submit to the Security Council a new compliance report on resolution 1540 (2004). I conclude by urging all delegations to actively celebrate the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September.

I now give the floor to the representative of Saudi Arabia.

At the outset, I am pleased to congratulate you, Sir, on your presidency of the Council for this month and I wish you every success in your work. I am also pleased to express my appreciation to your predecessor, the Permanent Representative of Nigeria, for her leadership of the Council last month. For more than 60 years, the entire world has relied on the Charter of the United Nations and the Security Council as instruments of the international community to ensure peace and security in the world. The Security Council was given the mandate to implement that crucial role, and today we are trying to carry out to nuclear disarmament and the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. Saudi Arabia has made great strides in implementing resolution 1540 (2004). With a view to strengthening cooperation at the regional and international levels to maintain peace and security in the area of disarmament, the resolution aims at preventing non-State actors from manufacturing, possessing, developing, transferring, transforming or using weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) through national legislation and foreign policy. Saudi Arabia was one of the first countries to adopt international resolutions on nuclear disarmament, including resolution 1540 (2004). It has paid special attention to developing an infrastructure for nuclear security and to training in the area of human resources. It established an academic programme on nuclear science and organized an international workshop on resolution 1540 (2004) in Riyadh in January 2011, with a view to raising awareness of the resolution through the participation of many delegations from countries in the region. In 2012, Saudi Arabia contributed $500,000 to help the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) fulfil its mandate. Three different events were organized in cooperation with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Nations University and the 1540 Committee. Many officials from countries, universities and specialized institutes participated in those events to raise awareness of the work of the 1540 Committee and its impact on international peace and security. Your own delegation, Mr. President, had a very important role in the success of those events, since it was Chair of the Committee at that time. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has clearly demonstrated its international commitment to resolution 1540 (2004) by acceding to international conventions and treaties on WMDs, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, as well as to the 1925 Geneva Protocol on toxic gases. That reflects Saudi Arabia’s commitment to support international efforts to eliminate WMDs for the achievement of international peace and security. Saudi Arabia has announced its intention to develop an ambitious programme to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes to achieve the sustainable development goals and preserve the hydrocarbon resources for the coming generations. That programme is completely in line with the nuclear security requirements and use the guidelines of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the planning, establishment and operational stages. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is committed to the establishment of an international monitoring system to control nuclear material. We make every effort to control our borders, customs and all law enforcement agencies to stop any illegal trade in those materials. We reiterate that nuclear security strategies must be cooperative and based on mutual confidence. They must not obstruct peaceful nuclear programmes around the world. We would also like to reiterate the legitimate right of all countries to possess nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, in accordance with the guidelines of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia emphasizes the importance of the efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the need for the international community to adopt similar measures through legal frameworks to achieve a world free of terrorism and nuclear weapons, especially in the Middle East. Security and stability in any region cannot be achieved through weapons of mass destruction. However, it can be achieved through cooperation and consultation with other countries, development, progress and by avoiding a destructive arms race. Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons therefore represents a major obstacle to the achievement of stability and security in the Middle East. We therefore reiterate our call for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, including by inviting Israel’s to declare its nuclear weapons and submit it nuclear sites to the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Based on our position on the need to rid the Middle East of nuclear weapons, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia reiterates its regret at the failure to hold the conference on establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East scheduled to be held in Helsinki in 2012 because of Israel’s refusal. Such a conference must be held as soon as possible in 2014. One single country in the region must not be allowed to spoil the chance for all countries to live in peace, free of nuclear terror. Saudi Arabia underscores that the Syrian regime must remove and destroy all chemical weapons and materiel and end all relevant activities in implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) and the resolutions of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. We express our concern at the Syrian regime’s failure to meet its deadlines, most recently on 27 April. It is unacceptable to use the security situation as a pretext. Indeed, it should be a reason to accelerate the removal of such weapons, and not the contrary. We would like to draw the attention of the international community and the Council to the fact that the chemical weapons declared destroyed was based only on what was declared by the Syrian regime. We would like to see the Syrian regime held accountable for all chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction, which should be kept in a secure place and must not be transferred to any other party. It is extremely important that the international community and Security Council remain vigilant in that regard. My Government would like to affirm that eradicating weapons of mass destruction is the only genuine guarantee against their use or threatened use. Saudi Arabia reiterates that the concerns of non-nuclear- weapon States must be taken into account through an international instrument guaranteeing their safety and stability. We also emphasize that nuclear-weapon States must eliminate their weapons as soon as possible.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

At the outset, I would like to thank Deputy Secretary-General Eliasson for his remarks commemorating the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004). It is almost 70 years since the first nuclear-weapon State in the world emerged, in 1945. International efforts to build a nuclear-weapon-free world, thereby creating a peaceful world, have continued unabated. However, the number of nuclear-weapon States has increased, standing at nine countries today. The dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the largest nuclear-weapon State, demonstrating the most brutal and destructive power of such weapons, immediately sparked the proliferation of such weapons. The overall process of overheated East- West confrontations during the Cold War also gave rise to the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States under the protection and patronage of the largest nuclear- weapon State. One such country was Israel, which emerged as another nuclear-weapon State. On the other hand, under increasing pressure — torrents of so-called Security Council sanctions and increasing nuclear blackmail — countries such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea cannot have nuclear weapons even for the purpose of self-defence. Recently there has been an increasing tendency towards nuclear-weapon modernization programmes and nuclear umbrellas are continuing to open up for so-called allied countries, with massive build-ups of nuclear weapons — a trio, by air, sea and ground, with aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered submarines and strategic bombers carrying nuclear weapons. That gives further rise to the fear of the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and increased concern about a nuclear arms race among nuclear-weapon States. All of these facts clearly indicate that the mastermind of nuclear-weapon proliferation is none other than the largest nuclear-weapon State, the United States. The propaganda being produced by that country is nothing but hypocrisy seeking to deceive the world. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is consistent in its opposition to all types of weapons of mass destruction. We strongly insist that the total elimination of all existing nuclear weapons in the world is the only single measure that can guarantee the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea delegation would like to take this opportunity to briefly draw the Council’s attention to the recent developments in the situation on the Korean peninsula and to clarify its position on the nuclear issue on the peninsula. First, let me turn to the efforts of my Government with regard to national security and peace. In his 2014 address, Marshall Kim Jung Un, the respected leader of the entire Korean people, made a warm appeal to the entire Korean nation to move, at a historic turning point, towards the reunification of the country and safeguarding national security and peace. Upholding the warm appeal of the supreme leadership, the National Defence Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the supreme governing body of the country, last January advanced crucial proposals addressed to the South Korean authorities. Those proposals concerned very important issues. First, there was the question of suspending all acts of mutually slandering each other, thereby creating a better planet and improving North-South relations. They also concerned the question of suspending all hostile military acts against each other. In particular, they referred to suspending the joint military exercises that were going to be held as planned. After advancing those crucial proposals, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea took unilateral initial steps by suspending any slander against the other side. Furthermore, it went ahead with its suspension of all its military movements along the full length of the military demarcation line, so that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would not be misinterpreted as an instigator of provocations or threats, as one country is continuing to serve as an adversary to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and to mislead the world. In February, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea made another proposal on holding high-level talks between the two sides, which were held successfully. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea boldly accepted the request from the South Korean authorities to hold reunions for families separated throughout parts of North and South Korea. Most of those were held successfully. Those very positive initiatives, although they were in the initial stages, gave rise to great expectations and hope among the entire Korean nation for a broader and greater path towards reconciliation and the easing of tension in the Korean peninsula. It was highly welcomed by the international community. Secondly, there is the question of the United States response with its increased hostile activities and policies against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and its increased nuclear programmes. As I mentioned earlier, there had been positive moves towards easing tensions. It was only the United States that instead of encouraging them, totally ignored those moves and intentionally proceeded to escalate tension on the Korean peninsula. As soon as we advanced the crucial proposals, the United States totally rejected the proposals, declared that there would be no change in its policy towards the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and stated that the joint nuclear military exercises would be held as planned. Upon our initiative, the North-South dialogue was being held. At that time, the United States did not hesitate to fly strategic bombers carrying nuclear weapons into South Korea. As the two sides were holding the separated-family reunions, in an atmosphere of blood relations and warm feelings after a long time of separation, the United States went ahead with its opening of joint military exercises — which was very dangerous and provocative  — pouring cold water on the positive move towards the easing of tension and fostering reconciliation on the Korean peninsula. For two months, from the end of February to the end of April, the United States held joint military exercises in South Korea. They brought in a massive arms build- up of all kinds of the most powerful nuclear weapons against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. They held the largest ever joint landing exercises. And they began joint air-strike exercises, declaring that they were targeted at so-called Pyongyang occupation. In addition to that, the United States made gangster- like advertisements, referring to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as a provocation and a threat. On the other hand, they were advertising their own aggressive joint exercises as annual and routine. The were held on our doorstep in South Korea, far across the ocean from the United States mainland, threatening the very security of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. They went so far as to raise the issue of our legitimate self-defence rocket launches at the Security Council and to condemn them, which were held on our land and territorial waters. The United States still remains quite silent. This is a very serious issue: the question of South Korea’s ballistic missile launches with a 500-kilometre range. Instead of raising the topic of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s legitimate self-defence launches at the Security Council, The United States has remained silent until today. Thirdly, there is the question of the position of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the face of increasing nuclear blackmail by the United States. I mentioned earlier the hostile acts of the United States against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. All those facts clearly indicate that there has been no change at all. The ambition of the United States Government has been to eliminate the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea politically, isolating it economically and annihilating it militarily. On 14 March, the National Defence Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea issued a statement in the face of the grave, destructive situation being created intentionally by the United States.

We would like to remind the representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that the speaking time limit for non-members of the Security Council is four minutes. I think that the representative has used quite a lot of time. I would ask him to conclude his statement.

I will finish in just a few sentences. As long as the United States maintains more than 1,000 nuclear weapons and continues to increase its nuclear threats and blackmail against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s already diversified nuclear strike means will be targeted at the United States. On 28 April, a spokesperson of the National Defence Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea again made a statement in the face of the rumours wildly spread by the United States Government that it would not recognize or accept the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as a nuclear- weapon State, and that therefore the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should abandon nuclear weapons. Again, the spokesperson made it very clear that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea did not make nuclear weapons to be recognized by the United States nor, did it make nuclear weapons to be approved by the United States. I will finish soon.

If you have not finished and you have more remarks, you can circulate your written statement. You have actually used up your time limit of four minutes. Could you conclude in 10 seconds?

Annually, on the grounds of it being “annual and routine”, the United States continues to hold joint military exercises. This August, the United States is going to hold another very dangerous and provocative joint military exercise. I am finishing. This is the last sentence.

Your 10 seconds have elapsed.

The self-defence missile launch and military nuclear tests of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for the same purpose will become annual.

I now give the floor to the representative of Ukraine.

I would like to thank the delegation of the Republic of Korea for convening this important meeting today. Ukraine welcomes the tenth anniversary of resolution 1540 (2004) and the forthcoming 2016 comprehensive review as important milestones and as opportunities to identify realistic goals for the future. Ukraine attaches great importance to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and the subsequent resolutions 1673 (2006) and 1810 (2008). We participate actively in projects to advance the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In March 2013, Ukraine approved the concept of combating terrorism, including nuclear terrorism. Measures to respond to the threat of terrorism are being implemented on a permanent basis. Nine anti-terrorist exercises have been carried out. A State plan has been approved that provides for interaction among central and local authorities in the event acts of sabotage involving nuclear facilities, nuclear materials and other sources of ionizing radiation during their use, storage or transportation, as well as on nuclear waste in the process of treatment. A common tactical and special training session was held to test the capabilities involved in ensuring the physical security and anti-terrorist security of nuclear power plants in Ukraine. In October 2013, Kyiv hosted a joint training session on combating acts of nuclear terrorism for law enforcement officials and other central authorities of Ukraine and Belarus, aimed at improving the professional abilities and skills of relevant experts in nuclear and radiological terrorism resistance. The work is ongoing, with the goal of enhancing the efficiency of radiation monitoring systems along Ukraine’s national borders. At the beginning of 2014, such systems had been installed at 57 checkpoints. Eventually, there are plans for their installation at 150 checkpoints. The use of mobile radiation-monitoring systems that provide monitoring of “green borders” is also being expanded. In June 2013, Kyiv held a meeting of the interagency expert working group on countering the threat of the proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction and related terrorist threats and on protecting State infrastructure critical to supporting life. International and regional cooperation among States is a crucial step towards achieving the key objectives of resolution 1540 (2004). That is why, in November 2013, in Kyiv, the Government of Ukraine, in cooperation with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Conflict Prevention Centre of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, held a regional workshop on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). The resolution is an international legally binding instrument that addresses the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and that has played a crucial role in global and regional non-proliferation efforts. I would like to underline that the existing global non-proliferation regime is based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Ukraine became a member of the Treaty 20 years ago. Since then, Ukraine has been thoroughly implementing all the provisions of that document. Moreover, Ukraine has undertaken and successfully fulfilled additional obligations within the Nuclear Security Summit framework by eliminating all its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium. Ukraine’s decision to remove all nuclear weapons from its territory and to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State was adopted under strict conditions. In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom not only welcomed Ukraine’s actions, but also established their commitment to respect the independence, sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine. The Russian Federation’s deliberate aggression against Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea, as well as its support for the separatist groups operating in the eastern regions of Ukraine, has provoked an imbalance in the existing international security system. Today we have a situation where the Russian Federation is undermining the NPT regime not only by violating the Budapest Memorandum but also by violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself. At the same time, Ukraine considers the NPT a cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and an essential basis for achieving the objectives of nuclear disarmament. My country commends the efforts of States that have reaffirmed their commitment to guarantee the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and counts on their support and engagement for those commitments to be further fulfilled. We still count on their support, because my country will never agree to recognize the deliberate annexation of a part of its territory by the Russian Federation.

I now give the floor to the representative of Kazakhstan.

I thank you, Madam President, for convening this very relevant meeting on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of resolution 1540 (2004), which is a vital component of the global security architecture. My delegation would like to register its deep appreciation for the efforts made by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) under your chairmanship, Madam, as well as that of your predecessors. The 10-year extension of the Committee’s mandate until 2021 has effectively led to a permanent, institutionalized 1540 Committee. Yet much more needs to be done. To start with, steps must be taken to encourage United Nations States Members to accurately comply with resolution 1540 (2004) in a timely manner by adopting national legislation, in conjunction with other legal instruments and mechanisms such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative, which is also known as the Krakow Initiative. The key is to intensify efforts to promote full implementation through outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation by leveraging the capabilities and experience of international organizations and regional bodies. We will need to address such institutional challenges as the timely submission of State reports in order to regularize the flow of information to the Committee, the provision of feedback to interested States and the collection and dissemination of best implementation practices. We must also coordinate the efforts of the 1540 Committee and the Group of Experts and build relationships with the relevant organizations and partners. All those steps will help to develop transparency and political will with respect to internal issues, institutional capacity and the availability of resources. Resolution 1977 (2011) goes a considerable distance in bridging that gap. Those goals must be accomplished with the understanding that the Committee is a subsidiary body of the Security Council, and not the secretariat of an international treaty organization. For its part, Kazakhstan has been actively engaged in several initiatives. The decisions of the three Nuclear Security Summits are being seriously implemented. My country proposes that the cycle be extended beyond 2016. Kazakhstan is willing to convene such a summit in 2020. We seek to support the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which has a special role to play in assisting countries with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. To further the cause of non-proliferation, my country will shortly host the IAEA international low- enriched uranium fuel bank, under the supervision of the IAEA, negotiations for which are nearing completion. We will also convert high-enriched uranium reactors to low-enriched fuel, establish a regional nuclear security training centre and strengthen its emergency preparedness, response and mitigation capabilities. As indicated, regional organizations and institutions also play a pivotal role. For that reason, Kazakhstan has cooperated actively in the work of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Commonwealth of Independent States and OSCE countries. In particular, the States parties to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia are focused on strengthening nuclear safety and resolution 1540 (2004). Two workshops were hosted by my country, in Astana in 2011 and 2014, to enhance cooperation in preventing illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and to combat nuclear terrorism in our region. Kazakhstan is the larger producer and supplier of uranium, and therefore introduced the 2007 Export Control Act, which follows the most stringent international standards. We are strictly committed to implementing all Security Council resolutions. Resolution 1540 (2004) is one of the priorities of our non-proliferation policy. We have joined virtually all global treaties and conventions related to combating weapons of mass destruction, and also acceded to all 13 universal international conventions against terrorism. My country is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and the Zangger Committee. While awaiting accession to the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Wassenaar Arrangement, Kazakhstan is unilaterally committed to implementing the demands and regimes of those bodies. Kazakhstan is fully committed to joining the international effort in strengthening the work of the 1540 Committee.

I now give the floor to the representative of Israel.

I would like to start by thanking you personally, Madam President, for the patience that you showed towards the representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. One can understand that someone such as him who is usually deprived of speaking about anything in his own country is sorely taking advantage of the opportunity to speak freely and at great length. It is too bad that it is at our own expense. I wish to commend you, Madam President, on your able stewardship of the Security Council this month and for holding this important debate. Yesterday, Israel celebrated its sixty-sixth anniversary. Across the country, there were parties and picnics, fireworks and festivities. Amid the joy and celebration, the day was touched by sadness because, right before celebrating Independence Day, Israel observes Memorial Day. For 60 seconds a siren wails across the entire country. Cars racing down the highway slow to a halt, and drivers step out onto the road. Children pause their games and fall silent. Men and women stop working and stand at attention. Where else in the world does an entire nation stop everything to remember its fallen heroes? In Israel, we bow our heads and pay tribute to the people who enabled us to live freely in a democratic country. In its 66 years of history, Israel has not known a single day in which it has not fought for its survival. In Israel, every child grows up with armed guards outside his school. Every home has an emergency bunker. Almost every family is bereaved, having lost a loved one to terrorism or war. For the 8 million citizens of Israel, that abnormality is the reality. Ten years ago, the Council adopted resolution 1540 (2004) to enforce measures against the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery to terrorists. Yet it is clear that a great deal more must be done to stem the flow of weapons, particularly in the Middle East. Earlier this year, a shipment of advanced rockets was loaded onto a plane in Damascus and flown to Tehran. From there they were transported over land to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas and loaded onto a civilian vessel, the KLOS-C. From the outside, it looked like an ordinary cargo vessel but the KLOS-C was not carrying parcels for UPS. It was operating as T.P.S. — the Terrorists’ Proliferation Ship. The KLOS-C set a course towards Port Sudan, a transit point in a weapons supply route used by Iran to move arms to the Gaza Strip. On 5 March, the Israeli Defense Forces intercepted the ship in the southern Red Sea. Our forces discovered tens of thousands of munitions and tons of sophisticated rockets. The advanced weapons onboard the ship would have placed millions of Israelis in the crosshairs of terrorists. This is not the first time that Iran — the world’s leading State sponsor of terrorism — has been caught red-handed. In 2002, the Karine-A was intercepted while carrying 50 tons of Iranian weapons. In 2009, the Israeli Navy seized the MV Francop carrying hundreds of tons of weapons bound for the Hizbullah terrorist organization. And in 2011, the MV Victoria was caught carrying illicit arms destined for terrorists in the Gaza Strip. The KLOS-C was a close call and a reminder that each and every day, illegal arms are being smuggled across the sea, over land and through the skies. In the Middle East, radical groups are taking advantage of that instability to learn about the ABC of terrorism — atomic, biological and chemical weapons. In Syria, they learn from the dictator in Damascus, who sees no problem in dropping barrel bombs packed with explosives, shrapnel and chlorine on homes, hospitals and markets. For years, Al-Assad and his regime denied having chemical weapons, I remind all members. In its reports to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), Syria declared that “the Syrian Arab Republic is a State that neither possesses nor intends to acquire WMD [weapons of mass destruction], their means of delivery or related materials”. As Sherlock Holmes said, there is nothing more deceptive than an obvious fact. And the obvious fact is that Syria is deceiving us. It is a regime that lies in bed with Iran and sees no problem with lying to the international community. It is not enough to take Syria at its word when it says that it is complying with the elimination of its chemical weapons. We must verify and validate the situation on the ground. The failure to do so could have deadly consequences if Syria’s stockpiles were to fall into the hands of terrorist groups such as Hizbullah. Just as it is with one’s family, we do not get to choose our neighbours on the map. Israel finds itself in one of the most hostile parts of the world and so, out of necessity, we have become leaders in combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. In addition to developing state-of-the-art technologies and tools, Israel has instituted significant legal measures to fight terrorism. Israel is party to the core universal instruments on counter-terrorism, fully implements resolution 1373 (2001) and has enacted legislation to reduce threats against our citizens. The Israeli export control legislation restricts the goods and technologies that can be used by non-State actors, States supporting terrorism and other countries of concern in the manufacture, development and use of WMDs and their means of delivery. That legislation incorporates lists of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. Not long ago, Israel joined the handful of countries that ratified the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. That is in addition to having signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Israel has a policy of supporting efforts to promote the universality of those two important conventions. In addition, we are closely engaged in non-proliferation initiatives, such as the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and Proliferation Security Initiative. Israel is also sharing its unique expertise with other nations. From the plains of Africa to the jungles of Central America, Israeli experts have contributed their knowledge on a range of issues — from terrorist financing and forensic investigation to aviation security and border protection. As we speak, smugglers are transporting cargoes loaded with rockets, missiles and explosives across the Middle East. One of those rockets could spark the next major conflict. One of those missiles could trigger the next terror attack. One of those shipments could carry a dirty bomb. Winston Churchill said, “One ought never to turn one’s back on a threatened danger and try to run away from it. If you do that, you will double the danger.” The world is more dangerous than ever before. From smartphones to smart bombs, technology has made it easier for terrorists to inflict mass destruction. Each of us is an eyewitness to this danger, and we cannot turn a blind eye when rogue States’ regimes cross red lines. Resolution 1540 (2004) must be strengthened with real preventative measures, real enforcement mechanisms and real consequences for terrorists and rogue regimes. In conclusion, if we work together, we can ensure that the world’s most dangerous people never acquire the world’s most dangerous weapons.

I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico.

Mexico appreciates the initiative of the Republic of Korea to convene this debate and welcomes the participation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of that country. In the 10 years since the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), Mexico has derived great satisfaction from the fact that, throughout this decade, the Security Council has promoted measures to prevent the manufacture, acquisition, possession, development, transport, transfer and use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems by non-State actors. My country’s Government reaffirms its commitment to the resolution and emphasizes its importance as a crucial mechanism for coordinating the efforts of the international community to face the challenges of the non-proliferation regime, in particular by preventing non-State actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Successfully combatting that threat requires the implementation of the commitments and obligations undertaken in existing international instruments. We reiterate that non-proliferation and disarmament are complementary and mutually reinforcing processes that require balanced and parallel progress. The best formula for non-proliferation is the prohibition and elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Mexico has fulfilled all its commitments on nuclear security, radiological security and the physical protection of nuclear material. We have undertaken a strategy to promote the ongoing strengthening of the system of export controls and controls for the transfer of technologies, equipment and materials that could be used in the production of weapons of mass destruction, and we support the strengthening of the strategic control of international trade in dual-use goods and technology. Those measures have led Mexico to join three multilateral export control regimes: the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Australia Group. At the international level, Mexico cooperates with international organizations and other countries to undertake efforts focused on expanding its capacity in this area and in the field of atomic energy. We have controls for radioactive sources aimed at ensuring regulatory verification for such sources in compliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. These examples demonstrate that the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) is contributing to the reconfiguration process that the global cooperation architecture is undergoing, with a focus on inclusion. States parties are potential providers and recipients of such cooperation. The trade in strategic goods involves a certain risk of the proliferation of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Governments must establish effective controls and restrictions on the transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use items or technology, and ensure that such laws and procedures are compatible with the obligations arising from international treaties on disarmament and non-proliferation. We believe that it is important that the work of the 1540 Committee universalize the practice of submitting national reports, which are the most important tool for strengthening transparency and building confidence. We encourage those nations that have not yet done so to present such reports as soon as they can. The Government of Mexico believes that international cooperation is essential for resolving issues of global impact. In line with its tradition of pacifism, Mexico will continue to work actively on initiatives that strengthen the aforementioned regimes and contribute to a safer world that is based on international law.

I now give the floor to the representative of Iraq.

My delegation would like to congratulate the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, in his capacity as President of the Council, for having organized this open debate. We also wish to congratulate the Permanent Representative of Nigeria for the distinguished manner in which she led the Council’s work last month. My delegation welcomes the presidential statement (S/PRST/2014/7) adopted on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004). Iraq has acceded to all international treaties and conventions on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and has voted in favour of all the relevant international resolutions. On more than one occasion, we have expressed our support for efforts to strengthen the universality of those international instruments and their implementation in order to realize the objectives for which they were promulgated. Iraq welcomed the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004) by the Security Council and considers it an effective tool for strengthening international measures to deal with one of the major threats facing the international community, and for preventing weapons of mass destruction from finding their way into the hands of non-State actors and terrorist groups. At this juncture, I would like to reiterate Iraq’s respect for and total commitment to the international treaties and conventions in accordance with paragraph 1 (e) of article 9 of the Iraqi Constitution, which stipulates that the Iraqi Government respects and implements Iraq’s international obligations in the fields of the non-proliferation, development, production and use of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and related equipment, and prohibits any effort to develop, manufacture and produce them, including for related equipment, material, technology or means of communication. The Government of Iraq has taken a series of measures and steps, including the adoption of legislation, to prohibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and to impose suitable local controls on the relevant materials in order to prevent the illicit trade in such materials. Over the past few years, Iraq has enacted several laws aimed at enforcing the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and combating money-laundering and terrorism. I would like to focus on some of the steps my Government has taken pursuant to its commitment to implementing resolution 1540 (2004). Most important is our submission of four national reports for the years 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2013, which included legislative measures and activities for implementing the resolution. We have submitted one national report that includes experiences, lessons learned and practices, and another on cooperation and assistance in implementing the resolution. Iraq’s national control agency has taken effective measures to monitor the export and import of dual-use materials that coordinate with the European Union’s laws relating to resolution 1373 (2001) regarding the illegal use of such materials. My delegation regrets North Korea’s lack of respect for the decisions of the international community in continuing its experiments, contrary to international conventions and agreements. We have submitted proposals to the Secretary- General in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions entitled “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction”, that include the following. First, we should achieve the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004)’s provisions on preventing non-State actors’ access to weapons of mass destruction and related materials, and countries should be encouraged to voluntarily submit additional information on the steps they have taken or intend to take. Secondly, we should work together to devise international, regional and subregional strategies aimed at developing joint measures that can contribute to preventing non-State actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and related materials, and their use by terrorists. Thirdly, Member States should be urged to strengthen their national efforts, and encouraged to cooperate among themselves and with regional and international organizations in strengthening their national capacities to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and the related materials and technologies needed to produce them. My delegation is grateful to the United States of America, Switzerland and the European Union for organizing training courses aimed at strengthening Iraqi capacity in the areas of chemical, radioactive, biological and nuclear security, and border control. In conclusion, the implementation of international resolutions on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including resolution 1540 (2004), requires that practical measures be taken through the collective efforts of all members of the international community, not limited to any particular groups, and that developing States’ ability to build their technical capacities be improved so they can fulfil their obligations according to the relevant resolutions. We also wish to thank the Republic of Korea for taking the initiative to convene this meeting, which is so important to international peace and security.

I now give the floor to the representative of Mongolia.

On behalf of my delegation, I wish to congratulate you, Madam President, on the Republic of Korea’s accession to the presidency of the Council, and to applaud your leadership in organizing this open debate commemorating the tenth anniversary of the historic adoption of resolution 1540 (2004). I am confident that the debate will contribute to our efforts to realize the global agenda of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). I also wish to express our appreciation to Mr. Jan Eliasson, the Deputy Secretary-General, for his statement. Mongolia welcomes and supports the presidential statement adopted today by the Security Council (S/PRST/2014/7). We reaffirm our strong commitment to contributing to international efforts to ensure the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including the effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). The potential spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security. Mongolia shares the view that the international community should redouble its efforts to promote full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). We believe that the 2011 extension for 10 years of the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) was a significant step in strengthening its role in facilitating the provision of technical assistance and in enhancing its cooperation with the relevant international, regional and subregional organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons. In that regard, my delegation welcomes the Committee’s intensified efforts to fulfil its mandate, including by encouraging universal implementation through reporting by Member States, as well as improving mechanisms for sharing effective practices for strengthening national capabilities for implementing their commitments. In compliance with paragraph 4 of resolution 1540 (2004), the Government of Mongolia submitted its initial report in 2005; its second national report, which provides additional information on measures undertaken after 2005, was submitted to the Committee last month. Mongolia has worked to promote the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by becoming a party to all the major international frameworks and it continues to fully implement its obligations under the relevant multilateral agreements. At the national level, we have also been taking measures to establish a relevant domestic monitoring mechanism. That enforces a series of laws prohibiting any non-State actor from manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, developing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, particularly for terrorist purposes. With a view to strengthening its legal environment for implementing resolution 1540 (2004), Mongolia has reviewed its national laws and policies. In that regard, my delegation wishes to specifically highlight Mongolia’s foreign policy outlines, renewed and approved by Parliament in 2011, which stipulate that Mongolia shall refrain from stationing nuclear weapons or any other type of weapon of mass destruction on its territory. In addition to this, Mongolia has taken steps to strengthen its monitoring mechanism for implementing resolution 1540 (2004). In January, Parliament’s standing committee on security and foreign policy set up a working group to monitor the implementation of laws relating to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The working group has recommended that its sub-group, made up of representatives from 15 ministries and agencies, intensify efforts to improve border controls, export and import controls and law- enforcement measures. My delegation welcomes the continuing outreach activities designed to promote national implementation arrangements, including strengthening the close collaboration of all stakeholders at the international, regional and subregional levels. As a beneficiary, Mongolia is grateful to the donor community for its financial and technical contributions in support of our activities related to resolution 1540 (2004). We also note the efforts of the Office for Disarmament Affairs to assist Member States in implementing their obligations with respect to the resolution, and we ask that it continue to do so. Despite the progress we have achieved, many countries still face challenges in maintaining effective border controls and enforcement mechanisms aimed at combating illicit trafficking and brokering in items related to WMDs. Recognizing the need to continue our concerted efforts to improve our capability to address the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction, Mongolia shares the view that the 1540 Committee should continue its work to further enhance its role as assistance facilitator to better respond to the needs of Member States.

I now give the floor to the representative of Turkey.

I thank the Korean presidency for organizing this meeting on such a crucial issue and would like to express my appreciation to Ambassador Oh Joon for his able chairmanship of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery constitutes a vital threat to peace and security and hampers social and economic development. Located in a region with particular challenges with respect to proliferation, Turkey values all initiatives aimed at preventing such activities. Turkey will continue to support mechanisms designed to prevent WMDs and their material from falling into the wrong hands. In that spirit, Turkey has thus been fully supporting resolution 1540 (2004) and subsequent resolutions extending the mandate of the Committee. Turkey possesses the necessary legislation to fully implement the resolution and is party to all relevant international instruments and export control regimes to that effect. To date, Turkey has submitted national reports and matrices to the Committee on more than one occasion. Our latest national report and matrix are currently being updated. Turkey also joined the joint statement on promoting a full and universal implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), at the Nuclear Security Summit held in the Hague. Resolution 1540 (2004) is a solid and compelling basis for the universalization of efforts to prevent WMD proliferation, complementing existing international treaties and conventions. Over the past decade, resolution 1540 (2004) has become a key component of the global security architecture. We welcome the efforts exerted in the past decade to implement and raise awareness on resolution 1540 (2004). It is an important achievement that 172 States have submitted their national reports to the Committee. We hope for a universal reporting as soon as possible. Turkey would also like to express its appreciation for the work of the Panel of Experts. Robust export controls are crucial to combat the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, their means of delivery and all related technology. Needless to say, effective interagency coordination and cooperation, as well as timely and effective intelligence sharing, are very strong elements in that equation. We also would like to hereby draw attention to cooperation with industry for more effective counter-proliferation efforts. Regimes or systems are as strong as their weakest links. Resolution 1540 (2004) is being implemented on an uneven playing field, as States have differing capacities. We therefore strongly support the full utilization and strengthening of the assistance and cooperation mechanisms regarding resolution 1540 (2004), in close coordination with the 1540 Committee, and upon request. The resolution’s regional and subregional coordinators can play an important role in facilitating regional approaches to assisting States. Therefore options for funding such positions within international and regional organizations should be closely examined. In every part of the world, transit and trans-shipments are usually the most susceptible rings, in the chain of export control, to exploitation. Devising realistic and applicable methods to reinforce transit controls should continue to remain among our priorities in order to strengthen export controls. It would, however, be unfair to levy the whole burden of controlling goods to transit countries alone. More effective and equitable burden sharing is needed. We should therefore strongly highlight the importance of strengthening controls at the origin. Terrorism will remain a key challenge to peace and stability, particularly through its ability to use asymmetric methods to bypass traditional security and defence systems. The essence of export control measures is to prevent transfers of WMD-related sensitive materials to undesired destinations and individuals alike, including terrorists. We welcomed resolution 2118 (2013) on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of Syria. We regret, however, the delays in the implementation of the calendar determined by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. As the Secretary-General has reiterated in his various reports, the situation in Syria only underscores the importance of expediting the removal of all chemical weapons from Syria. We are additionally concerned by reports indicating non-declared WMD capabilities of the Syrian regime and the use of non-listed chemical agents for chemical attacks. We are prepared to listen to all proposals on enhanced coordination between national export control and counter-terrorism bodies by creating a broadened network of information and intelligence sharing at global and regional levels. We would therefore encourage cross-reporting on the progress of efforts and sharing lessons learned at regular intervals in relevant forums, such as the 1540 Committee and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and other international and regional meetings and events. Moving forward from a decade of awareness- raising to a decade of full and sustained implementation will indeed require long-term vision and strategy. We therefore look forward to the comprehensive review to be submitted to the Security Council in 2016, pursuant to resolution 1977 (2011), and stand ready to contribute in that regard. I would like to add a few words in response to one speaker’s statement. Our track record in the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and our commitment to the international mechanisms to which we have been party is clear. I reject the baseless allegations arguing otherwise. Needless to say, we will continue to contribute to the regimes combatting proliferation in line with our international commitments and we expect all respectable actors of the international community to do so.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

I thank Republic of Korea and its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yun Byung-se, for convening this meeting. I also thank the Mr. Jan Eliasson, Deputy Secretary-General, for his statement. Resolution 1540 (2004) affirms that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The Islamic Republic of Iran, as a State party to all major international treaties banning weapons of mass destruction, strongly supports that assertion. As the Secretary-General has rightly put it, “there are no right hands for these wrong weapons”. Therefore, the only absolute guarantee against the threat or use of such weapons is their total elimination. Iran firmly believes that every effort should be made, in accordance with international law, to rid the world of the menace of those inhumane weapons and to ensure that such weapons do not fall into the hands of terrorists and non-State actors. At the same time, we believe that our efforts to prevent the potential threat of weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of terrorists should not distract our attention from the real threat posed by the continued existence of thousands of nuclear weapons in the stockpiles of nuclear-weapon States. The silence of the resolution on the imperative of disarmament, as well as its failure to acknowledge the link between non-proliferation and disarmament, was one of the major deficiencies referred to by some States, including mine, at the time of the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004). Those arguments are still pertinent and valid. Accordingly, in our view the international community should exert its maximum efforts for the fulfilment by States of their legal obligations and commitments under treaties on weapons of mass destruction, in particular the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In that context, utmost attention should be paid to the universality of such treaties, in particular in such a volatile region as the Middle East, where the nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in the hands of the Israeli regime not only continue to threaten neighbouring and other States, but have so far thwarted all efforts towards the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction. We strongly share the view that, while the Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, it has no right to assume the role of prescribing legislative action by Member States, since this is in conflict with the political sovereignty of States and the independence of their legislative powers at the national level. We also continue to strongly support the view that there is a clear conflict between the Council’s adoption of resolution 1540 (2004) and the power and functions of the General Assembly in the progressive development and codification of international law. Likewise, we believe that issues related to preventing terrorist groups from acquiring weapons of mass destruction should be addressed by the General Assembly in an inclusive and transparent manner, based on consensus. We firmly believe that, as recognized in existing international treaties on weapons of mass destruction, efforts to prevent access to such weapons should not hamper, in any way, international cooperation to promote the use of materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes. This inalienable right of States cannot and should not be compromised under any circumstances. As a State party to major international treaties on weapons of mass destruction, the Islamic Republic of Iran is fully committed to the objective of the total elimination of all such weapons. Iran has enforced crucial laws and regulations to prevent the access of terrorist groups to such materials, equipment or technologies, as stipulated in the resolution. Iran has submitted reports required by resolution 1540 (2004) and continues to support relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. In response to the unfounded allegations made against my country by the representative of the Israeli regime, while I categorically reject all of those allegations, I would like to bring to the attention of the Council the fact that, over the past 65 years, the Israeli regime has waged more than 10 wars in the region. It has aggressed all of its neighbours without exception and attacked several other countries of the region. It is the only country in the region that possesses all types of weapons of mass destruction. It is the only country of the region not to be party to any of the treaties banning weapons of mass destruction. It is the only obstacle to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the region. It is the only country that refused to participate on the Helsinki conference on the establishment of a nuclear- weapon-free zone in the Middle East mandated by the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and it is the only country to have attacked peaceful nuclear installations in two countries in the region, one of those attacks being condemned by the Security Council. The Israeli regime is well known to be responsible for many acts of State terrorism and cannot and is not eligible to point fingers at others as a tactic for diverting attention from its extremist and terrorist policies. Its network of State terrorism has carried out deadly operations all over the world, amounting to a long list. To refer to just one very recent example, innocent Iranian scientists working for the development of their beloved country were brutally killed before the terrified eyes of their families by agents of that regime. They continue to threaten to kill more. The international community should first and foremost stop such heinous acts of terrorism supported and sponsored by that regime, whose representative now attempts to hide behind the camouflage of unsubstantiated attacks against others.

I now give the floor to the representative of Kyrgyzstan.

At the outset, I would like to thank you, Madam, for having convened this open debate on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction  — an issue of great importance for all Member States, including the Kyrgyz Republic. We welcome the statement by the President of the Security Council adopted this morning (S/PRST/2014/7) on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004). The commitment to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a fundamental principle of the foreign and domestic policy of my country. Kyrgyzstan does not possess nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or their means of delivery. It undertakes effective measures to bolster the national export control regime and to strengthen oversight and monitoring of the flow of materials and equipment used in the development and manufacture of weapons of mass destruction. Kyrgyzstan has ratified the primary international agreements on non-proliferation and regards international safeguards and the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities as the first line of defence against nuclear terrorism. The Kyrgyz Republic also supports efforts to strengthen the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in order to address the proliferation challenges posed by non-State actors. We welcome the practical measures identified in the communiqués of the 2010, 2012 and 2014 Nuclear Security Summits. Fully recognizing the dangers that the possession of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups would pose, the Kyrgyz Republic signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Resolution 1540 (2004) is an international legal and political instrument of great significance that has the real potential to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Kyrgyz Republic is taking consistent measures to effectively implement it. My country is among the 172 Member States that have presented their implementation reports so far. Pursuant to paragraph four of the resolution, Kyrgyzstan has submitted its initial report and additional information three times, in 2004, 2006 and 2008. Furthermore, on 2 April 2013, the Kyrgyz Republic submitted its national plan of action on implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). The plan was developed by the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic with the support of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Civil society also played an active role in preparing the plan. It includes specific measures and concrete actions for the implementation the resolution and identifies the State agencies responsible for implementing them in a specific timeframe. I would like to underline that the national action plan was developed on the basis of the idea that countries with the appropriate capacities may provide assistance to other States that need help in implementing the resolution. In this regard, Kyrgyzstan has submitted to the 1540 Committee a request for technical and financial assistance. I take this opportunity to thank those countries and organizations that have offered their assistance in implementing the national action plan and express our readiness for further cooperation in this sphere. One of the most promising approaches to disarmament and non-proliferation is the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Kyrgyz Republic takes pride in the entry into force in 2009 of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan, as the depositary country of the Treaty, welcomes the signing by the nuclear-weapon States of the protocol on negative security assurances. We call for its early ratification by the nuclear five. It will mark an important milestone for strengthening both regional security in Central Asia and the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Kyrgyzstan attaches great importance to the issue of mitigating the environmental consequences of uranium mining and associated nuclear fuel cycle activities in the production of nuclear weapons. In this regard, I would like to refer to General Assembly resolution 68/218 of December 2013, entitled “The role of the international community in averting the radiation threat in Central Asia”. It calls on the international community to continue the active sharing of experience and knowledge so as to effectively resolve the problems of uranium and other radioactive and toxic tailings in Central Asia. In conclusion, let me reiterate that Kyrgyzstan supports the full implementation resolution 1540 (2004) and remains firmly committed to the global non-proliferation and disarmament architecture.

I now give the floor to the representative of New Zealand.

I thank you, Madam President, for convening this debate. Ten years ago, resolution 1540 (2004) filled what was then a very significant gap in multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes — the lack of any coherent and consistently applied global framework for preventing humankind’s most destructive weapons from falling into the hands of non-State actors. At that time, we hoped that despite the less than ideal circumstances surrounding its negotiation and adoption, resolution 1540 (2004) would be effective in filling that gap and that it might do so in a manner sensitive to the differing circumstances and capacities of individual Member States. And so we are pleased that, 10 years later, we can judge resolution 1540 (2004) to be a success. What, might we ask, has underpinned that success? The approach of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) has been a critical factor in overcoming the initial misgivings and concerns that were held and expressed by many Member States. Its efforts to engage constructively with Member States on their capacity needs and to coordinate assistance with other relevant national capacity-building priorities, rather than imposing a punitive, one-size-fits-all approach, should be applauded; so too should its proactive attempts to capture the synergies between implementation of the resolution and other development and capacity-building needs  — an approach that has been particularly important for small States with limited institutional capacities. But even more significant has been the collective political will of States to apply considerable effort and resources to securing existing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and to place effective controls on the materials contributing to their manufacture and use — as, for example, was outlined somewhat earlier by the representative of Kazakhstan. New Zealand takes this opportunity to recognize the strenuous efforts undertaken by some of the smallest States Members of the United Nations, for which compliance on almost any issue requires considerable resources and attention. We have played our own part in those efforts. New Zealand is one of the 47 countries providing assistance to others in implementing the requirements of resolution 1540 (2004), both bilaterally and in partnership with the United Nations and with others. We have put resources — more than $7 million since 2004 — into the Group of Eight Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Nuclear Security Summits, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the additional security and non-proliferation programmes run by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. New Zealand is also looking to include a practical resolution 1540 (2004) implementation component in the tabletop exercise it will host for Asia-Pacific regional partners in September 2015, in connection with the Proliferation Security Initiative. But it is an understatement to say that challenges still remain. Last year’s confirmed use of WMDs against a civilian population in Syria was a stark reminder of the horrific power of those weapons and justifies even greater political support to efforts to prevent their proliferation. We can today say that so far, our combined efforts appear to have been successful in keeping such weaponry out of the hands of non-State actors. That is what resolution 1540 (2004) is all about. But when it comes to such powerful and horrific weapons, phrases such as “so far” and “appear to have” are quite simply not good enough. We cannot afford to relax our vigilance or our efforts. Looking forward, the comprehensive review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), to be reported to the Council by the end of 2016, will provide a very useful stocktaking to help identify where we need to focus our future efforts. And, given the constantly evolving nature and scope of all the global and regional WMD proliferation threats that the Committee has to address, it will be vital to ensure that the Committee’s priorities and activities remain strictly relevant to those threats. But ultimately, only continuing stringent verification and, as the representative of Mexico emphasized, the complete elimination of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons will ensure security for all. New Zealand has long called for the elimination of all such weapons, and that remains our foremost objective, as it is, we know, of many other like-minded countries.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands.

With respect, Madam President, to your presidency of the Council this month, I will try to speak in Korean. (spoke in Korean) (spoke in English) My delegation feels deep appreciation for the convening of this meeting marking the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004). We pay tribute to the work of the Republic of Korea in chairing the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). We align ourselves with the statement made on behalf of the European Union (EU). The adoption of resolution 1540 (2004) 10 years ago was historic; it was a crucial step in preventing terrorist groups from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction. To realize that important goal, we all must work together. Even today, the risk that non-State actors may acquire nuclear, chemical or biological weapons is real. Effective multilateralism, strong bilateral partnerships and robust national implementation are key to achieving our common aim, namely, to prevent that from happening. The Netherlands has taken robust measures to ensure compliance with resolution 1540 (2004). Those include effective controls to prevent non-State actors from developing, acquiring or transferring weapons of mass destruction. We continue to review our policies. A good example is the current review of our biosecurity regime. We intend to present that new regime at the upcoming Meeting of Experts of the Biological Weapons Convention. We also take innovative measures to improve chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear safety. For example, Rotterdam, one of the largest ports in the world, scans all containers for nuclear and radiological materials, and we share best practices like those with other countries. We truly believe in the power of sharing information and providing assistance to other countries. Therefore we support other countries in strengthening their legal and regulatory infrastructure, both on a national basis and through the EU. We invest in global cooperation in countering nuclear, chemical and biological threats. The Netherlands is a strong supporter of effective multilateral export control regimes and assists other countries with their implementation. Furthermore, the Netherlands actively lobbies in favour of making multilateral treaties truly universal. And of course, my country and Government hosted the recent Nuclear Security Summit. We welcome the reference to the Summit in the presidential statement adopted today (S/PRST/2014/7). The Nuclear Security Summit two months ago contributed to higher awareness and better implementation of nuclear security worldwide, and thereby promoted the agenda of resolution 1540 (2004). For my country, it is crucial that the results of the Nuclear Security Summit not be limited to its participants. Therefore, we actively share the outcomes. This afternoon, for example, our sherpa presented the achievements here at United Nations Headquarters to all Member States. The Summit resulted in The Hague communiqué, which was agreed upon by the leaders of the 53 countries and four international organizations that participated. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon took part. The participants welcomed the significant contribution made by the United Nations to strengthening nuclear security. The participants urged States to fully implement resolution 1540 (2004) and subsequent resolutions and to continue to report on such efforts on a regular basis. The Netherlands is proud to be one of the 33 countries that signed the joint statement on resolution 1540 (2004) in The Hague. The group, led by Canada and the Republic of Korea, committed to fully implementing resolution 1540 (2004). The main purpose of the group is better implementation, reporting and providing assistance within the framework of resolution 1540 (2004). To strengthen the Nuclear Security Summit process, we also hosted summits for industry and for the scientific community. The nuclear industry summit in particular was of great importance, because implementation of nuclear security and control measures very often must be carried out by industry. Summing up, inspired by spirit of the Nuclear Security Summit, the Netherlands would like to set the bar high for the next 10 years. The focus of our work should further shift from awareness-raising to effective implementation. Only together can we achieve the important objectives of resolution 1540 (2004). The Kingdom of the Netherlands will continue to be an effective partner for both the United Nations and other Member States in realizing those goals.

I now give the floor to the representative of Belarus.

The challenge of addressing threats posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) by ensuring effective non-proliferation is not simply and maybe not very a technical one. To be successful, a long-term non-proliferation strategy must have a solid moral core. The increasing sophistication of deception mechanisms must be accompanied by a more sophisticated understanding on the part of leaders and the public at large of the morally corrosive nature of weapons of mass destruction and of the unbearable moral responsibility that goes with their possession. For as long as weapons of mass destruction continue to be regarded as a prized and much sought- after possession and a legitimate entitlement of the very few to the right to dominate, and not as an evil that has to be done away with, our technological advances aimed at stopping the WMD plague on this planet will never prove to be sufficient. For as long as we focus our main efforts primarily on managing the consequences — the proliferation of terrorism and radicalism in our world  — rather than on addressing their root causes  — political, social and economic injustice — we may as well start preparing ourselves for commemorating the centenary of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Effective non-proliferation will not materialize in an environment where everyone mistrusts everyone and where honouring one’s word is not considered a virtue. One may ask: What is this country with the habitually mispronounced name whose Ambassador considers himself entitled to preach morality to the members of the Council? Belarus is a country that, in the Second World War, became an place of mass destruction, although by conventional means, and lost more than one-quarter of its population in the fire of war. Belarus is a country that, in 1986, received three-quarters of the entire radioactive fallout from the largest civil nuclear disaster in history, the Chernobyl disaster. Belarus is a country that, by joining the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear State, became the first State in the world to renounce voluntarily and without any preconditions the possession of operational nuclear weapons deployed on its territory. Belarus is a country that, since the mid-1990s, has been a lone proponent for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe. Belarus is a country that for decades has been advocating in the United Nations the prohibition of development and manufacturing of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. It would, of course, be naïve to expect that those and similar idealistic initiatives and actions alone can stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. But it would be reckless to dismiss the effect that the elimination of double standards in world politics and the relegation to the dustbin of history of the realpolitik mentality can have on our ability to build a world that cannot only survive through the balance of mutual annihilation capability, but that can thrive through the proliferation of the ideals of peace, good-neighbourly relations, and the promotion of the rule of law. Of the many extinction-level events that humankind may be preparing itself for, the possible use of the weapons of mass destruction is the only entirely anthropogenic factor. Unlike climate change or a dreaded encounter with an asteroid, WMDs do not provide the excuse of a shadow of doubt — the excuse of the uncertain and the unmanageable. Not just stopping the proliferation of WMDs, but getting rid of them completely is the most serious maturity test humankind faces. A hundred awareness-raising and outreach events a year on resolution 1540 (2004) may be a righteous way of keeping ourselves busy, but the real breakthrough will happen when world leaders collectively come to realize that the truest expression of real power is magnanimity, that the surest way to influence one’s opponent is to empathize with him, and that when people talk, great things happen. It is too bad that the United Nations summits that we contemplate are unlikely to have much to do with achieving that.

I now give the floor to the representative of Romania.

I wish to thank the Republic of Korea for organizing this timely celebratory meeting and to congratulate you, Madam President, on your excellent stewardship both today and during your presidency of the Security Council . Romania fully aligns itself with the statement made earlier in this meeting by the observer of the European Union, but I would also like to underline a few points of national relevance. Romania’s policy on promoting non-proliferation is an important part of its foreign and security policy. As a State party to the international non-proliferation regimes, Romania remains committed to contributing to regional and international security and stability by fully implementing its non-proliferation commitments and promoting transparency and responsibility in its export-control decisions. Resolution 1540 (2004) is widely recognized as complementing the multilateral non-proliferation regimes. Romania co-sponsored it and humanitarian actively supported its implementation by all States, including during its chairmanship of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) in 2004 and 2005. We recently reaffirmed our strong commitment by signing the joint statement on promoting full and universal implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) at the third Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague. A decade after the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), we are encouraged by the steady progress that Member States have reported in enacting national measures to implement its provisions. The 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts play an important role in advancing the implementation of the resolution, and they need to be supported to continue their important work ahead. While there has been progress in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), challenges still remain, as some Member States continue to need additional assistance to consolidate their national implementation capabilities. Implementation remains a long-term objective that requires continuous interaction and cooperation among States and between States and the Committee and its experts. All States in a position to provide assistance should continue to do so. Romania has provided technical assistance to countries in our region to help develop export-control legislation, and it is willing to continue to do so, upon request. State ownership of the implementation process remains essential. The requirements under resolution 1540 (2004) are too diverse to be addressed by one national authority only. During the past 10 years, Romania has organized more than tens of national seminars dedicated to the implementation of the resolution, in cooperation with several international and regional organizations and with the participation of the 1540 Committee and United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs representatives. The seminars have been attended by Government experts and representatives of industry and research institutes. Romania’s experience has developed and strengthened as we have adhered to various international non-proliferation instruments, which has required, inter alia, enacting national legislation for implementation and establishing the necessary regulatory infrastructure. We are ready to share our experience in that regard, and we have done so recently in the context of several regional training courses on nuclear security, organized in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. In a globalized world, the risk of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is more often associated with transnational organized crime, illicit trafficking and corruption. That reality requires integrated efforts and approaches to address such risks in a comprehensive manner, at national, regional and international levels. Integrated approaches are also necessary given the scarcity of resources at the national and international levels to prevent and respond to such risks. A similar coordinated approach by the 1540 Committee is very welcome. Forging partnerships and increasing cooperation among the Security Council’s committees and with international institutions and organizations will support the further promotion of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). In addition, developing means and ways to better coordinate and integrate the goals pursued by the resolution, with the objectives that other assistance-oriented international structures are following, is most welcome. Ultimately, the responsibility for implementing resolution 1540 (2004) remains with national Governments, but better targeted and more coherent and coordinated support of the international community would have a significant impact in improving the effectiveness of the increasingly limited resources with concrete results at the national level. In conclusion, Madam President, I wish to express our gratitude for all the efforts by the Republic of Korea to advance the goals of resolution 1540 (2004), to wish you great success in your endeavours and to assure you of Romania’s constant support.

I now give the floor to the representative of Azerbaijan.

I would like to thank you, Madam President, for convening this important meeting to mark the tenth anniversary of resolution 1540 (2004). This open debate provides an excellent opportunity to review the ground covered over the past decade since the adoption of this landmark resolution, to assess achievements and remaining gaps in implementation and to reiterate our collective commitment to the promotion of the goals of the resolution. We welcome the adoption of a presidential statement (S/PRST/2014/7) as an outcome of today’s meeting. In many parts of the world, including the South Caucasus, the direct relevance of resolution 1540 (2004) is obvious. Any region affected by armed conflict, aggression, foreign military occupation, violent extremism, terrorism and transnational organized crime can easily become a proliferation-prone area, where non-State actors may seek to exploit State vulnerabilities in order to benefit from the prevailing impunity for apparent violations of international law. The accumulation of large quantities of armaments and munitions in areas beyond international control and the risk of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and related materials falling into the hands of non-State actors pose a serious threat to international peace and security. We are also concerned by the existence of an outdated nuclear facility in our neighborhood and erroneous State policies in the sphere of nuclear safety and security, which pose a potential threat for the whole region and beyond. Therefore, the national security concept and the maritime security strategy of Azerbaijan define the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as one of the key challenges to national security. Countering that menace is also among the priority areas of Azerbaijan’s bilateral relations and international cooperation. Azerbaijan has always been a staunch supporter of a world free from weapons of mass destruction, including through the universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the establishment of WMD-free zones throughout the world. Aside from being a party to relevant international legal instruments, including the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, my country also participates in various multilateral initiatives, such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. At the national level, Azerbaijan makes all necessary efforts to maintain an effective export- control system in order to prevent illegal activities relating to arms, military and dual-use goods, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials. Azerbaijan’s export-control system takes full account of our international legal obligations, including those under the relevant Security Council resolutions. Moreover, the relevant State agencies in Azerbaijan constantly enhance their counter-proliferation capacities and physical protection measures and improve inter-agency cooperation to strengthen control over related materials. My country has hosted a number of national and international events on the effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) in cooperation with various intergovernmental organizations, including training sessions and workshops for law-enforcement agencies. At a time when challenges to international peace and security remain unabated, more concerted action and greater synergy are required at all levels. By striving to implement their national obligations under resolution 1540 (2004), Member States would contribute significantly to global non-proliferation efforts. Likewise, there is still an acute need for increased international assistance, including from the United Nations, to help individual member States fulfil the requirements of the resolution. I would therefore like to stress the particular importance of the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). We take note of the Committee’s review of the implementation of the resolution in 2013. We welcome its recommendations to facilitate Member States fulfilment of their obligations and we encourage the Committee to continue its valuable assistance to them.

I now give the floor to the representative of Serbia.

First of all, I would like to thank the presidency of the Republic of Korea for convening this important open debate on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004). My country has aligned itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union; nonetheless, I would like to make a few additional remarks. Serbia shares the conviction that the risks from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including the growing danger that non-State actors, especially terrorist groups and individuals, might acquire such weapons, present the greatest challenge to international peace and security today. Resolution 1540 (2004) continues to be one of the most important international documents related to combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The fact that it presents some 200 new obligations and recommendations to Member States is telling evidence of its relevance and importance, as well as of the need to take concrete and effective measures for its implementation. Since its adoption, in 2004, a very small number of countries have adopted their own national action plans, which proves that we still face considerable difficulties and challenges in the implementation of the resolution. My country continues to attach great importance to the fulfilment of its obligations under resolution 1540 (2004) and has pursued numerous activities with the aim of improving its legislation, standards and practices in that regard. In April 2012, the Government of Serbia adopted a national action plan for the implementation of the resolution covering the period 2012 to 2016, becoming the first country in the wider region to do so. The document was drafted in cooperation with the experts of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Representatives of all relevant ministries and Government agencies took part in its preparation. Our experience throughout the process was very positive. On the basis of our national action plan, also in 2012, the Government of Serbia decided to set up a working group to oversee the plan’s implementation and appointed its members and chair. The working group has completed the first stage of its tasks related to the preparation, adoption and initial work on the implementation of the provisions of the plan. Notwithstanding the relatively short period of time that Serbia has had at its disposal for the establishment of implementation instruments, it has achieved several significant results. On 30 April 2013, my country regulated its status within the Nuclear Suppliers Group, thereby becoming the forty-ninth member of that prestigious international control regime. Also in 2013, we adopted a new law on the export control of dual-use goods and completed the drafting of two new laws, on the export control of arms and military equipment and on the implementation of international restrictive measures. In addition, significant progress has been made in the preparations for ratification of the Additional Protocol and the amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. They are expected to be ratified soon. Furthermore, my country has completed its work on the elaboration of the matrix to resolution 1540 (2004), and will presently deliver it to the 1540 Committee. Finally, Serbia took an active part in the latest OSCE meeting held in Vienna, on 10 April 2013, which was organized in close cooperation with the 1540 Committee. At the meeting, we presented our experience, as well as the lessons learned in the process of the adoption of the national action plan and the activities embarked upon in the process of its implementation. The regional approach is another important contributive factor in the coordination and harmonization of these activities. From 9 to 10 May 2013, Serbia hosted the first regional workshop on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). It was the first such event in that part of Europe. The workshop adopted informal recommendations, with a focus on topics considered to be the priorities for the countries of the region. In conclusion, let me assure you, Madam President, that my country will continue to closely cooperate with the 1540 Committee and to further improve its administrative and regulatory frameworks for the comprehensive and effective implementation of the resolution and the relevant physical and technical safeguard standards. I would also like to point out that, based on its own experience, Serbia believes that all countries should make every effort to adopt their own national action plans. Encouraging them to do so is one of our priorities. For its part, Serbia is willing to share the lessons it has learned and the experience gained in that regard.

I now give the floor to the representative of Slovenia.

Allow me, first, to congratulate the Republic of Korea on its assumption of the presidency of the Security Council, and to thank you, Madam President, for convening and organizing today’s meeting. I would also like to thank the Deputy Secretary-General for his briefing to the Security Council today. I would like to align my statement with the statement made on behalf of the European Union earlier this morning. In my national capacity I would like to make a few points that are particularly important to Slovenia. Slovenia is a staunch supporter of resolution 1540 (2004), its effective implementation and the follow-up to resolutions 1673 (2006) and 1810 (2008). From the very beginning, my country has supported the objective of strengthening global efforts to prevent the acquisition and use by non-State actors of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and materials, as well as their means of delivery. Slovenia has adopted the necessary legislation, established an effective national control system and engaged in regional and global endeavours. We note with satisfaction that, after 10 years, resolution 1540 (2004) is a success story. Much has been achieved over that period. Hundreds of projects have been launched and many Member States in need have been assisted. Today, the world is better equipped to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors. I would especially like to commend Ambassador Oh Joon of the Republic of Korea for effectively chairing the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Furthermore, I would like to commend all Committee members and experts for their work. Slovenia is pleased to note that 172 countries report on the implementation of the resolution. However, we should not be complacent. We should strive for universal reporting and urge the remaining States to submit their reports to the Committee as soon as possible. Reporting lies at the heart of all international instruments and demonstrates their efficiency and health. The same applies to resolution 1540 (2004). Let me also credit international efforts to strengthen export control. Such efforts, notably those of the international export regimes, and initiatives such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative are vital for the success of the resolution. Slovenia actively engages in the activities of all those regimes and initiatives, except the Missile Technology Control Regime. Slovenia urges all States Members of the United Nations to establish and ensure the effective functioning of their national export controls. There is still a great deal of work ahead of us. The time is limited. The year 2021, when the Committee’s mandate expires, is not far away. We should use the remaining time effectively and enhance our cooperation within international and regional organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and work together for better implementation of the resolution. One of the key issues that we have to thoroughly address is the challenge of proliferation financing. We have to work closely with the financial institutions that control international transactions. At times, such institutions do not know for what kind of transactions their money is used. Sometimes it is channelled through complicated transactions to proliferators. We should also engage our national financial intelligence units in our activities. They should work closely with export-control authorities and law enforcement agencies. Finally, Slovenia welcomes presidential statement S/PRST/2014/7, adopted earlier at today’s meeting.

I now give the floor to the representative of Burkina Faso.

I would like, first of all, on behalf of my delegation, to extend to you, Madam President, my sincere congratulations on your country‘s accession to the presidency of the Security Council and to thank you for holding this debate on the future of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction regime on the occasion of the commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004). Allow me also to pay warm tribute to the Chair, members and experts of the Committee establishsed pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) for their tireless efforts in promoting and raising awareness on a future world free from the fear of nuclear disasters. Resolution 1540 (2004) recognizes the strong commitment of the international community to provide an effective response to the threat of the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons facing the world, through the implementation of appropriate measures and devices to prevent the acquisition or misuse of such weapons by non-State actors or terrorist groups. Designed as a flexible tool for cooperation, the resolution has the advantage of allowing each State to assess its own actions for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to then consider the necessary means to achieve the desired progress. While progress has been made since the adoption of the resolution, even if the ultimate goal is still far from being achieved, several challenges remain. Those include the universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, setting deadlines for the total elimination of chemical weapons, and the convening of a conference to bring about a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, in accordance with the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In addition to those challenges, we must condemn the continuing desire to acquire and develop nuclear weapons, the stagnation of the disarmament mechanisms and the lack of consensus on starting negotiations on crucial treaties, such as those on military fissile material, the prohibition of nuclear weapons and negative security assurances. Today, as in the past, although it does not possess weapons of mass destruction, Burkina Faso still strives to uphold and ensure compliance with resolution 1540 (2004). That is why during its term as a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 2008 and 2009, Burkina Faso spared no effort to promote the ideals of resolution 1540 (2004) through several initiatives. Burkina Faso has submitted reports to the 1540 Committee and received its members and experts from 10 to 16 November 2013 to assess the implementation of the resolution and to identify opportunities for capacity-building so as to strengthen existing capacity. The visit allowed the Committee’s experts to observe Burkina Faso’s true commitment to fully respecting resolution 1540 (2004), as reflected, inter alia, in its accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, as well as 12 of the 18 international instruments for combating terrorism. In addition, the members of the Committee welcomed the existence of monitoring and control mechanisms, relevant legal and regulatory frameworks and appropriate security and safety measures. I wish to reiterate the gratitude of the authorities of my country to the Committee, in particular the experts for their professionalism and clear cooperation. That contributed to the success of the visit, whose conclusions, we hope, will lead to follow up on the ground and technical cooperation. The coming of a world free of nuclear weapons, far from being a utopia, is within the realm of possibility, as long as we can outlaw the famous doctrine of strategic deterrence, which functions as an alibi for nuclear proliferation. In conclusion, my delegation takes the opportunity provided by this commemorative meeting to remind us all of the importance of demonstrating openness, mutual trust, transparency and genuine political will in the service of establishing conditions and dialogue frameworks conducive to disarmament and non-proliferation.

I now give the floor to the representative of Algeria.

I would like to thank the Republic of Korea for organizing this open debate on non-proliferation in commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004). Our meeting coincides with the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and thus rightly shows the degree to which the issue of non-proliferation is a serious matter of concern for the international community. I would also like to thank Mr. Eliasson for his comprehensive briefing. Algeria wishes to reiterate its full confidence in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and considers that full implementation of its provisions is a prerequisite for ending both the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. I would like to emphasize that non-proliferation should be pursued in all its aspects, and I would also like to stress the importance of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreements. We urge all States that have not yet done so to put comprehensive safeguards agreements into force as soon as possible in the interests of achieving their universality and consolidating and enhancing the non-proliferation regime’s verification system. In that regard, my delegation reaffirms that we accept safeguards with the purpose of preventing diversions of nuclear power, and that they should therefore be implemented without affecting countries’ inalienable right, as set out in article IV of the NPT, to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and without obstructing the economic or technological development of States that are parties to the Treaty Ten years ago, the legal framework of the non-proliferation regime was strengthened by the adoption, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, of resolution 1540 (2004). Affirming that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery constitutes a threat to international peace and security, the resolution obliges States to refrain from supporting non-State actors in developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using such weapons, and to pass and enforce effective laws and establish domestic controls. Resolution 1540 (2004) was unquestionably adopted at the right time, when it became important to deal with the risk of the dangerous nexus between weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and global terrorism. Any increase in potential access to WMDs for non-State actors who belong to terrorist networks could have dangerous implications for any State or group of States, and would constitute a threat to international peace and security. As long as the proliferation of WMDs remains a great challenge, we should recognize that the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) is a long-term task that requires continuing efforts at the national, regional and international levels. In that context, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) has a crucial role to play in facilitating the provision of assistance, enhancing cooperation with the relevant international organizations and reinforcing its outreach efforts. Since today we are assessing the status of the resolution’s implementation, I should mention that Algeria, in fulfilment of its obligations, has already submitted its national report to the 1540 Committee. We have participated in the three Nuclear Security Summits with a view to contributing to the international efforts to strengthen nuclear security and reduce the continued threat of nuclear terrorism. In that regard, I would like to highlight Algeria’s ongoing efforts at the national level, whereby we submitted our national progress report at the Nuclear Security Summit held in March in The Hague. Algerian delegations also regularly attend international events on implementing resolution 1540 (2004), and in that regard, Algerian representatives participated at a regional workshop held last December in Addis Ababa by the African Union Peace and Security Council, in collaboration with the 1540 Committee and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. I should also add that Algeria has been a member of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism since February 2012. Moreover, we have taken various appropriate measures, such as ratifying all the international legal instruments relevant to nuclear security, including the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. We have also adopted the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). At the domestic level, in December 2013 Algeria amended its penal code in order to criminalize the malicious use of radioactive materials, including general acts of nuclear terrorism, based on the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. In that connection, Algeria is putting in place a strong legislative and regulatory framework in the area of the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities and the security of radioactive sources. In addition, the import, detention and export regime of radioactive sources has been strengthened through rigorous border controls. During the period 2012-2013, Algeria hosted several IAEA nuclear safety and security workshops. In the upcoming months we plan to organize more national and regional workshops and training courses on nuclear security, some of them supported by the IAEA. I should also add that Algiers is host to the regional office of the European Union’s Centre of Excellence for North Africa for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threat reduction. The Centre is involved in coordinating several cooperation projects in that area, particularly in capacity-building. Finally, on behalf of my country, I would like to stress that we feel this open debate is timely and constructive beyond the expected adoption of today’s presidential statement (S/PRST/2014/7). Both will strengthen the political will needed to ensure the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) in our efforts to combat the proliferation of WMDs.

I now give the floor to the representative of Bangladesh.

I would first like to join others in congratulating you, Madam President, and your delegation on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) constitute one of the pre-eminent threats to global collective security in the twenty-first century. Acts of terrorism continue to pose a grave challenge to humankind, as terrorist groups choose their targets indiscriminately, change their modes of operation and improvise more complex ways to carry out their heinous acts with deadlier consequences. The Council will no doubt agree that the use of technology, information and social media, as well as the existence of the nexus between terrorist networks, non-State actors and transnational criminals with varying motives but unremittingly lethal intentions to acquire, target and use weapons of mass destruction, poses new challenges to States’ apparatus and the traditional lines of national defence. Coupled with these are the threats emanating from the rising extremism and radicalization of various ideological groups and networks that use indoctrination, terrorism and violence as a tactic for attacking peace, democracy, development and the peaceful coexistence of nations and communities. The adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), to which Bangladesh also contributed proactively as a member of the open-ended group of the General Assembly that negotiated the basis of the resolution, along with the series of follow-up resolutions adopted subsequently, has therefore been a watershed achievement. The resolutions demonstrate the determination of the membership of the United Nations to pursue comprehensive efforts to address the nexus between WMDs and terrorism, and to close the gap in international law regarding non-State actors and WMDs. Let me reaffirm the strong commitment of the Government of Bangladesh to the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), as we unequivocally support all international efforts at promoting a more peaceful and safer world. The Prime Minister of Bangladesh has been a strong voice on behalf of the complete elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and upholds her own foreign policy conviction — “disarmament for development” — and a nuclear-weapon and terrorism- free world. Our commitment to a WMD-free world is manifest in the fact that we are signatories to all major multilateral disarmament treaties, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty and the Arms Trade Treaty. We have also maintained a zero-tolerance policy to terrorism and in recent years adopted a number of bold, concrete steps to combat terrorism, the financing of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Bangladesh is well aware of its legally binding obligations under resolution 1540 (2004). It has already fulfilled its reporting obligations by submitting two reports to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). As part of efforts towards better implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), last month our capital organized a workshop on its implementation that was attended by focal points of key national agencies as well as members of the 1540 Committee’s Expert Group and representatives from Office of Disarmament Affairs. The workshop helped us to identify gaps in our legal, regulatory and national coordination infrastructure and deficits in our agency-wide capacities and experiences to enforce various provisions of the resolution. The Government of Bangladesh will be taking concrete steps to address the gaps and factors that impede the implementation of the resolution. While countries such as ours are doing their best to ensure the non-proliferation of WMD, concomitant actions from others that possess WMDs towards dispossession of those deadly weapons are conspicuously absent. To be sure, as long as there remain WMDs at the hands of some States, there will exist motivation for other States to acquire them, the risk of their use, either by accident or by design, and the grave danger of their falling into the hands of terrorists. The only absolute guarantee against the possible use, abuse or misuse of WMDs and their acquisition by terrorists and non-State actors is therefore their total abolition. Unfortunately, hundreds of billions of dollars, together with the human, technical and technological resources, are spent annually on the manufacture, maintenance and qualitative refinement of such weapons. That represents a colossal waste of scarce resources that could be freed up and diverted towards saving millions of lives and addressing pressing development needs. Obviously, the proliferation of WMDs by new countries is unacceptable. But so is the lack of progress towards the fulfilment of the disarmament commitments by States with nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Both disarmament and non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing and should be pursued in tandem to make the world free from the menaces of WMDs.

I now give the floor to the representative of Denmark.

Denmark associates itself with the statement made on behalf of the European Union. Denmark strongly welcome’s today’s debate. The presidency’s initiative to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the resolution 1540 (20040) and to hold an open debate on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) is most pertinent. The Proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery is one of the most serious threats to international peace and security in the twenty-first century. Since its adoption, in 2004, the resolution has been a vital instrument in our efforts to prevent WMD proliferation, blackmail and terrorism. The catastrophic consequences that would ensue if we were to fail in those efforts would be of a global and cross-sectorial scale, with damage to the environment, socioeconomic development and health for generations to come. We must continue to work for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons within the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We are deeply concerned that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has withdrawn from the Treaty and continues down its dangerous and irrational path of ballistic missile launches, nuclear tests and nuclear-weapon material production, in flagrant violation of its international obligations. The international community must continue to make clear that this behaviour is not acceptable and will have consequences. With regard to Iran’s nuclear programme we share the hope and optimism brought about by the joint plan of action agreed between the E3+3 and Iran in November. That is an important first step, but the focus must continue to be on achieving a comprehensive, long- term settlement that restores international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the programme and the absence of any military dimensions. Denmark continues to support the international community’s efforts in that regard and has this year donated €270.000 in support of the IAEA’s work to monitor and verify the implementation of the joint plan of action. The risk that nuclear materials could fall into the hands of terrorists or other none-State actors should be taken most seriously. In the Nuclear Security Summit, process we have committed ourselves to securing nuclear installations and materials to ensure that nuclear terrorism never happens. We believe that the IAEA plays a central role that should be enhanced, and we have this year pledged an additional €1.1 million to the Agency’s Nuclear Security Fund to further strengthen efforts in developing countries. There are other WMD threats than nuclear proliferation. The identification and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons remain a vital task for the international community. Denmark is leading the task group in charge of the maritime transportation of the declared chemical substances out of Syria for their destruction. Less than 10 per cent of the declared substances now remain inside Syria. However, in order to finish the job, it is vital that the remaining substances be transported out of Syria without further delay. We call for full cooperation from all parties, not least the Syrian regime. As the world’s attention focuses on nuclear and chemical weapons, we should not forget the threat from the proliferation of biological weapons either — a weapon much easier to acquire than, for example, nuclear weapons. In the hands of actors with malicious intent, such weapons could cause unimaginable devastation. They are rightfully referred to as weapons of mass destruction on a par with the two other categories. We have a joint obligation to ensure that such a situation never arises. The Secretary General’s mechanism to investigate allegations of the use of biological weapons should be strengthened, and biosecurity awareness should be raised around the world. With that in mind, Denmark will increase its efforts to contribute to international biosecurity. A pilot project is about to start that will aim to transfer Danish biosecurity experiences and best practices to partners in East Africa. Non-proliferation is an ongoing effort on all levels, from a rural veterinary laboratory in a developing country to the NPT Review Conference in New York next year. Resolution 1540 (2004) has helped us to focus our attention and pool our commitments. It is appropriate to celebrate its tenth anniversary while underlining that the work today is just as relevant as in 2004.

I now give the floor to the representative of Trinidad and Tobago.

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the 14 States members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). On the occasion of the commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), CARICOM wishes to underscore its continued commitment to the full implementation of the resolution and, in that regard, welcomes the adoption of resolution 1977 (2011), which extends the mandate of the 1540 Committee until the year 2021. CARICOM strongly supports the mandate of the 1540 Committee to strengthen its role in facilitating the provision of assistance, enhancing cooperation with the relevant international organizations and reinforcing its outreach efforts. Without question, the obligations pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) have served to precipitate unprecedented action by States to develop implementation approaches that are consonant with their domestic realities and constraints and which allow for the development of national engagement strategies that can be implemented in close coordination with existing security and economic priorities. It is that latitude that enabled CARICOM, in June 2009, to develop a unitary approach to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and that has led to the significant gains in the implementation process. The genesis of the CARICOM resolution 1540 (2004) implementation programme was largely precipitated by the reality that CARICOM members, both structurally and resource-wise, faced significant challenges in meeting the obligations emanating from the resolution, particularly in relation to the enactment of strategic trade legislation, including the implementation of domestic export controls. Additionally, it was recognized that national competences critical to increasing port and border capacities to prevent the import, export, re-export, transit, trans-shipment or brokering of strategic goods were also limited, and would continue to be so for the foreseeable future. The CARICOM experience demonstrates that all States, regardless of economic, trade or strategic standing, should assume a collective responsibility to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to fully implement resolution 1540 (2004), regardless of the level of participation in the strategic global supply chain. It also effectively underscores the notion that, if availed with appropriate resources, even small States such as those in CARICOM can develop mechanisms to effectively and measurably advance non-proliferation. Prior to the CARICOM initiative, there had not been a single instance where a group of States endeavoured to implement a major Security Council mandate in a unitary manner. The success of CARICOM’s experience in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) has served to underscore the merits of innovative thinking in dealing with the region’s pressing international security obligations. It is for this reason that other regional organizations have adopted the CARICOM approach and sought to leverage common structural and administrative assets along the security and political continuum to advance 1540 implementation. These gains would not have been possible without the political support of important regional organs under the aegis of CARICOM, including the CARICOM Council of Ministers for National Security and Law Enforcement and the Council of Ministers for Foreign and Community Relations. In addition, national support from Member States, including Trinidad and Tobago, has been consequential in ensuring the viability and indeed the success of the CARICOM 1540 programme. It would be remiss if CARICOM did not take this opportunity to recognize the work of the 1540 Committee and in particular its Chairman, Ambassador Oh Joon, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea, and its Group of Experts, for their efforts to actively support the work of CARICOM. CARICOM is grateful for this productive partnership, which, along with the support of critical entities such as the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, has allowed the region to realize meaningful and concrete progress in relation to resolution 1540 (2004). This partnership with the Community was clearly exemplified by the visit of the 1540 Committee Chairman to the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago a year ago, the first such visit of any Chairman of the 1540 Committee to the Caribbean since its inception in April, 2004. Indeed, following the visit to Trinidad and Tobago, the 1540 Committee also paid an official visit to Grenada, which again constituted the first time since the adoption of the resolution that the Committee had engaged with two Member States in the same geographic area within a relatively short period of time. This is again indicative of the emphasis that the Committee continues to place on supporting Member States in fully implementing the resolution. Without question, regional progress in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is inextricably linked to the economic viability of CARICOM member States. We are all too cognizant of the region’s susceptibility to external shocks, including those occasioned by acts of terrorism, as was the case with the attacks on the United States in September, 2001. Notwithstanding the fact that those events took place outside of the Caribbean, the economic impact within the first year after the attacks reverberated throughout our region’s markets and resulted in the loss of over $900 million in revenue and thousands of jobs, particularly in the tourism and hospitality sectors. This is a major reason why terrorism and the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials continue to be of significant importance to CARICOM. At the same time, regional Governments have been grappling with the influx of small arms and light weapons, as well as the deleterious impact of the drugs trade and spiralling gun related crime that has ensued from the confluence of these events. CARICOM’s regional focus on the issues of terrorism, furthering non-proliferation and building capacity with respect to the prevention and mitigation of a possible chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack is not new. Indeed, these issues constituted core components of a regional report, which followed an assessment of existing security threats facing the region in early 2002. These recommendations ultimately led to the establishment of the CARICOM Ministerial Subcommittee on Resource Mobilization for Crime and Security by the Conference of Heads of Government at its Twenty-Fourth Meeting in Jamaica in July, 2003. In order to place non-proliferation firmly and securely within the contemporary regional security framework and to elevate it to actionable levels within CARICOM Member States, engagement on this issue cannot be piecemeal or sporadic. It requires sustained interaction with both policy and enforcement entities in the region and the provision of equally sustained material support going forward. CARICOM therefore views this open debate as a useful forum to further the global discourse on non-proliferation and sees this exercise as particularly valuable in advancing efforts to fully implement resolution 1540 (2004) within our region and beyond.

I now give the floor to the representative of Montenegro.

At the outset, I congratulate you, Madam President, on assuming the presidency of the Security Council for the month of May. I would like to thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea for organizing and chairing this important meeting. We appreciate the concept note you prepared for the debate (S/2014/313, annex). I also thank the Deputy Secretary-General for his briefing. Montenegro welcomes the adoption of the presidential statement (S/PRST/2014/7). Montenegro fully associates itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union. I would, however, like to add some remarks in my national capacity. Today’s debate on the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004) offers a timely opportunity to take stock of the progress achieved so far, as well as to look at the challenges ahead in terms of compliance and fulfilment of the letter and spirit of the resolution. Many positive developments were made possible over the past decade towards the realization of universal implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and its subsequent resolutions. These have included awareness-raising about the principles and objectives of resolution 1540 (2004) and about the complexity of the terrorist threat, increased commitment of Member States to submit reports and develop national action plans, match-making of assistance requests and offers, and numerous initiatives of Member States and regional and international organizations contributing to strengthened international cooperation, capacity- building and assistance. I would like in particular to single out the role and contribution of Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and its Group of Experts to these efforts and advancements. Despite these achievements, challenges still remain in the global fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destructions. Numerous crises, the globalized and interconnected world, and constant improvements in science and technology serve as serious reminders that our common mission is far from finished. Increased potential access to weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technology demonstrates the growing need to remain on constant alert against the dangerous nexus between weapons of mass destruction and global terrorism. To address these issues comprehensively and successfully, we have to commit to continuous and long- term efforts and actions, while at the same time finding innovative ways and means to engage all stakeholders, first and foremost Member States. By doing so, we will ensure that our global campaign truly provides for the minimizing of risks associated with the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists. Here, I would like to raise one question that, in our opinion, is particularly relevant and deserves careful consideration going forward. With respect to countries that are, on the one hand, willing and ready to contribute to actions related to resolution 1540 (2004), yet on the other hand have limited capacity to deal with the challenges and threats of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and do not recognize that as the most pressing priority area of security concern — as is the case of my country — how can they be encouraged to buy in and show the requisite determination and leadership at the national and regional levels regarding implementation of resolution 1540 (2004)? In that vein, we note with satisfaction the progress made in the understanding of the multiple benefits of the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) that are not related or limited to preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. While that remains a primary objective, measures taken in accordance with the resolution will generate various other benefits to bolster national, regional and global security well beyond the core purpose of discovering weapons of mass destruction and related materials. Those include in the domain of border control, the prevention of illicit trafficking of various sorts, among others. That is why synergies related to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) should be further promoted. My country’s strategic orientation is to contribute to regional and international peace and security, including through active participation in combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Montenegro would like to state its full commitment and firm support for the robust and effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and subsequent resolutions 1673 (2006) and 1810 (2008). As a reflection of its resolve, Montenegro has finalized its national action plan for the period 2014- 2018 and its latest report on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), both of which are expected to be adopted by our Government in the coming days. The national action plan, as a guiding document with concrete steps and measures prescribed for all actors, will contribute to more effective and comprehensive compliance with the provisions of resolution 1540 (2004) through enhanced national capacities for the control and prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and through the harmonization of our legislation with international standards. In accordance with the national action plan, the Government of Montenegro will soon establish a coordinating body, comprised of representatives of relevant institutions, that will be tasked with monitoring and reviewing implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). In closing, let me convey Montenegro’s unwavering intention to continue to work diligently to aid in improving the prospect of weapons of mass destructions never falling into the hands of terrorists in any location.

I now give the floor to the representative of Armenia.

At the outset, let me express my delegation’s appreciation to Mr. Yun Byung- se, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, for organizing and presiding over today’s open debate, and to Mr. Jan Eliasson, Deputy Secretary-General, for his comprehensive briefing delivered today. Armenia also strongly welcomes the Council’s presidential statement (S/PRST/2014/7) under the agenda item on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), adopted earlier today. It again reaffirms that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery constitutes a threat to international peace and security. While Armenia fully associates itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union (EU), I would like to make some brief comments and remarks in my national capacity. The Republic of Armenia considers resolution 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004 to be one of the fundamental international instruments in the sphere of non-proliferation of WMDs and related elements, and attaches paramount importance to its implementation. Armenia was among the countries that fully supported the extension of the mandate of the relevant United Nations committee on the implementation of the resolution until 2021. Since the adoption of the resolution, Armenia has undertaken several measures for its comprehensive implementation. In particular, Armenia has completely reformed the national expert control system on dual-use and military goods by adopting a new law and relevant Government decrees. In July 2013, by decision of the Prime Minister, an inter-agency working group was formed to develop a national action plan for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). In September 2013, at Armenia’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the first workshop of the working group and international experts took place in Yerevan. Recently, a draft action plan was put on paper and submitted for review to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Conflict Prevention Centre, and the EU Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Centres of Excellence Initiative. In conclusion, while reiterating our strong support for the 1540 Committee, and in particular its leadership, I would like to inform the members of the Council that Armenia expects to finalize its national action plan on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) no later than July, and to start its implementation.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Philippines.

Madam President, the convening by your presidency of this open debate on an issue of great importance is very timely. I do not wish to use the phrase “in the wake of”, but maybe I should say “while the third meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is taking place”. Resolution 1540 (2004) reflected a vision and clearly set forth actions for States to follow up on, in order to achieve the objectives, including refraining from supporting non-State actors in developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, adopting and enforcing effective laws, establishing domestic controls, and affirming support for multilateral treaties that aim to eliminate or prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). A decade since the adoption of the resolution, a lot has been achieved. First, a group of sizeable, important countries has participated in the Nuclear Security Summits. It is noteworthy to recognize that the specific initiatives, measures and actions that must be undertaken have been clearly identified. That is quite an achievement in relation to securing fissile or radiological material. Secondly, more countries have now adopted the Additional Protocol to the NPT. It is well known that it is an additional burden and an additional commitment of countries, over and above their obligation in terms of comprehensive safeguards once they have become a member of the NPT. Thirdly, more countries have truly acceded to a number of agreements or conventions inspired by the International Atomic Energy Agency on securing such material. Fourthly, of course, there is the inspiring continuing work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). The Philippines takes its responsibility seriously and has accordingly demonstrated its will to pursue positive action, including, among others, the following: the regular provision to the Chair of the 1540 Committee of a comprehensive list of measures undertaken by the Philippine Government to ensure implementation of the resolution. Those include the development of counter- terrorism capacities and the upgrading of facilities, such as the establishment of a transport control communications centre at the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute, to monitor, control and coordinate the movements of category 1 and 2 sources within the country. There is also the Megaports Initiative project, which includes the establishment of a central alarm station monitoring unit and the National Single Window project. Secondly, we have developed the code for the Philippine National Research Institute, part 27, “Security Requirements in the Transport of Radioactive Material”, aimed at ensuring the security of radioactive materials during transport and preventing illegal diversion, trafficking, theft and/or sabotage of such materials during transport. The Philippines has, of course, ratified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol. To further strengthen the national legal framework for non-proliferation, the Philippines is finalizing the Chemical Weapons Prohibition Act of 2013, known as an act prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling, use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, and providing penalties therefor. The draft legislation is now pending review. Moreover, the Philippines has also prepared a strategic trade management act, the purpose of which is to prevent the proliferation of WMDs and their means of delivery through the establishment of a national strategic goods control list and providing a regulatory framework for dual-use goods. The bill has already been filed with both houses of Congress. But we all have to do a lot more. We need to do much more. First, for instance, when we talk about the nuclear security initiative of a group of sizeable countries, there is a great need to make multilateral what has been been agreed there in order to secure real and multilateral traction for its implementation. Secondly, we need more countries. Not all members of the NPT accept the additional protocol, mindful that those are additional obligations for themselves. These highlights the fact that even those outside the NPT must in fact adhere to safeguard measures under the IAEA that approximate those obligations. Thirdly, it is very important to encourage more countries to ratify and accede to all the conventions that secure the transport and storage of fissile radioactive materials. Of course, there is a disquieting effect in the disregard for the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which has a direct bearing on the issue of non-proliferation. Following the success of 2010, I note that the clarion call on the international community to move forward quickly and to work together even more closely concerns the overriding issue of nuclear disarmament. Why, for instance, in the preamble of resolution 1540 (2004), are all Member States enouraged to implement fully the disarmament treaties and agreements to which they are party? We must do our very best to secure all fissile radioactive material. We must attempt to do our very best to fully implement resolution 1540 (2004) for as long as we nuclear arms exist. Thus, one day we may not be so worried about this, and all that remains could be only those materials intended for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Following the success of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which I had the honour of being Chair, there was much optimism owing to the adoption by consensus of the 64-point action plan — 62 action points plus two major issues of concern. One was related to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Six-Party Talks; the second was related to the implementation of the 1995 resolution on convening a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of a nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. There was some optimism after the Conference. It was a watershed moment. Given the obstacles and differing positions of Member States, there was certainly difficulty in achieving consensus. Yet we managed to arrive at that point. The challenge now, however, is in the implementation. My country is disappointed that, four years after the 2010 NPT Review Conference, we have not yet convened the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. I wish to briefly recall that this is one of grand designs that ensured the success of 2010. It worries me in the wake of the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference, which may put us on shaky ground as we move into the coming years. In many ways, that sums up the circumstances in which we find ourselves. We have been most active in expressing our views on our commitment to non-proliferation initiatives. Our responsibility, and indeed challenge now is to match those words with clear and concrete actions, fulfilling our commitments. Pacta sunt servanda. Only then will we be able to positively answer the hard questions we ask ourselves and secure for ourselves and our posterity the safe future we deserve.

I now give the floor to the representative of Peru.

At the outset, let me congratulate the Republic of Korea on having assumed the presidency of the Security Council, and welcome its initiative to convene an open debate to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004). Likewise, we appreciate the briefing by the Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson. Since the establishment of the Organization, the international community has encouraged the construction of a comprehensive and global legal regimen aimed at nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. In that context, the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004) represents a milestone in the treatment of the new threat to international peace and security embodied in the possibility that non-State actors might gain access to weapons of mass destruction. Peru considers it essential to address the issue of weapons of mass destruction at the global level, since no country is exempt from the potential of terrorist activities in its territory. It is therefore essential to strengthen measures at the international level to combat that scourge, always in strict respect for human rights. In that regard, we must jointly implement the international instruments on weapons of mass destruction — such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention and resolution 1540 (2014) — with the goal of preventing the dual use of nuclear material, biological agents and chemical substances, as well as the ability of terrorist groups to manufacture or obtain access to nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. My country is firmly committed to efforts to achieve complete disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery, which constitute a threat to international peace and security. My country therefore supports the strengthening and universalization of the relevant legally binding multilateral agreements and has adopted various administrative and penal measures towards the effective implementation of its obligations under resolution 1540 (2004), primarily in the areas of immigration and customs control, air and maritime control, and intelligence activities, in order to avoid the production and the illicit trade in weapons of mass destruction. In that respect, Peru has aligned its domestic legislation with the standards established in resolution 1540 (2004), as demonstrated in the three reports submitted by my country on its implementation of the resolution. The various relevant sectors are currently working on the development of a new national report for submission to the Committee. In that regard, Peru reiterates its full support for and commitment to the hard work being conducted by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Peru’s commitment to resolution 1540 (2004) was also demonstrated in its organization, with the support of the United Nations, of two regional workshops in Lima, in 2006 and 2010, to disseminate the content and scope of application of the resolution, and to identify areas of possible cooperation among the countries of the region. In conclusion, my delegation believes that the maintenance of international peace and security is a task that requires the participation of the international community as a whole. We therefore call on all Member States to step up their efforts to that end. The Security Council can count on Peru to continue to do its part in this collective effort.

There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.