A/35/PV.81 General Assembly

In operative paragraph 2ofthe draft resolution that has just been adopted, the General Assembly requests the President of the Assembly, after due consultations with the Chairmen of the regional groups, to appoint the members of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Con- vention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries on the basis of equitable geographical distribution and representing the prin- cipal legal systems of the world. It is my hope that I shall be able to do this on or before 16 December this year. 24. Next, we turn to the report of the Sixth Com- mittee on agenda item 102 [A/35/615]. The Assembly will now take a decision on the draft resolution 29. In conclusion, we should like to emphasize that, given such circumstances, one should not expect any satisfactory results from the discussions on the con- clusion of an international convention. For those reasons, the Albanian delegation would like to affirm that it cannot support the continuation of the Special Committee's mandate or the draft resolution adopted by the Sixth Committee and recommended in para- graph 12 of its report. Therefore the Albanian delega- tion will not participate in the vote on that draft resolution.

The day on which the Sixth Committee took a decision on this question my delegation, unfortunately, was not available to par- ticipate in that vote. Had we been present, we should have voted in favour of the draft resolution, and we intend to do so on this occasion.

I now put before the Assembly the draft resolution recommended by the Sixth Com- mittee in paragraph 12 of its report [A/35/623]. The I The delegations of Chad and Mali subsequently informed the Secretariat that they wished to have their votes recorded as having been in favour of the draft resolution.

I should like to announce that only the debate on this item will be held today. The decision on draft resolution A/35/L,34/Rev.1 will take place at a later date. This will give delegations more time to study the draft resolution. 36. Mr. RAcz (Hungary): The delegation of the Hungarian People's Republic maintains the view, which it stated emphatically in the debate on the' agenda item entitled''Question <.Jfequitable representa- tion on and increase in themembership of the Security Council" at the last session of the General Assembly, that the initiatives for reviewing and amending certain provisions of the Charter are as unacceptable as they are untimely. The Hungarian Government firmly believes that the Charter has fully withstood the test of time. This applies particularly to the purposes and principles which are laid down in Articles I and 2 and which at the same time determine the entire structure and the organizational set-up of the United Nations. I should like to underline the fact that the provisions concerning the maintenance of international peace and security and the quest for solutions to economic, social, cultural and other problems through international co-operation, as well as the no less important objective of making the United Nations a centre for such activities, are closely linked with the rest of the provisions of the Charter, especially those which govern the compusition of the principal organs of the Organization. 37. The proposal for equitable representation on and increase in the- membership of the Security Council, which has now been submitted to the General Assem- bly for the second time, seeks to amend one of the most important articles of the Charter. Although in an earlier period, when the process of the liquidation of the colonial system entailed a significant and rapid increase in the membership of the United Nations, we recognized the necessity of enlarging the Security Council, we remain convinced that in present-day circumstances the consideration of a new proposal to that effect could only result in confrontation while distracting the attention of Member States from sub- stantive issues the early solution of which is in the vital interests of the community of nations. It is all too obvious as well that this debate cannot but fail to enhance the atmosphere of confidence and under- standing which would indeed be urgently needed for the joint solution of the accumulated problems of the world. 38. The Hungarian delegation is further convinced that the sources of problems and imperfections and the cause of the Security Council's failure always to act with the required degree of effectiveness are by no means to be sought in the provisions of the Charter or in the size of the membership and the composition 39. Possible imperfections in performance should therefore be eliminated, not by way of amendments involving an increase in the membership ofthe Security Council or by way of a concomitant confrontation, but by respect for the Charter and fulfilment in good faith of its provisions, which would, without doubt, contribute to the further development of various forms of co-operation between States, both within the frame- work of the Organization and in bilateral relations. Therefore, proceeding from this position of principle, my delegation is unable to accept the argument that an increase in the membership of the Security Council would enhance the role and significance of that im- portant organ of the United Nations in maintaining the peace and security of mankind. 40. Nor can we overlook the fact that the main geographical groups of States have adequate repre- sentation in the Security Council and that its composi- tion allows for an appropriate expression of the diver- gent political interests of Member States. Conse- quently, we cannot accept a mere game of numbers as a serious argument, because it totally ignores the primary role which the Council has played and is expected to continue playing in the maintenance of international peace and security. 41. My delegation firmly believes that the effective- ness of the work of an important organ of the United Nations such as the Security Council does not increase in proportion to the constant enlargement of its mem- bership. On the contrary, the larger an organ like the Security Council becomes, the less apt it is to act quickly and to adopt operative and effective decisions and to take whatever measures may be necessary. That principal organ of the Organization was assigned impurtant functions by Article 24 of the Charter in order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations. The principles governing the present membership and composition ofthe Council, especially the principle of equitable geographical distribution, provide, in our view, an adequate guarantee for the successful and purposeful discharge by the Council of its responsibilities. 42. Finally, ir. expressing our substantive objections to the initiative of the J6 States, we should like to put on record O'Jr strongest reservations regarding the adequacy and advisability of any action that the General Assembly may take on that proposal.

Before calling on the next speaker, I should like to propose that the list of speakers in the debate on the item before us be closed at 3 p.m. today. May I r-ke it that there is no objection to this proposal?

The item we are con- sidering this morning is not an altogether new one. Last year as well as earlier this year, however, the proposal for a discussion of this item had a rough passage in the General Committee owing to opposition from certain quarters. 46. In the course of the last 12 months, my delega- tion has had occasion, along with others concerned, to examine the matter in further detail. We have had the benefit of the comments and advice of other Member States, including those whose views do not fully coincide with our own. We have profited from these comments and have given serious thought to the range of arguments and varying perceptions advanced by them. 47. In presenting the matter once again before the Assembly and, more particularly, in .introducing the draft resolution contained in document A/35/L.34/ Rev. J, I should like to point out that the sponsors have given due weight and consideration to various arguments advanced on the question. We remain more convinced than ever that, in order to strengthen the primary role ofthe Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security, it is most essential that the composition of that body be reviewed with a view to providing for a more equitable and balanced representation of the membership of the United Nations on it. 48. It is, perhaps, useful to recapitulate briefly a fact known to all representatives, namely, that since the Charter was last amended in 1963 to enlarge the membership of the Security Council from 11 to 15, the total membership of the United Nations has increased from J13 to 154. The admission of new Members has been almost entirely from Asia, Africa and Latin America, and it is these regions that remain even today glaringly under-represented in the Security Council. On the basis of the present composition of the Security Council, the global average of the number of countries represented by one non-perma- nent seat in the Security Council is 14.9. As against this figure for the totality of the membership, the number of Asian countries represented by one non- permanent seat is 18.5; while the corresponding figure for African States is 16.7; for Latin American States,' 15;for Western European ar.J other States, 11;and for Eastern European States, 10. 49. If the activity of this world body is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of States and upon the concern on the part of every State for the peace and security of the world at large, it would be logical to presume that such an increase in the membership of the world body should be reflected at the very least in a more equitable manner, if not to a fully com- mensurate degree, in the composition and representa- tion ofone ofits principal organs, the Security Council. 50. As we have said before, there are basically two ways of redressing this imbalance in representation. One is by a redistribution of the existing non-perma- nent seats among the different regional groups in 54. That is precisely why the amendments proposed have been put in terms of Article 108 rather than in terms of Article 109 of the Charter, which implies the revision of the Charter in its substantive aspect. 55. The proposal contained in document A/35/L.34/ Rev.l envisages an increase in the membership of the Council from 15 to 21 by the addition of six non- permanent seats. The draft resolution also contains ai'opriate and consequential amendments to Arti- cles 23, 27 and 109 of the Charter. Operative para- graph 3 suggests the allocation of the seats of the regional groups in conformity with the principles of equitable geographical distribution in consonance with the provisions of Article 23, paragraph I, of the Charter. 56. It is relevant to advert to the fact that in the present draft resolution the sponsors have attempted to take into consideration certain critical preoccupa- tions put forward by the Latin American States to the Assembly last year. The proposal put forward by Ecuador and other Latin American States la-t year envisaged the enlargement of the membership of the Security Council to 21 instead of 19 in order, inter alia, that in any revised allocation of seats the growing number of Latin American States that were in the process of attaining independence and of joining the United Nations would be taken fully into account. 57. It was felt that in this manner the increase in the membership of the Security Council not only made it more representative in character but did so on a stable and long-term basis. It is clear that for the next quarter- century and more the number of territories or areas 61. The present proposal for the distribution of non-permanent membership is as follows: five for African States, four for Asian States, three for Latin American States, two for Western European and other States, one for Eastern European States; and one non- permanent seat to alternate between the Latin American States and the States of Europe, both Western and Eastern, in a proportion of one half, one third and one sixth respectively for Latin America, West T<;uropean and other States and Eastern Europe; . states. The sequence of distribution of that seat will be Latin America, Western European and other States, Latin American, Western European and other States, Latin America, Eastern European States, and so on. 62. Apart fr.-m the distribution of the non-permanent seats on the Security Council, the amendment proposed to Article 27 'on voting puts the required majority for decisions on procedural as well as other matters by an enlarged Security Council at 13,which is just short of the two-thirds majority. This suggestion is almost identical to the present situation, where nine out of 15 votes are required for decision-making under Article. 27, paragraphs 2 and 3. 63. In this case, too, the stipulation of the required majority for decision-making sets at rest misgivings expressed by some sceptics about one group of countries being able to obtain a runaway majority in the Council and thereby paralyse its functioning. The requirement ofvotes for decision-making in the Cou..cil leaves the calculus ofcombinations as between political groupings very much the same as it is at present. 64. Apart from the growing burden on the regional groups which are at present under-represented in endorsing a regional candidate, given the strong pressures from the increasing number of countries

As I am sure representa- tives will recall, last year at its thirty-fourth session the General Assembly considered the item entitled 80. Here are the figures. In 1945, when the non- permanent membership was set at 6, it represented 1 for each 8 United Nations Members, naturally not counting the permanent members, or 13 per cent representation ratio. With the increase of non-perma- nent members to 10in 1963,on the basis of 107-again not counting the "big Five"-the ratio of represen- tation was 1 to 10.7, or 9.9 per cent. An increase to 21 would mean I for 7.3 Members, or 13.6 per cent, that is, a return to the ratio of 1945. 81. Thus, in terms of power and representation, a Council newly augmented to 21 would be a return to the ratio of renresentation of 1945-precisely in con- formity with the intent of the founding fathers, the authors of the Charter. 82. As to increased effectiveness, I would only point out that in the recent resort to the procedure of consultations the permanent members, when unable to act in concert, gave over the drafting of a resolu- tion to the non-aligned group of the non-permanent members and, by this procedure, managed to have a workable Council in certain delicate situations. 83. This happy process should work even more effectively with greater numerical latitude, to the advantage of the permanent members, whose power of veto is in no way affected by the number of votes cast against them. This process has proved its viability, as the tendency in the Council is more and more to emphasize peaceful negotiations. 84. Often, fear is expressed that too big a Council may retard action. Perhaps there is some justification for such fear, but, to my mind, this process ofdelegated be considered further. 86. Once before the permanent members of the Security Council accepted the logic ofa bigger Security Council. I hope they will take into consideration the tentative arguments I have advanced and do so again at an appropriate time. 87. My Government obviously deems it unwise at this stage of the world situation for the small nations and the "veto-endowed" nations to engage in a cold war. Accordingly, my delegation will abstain on draft resolution A/35/L.34/Rev.l on the question of equi- table representation on and increase in the member- ship of the Security Council.

The proposal before us to increase the number of non-permanent members of the Security Council is not new. The representative of India, Mr. Mishra, put before us an initiative indicative of the same concerns last year, which we then opposed. Since that time we have given the matter a great deal of thought. This is a proposal of considerable scope which would upset the membership and the functioning of the Security Council. 89. Members of the Assembly know the position of France because on 17 September, when the General Committee decided to recommend the inclusion of this item in the agenda, my delegation voted against that reccmmendation. 90. Is it a good idea for the Assembly to open a wide- ranging debate on this issue when it may well prove inconclusive? The confrontation which would certainly come about within the Organization might finally lead to a weakening of the United Nations. But the inten- tions of the sponsors of draft resolution A/35/L.34/ Rev.l are, we are told, to increase its authority and strengthen its role. 91. The French delegation is persuaded that this aim, which we fully share, cannot be achieved by the means proposed. It is not by changing the balance of power among the principal organs of the United Nations -which is what in the final analysis the implementation of the provisions of draft resolution A/35/L.34/Rev.l would mean-that we shall enable the Organization w~re. less radical, its implementation would upset the existmg structure. 94. Indeed, the essential problem does not lie there. If we want the Security Council to be able to play an important role in world affairs, it is necessary for it to pay attention to the balance which exists in the world, from the economic and military point of view in particular. This is the only body empowered by the Charter to take binding decisions that even go as far as the imposition of sanctions or the use of armed force. Once tfiose decisions have been taken it is imperative for them to be implemented and observed by all Member States, who committed themselves to do that by signing the Charter. Let us imagine for a moment that the Council were to adopt decisions that were not acceptable to those States that have special responsibilities pursuant to the Charter. It is obvious that those decisions would not be implemented because of the lack of power to impose them upon said States against their will. Hence the authority of the Security Council and of the Organization as a whole would be weakened. 95. Furthermore, if we really want the United Nations to be able to increase its role and strengthen The meeting rose at /2.05 p.m .